PUBLISHED WORK
“White Turks, Black Turks? Faultlines beyond Islamism versus Secularism,”
Third World Quarterly (forthcoming in 2012)
According to popular views, contemporary Turkish politics is defined by the ideological
conflict between Islamist and secularist parties. However, the focus on the Islamism versus
secularism dichotomy, a common bias in the studies of Muslim countries, disguises a deeper
faultline between the old urban elites and the newly-rising provincial actors. This article
highlights the urgency to see beyond the “Islamism-secularism” divide and to consider the
complex relations of power between alienated social groups in Turkey. Along these lines, this
study analyzes the intricate and multi-layered forms of “othering” in the urban secularist
discourse, which perpetuates the inequalities and contention in society. Instead of taking the
“Islamism-secularism” divide as given, this article analyzes the construction of secularist and
Islamic identities and considers how this dichotomous discourse empowered the urban parties
to control the provincial. Finally, implications for the reconciliation between antagonized
social groups are presented.
“The Odd Tango of the Islamic Right and the Kurdish Left in Turkey:
A Peripheral Alliance to Redesign the Center?” Middle Eastern Studies (forthcoming in
2012).
The common portrayal of Islamist and Kurdish constituencies as solely religion or ethnic oriented
groups is misleading and it veils broader problems such as authoritarianism and urban elitism in
Turkey. The proximity of the two constituencies and their electoral shifts between the Islamic right
and the Kurdish left suggests that the shared “peripheral” identity of these groups can cut across
religious or ethnic identities and constitutes a major source of contention. On the other hand, our
findings show that both constituencies are to an important extent willing to shelve or abandon
some of their religious or ethnic based demands when other interests are harnessed. We find that
Islamic and pro-Kurdish groups are significantly open to different political alternatives which
promise a circulation of elites, a decline of urban-rural discrepancy, and an expansion of
universal human rights.
“The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey,”
Comparative Politics, 2009
The turning point in Islamists’ moderation in Turkey took place in 2001 when a
sizable faction,mainly consisting of younger provincial entrepreneurs, announced their split
from the fundamentalist Islamist group to establish the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The leaders of the AKP emphasized that they had changed; they had embraced the rules of
democracy and would keep religion apart from political discourse. In contrast to previous
Islamic parties, the AKP came to power with a discourse embracing pluralism and all aspects
of free market economics, as well as rapprochement with the West. A single year after its
establishment, the AKP won 34 percent of the vote in 2002 and increased its support further
to 41 percent in 2004 (municipal elections) and 47 percent in 2007 (national elections). With
this electoral support the AKP vanquished not only other secularist parties but also the
radical Islamists in the Felicity Party (SP).
This major decline in support for radicalism signaled important changes taking place
within the Turkish Islamist movement and raised critical questions. What was the process that
led to this moderation? Was it a tactic, or was it sincere? Most interestingly, why was a
moderate movement initiated by the same group of people, the provincial entrepreneurs, who
used to be the vanguards of radical Islamic policies in the first place? This study answers
these questions and explains the moderation of the Turkish Islamist movement with the help
of in-depth interviews.
Can Money Make Us Friends? Islamist Entrepreneurs and Chances for
Democratization in the Muslim World, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2010
Comparing and contrasting the transformation of Islamist parties and institutions in Turkey,
Indonesia, and Sudan, this paper will suggest that contemporary Islamist movements are not
solely concerned with “Islamizing the society” but often seek an economic mobilization
against established economic elites and transfer wealth to their constituencies. In some
cases, this goal requires cooperation with liberal, secularist, or Western actors which is when
Islamist groups develop more moderate agendas and control the radical elements in their
groups. Yet, in other cases economic concerns require forming alliances with illiberal groups
which leads to radicalization of Islamist movements. In either case though, economic
interests are highly influential in shaping the agendas of these parties. Hence, in contrast to
popular studies that focus on the “ideologues” in Islamist parties this paper will emphasize
the role of “ pragmatists,” more specially, Islamist businessmen, upon Islamist politics.
“Periphery’s March to the Center and Decline of Islamist and Kurdish Extremism in
Turkey,” in Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon, ed.by Ozgur
Nikbay and Suleyman Hancerli (IOS Press: Amsterdam, 2006),
This paper will explore how and why the culturalist anti-systemic movements in Turkey, such
as the Islamists and the Kurdish separatists, that arose approximately in the same period of
time and geographic region, almost simultaneously started to moderate their demands, gave
up their radical ethnic or religious ideals and showed interest in a pluralist solution from
within the preexisting political and geographic boundaries. I suggest that what define
Turkish politics are the relations of power between the urban ruling elite and the isolated and
agitated agrarian periphery. I find that in either movement, the “peripheral” identity” was
more critical than religion or ethnicity. Therefore, the changes in the center-periphery
relations that took place in the late 1990s marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish
politics. The decentralization of the state and its approximation to the EU created new
opportunities for the periphery to enhance its condition from within the legal framework.
These developments led to the moderation of previously anti-systemic Islamic and Kurdish
movements, a de-emphasis on ethnic and religious elements in their discourse and the
emergence of a new consensus around a cosmopolitan democratic approach.
Prisoner Erdogan’s Dilema and the Origins of Moderate Islam in Turkey
(with Todd Eisenstadt)
This case study provide supplementive classroom text to teachers of politics and international
affairs. The study aims to provide insight to the moderation of Turkey’s Islamic movement
and the foundation of the moderate Justice and Development Party under the leadership of
Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
WORKING PAPERS
Islamic Economic Actors: A Comparative Analysis between the Conventional and
Islamic Banks in Turkey (with Selva Demiralp)
“Islamic exceptionalism” considers Islamic actors as essentially “different” from their nonIslamic counterparts. Such perspectives depict Islamic groups as ideologues who do not act
based on pragmatic interests. This presumption has important political and economic
implications as it prevents the possibility to perceive these groups as participants of the
global liberal order which is based on compromising around pragmatic benefits. This paper
targets this question and analyzes the extent of any pragmatic behavior among Islamic agents
by providing a comparative empirical analysis of the customers of Islamic and conventional
banks in Turkey. Utilizing a multidisciplinary framework, our findings suggest that the
customers of Islamic banks are sensitive to interest rate changes, as the customers of
conventional banks, in contrast to the common notion that these banks are preferred by
customers who refuse to operate within an interest-based banking structure.
In Bourgeoisie We Trust-But Which One?
The Political Economy of Islamic Moderation
The rise of Islamic economic actors in the past decades stimulated academic studies
that investigated these groups’ link to Islamist political parties. While some perspectives
portrayed Islamic economic actors as the financial wing of Islamist extremist movements and
thus a challenge of democratization, others viewed the rise of an Islamic bourgeoisie is a
positive development which contributes to the prospects of democracy in the Muslim world.
The purpose of this study then is to investigate when and which Islamic economic
sectors are more likely to cooperate with their non-Islamic counterparts and/or support
liberalization. Our comparison of the political behavior of Islamist business groups in five
predominantly Muslim countries, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt and Sudan, suggests
that Islamist industrialists are more likely to moderate and embrace liberal values than
Islamist financiers. Our findings show that (non-oil) product-based, export-oriented
economic environments promote cooperation and mutual wins among Islamist and nonIslamist economic groups, and consequently increase opportunities for Islamic moderation.
Finance based economies on the other hand produce zero-sum games and decrease chances
for moderation and liberalization.