HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT GUIDELINE
FERM Facility Plan
DOCUMENT ID - GU 230
REVISION
- 2.0
DATE - 15/07/02
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Authorised for Issue by the HSE IC 15/07/02
Document Authorisation
Document Authority
‘dapo Oguntoyinbo
Ref. Ind: CSM
Date: 15/07/02
Document Custodian
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02
Document Author
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02
The following is a brief summary of the four most recent revisions to this document. Details of all revisions prior
to these are held on file by the Document Custodian.
Version No.
Version 2.0
Date
Jul 2002
Version 1.0
Jul 1998
Author
Hamad Khalfeen,
CSM/11
Scope / Remarks
Editorial changes, new format.
Original issue as HSE/97/13.
User Notes:
This document is a guideline only.
A controlled copy of the current version of this document is on PDO's EDMS. Before making reference to this
document, it is the user's responsibility to ensure that any hard copy, or electronic copy, is current. For
assistance, contact the Document Custodian.
This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of this
document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by
any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior written consent of the
owner.
Users are encouraged to participate in the ongoing improvement of this document by providing constructive
feedback.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page ii
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Contents
ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... IV
1.0
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
1.1
1.2
1.3
PURPOSE............................................................................................................... 1
SCOPE .................................................................................................................. 1
BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 1
1.4
1.5
DISTRIBUTION AND TARGET AUDIENCE ......................................................................... 2
DOCUMENT REVIEW ................................................................................................. 2
1.3.1
2.0
Pre Fire Planning ........................................................................................... 1
PREPARATION OF A FERM FACILITY PLAN .................................................... 3
2.1
2.2
GENERAL............................................................................................................... 3
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED ............................................................................................ 3
2.3
FIRE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................... 6
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
Area Facility FES and Fire Protection Equipment Description ............................ 3
Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans ..................................................... 5
Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet .......................................................... 7
Fire Responder Capabilities ............................................................................ 3
Shortfall Listing ............................................................................................. 5
2.3.1
2.3.2
General ........................................................................................................ 6
Resource Levels for Scenarios ........................................................................ 6
3.0
3.1
3.2
EXAMPLES ....................................................................................................... 8
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE PLANS ........................................................... 8
FIRE SCENARIO WORKSHEETS .................................................................................. 10
ATTACHMENT I: BLANK FIRE SCENARIO WORK SHEET ............................................... 29
ATTACHMENT II: BLANK PRE-FIRE PLAN/OPERATOR RESPONSE SHEET ....................... 38
ATTACHMENT III: BLANK FIRE RESPONDER COMPETENCIES ...................................... 43
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page iii
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Abbreviations
GU-230
AFFF
AFO
Aqueous Film Forming Foam
Airport Fire Officer
BA
BLL
BLEVE
BPD
Breathing Apparatus
Barrels
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
Barrels Per Day
CAA
Civil Aviation Authority
DCS
Digital Control System
EOM
EP
ERD
ESD
Emergency Operations Manual
Engineering Practice
Engineering Reference Document
Emergency Shut Down
FCP
FERM
FES
FMECA
Field Change Proposal
Fire and Explosion Risk Management
Fire and Explosion Strategy
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
HSE
Health, Safety and Environment
ICAO
IR
IT
International Civil Aviation Authority
Infra Red
Information Technology
LEBC
LEL
LPG
lpm
Local Emergency Base Controller
Lower Explosive Limit
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
litres per minute
MAF
Mina Al Fahal
NED
NGL
NFPA
National Emergency Director
Natural Gas Liquids
National Fire Protection Agency
oo
ORC
OWS
out of (eg 2oo3 voting)
Oman Refinery Company
Oily Water Separator
PDO
PPE
PS
Petroleum Development Oman
Personal Protective Equipment
Production Station
QRA
Quantitative Risk Asssessment
RCM
RFF
Reliability Centered Maintenance
Rescue and Fire Fighting
REVISION 2.0
Page iv
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
GU-230
RFFS
RMS
Rescue and Fire Fighting Service
Remote Manifold Station
SCBA
SIEP
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
Shell International Exploration and Production
UL
UV
Underwriters Laboratory
Ultra Violet
VESDA
Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus
REVISION 2.0
Page v
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
1.0
Introduction
1.1
Purpose
The prime objective of a FERM Facility Plan is to minimise the risk to life and assets
by maximising the potential for risk mitigation with manual intervention, utilising
available manpower and equipment.
It is intended that FERM Facility Plans be produced in a consistent manner for both
new facilities and modifications to existing facilities. Presently, throughout PDO
facilities there are differences in procedures, available equipment, manpower and
capability. The purpose of this Guideline is to provide a consistent approach to
identified fire hazards, by setting standards for the preparation of specific pre-fire
planning documents for each PDO location.
This document supports the requirements provided in SP 1075, Specification for Fire
and Explosion Risk Management, and provides examples where applicable.
1.2
Scope
This guideline is focused on FERM Facility Plans.
1.3
Background
Automated systems have the advantage of rapid response but are limited in terms of
assessment and usually follow a single pre-determined pattern initiated by condition
sensors. Only trained personnel can provide the necessary assessment of a situation
but their performance is very much improved if all of the possibilities for escalation
have been considered and fully understood prior to any occurrence.
By preparing specific action plans for manual response based on identified fire
hazards and scenarios, simulated response exercises can be tested and practised.
The testing aspect provides information regarding any weaknesses in the systems, or
failures on demand; whilst the practice induces a level of familiarity with tasks which
then become routine, and therefore more reliable. During an emergency, fire
responders rely on their ability to use equipment safely and effectively.
1.3.1
Pre Fire Planning
Pre-fire planning may be described as the advance preparation of documentation and
practical rehearsals, based on potential credible fire scenarios, which can assist fire
departments and line management personnel to respond to and control fire events
within company facilities. Pre-fire planning addresses the nature of contribution from
human intervention as a recovery measure.
Pre-fire planning sets plant control, safeguarding and fire fighting objectives and
strategies so that in the case of a potential incident critical time is saved should
hazardous events come about. It also identifies particular fire and explosion scenario
resource requirements and hazards that may be encountered during an incident.
The appropriate actions to be employed when applying mitigation and recovery
measures are then developed.
Pre-fire plans need to be scenario specific. They should not be overly detailed or
inflexible since it is not possible to predict the precise events or impact that may
occur from any given scenario. Having identified plausible fire scenarios and relevant
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 1
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
control methodologies it is then possible to identify the role of contributing systems,
for example:





1.4
Response times and capabilities of fire responders
Physical site aspects including adequate access ways for the assigned
equipment taking wind directions into account
Clear communication procedures and systems
Availability of suitable quantities of foam, water or hand extinguishers
Convenient location of equipment such as hydrants, monitors and fireman’s
equipment.
Distribution and Target Audience
This guideline has been developed for the use of PDO staff, contractors and
consultants that are involved in the design of new facilities and modification of
existing facilities.
It is also intended for use during the review of existing FERM Facility Plans as they
are completed on a periodic basis.
1.5
Document Review
This Guideline shall be reviewed as necessary in line with any review and
modification of the related Specification.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 2
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
2.0
Preparation of a FERM Facility Plan
2.1
General
This section provides guidance on how to prepare a FERM Facility Plan, and provides
a list of documents for a typical plan.
In establishing facility plans it is necessary to prepare a list of company facilities,
then list the processes, plants, operation, structures and personnel within the
facilities. From this list the numbers and types of potential (moderate, serious and
major fire) incident scenarios should be further listed. It is anticipated that company
personnel in the vicinity would deal with minor or incipient fires and therefore such
incidents should not be used for pre-plans.
After confirming the credibility of the draft fire scenarios with line management,
supervisor actions to prepare for the event can be developed. These should be in
line with an emphasis on the impact on operations, facility, plant and equipment to
ensure accuracy of planning. A final list of scenarios should then be converted into
fully prepared pre-fire plans with further investigative work on impact on the
environment and the public.
Establishing a pre-fire plan for every single potential fire incident in all company
facilities serves little useful purpose since it would take many years to exercise the
response to these incidents. Operator’s pre-plans should be developed as well as
those for fire fighters and the two should be coordinated on a scenario basis.
2.2
Documents Required
The following documents are required in order to complete a FERM Facility Plan:
1. Area Facility FES and Description of Fire Protection Equipment, for reference,
information and possible inclusions in the HSE Case.
2. Fire protection systems maintenance plans, for inclusion in the site EPMARS.
3. Pre-fire plans/Operator response, for inclusion in the Site Emergency Procedures,
Part III.
4. Fire responder capabilities, for inclusion in the Operator Competency Assurance
Scheme and/or the Fire Brigade Training Programme.
5. Shortfall Listings, for inclusion in the EOM, Staff Training Plan and FCP as
required.
2.2.1
Area Facility FES and Fire Protection Equipment Description
Area Facility FES
This should be in accordance with PDO’s FERM and FES levels assigned to the
facilities. Include a description of each main area of the site being examined and list
the strategy that is assigned.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 3
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
An example might be:
Strategy Level 1 (Minor Incident Intervention Only)
Remote manifolds 1 to n
Gathering station X
Camps and offices
Level description
Fire response is limited to trained personnel using portable extinguishers or other
types of first aid fire fighting equipment. In addition, in critical areas, such as some
areas of camps, automatic detection systems may be installed to provide fast alarm
and personnel escape.
Strategy Level 2 (Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection Systems)
Power station
Level Description
Automatic actuation of a self contained extinguishing system, for a specific facility
from detection systems.
Strategy Level 3 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Back Up)
Production Station
Level Description
Dedicated fixed fire protection systems and a fire water network with back up from
manual intervention by trained personnel using fire fighting equipment.
Strategy Level 4 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Fire Brigade)
Airstrip
Level Description
Similar to strategy 3 with back up from a professional fire brigade.
Fire Protection Equipment
Each area identified above needs to have a description of the fire detection and
protection equipment installed, together with a conclusion as to the adequacy, and
applicability of the strategy level assigned.
An example might be:
Remote Manifold Stations – Strategy Level 1
The remote manifolds have the following fire protection equipment in place:

1 x 60kg dry powder trolley extinguisher

4 x 12kg dry powder extinguishers

2 x CO2 extinguishers
The extinguisher type and number are appropriate to the facilities. There are no fixed
fire systems at any RMS in accordance with strategy level 1.
The following fire and gas detection is in place:
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 4
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
RMS 1 to 4 and 6 to 10
H2S gas detection (DCS building)
Smoke detection (DCS building)
Break glass units (external)




RMS 5
Break glass units (external) only
Actuation of any of these devices will alarm in the control room and ESD the
respective RMS.
Conclusion:
2.2.2
Strategy level 1 is applicable to the Remote Manifold Stations.
Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans
This section needs to identify the weekly, monthly, quarterly, 6 monthly and annual
maintenance requirements for each of the fire protection systems at the site under
consideration. It is intended for reference against the facility EPMARS to ensure
testing of systems hardware is carried out.
An example of a Fire Protection Systems Maintenance and Testing system is provided
below. Additional examples are provided in Section 3.1.
EXAMPLE 1.
Fixed Semi-Sub Surface Foam Injection System (SSSFIS)
The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the SSSFIS
hardware either in addition to the existing maintenance requirements or to enhance the
requirements. The following considers the operating environment, water supply and
materials in use for the SSSFIS.
The fire and gas detection testing frequency and methods have been checked and were
generally found satisfactory:
GU-230
1.1
Weekly
 Check all valves on the foam system and ensure they are all in the correct
stand-by positions;
 Inspect firewater supply system to ensure pressure and flow required for the
SSSFIS;
 Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank, ensure foam
discharge to surge tank is fully isolated and run foam pump and verify the
duplex gauge foam pressure indicator is working;
 Check foam tank and fittings for leakage;
 Check storage temperature of foam concentrate to ensure it is within
manufacturers limits.
1.2
Monthly
 Inspect full system for physical wear and tear or damage;
 Remove, clean, inspect and reassemble foam concentrate line and sensing
line strainers;
 Check foam generators air inlet screens and clean if necessary;
 Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank and ensure foam
discharge to surge tank is fully isolated then run foam pump and check for
leakage, excessive noise, vibration or overheating in the pump or driver
motor;
 Ensure foam tank is isolated and water supply is isolated and cycle valves
from the control room fire and gas control panel or by manual override at
valves;
REVISION 2.0
Page 5
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Inspect foam tank pressure/vacuum vent to ensure free movement and that
screens are clean.
Quarterly

Override solenoid switch for deluge valve operation

Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation

Reassemble solenoid

Reinstate actuation system to stand-by mode

1.3
GU-230
1.4
6 Monthly
 Check complete system, all valves, fittings and connections for leakage
 Check flange bolts for tightness
 Isolate and remove hose container from tank and inspect hose condition,
and return to service.
 Check system for any external damage to paint surfaces.
 Check supervision of control circuit and check air supply. Check low air
supply alarm and check for leakage/passing valve seats.
 Remove, clean, test and reassemble the pressure vacuum vent on the tank.
 Remove, clean, test and recalibrate the duplex foam/water gauge.
 Check that proper control system indicators are present, check supervision of
all circuits, check alarm operation, check system operation and check that all
indicators illuminate.
 Isolate duplex foam/water gauge and clean water and foam lines to gauge.
Flush and pressure test gauge for water and foam indications
1.5
Annually
1. Carry out annual discharge test, ensuring discharge to surge tanks is fully
isolated and check foam solution proportioning, foam expansion and
drainage in accordance with NFPA 11.
2. Check foam pump alignment in accordance with the manufacturers
instructions
3. Check that proper voltage is available at pump motor.
4. Check motor for proper rotation and rotate pump by hand to ensure free
movement.
5. Check that foam pump can supply adequate pressure for the foam supply
system by observing the duplex water/foam gauge. The foam needle
indicator (red) should be approximately 1 barg higher than the water
pressure.
6. Remove water filter from line and clean, inspect for damage and reassemble.
7. Strip, clean, test and reinstall the system deluge valves in accordance with
manufacturers instructions.
8. Check foam pump relief valve setting for proper operation.
9. Take sample of foam concentrate and submit for analysis on sedimentation,
corrosion, dilution or contamination to an approved foam supplier.
REVISION 2.0
Page 6
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
2.2.3
Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet
This section of the FERM facility plan should contain pre-fire plans for each of the
scenarios identified in the fire scenario development section.
In addition, an operator response sheet is also required for each scenario developed.
An example of a Pre-Fire Plan and Operator Response Sheet for a surge tank or full
surface fire follows. Blank sheets with guidance notes, are shown in Attachment II.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 7
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR
SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR TXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY : Operator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Actuation of fixed foam system - Fire brigade response - Fire brigade deploy portable water
monitors for cooling adjacent tank roof - Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system
requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
[
] Control Room Operator
Request fire alarm fire confirmation
Outside operator to confirm fire event.
[
] Control Room Operator
Verify or activate site fire siren
Use control room fire siren switch if necessary.
[
] Control Room Operator
Alert fire brigade to respond to incident
Radio, telephone or pager call out.
[
] Control Room Operator
Alert LEBC and advise nature of incident
Telephone, radio or pager call out.
[
] LEBC
Request emergency team response
Emergency pager call out button in control room or individual telephone numbers.
[
] Control Room Operator
Check fixed foam system valves have activated
Control room fire and gas panel
[
] Control Room Operator
Check ESD is initiated for tanks and station and inform LEBC of status Radio or telephone.
of shutdown
[
] LEBC
Designate an OSC
Radio contact or control room telephone.
1st RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
[
] OSC or designated person
Check personnel evacuation status for missing persons
Personnel Log Book in control room
[
] OSC or designated person
Verify fire size/severity and any obvious immediate hazards and
Radio in vehicle with external loudspeaker
advise LEBC
[
] OSC or designated person
Ensure fixed foam system is operating correctly
Fixed semi-sub surface foam system pump and valves. Manual pneumatic valves can be
actuated at the foam skid if required. Foam system tank requires a minimum of 5880
[
] OSC or designated person
litres foam concentrate for injection into one tank. 100% quantity should be available for
refilling within 24 hours.
Ensure both tank bund drains are closed.
Tank bund drains.
2nd RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
[
] Fire Brigade
Deploy/actuate cooling water monitors on next tank roof.
2 x 3000 lpm water monitors, 24 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.
[
] OSC
Check foam system effectiveness in reducing and controlling tank fire
Visual assessment of fire size reduction. Foam system to be run for a minimum of 55
and advise LEBC.
minutes. Should be signs of fire control after approximately 30 minutes. If no visible fire
reduction after 55 minutes then foam system obviously not effective.
[
] OSC
Ensure cooling water does not drift into tank being foamed.
[
] Fire Brigade
Deploy foam monitor in readiness to support foam system application
1 x 3400 lpm portable foam monitor, 12 x 70mm x 20 m delivery fire hose and
in case some “fire traps” remain under tank shell folds which the
minimum 2040 litres 3% foam concentrate for 20 minutes supply foam monitor.
foam system cannot fully extinguish.
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS: Cooling of adjacent unaffected tank is necessary to prevent tank roof damage and protect tank integrity. To check if cooling is required, play a water stream on to the roof
and if steaming occurs, the roof needs to be cooled. If foam system does not achieve extinguishment after 55 minutes then all personnel should evacuate the LPS and await boilover event. Crude oil and
water pumpout from affected tank should be commenced as soon as it is obvious that foam extinguishment has failed. Pump out will not prevent a boilover but may reduce the fireball and fire spread
extent.
ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS : Crude oil boilover will occur if tank fire extinguishment is unsuccessful. Boilover event may overflow bund walls.
Fireball may achieve heights of 100m with resultant high radiant heat levels dangerous to fire responders and observers.
Probable escalation involving adjacent tank or separators once a boilover occurs. More than one boilover is possible . Personnel should not re-enter LPS after a first or second boilover. The fire incident will
only be safe once the tank fire, or fires, are burned out.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 1
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR
LPS SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY
Operator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system - Fire brigade
response - Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in
case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.
CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS
GU-230
1
Request outside operator to confirm fire in tank
2
Verify siren has activated or activate if necessary
3
Alert fire brigade to respond to incident
4
Alert LEBC and advise nature of incident
5
Alert Emergency Team if advised by
6
Check tanks foam system valves have actuated and advise LEBC
7
Check ESD operated for tanks and station - confirm to LEBC shutdown status.
8
Await further instructions from LEBC and act accordingly.
REVISION 2.0
Page 2
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
2.2.4
Fire Responder Capabilities
Fire Responder Competencies
The fire responder competencies should be identified through the use of the scenario
worksheets. This will be in terms of the fire fighting or fire control strategy and tactics
which fire responders will have to apply, and also in terms of the hardware they may or
will have to utilise as part of the tactics. Fire responder competencies should be
developed for each fire scenario identified.
A blank form for this is provided in Attachment III.
Fire Responder Fitness
To be analysed against the requirements laid down in EP 95-0351, Fire Control and
Recovery.
An example of fire responders competencies for a surge tank or full surface fire follows.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 3
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:
SURGE TANKS T-XXXX and T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:
Knowledge of operations emergency plan, emergency team composition, chain of command.
Knowledge of firewater supply system for station .
Understanding of the need and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for firefighting and emergency incident response.
Location of surge tanks within station, tanks construction and function and concept of pump out under emergency conditions.
Knowledge of location and manual operation of surge tanks foam system, minimum duration of foam system application on a surge tank and reasons for this.
Use of portable water and foam monitors, fire hose, fire hydrants and foam tanker for foam monitor concentrate supply.
Use of water for cooling heat affected plant and equipment, correct foam application rates for foam monitor application and application methods.
Knowledge of mechanisms of crude boilover and potential fire escalation by crude oil boilover and associated hazards
COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:









Area emergency plan, emergency team members and team call out system, emergency incident command structure and fire responder responsibilities.
Station firewater system normal flowrate and pressures, the location of firewater system isolation valves, how to use a fire hydrant safely and how to avoid water hammer.
Function of surge tanks and basic tank design including roof-to-seam design and main gas and oil piping connections.
Types of portable water monitor and foam monitor in use at the station in particular and the area in general.
Types of delivery fire hose and connections in use at the station and the area.
Types of fire hydrants and number of hydrant outlets on hydrants at the LPS.
Types of foam in use at the station in the surge tank foam system and in the station fire cabinets and their correct proportioning ratio.
Types of portable foam inductors and foam branches in use in the station and the station area and their respective flowrates and pressures.
Hazards associated with crude oil boilover events.
RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:







Identify fire response personal protective equipment.
Describe surge tank pump out under emergency conditions and how this may affect boilover damage.
Identify all valves on fixed foam system to operate system manually at the foam station.
Explain what is meant by the terms “boilover and pump-out”.
Identify time before a 20 litre foam concentrate drum is empty using a given a portable foam branch.
Deploy and actuate water and foam monitors in use at the station in a safe and stable manner as part of a two man team and as one man.
Describe the objectives of cooling a fixed roof tank and explain where water streams should be directed to achieve maximum cooling protection.
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:







Method of wearing PPE for fire response.
Method of delivery fire hose running, hose connection, disconnection, advancing/retiring a length of fire hose, connecting branches to fire hose and how to make up fire hose.
Method of supplying foam concentrate to portable foam monitors from a foam tanker.
Method of setting up and stabilising portable water monitors using fire hydrants and fire hose as part of a two man team and as one man.
Method of handling a charged hoseline with branch as part of a two man team and as one man.
Method of setting up portable foam making equipment to produce foam from a foam branch as part of a two man hoseline team.
At least two methods of gentle foam application from a portable foam branch.
GU-230
REVISION 1.0
Page 4
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
2.2.5
Shortfall Listing
This section should list all shortfalls identified during the preparation of the pre-fire
plan in comparison to the FERM Specification requirements. The listing should
include statements regarding whether or not the shortfall is acceptable and that a
waiver from the Specification should be obtained. In those shortfalls which are not
acceptable, a priority shall be assigned, together with personnel designated for
action.
Examples of shortfall listings are provided in the worked examples of Fire Scenario
Worksheets in Section 3.2.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 5
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
2.3
Fire Scenario Development
2.3.1
General
This section needs to list the major fire scenarios identified after reviewing the
facilities.
Those scenarios of a minor nature need not be listed individually if for these strategy
level 1 types, the existing resources have been reviewed and are considered
adequate. Minor fire scenarios are equated to a FERM strategy level 1. Minor fire
scenarios are those which can reasonably be expected to be dealt with by operators
or staff using available fire equipment. The equipment would not normally exceed 1
or 2 extinguishers or a trolley extinguisher. Such minor fires may be a limited
hydrocarbon spill fire, refuse container fire, small office fire, or other easily contained
fires.
Serious and major fire scenarios are those involving critical production equipment
that present potentially serious consequences and require specific protection or
response resources. Serious or major scenarios can be equated to a FERM strategy
level 2, 3 or 4. The following procedure should be followed when filling out the work
sheet (refer to Attachment I for a blank work sheet):





Identify the consequences from each
Identify the existing FERM measures in place
Compare existing and required FERM measures for each scenario
Establish the fire response and training for fire response
Identify shortfalls in resources and training for fire response.
The fire scenarios identified should then be listed. Section 3.1 of this Guideline
provides examples of typical major fire scenarios. Guidance is provided below on
how to complete the resource levels for scenarios.
A blank work sheet example showing the format and information requirement is
shown in Attachment I.
2.3.2
Resource Levels for Scenarios
The Scenario Worksheets contain quantities of resources identified for the particular
fire event described. The quantities should be based on the following information.
Foam Concentrate
Calculations to be based on NFPA minimum application rates plus foam blanket
maintenance (top up) where required and considering foam capacity of foam
monitors or foam branches.
Fire Hoses
Review the nearest hydrants which may be used, number of hose inlets in a portable
water monitor or portable foam monitor or foam branch.
Monitors
Judgemental based on practical fire ground experience and/or surface area or
number of exposure hazards to be cooled if for water monitors, or foam solution
capacity if for foam monitors.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 6
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Manpower
Based on the number of monitors or handlines to be deployed or SCBA to be used.
Typically, three men are needed for deploying a single monitor and fire hose to the
monitor, maintaining the flow direction of the water stream or for maintaining the
foam supply and direction of the foam stream. Where obviously practical, man
power for monitors are also used to supply foam concentrate to foam hand lines if
they are also in use.
For foam hand lines, typically, a minimum of 2 fire responders are needed for each
hand line excluding foam re-supply.
Vehicles
Generally, there is only one fire truck listed although a foam tanker may also be
used.
Specialist Equipment
Mainly SCBA sets. Based on one set per person for scenarios where personnel may
be exposed to smoke conditions or atmospheres.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 7
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
3.0
EXAMPLES
3.1
Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans
EXAMPLE 2.
Water Deluge System
Following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the water deluge
system either in addition to the existing maintenance requirements or to enhance the
requirements. The following considers the operating environment, water supply and
materials in use for the deluge system.
The fire and gas detection frequency and methods have been checked and generally
found satisfactory:
GU-230
2.1
Weekly
 Check all valves to ensure they are in the normal stand-by mode;
 Inspect firewater supply to ensure water supply will be operational if
required;
 Check water supply and air supply valves for leakage;
 Check deluge valve pressure gauges to ensure pressure differential is
maintained at the required settings.
2.2
Monthly
 Check for system hardware wear and tear or physical damage;
 Check for corrosion at drain/weep holes on discharge piping;
 Check low air supply alarm for deluge valve;
2.3
Quarterly
 Override or isolate executive actions on the fire detection and alarm panel;
 Override Solenoid switch for deluge valve operation
 Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation
 Reassemble solenoid
 Test solenoid actuator on deluge valve;
 Actuate the system (from different detection or manual device each time) to
check each nozzle water pattern;
 Remove and clean any blocked water nozzle;
 Flush the discharge piping and nozzles;
 Remove terminal nozzles from the discharge piping array;
 Run deluge system for minimum 2 minutes with terminal nozzles and any
blocked nozzles removed for flushing purposes;
 Close water discharge valve;
 Reassemble all removed nozzles;
 Reset the deluge valve;
 Reinstate the fire detection system to normal operation;
 Ensure discharge piping drain/weep hole is functioning correctly.
2.4
6 Monthly
Remove and clean water screen/filter and reassemble.
2.5
Annually
Strip, clean, test and reinstall the deluge valve in accordance with manufacturers
instructions;
REVISION 2.0
Page 8
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
EXAMPLE 3 Turbine Enclosure CO2 System
GU-230
3.1
Weekly
 Check all CO2 status lights are indicating outside the turbine enclosures
 The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to
the CO2 system for the power station either in addition to the existing
maintenance requirements or to enhance the requirements. Check system is
on automatic release at F & G panel and at enclosures
 Check CO2 cylinders are in position and are securely fastened.
 Check slave cylinder is in position
 Check manual isolation device is available in the cylinder room
 Check there are no fault signals on the fire and gas panel for the generators
 Test automatic/manual switch at enclosure and ensure this indicates at F &
G panel. Return switch to automatic.
3.2
Monthly
 Check general condition of heat detectors,flame detectors and gas detectors
in the enclosures.
 Check enclosure doors are properly closed and door seal is in good condition.
3.3
6 Monthly
 Check cylinders CO2 content either by non intrusive level detection or by
weighing cylinders. Any cylinder showing a net loss of 10% or more should
be refilled or replaced.
 Check all piping and flexible hoses for wear and tear or damage.
 Ensure system is isolated if weighing cylinders
 Return system to service on completion of cylinder content checks.
 Check flame detectors positioning and ensure they are aimed in accordance
with design intent.
 Isolate or override flame detectors executive actions and test using UV test
lighting device.
 Reinstate UV executive alarms.
3.4
5 yearly
All high pressure hoses should be removed and tested by hydrotest to a pressure
of 175 barg. Pressure to be maintained for one minute. Any hose and/or coupling
developing a leak during this time should be replaced
REVISION 2.0
Page 9
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
3.2
Fire Scenario Worksheets
Example worksheets are provided for the following typical fire scenarios:



Full Surface Fire - coned roof tank.
Rim Seal Fire - floating roof tank.
Gas Compressor.
SCENARIO WORKSHEET 1
REFERENCE: XXX-1
FACILITY
Crude Oil Dewatering
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
3
PLANT/EQUIPMENT Tank T-XXX. One of two surge tanks. No sparing. Tank is 27.5m
diameter and 11.5m height. Tank maximum capacity is 6830 m 3.
FUNCTION
Surge/Dewatering Duty Tank.
Normal duty is between 55% level and 80% level at approximately
45oC. Both tanks serve as buffer storage for approximately 5 hours.
SCENARIO
Full surface “open can” fire occurs due to either internal explosion or
overfilling of tank. Tank roof is either partly or wholly separated from
tank shell.
Adjacent dewatering tank T-2613 roof affected by radiant heat. Tank
is full at time of fire event.
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety – Personnel not normally on the tank roof. If internal explosion occurs, roof may
totally separate resulting in spiralling heavy object. Personnel in the general area may be at
risk from this event. Radiant heat at grade level should not present a life threatening
condition from the full surface fire.
Environment – Initially, smoke pollution only. Some crude may have spilled into bund on roof
separation but this will be retained in bund.
Business interruption – Immediate shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Involved tank damaged due to loss of roof and burning
surface. Immediate production deferment, will be approximately 14,000 m 3.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Adjacent surge/dewatering tank roof would be subjected to moderate radiant heat that may
result in roof damage or failure in the order of 50/60 minutes if no cooling actions were
taken. Radiant heat effects may increase if wind direction and speed causes flame to tilt
toward adjacent tank and therefore time to failure may be much less than the above.
If fire is not extinguished within first 1 or 2 hours, boilover will result some time after this.
Crude boilover may overflow tank bunds and then would involve adjacent surge tank and
possibly some of the bulk and/or test separators outside the tank bund.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 10
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Post Escalation
Life safety – Fire responders may be fatally or seriously injured if caught in the vicinity of a
crude boilover.
Environment – Soil contamination will occur if crude overflowed bunds. Continued smoke
pollution.
Business interruption – Prolonged station shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Loss of both surge tanks due to escalation. Production
deferment would be approximately 14,000 m 3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process – Tank low and high level alarms. High level trips tank inlet and outlet and causes
hydrocarbon ESD.
Fire Event – Fusible plug heat detection ring on tank roof rim with 3 pressure switches voting
2 out of 3 to cause tank ESD, hydrocarbon ESD, site fire siren, foam pump start and foam
system valve to tank opened.
Gas Event – Not applicable for this event.
Mitigation
Process Controls – Tank inlet/outlet valves, hydrocarbon ESD, Station ESD.
Containment – Tank acts as containment. Tank walls will fold inward during fire event. Bund
acts as containment for oil spillage/release.
Drainage – Bund drains provided and normally closed.
Passive Fire Control – Single bund and intermediate bund between tanks.
Active Fire Control – Fixed automatic semi sub-surface injection foam system serving both
tanks. Quantity of foam concentrate required in foam storage tank is not precisely indicated
but appears to be in the order of 8,500 litres. (See section 2.2.5). Firewater system taken
from water injection header but it is not known if the water pressure and supply can be
increased under fire/emergency conditions.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the tanks. No fixed water monitors. 12 x fire boxes with
typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm
foam branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water branch.
EFFECTIVENESS OF FIXED FIRE SYSTEMS
Applicability of Type
Applicable for the type of tank and tank duty although a base injection system is the
preferred foam system for such tanks. Use of a Universal foam concentrate is unnecessary as
a standard approved fluoroprotein concentrate would be just as effective.
System/Hardware Suitability
The firewater supply is pressure governed and during a test with a water monitor only 3 barg
was achieved. It was stated that the pressure would rise after a short time but on a later
foam discharge test the pressure was again low. The foam discharged appeared to be weak
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 11
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
although visual indications cannot prove inaccurate proportioning. It is therefore necessary to
carry out tests as soon as practically possible to ensure correct proportioning across a range
of pressures. The foam concentrate storage tank has had leaks and the tank level is difficult
to read.
There is no clear level gauge and there is no information available as to the minimum
operating foam concentrate quantity that should be maintained in the tank. There are 3 high
backpressure foam generators (HBPG) but one of these is normally valve locked closed,
acting as a stand-by for maintenance. Generally, the hardware is suitable but there are
shortfalls as noted.
Reliability
System has actuated in 1996 although cause was a spurious fire alarm. The design of the
foam hose deployment inside the tank is unknown, i.e. is it vertical, horizontal or inclined ?
Sludge build-up in the tank over the course of 5 years may prevent foam hose deployment
and thus prevent foam application on the tank fire. The foam inlet is less than 1 metre from
the tank base.
During a discharge test, the foam/water duplex gauge did not function, indicating blocked
water and foam lines. The drain valves for the gauge did not work, indicating lack of effective
maintenance.
Operability
System is automatic from heat detection or remote at control room or locally by pneumatic
switch actuation. System actuated during test when pressure was reduced in the fusible plug
line. There are no instructions posted at the foam station for manual operation of the system
or which valve to open for which tank. Also, the tank numbers cannot be seen from the foam
station.
There are questions over the pressures available from the water injection supply header. The
pressure regulators appear to be set at a maximum of 10 barg but on testing it was obvious
that the pressure was much lower than this.
This scenario envisages use of water monitors and a foam monitor that will result in an
obvious pressure drop. It is not clear if this will impact on the foam system and it is also not
clear if the control valves on the water supply header can be altered to meet water demand
under emergency conditions.
Survivability (in incident)
Foam inlets are at lower tank area. Roof separation would not affect foam system operation
unless roof blow-off descends and impacts on foam inlets or inlet piping.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm - Tank inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator confirms
fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire brigade response - Fire
brigade deploy cooling water monitors on adjacent tank roof - Foam application until
extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys
foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by
until incident declared over.
Firefighting Tactics
Stage 1 – Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and ensure tank
ESD has initiated and foam system has actuated. Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan
and ensures site alarm has activated and alerts fire brigade.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 12
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Stage 2 – Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 – Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and requests call
out of emergency team.
Stage 4 – Fire brigade deploys and actuates cooling water monitors on adjacent tank roof to
prevent potential fire escalation.
Stage 5 – Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in event additional foam application is required.
Stage 6 – OSC monitors fire size and severity for foam system control impact and ensures
water streams are not affecting foam application.
Stage 7 – Foam system application continued until extinguishment and thereafter to ensure a
secure foam blanket is achieved on the liquid surface.
Stage 8 – Fire brigade actuate portable foam monitor if fire is controlled by foam system but
not fully extinguished due to fire trap areas of folded tank shell maintaining minor fire
pockets.
Stage 9 – Fire brigade checks to ensure fire is totally extinguished and a secure foam blanket
is achieved.
Stage 10 – Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is
announced.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process
As Existing FERM measures
Fire Event
As Existing FERM measures
Gas Event
Not applicable.
Alarm system
For Operator
Alarm
Tank level alarms, Heat detection alarm and Site
For Fire Brigade
Emergency Team Pager Call Out
Process Control
As existing FERM measures
Passive Fire Protection
As existing FERM measures
Active Fire Protection
As existing FERM measures plus:Method and procedures for additional firewater
supply/pressure under emergency conditions.
Instructions on manual operation of foam system.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 13
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
3457 lpm for affected tank from fixed foam system.
3500 lpm for propane accumulator water deluge
system which will actuate on surge tank heat
detection.
Total = 6,957 lpm
Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures
Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures
Hose
12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water monitors.
12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam monitor.
Total of 24 x 70mm x 20 delivery fire hose.
Monitors
2 x 3000 lpm water monitor
1 x 3400 lpm foam monitor
Foam Concentrate
5880 litres 3% AFFF for T-2623
3060 litres 3% FP for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 5,880 litres 3% AFFF
3,060 litres 3% FP.
Specialist Equipment
None
Manpower
6 fire responders for portable water monitors
3 fire responders for foam monitor
Total of 9 fire responders
Vehicles
1 x fire truck
1 x 9000 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker
Port. Equip. Water Flow
6000 lpm for water monitors
3400 lpm for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 9,400 lpm
Fixed and Port. Total Flow
3,457 lpm
3,500 lpm
6,000 lpm
3,400 lpm
for fixed foam system
for water deluge system
for water monitors
for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 16,357 lpm.
Total Water Quantity
(fixed & portable)
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
190 m3 for fixed foam system (55 minutes)
105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)
360 m3 for portable water monitors (60 minutes)
99 m3 for foam monitor (30 minutes - supporting
the foam system if necessary).
Page 14
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Total = 754 m3.
SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
The following are listed as shortfalls in procedures, hardware or resources when compared to
the facility FES Strategy Level or the FERM Specification SP 1075 as noted during the
development of this scenario worksheet:
i)
The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the fixed
systems or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire
brigade who may be on stand-by at the airstrip when this scenario develops.
ii)
Fire cabinets and equipment within intended for operator use but operators are not
trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3 Issue)
iii)
A total of 9 fire responders are required for this scenario. There are only 5 fire
brigade personnel to respond and the operators cannot back-up the fire brigade due
to lack of training in use of monitors and hose handling etc.
iv)
Firewater supply taken from water injection system. Pressure is controlled via
pressure control valves (3 of) but there are no fire pumps. This is a deviation but
may be acceptable provided pressure and flow can be maintained under emergency
conditions.
v)
The maximum firewater demand for this scenario is 16,357 lpm but the design
firewater supply is listed as 12,000 lpm (720 m 3/h) @ 10 barg. There is no known
procedure or method for increasing firewater pressure/supply under emergency
conditions where additional water is required. Although not listed in the Specification,
this would be part of a requirement for fire water pumps.
vi)
There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the foam
station. These should be provided.
vii)
No labelling of main valve functions on the foam system.
viii)
No sight glass on foam concentrate tank.
ix)
It is understood that there is a sludge build up in the tanks over the course of 5
years. It is possible, given the low location of the foam injection system inlets, that
depending on the design of the foam inlet within the tank (vertical bend or straight
pipe inlet) sludge will prevent or obstruct the deployment of the foam hose in the
tank. It is necessary to check the inside of a tank to ensure the foam hose can be
deployed.
x)
The foam system flexible hose inspection quoted as every 5 years when tank is down
for maintenance but it is possible to remove the hose container and visually inspect
the hose as there is a tank isolation valve downstream of hose unit and this should
be done.
xi)
An annual foam discharge is carried out but the necessary proportioning, expansion
or drainage tests are not being carried out.
xii)
There is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion and drainage testing.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 15
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
xiii)
The minimum foam concentrate quantity to be maintained in the foam system tank is
unknown. There appears to be approximately 8,500 litres but this is not confirmed
and the design quantity is not listed in the foam system installation manual.
Calculations (See below) illustrate that a minimum of 5880 litres should be in the
tank and as per NFPA there should also be 100% of this quantity available within 24
hours. There is no exact heading for this in the Specification but generally this is
covered under SP 1075 - Foam Systems.
xiv)
Spare foam concentrate is located in drums at the foam station but there is no
identification of the concentrate type or expiry date or UL approvals normally
associated with approved foam concentrate supplies. The source of the foam
concentrate is unknown. It appears to be a polymer AFFF (Universal type) but this
cannot be confirmed without detailed analysis. It is possible that this concentrate is
decanted from the original manufacturers drums but this is not confirmed.
xv)
The original concentrate in the system was a universal 3 & 6% AFFF foam for use at
3% on hydrocarbon fires and 6% for polar solvent fuels. This is a polymer-based
concentrate. It is unclear if the spare drums concentrate is the same type and if it
has UL approvals etc.
CRUDE SURGE/DEWATERING TANK FULL SURFACE FIRE
FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
USING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM MONITOR
Fire Area (Tank Dia. 27.5m)
594 m2
Foam Concentrate
3% AFFF
System Design Application Rate
6 lpm/m2 (Taken from Installation Manual)
Total Application Rate
594 x 6 = 3564 lpm/m2.
Foam Application Time
55 minutes
Total Concentrate Required
3564 x 0.03 x 55 = 5,880 litres
Total Water Required
3564 - 107 (3%) x 55 = 190 m3
Portable Foam Monitor Application
Foam Monitor Capacity
3,400 lpm
Application Time
30 minutes
Total Concentrate Required
3,400 x 0.03 x 30 = 3,060 litres
Total Water Required
3400 - 102 (3%) x 30 minutes = 99 m3
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 16
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
SCENARIO WORKSHEET 2
REFERENCE: XXX-2
FACILITY
Crude Oil Dehydration
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
3
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
Tank T-XXXX. One of six floating roof tanks. No sparing. Tank is
29.2m diameter and 14.6m height. Tank maximum capacity is 8586
m3.
FUNCTION
Crude Oil Dehydration Tank.
Normal duty is between 55% level and 60% level at approximately
40oC. One of six dehydration tanks.
SCENARIO
Rim seal fire occurs on tank T-XXXX. Tank is 60% (5140 m3) full at
time of fire event. Overfilling of tank. Adjacent dehydration tanks
are all almost full under normal operating conditions.
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life Safety – Personnel not normally on the tank floating roof. Immediate life safety risk is
considered low.
Environment – Smoke pollution only. Fire is contained in the tank rim seal area.
Business interruption – Immediate shutdown on detection of rim seal fire, plus all incoming
oil MOV/ESDV from all areas will close-in.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Involved tank seal damaged due to fire. Production
deferments from all gathering stations when surge tanks and storage tank high levels are
reached.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Rim seal fires have burned for several hours without escalation and in at least two known
cases, for more than 24 hours without escalation. However, this was due to the high
standard of effective maintenance of the tanks involved and it should not be assumed that
these time frames would apply to every floating roof tank rim seal fire.
The main concern is that if the fire is unchecked it will continue around the full seal
circumference and thereafter the flame impingement would affect the tank shell and roof. It
is therefore prudent to expect escalation within a few hours if no fire control or extinguishing
actions are taken. Escalation would occur if the roof tilted/jammed or sank, creating a full
surface fire event.
Post Escalation
Life Safety – Fire responders on the gaugers platform may be injured by burns if they are at
the tank top when the roof jams or tilts. Such an event should be noticeable and therefore
the risk to responders is considered low.
Environment – Continued smoke pollution. Fire would still be contained.
Business interruption – Prolonged shutdown.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 17
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Loss of affected dehydration tank due to escalation.
Production deferment for all areas will be approximately 70,000 m 3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process – Tank low, high and high-high level alarms. High-high level trips tank inlets and all
incoming oil lines and causes Station ESD.
Fire Event – Halon fusible plug detection. New fusible plug heat detection ring provided
around tank rim seal area with 3 pressure switches voting 2 out of 3 to cause total ESD. This
new detection system is installed but not yet commissioned.
Gas Event – Not applicable for this event.
Mitigation
Process Controls – Tank inlet/outlet valves, Station ESD remote from control room and
automatic on rim seal point heat detection.
Containment – Tank acts as containment for rim seal fire.
Drainage – Bund drains provided and normally closed.
Passive Fire Control – The primary seal and secondary seal material specification could not be
confirmed during the study. It is doubtful if the material is fire retardant.
Active Fire Control – Fixed automatic halon system provided for the rim seal area. Fixed
manually operated rim seal foam pourer system using balanced pressure proportioning. Foam
system concentrate tank holds 1370 litres of 3% fluoroprotein. Firewater system supplied
from dedicated firewater tank. Fire hydrants in the general area of the 6 x fire boxes
strategically located throughout the facility. Each box typically contains 1 x 250 lpm foam
branch, 3 x 20 litre fluoroprotein 3% foam concentrate drums, 1 x 450 lpm water branch, 4 x
70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems
Applicability of Type
Halon is being phased out and the rim seal foam system is designed to replace the halon
system.
Foam system is applicable for the type of tank and rim seal. An automatic system would be
more appropriate considering the low manning levels and the absence of fire crews (airstrip
stand-by) during daylight hours.
System/Hardware Suitability
Foam system hardware is suitable for a fixed manually operated system but better weather
protection of the system is necessary to prevent foam concentrate deterioration and overall
hardware wear and tear, especially valve identification and instructions.
Reliability
Foam system has been commissioned in May 1998. With this type of system it is necessary
to either regularly flush the foam pump with clean water (weekly) and maintain a dry foam
pump or if pump permanently flooded with concentrate then regularly turn the pump over
and cycle the foam concentrate back to foam tank. Given the operating environment, it is
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 18
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
important that a high frequency of foam pump flushing or circulation running is provided,
otherwise this system will become very unreliable.
Operability
Foam system is manual only and requires operators or firefighters to actuate during a fire
event. There are no instructions on how to operate the system and there are no foam tank
valve and system valve identification labels. The original labels have been damaged or the
combination of sand and heat has erased them.
Survivability (in incident)
Foam system pourers are above the rim seal and therefore above the fire area. If the tank
roof is high and the rim seal fire is high the pourers may be subjected to radiant heat and
damage. Therefore it is important that the foam system is actuated as quickly as possible to
extinguish the fire.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm and halon discharge - Tank inlet/outlet ESD, Station ESD - Operator
confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire brigade response Fire responders check if rim seal fire is extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved in
the rim seal area - Portable foam application into rim seal to support fixed system application
if required - Fire brigade stand-by until incident declared over.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 – Rim seal heat detection alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and
halon discharge and ensure tank ESD and Station ESD has initiated. Control room selects
relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated and alerts fire responders.
Stage 2 – Fire responders select relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 – Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and requests call
out of emergency team.
Stage 4 – Operator actuates the rim seal foam system for the affected tank.
Stage 5 – Fire responders don SCBA and ascend tank and check to ensure rim seal fire is
extinguished and foam application covers all the foam dam area.
Stage 6 – Fire responders in SCBA run a foam handline to the tank top and apply foam into
the rim seal to support the rim seal system if necessary. (This may require responders to
move on to the roof as there is no wind girder (walkway) around the tanks)
Stage 7 – OSC verifies fire is extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved in the rim
seal foam dam area.
Stage 8 – Rim seal foam dam blanket is topped up to ensure foam blankert is maintained
effectively, acting as a vapour suppression blanket.
Stage 9 – Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is announced.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 19
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process
As Existing FERM measures
Fire Event
As Existing FERM measures
Gas Event
Not applicable.
Alarm system
For Operator
Tank high and high-high level alarms, Heat detection alarm.
Site Alarm
For Fire Brigade
Emergency Team Pager Call Out
Process Control
As Existing FERM measures
Passive Fire Protection
As Existing FERM measures
Active Fire Protection
As Existing FERM measures and also removal of halon
system for the tanks.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
700 lpm for affected tank from fixed foam system.
Resources for Fire Brigade
Total = 700 lpm
Procedures
Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures
Hose
8 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam handline.
Total of 8 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.
Monitors
None.
Foam Concentrate
420 litres 3% fluoroprotein for rim seal.
270 litres 3% fluoroprotein for handlines.
Total
= 690 litres.
Specialist Equipment
Minimum 4 x SCBA sets
Manpower
2 fire responders for foam handline
2 fire responders for support/stand-by
1 fire responder for foam concentrate supply
Total of 5 fire responders
Vehicles
GU-230
1 x fire truck
1 x 6300 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker
REVISION 2.0
Page 20
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Port. Equip. Water Flow
450 lpm for foam handline.
Total = 450 lpm
Fixed and Port. Total Flow
700 lpm for fixed foam system
450 lpm for foam handline
Total = 1,150 lpm.
Total Water Quantity
(fixed & portable)
14 m3 for fixed foam system (20 minutes)
9 m3 for foam handline (20 minutes)
9 m3 for foam blanket top-up
Total = 32 m3.
SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
The following are listed as shortfalls in either procedures, hardware or resources when
compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or SP 1075 FERM as noted during the
development of this scenario worksheet:
i)
The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the fixed
foam system or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the
fire brigade who stand-by for most of the daylight hours at the airstrip, about 17 km
distant and may be there when this scenario develops. (Strategy Level 3 Issue)
ii)
Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but operators are
not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3 Issue)
iii)
There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the foam
station and no valve labels or descriptions. These should be provided.
iv)
Fire crews are not trained in the use of the fixed foam system.
v)
Fire crews are not trained to use foam handlines on a rim seal fire or for moving on
to a floating roof tank.
vi)
The foam system is not fully protected against direct sunlight and sand erosion. This
is leading to poor system condition.
vii)
The temperature varations are causing water condensation on the tank inside cover
that is affecting the foam concentrate. This is due to inadequate weather protection.
viii)
It is understood that the commissioning tests for the fixed foam system did not
include a foam proportioning, expansion or drainage test. This could not be
confirmed during the study period.
ix)
It is understood that there is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion and
drainage testing.
x)
Foam was discharged from the valve manifold connection during a brief flow test
(not to the tanks) and although there was no method of checking the quality or
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 21
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
proportioning of the foam the visual observations raised doubts over the produced
foam effectiveness for firefighting, mainly due to the firewater contamination.
xi)
There is no clear responsibility for the maintenance of the hardware/mechanical
components of fixed foam system.
DEHYDRATION TANK RIM SEAL FIRE
FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
USING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM HANDLINE
Tank Dia.
29.2 m
Tank Circumference
95 m
Foam Dam Distance
0.6 m
Foam Dam Area
95 x 0.6 = 57 m2
Foam Concentrate
3% Fluoroprotein
System Design Application Rate
12.2 lpm/m2 (NFPA)
Total Application Rate
57 x 12.2 = 700 lpm.
Foam Application Time
20 minutes
Total Concentrate Required
700 x 0.03 x 20 = 420 litres
Total Water Required
700 - 21 (3%) x 20 = 13.5 m3
Portable Foam Handline Application
Foam Branch Capacity
450 lpm
Application Time
20 minutes
Total Concentrate Required
450 x 0.03 x 20 = 270 litres
Total Water Required
450 - 14 (3%) x 20 minutes = 8.7m3
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 22
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
SCENARIO WORKSHEET 3
REFERENCE: XXX-3
FACILITY
Gas Conditioning Unit
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
3
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
Propane Compressor K-XXX. Single compressor. No sparing, no
stand-by.
FUNCTION
Propane compressor for refrigerant gas sweetening facilities.
Normal discharge pressure is approximately 20 barg at 5oC. Loss of
compressor would result in heavy flaring requirement and probable
shut down in the long term but oil production could continue in the
short term.
SCENARIO
Propane release from the compressor or associated
vessels/equipment on discharge side and ignition results in a jet fire
in the order of 25 metres in length. Jet flame diffuses against
compressor suction and interstage scrubber vessels. Heat detection
on compressor activates compressor ESD, gas conditioning ESD and
water deluge system for propane accumulator. No hydrocarbon
ESD. A hole size of 25mm on the high pressure side would release
in the order of 3 kg/second.
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety – Personnel are not normally present in the gas conditioning area. Personnel in
the general area may be at risk from radiant heat on ignition. Compressor is on upper level
but two escape routes provided. Grade level Pumps area is open on all sides. Life safety risk
is considered low.
Environment – Smoke pollution only.
Business interruption – Immediate propane compressor and gas conditioning ESD. No
hydrocarbon ESD but operators would probably shut down the station for such an incident.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Damage to insulation and instrument fittings and cabling
on compressor and associated equipment. Would shutdown immediately with resultant initial
production deferment of approximately 14,000 m3/day.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Escalation would be caused by a prolonged jet fire or diffused gas fire impinging on adjacent
gas containing piping or scrubber vessels or the propane accumulator vessel. For gas jet
fires, time to failure of other equipment would typically be in the order of 10 minutes or less
for piping and vessels if no cooling or control actions are taken. Gas jet flame impingement
would involve radiant heat levels of up to 300 kW/m 2. It should be noted that cooling must
be effective where the flame impingement occurs rather than having a light water screen for
radiant heat general protection.
Post Escalation
Life safety – Fire responders will be at serious risk if flame impingment occurs on gas
containing piping or equipment and no cooling takes place. All non-fire responders should
have evacuated the station.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 23
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Environment – Air pollution only.
Business interruption – Total station oil and gas shutdown due to hazards presented by
potential explosions and BLEVE’s.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment – Loss of propane compressor, vessels and piping would
result in several months shutdown. Production may be permitted for several days or more
without gas sweeting facility but wet gas export and heavy flaring would eventually impact on
equipment and enviroment. Therefore, production would be halted. Production deferment for
gas conditioning down time would be approximately 14,000 m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Compressor has seal gas leak detection alarm, vibration monitor alarm, high
temperature alarm, low pressure suction and high pressure discharge alarms as well as
suction low flow alarms.
Fire Event – Single heat detector located over compressor will cause a compressor ESD and
gas conditioning ESD, will activate the propane accumulator water deluge valve and site fire
siren.
Gas Event – No gas detection provided.
Mitigation
Process Controls – Compressor has seal gas leak detection trip, vibration monitor trip, high
temperature trip, low pressure suction trip/high pressure discharge trip and suction low flow
trip.
Containment – Not applicable.
Drainage – No spill drainage. Compressor base slab drains away from centres out to open
ground areas.
Passive Five Control – Adjacent propane accumulator has fireproofing of vessel
saddles/support. No passive protection on vessel or compressor associated vessels.
Active Fire Control – Firewater system taken from water injection header but it is unknown if
the water supply can be increased under fire/emergency conditions. Fire hydrants in the
general area of the export pumps. No fixed water monitors. 12 x fire boxes with typical
contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam
branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water branch.
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire System (for Propane Accumulator Vessel)
Applicability of type
Water deluge system is applicable for cooling gas vessels and protecting from radiant heat
where no gas jet impingement is anticipated. Gas jet fires, being pressurised, can penetrate a
water screen and cause vessel failure. The most effective method of protection where gas jet
fires may impinge is passive fire protective coatings.
However, the location of the propane accumulator to the high pressure propane compressor
is such that gas jet fire impingement is not likely. Any gas jet fire would diffuse on the
suction and interstage scrubber vessels in between the compressor and the accumulator.
These vessels will depressurise/blowdown but they should still be cooled if this scenario
occurs.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 24
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
System/Hardware Suitability
The fixed system hardware consists of open ended deluge nozzles with system kept normally
dry. There are no terminal flushing connections on the branch lines to ensure solids are
flushed out.
Reliability
The system failed to operate from a heat detector during a test requested by the study team.
The control room fire and gas panel indicated the system was activated and this led the
operators to believe the system was working since the panel was indicating this was the case.
The manual pneumatic valve had to be actuated at the deluge valve station to make the
system work. The pneumatic valve release solenoid switch was defective. In addition to this
defect, 10 of the 35 deluge nozzles failed to operate due to nozzle blockage by either
corrosion particles or other solids. It is necessary to provide screw plugs or valves at the
terminals of the deluge pipe branches to permit flushing after use. This will reduce, though
not eliminate nozzle blockage.
Operability
Automatic, remote manual and local manual operation all occur by pneumatic release.
However, from known jet fire potential, the manual actuation at the deluge valve station is
within radiant heat levels of 37kW/m2 and above from a jet fire event on the propane
accumulator vessel or associated equipment. The maximum radiant heat level allowed at a
deluge station is 5 kW/m2 and therefore radiation protective screening is considered
necessary.
Survivability (in incident)
If a jet fire impinges on the system piping or valving for <5 minutes without water flow then
system may fail.
An additional concern is that if a large propane liquid release occurs on the accumulator this
may quickly migrate toward the deluge valve controls because the vessel slab slopes toward
the water deluge valve. Calculations should be made to check if pool migration to the valve
assembly is possible.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm - Compressor and gas conditioning ESD - Operator confirms fire
event - Actuation of fixed water deluge for propane accumulator - Fire brigade response Fire brigade deploy portable water monitor to cool any heat affected exposures - Cooling
maintained until depressurisation - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 – Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and ensure
compressor and gas conditioning unit ESD. Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan and
ensures site alarm has actuated and alerts fire brigade.
Stage 2 – Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 – Control room alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and requests call out
of emergency team.
Stage 4 – Fire brigade arrive and ensure propane accumulator vessel water deluge is
activated.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 25
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Stage 5 – Fire brigade deploy and actuate portable water monitors to cool heat/fire affected
vessels and piping.
Stage 6 – Fire brigade evacuates to a safe distance to await gas depressurisation.
Stage 7 – Cooling operations maintained until depressurisation of gas fire. Any residual minor
gas flame extinguished by dry powder extinguisher if considered safe to do so.
Stage 8 – Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down announced.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process As Existing FERM measures.
Fire Event
As Existing FERM measures.
Gas Event
Point flammable gas detection for propane compressor.
Alarm system
For Operator Low flow alarms, high pressure alarms, vibration alarms, high temperature
alarms on compressor. Heat detection alarm. Site Alarm.
For Fire Brigade Emergency Team Pager Call Out
Process Control
As Existing FERM measures.
Passive Fire Protection
As Existing FERM.
Active Fire Protection
As Existing FERM measures plus method and procedures for
additional firewater supply and pressure under emergency conditions.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
spray nozzles @ 100 lpm.
Estimated at approximately 3,500 lpm based on a total of 35
Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures
Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures.
Hose
12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water monitor.
Total = 12 x 70mm delivery fire hose.
Monitors
2 x 3000 lpm portable water monitors.
Foam Concentrate
Not applicable for this scenario.
Specialist equipment Not applicable for this scenario.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 26
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Manpower
6 fire responders for setting up two water monitors.
Total of 6 fire responders.
Vehicles
1 x fire truck.
Port. Equip. Water Flow
6000 lpm for water monitors.
Total = 6,000 lpm
Fixed and Port. Total Flow
3500 lpm for fixed water deluge system
6000 lpm for water monitors
Total = 9,500 lpm
Total Water Quality
105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)
180 m3 for water monitors (30 minutes)
Total = 285 m3.
SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
The following are listed as shortfalls in either procedures, hardware or resources when
compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or SP 1075 FERM as noted during the
development of this scenario worksheet:
i)
Existing fire response personnel limited to 5 only. A minimum of 6 responders are
required for this scenario.
ii)
The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for the fixed
systems. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire brigade who may be on standby or out on maintenance work or at the airstrip when this scenario develops.
iii)
Radiant heat potential from a gas jet fire on the propane accumulator in the direction
of the water deluge valve will exceed the limit of 5 kW/m 2, there is no protection for
personnel who may have to manually operate the deluge system.
iv)
10 of the 35 water deluge nozzles for the propane accumulator were blocked during
a functional test of the system. The reduced water coverage was inadequate to
provide protection under fire conditons. (Fire Equipment Maintenance).
v)
No point combustible gas detectors at the propane compressor. Criticality of
compressor and associated equipment for production is such that earliest possible
gas release alarm should be considered.
vi)
The water deluge valves on the discharge piping are correctly wire padlocked in the
open position but the valve can actually be closed with this wire and padlock in place.
vii)
Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but operators are
not trained to use equipment in boxes.
viii)
No known procedure or method for increasing firewater pressure/supply under
emergency conditions.
ix)
No reference to gas detection in SP 1075 for propane vessels (propane accumulator).
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 27
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
x)
GU-230
The propane accumulator vessel slab slopes to allow drainage of a propane liquid
release but the slope is toward the deluge supply piping and valve assembly and
disable the system. The Specification does not have reference to the provision of
sloping drainage under LPG vessels but this is an acceptable practice provided the
slope is not directed to protective systems or potential escalation areas. This should
be mentioned in the Specification.
REVISION 2.0
Page 28
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Attachment I: Blank Fire Scenario Work Sheet
Notes:
GU-230
1)
The first worksheet contains guidance notes (4 pages).
2)
The second work sheet is blank for copying for use (4 pages).
REVISION 2.0
Page 29
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
SCENARIO WORKSHEET (Guidance Notes)
REFERENCE:
FACILITY
Operation or process
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
For the overall station or facility
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
Particular item or vessels or tank
FUNCTION
Process performed, it’s criticality etc.
SCENARIO
Credible description of a major or serious fire event and if
any ESD will occur
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety
Any immediate impact on personnel
Environment
On enviroment
Business interruption
By ESD for fire event
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
Immediate effects of fire
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
If any escalation, the method/route that this may take and the rough time frames in which
the escalation may occur.
Post Escalation
Life safety
Impact after escalation
Environment
As above
Business interruption
As above
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
As above
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Means of detecting a leak or release through process alarms
Fire Event
The type of detection provided
Gas Event
The type of detection provided
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 30
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Mitigation
Process Controls
For mitigation (ESD, manual isolation, trips etc.)
Containment
Once spill/release occurs, any physical containment (bunds etc.)
Drainage
Process drains or OWS etc.
If any for vessel supports, structures etc.
Passive Fire Control
Active Fire Control
extinguishers.
All fire systems and equipment, other than portable fire
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems
Applicability of Type
For the hazard
System/Hardware Suitability
etc.
For the environment, operating conditions, type of system
Reliability
Any previous spurious alarms or discharges. Availability,
additional maintenance, complexity of operation etc.
Operability
Auto, remote, local functions and transparancy of operation.
Survivability (in incident)
If required to survive the scenario immediate impact or
scenario duration, can it survive.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Headings on what should occur and from what equipment or systems, and the fire fighting
strategy necessary to effectively contain, control and if necessary, extinguish the fire event.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 Logical staged actions from the moment the alarm is raised or received.
Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
What hardware, systems and/or equipment is required for operations or other non fire
brigade personnel to deal with the incident in accordance with the chosen strategy. To meet
the strategy the requirements may be more than the existing FERM but should still be listed
below. The short falls are itemised as part of the facility plan.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 31
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Detection
Process
Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over and
above the existing.
Fire Event
Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over and
above the existing.
Gas Event
Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over and
above the existing.
Alarm system
For Operator
Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the operators.
For Fire Brigade
Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the fire brigade.
Process Control
Passive Fire Protection
Either as existing FERM measurements or the specific
requirements over and above the existing.
Active Fire Protection
Either as existing FERM measurements or the specific
requirements over and above the existing.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
Lpm for fire systems (water based systems only)
Resources for Fire Brigade
These heading apply only to the fire brigade (or fire responders) resources to combat the fire
event.
Procedures
What procedures or plans they should have for the response.
Hose
Quantity and sizes.
Monitors
Type, quantity and capacity.
Foam Concentrate
Type and quantity.
Specialist Equipment
Type and quantity.
Manpower
Total for all actions required.
Vehicles
Limited to the type available only.
Port. Equip. Water Flow
Monitors, water or foam hand lines etc.
Fixed and Port. Total Flow
Total including any fixed system flow plus the portable
equipment flow.
Total Water Quantity
(fixed & portable)
Self explanatory.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 32
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
Some of these will be identified from the resources required to meet the strategy level but
some may also be noted as short falls in maintenance or location of equipment or other
deficiency during the development of the scenario. As far as possible, where a short fall item
is listed, reference should be made to why, either by use of the SP1075 FERM or DEP or
ICAO requirements.
SCENARIO REFERENCE:
FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
Fire Area
m2
Foam Concentrate
Type and ratio
Design Application Rate
lpm/m2
Total Application Rate
lpm/m2
Foam Application Time
minutes
Total Concentrate Required
litres
Total Water Required
m3
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 33
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE:
FACILITY
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
FUNCTION
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Post Escalation
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 34
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Mitigation
Process Controls
Containment
Drainage
Passive Fire Control
Active Fire Control
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems
Applicability of Type
System/Hardware Suitability
Reliability
Operability
Survivability (in incident)
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 35
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Alarm system
For Operator
For Fire Brigade
Process Control
Passive Fire Protection
Active Fire Protection
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures
Hose
Monitors
Foam Concentrate
Specialist Equipment
Manpower
Vehicles
Port. Equip. Water Flow
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 36
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Fixed and Port. Total Flow
Total Water Quantity
(fixed & portable)
SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
SCENARIO REFERENCE:
FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
Fire Area
Foam Concentrate
Design Application Rate
Total Application Rate
Foam Application Time
Total Concentrate Required
Total Water Required
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 37
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Attachment II: Blank Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet
Notes:
(1)
(2)
GU-230
The first pre-fire plan sheet contains guidance notes (2 pages).
The second pre-fire plan sheet is a blank for use (2 pages).
REVISION 2.0
Page 38
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
Typically, immediate actions will
be for operations.
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
Operator actions in terms of reaction and procedures and call
out etc.
1st RESPONSE
The obvious hardware resources necessary to carry out the actions.
ACTIONS
Typically this will involce the OSC
or persons designated by the OSC.
RESOURCES REQUIRED
What fire control or fire event related actions should be taken
on arrival by the OSC or his designated personnel
2nd RESPONSE
ACTIONS
Typically, this will involve the fire
brigade or OSC or other identified
person.
As above
RESOURCES REQUIRED
Normally, the fire containment or fire control or extinguishing
actions required for the fire event.
These resources here should match the fire equipment, foam concentrate etc.
listed in the scenarios.
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:
Any actions which could assist in the control of the incident of which the responders should be aware. Any concerns which may impact on the course of actions to control the
incident.
ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :
Hazards which may endanger fire responders or non fire personnel, or the environment etc.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 39
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY
A description of the strategy to be adopted for the fire, including the operator responses and fire brigade actions.
CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS
1
2
3
4
5
6
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 40
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
1st RESPONSE
2nd RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:
ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 41
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY
CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS
1
2
3
4
5
6
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 42
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
Attachment III: Blank Fire Responder Competencies
Notes:
(1) The first fire responder competencies sheet contains guidance (1 page).
(2) The second sheet is a blank for use (1 page).
GU-230
REVISION 1.0
Page 43
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:
KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:
This should list the knowledge required by the fire responder for dealing with the particular scenario, including the emergency plan, team composition, chain of
commond and specifics including knowledge of the equipment and locations.
COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
Describe what the responder knows.
RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:
What are the fire responders capabilities ?
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
To list what the responder can demonstrate, eg. wearing of PPE, method of running hoses etc.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 44
HSE – GUIDELINE
Recommending Best Practice
FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:
KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:
COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 45