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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: A CASE
STUDY OF CULTURAL IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION AND CONTESTED
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN A GLOBALIZATION CONTEXT
José Guerra Vio
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Abstract:
This article focuses on a theoretical discussion about the interrelations across the Taiwan Strait in the
context of a regional economic integration process. The particular situation of Taiwan and China in these
regards becomes an interesting case of study, due to their highly interdependent economies, their cultural
bond and their sovereignty dilemma. For many commentators, the two governments’ recent moves in the
direction of pursuing an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is thought to be the preliminary
stage for further political integration. It is argued here that more institutionalized economic integration
arrangement between Taiwan and China will be inevitably determined by the identity conflict that Taiwan
has in opposition to the PRC, and by the sovereignty dispute among the two sides of the strait. The dilemma
arises since identity and sovereignty are intrinsic aspects that nation-states possess and utilize. However,
these two basic features are now being challenged by the forces of globalization and regionalization.
In this environment, an institutionalized regional integration framework can be considered as the stabilizing
mechanism necessary to bring nearer Taipei’s and Beijing’s postures. An approach to regional integration
which does not exclude Taiwan would offer an instance where China and Taiwan could work together for a
peaceful solution of their differences. Social Constructivism offers the theoretical standpoint for this article,
which has been divided in four sections. As an introduction, Section 1 exposes how the interdependence of
the cross-strait economic ties has being developed. Section 2 places the emphasis on the theoretical
contributions and conceptual definition considered for this analysis, while in section 3 those perspectives are
applied to the particular case of integration between Taiwan and Mainland China. Finally, in the conclusions
the article proposes that, as a consequence of the inevitable forces of globalization and regionalization, a
new understanding of the identity and sovereignty dilemma deeply rooted in the cross-strait relationship, has
to necessarily be taken into account. This article puts forward an approach where the traditional notions of
identity and sovereignty are no longer entirely attached to nation-states.
.
Introduction: Two Economies, One Inevitable Destiny
The two simultaneous processes of globalization and regionalization have brought about new
ways in which nations-states and their citizens interact, as well as their identities are formed and
transformed. Considering this context, the particular situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC)
and the People’s Republic of China in the Mainland (PRC) becomes an interesting case of study because
of their highly interdependent economies, their cultural bonds and their sovereignty dilemma. For many
commentators, the two governments’ recent moves in the direction of the accomplishment of the so
called Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is thought to be the preliminary stage for
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further political integration and possible reunification with the Mainland.
Cross-strait “invisible linkages” and informal economic integration started more than twenty
years ago and now comprises an important part of the regional production networks and the international
division of labor within East Asia, which makes it hard for both Beijing and Taipei to continue ignoring
and avoiding the creation of a way to regulate such inevitable developments. Already in 2002, China
surpassed the US and became the biggest market for Taiwanese exports, which accounts for one fifth of
the island’s total exports. The PRC also represents the main destination for Taiwanese investment
abroad. According to statistics of the Central Bank of Taiwan, the accumulated investments to China
from Taiwan in the previous decade may be around US$104.5 billion (Ho and Leng, 2004: 738). In the
context of this market driven economic interdependence, Yung Wei develops the concept of “linkage
communities” to describe how this informal integration process has been undertaken. Apparently the
existence of a group of people who have had an extensive social and commercial contact with the people
and society of the opposite system allows to develop an understanding, sensitivity, and empathy across
the boundaries (Wei, 1997: 7), which in the case of Taiwan and China is enhanced by the close cultural
ties shared by their people, such as language and to some extent common history.
Following the same logic, cross-strait economic relations are characterized by a “civilian
governance” in which the private sector takes the lead (Leng, 2002: 267); however, many scholars and
commentators have addressed the necessity of a more institutionalized cross-strait economic integration,
bearing in mind the inevitability of the current process. This is especially important considering the
global trend for regionalization.
Nowadays PRC’s recent standing towards a more institutionalized economic integration process
within the Asia-Pacific region through an assertive FTA policy is also contributing to the isolation of
Taiwan from these kinds of regional agreements, a situation this paper recognizes as a strategy
deliberately used by the PRC. Undoubtedly, this puts great pressure on the ROC government, since
Taiwanese businesses may be pushed into a disadvantageous position when competing in the Mainland
or within the regional market, whereas other countries enjoy the benefits of trade liberalization. The new
administration of Ma Ying-jeou in Taipei has acknowledged this, and they have recognized that it is in
Taiwan’s best interests to try to revert this situation by seeking a formal and institutionalized economic
integration framework with China, to secure its trade and economic status in East-Asia.
Accordingly, in May 2009 Beijing responded positively to the urgent call from Taiwan to
negotiate an integration agreement and try to conclude it as soon as possible. The ECFA is a
comprehensive agreement that would allow the free flow of goods, services and capital across the
Taiwan Strait. The initiative is expected to be signed this year, and while Taiwanese groups have tried to
play down the political implications of the economic pact, those in the Mainland are already talking
about the eventual reunification of the two Chinas.
This article focuses on a theoretical discussion and tries to argue that this institutionalization of
the economic integration process between Taiwan and China will be inevitably determined by the
identity conflict that Taiwan has in opposition to the PRC, and by the sovereignty dispute among the two
sides of the strait. The dilemma arises since identity and sovereignty are intrinsic aspects that
nation-states possess and utilize. However, these two basic features are being challenged by the forces of
globalization and regionalization that are responsible for the already informal cross-strait economic
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integration. In this environment, an institutionalized regional integration framework can be considered
as the stabilizing mechanism necessary to close the gap between Taipei’s and Beijing’s postures. An
approach to regional integration which does not exclude Taiwan would offer an instance where China
and Taiwan could work together for a peaceful solution of their differences.
Since Taiwan has the fourth largest economy in the region, as many scholars have pointed out,
any East Asian regional integration process without involving Taiwan would be incomplete (Cai, 2005:
587). This fact constitutes something that both the leadership in Beijing and Taipei cannot longer ignore
when making foreign policy concerning their regional integration strategies. The relevance of this lies
on the degree of economic interdependence between the two sides created by those linkage
“communities,” which can effectively reduce the possibility of confrontation by increasing the chances
of functional integration, eventually leading to a peaceful political solution of the dispute over the
island’s sovereignty. This constitutes one of the main arguments of this analysis. The ‘de facto’
integration of the Chinese and Taiwanese economies, induced by those same forces of globalization and
regionalization, can create the context and the opportunity to bring closer the ROC and the PRC.
II. Globalization, Identity, Sovereignty and Economic Integration.
The main arguments in the discussion of this paper will be Taiwan’s identity transformation,
putting emphasis on its cultural and political aspects, as highly affected by its relation with Mainland
China and their integration process in a regional context. The PRC’s sovereignty claim over the island
will also be considered in that context of a future ECFA, and the possible formalization of political ties
between the two sides. The main objective for this study is to analyze how these two concepts affect and
determine the prospects of economic integration between China and Taiwan, and vice versa. The
relevance of looking at these two aspects when trying to understand regional integration is related to the
fact that, in the wake of globalization the status of national identity as the main source of identification,
as well as the state’s sovereignty not just over its territory but also over some of its policies - both face
unprecedented challenges.
“Although globalization has been imagined in a variety of competing ways, there is general consensus
that the cornerstones of modern governance, especially the symmetries forged largely in the past two
centuries between national states, national territory, and national citizenship rights, have been
progressively fractured by transnational networks, flows, and identities. Globalization is commonly linked
to the erosion of the capacity of national states to exercise sovereignty over domestic policy and territorial
boundaries or to buffer its citizens from an increasing predatory and unpredictable international political
economy.” (Brodie, 2004: 323).
Taking into account the issue of identity first, it has been argued that under the current global
flows closed national spaces and identities no longer capture social and political life, because the local is
now infused with transnational and transcultural networks that multiply and often deterritorialize citizen
subjectivities, as Brodie explains. Understood as something multiple, diverse and always in flux,
individual and national identities in a globalizing era are complicated by a complex of forces, loyalties,
technologies and movement that iterate individuals differently and at different scales of political
organization into what has been called ‘overlapping communities of fate‘.1 In these communities,
strings of transactions and interests as well as non-territorial and pre and post-national solidarities run up
and down through the national social fabric such as citizens are often more directly linked to distant
forces and actors than to the nation-state, affecting the way identities are formed and trans-formed.
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These processes undermine, or at least question, the correspondence that identity has traditionally drawn
between belonging and the nation-state. Consequently, local events are in turn being shaped at a
distance, which lead us to the second aspect of sovereignty and its increasing limitations, thus depriving
the national state of the illusion of control.
In these regards, critics have argued that under the neo-liberal way that globalization has been
carried out so far, national sovereignty, as the ability to realize policy goals and democratic will within a
national territory, has been indeed eroded. With regional economic integration the form of the modern
state is altered, as sovereignty shifts up to international trade and investment agreements that
increasingly assume binding authority over national policies. “Through membership in the WTO or as
signatories of regional trade agreements and investment agreements such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), elected officials agree to narrow the terrain of state competency by
complying with externally-derived and binding rules that almost exclusively relate to the deregulation of
capital within their jurisdictions” (Brodie, 2004: 326-327). This argument serves here to link the
previous concepts already outlined with the issue of economic integration that constitutes the main
concern for this particular analysis.
Usually in International Relations theory economic integration, as a process of globalization, has
also been used by the neo-liberal approach to address how this aspect would help to prevent different
states from conflict, because of the interdependence and peaceful implications of trade that integration
agreements generate. Economic integration is defined by Dajin Peng as a process of building regional
systems that increase the economic interaction whereby economic exchanges increasingly transcend
national boundaries. This is different and more inclusive that the conventional definition of economic
integration, which defines economic integration as just different levels of trade of blocs (Peng, 2004).
For others like Wang, regional economic integration is defined as “the deepening on intra-regional
economic interdependence in a given region, through intra-regional trade, foreign direct investment
(FDI) and harmonization of commercial regulations, standards and practices” (Wang, 2005: 19).
In general aspects, the study of regional integration is not always efficacious for studying a case
like the cross-strait integration between Mainland China and Taiwan. Shaun Breslin argues that the
study of regionalism as a sub-set of political economy has been heavily influenced by the European
experience. “Regionalism will entail at least some of the institutionalization exhibited in the European
Model, and there is often an implicit understanding that something like the European Union will be the
end point of integrative processes” (Breslin, 2004: 8). This emphasis on inter-governmentalism as the
main dynamic behind regional integration contrasts the case across the Taiwan strait where real
economic integration was occurring across national political boundaries when there was no formal
intergovernmental agreement or institutionalization. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the
different types of regional processes. Thus, “regionalism” has become widely accepted to refer to the
conscious and deliberate attempts by national states to create formal mechanism for dealing with
common transnational issues through intergovernmental dialogue and treaty. By contrast,
“regionalization” is conceived as an undirected process of growing interdependence which originates in
the actions of individuals, groups and corporations rather than through the deliberate actions of national
governments (Breslin, 2004: 9). These two types of processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Indeed, some theorists see regionalism as a response to regionalization. The ECFA between the ROC
and the PRC would follow this logic.
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The notions aforementioned are certainly useful to understand the issue of regional economic
integration, but not broad enough to comprehend the implications of identity and sovereignty over the
process. As Evans points out, if regionalization is the expression of increased commercial and human
transactions in a defined geographical space, regionalism is the expression of a common sense of
identity and destiny combined with the creation of institutions that express that identity and shape
collective action (Evans, 2005: 196). This situation is clearly perceived in the way the European
integrative process has been carried out so far, where a strong regional identity is present, however it
remains to be seen how it can be transplanted to other parts of the world. In order to do so when
considering the possible institutionalization of the integration process across the Taiwan Strait, this
study also gathers elements from the Social Constructivist approach.
This theory helps to understand how the cultural aspects of Taiwan’s identity can be affected and
challenged by globalization and regional integration at both nation-state and individual levels, since it
claims that positivist objectivity is more apparent than real (Wu, 2000: 425). When applied to
international relations, Social Constructivism emphasizes the identity formation, the perception of
‘other’ actors and the influence of the ‘culture’ present in the international arena. First exposed by
Alexander Wendt,2 this view essentially argues that shared ideas and culture, not material power
structures as it is understood by the realist stand, is what constitute and determine relations between
states. This happens because the ideational structure, the set of beliefs and the expectation that states
possess over the behavior of other states, is what really influence the international system. Social
Constructivists puts the emphasis on the social construction of subjectivity, involving a
socio-psychological way of understanding the interactions among different states as social and collective
subjects.
Shared ideas in any given inter-state relationship, especially regarding the nature of the ‘Self’
and the ‘Other’ are what constitute the “political culture” proposed by Wendt, and what determine the
character of the relation. Wendt perceives three distinct cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and
Kantian. Each of these is constituted by a particular notion of the basic relation between states.
According to this author, a state may consider its ‘Other’ an enemy, rival, or friend, respectively. Each
culture, moreover, includes three degrees of “internalization”, which is the motive states have for
playing by the established rules, namely, coercion, interest or legitimacy (1st, 2nd, and 3rd degree
respectively). All nine combinations are logically possible. For example, most of human history has
been characterized by a second degree Hobbesian anarchy: states considered it to be in their interest to
eliminate other states when they could, and to maintain a defensive balance when they could not. As
Wendt proposes, the Peace of Westphalia created a Lockean anarchy based on the principle of
sovereignty. This meant the states might continue to use violence against each other, but they would not
exterminate their rivals. Signed in 1648, The Peace of Westphalia is said to have ended attempts at the
imposition of any supranational authority on European states. 3 The “Westphalian” doctrine of states as
independent actors was bolstered by the rise of nationalisms in the 19th century, under which legitimate
states were assumed to correspond to nations-groups of people united by language and culture. Benedict
Anderson refers to these putative nations as an “imagined political community - and imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1991: 6). According to this author, it was the new modes
of apprehending the world, more than anything else, what made it possible to ‘think’ the nation, which is
conceived as a solid community moving steadily down history, and it has become the current
‘taken-for-granted’ frame of reference.
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International relations theorists have identified the Peace of Westphalia as having the following
key principles: 1) The principle of the sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self
determination 2) The principle of (legal) equality between states and 3) The principle of
non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state. These principles are common to the
way the “realist” international relations paradigm views the international system today. According to
Wendt, we still live in this world. However, it is important to point out that these “political cultures” are
not uniquely global systems, so states might find themselves in a Kantian culture vis-à-vis their
immediate neighbors, for example, but continue to recognize a Lockean anarchy in the wider world. The
changes in identity formation between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ constitute a sophisticated element that
influences the kind of political culture institutionalized within this relationship. Bearing in mind this
theoretical framework, it can be understood how the Social Constructivist approach can contribute to a
broader perspective in this analysis. It represents a useful tool to decipher the way in which Taiwan’s
identity transformation affects the economic integration process with the Mainland and vice versa.
Indeed the applicability of Westphalian sovereignty in practice has been questioned from the mid-20th
century onwards from a variety of viewpoints. Much of that debate follows the same logic of this
analysis, where globalization and regional integration appear to conflict the Westphalian notion of
sovereignty.
At the same time, the sovereignty issue behind the integration process across the Taiwan strait
can be also considered through the so called Integration Paradigm. This more liberal perspective puts
the emphasis on the common cultural roots and the desire to achieve maximum economic efficiency and
prosperity among the parties concerned, which is the case across the Taiwan Strait. “Economy plays a
critical role in the integration process, as it is not only the major motive for different countries to take
part in the joint effort toward integration, but it is also the chief means through which integration can be
achieved” (Wu, 2000: 411). Closer to the Institutionalist line of thought, this paradigm also proposes
that the less sensitive type of functional integration such as the economic one can actually produce the
right conditions to spill over other functional areas, and ultimately to include high politics and national
sovereignty, i.e. to political amalgamation. In order to reach that level each contracting part has to
negotiate and give away some amount of sovereignty first, to attain the mutual benefits of economic
gains. This approach could suit perfectly to the context of cross-strait economic integration, but until
now it has not done it. To explore the turbulent case of the PRC’s claim over Taiwan from this point of
view can be thus illuminating, since it assesses the importance of sovereignty and how the economic
gains can lubricate a more politically driven integration process.
III. Taiwan’s Identity Transformation vs. China’s Sovereignty Claim
After addressing the theoretical points of view gathered for the analysis, in the following section
the main arguments of this article will be exposed and discussed.
“When communities share a common language and cultural heritage, trade in cultural goods
more than any other forms of trade can bring communities closer together” (Liew, 2004: 201). This line
summarizes what have been widely discussed among East Asian scholars regarding the magnitude of
Cross-Strait economic integration. Taiwan as an important part of the so called “Greater China” market,
the growing influence of the ethnic Chinese business networks in the region and the close not just
geographic, but especially cultural and even emotional ties that Taiwanese individuals have with
Mainland China, have help to build up a large amount of literature exposing the nature of the informal
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and market driven economic integration across the Taiwan Strait.
All these forces enhance the prospects of the island integration with the Mainland. Indeed,
Taiwanese have a relative cultural and linguistic advantage when conducting business in China, and the
networks that Taiwanese investors have established with local Chinese officials have invigorated the
discussion of the role of culture and identity in the process of international capital flows. Hence, it seems
clear that the major barriers dividing Taiwanese from Mainlanders are not really related to cultural
identification, but more related to a process of identification based almost entirely on political terms.
With the prospects of regional economic integration with the PRC, Taiwan’s identity issue is under a
new kind of tension.
In regards to national identity, it is important to note that it is considered to have at least two
dimensions, a political and a cultural one. “While political nationalists understand the nation primarily
as a political and territorial unit, cultural nationalists regard the nation as the ‘organic’ community based
on its unique history, culture and genealogy, or the product of a unique civilization” (Hutchinson, 2004:
33). Therefore, within today’s global and regional processes, many scholars explicitly acknowledge the
‘return of culture and identity’ as analytical focus. Der-yuan Wu wonders whether national identity has
become outmoded in the era of local, regional and global governance. “Is national identity going to be
replaced by regional or ethnic one? Or, is it feasible to have multiple identities coexisting at ethnic,
national and regional levels?” (Wu, 2006: 77). While some experts have endorsed the first option as a
real possibility, the approach this analysis maintains is closer to the second alternative.
To apply these questions to the case of Taiwan, as a highly globalized economy but a country
ostracized from the international community, represents an interesting exercise. Many Taiwanese
intellectuals insist that the differences in historical experience, level of development, political system,
and degree of exposure to the rest of the world have produced a significant divergence between
Taiwanese and Mainland culture, and the process of political liberalization on the island is permitting a
resurgence of a sense of local Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, as Kenneth Lin emphasizes, the
PRC worries that a trend towards a separate identity can make peaceful reunification impossible. Lin
acknowledges the intelligent and pragmatic strategy used by the leaders in Beijing to entice their
political purposes using the economic integration card when dealing with the Taiwan issue. By attracting
Taiwanese investment to the Mainland, Beijing can exert some kind of influence in Taiwan’s domestic
politics since those businesspeople with economic interests in China are more likely to exercise a
pro-PRC voice regarding the national identity trans-formation in the ROC, as Lin notes:
“PRC is aware of the effects of democratization on seeking a clear national identity in Taiwan, interprets
them as negative to its unification project. Since PRC is an autocratic state, it is not only against any
democratization process in the PRC, but also use all possible means to destroy the democratic political
system and weaken the rising national identity” (Lin, 2006: 296-297).
When employing Wendt’s constructivist approach to understand this matter, Acharya explains:
“Constructivism would see the conflict between Taiwan and the mainland in terms of a clash of two
distinct identities, between an inward-looking, intensely nationalist, acutely historically-minded, highly
sovereignty-bound, and monolithic state vis-à-vis an outward-looking, democratic and ‘internationalized’
state relatively at ease with the ideas and influences from the outside world because of its commitment
with globalization” (Archaya, 1999: 7).
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Because of the diverse ways their identities are being transformed, the two opposite sides of the
strait lack a similar understanding of the relationship which is reflected in different ideas about how to
handle a more institutionalized economic agreement as a first step for closer ties. This Taiwanese
identity does not have a long history. It emerged in the 1990s with the democratization process and it
became a political force since politicians in the ROC, even president Lee Teng-hui, found it useful to
strengthen that sense of identity in order to prevent a too-easy accommodation with Beijing. However,
many have argued that the people in Taiwan have resided on the island for generations and have become
entirely localized, and they long ago forged an identity with Taiwan within centuries of waves of
migration to the island from Mainland China. “Many Han Chinese who migrated to Taiwan did so with
no intention of returning to China. After a period of time, they identified with Taiwan as being their
home village. While people referred to China (“Tangshan”)4 as the place of origin, scholars have
determined that ‘Tangshan’ more often meant the hometowns of these immigrants and not the nation or
country of China” (Hsueh, Tai and Chow, 2005: 110). This is in fact true, since the China or “Tangshan”
often cited by the Han Chinese in Taiwan or by the rest of the Chinese Diaspora throughout South East
Asia, did not involve a national identity based on all of Mainland China, which by that time it was
controlled by the Manchu, but instead referred to specific places of origin in Xiamen, Zhangzhou or
Quanzhou. The modern concept of a nation, as it has been noted, was still not prevalent during that
period.
Alan Wachman explains that only in the second half of the 20th century “the cultural identity of
Taiwanese appears to have been ‘invented’ in reaction to the efforts of the Mainland elite to make
residents of Taiwan cleave to the Chinese motherland, its culture, and its people” (Wachman in Bush,
2005: 179). Today Han Chinese residents in Taiwan consider themselves to possess at least two and
probably three identities at once. One of these identities - emerging over the last fifty-plus years - is
native Taiwanese, which even immigrants mainlanders possess nowadays. The second is a Chinese
identity, at least in a cultural sense as proposed by this analysis. The third is what some have referred to
as a ‘dual cosmopolitan identity’ (Bush, 2005: 180).
Certainly, with globalization and regionalization as the driving forces of world affairs, concepts
like cosmopolitan or multicultural identities and citizenship are indeed arising as a reality in many
societies. According to a survey conducted from 1992 to 2004, 40 to 50 percent of the people in Taiwan
feel themselves both as Taiwanese and Chinese averagely, but the figure of Taiwanese identity has
grown two times than that a decade ago from 20 percent to 40 percent. At the same time, the figure of
solely Chinese identity has decreased from 26 percent to 6 percent. 5 In other words, over the past
decade or so, the people of Taiwan increasingly have focused on their own identity, which is indicated
by more people speaking Taiwanese and focusing on the island's own history and self-government (Day
and Yao, 2004: 13).
Consequently, many could misinterpret these numbers by getting the impression that the vast
majority of Taiwan people tend to move towards independence, because strong Taiwan identity would
be easily considered as willing to build a separate country. Nonetheless, it has been observed that within
Taiwanese population, the support for an official declaration of independence over the past decade
remains only around 5 percent.6 Most of the scholars revised for this analysis adhere to the consensus
that the growth, or even dominance, of a Taiwanese identity does not ipso facto lead to a quest for
independence. This can be understood thanks to the two dimensions of national identity aforementioned,
the political and the cultural, as many residents see themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese without
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having any identity conflicts. Indeed, with the wave of globalization which creates favorable
circumstances for cultural hybridization, as Wu emphasizes, it becomes evident that individuals could
belong to more than one collective group, thereby acquiring “multiple identities” (Wu, 2006: 86).
As such, contemporary Taiwanese identity could be described as a hybrid, global-local (or more
accurately ‘glocal’),7 fragmented, multiple and fluid one. Hence, from the identitarian point of view, the
constant and fragile transformation of Taiwan’s identity does not compulsorily goes against the
achievement of a deeper and more institutionalized cross-strait economic integration process. In these
regards, what is really important and influential for the economic integration process is that “a
significant percentage of the population believes that Taiwan is distinct (but not necessarily exclusive
of) China… Taiwanese consciousness does not necessarily translate into a drive to legal independence,
but it both constitutes a powerful bulwark against acceptance of the one-country-two-systems formula
and reinforces the more substantive concerns about sovereignty” (Bush, 2005: 180).
This last explanation appoints precisely how the identity transformation when linked to the
sovereignty issue can influence the prospects of institutional economic integration between the PRC and
the ROC, particularly through the EFCA process. Taking into account here the aforementioned approach
of ‘cultures of anarchy’ proposed by Alexander Went, it is clear that while the Peace of Westphalia
created a “Lockean” type of anarchy based on the principle of sovereignty, this is insufficient when
trying to understand the case of Taiwan. Stephen Krasner defines the predicament of Taiwan as a result
of this ‘sovereignty game’:
“A State like Taiwan can have Westphalian sovereignty, but not international legal sovereignty (…)
International legal sovereignty refers to the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between
territorial entities that have formal juridical independence, while Westphalian sovereignty is political
organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory”
(Krasner in Wang, 2006: 150)
Taiwan’s isolation from most of the regional economic integration processes in East-Asia
follows this logic. The Taiwanese government and state apparatus exercise indeed a ‘de facto’
sovereignty in the island, but the ROC unique international legal status, which is the result of a lack of
recognition given by other nation-states, is the main cause tackling any possible involvement of Taiwan
in any kind of regional integration framework with others before having one with the PRC first. Going
back to the “political cultures”, it could be noted that in the case of Beijing’s firm and persistent
sovereignty claim over Taiwan, this relationship does not follow the Westphalian logic, but instead it
can be considered as a “Hobbesian” type of culture, with a third grade of internalization based on
legitimacy over the right to govern the island. So far this has been basically the strongest argument in
both sides of the Taiwan strait to slow down the speed of negotiations oriented towards the achievement
of a trade agreement that will regulate the until now informal cross-strait integration course.
Vincent Wang notes that in a globalization era, it is a must for any kind of regional arrangement
in the Asia-Pacific to include the most-globalized nations, and in this regard the ROC remains as a key
player that has been an outcast. He agrees with other authors, like Kevin Cai in his article “The
China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and Taiwan,” by addressing that China’s imposed isolation of
Taiwan is consequently hurting not just economies on both sides of the strait, but everyone else in the
area, due to Taiwan’s crucial role as a supplier of goods and capital flow in the regional production
networks.8 Therefore, the economic costs for all the parts involved are high.
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The main conflict for the inclusion of Taiwan as an autonomous territory in any kind of regional
economic integration arrangement, with the PRC on a bilateral basis or including others on a multilateral
basis, has to do with the perception that first it is necessary to grant the recognition of a Westphalian
kind of sovereignty for Taiwan. The main cause of this is due to the notion of sovereignty that most
leaders still have on both sides of the strait, which is at odds with the norms and needs of the era of
globalization. As a consequence, the discussion usually focuses on the issue of whether Taiwan is part of
China, that is, as Richard Bush clarifies, whether the state known as China owns the territory of Taiwan.
Instead, the heart of the matter, this author suggests, “is how Taiwan might be a part of China, or, to be
more precise, whether the ROC government might be part of the Chinese state” (Bush, 2005: 177).
This is, of course, considering the matter from a Wesphalian point of view. However, the
possibility of integrating Taiwan and China in the context of a wider East Asian regional integration
arrangement9 may signify distancing from that notion of sovereignty that still prevails in Taipei and
Beijing. Undoubtedly the positive gains and economic interests that both sides have due to their
economic integration process could serve as a solid foundation for reaching out an agreement in which
Taiwan’s sovereignty condition and China’s approach to it are reformulated according to the challenges
of globalization. The identitarian aspects are also determinant in such a process if we considered that the
cultural aspects of the identity trans-formation of Taiwan collects elements from local, regional and even
global levels. In this sense, the current institutionalization of a regional bloc, in which a sense of
community and a nascent East Asian identity are being built, can serve as the framework agreement to
finally overcome the obstacles of an inevitable cross-strait integration, and in the process decrease the
threat of an unjust treatment for Taiwan.
IV. Conclusions: Towards New Notions of Identity and Sovereignty across the Taiwan Strait
While at a global stage the economic and also political maps of Europe, North and South
America are being redrawn in the context of regionalization as the mainstream international trend, this
study has focused on the analysis of the cross-strait economic integration process between Taiwan and
Mainland China. The emphasis has been put on Taiwan’s identity trans-formation and its sovereignty
situation in opposition to the PRC’s claims over the island, and how these two features influence the
process of negotiating the so called Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement among the two sides
of the strait.
As it has been noted, the extensive economic exchange between the PRC and the ROC, as a
consequence of the inevitable forces of globalization and regionalization, allows to shape new
understandings regarding the identity and sovereignty dilemma which is deeply rooted in the cross-strait
relationship.
On the one hand, the deepening market-driven and informal integration across the strait already
started in the 1980s is accompanied by the awakening of Taiwan’s identitarian aspects mainly due to its
democratization, but also reinforced by China’s increasing hostile attitude towards Taiwan on this
matter. However, a rise on Taiwanese self-perception of identity has not signified that the majority of
the population on the island support Taipei’s full independence. Apparently in Taiwan there is a certain
awareness that the degree of interdependence of its economy with the Mainland means the necessity to
work out a more institutionalized process of integration in the coming years, in order to stop Taiwanese
130
isolation of other regional frameworks as well as maintain its economic competitiveness. The last
legislative and presidential elections serve as a testimony of this fact, when the Kuomintang, which
favors closer ties with Beijing, got a huge win in both processes, by securing a majority of the seats in
the parliament, and by beating the independence-leaning DPP presidential candidate in 2009.
It can be said then that at least on its cultural dimension, Taiwan’s identity transformation is not
constructed upon an exclusive opposition to a Chinese identity, and it actually presents many diverse
elements combined, making it more inclusive. Identity becomes something that it is not just focused in
an ancestral past but instead, as something multiple and diverse, it means a simultaneous process in
constant trans-formation under the tension of global and local forces. Bearing in mind that the individual
is the constituent unit of society, in a time of globalization each individual can present multiple identities
at multiple levels. Indeed the modern notion of identity as something almost exclusively attached to the
nation-state, which is a creation and product of the 19th century and does not have its roots in human
nature, is now generally being replaced for an ethnic, regional and local aspect.
In the case of Taiwan and its inevitable integration with China and the rest of the region, this
means that Taiwanese people do not necessarily have to develop a ‘Chinese identity’ which is equal to
the status of being a citizen of the PRC, although Beijing would gladly like to. In a similar fashion, a
more formal and institutionalized cross-strait economic integration agreement through the ECFA
approach does not mean a loss of the unique status of Taiwanese identity, something especially feared
by Taipei. On the contrary, considering integration in a regional framework means that the respect for a
Taiwanese local identity is guaranteed and even further enhanced; at the same time that a cultural or
ethnic ‘Chinese identity’ remains present, a nascent East Asian regional identity is being formed, in
which both Taiwan and Mainland China inevitably have to fit together as two diverse entities.
On the other hand, the only way out to build some kind of institutionalized framework for the
economic integration process across the Taiwan strait seems to be the necessity of a change in the way
sovereignty is understood by the leadership in Beijing and Taipei, more according to the current trends
in a global era.
Since Taiwan already wields a ‘de facto’ Westphalian type of sovereignty over its territory, the
‘Hobbesian’ culture of anarchy proposed in this analysis to describe the current political cross-strait
relations should be replace by a second grade ‘Kantian’ one. This would be more according to the highly
interdependent economies both parts possess and based on their mutual interests in maintaining their
respective rates of economic growth, something especially important for the legitimacy of the
Communist Party over the government of Mainland China. This change in the perception of national
sovereignty seems more appropriate to portray the actual economic ties biding together the PRC and the
ROC, which are indeed having a spillover effect over the political ones. Following this logic, Taiwan
sovereign state status is not being downgraded or denied during the ECFA, as some have argued. The
leaders in both Beijing and Taipei must then re-interpret their sovereignty notion in a more
comprehensive way.
To allow a fluent dialogue and smooth process of economic integration between Taiwan and
China, from the revisited theories’ points of view, first there has to be a change of perceptions of the
‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, to alter the actual ‘culture of anarchy,’ using Wendt’s terminology, in which the
relationship is inserted. As long as Mainland China is still opposed to accept Taiwan as a valid ‘Other’
131
with its own subjectivity, i.e. its own identity and sovereignty, there are little chances to have those
‘shared ideas’ or ‘common sense’ of destiny and community necessaries to build regional institutions
involving the two sides of the Taiwan strait. The following diagram depicts the proposal put forward in
this analysis.
Only when understanding the building of international and regional institutions, such as
economic integration agreements, as social structures, can the mutual perception of Taipei and Beijing
reach a level where their inter-subjectivity will allow them to construct a larger public space where the
traditional notions of identity and sovereignty are no longer entirely attached to nation-states.
Democracy, in this view, has to become the ‘trans-national’ force and form of governance, by breaking
with the cultural hegemony of the state.
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Annexes
Diagram 1
Diagram 2
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1
Terminology coined by Held et al. (1999) in Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford , CA,
University Press.
2
Alexander Wendt exposes his proposal in depth in his publication “Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social
Construction of Power Politics” first published in 1992 in the Journal International Organization 42, 2.
3
In 1648 these were the European settlements that ended the Thirty Years' War, negotiated in the Westphalian towns of
Münster and Osnabrück.
4
The term ‘Tangshan’ (唐山祖) referred to the way Han Chinese identify themselves with their ancestors in Mainland
China.
5
See Diagram 1 included in the Annexes.
6
See Diagram 2 included in the Annexes.
7
Glocalisation is a term originated in the 1980s from within Japanese business practices. The term glocalisation was
subsequently (and independently) developed in the English-speaking world by the British sociologist Roland Robertson and
the Canadian sociologists Keith Hampton and Barry Wellman in the late 1990s. In The World is Flat, Thomas L. Friedman
talks about how the Internet encourages glocalization, such as encouraging people to make websites in their native languages.
8
Vincent Wang exposes this thesis in several of his articles, for more see “The logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic
Statecraft of Peaceful Ascendancy.” China and Southeast Asia; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (2005) and
“Taiwan’s Participation in International Organizations” in Edward Friedman, ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas, and
International Peace (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Kevin Cai presents his argument in “The China-ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement and Taiwan”. Journal of Contemporary China; 14(45), (November 2005).
9
Currently, the perception of an East Asian Community is best represented by the so called ASEAN Plus Three process
(APT), involving the 10 ASEAN countries of South East Asia and the 3 largest economies of North East Asia of Japan,
China and South Korea, but excluding Taiwan. For more refer to Evans (2005).