Introduction to Epistemology and Metaphysics
Course Instructors:
Autumn Term – Metaphysics, Keith Hossack
Spring Term – Epistemology, Keith Hossack
Description
This is a foundational course (Level 4) in Epistemology and Metaphysics, which are
two of the central areas of contemporary philosophy. The autumn term’s teaching is
devoted to Metaphysics, and the spring’s to Epistemology; there is an exam in
summer term.
Syllabus
Metaphysics, ‘the science of Being’, aims to describe Reality at the highest level of
generality. Here are typical questions in Metaphysics:
 What is an object?
 What is a property?
 Are there any immaterial objects, such as the soul, or God?
The lectures will cover the topics of material objects and their identity, the question
whether Reality contains such things as properties in addition to material objects, and
whether there are any immaterial objects.
Epistemology, ‘the theory of Knowledge’, investigates what Knowledge is, and
whether human beings have any. It concerns such questions as:
 How does Knowledge differ from mere Opinion?
 When is a belief justified?
 Do the senses give knowledge, or merely beliefs?
The lectures will cover the connection between knowledge, belief, truth and
justification. Scepticism will then be considered: how should we answer a sceptic who
says we do not know there is an external world outside our own minds?
Supplementary information
Course materials (e.g. lecture-notes, suggested essay questions and bibliography, past
exam-papers, etc.) are regularly published on Moodle. Registered students can access
this material using their College login name and password.
Recommended textbooks are as follows:
Metaphysics

Crane and Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics : A Guide and Anthology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press)
We will make extensive use of this book. You should acquire a copy.
Epistemology
 Dancy, J 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Blackwell, Oxford.
Seminar programme, Metaphysics
1 Identity and similarity
Distinguish the ‘Identity of Indiscernibles’ from the ‘Indiscernibility of Identicals’. Is
the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles true?
Reading:

Black, M (1952) ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Mind 61: 153-64
2 Composite beings
Do such things as tables and chairs and statues really exist, over and above the matter
of which they are made?
Reading:

van Inwagen, ‘Selection from Material Beings’, in Crane & Farkas, Chapter 16.
3 Change
Is Prior right to claim that events change?
Reading:
Prior, AN ‘Changes in events and changes in things’, in Crane & Farkas pp464-473

4 Substance
Can one bathe in the same river twice? Can one ‘swear to the same tree as having
stood fifty years in the same place’?
Reading:


Butler ‘Of Personal Identity’ reprinted in Perry (ed.) Personal Identity 99-105.
Available online at www.archive.org/details/analogyreligionn00butl
Chisholm, R ‘Identity through time’, sections 1 and 2 only. In Crane and Farkas
(eds.) Metaphysics pp537-45.
5 Doubts about substance
How convincing is Unger’s argument that there are no ordinary things?
Reading:

Unger, Peter (1979). ‘There are no ordinary things’. Synthese 41 (2):117 - 154.
6 Universals
What is a universal? Do universals really exist?
Reading:
•
•
Plato Parmenides 131 – 133. Reprinted in Crane and Farkas, 227-30.
Russell (1912) ‘The world of universals’. Chapter 9 of The Problems of
Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Available online at
www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5827
7 Resemblance nominalism
‘There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets.’ Does it follow that these all have a
universal (‘attribute’) in common?
Reading:
•
Quine, Willard van Orman (1948). ‘On What There Is’. Review of Metaphysics 2
(5):21--36. Reprinted in his 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard
University Press.
8 The Soul
Can a machine think?
•
Turing, Alan M. (1950). ‘Computing machinery and intelligence.’ Mind 59
(October):433-60.
9 God
Are there any good reasons from pure metaphysics to believe in the existence of God?
Reading:
•
•
Aquinas ‘The five ways’, in Crane and Farkas, 31-33.
Paley ‘Selection from Natural Theology’ in Crane and Farkas, 34-40.
10 Possible worlds
‘[L]ogical space is a paradise for philosophers. We have only to believe in the vast
realm of possibilia, and there we find what we need to advance our endeavours.’
(Lewis) Discuss.
Reading:
•
Lewis, D. Excerpt from The Plurality of Worlds, in Crane and Farkas, 330-334.
Metaphysics – Essay titles and reading
See lecture handouts and ask your lecturer/ tutor for additional reading.
1. Are there any good arguments for the existence of universals?
Reading:
•
•
Plato Parmenides 131 – 133. Reprinted in Crane and Farkas, 227-30.
Russell (1912) ‘The world of universals’. Chapter 9 of The Problems of
Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Available online at
www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5827
•
Quine, Willard van Orman (1948). ‘On What There Is’. Review of Metaphysics 2
(5):21--36. Reprinted in his 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard
University Press.
2. Is it really conceivable that a computer could possess consciousness?
Reading:
•
•
Turing, Alan M. (1950). ‘Computing machinery and intelligence.’ Mind 59
(October):433-60.
Nagel, Thomas (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83
(October):435-50.
3. Assess the view that a necessary truth is one that is true at every possible world.
Reading:
•
•
Kripke, S Excerpt from Naming and Necessity, in Crane and Farkas, 313-329.
Lewis, D. Excerpt from The Plurality of Worlds, in Crane and Farkas, 330-334.
Seminar programme, Epistemology
1. Truth
Seminar question: ‘I have a right to my opinion!’ Does it follow that my own opinion
is right for me?
Reading. Plato. Theatetus 152-152d, 161c-162c, 166-172b
2. Belief.
Seminar question. In what way, if at all, is knowledge more valuable than true
opinion?
Reading. Plato Theatetus 187, 200d-201e Meno 97 – 98c
3. Justification.
Seminar question. Does Agrippa’s trilemma show that no one is ever justified in
believing anything?
Wikipedia, Article on the Regress Argument, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regress_argument.
4. Foundationalism.
Seminar question. Can the foundationalist solve Agrippa’s trilemma?
Dancy 1985, Chapter 4. (Omit the section Probability and Certainty)
5. Coherentism
Seminar question. Can the coherentist solve Agrippa’s trilemma?
Reading. Quine, W v O, 1951, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review,
60: 20–43. (Read only Section 6).
6. Skepticism about the senses.
Seminar question. In perception, are we ever directly aware of material objects?
Ayer, A J 1940. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. MacMillan, London.
Read pp1-10.
7. The Problem of Induction
Seminar question Does anyone really know anything about the future?
Reading. Russell, B 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press,
Oxford. (Read Chapter 6)
8 The Gettier problem
Seminar question. Did Gettier prove that knowledge is not the same thing as justified
true belief?
Gettier, E (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis Vol. 23, pp. 121123.
9 Repairing the tripartite analysis.
Seminar question. Is knowledge undefeated justified true belief?
Reading. Lehrer, K and Paxson, T, 1969. ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True
Belief’, Journal of Philosophy 66.8 225-237.
10 Externalist theories
Seminar question Does the causal theory of knowledge solve the Gettier cases?
Reading. Goldman, A 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing
’. The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 12 pp. 357-372. (Read pp 357-363 only.)
Epistemology — Essay titles and Readings
1) Distinguish between knowing and merely believing truly. Does anyone ever know
anything?
Unger, P (1978) Ignorance, Oxford University Press. Read Chapter 1, §§ 1- 8,
pp 6 – 28. (Available on Oxford Scholarship Online)
2) What is ‘the epistemic regress problem’? Can Foundationalism solve it?
Bonjour, L (1978). ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’ American
Philosophical Quarterly Vol 15, pp 1-13. Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009690.
3) ‘Knowledge is adequately justified true belief.’ Discuss whether adding the word
‘adequately’ thus to the classical analysis of knowledge is sufficient
to answer Gettier.
Gettier, E (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis Vol. 23, pp.
121-123)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922
4) Can the reliabilist answer the sceptic about induction?
Reading: Papineau, D (1992) ‘Reliabilism, Induction and Scepticism’
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 42, pp 1- 20.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/i312670