Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
DRAFT ARTICLE
-suggestions/comments welcomePower Politics and the Negotiated Meaning of Heritage. A Case Study of Nepal’s
Civil War (1996-2006) and its Aftermath
The article addresses the relationship between heritage and politics. Historically embedded
beliefs, encompassing art, rituals, myths, and sacrifices, can be employed by different interest
groups in the context of war, to build up status, legitimacy and power. The borders,
proprietorship, and naming of natural sites are often also subject to conflict in such a context. The
article focuses on South Asia, and on Nepal in particular, looking at the role heritage played in
the quest for power before, during and after Nepal’s civil war (1996-2006). The aim is two fold:
1) to illustrate, through a case study, that the concept ‘heritage’ is an interesting and too-oftenoverlooked cultural factor to analyze authority structures and power politics; and, 2) to develop a
more comprehensive understanding of the importance, conceptualization, theorization and
working of ‘heritage’ in today’s globalized and rapidly changing world.
The meaning of authority and heritage in the past is a prerequisite for comprehending the role
cultural and natural heritage played in Nepal’s civil war. In Nepal, ‘authority’ can best be
understood by taking account of power distribution in the physical world and the allocation of
power in the supernatural world. Nepal’s ontology has historically been one of a cosmological
order where power was distributed by Hindu gods and deities. Natural heritage was attributed
accordingly, and rituals and sacrifices reproduced and fortified the cosmological order of the
Nepalese society. Religion stands in close relation to Nepal’s politics and at some points in
history this form of cultural heritage has been capitalized upon by power seekers and power
holders. Because, cultural and natural heritage have been regenerated or adjusted in the sociocultural, economic and political domains, heritage must be considered a multi-dimensional, multivalued and multi-vocal concept.
Keywords: power politics, heritage, South Asia, Nepal, civil war.
1
Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
Those people of other political parties then the United Communist Party of Nepal- the Maoists
(UPCM)1 were not allowed to stay in the village. The Maoists forced the Damais [Dalits] to play
the drums, which they traditionally played when there was a burial (see photo 1).2 The Maoists
meant to say to us;“if you do not leave the village immediately, we will make sure that it will not
take long before a burial will happen. If you do not obey to our commands, we will come to kill
you and your family”(citation of an Internally Displaced Person of one of UPCN-M’s opposition
parties in Rukum VDC, Nepal).
Before, during and after Nepal’s civil war (1996-2006), the UCPN-M engaged rituals to solidify
their position of power. So did the other warfare actors; the Monarchy (including the army) and
the other political parties; the Nepali Congress (NC) Party, the Communist Party of Nepal- the
United Marxists- Leninists
(CPN-UML), etcetera. In the
citation above, an Internally
Displaced Person (IDP) from
a certain village in the
Rukum District3, who was an
elected
member
of
the
Village District Committee
(VDC) before the civil war,
explained how the UCPN-M
made use of the symbolic
power of ritual services to
Photo I. According to the division in caste-based ritual services, the
Damai’s (the lower caste) are the drummers. They play(ed) the drums when
there is a burial, at times when sacrifices are performed for the Hindu gods,
during cultural activities, and with other important events.
demand obedience of the
local population to UCPNM’s rules and regulations. In
this way, the UCPN-M aimed to establish a firm position of authority at the local level.
1 The United Communist Party of Nepal- the Maoists (UCPN-M) was until January 2009 known as the Communist
Party of Nepal- the Maoists (CPN-M). The UPCN-M was established after the CPN-M unified with the Communist
Party of Nepal (Unity Centre-Masal).
2. The Hindu Varna System divides the population into four categories, which were originally related to occupational
activities; the Brahmins (the priest and scholarly), the Chettri’s (the warriors), the Vasishya (traders and
agriculturists) the Sudras (those engaged in menial services) (Upreti 2001; SNV 1998). While the caste was initially
based on the work families performed, steadily it became hereditary; “from parents to offspring irrespective of their
work specialty” (Upreti 2001: 35).
3. For security reasons, the VDC and village name are not identified.
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
Civil War in Nepal (1996-2006)
In Nepal, the inequality between the feudalist minority and the marginalized majority is a political issue
that has been there for centuries. It was this issue that the Communist Party, when established in 1949,
chose as their first and foremost political agenda item. The Royal family and its supporters were
portrayed by the Communists as the upholders of feudalism. From 1992 to 1996 the political tensions,
between the Monarchy and its supporters, the pro-democratic parties and the Communist Party of Nepalthe Maoists (CPN-M), increased and in 1996 the CPN-M called for the “people’s war”, which started in
the Mid-Western Hills of Nepal. The CPN-M intended to abolish the feudal forces that were, according
to them, responsible for the multiple forms of oppression in the Nepalese society. Between 1996 and
2001, this civil war expended throughout the country. Violent confrontations between the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) of the CPN-M and the government security forces continued until 2006. Then,
the CPN-M joined mainstream politics and in November of that same year the Comprehensive Peace
Accords (CPAs) were signed. The civil war caused 13,347 war-related deaths and an estimated number
of 200,000 internally displaced persons. In May 2008, the Constitutional Monarchy was abolished and
Nepal became a Federal Republic. The political tensions are not resolved and violent actions continue to
take place.
Nepal’s rich cultural and natural heritage
The fieldwork example and quote about the Damai drummers is just one of many possible
examples which features that an abstraction of the concept of heritage, to interpret more recent
political developments, leads to interesting findings.
Nepal is a rich and diverse country, with regards to its cultural and natural heritage. The
UNESCO World Heritage List records 830 properties with outstanding universal value. These
include 644 cultural, 162 natural and 24 mixed properties.4 The country covers an enormous
diversity of topological regions and approximately 6,000 rivers and rivulets stream through the
Himalayan Kingdom (Upreti 2001: 34). The central sector of Himalayan arc resides in Nepal;
nearly one third of the 2400 km long Himalayan range (Dahal 2006). The country can be divided
in three altitudinal/landscape zones; the Terai Lowlands, the Middle Hills and the High
Mountains, each with its own topography, climate, and natural features ranging from dramatic
mountains, glaciers, deep valleys, to dense forests and desert-like plains (see Figure I) (Bista
2001: 11-14).
4. See http://colorfulnepal.com/world-heritage-sites.html
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
Figure I ‘Physiographic zones and development regions
iNepal’
The two national parks included in the World Heritage Sites List are the Sagarmatha National
Park, with the 8848 meter Mount Everest -the highest peak in the world-, and Chitwan National
Park in the subtropical inner Terai lowlands with bountiful flora and fauna including rare and
endangered species.
Regarding Nepal’s cultural heritage several developments had an impact on the practices and
material expressions symbolizing the ideas and belief system of its population. Nepal is from
origin a Buddhist society, with Mongolian peoples who emigrated from Central Asia via Tibet.
Around 200 A.D. the Licchavis (Indo-Aryans) invaded Nepal from the north of India and spread
Hinduism throughout Nepal (Bista 2001: 29-60; Van Dalen 2002). More in general, Nepal’s long
history of human in-migration from the north and the south added to the ethnic and cultural
diversity that evolved over time (Whelpton 2005: 9-15; Upreti 2001: 36; UNFP 2007: 22). The
2001 population census data identified 92 languages spoken as mother tongue (CBS 2003). The
multiple influences on the geographical area that is now known as ‘Nepal’ and on its inhabitants,
contributed to its affluent cultural heritage. The abundance of memorial sites, ritual places,
temples, monasteries, shrines monuments, and festivals are a nice illustration of this. However,
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
the ethnic and cultural differences not only indicate diversity, but also historic struggles for
social, political, and land tenancy survival and predominance.
Throughout the every day lives of the Nepalis, rituals, myths, and sacrifices play an important
role; they determine the rhythm of the day, divide the year in different seasons, and also structure
the society in different caste and status groups (Lecomte-Tilioune 2004). Even amidst the
political turmoil right before, during and after the civil war, “religious rituals at the Agnimatha,
the Vedic fire temple in Patan, continue to be carried out, modestly and silently, with the idea that
they guarantee the continuation of the cycle of the sun and the moon and thereby secure human
existence on earth” (Shrestra & van Willigenbrug). During my fieldwork in the Mid-Western
Hills of Nepal I witnessed many families, with a food security of 3 to 6 months a year, who saved
the best they had to offer to; a particular deity (e.g. spirits of the woods, a beck, a river etc);
God(dess), for instance Shiva (the destroyer and the god of fertility and life) or Durga (the
Mother Goddness, “the inaccessible”); and to local/tribal Godnesses (Ghosh 2000; Kovacs 2004).
Just like Schnepel indicates about Orissa in India, the majority of the Nepalis belief that these
God(desse)s have local importance, “they are greatly respected and feared. They are held to have
a decisive influence on the fertility of the land and on the well-being of its inhabitants; they are
also held responsible for misfortunes, droughts and other calamities in the life of an individual or
of the community as a whole”(Schneppel 1995:148).
The Nepali filmmaker Aman Adhikari comments that “people share a very tight attachment with
their culture and religion”5 He comes to this conclusion after having made the film In God’s
Pond, in which it is shown that baby goats are drown in a local pond to protect the newborn
children of the community for a similar fate. He noticed that the younger people that wanted to
break away from the tradition of sacrifices felt unable to do so because they are grown up with
the local belief that blood sacrifices are needed to please the Goddess Durga. Initiatives of the
government in 2008 to withdraw financial support for the rituals of animal sacrifices met strong
protests from local communities.
The Nepali people's deep belief in Hindu, animist, and related traditions, is easily discounted by
Westerners who see them as merely superstitions, or quaintly interesting yet restricted to religious
5. See http://freethinker.co.uk/2010/10/17/orgy-of-blood-letting-as-nepal-honours-durga-hindu-goddessof-power/
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
areas of life. Power elites in South Asia have long sought to make their positions seem credible,
and indeed, inevitable by ingratiation within the traditional worldview.
Conceptual definitions: heritage, power and authority
In this article, heritage refers to natural and cultural heritage. The operational definition of natural
heritage applied is “natural features and sites, geological and physiographical formations or
precisely delineated areas of outstanding (universal) value” (UN conventions 1972).6 When
speaking of cultural heritage I aim at “historically embedded beliefs which are reproduced i.e. by
means of rituals, myths, sacrifices and the construction of memorial sites. Groups of buildings,
artistic works or archeological sites of universal value” (UN conventions 1972). I will not make a
distinction between tangible and intangible cultural heritage, since the boundaries between the
two are often not so clear cut. From fieldwork experiences I learnt that local ontology and
epistemologies may call something tangible which according to the dominant rhetoric would have
been defined as intangible cultural heritage, or the other way around.
The concept ‘power’, indicates “the ability to affect outcomes or get things done” (Mintzberg
1983; Salancik & Pfeffer 1977). Authority refers to formalized power structures and the power
relations between different individuals. In remote areas, formalized power structures are deeply
rooted in the institutions (social and formal) which regulate society in a village (Scott 1985:2327; Schrauwers 1999: 105-128). For example, when individuals act in line with the ‘unspoken
behavioural norms’ (trust, reciprocity, etcetera), a person has good chances of acquiring a formal
power position, like becoming the newly elected VDC Chairperson or being promoted to a higher
UCPN-M rank. The area where I performed my fieldwork (Mid-Western Hills of Nepal) houses a
moral economy that is regulated by social and moral obligations of exchange (Scott 1976; Moser
1998: 4; Bourdieu 1977: 92-110). In this context, it is especially relevant to realize that power is
non-static but negotiated in the interaction between people (Elias 1971; Wolf 1999: 55). Here, the
most applicable definition of authority seems “an asset of an individual, a group, or a state which
enables them to “penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and
appropriate or use resources in determined ways” (Migdal 1998: 4).
Power and governance in Nepal’s history
The geographical area that is nowadays known as Nepal was until the 18th century made up by
6. UNESCO (1972), UN Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16-111972, http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
small states, ruled by Hindu kings. Only the Kathmandu Valley was by then known as ‘Nepal’.
(Upreti 2001: 35; Bista 2001: 24, 25). According to a Nepalese legend of the 16 th century, the
god-cum-saint Goraknath commanded Drabya Shaha to conquer the Kathmandu Valley, after
which -two centuries later, between 1743 and 1775- Prithivi Narayan Shah completed the
unification of Nepal (Upreti 2001: 35, 36; Stiller 1973).
The 16th century legend is not an exception of its kind and there are more concrete examples that
indicate the strong connection between religion and governance in Nepal. According to
mythologies of the (Hindu) Vedic literature, the kings of Nepal are the incarnations of the
protagonist God Vishnupurana, called Lord Vishnu. Based on these scriptures the actions and
legitimacy of the (Shah) kings were in many cases barred from critique, at least until the fall of
the Nepal as a Hindu state (in May 2008).7 Natural heritage, for instance ritual places, temples,
natural sites, were not only dedicated to a supernatural entity but also to the kings of Nepal,
because they were seen as a reincarnated deity.
The French anthropologist Lecomte-Tilouine refers to the old kings of Nepal as ‘Hindu warrior
kings’, since traditionally every Hindu king was a member of the Kshatriya or warrior caste. The
interaction between the supernatural world and the natural world has been significant, in the
process of 1) determining which warfare strategies to use and 2) to legitimize the means exercised
to secure the power position of the kings of Nepal. Three Warrior Kingship rules can be identified
based on the religious beliefs and traditions of Nepal’s past:
1) It was the obligation of the Hindu kings to enact blood sacrifices, by means of offering an
animal and by initiating war “the sacrificial function of the king’s sword revives his sovereignty:
at regular intervals the king is required to carry out blood sacrifice, […] [this] blood regenerates
his power” (Lecomte-Tillouine 2004: 15).
2) Much emphasize was put on people’s individual responsibility to take part in the warfare.
When the king declared war, after the gods had insisted him to do so, every household had to
provide one men that could fight in the war (Gersony 2003).
3) Traditionally, war was placed outside the Hindu law; the country was plunged into temporarily
lawlessness. This means that all rules of the caste hierarchy were allowed to be broken in times of
mortal danger. The fundamental Hindu laws that are abrogated in these circumstances are e.g.
“murder of a Brahmin, a woman, a child, or a cow” (Lecomte-Tilioune 2004: 14).The usual
7. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601091&sid=awd0pBr9DrlQ&refer=india
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
norms of purity and impurity are also altered in the context of warfare.8 Slaughter of an enemy
did not lead to impurity for the belligerent, neither did ‘bali dan’ (a self-sacrifice) for the relatives
of the warrior who died as a martyr.9
Besides the above outlined ideas, there are other views about the effects of religious beliefs and
practices on governance patterns in Nepal. There are, for instance, factions who indicate that the
Hindu scriptures never literally identified the kings as gods, but that it was merely a political
maneuver of religion (Savada 1991). Another point of critique, is that the elite (i.e. at the political
level, top civil servants, businessmen, and high caste) refused to accept all religious Vedic literary
works, but focused on the content of the Puranas to justify their claims to power (Upreti 2001: 36,
37, 40; Van Dalen 2002: 24-37).The Puranas contain the mythologies of the Gods and Godesses,
in which the feudal elite is said to find justification for its superiority, through the cosmological
order outlaid (Dimmitt, Cornelia & van Buitenen 1978). The elite interpreted the hierarchy
prescribed by the cosmological order as follows: Gods and Godesses (first in line), the king
(second in line), the higher caste (third), lower caste (bottom of the pyramid) and ‘untouchables’
(no place in the cosmologic order). In the article ‘Enlighten People on Nepal a Secular
Democratic State’ on Civil Society of Nepal, the elite are also called down because they propagate
the caste system, and indulge in violent ethnic rituals, rites and worships, including animal
sacrifices.10 While, at the same time it is argued that, they are less interested and involved in nonviolent and non-life-sacrifial Vedic rites which are practiced on the childbirth, marriage and death
ceremonies.
Clearly religion stands in close relation to Nepal’s politics and this form of cultural heritage has at
some points in history been capitalized upon by power seekers and power holders. Hence,
Nepal’s ontology has historically been one of a cosmological order where power was determined
by the gods. Natural heritage (e.g. parks, rivers, geological (rock) formations, wildlife habitats or
general flora and fauna), along with various rituals and sacrifices (cultural heritage), were
attributed to a cosmology that flattered the incumbent elite.
8.
According to Sharma Dhakal (1963), there is no period of impurity following a death on the battlefield. If one
dies from a war wound, the number of days of impurity is equal to the number of days that have passed since the
battle. Should seven nights have passed since the battle, then relatives have to observe the usual ten days of
impunity (Lecomte- Tilouine 2004: 14).
9. Bali dan refers to a ‘self-sacrifice’. When a combatant dies in warfare it is called a ‘bali dan’ because it is seen as
a blood sacrifice to worship the Hindu gods. As such, a combatant is often times called a ‘martyr’ (LeComteTilouine 2004: 15; Sushil 2005).
10. See: http://www.nepalcivilsociety.org/enlighten.htm
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
The following part will discuss how cultural and natural heritage was exercised in the
confrontation between different political actors in the context of Nepal’s civil war. Moreover, it
regards how the meaning of cultural practices were negotiated, adapted and applied in favour of
one of the political interest groups to sustain and legitimize their quest for power.
The Monarchy, UCPN-M’s opposition parties, heritage and power politics in the context of
Nepal’s civil war
Sacrifice
King Gyanendra reigned Nepal between 1950- 1951 and 2001- 2008. To understand the symbolic
strategies utilized to reinforce his position as a legitimate ruler; the notion of cosmological order
and Warrior Kingship are of importance. The following remarks signifies that the question of
godly-determined-sovereignty was a significant one in the collision between the Monarchy, the
main political parties and the UCPN-M throughout the civil war:
Gyanendra, considered by loyalists to be a reincarnation of a Hindu god, ascended to the throne
in 2001, after most members of the royal family were slain by a drugged, drunk, lovelorn and
suicidal prince. But the new king failed to win the support of the public, many of whom believed
conspiracy theories linking him to the killing11
Steeped in the sea of blood which was the occasion for his [King Gyanendra] accession to the
throne, and the father of a prince infamous as the alleged perpetrator of hit-and-run manslaughter offences, the king is described by the Maoists with sanguinary imagery: ‘As if to fulfill
a predetermined quota of human sacrifice every day, on an average more than two dozen persons
per day have been brutally massacred by the security forces’’ (Lecomte- Tilouine 2004: 19).
Later in the same article, it becomes clear that Gyanendra, made no attempts to disassociate
himself from this bloodthirsty image, but rather embraced it. As an example, she features an
occasion at Gyanendra’s first Dasain12 as king, when he performed a pilgrimage to worship and
sacrifice at all the temples on the Nepalese territory with links to his dynasty, going right back to
its origins such as Lasargha, Gorkha, Nuwakot, Dasain. With this act Gyanendra intended to
11. Source: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jQhDpbHPipVypRDjAorpRS9RvWjg
12. Dasain is one the most important annual festivals. Dasain is the ‘great warrior festival’.
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
reaffirm his sovereign position as a godly installed king, a legitimate ruler, and as a chief in
command of the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA).13
UCPN-M and its opposition parties asked for a sacrifice of the king. The NC Party, for instance,
stressed in a headline of a newspaper article that the “King’s sacrifice [is] needed for political
stability” (Ojha 2003).14 Important to distinguish here is the interpretation of the word ‘sacrifice’.
The UCPN-M asked for a literal sacrifice of the King, while the opposition parties demanded for
a symbolic sacrifice of the king. At the same time, the Nepal Communist Party-United Centre
Mashal (NCP-Mashal) stressed that the UCPN-M only spoke out against king Gyanendra right
after the Royal Massacre, with the aim to clear their name from potential blame of being involved
in the tragic event.15 They highlighted that before and some time after the Royal Massacre, the
UCPN-M cooperated with king Gyanendra and praised king Birendra and all the kings of the
Shah dynasty. M.B. Singh, General Secretary of the NCP-Mashal, explains this Maobadi dualism
as follows “in a revolutionary war, in different conditions, [it is necessary] to take advantage of
the contradictions of [your] enemies and […] to support comparatively positive policies, at least
to some extent”(2002). With their criticism towards the UCPN-M rhetorics and actions,
indirectly, the NCP-Mashal asked for a sacrifice of the UCPN-M; that is, to sacrifice their
dualism and covert collaboration with the Monarchy.
National symbols
One year after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPAs), I entered the district
headquarter of district Rukum in the Mid Western hills, where the opposition parties (i.e. the NC
Party and CPN-UML) utilized the symbol of a flag to show that they were ‘alive and present’ to
the literate and illiterate. While I searched for the district office of each political party, to conduct
some interviews, these flags with the different the party symbols clearly indicated where the
offices were to be found. On the national level, there are also examples which illustrate the
strength symbols can play in politics and power disputes. Since 28th May 2008 Nepal is no longer
a Monarchy but a Federal Democratic Republic. The ‘Mail&GuardianOnline’ of 29 May 2008
reported that “the flag of Nepal's 240-year-old Shah Dynasty was taken down from the main
palace in Kathmandu after legislators abolished the world's last Hindu monarchy. The royal flag
13. The Royal Nepalese Army became the Nepalese Army in May 2006, because the Nepalese parliament
curtailed royal power, after the Loktantra Andolan (People's Movement for Democracy). Moreover, the Army
functioned no longer under the control of the King.
14. Ojha, G. (2003), King’s.sacrifice. needed for political stability: Experts.The Kathmandu Post, 2 June 2003.
15. Singh, M.B. (2002), “The So Called People’s War”.13 June 2002 http://www.ncpmashal.org/
english/arti_3.php, retrieved April 2011.
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was replaced by Nepal's national flag inside the palace on Thursday morning, a palace official
said on condition of anonymity. The king has been given 15 days to vacate the sprawling pink
palace at the heart of Kathmandu, which will now be turned into a national museum” . The
emblematic meaning of symbols like flags, makes them authoritative in the quest for power
between different fractions.
Anti-monarchism has not been limited to the UCPN-M party and adherents, but has been more
widespread. Wherever I went in Nepal in 2007/2008, individuals expressed their doubts about the
royalty in general and in particular in relation to king Gyanendra. Several times respondents
indicated that they suspected Gyanendra to be responsible for the Royal Massacre (2001).16
Disillusion in his unfulfilled promises to end corruption and bring development, added to the
negative attitudes towards the monarchy as an institution. Photo II is a concrete demonstration of
the anti-monarchist feelings. Anti-monarch civilians, which could have been UCPN-M members
but were not necessarily, taped-over the word ‘royal’ on signboards of i.e. property, like national
parks, forest, army territory, temples and museums. With this gesture they made a statement
which meant something like ‘away with the king and royal property legislation’ or ‘equality to
all, we do not longer want the central power to be in the hand of the Monarchy’.
Their action was not illegal
considering the fact that right
before
my
visit
to
Chitwan
National Park, the cabinet had
decided to nationalize property
belonging to the royal family and
Photo II
I made this picture in Chitwan National Park in October 2007. The word
‘Royal’ is taped away, to show that the Monarchy can no longer claim that
natural sites are royal property , as according to the tradition.
formed a five-member panel to
nationalize
royal
property
inherited by the present king,
16. The royal massacre refers to a cruel event whereby the (drunken) crown prince Dipendra massacred ten members
of the royal family, including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, and committed a failed suicide attempt. He
died three days later, on 4 June 2001. The only surviving brother of King Birendra, ‘Gyanendra’, ascended the
thrown. According to the official report, the crown prince shut himself. There are also rumours about palace
guards who shot the crown prince, and about Maoists being responsible for the royal massacre.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html
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including the property of late king Bihendra and his family.17 However, it did illustrate the
frustration of Nepal’s population build up over the years about the monarchy and loyalists who
seized resources and tried to vindicate their acts; they negotiated the meaning of religious beliefs
of the past and creatively adjusted cultural practices. Anti-monarch actions, like the one sketched
above, can also be dubbed as a protest against the idea that the king is a half divine/half human
creature and consequently has a divine right to claim national property. The king, before seen as
an incarnation of Vishnupura or at least considered as a legitimate ruler, was no longer barred
from critique.
The UPCN-M, heritage and their claims to power
After the Royal Massacre, the UCPN-M tried to unhorse the cultural construction of the king as
the sovereign ruler, representing Lord Vishnu on earth. In UCPN-M’s propaganda literature king
Gyanendra was repeatedly referred to as the ‘Butler King’, and the RNA as ‘Royal Butlers’ and
‘puppets of the King.18 They argued that the ‘traditional monarchy’ had come to an end in Nepal
and that the ‘consolidation of the republic’ must be the immediate programme.15 Sacrifices
enacted by the king, to regenerate his sovereignty and to absolve his instigations to RNA military
action, were engaged by the UCPN-M to condemn
the king and the RNA. In the Nepalese case, Figure II. Front Cover of a Pro-Maoist
Magazine ‘Naulo Bihani’(2001)
collective deprivation, e.g. caste- and gender
discrimination, corruption of state representatives,
unfulfilled promises of development in a remote
area,
etcetera,
were
smartly
pictured
as
characteristics of the enemy. The status quo could
only be overthrown, so the UCPN-M argued,
when people identified themselves with the party
and supported their call to take up arms and start a
revolution (Sharma 2007: 7; Van Dalen & De
Vries 2002: 19).
Hence, the UCPN-M asked for the sacrifice of the
‘Butler King’, and pointed at their forces as the
17. This decision of the cabinet was made in August 2007. Source: OCHA Nepal, National situation overview, Issue
no. 17, 15 August- 12 September 2007.
18. The Maoist journal Janaawaj and Maoist Information Bulletin 3, 2002.
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admissible actors to perform the sacrifice and to the party as the warranted substitute of the king.
The legitimization of their rule of law and the violence used to install it, was set in motion by
reviving the Warrior Kingship rules.
Revival of Warrior Kingship
Until the 18th century ‘bravery and war related sacrifices’ were associated with a confirmation or
promotion of one’s position in the cosmological order (concerning the king) and possibly also in
terms of social stratification (for the rest of the Nepali people), such as a shift from lower to
higher caste. The UCPN-M played upon the first and third Warrior Kingship rule regarded
earlier; every king had the right and duty to start a war, when the time was ripe for blood
sacrifices, and to plunge his kingdom periodically into a state of temporary lawlessness
(Lecomte-Tilouine 2004).
A photo-montage published after the Royal Massacre in 2001, in the pro-Maoist journal Naulo
Bihani (2001), clearly illustrates how the UCPN-M underplay the legitimate rule of Nepal’s
successive Shah kings, to fill these posts of godly given legitimacy themselves (see figure II). On
the cover of the journal, the pictures of successive Shah kings are shown whereby the headline
read ‘following the royal massacre the end of the traditional monarchy in Nepal and the
establishment of a republic’. At the bottom, three UCPN-M leaders are pictured, as if they are the
natural successors of the Shah kings, supplemented with the comment ‘the central people’s
government is prepared’. The UCPN-M reasoned that their act of bravery, the initiating of the
war in 1996, placed them in the same position of sovereignty as the Shah Hindu kings of Nepal.
The UCPN-M leaders, as modern incarnation of the Warrior Kings, explained that they had no
other choice then to start an armed conflict to ‘cleanse the country from within’ of all forms of
exploitation (Prachanda 2001).19
Singh of the NCP-Mashal wrote in relation to UCPN-M’s belief that their leaders were placed in
the position of Warrior Kings; there is a powerful tendency within the dominant feudal culture of
Nepal which has encouraged ... hero worship. It is rare to find a leader praising himself in a
political resolution presented by himself, even in bourgeois parties. Even kings and emperors,
who are routinely praised by others, less commonly praise themselves. When we study the
propositions and publications of the Maoist group, we find Prachanda adopting a personality
19.
An interview with UCPN-M Chairman Prachanda, taken on 28 May 2001. Published in A World to Win,
No. 27, 2001.
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
cult and trying to have this established in a planned and sponsored manner from the very
beginning. As a result of such efforts, the Maoists’ second national conference adopted the
‘Prachanda path [in 2002, as addition to the already existing UCPN-M ideology of Marxism
Leninism Maoism].15
Just like the sovereign rulers of the past, the UCPN-M leaders started to raise taxes on land,
property, natural resources, usage of infrastructure, and loans. A report of USAID explicates that
“Maoist military operations are partially funded in some areas by ‘taxes’ on natural resources,
including timber, Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs), medicinal and aromatic plants, and
national park visitor fees” (USAID 2006: v, vi, 10). Many of my respondents in the Mid Western
Hills of Nepal were forced to turn in ‘donations’; a portion of their loan, food, livestock, and land.
School teachers, for instance, had to give one-seventh (or more) of their salary to the local CPNM leaders. At least on-seventh because the UCP-M considered Saturday as a working day and the
teachers did not work on Saturdays. If they refused to hand in ‘their donation’, they were beaten,
kidnapped or send to labour camp.
Whereas bravery and war-related sacrifice until the 18th century led to opportunities of ‘being
promoted’ a higher status position in the caste validation system, today it leads to admiration and
inclination of status within the UCPN-M hierarchy. All party members, but also non-committed
people killed by the government forces or that went missing are recognized as martyrs. When a
UCPN-M combatant showed his military bravery and killed (‘sacrifices’) an enemy, it was
believed to create a direct connection, without interference of the Brahmin priests, between the
combatants and the Hindu gods (Lecomte-Tilouine 2004: 15). Ann de Sales explicates that it is
necessary to kill ‘a class enemy’ to rise up in the hierarchy of UCPN-M’s military forces, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Gellner 2007: 348). The highest offer one could bring was a
‘bali dan’; “by offering themselves in sacrifice through their commitment, Maoist soldiers
became living dead, martyrs-to-be” (LeComte- Tilouine 2004: 17; 2010: 11). Every UCPN-M
combatant is thus both a sacrificer and a willing sacrificial victim. Like the Tamil Tigers who
flaunted a cyanide capsule pendant, the UCPN-M forces and nowadays the Youth Communist
League wore the sign of their imminent demise on their foreheads: a mourning headband
(kaphan) or a red star, which is said indicate that they are willingly to accept their own death (see
photo IIV) (Sushil 2005).
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The second Warrior Kingship rule ‘every
man is a potential warrior and thus
expected to contribute to the war’ was
capitalized upon by the UCPN-M to
justify their ‘involuntarily’ manners to
recruit people for the UCPN-M forces
(Lecomte-Tilouine
2004:
14).
The
UCPN-M revived the rule, and extended
it to include also women and children.
One member of each house should take
part in the UCPN-M meetings, forced
labour and the armed conflict. As such,
the UCPN-M used schools as grounds for
abduction and recruitment of children
and teachers (Watchlist 2005: 21-26).
INSEC outlines that 2478 people were
Photo IIV.
This picture was taken at the second day of my stay in Khalanga,
Rukum district. It shows a march of the YCL, whereby they wear a
‘kaphan’, a red scarf, to express that they are willing to die for the
UCPN-M cause. On the same day, all these YCL members came to
the UPCN-M meeting .
abducted by the UCPN-M between 1996
and the end of 2006, of which 2328 were
released later on, and of 150 individuals
their status is not clear (ICG 2007: 13).
During my fieldwork I listened to many stories of youngsters that were involuntarily recruited or
abducted. In one of my case study Village District Communities in the Rukum district of Nepal’s
Mid-Western Hills about 80 percent of the households had at least one of the household members
forcefully recruited for the PLA, labour camps and projects by the UCPN-M. With the following
narrative an ex-PLA combatant confirmed that the UCPN-M utilized cultural programs,
propaganda (i.e. promises about development facilities), and physical/verbal violence to recruit
people;
When I was 14 years old I took part in a cultural program of the CPN-UML in the Khalanga [the
district headquarters], and the Maoists noticed me. Soon after that [in 2004] the Maoists came to
my house and took me with them. They did this because I was with another party [CPN-UML]
and because I was good in dancing and singing. They [the UCPN-M] could use my singing and
dancing in their cultural program. They told me it was only temporarily and that I had to make
15
Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
roads for them, but they took me to a training. The training was about how to recruit other kids.
We [the respondent and her friend] were sent to schools in lots of villages in Rukum and Salyan
[that is a neighbouring district of Rukum]. We had to make promises to the students like ‘the
Maoists will do good things. Good days will come when you work for the party’. And we had to
tell the kids that we only wanted them to become ‘Maoist people’ [UCPN-M party members or
workers], but for real [in reality] they were recruited for the Maoist army [the PLA]. Lots of
students listened and went with us.
During the informal chat after the interview, my respondent also explained that the UCPN-M beat
her and coerced her to take part in the PLA. She decided to flee, and for a period of two to three
years she hid from the UCPN-M in several neighbouring districts. She did not dare to return to
her own village, because she heard that the UCPN-M told her parents “if she comes back we will
cut off her hands and legs”.
Contested national and supernatural heritage
Before, during and after the civil war the UCPN-M damaged and destroyed national and
‘supernatural’ heritage to contest the authority structures they symbolized.
Murals were used by the UCPN-M to strengthen support for the party and their ideology, for
example murals with the text ‘long live the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist- the Prachanda Path’. They
also engaged murals to highlight their rules and regulation; and to threaten people with
punishment-implications if they did not live up to these rules. In this regard, red painted letters on
walls of houses or public buildings would explicate e.g. that youngers were not allowed to marry
before a certain age, that every conflict (on household, neighborhood or community level) had to
be reported to the local Maoist leaders, that every household had to deliver at least one member
who would serve in the PLA, etcetera. It was unlikely that disobedience to these rules would stay
unnoticed, since the UCPN-M developed an informant system which was quite effective, making
use of a refined word-of-mouth and passing-on-of-handwritten-notes communication system
(Nepal 2005).
UCPN-M’s way of playing out power politics over murals, bears similarities with the Maoist
strategies in China during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Davis writes in the
article ‘The Writing on the Wall. Marking the Limits of Ethnicity on China’s Border Land’ that
the Red Guards knocked down old buildings, burned Buddhist images, and scrapped off old
16
Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
Buddhist murals or texts written in ethnic languages like Tai Lüe, to replace them with red
painted slogans like ‘Long Live Chairman Mao’(2005).
Flags are another important way to indicate which actor bears authority. In the areas under
UCPN-M control, the red flag with the symbol of the hammer and the sickle adorned the
landscape. State representation in the form of symbols (like flags, name signs and murals) were
removed or damaged by the Maoist forces (Gersony 2003: 60-63). Government buildings, police
offices and any other type of building that embodied the Royal House and the state were attacked
(Gersony 2003: 60-63). In Rukum and Rolpa district, strategic infrastructure was demolished,
police stations and VDC buildings burnt down, raided or occupied to be used for UCPN-M
purposes (stockpiling of weapons, meetings of the United Peoples Village Committee or Court,
accommodation of Maoist leaders who substituted the government representative at the local
level). In Tansen, a village in Palpa district of Nepal, the UCPN-M fought with the local
authorities on the 31st January 2006, whereby ancient buildings were destroyed including
Tansen’s Palace. The 64 room palace was a representation of arts and crafts of the ancient Palpa,
but also housed government offices; the reason why it was attacked by the UCPN-M. Michael
Wilmore (2008) researched how political identities in the town of Tansen in the central western
district of Palpa, Nepal, have been mediated by contrasting forms of cultural and material
practice, and concludes “Tansen's Palace (Durbar), the seat of the district administration and the
site of the throne room that housed the sword of the monarch as a symbol of his rule,
was destroyed by fire in the course of the Maoist assault”.
Government schools and historical education were also a target for UCPN-M attacks; I collected
evidence which proved the destruction of government schools. In relation to school curricula, the
UCPN-M tried to relinquish government’s sphere of influence. Teachers whom I interviewed in
the Maoist Heartland stressed that “they [UCPN-M] burned the photos of king Bihendra in the
school books of the children”, the teaching of Sanskrit was stopped, singing the national anthem
was banned”.20 Furthermore, the UCPN-M forced teachers to support the militarization of the
schooling program, whereby the students were educated in the Maoist Leninist Maoists- the
20. As a critic to the national anthem adopted in 1962 and entitled “May Glory Crown You, Courageous Sovereign",
the UCPN-M introduced their own anthem during the war, which is based on a popular national song written by
Madhab Ghimire " �auncha geet Nepali jyotiko pankha uchali, jai, jai, jai Nepal, sundara shanta vishal�
(Nepalese sing the song rising light high; great, great and great Nepal - beautiful, peace and the great). In May
2006 the official version of the national anthem was abolished as it was accused of being a tune for monarchical
glorification instead of representing the nation as a whole. See also
http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper274.html
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
Pranchandra (MLM-P) ideology (Watchlist 2005: 21-28). One of the teachers in my focus group
testified “after the morning prayer the Maoists took us [the teachers] and children to the fields
where we had to listen to their speeches and sing revolutionary programs”. Respondents in other
VDCs of Rukum and Rolpa district, expressed similar stories in which the schools and the
associative educational groups were compelled to underline and teach the MLM-P ideology.
UCPN-M’s struggle for authority did not stay limited to the natural world, they aimed to install
and all-encompassing governance structure. This included coming to terms with the power
holders of the supernatural realm. Hence, the local faith healers, called the ‘dhami-jhankris’21,
were not allowed to do their work (Shankar et all. 2006). In addition, the marks used by these
spiritual leaders (see photo IV), to express worship to the Hindu gods and local spirits and
indicate protect the village against evil spirits, were not appreciated by the UCPN-M. I will
provide three explanations for UCPN-M’s inhibitions against the work of the dhami’s and
jhankri’s. First of all, the marks were seen as a symbol of the power of the spiritual leaders which
contrasted with the aims of the UCPN-M to establish their all-encompassing governance
structure. Secondly, the UCPN-M propagated development and progress for the rural population,
and opposed the animist and shamanist beliefs because they found them ‘backward’. Third, the
UCPN-M argued that these kind of shamanist practices enhanced social inequality because the
dhami’s (Brahmin’s) functioned as (paid) brokers between ordinary people and the Hindu gods
(Onesto 1999 and 2000).
Cultural beliefs, social practices, rituals, sacrifices and memorial sites
Cultural beliefs and social practices which underlined the existing inequalities in Nepal’s social
stratification, were curtailed by the UCPN-M. As a consequence, any cultural practice that would
confirm caste differences, gender inequality, or differences between poor-rich or educated and
non-educated, were challenged and brought in line with the MLP-P ideology. The latter
emphasized the importance of social equality and the inclusion of all kind of people in the
associative institutions. This did not happen without the use of verbal, physical and psychological
violence. During an interview the UCPN-M leader of one of Rukum’s VDC’s explained in which
way the lower caste groups were drummed with the equalitarian ideas of the MLM-P “if you cut
high and low caste people, they all have the same blood. That is why we stirred the lower caste
people to claim their right to equality. We joined them when they went to the houses of the higher
21. Nepalese faith healers are called ‘dhami-jhankris’ and act as mediators between the material world and the
world of spirits. Source: http://www.aaimedicine.com/jaaim/sep06/Healing.pdf
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
caste to ask them to eat together”. He did not tell that this was done with force and violence;
UCPN-M workers with guns, threatening and beating the higher caste people to permit the lower
caste people access to their house and to cook for them.22 Furthermore, relatively wealthy
households were discriminated against and forced into giving up part of their land or salary.
The fact that the UCPN-M obliged the local population to adopt the MLM-P ideology and
meanwhile banned some of their cultural beliefs and social practices inevitably means that new
forms of exclusion arose. Like sketched above, this happened through UCPN-M’s efforts to offset those who, according to the UCPN-M upheld and regenerated the unequal power structures in
society.
In terms of the gender inequality, the UCPN-M reasoned that women should also get a citizenship
card, perform the same tasks as men, join community meetings and groups, and marry late so that
the girls could finish their education program. My respondents indicated that if girls married
before their 18th and boys before they reached their 20s, the fresh couple were sent to labour
camp. This while, according to local traditions, girls and boys married much earlier; even before
their 16th birthday, because “there must be something wrong with a girl if she is not married at her
sixteenth”. Young girls and women were also involuntary recruited for the party and the PLA;
with the argument that women needed to break away from any cultural tradition which placed
them in a position of subordination.
In some cases the UCPN-M did not contest local tradition (religious beliefs, social practices, rites,
etc) but smartly employed them to make their case. An example concerns the story with which
this article started, about the Damai drummers. I would like to add the following illustration to
give some more flesh to the bones of the argument made; in one of my first case study VDCs, the
UCPN-M caught a man who had stolen a blanket, money (loans of villagers who performed
several years of labour abroad) and broke the legs of multiple goats belonging to other villagers.
The sentenced person had to repay the money, and was publicly embarrassed; his face was
painted black and his hair was shaved off. Also, a garment of slippers was placed around his neck
and he had to walk around the village, accompanied by UCPN-M members. During the public
humiliation the sentenced had to undergo, the Hindu hill rite of purification (shaving of the head)
was used as a moral form of punishment. Moreover, according to the local tradition, a garment
22. According to the Hindu tradition the house of the higher caste is polluted when a lower caste person enters the
house. Also, a higher caste person will be dishonored and ‘defiled’ when he or she will accept water or boiled rice
from the lower caste. See http://web.comhem.se/~u18515267/CHAPTERIV.htm
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Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
with flowers is given to people you want to honor (a guest, a deity, a God or Goddess). A garment
with slippers symbolizes the opposite; impurity and despise. This belief goes back to the Vedic
conception of the universe as the body of God. “Just like a body has high and low parts so this
universe has high and low, pure and impure places. Up is high, down is low”.23
The cult of martyrdom, is a third example whereby the UCPN-M made use of local traditions, and
applied them in an adjusted form. They did this with the intention to make it easy for the local
population to sympathize with the UCPN-M and to enforce their position of power. Phillipe
Ramirez explicates that the cult derives from traditional conceptions in which “the martyr who
dies a violent death can only escape from eternal wandering by a recognition of his status, which
is the equivalent of reintegrating him into society” (1997: 60). In the past, resting platforms and
paths were built in memory of the dead, who would then become ancestors. Among Kham
Magars, an ethnic group concentrated mainly in the Mid Western hills, it is believed that the spirit
of the dead will ensure prosperity in the locality where its memorial is build and where he
receives regular worship (Gellner et all. 2007: 352). In line with this local belief, the UCPN-M
memorized their dead by constructing platforms, paths, gates, and gardens.24 Natural resources
(such as forests, rivers, ponds and becks), and public services (like water taps) that were
originally named after the deity or God who reigned over the resource, were re-named after
Maoist martyrs. In that sense, it was not only about commemorating the dead, but also a question
of authority shift. Respondents from Rukum district who had worked in UCPN-M’s labour camps
narrated that “they had to construct roads, and build gates which served as status symbol for the
party and as memorial for the Maoist martyrs”. As a conclusion to UCPN-M’s application of the
cult of ‘martyrs’, I would like to iterate Anne de Sales “the revoluntionaries […] neutralize the
violent death of the victims of the People’s War by turning them into benevolent ancestors”
(Gellner et all 2007: 352).
Conclusion
This article started with the question: what is heritage and which role did it play in the context of
power politics and Nepal’s civil war? Based on the arguments above, I conclude that heritage is
neither a thing, a movement or a project nor does it exist by itself. Smith (2006: 11-13) and
Harvey (2008: 19) provide a beautiful definition that fit the discussions and outcome of my
23. http://www.sanskrit.org/www/Hindu%20Primer/feetsymbolism.html
24. Muktiyuddha (The War of Liberation, a Maoist aligned magazine), May 1998, no 1
20
Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
analysis; “heritage is about the process by which people use the past; a discursive construction
with material consequences”.
To comprehend the role cultural and natural heritage played in the context of Nepal’s power
politics and civil war, it necessary to look at the meaning of authority and heritage in Nepal’s
history. To understand the meaning of ‘authority’ -as a concept and its practical application- we
have to take account of the relationship between power distribution at the micro- and macro level
of the physical world and the allocation of power in the supernatural world. Nepal’s ontology has
historically been one of a cosmological order where power was regulated by Hindu gods and
deities. Natural heritage was assigned accordingly; to those in power, and rituals and sacrifices
reproduced and fortified a cosmology that flattered the incumbent elite. Thus, religion stands in
close relation to Nepal’s politics, Ramirez writes about this “[Nepal accommodates] a society
where religion does not constitute an autonomous domain [and] the practice of Nepalese Maoism
is hardly a seculair affair” (Gellner 207: 350).
At some points in history, religious beliefs have been capitalized upon by power seekers and
power holders. The Monarchy and the UCPN-M regenerated the Warrior Kingship Rules and
claimed having the rights of Nepal’s sovereign rulers of the past. The same rules were applied to
legitimate UCPN-M’s and the king’ use of violence, and to impose their authority on the local
population. The opposition parties and the UCPN-M tried to unhorse the cultural construction of
the king as the sovereign ruler and ‘God on Earth’. The symbol of a flag, murals, prophetic signs
made by faith healers, the national anthem and the school curriculum were all subject to conflict.
Regarding Nepal’s natural heritage, discord over the naming of natural sites, such as parks, rivers
and forest areas was one of the warring parties strategies to accrue power. In their attempts to
become the all-encompassing-authority figures, the UCPN-M destructed and damaged temples
and other ancient buildings associated with the Monarchy or one of their political opposition
parties. Even the faith-healers, dhami-jhankri’s, were not allowed to do their work, because the
UCPN-M also wanted to come to terms with any type of alternative power holder.
All in all, the case study of Nepal shows that cultural and natural heritage has been regenerated
and/or adjusted in the socio-cultural, economic and political domains. More in general, I come to
the conclusion that the appropriation of heritage is never neutral. Therefore, heritage must be
considered a multi-dimensional, multi-valued and multi-vocal concept.
21
Marloes van Houten, IIAS Research fellow, May 2011, mrls.vanhouten@gmail.com
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