Introduction to Epistemology and Metaphysics
Course Instructors:
Autumn Term – Metaphysics, Simon Hewitt
Spring Term – Epistemology, Keith Hossack
Description
This is a foundational course (Level 4) in Epistemology and Metaphysics, which are
two of the central areas of contemporary philosophy. The autumn term’s teaching is
devoted to Metaphysics, and the spring’s to Epistemology; there is an exam in
summer term.
Syllabus
Metaphysics, ‘the science of Being’, aims to describe Reality at the highest level of
generality. Here are typical questions in Metaphysics:
 What is an object?
 What is a property?
 Are there any immaterial objects, such as the soul, or God?
The lectures will cover the topics of material objects and their identity, the question
whether Reality contains such things as properties in addition to material objects, and
whether there are any immaterial objects.
Epistemology, ‘the theory of Knowledge’, investigates what Knowledge is, and
whether human beings have any. It concerns such questions as:
 How does Knowledge differ from mere Opinion?
 When is a belief justified?
 Do the senses give knowledge, or merely beliefs?
The lectures will cover the connection between knowledge, belief, truth and
justification. Scepticism will then be considered: how should we answer a sceptic who
says we do not know there is an external world outside our own minds?
Supplementary information
Course materials (e.g. lecture-notes, suggested essay questions and bibliography, past
exam-papers, etc.) are regularly published on Moodle. Registered students can access
this material using their College login name and password.
Recommended textbooks are as follows:
Metaphysics
 E.J. Lowe, 2002. A Survey of Metaphysics. OUP. Oxford
 Crane and Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics : A Guide and Anthology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press)
We will make extensive use of both of these books. You should acquire a copy of each.
Epistemology
 Dancy, J 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Blackwell, Oxford.
Seminar programme, Metaphysics
1. The nature of metaphysics
Seminar question: 'Is metaphysical enquiry possible?'
Reading. A.J. Ayer ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics’, Chapter 1 of Language, Truth,
and Logic (Harmondsworth: Penguin)
2. Identity
Seminar question: 'Is this piece of paper today the same thing as this piece of paper
yesterday?'
Reading. Roderick Chisholm 'Identity Through Time', Chapter 40 of Crane and Farkas
(eds.), Metaphysics : A Guide and Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
3. Time
Seminar question: 'Can there be time without change?'
Reading. Sydney Shoemaker 'Time without Change'. Journal of Philosophy 66
(1969), pp. 363-81. (See also Lowe, Survey, pp. 245-9)
4. Parts and Wholes
Seminar question: 'Are there really objects with parts?'
Reading. Peter van Inwagen 'Selection from Material Beings', Chapter 16 of Crane
and Farkas.
5.Truth, Realism, and Objectivity
Seminar question: Are there truths independent of any human perspective? Does it
matter?'
Reading. Mari Mikkola, 'Is Everything Relative? : Truth, Anti-Realism and Feminism' in
Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan),
Chapter 9.
6. Ontology – What there is
Seminar question: Under what circumstances should we believe that a certain kind of
entity (for example: properties, numbers, fictional characters) exist?
Reading. W.V.O. Quine, 'On What There Is' Available on-line at
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_What_There_Is
7. The Problem of Universals
Seminar question: Do all red things share a universal (Redness)?
This is a question about the problem of universals, not about particular questions
around colour! If you find the Redness example difficult to think about, consider
another property (such as Wisdom, or weighing 2kg)
Reading: David Armstrong, 'Selections from Universals' in Crane and Farkas (ed),
Chapter 20
8. Tropes
Seminar question: Is the wisdom of Socrates identical with the wisdom of Plato?
Reading: 'On the Elements of Being I' in Crane and Farkas (ed), Chapter 21
9. Fictional Characters
Seminar question: Do fictional characters exist?
Reading: Friend, Stacie (2007) 'Fictional Characters' in Philosophy Compass, 2 (2)
10. Numbers
Seminar question: Does the fact that we seem to need numbers to do science mean
that we should believe numbers exist?
Reading: Mark Colyvan (2014) 'Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of
Mathematics'. Available on-line at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathphil-indis/
Metaphysics – Essay titles and reading
See lecture handouts and ask your lecturer/ tutor for additional reading.
1. “Nobody ever steps in the same river twice”. Discuss.
Butler ‘Of Personal Identity’ reprinted in Perry (ed.) Personal Identity 99-105.
Available online at www.archive.org/details/analogyreligionn00butl
Chisholm, R ‘Identity through time’, sections 1 and 2 only. In Crane and Farkas (eds.)
Metaphysics 537-45.
2. Can there be time without change?
Sydney Shoemaker 'Time without Change'. Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 36381. (See also Lowe, Survey, pp. 245-9)
3. Socrates is wise and Plato is wise. Does it follow that there is some entity, wisdom,
which Socrates and Plato both exemplify?
Plato Parmenides 131 – 133. Reprinted in Crane and Farkas, 227-30.
Russell (1912) ‘The world of universals’. Chapter 9 of The Problems of Philosophy.
Oxford, Oxford University Press. Available online at
www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5827
4. Distinguish the ‘Identity of Indiscernibles’ from the ‘Indiscernability of Identicals’.
Is the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles true?
Black, M (1952) ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Mind 61: 153-64
Seminar programme, Epistemology
1. Truth
Seminar question: ‘I have a right to my opinion!’ Does it follow that my own opinion
is right for me?
Reading. Plato. Theatetus 152-152d, 161c-162c, 166-172b
2. Belief.
Seminar question. In what way, if at all, is knowledge more valuable than true
opinion?
Reading. Plato Theatetus 187, 200d-201e Meno 97 – 98c
3. Justification.
Seminar question. Does Agrippa’s trilemma show that no one is ever justified in
believing anything?
Wikipedia, Article on the Regress Argument, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regress_argument.
4. Foundationalism.
Seminar question. Can the foundationalist solve Agrippa’s trilemma?
Dancy 1985, Chapter 4. (Omit the section Probability and Certainty)
5. Coherentism
Seminar question. Can the coherentist solve Agrippa’s trilemma?
Reading. Quine, W v O, 1951, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review,
60: 20–43. (Read only Section 6).
6. Skepticism about the senses.
Seminar question. In perception, are we ever directly aware of material objects?
Ayer, A J 1940. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. MacMillan, London.
Read pp1-10.
7. The Problem of Induction
Seminar question Does anyone really know anything about the future?
Reading. Russell, B 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press,
Oxford. (Read Chapter 6)
8 The Gettier problem
Seminar question. Did Gettier prove that knowledge is not the same thing as justified
true belief?
Gettier, E (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis Vol. 23, pp. 121123.
9 Repairing the tripartite analysis.
Seminar question. Is knowledge undefeated justified true belief?
Reading. Lehrer, K and Paxson, T, 1969. ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True
Belief’, Journal of Philosophy 66.8 225-237.
10 Externalist theories
Seminar question Does the causal theory of knowledge solve the Gettier cases?
Reading. Goldman, A 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing
’. The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 12 pp. 357-372. (Read pp 357-363 only.)
Epistemology — Essay titles and Readings
1) Distinguish between knowing and merely believing truly. Does anyone ever know
anything?
Unger, P (1978) Ignorance, Oxford University Press. Read Chapter 1, §§ 1- 8,
pp 6 – 28. (Available on Oxford Scholarship Online)
2) What is ‘the epistemic regress problem’? Can Foundationalism solve it?
Bonjour, L (1978). ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’ American
Philosophical Quarterly Vol 15, pp 1-13. Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009690.
3) ‘Knowledge is adequately justified true belief.’ Discuss whether adding the word
‘adequately’ thus to the classical analysis of knowledge is sufficient
to answer Gettier.
Gettier, E (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis Vol. 23, pp.
121-123)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922
4) Can the reliabilist answer the sceptic about induction?
Reading: Papineau, D (1992) ‘Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism’
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 42, pp 1- 20.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/i312670