António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
António Manuel Hespanha i & Teresa Pizarro Beleza ii
ON WITCHES, FAIRIES AND UNICORNS
PERPLEXITIES ABOUT AN APPARENTLY NEAT IDEA
ARE HUMAN RIGHTS A DIRE ILLUSION?
In this article the authors argue that current conceptions on
Human Rights are often biased by some sort of triumphalism that
erases (or, at least, softens) either theoretical or practical
obstacles to a really all-embracing protection of the rights of
humankind. Cultural pre-comprehensions of basic rights
pretending to play the role of naturally rooted, objective and
universal catalogues; individualistic perceptions of humanness
hiding the need for legal protection of group rights;
acknowledgement of formal rights without a generally available
procedural implementation; all these are among the factors that
lessen dramatically the range of effectiveness of Human Rights.
Not surely as far as converting them in a dire illusion. On the
contrary, in many cases the resonance of the sole formula
proved to have turned into a valuable factor of either preventing
or actually counteracting notorious offenses to Human dignity.
However, a danger still exists that a biased acknowledgement of
Human Rights could create a new divide between those who
have and those who have not an effective right to Human Rights;
a well-intentioned optimism or an unproblematic acceptation of
unidimensional or poorly contextualized definitions of Humankind
and its basic needs could not but increase this threat.
Human rights emerged, as an overwhelming topic in legal theory
and legal policy, in the aftermaths of the WW II, as one can easily
understand. Modernity had so far been hardly confronted with such
harsh and systematic aggressions against individuals and
communities. The new possibilities of the mass media no longer
permitted that such events could remain a secret known only to a few
war lords or politicians. The very disclosure of such enormities
triggered a much wider public worry concerning the protection of the
deepest levels of Human dignity. Dramatic testimonies, like that of
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
Primo Levi 1, or Jorge Semprun 2 made of the most simple, but also
the most pungent, fragments of the everyday life in an extermination
camp, exposed how much human life, even if preserved, can be
turned into something totally deprived from the most basic features of
being Human.
These ordinary propositions immediately entail the need for a
few remarks, in order to deepen the analysis of what really brew his
new sensitivity to the issue of Human Rights.
A first remark shall underline that the magnitude of the Shoa, as
well as of the extermination of gypsies, homosexuals and other
“undesirables”, or even that of the Nazi genetic cleansing of
handicapped people, often leads to the oblivion that brutal attacks on
Human Rights were of course not new in the very Modernity. Each
new tragedy, natural or man-made, tends to efface the immediate
memories of what terrible things happened before. Almost equivalent
atrocities were already committed, mostly under colonial rule, on nonEuropean native populations. Two of the most notorious examples will
be enough to illustrate our point. The first one is the passivity – to say
the least - of British government in India during the outburst of famines
in Central India, between 1870 and 1910; then, more than thirty million
famine related deaths occurred, in a process where natural factors
combined with a seemingly intentional policy of ethnic / eugenic
extermination, which deserved recently the denomination of “Late
Victorian Holocaust” 3. The second one is the German genocidal war
against the Herero, in South West Africa, by the end of the 19th
century, during which 80 percent of the Herero died or were
incarcerated to die in concentration camps; an explicit “order of
extermination” (Vernichtungsbefehl) against the Herero people was
issued in October 1904, inaugurating a terminology and a practice
which announce and prepare what would come true in continental
Europe within a few decades4. Even if we leave aside for the moment
the reference to Human Rights violations in the particularly callous
colonial underworld, we are still left with some other examples of
rather gruesome and ruthless treatment of ethnic, religious and cultural
groups in the near peripheries of “civilized nations” 5. Even in the core
1
Se questo è un uomo, Torino, De Silva, 1947.
2
Le grand voyage, Paris, Galimard, 1963; Quel beau dimanche, 1980; L'écriture ou la vie, 1994.
3
Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World, London, Verso,
2001. S. other references in Laxman D. Satya, ”The British Empire, Ecology and Famines in Late 19th Century Central
India”, Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania (http://www.celdf.org/Portals/0/Docs/NATURE%20and%20EMPIRE%20%20LAXMAN%20SATYA%20ARTICLE%20ON%20BRITISH%20EMPIRE%20ECOLOGY%20FAMINE%20IN%20INDIA.doc).
4
A similar fate struck the Nama population some years later.
5
Even today, Turkish official historiography refuses to classify the massive extermination of Armenian as a
genocide.
2
António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
of western supposedly decent people (USA, UK, Sweden, Russia),
“progressive” policies developed “eugenic” programs and practices
which today would surely fall within the concept of serious violations of
Human Rights .
One need only think of the data on domestic violence and go
back to the isolated denunciations of Stuart Mill in the British
Parliament in Victorian times to understand that in the core of
“civilized” nations basic Human Rights of many people, in particular
women and children, were violated as a matter of course under the
supposed sanctity of privacy and home. And, of course, the violence
continues – but not silenced and accepted as before, when laws and
customs shielded the horrors of family and domestic terror.
To remember these histories is no merely historical exercise. It
can also lively enlighten some current imbalances in the pervasive
feelings about Human Rights, their nature, their range and their typical
victims and predators.
First of all, recent history can unveil the unspoken reasons which
lead to differentiate the relevance of these primary rights according to
the geographic and ethnic-cultural scenario where their offence takes
place. Namely, in differentiating the cogency and urgency of rights of
mankind and human beings, as well as in conceiving and
implementing systems of protection, respectively either – let us say –
in the so called “civilized countries” or, by contrast, in the “waste lands”
of Africa and of some regions of Asia or Latin America. While the
former occupy the leading titles and the prime time TV journals, the
second latter are almost completely “lost in translation”, trivialized or
merely kept out of public memory. One could say that even Human
Rights tend to gain a geographical milieu of their own.
Secondly, the most recent history seems to demonstrate that the
most repulsive violations of Human Rights tend to be committed, not
against individuals, but against groups, characterized by their ethnicity,
religion, culture, customs, way of life, or gender. It is morally true than
Human dignity is not measurable, in the sense that the offense against
one person is, ethically speaking, as serious as the offense against
very many. However, our moral sensitiveness is also affected by the
sheer number of victims of harm, so much so that ordinary language
has coined a specific word, genocide which expresses more
vehemently the common repugnance towards a massive and collective
offense of Human Rights (contrasting with homicide, which ordinarily is
not deemed to be, per se, either a crime against humanity, or an
autonomous and specific offense of Human Rights, but rather as a
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
“common crime”, however serious). Ordinary moral sensitiveness
seems to be rather communitarian than individualistic, evaluating
under much darker tones the harm caused to humans - i.e., to a
collective of beings belonging to the larger collective of mankind - than
that caused to an individual.
Thirdly, in some of the more recent historical examples of deep
and serious contempt towards Human Rights, the State was involved,
as they were either carried out directly by State organs or allowed to
happen due to State administration (intentional) carelessness or
callous ignorance of a “duty to protect”. However, beyond or behind
the State was civil society, or even particularly influential and
celebrated groups within it. Namely, scientist, who - from the 1880’s to
the 1940’s – created a whole set of theoretical topics legitimating
human differentiation, human hierarchies and human divisions along
the lines of normality/abnormality, mostly within scientific disciplines
like Anthropology and Eugenics 6. Occasionally – as it often happened
in the colonies – there was a perceptible, although silent, congeniality
between “scientific” and economic or political interests. This means
that every strategy to protect Human Rights should discard a Stateonly oriented approach in order to adopt a wide and all-embracing
checking and watching strategy, scanning every potential predator of
humankind, including possibly well intentioned policies aiming at the
bettering of human condition and human life quality. Summing up.
Narrow, imprudent or group biased utilitarianism can clash with major
rights of individuals or communities, even if it is labeled under a
humanitarian telos.
Fourthly, it must be stressed – as we can learn from the
examples above - that almost all human tragedies are the product of
active or passive policies and not of mere natural causes. Famine can
normally be foreseen, prevented, or at least reduced ; physical or
psychic challenges or imbalances can be accepted as normal
differences or compensated for through measures compatible with
Human dignity; environmental disasters can often be avoided by
adequate policies or drastic, but prudent, changes in the way of life.
Nature is seldom independent from human political decisions, let alone
the everlasting attempt to transform nature into a scapegoat for human
7
6 S. Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race, Four Walls
Eight Windows, 2003; Gina Maranto, Quest for Perfection: The Drive to Breed Better Human Beings, Diane Publishing
Co., 1996; Universe.com, 2000; Richard Lynn, Eugenics: a reassessment, Praeger Publishers, 2001.
7
Amartya
Sen,
“Democracy
Isn't
'Western'”,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114317114522207183.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries.
4
in
António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
errors, carelessness or greed. This consideration is particularly
important as we are apparently entering a period of rough
environmental changes, which will very likely have devastating effects
on human life. A great deal of this imminent danger is the result of
human/societal decisions about producing goods and providing
services (what, how, how much and at what costs) and, in the end,
about keeping or changing living styles. Environmental threats can be
anticipated and curtailed by restraining damaging policies and styles of
living, by reducing avoidable risks, by subsuming secondary goals to
the paramount value of preserving all embracing humankind’s future,
by improving solidarity and implementing an ethic of care. “Caring for
the Future 8” must be a political priority here and now. To imprudently
or impudently jeopardize the future can only be described as a threat
or a real offense to Human Rights. This dramatic shift in human
environment should certainly soon lead to an emergent age of Human
Rights protection, which should be more demanding, more global and
more thoroughly protective. From now on, amidst the indicted people
on judicial cases of Human Rights violations, brutal war lords and
dictators will share their notorious arena with greedy or sloppy
politicians, tycoons, or other representatives of egoistic (nationalistic,
regionalist, sectorial) interests.
Finally, we shall address a last question which, can be more
clearly perceived today than a century ago.
It is now easy enough to understand that all the European world
policy along the last decades of the 19th century and the first half of the
20th century was supported by a deep rooted ethnocentrism, if not by
an outright, entrenched pervasive racism and sexism. This may help to
explain the low sensitivity of both politicians and in general of
discourse in the public sphere regarding the atrocities perpetrated
against non-European people. Or the subjection and violence against
women, which became a public issue only fifteen years ago 9.
Ethnocentrism may also help to explain the absence of an audible
critical approach to the values European nations were imposing over
“alien” cultures. On the inner front, scientism provided the same
dogmatic shield against otherness, be it gender differences, physical
or psychic deviance or alternative strategies for organizing
communitarian life. The European oriented uniqueness of humankind
developed in a twofold way a strangely unidimensional mental model:
8
“Caring for the future” is the strategic guideline of a Portugal based Foundation, dealing with strategic issues
concerning
a
sustained
well
being
for
the
Human
generations
to
come
(http://www.fcuidarofuturo.com/cuidarofuturo.html).
9
The UN Declaration on Violence Against Women dates from 1993…
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
the uniqueness of culture and the uniqueness of truth, values and
mores.
On the legal front, this uniqueness of European moral economy
was expressed in the uniqueness of political power and the
uniqueness of law, as it was theoretically built by both the legalism and
the logical deductivism of the German Pandectistic, the two
mainstreams of the European-continental legal model. These are in
fact much more structurally influential in European legal culture than
the episodic albeit long political authoritarianism, pervasive in the
1930’s and 1940’s. If such unidimensional legal thought was deemed
to be a core component of the authoritarian regimes which carried out
– in the 1930s and in the 1940s – the harshest violations of individual
and collective Human Rights to this date 10, the fact is that the trend to
uniqueness began long before and survived until long after the
authoritarian wave.
In common law countries this trend to legal uniqueness also had
its surrogates, as the combination of Austin’s positivism with a narrow
conception of realism, both of which rendered un-problematic either
the native constituted legal values or their extension to other cultural
environments. Therefore, the very definition of Human Rights was not
completely freed from this unidimensional conception of humankind,
human values, good government and – as a consequence – the herein
derived rights of individuals or of groups.
Even if we turn to the kind of jusnaturalism prevailing in southern
Europe in the same period, which was deemed to be a better shelter
for Human Rights, we have to admit that is was inoculated by the
same unidimensionalism. Southern Euro-continental jusnaturalism was
actually, mainly rooted in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church,
namely in the Encyclic Aeterni Patris, issued in 1879 by Pope Leo XIII,
which condemned all the symptoms of modernism (as “a plague of
perverse opinions”), amidst them democracy, freedom of conscience,
pluralism and Human Rights, insisting on a political society based on
the “Authentic first principles”. Even some liberal Catholic thinkers (like
Jacques Maritain) stated that the Church’s doctrine was compatible
with most of the political regimes known on Earth, even those non
democratic or elitist, as far as they respected the Catholic dogmatic
understanding of the dignity of the Human Person 11.
10
Actually, the assumption of this linkage is a quite problematic the core of the authoritarian legal thought
was almost always more dependent of a decisionistic than of a legalistic pattern of law.
11 Kenneth L. Grasso, “Democracy, Modernity and the Catholic Human Rights Revolution: Reflections on
Christian Faith and Modern Democracy”, ttp://www.catholicsocialscientists.org/cssrIX/Kraynak%20symposium
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
This ethnocentric conception of Human Rights can be read at a
double level. On the one side, the offense of Human Rights was
narrowly bound to an individualistic conception of rights, which
excluded or made difficult the legal condemnation of offenses against
groups or communities. “Everyone” and “No one” are systematically
the incipit of every article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948). And it was to a large extent this limited conception of Human
Rights that lead the UN to approve successive declarations of group
rights, culminating, almost 60 years (!) after the San Francisco’s
Charter, in a supplementary Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples12, where the collective side of the rights of mankind, hidden by
the atomistic conception of society, is finally assumed, notwithstanding
the predictable obstacles of their practical implementation in strict legal
terms. That is corresponds to a specific European cultural element is
possibly proven by the fact that the African Charter on Human Rights
is less individualistic (rights of “peoples”) than the European
Convention on Human Rights.
On the other hand, values included in human nature that were
recognized as needing protection were solely those embedded in the
Western European elitarian culture, now taken as a universal canon .
Not by chance, every right included in the most conspicuous
Declarations and Charters was born in the womb of Western culture;
notwithstanding the fact that Europeans had already “opened the
world” and witnessed both several other ways of life and different sets
of communitarian basic values. This ethnocentric concept of Human
Rights provoked strong reactions from “exotic” cultures, societies and
political entities. On the political arena, arguing and counter-arguing
about Human Rights violations, moved from a political to an
anthropological level. Mainland China, for example, left the prior
arguments based on the “inner” nature of the question and the
denegation of legitimacy of third Sates or organizations to interfere in
issues depending on each State’s sovereignty, to adopt a brand new
defense, anchored on the most influential Western anthropology or
philosophy (namely, that of Clifford Geertz or Richard Rorty), when
they assess values as “local” and embedded in cultural / political
13
12
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007.
On the violence which made possible sush homogeneization of Western European Culture, s. Zygmunt
Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1987
13
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
contexts 14. On the theoretical arena, the issue of Human Rights and
decent government gave origin to a lively worldwide debate on the
peculiarity of local values, from the “Asian values”, which are deemed
to frame conviviality from China to Singapore, India and Japan 15, to
“African values”, which grounded a regional Charter of Human rights
for Africa, approved in 1981 16.
In face of this kind of criticism, are we forced to agree with
Alistair MacIntyre, when he writes that to count on Human Rights as a
source for normative projects is something akin to believe in witches,
fairies and unicorns, which nobody has ever seen ?
17
A possible answer is that Human Rights can actually be seen as
far as they are vested in ratified charters or enshrined in agreed
international declarations. Although this prerequisite could be viewed
as a pyrrhic victory, needing as it does the agreement of the States, it
still brings a warrant of “local” social and political embeddeness and
the resulting feasibility. Conversely, trying to escape from such realistic
approach risks to embody, once again, a further attempt at
(occasionally well intentioned) cultural colonialism, imposing as
Human Rights expectations which are well rooted in our (European)
political mores, but totally unexpected and even strongly irritating in
different cultural contexts. Even if majorities are not parliamentary
ones, however conspicuous enough 18 to be clearly distinguished from
people’s manipulation, it seems wise to credit their political
sensitiveness – at least provisional – a status of legitimacy, which
prevent their disruption by an external counter-majoritarian 19
14 S., v.g., Julia Ching, “Human Rights: A Valid Chinese Concept?”, on the theoretical background of the
Chinese White Paper ion Human Rights, 1991 [http://www.religiousconsultation.org/ching.htm]; also, Wang, Z. , 200901-07 "Historical Embeddedness and Endogenous Constraint: Re-examination of Relation between Sovereignty and Human
Rights" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel Intercontinental, New
Orleans, LA <Not Available>. 2009-05-22 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p283489_index.html; Stephen Angle,
Human rights and Chinese thought: a cross cultural inquiry, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2002 max., 4/5,
describing the evolution in the tone of Chinese White Papers on human rights; a broader panorama of Chinese and
Western debate on the theoretical foundation of human rights, Marina Svenssons, Debating Human Rights in China: A
Conceptual and Political History, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
15 S., v.g., Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asians think, Singapore, Steerforth Press, 2002. Discussing the idea of
“Asian” values: Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values," The New Republic, July 14-July 21, 1997
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sen.htm). A SEN: The Argumentative Indian…
16 S. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2000/papers/MUTUA.pdf.
17
"Some Consequences of the Failure of the Enlightenment Project", After Virtue: A Study in Moral
Theory. University of Notre Dame Press, 1981. Actually, what MacIntyre was arguing was that it was
impossible to demonstrate the existence of Human Rights without a reference to supra-positive levels of
belief, like faith.
18
Although under other more or less credible forms of manifestation, like pervasive social consensus.
19
The counter-majoritarian fallacy was originally criticized by Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch,1961, to denounce the imposition of pretended truth (or, at least, truthful) values to the values of representative
assemblies, claimed as hazardous, self interest-seeking, emotional or populist. The comparison is appealing as “universal
human rights” are also deemed to overcome irrationality, lack of cosmopolitism, deficits of civilization, shortage of
human sensitiveness, political indecency.
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
conception of good governance. Once rendered visible by the
hegemonic / majoritarian native community, Human Rights should
obey the geometry proper to this community.
Delicate and extremely controversial issues may arise when
locally rooted values damage the rights of particular groups within a
local culture. This is typically the case of women in some Islamic
communities, in orthodox Jewish groups or even in traditional
Mediterranean societies. Often, the proper answer to the troubling
question of Susan M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 20 shall
definitely be “yes”. However, wisdom and caution are highly required
by the diagnosis and the therapeutics in these critical areas of
protecting rights which a rooted / hegemonic / majoritarian local culture
does not acknowledge. Actually, the first need is a hermeneutical task,
a thick interpretation of local attitudes, in order to uncover their deeply
contextualized meaning, instead of hastily give them the meaning they
have for us. Sometimes modesty, reserve of intimacy or sense of
restraint are read as self-humiliation, serfdom or submission to
external constraint; often, in spite of troubling but quite unequivocal
signals, we don’t accept easily to consider that, in these uncomfortable
cases, what is finally at stake is a different “anatomy of the soul” (as
“strange” it may be). Also on the level of social therapeutics,
experience is eloquent in telling us that a to hasty imposition of
“correct” values and behaviors often triggers a violent social refusal
and a consolidation of what would be to erase.
Are we proposing a simple surrender of our convictions on
Humanity and on its core values and rights ? Or even a seemingly
hopeless expectation of spontaneous changes in the uncomfortable
otherness ? Surely not. The deference to difference is also a
deference for our own feelings of fairness. On the other hand, cultures
are mobile and entangled artifacts, made up of conflicting perceptions
and senses of belonging and identity. Subaltern groups within a culture
do participate in several and often contradictory feelings of fairness,
some arising from their unbalanced social position, others imported
from external cultural sensitiveness. This intricate network of systems
of values, with the inherent triggering of a political dialogue about
confronting values, does introduce a real but autonomous dynamism in
the group definition of good life and fair governance 21. Actually, the
problem is similar to that recently raised by Karl-Heinz Ladeur with
20
Susan Moller Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” in Joshua Cohen and Matthew Howard, Is
Multiculturalism Bad For Women? Princeton University Press, 1999.
21
S. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (Issues of Our Time), New York, W. W. Norton
Company, Inc., 2006.
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
respect to the weighting (Abwägung) of conflicting legal values within a
legal system 22; this has to be the outcome of an internal self-adjusting
process producing the least irritating solution, instead of the result of
an external adjudication jeopardizing generalized expectations. This
process of autopoietic adjustment will surely take its time to reach an
equilibrium. However, taking time can be more productive than forcing
it; also here, indolence could be a wise way of capitalizing and making
work social experience 23.
A last couple of phrases about the scope and addressees of a
legal shelter of Human Rights.
Human Rights comprise all the expectations consistent with a
conception of well being and well-ordered society – expectations
towards the state, but also towards other social groups or individuals.
Life is lived in many rooms (State, family, job, gender groups, very
primary needs, to basic communicational requisites), each of one
inhabited by specific dangers and threats. In some rooms, individual
rights are required; in others, what a life worth being lived needs, is
probably mutual duties of cooperation, “republican” solicitude and
brotherly and sisterly compassion; in many, on the opposite, real
public assistance and care are the main needs. Without the protection
being afforded in each one of these living rooms, human life can be so
severely amputated that it will no more merit the qualification of
human, becoming eventually a residual “naked life” (G. Agamben),
where the very sense of being human may be lost.
Since the appeal to Human Rights is more than a programmatic
or rhetorical proposition, it will only make sense where its force is
doubled by an institutionalized procedural efficiency that can grant the
availability of their implementation or defense to everybody, individuals
or groups. This is a crucial issue, because the current legal rules
usually design the jurisdiction proper to claim such rights as a highest
jurisdiction, frequently dependent on unknown, foreign, far and
expensive procedures, therefore almost inaccessible to ordinary
people. The rationale seems to be either a symbolic one – the
correspondence between the high rank of this kind of rights and the
high level jurisdictional institution – or an idea inherited from the prior
conception that the normal offender being the State, the jurisdictional
control had to be outside the possibility of State control.
22
Boaventura Sousa Santos, A Crítica da Razão Indolente. Contra o desperdício da experiência, Vol. I, Edições
Afrontamento, 2000.
23
K.-H. Ladeur, Kritik der Abwägung in der Grundrechtsdogmatik. Plädoyer für eine Erneuerung der liberalen
Grundrechtstheorie, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2004.
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António Manuel Hespanha & Teresa Pizarro Beleza, On witches, fairies and unicorns
The result is that Human Rights, whose main feature is their
ubiquity and pervasiveness, are only actionable by small elites, well
informed, assisted by legal counsel, wealthy enough to afford a rather
specialized and least known jurisdictional path.
This may mean that some have seen the witches, the fairies and
the unicorns; many more may have imagined them; but only a few
have had the privilege to come near them and checked for real if they
were more than a passing fancy. And yet, the banality of evil and the
resistance of goodness might have engendered a denser population of
realistic dreams.
i
Prof. at the Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (amh@oniduo.pt) – Legal History, Theory of
Law.
ii Prof. at the Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (tpb@fd.unl.pt) – Criminal Law, Human Rights
Law, Gender Law.
11