Amitabha Buddhist Centre
Basic Program – Module 8
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
Transcript of the teachings by Geshe Chonyi
Root
verses from Engaging in the Bodhisattva
Deeds
(Bodhisattvacharyavatara) by Shantideva, Chapter IX: WISDOM, translated by
Ven. Joan Nicell, February 2006, used with permission from the FPMT
Education Department.
Root verses are centred, in italics, with verse numbers added
Outline from
The Subject Headings from Gyalsab Je’s Commentary to the
Bodhicaryavatara, translated by Ven. Losang Sopa (Bob Miller), ed. Feb. 2002;
used with permission from the FPMT Education Department, October 2005.
Outlines are in bold, numbered.
Lesson No: 19
Date:10th April 2007
Chapter Nine, Verses 7-10, Outline D a 2) a) ii) 2’ a’ 2”
c” (1) onw
Dependent Arising – A Praise of the Buddha
7
Benevolent teacher, you taught to help all living beings.
Emptiness is the essence of those teachings,
its highest proof dependent arising
8
Those claiming it proves the opposite,
those denying its very existence,
how will they grasp your teachings?
The compassionate one, the Buddha, who works solely to benefit us, bestows
upon us the medicinal Dharma, like the best of doctors caring for his patients.
Amongst the Buddha’s teachings, the supreme teaching is his presentation on
the meaning of emptiness, the final nature of all phenomena. This is the
essence of all of Buddha’s teachings. Dependent arising is the highest proof of
and establishes the meaning of emptiness.
"Those claiming it proves the opposite" refers to the proponents of true existence.
For them, dependent arising cannot be used to establish emptiness as they
assert that if something is dependent arising, that phenomenon must exist
truly. It is very difficult for them to understand the meaning of emptiness.
According to the teachings and the position of the CMWS, the best reasoning
to establish the absence of inherent existence is dependent arising. Because
phenomena are dependently arisen, they cannot exist inherently.
Dependent arising is one of the many different forms of reasoning used to
establish emptiness. We had looked at the four logical steps to establish
whether a phenomenon is inherently one or inherently different. Form is not
truly existent. Form does not exist by way of its own character because it is a
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Basic Program – Module 8
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
dependent arising. How do we establish that form is not truly existent? This is
because form is dependently arisen or we can say that it is neither inherently
one or inherently different.
For example, we would apprehend a vase as a singular phenomenon and not
different. On the other hand if we were to compare a vase and a pillar, we
understand those two are different and not the same.
One and different or one and many are synonymous. Anything that exists is
either one or different. If something is inherently existent, it must be inherently
one or inherently different.
If the subject matter is, say, form, it would be expressed as: Form is not
inherently existent because it is neither inherently one or inherently different.
Why is form not inherently one? This is because form possesses parts. We
need to understand why something that possesses parts cannot be inherently
one. Why is form not inherently different? Form is not inherently different
because form is not inherently one.
c" Abandoning contradiction to that
(1) Abandoning [the notion] that is even relatively established
(2) Abandoning [the notion] that gathering the accumulations is invalid
(3) Abandoning [the notion] that conception is invalid
(4) Abandoning [the notion] that the classifications of virtue and negativity is invalid
(5) Abandoning [the notion] that there are separate and definite classifications for cyclic
existence and nirvana
(1) Abandoning [the notion] that is even relatively established
(9,7cd)
“Is it also contradictory conventionally?”
(9,8)
For yogis that it is conventional is without fault.
Compared to worldly beings, they see thusness;
Otherwise, their definite realization of women as unclean
Would be harmed by worldly beings.
Qualm from the SS:
If it is asserted that composed phenomena are not
impermanent ultimately, they cannot be established
to be impermanent conventionally. Why? This is
because something which existed in an earlier
moment also exists at a later time. It is not
conventionally known that composed phenomena are
impermanent. In fact people believe that composed
phenomena are permanent.
Reply by the CMWS:
We ordinary people think that things are permanent
but, in reality, composed phenomena are not
permanent. It is mentioned in the root text that
ordinary beings believe and see impermanent things
as permanent. However, there are minds, such as the
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Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
conventional valid perception of the yogis that can
establish
that
composed
phenomena
are
impermanent. There is therefore, no contradiction.
The SS then asserts:
If composed phenomenon is established as
impermanent conventionally, this contradicts what is
said in one of the sutras: “Those who see composed
phenomena as impermanent, they see emptiness.”
The CMWS responds:
Verse 8 points out, "Compared to worldly beings, they
see thusness” which means that those who see
composed phenomena as impermanent see thusness
(or emptiness).
This does not mean that, in general, whoever sees
composed phenomena as impermanent also sees the
final nature of composed phenomena. In general,
there are many misconceptions such as conceiving
the unclean to be clean, suffering to be happiness
and the impermanent to be permanent.
Compared to those adhering to such misconceptions,
those who do realise that composed phenomena are
impermanent are thus much better off in that they
see the nature of phenomena. It is in this sense that
it is said, “they see thusness.”
It is widely believed by ordinary people that things,
such as forms, are permanent in nature. What is the
fallacy in holding such a belief? This suggests that
the valid perception in the minds of ordinary beings
would necessarily harm the valid perception of the
yogis.
People who have achieved a certain level of
concentration or realisation see phenomena as
unclean
and
unpleasant
by
nature.
This
understanding “harms” the mind of a desire being
who grasps at the body as being very clean.
One is an erroneous mind and the other is a valid
mind. There is a difference between the two. If it is a
valid perception, it cannot be harmed by its
opponent.
The valid perception that realises unclean
phenomena to be unclean acts as an antidote against
attachment. When a mind of desire sees unclean
phenomena as clean, such a mind cannot be a valid
mind that can harm the valid perception of the yogis.
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(2) Abandoning [the notion] that gathering the accumulations is invalid
(9, 9)
Merit comes from an illusory-like conqueror,
Just as it does from an actually existent one.
Qualm from the GES & Asserting things do not exist inherently suggests that
SS:
the Buddha also does not exist inherently. If that is
so, making offerings or prostrating to the Buddha will
not lead to the generation of any merits.
Response
CMWS:
from
the “Merit comes from an illusory-like conqueror, just as it
does from an actually existent one.” There is no
contradiction. Making offerings and prostrations to
an illusion-like Buddha yields illusion-like merits.
“Just as it does from an actually existent one”: The
lower tenet systems assert that truly existent merits
are acquired by making offerings and prostrations to
the truly existent Buddha. In the same way, illusionlike merits are gained by making offerings and
prostrations to the illusion-like Buddha.
(3) Abandoning [the notion] that conception is invalid
Conception here means rebirth.
(9, 9 cd)
"If sentient beings are like an illusion,
Having died, how are they reborn?"
(9, 10)
For as long as those conditions are assembled,
For that long will illusions also last.
Why should sentient beings be truly existent
Due merely to their continua lasting long?
Qualm from the GES & If sentient beings are not inherently existent but exist
SS:
like illusions, how can they take rebirth? The illusory
elephant, created by the magician, does not take
rebirth. In the same way, sentient being who do not
exist inherently are unable to take rebirth too.
Response
CMWS:
from
the “For as long as those conditions are assembled, for
that long will illusions also last”.
Sentient beings take rebirth due to their karma and
afflictions. As long as these causes exist and come
together, sentient beings will continue to take rebirth
just as an illusionist creates his illusions in
dependence on mantra recitations and special
substances. As long as these causes and conditions
continue to exist, the illusion continues to appear.
When the conditions for taking future rebirth cease,
rebirth will no longer happen. In the same way, when
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the causes and conditions for the creation of the
illusion disappear, so will the illusion itself.
Objections by the GES How can sentient beings be compared with illusions?
& SS to this argument:
Sentient beings have existed since beginningless time
and since they have been around for a very long time,
they must exist truly whereas an illusion only exists
for a short time.
Response
CMWS:
from
the “Why should sentient beings be truly existent due
merely to their continua lasting long?”
Time is not the basis for establishing whether a
phenomenon is truly existent or not. If we can use
time as a determinant of this, it would imply that
some longer-lasting dreams and illusions are truly
existent while shorter ones are not. This means that
there are some dreams and illusions that are truly
existent.1
Going back to the text, at this point the Prasangikas, referring to the statement of the
Buddha that explains that composite phenomena are impermanent and therefore momentary,
explain, "Conventionally, we say that composite phenomena are momentary; but on an
ultimate level they are not, because nothing exists truly."
The following objection is raised. "You say that ultimately impermanence cannot be seen,
because transience of phenomena exists only conventionally. This also cannot be true. You
accept conventional existence of phenomena because you maintain their nominal existence
(because of the name attributed to them). Yet not even the conventional existence of phenomena as momentary or impermanent is possible, because the object of the morning is
recognized as being the same object in the evening. If it were momentary, the object in the
morning could no longer be the same as the object in the evening, and yet we generally say
that it is. Therefore, conventionally, too, momentary phenomena are not possible."
Now, conventionally we say that a glass seen in the morning is the same as the glass seen in
the evening. In reality, that perceived object is no longer the same. The glass of the first
moment is not the same as the glass of the second moment, because at every instant it
undergoes changes, but we generally maintain it is the same, because of having understood it
incorrectly.
Not everything we conventionally designate to be existent actually exists. Things that exist
in conventional reality cannot be contradicted by logic, whereas things that do not exist, even
though we give them a name, are in contradiction with logic.
We say, for example, that our bodies are pure, but this is only a statement. In fact, the
body is not pure, but impure.
So, not everything that is seen or conceived as being a certain way is so in reality. How can
we make this distinction among things we see? If someone, supported by sound logical
arguments, says that in reality a particular thing is just as it has been established by valid
cognition, then we can consider it to be so, but what is not sustained by logic should be
considered false. Someone might object, "Although we say that impermanent phenomena are
momentary and therefore the glass seen in the morning is not the same as the glass seen in
the evening, we think that the glass is the same, because it appears to us to be so." This way
of thinking, however, is not correct, because the glass we perceive in the evening is not the
same as the one we perceive in the morning—it undergoes transformation moment by moment,
since it is impermanent. However, we believe it to be the same because of our attachment to
the self of phenomena, which means the glass appears to us as if it were truly existent.
There are people who, through samadhi, directly perceive the subtle impermanence of
phenomena. To them, the glass appears as momentary— that is, the glass of a particular
moment is no longer perceived later as the same glass. Because we ordinary people grasp at
1
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the true existence of impermanent phenomena, we perceive them in the same way that we
perceive the existence of the glass—as if, at any given moment, they will always be of the same
substantial nature.
Hence there are two different ways to perceive impermanent phenomena: as momentary or
as non-momentary (as if they constantly have the same substantial nature). The latter is
ordinary people's perception and is caused by the ignorance that grasps at the self. Because of
the view that grasps at true existence without the support of valid arguments, they cannot
understand the true nature of phenomena. Whereas people who perceive the transience of
phenomena directly through samadhi are supported by logic, and we can definitely say that
their view is the perfect one.
Our bodies made of blood, flesh, and bones, are not as attractive as they might appear. Yet
we nevertheless consider them to be clean, beautiful, and desirable because of our grasping at
them as such. Likewise, although produced phenomena are impermanent, we do not accept
their transience and instead consider them to be identical at each moment. While studying the
Dharma, we should generate interest in its aims by eagerly persevering in the practice and not
being like a flower under the hot sun, weakened by lack of water. We must be active and start
immediately to examine our storehouse of mental afflictions. In order to do so, we must
comprehend and retain that the mind grasping at phenomena as if they were truly existent is a
kind of ignorance.
Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and Chittamatrins formulate the following objection to the
Prasangikas, "If phenomena do not exist truly, maintaining the impermanence of phenomena
on a conventional level is contradicted, since in that case forms and so forth could not be
impermanent, even conventionally."
The Prasangikas reply, "Although phenomena do not truly exist, forms and so forth are, on
a conventional level, established as impermanent by valid cognition." [8]
Phenomena do not exist independently, do not exist by their own nature or by their own
characteristics, and do not exist only from the side of the object—that is, without depending on
the mind that designates them. But the ignorance that grasps at true existence conceives the
nature of phenomena in a wrong way. Such an erroneous concept is akin to finding a piece of
brass and believing it to be gold. Likewise, our minds apprehend phenomena as if they were
truly existent, as if they existed by their own nature and from the side of the object, and these
are indeed wrong conceptions.
Understanding that the piece of brass is not gold is the right way of knowing it. In the same
way, if we understand that phenomena do not truly exist, that they do not exist naturally and
from the side of the object, but are instead mere designations of the mind, we can say that we
have generated the correct view with regard to their existence.
Let us take another example. When a magician turns some wood or a stone into a horse,
people who see it galloping do not realize that in reality it is not a horse. They perceive it to be
a true horse, and this is a wrong conception with regard to that piece of wood. If, however,
someone starts to think, "It is true, I see a horse galloping, but in reality that is only a piece of
wood that the magician has turned into a horse," at that moment he will understand the
reality of that piece of wood. That ignorant mind that previously grasped at the emanation as it
I! were a true horse no longer exists, because the mind has apprehended the object correctly.
Therefore the wrong conception related to it cannot arise anymore. The two thoughts— the
wrong one and the correct one—cannot coexist. When the mind understands correctly, the
wrong conception disappears.
Those people who, because of magic, perceive the emanation as a real horse grasp at that
idea, but the magician, although he sees the appearance of the horse, knows that it is only a
creation, and does not grasp at the idea that it is a true horse.
All phenomena that appear to us exist in this same way. Their existence is not found on
their own side, in the object, in the same way that we cannot find the horse created by the
magician through a piece of wood.
The way that the things we perceive exist does not correspond to the way that they appear
to us. We should therefore try to change our view and reflect on the fact that, although they
appear to us to be truly existent, their authentic mode of existence does not correspond to this
perception. At present we continually think that phenomena are concrete and that they exist
from their own side, and not that this way of existing is only an appearance. Now we can start
to change that view, trying to see them as akin to an illusion. We should not have a view of
phenomena like that of spectators who watch the spell of the magician, but instead think like
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Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
the magician who sees the horse, but knowing that it is not true, does not grasp at that
appearance. While asleep, anything that appears to our minds seems real, and it is the same
with all actions we perform in our dreams. As soon as we awake, however, we understand how
none of this was real.
The Hinayana arhats, the bodhisattvas who have reached a certain level, and the buddhas
see all phenomena as mere appearance. They are free from the mind that grasps at
phenomena as if they existed concretely, and therefore they do not have attachment for them.
We, on the other hand, do not have the strong conviction that phenomena do not exist as they
appear, but believe them to exist concretely, from their own side, objectively, and by their own
nature. Therefore we grasp at them and because of this generate attachment, hatred, and so
forth. This conditioning is created because we are not satisfied to think that phenomena are
only an appearance, but believe them to be something more.
Another objection of the three lesser schools is the following, "If phenomena were not truly
existent, then the Buddha too would not exist, and therefore one would not accumulate merits
through offerings made to him."
The Prasangikas reply, "Buddha does not exist 'truly,' but he does exist conventionally.
Therefore it is conventionally possible to accumulate merits by making offerings to him."
The correct attitude toward the mode of appearance of phenomena is not easy to acquire,
because for a long time we have been used to thinking in an erroneous way and have many
imprints of wrong views in our mind. If we pour scented water into a wooden container and
then empty it and even wash it, the container will retain that scent for a long time. The same
happens with our mental imprints.
Since lesser schools than the Prasangika are not able to comprehend that phenomena do
not exist "truly," by their own characteristics, when the Prasangikas state that phenomena do
not exist by their own nature, the other schools think that these do not exist at all. This is why
they object, "If phenomena are illusions, it follows that the Buddha too is only a magical
appearance, and the offerings made to him are also illusory. Therefore by making these
illusion-like offerings to an illusion-like Buddha, we cannot accumulate any merits." They
maintain this because they think that if Buddha is a phenomenon that does not exist by his
own nature, and the same is true for the offerings made to him, both the Buddha and the
offerings do not exist at all.
They then carry on with their objections, "Since phenomena do not exist by their own
nature, it follows that they do not exist, and if something does not exist and we speak of it, it is
like speaking of an illusion or a spell. The offerings we make to the buddhas would then be
illusion-like offerings made to illusory buddhas, and through them we would not be able to
accumulate any merit."
The Prasangikas reply, "Just as you maintain that it is possible to make truly existent
offerings to a truly existent buddha, and that through that it is possible to accumulate truly
existent positive karma, with the same argument we maintain that we can accumulate merits
by making illusion-like offerings to illusion-like buddhas." [9]
For Prasangikas, even if phenomena appear as real, they do not exist "truly," but are like an
illusion.
The exponents of the three lesser schools now ask another question to the Prasangikas, "If
ordinary beings are like illusions, how can they be reborn after death?"
The Prasangikas reply, "When all conditions are there, sentient beings are reborn, just as it
occurs with magical emanations that manifest when all necessary conditions are assembled,
whereas if those conditions are not there, they cannot be produced." [10]
A magician needs specific conditions in order to perform his magic: he will have to assume
a certain posture and have certain objects at his disposal. He will only be able to perform his
magic when all the necessary requirements are fulfilled. Likewise, when the main causes and
the circumstantial conditions are present, sentient beings take on a new birth.
Anyway, when the Prasangikas maintain that phenomena are like an illusion, they use this
analogy only in order to explain the conventional reality of phenomena; they do not mean to
say that phenomena are actual illusions.
Hinayana arhats, arya bodhisattvas, and buddhas are no longer reborn through the power
of negative actions and mental afflictions, whereas we take on conditioned rebirths because
these two factors are present.
Exponents of lesser schools observe, "With regard to magic, we can understand that what
you say is possible, because magic only lasts for a short time. But with regard to living beings
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Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
Question/Answer Session:
Q: If the Buddha did not teach on emptiness during the 1st turning of the
wheel of Dharma, how did some of his disciples become arhats immediately
after the teachings?
A: The first five disciples of the Buddha are not proponents of the GES or the
SS. From the perspective of the CMWS, the Buddha did teach emptiness
during the 1st turning of the wheel of Dharma. Because of those teachings,
those five fortunate disciples realised emptiness and became arhats.
Q: From the perspective of the CMWS, did the Buddha teach the Four Noble
Truths during the 1st turning of the wheel of Dharma?
A: Yes. The Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths during the 1st turning of the
wheel of Dharma. The four characteristics or attributes of the First Noble
Truth (the truth of suffering) are: impermanent, suffering, empty and selfless.
Therefore, from the perspective of the CMWS, Buddha did teach on
selflessness and emptiness in the 1st turning of the wheel of Dharma. But
proponents of the lower tenet systems, even the Autonomous Middle Way
School, assert that the Buddha did not teach the selfless of phenomena
during the 1st turning of the wheel of Dharma.
In this context, selflessness refers to the lack of inherent existence of true
suffering and of self and phenomena. Emptiness refers to the emptiness of a
self-sufficient substantially existent person.
With reference to the object of negation, what is being negated? We need to
posit the coarse object of negation and the subtle object of negation. There is a
difference in the subtlety of the object of negation. Therefore, there is also a
difference in the subtlety of the level of emptiness or selflessness.
The 4 attributes of true suffering are in this order: Impermanence, suffering,
empty, selfless. There are 16 aspects to the Four Noble Truths with 4
characteristics to each truth.
Translated by Ven. Gyurme
we do not think this is so, because they appear for a long period of time, since they take on
one rebirth after another. Besides, if beings were like an illusion, it would follow that one does
not commit a negative action in killing another being, just like a magician does not create
negativity when he makes the horse that he himself has created through magic disappear."
(The Way of Awakening by Geshe Yeshe Tobden, pg. 268-273)
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Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
Transcribed by Phuah Soon Ek, Vivien Ng & Angie Xiao, 21st April 2007
Edited by Cecilia Tsong, 2nd May 2007
Checked by Yap Siew Kee, 5th May 2007
Vetted by Geshe Chonyi.
Amended: 14th November 2007
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