MORAL POTENCY: BUILDING THE CAPACITY FOR CHARACTER-BASED
LEADERSHIP
Sean T. Hannah
Director, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic
West Point - United States Military Academy
646 Swift Road
West Point, NY 10996
(845) 496-8747
Sean.hannah@usma.edu
Bruce J. Avolio
Marion B. Ingersoll Professor of Management
Michael G. Foster School of Business
University of Washington
Management and Organization Department
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
206-543-4367
bavolio@u.washington.edu
In Press in the Consulting Psychology Journal
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Abstract
In this paper we propose a new construct titled moral potency and its component
elements: moral courage, moral efficacy, and moral ownership. We propose that moral potency
is a critical factor in developing leaders who have the conation to act on their moral judgments
and behave as leaders of character. Further, we offer suggestions for developing moral potency
and each of its components. Finally, we offer a new measure and preliminary findings to assess
the dimensions of moral potency, while offering suggestions for future avenues for research and
practice.
Keywords: leadership, moral efficacy, moral courage, moral ownership, agency, character
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MORAL POTENCY: BUILDING THE CAPACITY FOR ETHICAL LEADERSHIP
There is growing recognition that organizations operate in more complex and ambiguous
contexts where leaders and their followers face challenging moral dilemmas that must be
resolved; while often with the competing needs and values of multiple stakeholders (Donaldson,
2003; George, 2007). Paralleling the rise in complexity, many believe that the scope and scale of
malfeasance in organizations is also on the rise (George, 2007). Indeed, a 2007 national study
reported that 77% of participants responded as agreeing or strongly agreeing that there was a
crisis of confidence in America’s leaders (Rosenthal, Pittinsky, Purvin, & Montoya, 2007).
Whether driven by heightened ethical consciousness or response to public scrutiny, many
organizational leaders have assumed a larger role in seeking to build cultures and performance
management processes that develop ethical leadership. In the current paper, we offer a new
perspective and a tool to enhance the moral development of organizational leaders by addressing
what we believe is a key missing element in the research on ethical and character-based
leadership that we refer to as moral potency. A guiding question for our work can be stated as,
Why do leaders who know what the right ethical decision or action to take is still fail to action
when action is clearly warranted? We suggest that the gap between knowing and doing what is
right is partially explained by the concept of moral potency and present arguments and evidence
in this paper to justify our position.
We define moral potency as a psychological state marked by an experienced sense of
ownership over the moral aspects of one’s environment, reinforced by efficacy beliefs in the
capabilities to act to achieve moral purpose in that domain, and the courage to perform in the
face of adversity and persevere through challenges. Moral potency is a psychological state that
can be impacted by the context in which a leader is operating, as well as through developmental
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intervention. Moral potency is a psychological resource that is more open to change than any
personality trait, and is therefore expected to vary more from one context to another. For
example, a leader may exhibit higher levels of moral potency in a context where they are faced
with confronting peers than they would where they must face their supervisor.
To date, the academic community has provided practitioners with a very limited set of
theoretical models and tools with which to develop leaders of character. The most prevalent
models for character or moral1 development have focused primarily on aspects of cognition or
judgment, most typified by Jean Piaget (1932/1965) and Lawrence Kohlberg’s (Kohlberg, 1981;
Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) models of cognitive moral development, and James Rest’s (Rest,
Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) four component model. While these models offer significant
guidance in how to develop the way individuals make judgments about moral issues, they
neglect to determine how those judgments result in actual intentions and behavior – particularly
in complex, ambiguous contexts where leaders often face competing values and loyalties. Simply
put, a leader may know something is not ethical, but whether he or she has the conation or
impetus to act on that judgment is still unknown.
The lack of connection between a leader knowing what’s right and doing what’s right is
quite problematic in that we know that attitudes and judgments in general (Ajzen, 1991), as well
as ethical judgments in particular (Bebeau, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990),
have generated relatively weak relationships when predicting actual ethical behavior. In fact,
Rest et al. (1999, p. 101) report that the Defining Issues Test (DIT), the most commonly used
measure of cognitive moral development, typically explains less than 20% of the variance in
actual ethical choices or behavior. Yet, despite this limitation, ethics research continues to focus
on how ethical judgments are made as opposed to how those judgments once made are enacted,
1
This article will treat the terms moral and ethical as synonyms.
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as shown in an array of recent literature reviews (see O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel
& Smith-Crowe, 2008; Treviño, Weaver & Reynolds, 2006).
By just focusing on moral judgments (one’s capacity) we in effect leave about 80% of the
variance in ethical behavior unexplained. It is therefore somewhat surprising that most ethical
development programs still focus on training participants how to interpret and make judgments
about ethical cases and vignettes; as opposed to determining how to enhance the motivation to
actually act once a moral judgment has been reached (e.g., Bebeau, 2002; Hartwell, 1995).
Moral potency represents an individual’s ethical psychological resources and includes the
components of moral ownership, courage, and efficacy. We propose that a leader’s character is
defined not only by what the leader thinks but also by their motivation to act to address ethical
dilemmas. Indeed, character, Aristotle states, “is that which reveals choice, shows what sort of
thing a man chooses or avoids in circumstances where the choice is not obvious, so those
speeches convey no character in which there is nothing whatever which the speaker chooses or
avoids” (Nussbaum, 1992, p.117). In sum, as shown in Figure 1, we propose that moral potency
provides leaders with the psychological resources that bridge moral thought to moral action.
---------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 About Here
---------------------------------------To be clear, we are not stating that previous researchers or practitioners have failed to
specify the relevant processes associated with moral judgment. In fact, Rest’s four-component
model identified that judgments must be preceded by moral awareness and then they must be
followed by the formation of intentions to act, and ultimately, action. Rest et al. (1999, p. 102)
note, however, that besides some “forays into studying Components 3 and 4 [i.e., intentions and
action],” little work has been done to explain aspects of moral motivation/intentions and moral
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character/action. Rest and his coauthors further state that, “we believe that the overall progress in
the larger enterprise of moral psychology can be viewed in terms of how well research
progresses in all four inner psychological components leads to outwardly observable behavior”.
Moral potency is intended to begin to fill this gap in leader character development.
In sum, in this paper we will 1) examine the moral potency construct and its associated
elements of moral courage, moral efficacy, and moral ownership and explain their critical
importance to what we observe as a leader’s character and ethical behavior, 2) present initial
evidence for a measure of moral potency, and 3) present ideas regarding how to develop these
capacities in organizational leaders along with suggestions for future research and practice.
The focus we take here is on who the leader is in terms of the way a leader thinks about
moral dilemmas and the motivation that leader has to take action once a judgment is reached. In
that regard, we are focusing more on the antecedents to ethical leadership behavior than on the
behavior itself, which has been the primary focus of other research (see Brown, Treviño, &
Harrison, 2005; Treviño, Brown, & Pincus-Hartman, 2003). Our approach may thus expand
current models of character-based leadership by identifying in part its source.
Conceptualizing Moral Potency
To determine the psychological resources that provide leaders’ conation for ethical
action, we draw from the literature on 1) human agency and psychological ownership (e.g.,
Avey, Avolio, Crossley & Luthans, 2008; Bandura, 1991, 1999; May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004;
Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003), 2) courage (e.g., Goud, 2005; Kidder, 2003), and 3) self and
means efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Eden, 2001) to identify the key indicators of moral potency.
Together we propose these psychological resources instill in leaders that it is their place to act
(i.e., ownership), that they can be successful in those actions (i.e., moral efficacy), and can
overcome fears to persevere and see those actions through to resolution (i.e., moral courage).
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It is important to note from the outset our position that each of these three components of
moral potency is necessary but not sufficient – leaders require adequate levels of all three to
promote consistent ethical action. We propose that leaders exhibiting high levels of moral
potency will also be viewed by their followers as being more authentic in that they take
ownership, and have the courage and confidence to traverse the influence of group norms and
authority to take the action they deem appropriate to pursue based on their moral values and
judgment (Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans, & May, 2004; Avolio & Gardner, 2005).
Moral Ownership
Kohlberg and Candee (1984) stated that people must first make judgments of
responsibility before they will initiate dedicated moral judgments and actions. We propose that
the psychological process underpinning such judgments of responsibility stems from a sense of
ownership over the ethical conduct of oneself, and for leaders or even teams in terms of shared
leadership, over others in their sphere of influence. Ownership is critical in that even though a
certain leader may be unwilling to commit an immoral act themselves (i.e., ethical commission),
if lacking in moral ownership, that leader may allow unethical things to happen in their sphere of
influence or for others to act unethically without intervention (i.e., ethical omission).
Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) presented ownership as a feeling by organization members
that their work and their organization is theirs and that they have a responsibility to act in ways
that serve the long term interest of the organization. Pierce, et al. (2003) further define ownership
as “the state in which individuals feel as though the target of ownership or a piece of that target
is theirs” (p. 86); and these “targets” can be tangible, such as an office, equipment, or product, or
can also be less tangible such as a ethics, mission or purpose (Rousseau, 1998). Here we extend
this thinking to a specific form of moral ownership defined by the extent leaders feel a sense of
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psychological responsibility over the ethical nature of their own actions, those of others around
them, and their organization.
Psychological underpinnings of ownership. The mechanisms that create moral ownership
may be informed by Bandura’s (1991, 1999) theory of moral agency. Bandura defines agency as
the capacity to exercise control over the nature and quality of one’s life, and stems from an
interactive and reciprocal causation between the person, his or her behavior, and the environment
(Bandura, 2002). Leaders “own” their experiences when they interpret those experiences and
plan their future actions in ways that portray their values and beliefs, thereby shaping their
context in ways desired—and through this reciprocation leaders are producers as well as
products of their environments (Bandura, 2002). Leaders with less agency/ownership may
interpret themselves as mere products of their context and therefore be less prone to step up
when there are conflicts with their internal standards (acts of ethical omission) or be more likely
to join others in their context that are acting unethically (acts of ethical commission).
Bandura (1991, 1999) proposes that people with higher moral agency employ selfregulation strategies when either their own behavior or their environment is inconsistent with
their identity and values. In such cases, the individual will seek to alter their behavior to be
consistent with their identity, or through their behavior seek to influence their environment to be
self-consistent. It is this identity-based self-regulatory function that we believe explains moral
ownership. Indeed, Dittmar (1992) suggested that targets of ownership can become so associated
with one’s self-identity that they can become viewed as an extension of the self. A leader in an
accounting department, for example, may come to view the level of accuracy of audit reports her
office completes as a representation of her own ethicality. When this occurs, moral ownership
can create strong motivational forces to act ethically once an ethical judgment has been reached.
We now draw from theories of identity-based motivation to better explain this self-
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regulatory function underlying moral ownership. Various researchers have proposed theories of
moral identity, stating that a coherent moral identity motivates self-consistent moral action
across situations (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Hardy & Carlo, 2005). While we
generally agree with the focus of this research, we also think it can be enhanced by incorporating
self-complexity theory. How? Leaders’ identities are better described as an assemblage of
identities rather than some global whole (Hannah, Woolfolk, & Lord, 2009; Peterson, 1994;
Stahlberg, Peterson & Dauenheimer, 1999). That is, the content (e.g., values) in a leader’s
“company spokesperson” sub-identity likely differs in some ways from that in their “accounting
team leader” sub-identity or their “parent” sub-identity. This leads us to consider that the
dimensions of moral potency are more state-like then trait-based as compared to the more global
conceptualizations associated with prior moral identity research (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002).
Research on self-verification (Swann, 1983), self-concordance (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998)
and cybernetic self-regulatory processes (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2004) has shown that when
aspects of identity related to specific values or ideals are salient, it creates a strong impetus to act
in line with those values in order to establish coherence with the self and thereby maintain a
positive self-evaluation (e.g., self-esteem). Yet, supporting our focus on self-complexity,
research has shown that aspects of one’s identity can be defined as more or less central in
importance to an individual depending on the context. When an identity aspect is considered
central or self-schematic (e.g., that of nurturer in a leader’s mentor identity), individuals have a
strong impulse to verify that aspect by acting accordingly (e.g., being nurturing). Conversely, in
areas less central to a sub-identity or aschematic (e.g., nurturer in a disciplinarian role),
individuals are less motivated to behave to verify those aspects of the self, and are thus more
likely to act inconsistently, particularly when another behavior can reap higher rewards
(Peterson, 1994; Stahlberg, et al., 1999).
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In sum, this literature suggests that moral ownership can be more or less central to subidentities and will be experienced when relevant aspects of morality are central to an activated
identity. When these aspects are central, the motivation for leaders to act consistent with them
and to influence their context to support that motivation will also be higher.
Disengagement of ownership and self-deception. On the dark side of leader self identity,
we also know that leaders are capable of deriving and enacting strategies which can delink their
identity from their behaviors (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007). This is especially true for
aschematic aspects of identity that are not central to the way a leader defines him or herself in a
specific context. Consequently, we propose that leaders that have less moral ownership to act in
certain situations would also be more prone to this delinking process. These leaders would
therefore be more likely to commit acts of ethical omission and commission by protecting their
self-concept through processes of moral disengagement or self-deception.
Bandura (1999) describes moral disengagement as practices of self-deceit whereby a
person justifies or discounts their unethical action/inactions in ways that protect their self-image.
Bandura provides six forms of moral disengagement including advantageous comparisons (e.g.,
“well at least our actions weren’t as bad as what our competitors would do”), justifications that
attribute blame to victims (e.g., “they were asking for it”), diffusion of responsibility (e.g., we
wouldn’t have to do this if headquarters didn’t demand such a high profit margin”),
dehumanizing victims (e.g., ”the competition is a bunch of snakes”), choosing to not recognize
the extent of harm (e.g., “it will only put some people out of work”), and using sanitizing
language or euphemisms (e.g., “a bomber ‘servicing’ a target causes ‘collateral damage’”). Any
of these moral disengagement strategies allow the actor to lessen the perceived severity of their
actions and thereby protect their moral self-identity.
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The self-deception literature has also been applied to explaining unethical behavior and
parallels arguments made by Bandura concerning moral disengagement. For example,
Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) review the self deception literature concluding that individuals
use four strategies that allow them to act unethically, while still deceiving themselves that their
moral principles are being upheld. The first strategy is the use of language euphemisms to
deceive oneself that the actions being taken may be in the short-term troublesome, but ‘great
leadership warrants tough choices’ (cf. Bandura, 1999).
The second self deception strategy is what they call the “slippery slope of decisionmaking”, which is created foremost through repetitious exposure to perhaps less consequential
unethical acts, each becoming increasingly more unethical. The gradual increases in unethical
consequences allows the actor to more easily justify each incremental act as not much worse than
the last, delaying an overall downward spiraling in what they view as unethical behavior.
The third is errors in perceptual causation, where self-interested motives spur individuals
to construe the cause of their unethical commissions to external sources (e.g., our competitors
started by behaving this way), as well as justify their omissions to take ownership (e.g., our
competitors do business this way and we must to stay alive). Errors in perception causation can
result in a leader justifying the actions taken by saying we “couldn’t do anything about it”.
The fourth strategy is based on constrained representations of the self. At any one point in
time how we view the world we operate in is not completely accurate, as it is filtered through
lenses based on our self-identity. From a dramaturgical perspective we are each in varying
degree able to influence what “character” we play in the contexts we operate within, while also
being able to determine whether we are a main actor or supporting cast. Where we see ourselves
as supporting cast, we can minimize the impact we see our choices having in terms of promoting
or tolerating unethical actions or omissions.
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In sum, we propose that leaders with higher levels of moral ownership will be less likely
to morally disengage or practice self-deception, and instead will be more likely to engage when
confronted with ethical challenges. This is also consistent with research showing that some
individuals focus on avoiding doing bad, while others have a more proactive orientation to doing
good, in terms of their ethical actions and decisions (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Of
course, we expect that leaders with higher levels of ownership would represent the latter.
Moral Courage
The second component of moral potency is moral courage. We propose that moral
ownership and moral efficacy are necessary but not sufficient for a leader of character to act. A
leader may feel responsible to act (i.e., moral ownership) and believe they have the efficacy to do
so (i.e., moral efficacy); yet remain immobilized due to a lack of courage to face risk and
overcome their fears. Indeed, Osswald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, and Frey (2009) stated that
“Before a person can act with moral courage, s/he has to perceive an incident as a situation of
moral courage, s/he has to take responsibility and has to feel competent to act” (p. 98).
Moral courage, like the other components of moral potency, is state-like and thus task
and context specific. Courage for mountain-climbing, for example, is a distinct psychological
phenomenon from the courage to go against group norms in order to act in line with internal
values. Further, courage to go against the group may also vary across contexts, e.g., when in a
group of peers versus when senior leaders are present. In their model of a “courageous mindset”,
Hannah, Sweeney, and Lester (2009) argue that this state-like nature of courage is driven by
individual differences in identity, where consistent with our previous discussion of leader selfcomplexity (Hannah, et al., 2009b), each leader may hold a unique signature of courage across
their identity structures. When aspects of identity are activated, therefore cognitive and affective
responses may produce varying expressions of forms and levels of courage across contexts. In
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support of the proposal that courage is a differentiated construct, researchers have distinguished
moral courage from other forms of courage. Lopez, O’Byrne and Peterson (2003) separate
courage into physical, vital/psychological, and moral dimensions. In empirical testing, Woodard
and Pury (2007) also demonstrated that moral courage was a distinct form of courage.
Participants in their study psychometrically differentiated courage into four dimensions:
work/employment, patriotic/religion-based, independent/family-based, and social/moral.
May, Chan, Hodges, and Avolio (2003, p. 255) defined moral courage in the workplace
as the “fortitude to convert moral intentions into actions despite pressures from either inside or
outside of the organization to do otherwise.” Kidder (2003, p.7) defined moral courage as “a
commitment to moral principles, an awareness of the danger involved in supporting those
principles, and a willing endurance of that danger.” It is the inclusion of moral goals, principles,
virtues and intentions that distinguishes moral courage from other forms of courage, e.g., deep
water scuba diving, which may be morally neutral. Indeed Rate, Clark, Lindsey and Sternberg
(2007) empirically-derived that “nobility of purpose” can be a distinguishing element of courage.
Moral courage has been viewed as being critical to ethical actions in the workplace, yet
empirical organizational research on moral courage has been nearly non-existent, particularly in
terms of its links to leadership. We propose that moral courage, coupled with the other two moral
potency constructs may be one of the most important factors explaining why the moral
judgment-behavior linkage is found to be weak. This is because knowing what is right must be
coupled with the courage to overcome one’s fears and step up and do what is right; typically in
the face of adversity (Goud, 2005; Sekerta & Bagozzi, 2007; Worline, Wrzesniewski, & Rafaeli,
2002). Indeed, pursuing virtue or a higher purpose than one’s own self while overcoming fears to
do so is inherent in most definitions of moral courage (e.g., Kidder, 2003). Moral courage thus
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enables one to be virtuous, which we believe led Aquinas to state that courage is “a general
virtue or rather a condition of each and every virtue” (Yearley, 1990, p. 130).
Hannah, et al. (2009a) argued that courage emerges in individuals as they interact with
their environment, where external normative and informational forces call forth individuals’
personal psychological resources to enact courage. For example, a military context holds high
expectations for and reinforces the personal sacrifice, discipline, and ethos of its members. Such
a context would tend to activate values in organizational leaders such as duty, loyalty, and
integrity, provided those values have been previously developed in those leaders. As we have
noted, when activated, highly salient core beliefs such as these in turn prompt behavior in line
with those beliefs (Blasi, 1980; Verplanken & Holland, 2002) and more specifically, courage in
individuals to face fear and manifest beliefs into action (Goud, 2005; Sandage & Hill, 2001).
In sum, we propose that moral conation, i.e., the impetus or motivation to act ethically,
requires not only assuming responsibility and agency to act (moral ownership), but the fortitude
to face risk and overcome fears (moral courage) to exercise that responsibility.
Moral Efficacy
The final component proposed in the moral potency construct is moral efficacy. Moral
efficacy is critical as leaders can make a correct moral judgment and even experience a sense of
conation to act (moral ownership and courage), yet be immobile to act because they lack the
confidence that they can address the specific ethical issue or dynamics of the context in which
the issue is embedded, e.g., an organization going through an economic disaster. For example, a
leader may clearly know the right decision to make in a situation where tough choices need to be
made during an economic downturn. Yet, with all of the conflicting interests created during the
economic crisis they may choose not to act because they feel they don’t have the support of the
senior leadership, or that they lack the personal skills to confront their senior leader.
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We define moral efficacy as one’s belief (confidence) in his or her capabilities to
organize and mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, means and courses of action needed
to attain moral performance, within a given moral domain, while persisting in the face of moral
adversity. This definition recognizes that moral efficacy is dependent on both external sources of
means efficacy (Eden, 2001) as well as internal aspects of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997).
Like the other components of moral potency, we propose that moral efficacy is state-like
versus trait based. That is, consistent with other forms of self- and means-efficacy (Bandura,
1997; Eden, 2001), moral efficacy is task and domain specific. By that we mean that leaders will
have both specific levels of confidence related to their ability to perform ethical behaviors (that
differ from other forms of behaviors such as public speaking), as well as varying levels of
confidence in their ability to perform those ethical behaviors across various contexts. Selfefficacy, for example can be differentiated into forms of athletic, academic, interpersonal,
managerial, and numerous other forms of efficacy as discussed by Bandura (1997), and an
individual can possess varying levels of each form.
Bandura (1997) argues that self-efficacy can generalize over time where through repeated
successful experiences across varying contexts a form of efficacy (e.g., moral) can be
generalized across a continually-broadening set of contexts. This ‘scaffolding’ process occurs
through a wide span of rich personal mastery and vicarious experiences whereby leaders
discover they are more broadly capable to adapt and employ their capabilities in a larger range of
situations. This scaffolding approach, however, is quite distinct from conceptualizations of traitbased, decontextualized conceptualizations of general confidence which propose individuals’
posses some global form of efficacy regardless of the context (Chen, Gully & Eden, 2001).
This scaffolding approach is instead consistent with our prior discussion of moral potency
as operating as part of a complex personality system where leaders’ efficacy is organized across
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a complex identity structure (Hannah, et al., 2009b). Therefore leaders will be more or less selfschematic (versus aschematic) on aspects of moral efficacy (Peterson, 1994; Stahlberg, et al.,
1999) and thus generate varying moral efficacy across contexts. A leader, for example may have
varying levels of confidence to report peers for unethical behaviors based on whether the person
is a close coworker versus someone less close to the leader. In one of the only published
empirical investigations of moral efficacy, for example, Kuo and Hsu (2001) found that
participants’ levels of ethical self-efficacy related to software pirating influenced their ethical
behaviors related to the access and distribution of pirated software and their ability to persuade
others not to pirate.
Prior research has consistently shown the powerful role of self-efficacy in driving human
intention and behavior (see Stajkovic & Luthans 1998). Specific to ethical behavior, research has
shown that social and empathetic efficacy motivates people to perform more pro-social behaviors
such as helpfulness, cooperation and sharing (Bandura, 2002). This is because efficacy provides
leaders with a sense of perceived control over their behaviors and their capabilities to perform.
This sense of capability then serves to help explain the linkage between intentions and behavior
(Ajzen, 1991). Moral efficacy should therefore help explain the rates of moral judgments that
turn into moral action, as discussed in the introduction.
Bandura (2002, p. 59) states that “It is one thing to possess [moral] self-regulatory skills
but another to stick with them in the face of compelling inducements to behave otherwise. A
strong sense of self-regulatory efficacy provides the necessary restraining power.” Luthans and
Youssef (2005) suggested that moral efficacy is comprised of two dimensions including
magnitude (the level of difficulty to which one expects to perform in a given moral situation),
and strength (the extent that one is certain in their ability to perform to that level of difficulty).
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This is because moral self-efficacy represents not just an assessment of leaders’ ability to act, but
what they believe they can do with those abilities in a given context and task (Bandura, 1997).
To the degree that moral efficacy is context-dependent it is also influenced by means
efficacy (Eden, 2001). Means efficacy is an individual’s belief regarding the extent to which
external factors inhibit or support his or her capability to perform in a given situation. Means
efficacy has been shown to effect performance separately from self-efficacy, yet the two are
dependent in terms of explaining the motivation to act (Eden & Sulimani, 2002).
External factors related to means efficacy could include people (e.g., coworkers,
followers, and supervisors), procedures and processes, or a host of other external factors that
reinforce one’s motivation to take moral action. Indeed organizations can create strong
normative climates that promote ethical behavior (Victor & Cullen, 1988). For example, in an
organization that consistently supports its employees choosing the harder right versus the lesser
wrong, we would expect that leaders in that organization would have higher means efficacy to
take moral action. Eden (2001) conceptualizes means efficacy as being specific to domains,
similar to self-efficacy. For example, an organization and its leaders and policies may provide
the means efficacy required to support the creativity domain (e.g., encourage innovation) yet not
provide similar means efficacy for the moral domain (e.g., encourage reporting unethical acts).
We therefore propose that moral efficacy will be maximized when both the self and
means components are high. Consequently, leaders must not only believe they have the ability to
perform a moral task (e.g., to disclose the falsification of records), but that they have the external
means that will support their accomplishment of that action (e.g., that their followers will stand
behind them, the organization has ‘whistle blower’ procedures, and they will not be ostracized by
their peers or direct leaders).
Measuring Moral Potency
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We have conducted initial validation of a survey measure to assess moral potency for use
in organizational research and practice. A summary of initial validation work is described below.
Item Generation and Development
Based on the theoretical framework proposed, we created a measure to represent the
construct of moral potency drawing from widely accepted scale development approaches (e.g.,
DeVellis, 1991; Hinkin, 1995). First, four practitioners, each with between 10 and 23 years of
experience leading dynamic organizations were given construct definitions of the three
dimensions of moral potency and were asked to generate a list of 10 items reflecting each
dimension (30 total). Simultaneously, four leadership scholars generated similar lists of ten items
for each of the three dimensions based on reviews of the psychology, ethics, organizational
behavior and leadership literatures. Nineteen items identified by the practitioners and scholars
overlapped (were on both groups’ lists) based on content after adjusting for differences in
wording. The researchers then refined the 19 items by adjusting the wording so that all items had
consistent tense, usage, agreement and other grammar aspects.
Next, the 19 items were placed into a randomized list and presented to five naïve
observers who were asked to sort those items into three categories based on the dimension
descriptions (i.e., a “bucket drill”). Based on this sorting, following recommendations by
MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter (1991), items assigned to the proper a priori category more
than 80% of the time were retained; in this case 15 items. A second bucket drill was then
conducted using the 80% rule for retention, whereby 13 items were retained.
Finally, the 13 items were subjected to a content validity assessment by two senior
faculty members, one in psychology and one in organizational behavior with expertise in the
domain area. Raters were provided the three dimension descriptions and asked to assign each
randomly ordered item to one of the three dimensions, as well as to recommend items to drop or
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change, to mark unclear items, and to provide written comments. Again following MacKenzie et
al. (1991), items assigned to the proper category more than 80% of the time were retained. In this
case only one item was incorrectly sorted. Minor wording adjustments as recommended were
made to four of the remaining items, creating a 12 item measure for empirical testing.
This 12-item measure2 contains 4 items measuring moral courage (e.g., I will… “confront
my peers if they commit an unethical act”, 3 items measuring moral ownership (e.g., I will…
“assume responsibility and take action when I see an unethical act”, and 5 items measuring moral
efficacy (e.g., I am confident that I can… “determine what needs to be done when I face ethical
dilemmas”. The 7 items related to moral courage and moral ownership are rated based on level
of agreement from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 5 (“totally agree”). The 5 moral efficacy items, in
accordance with Bandura’s (2006) efficacy scale guide, were rated based on strength of
confidence ranging from 1 (“not at all confident”) to 5 (“totally confident”).
Initial Validation Study
Sample and methods. In this study we sought to assess the psychometric properties of the
moral potency measure in a large sample, while also providing initial data on the validity of the
measure in predicting ethical outcomes. Specifically, we conducted a cross-sectional field study
with a sample of 2,481 U.S. Army soldiers assigned to 295 squads (each approximately a nineperson size group) serving in combat in Iraq during 2009. This sample was selected as it
provided a highly complex and ambiguous context where soldiers’ faced a high base rate of
difficult moral challenges.
The 295 squads were randomly selected from all units assigned to the Iraq theatre of
operations by the command’s inspector general. Data were collected from the randomly selected
2
The full measure is available at www.mindgarden.com
20
units by their unit’s battalion chaplain under the direction of and using measures provided by the
researchers. These chaplains then mailed completed surveys to the researchers in the U.S.
Measurement model testing. First, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis through
structural equation modeling using LISREL to assess the factor structure of the moral potency
construct. Specifically, we conducted competing model analyses comparing three models. The
first was a single factor model (all 12 items loading on one factor). The second was a 2-factor
model with moral ownership and moral courage combined into a single factor and moral efficacy
maintained separately as a second factor. The last model was the hypothesized 3-factor model
with each component of moral potency separate. We tested the competing 2-factor model as
there is plausible rationale that courage and ownership may not be entirely psychometrically
distinct. That is, while efficacy reflects ones confidence in their capability to act (i.e., “I can”),
ownership and courage, as we have described them, focus more on the impetus to act (i.e., “I
will”). We thus felt it was important to explore whether courage and ownership tend to hang
together psychometrically in this first measurement model testing.
Results showed that the 2-factor model indeed demonstrated the best fit to the data (χ2 =
1378, df = 53, p < .0001, ILI = .98; NFI = .98, CFI = .98, SRMR = .03). These results exceeded
Hu and Bentler’s (1999) stringent standards for model evaluation: “that practitioners use a cutoff
value close to .95 for TLI (or BL89, RNI, CFI, or Gamma Hat) in combination with a cutoff
value of close to .09 for SRMR to evaluate model fit (p. 27).” In Hu and Bentler’s analyses, this
combination resulted in the least sum of Type I and Type II error rates. Analysis of the 1-factor
and hypothesized 3-factor model demonstrated inadequate fit to the data (RMSEA > .25). Tests
of chi-square difference demonstrated that the 2-factor model fit the data significantly better than
either the 1-factor (∆χ2[1] = 7244, p < .0001) or 3-factor (∆χ2[3] = 10606, p < .0001) models.
The factor loadings and factor covariances for both factors were all significant
21
(standardized loadings ranging .50 to .77 for moral courage/ownership, and .72 to .91 for moral
efficacy), evidencing convergent validity. The results from this initial empirical test suggest that
moral confidence and courage converge and share significant variance, which we propose is an
overall propensity to assume responsibility and act in the face of moral adversity (i.e., moral
conation). Results suggest that moral efficacy is a discriminant factor reflecting confidence that
one can act ethically, distinct from the conation to act. Reliability of the moral efficacy (α = .95)
and moral ownership/courage (i.e., conation) scales (α = .93) were high.
The convergence of moral ownership and moral courage into a single construct prompts
us, based on our literature review, to offer a revised definition for moral ownership/courage (i.e.,
moral conation): the extent leaders feel a sense of psychological responsibility over the ethical
nature of their own actions, those of others around them, and their organization; and possess the
fortitude to face risk and overcome fear to convert moral intentions into action.
Summary of field study results. We found compelling evidence for the concurrent
validity of the 2-factor moral potency construct in our analysis of the data from this military
combat sample. These results are reported elsewhere (Schaubroeck, Hannah, Avolio, Kozlowski,
Lord, & Trevino, 2010) so will only be briefly summarized here.
First, soldiers with higher scores on both the moral efficacy scale and the combined
moral courage/ownership scale were more likely to confront or report others in their unit for
ethical transgressions. Additionally, soldiers’ moral efficacy and moral courage/ownership were
negatively related to their level of tolerance for the mistreatment of non-combatants, and both
measures were associated with greater adherence to the Army’s stated organizational values. We
also found an interaction at the squad level of analysis between moral courage/ownership and the
level of moral transgressions in squads that predicted the frequency with which soldiers
confronted other unit members for ethical transgressions. Specifically, soldiers who were both
22
higher in moral courage/ownership as well as assigned to units who had a higher frequency of
actual unethical behaviors were particularly likely to step up and confront other soldiers for
unethical acts. Although preliminary, it appears that when there was a greater opportunity (i.e.,
higher frequency of transgressions) to step up and address unethical behavior, those with higher
moral potency tended to do so in this sample.
Developing Moral Potency
We next provide example interventions for organizations seeking to develop moral
potency in their leaders and discuss the malleability of the construct.
Developing moral ownership
Moral ownership can be described from a more transactional perspective whereby an
individual feels accountable to take on a particular moral or ethical issue because of his or her
perceived roles and responsibilities. Developing accountability-based moral ownership entails
clarifying what is expected of the individual in his or her role and recognizing that individual for
stepping up and taking appropriate responsibility or action (Avey, et al., 2009). Through repeated
interactions with one’s leader an individual learns what is within and outside of their scope of
responsibilities regarding moral and ethical issues at work. The clarity of one’s accountability
would serve to reduce the type of self deception regarding moral ownership described earlier
(Stevens, 2005; Victor & Cullen, 1988). For example, an auditor may be trained to alert others to
ethical violations falling within her scope of responsibilities based on the standards set by the
organization for mandatory reporting.
A deeper and perhaps more transformational form of moral ownership would require that
the individual comes to identify who they are with the justification for moral actions, such as we
described earlier in our discussion of leader self-identity. For example, through many years of
education and training, we expect that a physician’s identity should become inextricably linked
23
to ‘do no harm to one’s patients’. This level of personal identification can be developed by
observing well respected physicians who consistently practice and exemplify the Hippocratic
oath, as well as through the reinforcement a medical student or young resident receives from
mentors and supervisors for keeping the patient’s interests and safety front and center during
treatment. Individuals who exhibit this higher level of moral ownership would also be expected
to display greater levels of confidence or efficacy, as well as responsibility to themselves and to
others, while viewing their success or failure as physicians in this case as being part of who they
are and what they represent to others when discussing ‘their’ profession (Avey, et al., 2009).
Higgins’ (1998) regulatory focus theory can also be used to examine how leaders may
develop levels of moral ownership. Higgins states that, “individuals who are more promotion
oriented will experience feelings regarding targets of ownership that are quite different from
those who are prevention oriented” (p. 6). A prevention oriented individual may know what the
ethical versus unethical choice is, but may not act because they have been developed by leaders
in their organization to not get involved with issues outside of their scope of responsibility. This
sort of territorial view of moral ownership would coincide with the individual feeling more or
less accountable to take action based on their prescribed roles and responsibilities. One of the
ways to reduce this prevention focus is to use real incidents where leadership development
involves debriefing prior incidents to demonstrate how leaders can and should act to broaden the
scope of their ethical actions. By debriefing real incidents, the transfer of learning is maximized,
while the reinforcement for taking the appropriate action is not some abstract notion, but instead
is addressing real moral and ethical issues.
Moving to the highest end of moral ownership, we expect that an individual’s self
concept would be inextricably linked with doing what’s right to create a moral organization as
the organization becomes a referent for how the individual views him or herself. Kark, Shamir
24
and Chen (2003) argue that through the development of one’s social identification with an
organization or profession, individuals’ self concepts can become defined by the values and
beliefs of those associated with the group, thus taking on the group’s identity. Indeed, Kark et al.
(2003) suggest that one of the central roles of transformational leaders is to develop in followers
this sense of collective identity, which in this instance, would represent a broader sense of what
constitutes moral ownership to see a moral or ethical failure on the part of their organization as
being their failure, thus providing the impetus to act. This is done by coaching followers through
moral dilemmas, sharing stories of exemplary leadership, delegating moral challenges to
followers to resolve, role modeling what the organization expects from its leaders and teaching
followers each and every day what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
For example, in our conversations with the leadership of Costco, we found that a long
time employee with a very good record of employment was caught drinking a soda off of a pallet
on a very hot day. Costco’s zero tolerance policy for stealing resulted in that employee being
fired for that one incident. By taking these sorts of actions, the Costco leadership has clearly
signaled a zero tolerance for ethical or legal violations. CEO Jim Sinegal also reinforces his
values and expectations for how to best treat employees and customers by holding monthly
‘campfire chats’ with leaders throughout Costco where he shares stories about proper leadership
and management practices, including ethical standards and practices they are expected to
maintain throughout Costco. In terms of the work on individual and collective identity noted
above, Mr. Sinegal says that ideally, he would like to serve every customer at Costco. Since that
is physically impossible, he sets out to teach leaders exactly how he hopes they will treat
customers by sharing his internal model of service and ethics. He transmits this to his followers
seeking to form a proxy form of moral ownership on his behalf across the organization, teaching
and inspiring in others the importance of stepping up and taking moral ownership to act when
25
they see something done that is unethical. Sinegal emphasizes the importance he places on
teaching his associates by allocating up to 80% of his time for teaching.
We see that transformational leaders like Jim Sinegal work to develop their followers in
ways that shift their identity and motivations from a focus on individual needs to a focus on the
collective longer-term needs of the organization (Avolio, Bass & Jung, 1999). Through
transformational leadership processes such as displaying individualized consideration, the leader
learns about the follower’s needs and aspirations and then works to develop the follower to see
how their personal views and identity can be aligned with the organization’s, thus creating
identity-based motivation for the follower to assume greater levels of moral ownership in order
to maintain the organization’s moral status.
Pierce, et al. (2001) describe psychological ownership generally as representing the
bundle of rights and responsibilities that characterize individuals who experience feelings of
ownership. Pierce et al.’s (2001) suggest that when individuals experience feelings of ownership
towards a certain issue, they would feel more responsible to expend efforts towards the proper
resolution of that issue. Consequently, by experiencing and receiving reinforcement for
displaying higher levels of moral ownership, individuals would also expect to be included in
making decisions and having influence in the organization, spurring them to take action
regarding moral and ethical issues that may influence the organization’s standing. Thus, another
part of the development process occurs where the individual sees their rights and responsibilities
being expanded over time with respect to what they consider their span of moral ownership. This
expansion may begin from a transactional base in terms of roles and responsibilities, but
ultimately elevated through transformational leadership to being tied to the individual’s identity.
Based on the work of Bandura (1991, 1999), senior leaders can also increase a sense of
moral ownership with their followers by teaching them ways to combat moral disengagement.
26
This can be done by using actual incidents to discuss how moral disengagement occurs, stories
from other organizations, personal stories of the leader, simulations that require individuals to
make ethical choices, as well as reviewing examples in literature, film and news stories to
examine where moral disengagement occurred and how it could have been avoided.
With regards to simulations, we have developed a series of computer-based simulators
based on real moral incidents that U.S. Army leaders had to address in pre-deployment,
deployment and post deployment contexts. The series of vignettes requires the leader to serve in
the first person operator role and to make decisions as to the actions he or she would take in each
situation. The choices provided are based on moral and ethical theory, so that once completed,
the participant can receive feedback on the pattern of decisions made. For instance, some
participants follow a more rules based approach, while others choose decisions where the ends
justify the means. In each instance, we can provide feedback both on the extent they took
ownership in each situation, as well as what framework they used as a basis for their decision.
Regardless of through leader emphasis, discussions, simulations, or other means; based
on research done by Bandura, efforts to diminish moral disengagement should: 1) place ethical
issues in humanistic terms (e.g., highlight the human aspects of decisions), 2) discourage the use
of sanitizing language (e.g., euphemisms that downplay harm), 3) encourage personal
responsibility for stepping up (e.g., make clear that unethical actions cannot be blamed on
others), 4) make clear the potential injurious effects of actions on others, 5) model not to
carelessly attribute blame to or dehumanize others, and 6) limit self-deceptive thinking that one’s
unethical actions, compared to other’s more serious actions, are less consequential.
Developing Moral Efficacy
There are four major determinants of self-efficacy, moral or otherwise, that are well
established in the literature (Bandura, 1997): enactive mastery experiences, vicarious learning,
27
social persuasion and feedback, and psychological and emotional arousal. We add a fifth source
to our discussion, which includes those external determinants that enhance means efficacy, i.e.,
by providing and articulating the quality and utility of organizational support, means, and
systems that provide leaders with external sources of confidence to take moral action.
Through enactive mastery experiences where successful moral performance is achieved,
we expect that leaders will achieve the requisite moral efficacy levels to enact similar strategies
to address future ethical challenges (Bandura, 1997). How an individual performs in these
situations can be examined by having the leader use a post-performance review or debrief to help
leaders and followers make greater sense of the experience. For example, research has shown
that reflection on factors present during past performance, such as the level of resources
available, amount of autonomy, amount of physiological or psychological danger, and other
factors will affect the development of one’s efficacy beliefs and how a person interprets the
context in which similar challenges in the future are located (Bandura, 1997). Thus by unpacking
the context through debriefs, individual levels of moral efficacy can be enhanced by determining
what could and could not have been done in a particular situation.
Moral efficacy development can also be enhanced by providing individuals with
progressively more difficult or intense ethical mastery experiences, coupled with the leader
working through those experiences to determine how he or she could respond and also the
consequences of taking no action (Avolio, 2005). We have used this approach with physicians
where we take real vignettes from their hospital and have them analyze how they would respond
to those events. These discussions are incorporated into the regular morning briefings to show
physicians, vicariously, how dealing with these ethical issues constitutes their physician
leadership role. Through reflection and debriefing, we try to examine how strategies used to
address these vignettes can be successfully applied to similar situations they may confront in the
28
future. The key factors to making this physician intervention work is that the vignettes are
relevant and really occurred, are discussed as part of the physician’s daily routine, the
physician’s learn strategies for successfully addressing these events, and the physician leader
running the intervention is role modeling the importance of ethics by taking the time in morning
briefings to discuss them.
One of the ways to explain how such training and discussion impacts these physician
levels of moral efficacy is by the use of what has been called ‘issue framing’. Butterfield,
Treviño, and Weaver (2000) described how one can use such framing to trigger moral scripts and
therefore thought and behavior repertoires that are tied to a particular ethical dilemma. By
providing individuals with a range of experiences, either through simulations or by using real
events to debrief, the leader can teach followers strategies that repeatedly lead to successful
outcomes that become part of the cognitive scripts used to interpret subsequent ethical dilemmas
(Gioia & Poole, 1984).
Butterfield et al. (2000) found that repeated exposure to typical ethical dilemmas (e.g.,
through training, discussions with supervisors, cases, etc.) and observing role models increased
the likelihood of forming more desired moral scripts that once enacted, we argue would enhance
individuals’ level of moral efficacy as they have already developed potential response
repertoires. One can also see how respected leaders frequently discussing ethical issues and
showing ways they can be effectively resolved would reinforce the development of scripts and
the ensuing behavioral actions that could increase moral efficacy, as well as moral ownership.
For example, Stevens, Steensma, Harrison, and Cochran (2005) suggest that training ethics codes
in organizations instills greater confidence in employees through deepening their understanding
of appropriate behavioral responses and the organizational processes that support ethics.
In sum, Hannah, et al. (2008) argued that through the interactions leaders have with their
29
followers they can transfer to followers a greater sense of confidence, such as to take on moral
and ethical issues similar to the examples we have provided above for moral ownership. When a
leader displays confidence when addressing a moral issue, we expect those actions to reinforce
and bolster their followers’ confidence to do so as well in similar contexts and to establish norms
in the group for displays of moral confidence.
Developing moral courage
As described above with our case examples, leaders can serve as powerful determinants
by simply being moral exemplars for what they desire to see in their followers (Walker &
Henning, 2004), and thus the approaches we suggested for developing moral ownership and
efficacy would certainly be useful for developing moral courage. For example, Worline, et al.
(2002) found that role models displaying courage had a contagion effect on others such that
observers’ believed that they too had the capability to successfully meet threats.
Leaders serving as role models can be particularly powerful in terms of their influence on
follower development, as leader behaviors are often seen as prototypical and serve as a basis for
cuing follower identification with their leader and the subsequent behaviors those followers
display (Hogg, 2001). For example, self-sacrificing leaders have been shown to activate prosocial goals in their followers, making them more willing to self-sacrifice themselves (De
Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002). We believe that if senior organizational leaders are
encouraged to display moral courage that they will create the conditions to promote courageous
moral actions in followers, while also reinforcing a culture and climate that supports such actions
in the future. In these instances, the development of moral courage occurs through the cues that
the leader signals to followers to think and act morally and the norms they set for courageous
actions. At the U.S. Military Academy (West Point), for example, the Cadet Honor Code not
only requires that cadets “will not lie, cheat or steal”, but also “nor tolerate those that do”. Cadets
30
are disciplined or released from the Academy if they fail to display moral courage and do not
“self-police” their ranks and confront others’ ethical transgressions.
Results of training programs have recently been reported (see Osswald, et al., 2009;
Jonas, Boos, & Brandstätter, 2007) that were specifically designed to develop moral courage by
teaching participants specific behavior routines to use when facing threats. As noted earlier,
these programs can serve as a means for developing the scripts that can help guide appropriate
ethical decision-making and action as required by the situation. For example, we have conducted
moral courage training with Soldiers where leaders were directed to confront a peer for an actual
ethical transgression. In order to enhance the individual’s moral courage, we provided trainees
with specific actions and techniques they could use to address the transgression, such as asking
permission to discuss the event with the individual, selecting the right time and location to do so,
and sticking to the specific behaviors that were in violation versus more general attributions.
Other means for developing moral courage could involve the use of high fidelity
simulations. We are currently working on a project with a large airline where we worked with
senior leaders to identify four crucible events that had led to this organization’s transformation
and current success. Participants in the simulation are asked to step into the roles their senior
leaders assumed in those events and were given the data the leaders had at the time the event
occurred. Many of the actual leaders that were involved in these events serve as instructors in the
simulation, challenging participants to step up and improve upon their performance. After going
through these historical incidents, the simulation then moves to the current period of time, where
participants have to make decisions based on scenarios that may actually be implemented. Thus,
the simulation in real time operates as an incubator for making real choices, in which we can
impose real ethical challenges wherein participants must have the moral courage, as well as
ownership and efficacy, to confront, and do so in front of their leaders.
31
Another means of developing moral courage is for individuals to identify a role model in
or outside their profession, who has exhibited exemplary ethical behavior. We then ask the
individuals to study what produced the moral courage in that individual to take the moral actions
they did to confront ethical dilemmas. We examine with them the situation leading up to and
including where moral courage was displayed, and discuss antecedents to the leader’s
development to take such action, the parameters of the context and action itself and whether the
moral courage displayed was representative of the leader’s behavior or a more isolated
occurrence. Using a highly respected individual motivates participants by providing an attractive
role model who serves to guide the observer’s development, and taps into the deeper level
conation needed to display similar courage (Bandura, 1997; Hogg, 2001; Worline, et al., 2002).
In sum, we have attempted to provide an overview of a variety of ways that moral
potency and its components can be developed in individuals and organizations. What now
remains is a concerted effort into systematically testing which approaches work best in different
contexts and with different individuals.
Future Directions
Moral potency and relationships to individual differences
We have framed moral potency as being state-like, such that it changes over time and can
be developed. Future research should now consider how moral potency may relate to or interact
with more stable personality variables, such as conscientiousness, openness to new experiences,
proactive personality, altruism, narcissism, or Machiavellianism. It is possible, for example, that
conscientious individuals will be more likely to experience a sense of moral ownership,
suggesting a possible mediation or interaction effect in predicting ethical action.
Individual differences related to approach and avoidance styles of self-regulation (JanoffBulman, et al., 2009) may also be of interest in future research attempting to address the link
32
between moral cognition and conation. It is possible, for example, that leaders more oriented
toward pursuing ethical aims, versus avoiding unethical outcomes, may be more prone to exhibit
higher levels of moral potency, and/or act morally when moral potency is also high; again
suggesting possible mediation or interaction effects.
Extending to the collective level
Further, there might be important practical implications by extending the work on moral
potency to the collective level, such as to teams and organizations. This is because collectives
develop norms that influence the moral thinking and action of group members as also
demonstrated in the work on collective identity (Durkheim, 1961; Power, Higgins & Kohlberg,
1989). Group and individual character are thus likely reciprocally related, with each influencing
the other across levels through mechanisms such as organizational climate and culture as
individuals interact and promote higher levels of moral potency in each other (e.g., Selznick,
1992). Other potential mechanisms whereby moral potency may raise to the collective level
includes social identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988) and various social normative and informational
effects (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) that make collectives powerful instruments of social
influence on the identity, attitudes, and behaviors of members.
Finally, leaders’ effects on the collective moral potency of their groups should be further
developed. Efficacy, for example, can be developed through social interactions and role
modeling between leader and followers and emerge over time as forms of collective efficacy (see
Hannah, et al. , 2008). Therefore, investigating collective moral potency may be informed by
models of systems level thinking (Jacques, 1997; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Weick, 1979) whereby we
identify the interdependencies and causal loops operating between members of the collective,
leadership systems, social networks, and other organizational systems and processes.
33
Though some researchers have acknowledged that character is both a collective and
individual phenomenon (Durkheim, 1961; Power et al., 1989), nearly all previous research has
been conducted at the individual level of analysis (see Wright & Goodstein, 2006). This offers
the opportunity to extend the theory and measure presented here to achieve a deeper
understanding of the moral potency occurring in groups and subsequent effects on ethical
behaviors in collectives or cultures.
Measurement testing and predictive validity
We have offered initial validation of a measure of moral potency, presenting a first test of
its psychometric properties and validity. Much further testing of this measure is certainly
warranted, which must include convergent and discriminant validity assessments to determine
the nomological network of constructs related to moral potency. Extending work on this
preliminary measure to a broader array of organizational and cultural contexts certainly is
warranted. Specifically, how moral potency is developed and operates in organizations that deal
with less extreme events or across different global cultural contexts may differ from the context
we have currently examined. For example, how would moral potency vary in cultures that are
more individualistic versus collectivistic?; how would it vary in terms of cultures that are more
risk averse versus more risk prone remain to be examined?
Beyond field research, we also advocate the use of laboratory experiments to assess
whether moral potency moderates the relationship between moral judgments and actions as we
have proposed in Figure 1. We have previously suggested that higher levels of moral potency
will be most important for leaders to possess when faced with tough moral challenges. In the lab,
we could systematically present participants with varying levels of ethical dilemmas in terms of
moral intensity to determine how moral potency moderates the relationship between thought and
action for say morally high and low intensity challenges.
34
We also can envision lab experiments for developing moral potency by systematically
testing how role modeling, debriefing and the use of vignettes serve to boost levels of moral
potency and its components. Relatively little systematic work has been done in the leadership
development field in general to examine whether leadership training works (Avolio, Reichard,
Hannah, Walumbwa, & Chan, 2009). The use of experimental interventions to systematically test
what develops and doesn’t develop moral potency could serve to advance our understanding of
how moral potency can be enhanced.
Being more state-like, Avolio and Luthans (2006) argue that relatively short training
interventions, which they have referred to as micro-interventions, may be more efficient and cost
effective in developing leaders, such as their moral potency. Consequently, examining the length
of intervention along with its focus seems like worthwhile avenues to pursue in future research.
Finally, additional field research is needed that investigates a broader array of outcome variables
beyond those reported here, and across a wide span of organization types beyond the military.
Through such future research and further development of the moral potency construct we
believe organizations can seek to develop leaders who can not just determine what is right (i.e.,
make ethical judgments), but more importantly, step up and do what is right under pressure. This
is critical as leaders serve as exemplars for others to emulate and establish the normative tone for
their organization.
35
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Figure 1
Moral Potency - Linking Moral Thought to Action
Moral
Potency
• Ownership
• Courage
• Efficacy
Moral
Cognition
Moral
Action