Contemporary Ethical Theory
Philosophy 440: 49466R
Fall 2010
MW 2:00 – 3:15
John Dreher
Office: MHP 211
x05173
dreher@usc.edu
Hours: Aug 23 – Wed Dec 1
Mon 10:30 - 11:30
Wed 9:30 – 10:30
Hours: Dec 5 – Dec 13
TBD
Last Minute Review for Final Examination:
Fri Dec 10 1 – 2
Final Examination:
Fri Dec 10 2 - 4
Materials: 1. Cahn and Haber, 20th Century Ethical Theory, Prentice Hall, 1995,
ISBN 0-02-318031-5. Except for readings from R.M. Hare, Moral
Thinking and M. Smith, The Moral Problem, all required reading
assignments listed refer to Cahn & Haber.
2. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981,
ISBN 0-19-824660-9
3. Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Inc,
1994, ISBN 0-631-19246-8.
Description: This course is an introduction to ethical theory in the twentieth century as
it was carried on in the tradition of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The course
emphasizes what is called ‘meta-ethics,’ meaning the study of the semantics of moral
discourse and the rationality of moral belief. However, the course will not neglect the
development of various substantive theoretical theories, including neo-Aristotelianism,
neo-Kantianism and Utilitarianism. The readings from the pre-WWII era will be taken
up in chronological order, to give a sense of the dialectic of the great debates of the
twentieth century between cognitivist and noncognitivist theories. Readings from the
post-WWII era will be organized thematically.
Requirements: There will be two midterm examinations during the course of the
semester. These examinations will test for knowledge of the reading assignments as well
as the expository and supplementary information delivered during class. There will also
be a final examination. Class attendance is very strongly recommended. Students
planning an absence should notify the instructor in advance and make arrangements with
classmate to record the lecture.
A term paper is required and will be due on Wed, Dec the 1st. The term paper should
not be merely expository, but rather should be an analytic piece examining a fragment of
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one of the themes developed in the course. For most topics, a suitable length will be ten
to twenty pages. Please identify your topic well in advance of the Wed Nov the 3rd
deadline. Electronic submission of the paper is desirable. In case the paper is submitted
electronically, comments will be returned electronically. Please enter the subject line of
an electronic submission in the following format: <LAST NAME FIRST NAME>PHIL
440 F 10 TERM PAPER<TITLE>. Papers that are late will be penalized as follows: up
to 48 hours: 1/3 of a letter grade; for more than 48 hours: 2/3 of a letter grade. No term
paper will be accepted after the final examination. In the event that a term paper is not
submitted, the final COURSE grade will be lowered by one full letter grade. The grade
of “IN” will be given only for documented illness or family emergency.
There will be a final examination held at the time and place indicated in the Schedule
of Classes. Part I of the final examination will test for knowledge of material taken up
after the second midterm. Part II of the final examination will be a comprehensive
question, dealing with the main ideas of the course. The final grade will be calculated as
follows:
Weighting of grades:
Midterm #1: 1/6
Midterm #2: 1/6
Term Paper: 1/3
Final Exam Part I: 1/6
Final Exam Part II: 1/6.
Grade scale:
94: A
90: A –
87: B +
84: B
80: B –
and so forth.
Please remember that the University strictly prohibits plagiarism, which can be the
mere failure to acknowledge the work of another as well as the deliberate
misrepresentation of the work of another as your own. You must acknowledge your
indebtedness not only to the ideas of others but also to their words.
Schedule of Readings, Assignments and Examinations:
1. Mon, Aug 23: Introduction: Kantian and Utilitarian Background; Twentieth
Century Ethical Theory: Cognitivism/Noncognitivism;
Realism/Anti-Realism Introduction
2. Wed, Aug 25:
G.E. Moore, ‘The Subject Matter of Ethics’ (from Principia
Ethica), pp. 12 – 32.
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3. Mon, Aug 30: H.A. Prichard, ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’
(from Mind, 21, 1912), pp. 37 – 47. W.D. Ross, ‘What Makes
Right Acts Right’ (from The Right and the Good),
pp. 87 – 107.
4. Wed, Sep 1: L. Wittgenstein, ‘A Lecture on Ethics,’ pp. 81 – 86.
5. Mon, Sep 6: Labor Day
6. Wed, Sep 8: J. Ayer, ‘A Critique of Ethics’ (from Language, Truth and
Logic), pp. 108 – 15.
9. Fri Sep 11:
C. Stevenson, ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,’ (from
Mind 46, 1937), pp. 116 – 28; ‘The Nature of Ethical
Disagreement,’ (from Facts and Values, 1963, first published,
1941), pp. 138 – 144.
7. Mon, Sep 13: Review for Examination
8. Wed, Sep 15:
Midterm Examination #1
9. Mon, Sep 20: J. Mackie, ‘A Refutation of Morals’ (from Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, pp. 1946. J. Mackie, ‘A Refutation of Morals’
(from Australasian Journal of Philosophy, pp. 1946), pp. 145 – 152.
10. Wed, Sep 22: J. Rawls, ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,’ 1951,
pp. 212 – 224.
11. Mon, Sep 27: R. Firth, ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,’
(from: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12:2, 1952),
pp. 225 – 46. K. Baier, ‘The Point of View of Morality’
(from: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1954), pp. 247 – 263.
12. Wed, Sep 29: Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy
13. Mon, Oct 4:
P. Geach, ‘Good and Evil’ (from: Analysis 17, 1956),
pp. 300 – 306. G. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’
(Philosophy 33, 1958), pp. 351 -64.
14. Wed Oct 6:
P. Foot, ‘Moral Beliefs’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 59, 1958-59), pp. 365 – 77.
15. Mon, Oct 11: P. Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’ (from Virtues and Vices and Other
Essay in Moral Philosophy, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1979), pp. 583 – 93.
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16. Wed, Oct 13: Kantian Moral Philosophy
17. Mon, Oct 18: P. Foot, ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,’
1972, pp. 448 – 456.
18. Wed, Oct 20: T. Nagel, ‘Moral Luck,’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
50, 1976), pp. 573 – 582.
19. Mon, Oct 25: Review form Midterm #2
20. Wed, Oct 27: Midterm #2
21. Mon, Nov 1: J. Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ 1955, pp. 273 – 90.
22. Wed, Nov 3: Utilitarianism, T. Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ (from
Utilitarianism and Beyond, A. Sen and B., Williams, eds., New
York, Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 647 – 666.
Last Day to Identify Term Paper Topic
23. Mon, Nov 8: B. Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, (from Utilitarianism,
For and Against, edited, by J.J. Smart and Bernard
Williams, New York, Cambridge University Press,
1973), pp. 457 – 75. B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character and
Morality,’ (from Moral Luck, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1981),
pp. 634 – 47.
24. Wed, Nov 10: R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, pp. 1 – 86.
25. Mon, Nov 15: R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, pp 87 – 116.
26. Wed, Nov 17: M. Smith, The Moral Problem, pp. 42 – 59.
27. Mon, Nov 22: M Smith, The Moral Problem, pp. 42 – 69, 92 – 136; 147 - 49
28. Wed, Nov 24: Review and Discussion
29. Mon, Nov 29: Review for Final Examination
30. Wed, Dec 1: Review for final Examination
Term Paper Due
Study Questions
The questions below are designed to help you focus on the most important parts of the
readings and lectures. Naturally the topics and questions addressed in the questions are
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the ones that are most likely to be included on the midterm and final examinations.
There may be additions to the list of the study questions during the semester and the
questions themselves may be modified.
1. What reason does Moore give for his contention that good cannot be a natural
property? According to Moore, ‘propositions about the good are all of them synthetic
and never analytic.’ (p. 15) What does Moore mean by this claim?
2. What is Moore’s famous “Open Question Argument”? What is it meant to prove?
What is the mistake in reasoning that Moore calls the “Naturalistic Fallacy?”
3. What does Moore mean by a ‘real definition’? Suppose that the property yellow were
defined as the color of objects that reflect visible light of wavelengths in the 570 nm
range. Could this, according to Moore, be a successful real definition? Why or why not?
What difficulties would arise, according to Moore, in giving a parallel ‘definition’ of the
property good?
4. What according to Prichard is the “mistake” upon which all moral philosophy rests?
What reason is there for thinking that ideal utilitarianism and Kantian moral philosophy
rests upon the “mistake”?
5. Did Thrasymachus make a mistake when he asked why anyone should be just? In
what sense is ‘just’ plausibly used in Thrasymachus’s question? Can Thrasymachus’s
question be successfully generalized by Prichard to apply to whatever we ought to do?
6. In his paper ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest On a Mistake?’ Prichard claims that
traditional moral philosophy, like traditional theory of knowledge, asks a question that
cannot be answered and hence that neither of the two questions really makes sense. What
are those two questions? What question or doubt about ethics is Prichard trying to relieve
by drawing his famous analogy between ethics and theory of knowledge?
7. How, according to Prichard, should we answer someone who asks: “Why should I do
what I ought to do?” Is his answer reasonable?
8. What according to Ross are the problems with utilitarianism and Kantian moral
philosophy that force us to think of prima facia duties as parti-resultant attributes?
9. What problem in traditional ethics does Ross attempt to address by his theory of prima
facie duties? How does that problem arise for ideal utilitarianism? How does it arise for
Kantian ethics?
10. Can Ross’s approach generate a decision procedure for ethics? If so, how? If not,
does it follow that ethics is in some way subjectivist? If so, what way? If not, how is the
appearance of subjectivity to be explained away?
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11. In ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ Wittgenstein distinguishes between relative judgments of
value and absolute judgments of value. What is this distinction, and what, according to
Wittgenstein, is its significance for ethics? How is the Verifiability Theory of Meaning
relevant to Wittgenstein’s distinction between absolute and relative value?
12. According to Wittgenstein, in what ways do we attempt to extend our frame of
reference when we use religious or moral language? What difficulties do those attempts
raise for understanding moral and religious discourse?
13. If ethical discourse is to be understood as simile (or metaphor), then what is ethics a
likeness of (or a metaphor for)?
14. According to Ayer, what is the subject matter of ethics? Where have others gone
wrong in identifying the subject matter of ethics?
15. According to Ayer, how does his own positivist understanding of ethical discourse
differ from more traditional subjectivist theories, like purely idiosyncratic theories or
conventionalist theories?
16. According to Stevenson, how are the purposes of moral language related to the
meanings of moral terms? In your answer be sure to explain Stevenson’s concept of
emotive meaning and how it is related to dynamic uses of moral language.
17. How, according to Stevenson, can apparent moral disagreement be addressed?
18. What is anti-realism in ethics? What arguments does Mackie present for his version
of anti-realism? How do anti-realism and non-cognitivism differ? Is one view better
equipped to explain moral language than the other?
19. How are the privileged observer theories of the 50s by Rawls, Firth and K. Baier
related to Hume’s theory, which is that a quality or action is good if and only if it elicits
the sentiment of moral approbation in the (disinterested) observer who takes the “general
and steady point of view”?
20. What is the role of explications within Rawls’ description of a decision procedure by
which we may for a time reach agreement, if not consensus, about moral issues?
21. In what ways does Firth’s ideal observer theory make use of subjunctive and
counterfactual conditionals? What difficulties do they cause in the application of Firth’s
theory?
22. To what extent must K. Baier’s theory allow for moral relativism?
23. How does Geach argue for the claim that an adjective like ‘big’ is a “logical
attributive”?
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24. Why, according to Geach, is it impossible to judge a person to be good simpliciter?
In what sense does Geach’s view about ‘good’ commit him to Aristotelian ethical theory?
25. According to Anscombe, what insurmountable obstacle must modern moral
philosophy overcome?
26. For Anscombe, what remains of moral philosophy once we have given up its claim to
law-like commands?
27. How does Foot attempt to deal with the two-component view of thick moral terms?
28. What, according to Foot, is a moral virtue? What role do the virtues play in human
life? Are the virtues essential to a ‘good’ life? What, for a neo-Aristotelian, can we
mean by ‘a good life’?
29. According to Foot, does the fact that moral virtue makes right action easy diminish
or increase the moral worth of moral virtues and the right actions that they facilitate
30. J.L. Mackie argues that it is possible to be a moral skeptic at the second order level
but a conventionalist at the first-order level. What does this mean? Is it plausible?
31. Mackie argues that there are two reasons to believe in ethical skepticism: The
Argument for Disagreement and the Argument from Queerness. What are these two
arguments; how are they related to each other?
32. In “Two Concepts of Rules,” Rawls distinguishes between the legislative and
juridical roles played by moral theory. What is this distinction, and why is it significant?
33. According to Rawls in “Two Concepts of Rules,” is it possible to punish a person
that one knows to be innocent? Why or why not?
34. According to Williams, utilitarianism is open to the objection that it doesn’t
adequately count the importance of moral integrity. What is Williams’s argument for this
dramatic claim? Is it plausible?
35. According to Williams, one’s personal projects are important in defining one’s own
identity. In what way does this attachment to one’s own integrity tend to undermine
Kantian moral thinking, at least according to Williams? Does Kant have anything to say
in response?
36. What, according to R.M. Hare, are the three defining characteristics of moral claims?
How do these defining characteristics enable us to draw substantive conclusions about
how to think about morals rationally?
37. What is the role of the concept of suffering in R.M. Hare’s preference utilitarianism?
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What according to Hare are the advantages of preference utilitarianism over hedonic
utilitarianism?
38. How does Hare deal with the fact that now-for-then preferences seem to
underestimate the value of then-for-then preferences; what is the consequence for
preference utilitarianism? What simplifying assumption does Hare introduce to facilitate
his elegant statement of preference utilitarianism?
39. What according to Michael Smith is “the moral problem”?
40. What is a network analysis of moral terms, and what is the permutation problem that
it faces? How does Smith’s summary style non-reductive analysis hope to improve upon
a network analysis?
41. What, according to Smith, is the externalist challenge to moral theory? How is it
related to his conception of “the moral problem”?
42. According to Smith, there can be moral reasons for modifying our desires. How is
this claim relevant to the “practicality platitude” and to Smith’s solution of “the moral
problem”?
43. What is radical subjectivism in ethics? State and evaluate one attempt to overcome
radical subjectivism in ethics by post-WWII philosophers.
44. Is it possible to draw conclusions about first order moral questions from meta-ethical
premises alone?
45. What role does epistemological access play in contemporary ethical theory?
46. How did the development of Logical Positivism influence the development of metaethics in 20th century moral philosophy?
47. Can 20th century versions of Aristotelian virtue ethics avoid making objectionable
metaphysical assumptions about human nature?
48. How is the distinction between relativist and absolutist ethical theories relevant to
the distinctions (a) between real and anti-realist theories and (b) between cognitivist and
non-cognitivist theories?
49. Is relativism objectionable on the ground that it cannot accommodate the “fact” of
moral disagreement?