P.O. Box 5675, Berkeley, CA 94705 USA
Connie de la Vega, delavega@usfca.edu and Alyson Beck, aly.beck@gmail.com
The Role of Military Demand in Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation
Commission on the Status of Women
50th Session
February 24, 2006
Contact Information
Alyson Beck, Edith Coliver Intern
Tel: (415) 794-8714
aly.beck@gmail.com
Representing Human Rights Advocates through
University of San Francisco School of Law’s
Frank C. Newman International Human Rights Law Clinic
Connie de la Vega
Tel: (415) 422-6946
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Introduction1
I.
A global crisis of human trafficking persists despite vigorous efforts in the international
human rights community to deter the practice. Solutions to the trafficking crisis have focused on
three theoretical frameworks of analysis: the law enforcement, labor and human rights
perspectives. The law enforcement perspective focuses on individual responsibility and bringing
individuals who procure trafficking to justice; the labor perspective focuses on victims’ labor
right’s in order to empower sex slaves once they have been relegated to human trafficking; and
the human rights perspective addresses the international legal violations that fuel the complex
web of the trafficking of persons. 2
These frameworks offer incomplete solutions, allowing the problem of trafficking to
persist while the global sex industry flourishes. They fail to curb the problem of trafficking
because they do not address the powerful economic and political forces of demand by
government militaries, U.N. peacekeeping troops and private military companies. This study
emphasizes the continuing need to integrate the gender perspective into the human rights of
women addressing one of the root causes of trafficking in persons - military demand in
trafficking.
Trafficking in persons is a modern day form of slavery and a gross violation of the human
dignity of trafficking victims. An estimated 600,000 to 800,000 persons are trafficked across
international borders each year, the majority of which are women and children.3
1
I am thankful to Professor Connie de la Vega, Caryn R. Nutt, and all the members of the University of
San Francisco Frank C. Newman International Human Rights Clinic, for their support and assistance in
preparing this report.
2
Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to Human Trafficking, 40
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (Winter 2004).
3
See, United Nations Population Fund, Trafficking in Human Misery, available at
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/trafficking.htm. (While the generally accepted figure remains 600,000 800,000 trafficking victims annually, it has been suggested that the number may be up to 4 million persons
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Trafficking is defined as:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation.
Article 3, U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (“the 2000 Protocol”).
The 2000 Protocol established trafficking at the forefront of the most serious
transnational crimes. Trafficking is a gross violation of the human rights of trafficking victims,
and its eradication should be a foremost goal of the international community. The growth and
development of the transnational crime of trafficking in persons is fueled by globalization and
governed by supply and demand forces operating in countries of origin and destination
countries.4 These forces provide traffickers with a vulnerable population of victims in source
countries and a market for cheap labor in destination countries.5
For example, in Burma, women and children, primarily from the country’s ethnic
minority populations are trafficked to Thailand, China, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Korea,
Macau, and Japan for sexual exploitation in military camps.6
In Columbia, insurgent and
paramilitary groups have exploited as many as 14,000 children, including trafficking for sexual
exploitation, from border areas of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. 7 Despite its increasingly
annually.)
4
Human Rights Advocates (HRA) has a related report on this issue. See, Caryn R. Nutt, HRA, Enhanced
Participation of Women in Development to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2006).
5
Id.
6
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in
Persons Report, 2005, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf (last accessed
February 2006).
7
Id.
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comprehensive anti-trafficking measures, Colombian courts still convicted no traffickers in 2004.
Thus, continued difficulties in successfully enforcing the 2000 protocol inspired wave of
global anti-trafficking measures against militaries is fueled by a history of military violence
against women,8 the U.N.’s own difficulty in acknowledging its peacekeepers’ procurement of
sexual exploitation and trafficking networks, and the growing sexual exploitation and abuse of
women by private military companies.
Section II will discuss the continuing role of U.N. peacekeepers in demand and procuring
networks of trafficking.
It also discusses the need for change existing U.N. immunity
agreements in order to prevent the U.N. from fostering a climate of impunity for its
peacekeepers. Section III will discuss the role of private military companies in the demand for
trafficking.
II.
A Troubled History: U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Trafficking
U.N. Peacekeepers are a prominent source of the demand for global trafficking. 9 This
renders trafficking increasingly difficult to diminish due to the countervailing growth of demand
created by various military presences in regions of armed conflict. Troops dispatched with the
intention of maintaining peace in destabilized regions now contribute to the peripheral
consequence of increasing the demand for the trafficking of sex workers. In May 2002, the
Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement reiterating the Council’s strong condemnation
of, inter alia, the sexual exploitation and abuse of children in armed conflicts, and adopted a
“zero tolerance policy” which called for all peacekeepers to immediately desist from such
8
Human Rights Advocates acknowledges the seriousness of the problem of military violence perpetrated
against women. Most national militaries around the world have struggled to effectively address problems
of sexual exploitation and abuse of women within their own militaries. However, this issue is not the focus
of this report.
9
See, Scott A. Levin, Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by U.N. Peacekeepers, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 833 (Summer 2003).
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practices.10
Nonetheless, in January 2003, Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting sexual
violence committed by international peacekeeping forces and confirmed that “UNAMSIL
investigations into allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers indicate a lack of appreciation
for the seriousness of the problem of sexual violence,” indicating that the “zero tolerance policy”
for sexual exploitation by UNAMSIL staff and affiliates “has had no teeth to date.”11
An institutional “culture of dismissiveness” has prevented the United Nations from
acknowledging its role in procuring trafficking until very recently. 12 Despite the adoption of a
“zero tolerance policy” towards trafficking in 2002, it was not until May 2005 that the Security
Council held its first ever meeting to address and condemn “in strongest terms” all acts of sexual
abuse and exploitation by global U.N. peacekeeping personnel.13 This marks the beginning of
the U.N.’s new era of acknowledgement of complicity by peacekeeping personnel.
A.
The Continuous Pattern of Sexual Exploitation by U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
There is evidence of a continuous pattern of sexual exploitation by U.N. peacekeeping
forces in the form of sexual exploitation and trafficking.
Sexual favors performed for
peacekeepers have reportedly become a source of basic survival for some refugee families.14 A
UNHCR and Save the Children-UK report that examined the problem of sexual exploitation by
U.N. peacekeepers indicated that most of the exploited children were only 13 to 18 years old.15
Examples of sexual exploitation by U.N. peacekeepers in the past include:
10
Id. at 837.
Id. at 840.
12
Supra, note 15.
13
United Nations Press Release SC/8400, Security Council Condemn ‘In the Strongest Terms’ All Acts of
Sexual Abuse, Exploitation by U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel, May 31, 2005.
14
Scott A. Levin, Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by U.N. Peacekeepers, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 833 (2003).
15
Id.
11
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


In Cambodia from 1992-1993, the number of sex houses and Thai-style
massage parlors multiplied and the number of prostitutes rose from 6,000 to
25,000, including an increased number of child prostitutes.16
In Eritrea, the U.N. peacekeeping mission has experienced numerous sex
scandals involving peacekeepers and the local population.17
In the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001, a number of military personnel
from the U.N. peacekeeping mission were accused of sexually exploiting
women and girls.18 A camp worker speaking on condition of anonymity who
worked for Atlas, an NGO in charge of maintaining the Bunia camp in eastern
D.R.C. added, “Yes, we know the girls go and visit the U.N. soldiers every
night. There is nothing to stop them, and the girls need food.”19
This women-objectifying environment is still rampant today, and perpetuates a climate
ripe for the sexual exploitation of women and increasing numbers of young children. The DRC
allegations caused shockwaves throughout the international human rights community and
sounded a wake-up call for the U.N. to finally address a problem it has long avoided.
Unfortunately, substantial questions remain about the efficacy of the zero tolerance
policy. The number of complaints of sexual violence against peacekeepers received by the
Office of Internal Oversight Services in 2004 was more than double the number reported in the
previous year.20 In 2005, the OIOS reported 295 peacekeeping personnel complaints, including
191 military personnel, 84 civilians, and 21 police.21
Recent evidence suggests that Haiti is a new source of U.N. peacekeeping demand for sex
trafficking. On February 24, 2005, the U.N. launched a new preliminary investigation arising
out of a Haitian woman’s rape accusations against several U.N. peacekeepers.22 The woman
alleged she was raped the prior week by three peacekeepers in Gonaives, a port town in western
16
Supra, note 7.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Supra, note 9.
20
United Nations Press Release GA/AB/3677, Budget Committee Debates for Financing Measures to
Address Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers, 20 May 2005.
21
Id.
22
U.N. News Centre, U.N. Probing Rape Allegations Against Peacekeepers in Haiti, 24 February 2005.
Available at: http://www.un.org. (Last viewed February 2006)
17
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Haiti. Initial investigation revealed that the incident involved two Pakistani police officers and
was a case of prostitution, in direct violation of the U.N.’s “zero tolerance policy” on sexual
liaisons by civilian staff and military during peacekeeping missions. In addition, an additional
NGO report interviewed a Brazilian peacekeeper who discussed his regular practice of crossing
the Haitian border to the Dominican Republic on the weekends to solicit prostitutes, many of
whom are Haitian women who have been trafficked to the other side of the island.23
Though the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping stated that the Security Council
has recognized the “severity of the problem”,24 any systemic effects of the General Assembly
plan to focus on prevention, enforcement and on remediation for victims remain to be seen.
B.
Military Demand for Trafficking is Fatal to the U.N. Peacekeeping Efforts
and Undermines the Legitimate Aims of SCR 1325
The Security Council has recently acknowledged the sexual exploitation and abuse of
local women and children by U.N. peacekeepers is “one of the greatest stains on U.N. history.”25
Trafficking where soldiers are stationed destabilizes regions by increasing crime, as women and
girls are usually brought into these areas by organized crime rings.
This undermines the
legitimacy and efficacy of the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the vulnerable regions that are in
critical need of U.N. protection. Security Council member Vanu Gopala Menon of Singapore
underscored the vulnerability of local populations to U.N. peacekeeper authority today, stating
“People in war-torn lands see blue helmets and expect their lives to improve.”26
Instead,
alarming numbers of peacekeepers continue to perpetuate a devastating cycle of trafficking and
23
Supra, note 9.
U.N. News Centre, Progress Made Against Sexual Exploitation But More to Do: U.N. Peacekeeping
Head, 23 February 2006.
25
United Nations Press Release SC/8649, Problem of Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers Now Openly
Recognized, Broad Strategy in Place to Address It, Security Council Told, 23 February 2006. (Quote is
from the U.S. Security Representative, whose delegation held the Security Council presidency for the
month of February 2006.)
26
Id.
24
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sexual abuse and exploitation on the very people who need their help the most.
Moreover, U.N. Security Resolution 1325 urges member states to remain actively
involved in recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping
operations and more specifically, to provide effective institutional arrangements to guarantee the
protection of women and girls in situations of armed conflicts. By extension, the intentions of
SCR 1325 must be honored and extended to protect the women and girls that are harmed by the
U.N. peacekeepers who contribute to the demand for trafficking in situations of armed conflict.
In February 2006, Nana Effah-Apenteng of Ghana urged the Security Council to consider
that the matter of sexual misconduct remains closely related to the wider issue of the
implementation of SCR 1325, as taking advantage of gender expertise would serve to gain a
fuller understanding of the societies and people whom peace processes are intended to help, not
exploit.27
C.
U.N. Immunity Arrangements Allow a Culture of Impunity to Persist
On arrival, U.N. peacekeepers are briefed on the U.N. Code of Conduct and the ten rules
of Conduct for U.N. Blue Helmets.28 Yet the existence of these codes of conduct and the reality
on the ground are two different matters.29 Problems in the enforceability of codes of conduct can
lead to impunity.30
In addition, the U.N. Charter establishes the fundamental proposition that representatives
and officials should “enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions.”31 The knowledge of such immunities prevents U.N. peacekeepers
from being held to justice for the role they may play in trafficking, where implicit acknowledge
27
Supra, note 15.
Cases and Materials on Systems of Oppression 508 (Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1994).
29
Id.
30
Supra, note 11, at p. 842.
31
U.N. Charter, Article 5, paragraph 2.
28
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of such immunities perpetuates an ongoing culture of impunity. Moreover, Article 6, Section 22
of the Privileges and Immunities Convention specifies the general protections contained in the
U.N. Charter such that “experts on mission,” which includes civilian police, are immune “in
respect of words spoken or written or acts done by them in the course of their performance of
their mission.”32
It is critical that U.N. peacekeeper immunity be waived in order to demonstrate that codes
of conduct must be honored, and that the problem of military demand for human trafficking be
stopped. Section 23 of the Privileges and Immunities Convention explicitly states that it is the
“right and duty” of the Secretary–General to waive the immunity of experts when that immunity
would “impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice” to U.N. interests.33
III.
The Role of Private Military Companies and the Demand for Trafficking
Government militaries constructed networks of trafficking during the World War II and
Vietnam War eras and have been responsible for creating the demand for trafficking. 34
American and Filipino officials owned brothels in the Philippines in the Vietnam War era, which
was subsequently acknowledged in order to enlist the military’s assistance in controlling the
spread of venereal disease.35
Today, the global military presence continues to broker
agreements, secure locations and provide the essential demand of troops on “rest and relaxation”
necessary to perpetuate a thriving global sex industry fueled by illegal trafficking. 36 A former
soldier from the 1970’s recalled that “There were two kinds of women in our world in Thailand:
32
Jennifer Murray, Who Will Police the Peace-Builders? The Failure to Establish Accountability for the
Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-Conflict Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 475, 508 (2003).
33
Id.
34
See, Emily Nyen Chang, Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry,
15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 621 (2001).
35
Id. at 625.
36
Isabelle Talleyrand, Military Prostitution: How the Authorities Worldwide Aid and Abet International
Trafficking in Women, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 151 (Winter 2000).
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those who did our laundry, and prostitutes, and the latter far outnumbered the former[.]”37
In addition, increasing militarization and the war on terrorism has fueled the continued
trafficking of women and children as a growing number of troops are being stationed in foreign
countries. Foreign military personnel contribute to the demand for trafficking by frequenting the
clusters of brothels, massage parlors and dance clubs which all serve as popular vehicles for
illicit sexual transactions, often with young children. As more functions are contracted out to
private military companies, they are a rapidly expanding source of demand for sex trafficking.
This section will discuss these problems raised in relation to private military companies and
suggest possible solutions to increase accountability.
A.
The Private Military Expansion Era Represents a Renewed Potential for
Sexual Exploitation
The global ratio of soldiers to private military contractors is expanding at an
unprecedented rate. In the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the ratio of contractors to soldiers was
1:50, whereas in the current Iraq conflict, it is 1:10 and falling. 38 This is significant because
governments are increasingly resorting to PMC’s to shield their own militaries from liability. 39
Now that PMC’s are being contracted by individual states in conjunction with peacekeeping
duties, they form a new face of the demand for sex trafficking amongst U.N. peacekeepers.
PMC’s enjoy less accountability relative to government militaries and U.N. peacekeepers
generally, which are increasingly under close scrutiny by the international community for their
role in military demand.
Large salary increases lure many soldiers from government work to private military
Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives, 69-70 (quoting
Gregory F. DeLaurier, Thailand 1970, PEACE REV. 8, 231, 233 (1996)).
38
Rebecca Ulam Weiner, Private Military Men Patrol Iraq in Constant Jeopardy of Stepping on Legal
Landmines, 2006-FEB LEGAL AFF. 23, 24.
39
Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 157 (October, 2005).
37
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companies. The former military demand for trafficking is now absorbed into the private military
industry, perpetuating the cycle of the trafficking of women and children.
The Balkans are an example of the problem of private militaries and trafficking. The
International Organization for Migration in Sarajevo estimates that there are anywhere from 600
to 3,000 trafficked women in Bosnia at any time, and that as much as fifty percent of the
clientele for brothels across Bosnia are international, including U.N. civilian police and NATO
military troops.40
In the 1990’s, the United States government contracted the private military company
DynCorp. to train American International Police Task Force (IPTF) officers in Bosnia as part of
the U.N. Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.41 DynCorp. employees joined a sex-trafficking ring
and committed numerous acts of rape, sexual abuse and exploitation, resulting in the dismissal of
eight DynCorp. employees in 2002.
Jordanians, Pakistanis and German military troops were
also implicated in the trafficking scandal.42
In addition:
[R]omanian IPTF officers that were accused of recruiting women from
Romania, purchasing false documents for them, and then selling them to
Bosnian brothel owners. Additionally, IPTF officers have allegedly
forged document for trafficked women, facilitated their illegal transport
through border checkpoints, and tipped off brothel owners about
upcoming police raids[.] In fact, the former Deputy Commissioner of the
IPTF, one of the highest-ranking U.N. officials in Bosnia, has been
accused of patronizing an infamous Bosnian brothel . . . [Yet] no IPTF
officer has ever been criminally prosecuted for trafficking or traffickingrelated offenses; instead, the most serious punishment any peacekeeper in
Bosnia has faced is repatriation.43
40
International Organization for Migration, Victims of Trafficking in the Balkans: A Study of Trafficking in
Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation to, Through and From the Balkan Region 24 (2001),
http://www.iom.int//documents/publication/en/balkan_trafficking.pdf. (Last visited February 2006)
41
Joshua Chaffin, Private Workers Found Central to Jail Abuse: Fay Report on Abu Ghraib Points to
Reliance on Contractors for What Were Once Military Jobs, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at 7.
42
Refugee International Report, p.5.
43
Supra, note 32.
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In addition, private military companies foster a code of silence amongst employees,
creating an environment where employees are strongly discouraged from speaking out against
the culture of trafficking practices, or risk harm for bringing their concerns to a public light. In
August 2002, a British employment tribunal found that Kathryn Bolkovac, a former employee of
DynCorp., was unfairly dismissed for disclosing evidence that IPTF officers in Bosnia played a
role in trafficking-related activities.44 According to the British employment tribunal chairman,
“[T]here is no doubt whatever that the reason for her dismissal was that she made a protected
disclosure and was unfairly dismissed.”45 (emphasis added)
Another former DynCorp. employee, Ben Johnston, filed a similar whistleblower
lawsuit.46
After initially claiming that Johnston was fired for cause and challenging his
accusations in court, following its defeat in the Bolkovac case, DynCorp. reconsidered its
position and reached an out of court settlement with Johnston instead.47
Despite the implication of a U.S. private military company in a sex-trafficking ring, the
U.S. remains reluctant to hold private military companies to the same accountability as its own
military. Though it officially maintains a “zero tolerance policy”48 for military trafficking, in
December 2005, powerful U.S. defense industry lobbyists defeated a proposal so that the “zero
tolerance policy” cannot be extended to private military contractors yet. 49 The lobbying groups
44
Daniel McGrory, Woman Sacked for Revealing U.N. Links with Sex Trades, Times (London) Aug. 7,
2002, at 13.
45
Id.
46
Colum Lynch, Ex-U.N. Officer Sues U.S. Firm Over Dismissal, Washington Post, June 23, 2002, at A20.
47
Bob Graham, Why I Had to Expose U.N.’s Role in Turning Girls into Sex Slaves, Mail on Sunday
(London), Aug. 11, 2002, at 56.
48
Under the “zero tolerance policy,” any U.S. service member convicted of patronizing a prostitute can
receive a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and one year of confinement. Sgt.
Sara Wood, DoD Personnel Face Stricter Rules on Human Trafficking, American Forces Information Press
Service News Articles, Defense Department Documents and Publications (January 10, 2006).
49
Cam Simpson, U.S. Stalls on Human Trafficking: Pentagon has yet to ban contractors from using forced
labor, Chicago Tribune, December 27, 2005.
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involved “represent thousands of firms, including some of the industry’s biggest names, such as
DynCorp. International and Halliburton subsidiary KBR, both of which have been linked to
trafficking related concerns.”50
B.
Increasing Accountability for Private Military Contractors
PMC’s present significant challenges to state and individual accountability for human
rights violations. Solutions to the problem of private military contractors and trafficking have
focused on three doctrines: democratic, contractual and internal institutional accountability.
51
Democratic accountability emphasizes the duty that democratic governments have to regulating
PMC’s in a transparent fashion consistent with democracy.
Contractual accountability
encourages governments to use contracting principles to regulate and protect civilians from harm
induced by private military contractors. Contract provisions can require military providers to
follow the same laws that bind corresponding government actors. When a contractor is not
performing well under the contract, governments can increase monitoring or even rescind the
contract.
Finally, internal institutional accountability encourages the use of cultural,
organizational and professional norms to promote accountability.
It promotes the use of
contracting norms to formulate strict internal standards in private military companies.
Norms are important in the military context because militaries impose a distinctive
institutional culture on their members and can impose strong internal sanctions for wrongdoing.
If norms against human rights violations are not strong or are ambiguous, it is difficult for the
military to enforce them with internal sanctions. This can make soldiers hesitant to report abuses
or punish offenders.
Contracting norms that protect human rights are essential. Private military commanders
50
Id.
Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to Human Trafficking, 40
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (Winter 2004).
51
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who operate in the field are not subject to commander authority but are instead controlled by the
terms of their contracts. The terms of private military contracts must include protections for the
rights and dignities of the potential women and children that are targets of sex-trafficking.
IV.
Recommendations
Given these continuing concerns on trafficking, Human Rights Advocates urges the
Commission on the Status of Women to:
A.
Continue to assess the military’s role in creating demand for trafficking of women
and children for forced prostitution by requesting that the Commission on Human
Rights include the following in the mandate of the Special Rapporteur:
1.
Focusing on the new demand that PMC’s will bring for trafficking of
women and children for forced prostitution;
2.
Mechanisms for holding military personnel to clear codes of conduct that
enforce a “zero tolerance” standard for prostitution by military personnel; and
3.
Mechanisms for using contracting norms to hold private military
companies to the same human rights standards as government soldiers.
B.
Urge the Economic and Social Council to recommend to the Security Counsel that
it:
1.
Continue compulsory training of all military and U.N. Peacekeeping
commanders in the appropriate forms of discipline and penalties for failing to
discipline their troops for violations; and
2.
Revise the immunity and zero tolerance policy for U.N. peacekeepers so
that the U.N. may prosecute violations of the 2000 Protocol and Codes of
Conduct if the countries of origin of the perpetrating soldiers are unable or
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unwilling to prosecute.
C.
Urge Member States to:
1.
Cooperate with investigations and information gathering efforts regarding
trafficking of women and children;
2.
Ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children;
3.
Report to the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking regarding specific
measures aimed at the elimination of trafficking and their effectiveness,
including:
a) Reporting to the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking regarding
members’ military’s own compliance with codes of conduct that
address the prohibitions of the 2000 Protocol; and
b) Creating national task forces to address the problem of military
and private military demand and the role that this plays in the
trafficking of women and children.
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