Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille:
Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost
by
Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson
12 July 1999
Introduction
Thirty years ago, Hurricane Camille struck the United States Gulf Coast with
an unprecedented fury. Camille, a Saffir/Simpson Category 5 storm, was the
strongest storm to directly strike the United States in the twentieth century.
After wreaking havoc along the Gulf Coast, Camille's remnants deposited a
tremendous amount of rain in the Appalachian Mountains of Virginia and West
Virginia, causing further damage. All told, Camille caused more than 200
deaths and billions of dollars in damage. In its aftermath, the storm was called
the greatest catastrophe ever to strike the United States and perhaps the most
significant economic weather event in the world's history.
For many, Camille is a distant memory, an historical footnote from a time long
gone. But Camille is also a harbinger of disasters to come. Another storm of
Camille's intensity will strike the United States, the only question is when.
When this future storm strikes, it will make landfall over conditions drastically
different from those in 1969. The hurricane-prone regions of the United States
have developed dramatically as people have moved to the coast and the
nation's wealth has grown. Estimates of potential losses from a single
hurricane approach $100 billion.
This report, and the web site of which it is a part, takes advantage of the
thirtieth anniversary of Camille's landfall to raise awareness about the
hurricane hazard facing the United States. This report reviews the Camille
experience with an eye to lessons learned and lessons lost from that event.
The subtext of this report is that many of the lessons of Camille have been
relearned in subsequent hurricane impacts with hurricanes Agnes, Frederic,
Alicia, Hugo, Andrew, Opal, and so forth. For the most part, society
acknowledges its need to improve response to hurricanes. The greatest
challenge we face is to turn that knowledge into practical action. Another storm
like Camille might open a window of opportunity to improve the nation's
hurricane policies, but it would be far better if, instead of waiting for that future
storm, we learned the lessons that history has already provided.
This report proceeds in four sections (after Pielke and Pielke 1997). Section I
reviews the forecasts of the storm's approach and the subsequent evacuation.
Section II examines the impacts of the storm, both along the Gulf Coast and
in the Appalachian Mountains. Section III provides a review of the response
to the event, and Section IV distills a number of the lessons learned. For
those wishing to learn more about Camille, or hurricanes more generally,
several bibliographies are included on this web site. We gratefully
acknowledge the support of the NOAA Coastal Services Center in the
development of this site. NCAR is sponsored by the National Science
Foundation
I. Forecast
History and Description
With satellite imagery, forecasters identified a typical tropical wave off the
coast of Africa on August 5, 1969. On August 9, the system was about 480
miles east of the Caribbean's leeward islands. Five days later, the pilot of a
Navy reconnaissance plane observed a central pressure of 29.50 inches of
mercury and surface winds of 55 mph (USACE 1970). Forecasters classified
Camille as a tropical storm located 60 miles west of Grand Cayman Island, 480
miles south of Miami (Figure 1).
Early on Friday, August 15, Camille developed into a small but potent
hurricane with a northwesterly track of about 9 mph. As Camille moved toward
western Cuba, that afternoon, winds reached 115 mph, with gale-force winds
extending out 125 to 150 miles to the north of the center and 50 miles to the
south (USACE 1970) (Table 1). A bulletin issued by the National Hurricane
Center at 3 p.m. on August 15 distinguished Camille as the most intense
hurricane since Beulah in 1967 (ESSA, 1969a). Camille weakened slightly
over Cuba, generating 92-mph winds, and releasing 10 inches of rain over
western sections of the island.
Hurricane Camille regained strength as it reached the warm Gulf of Mexico
waters, moving at about 10 mph in a north-northwesterly direction. Early
Saturday August 16, with Camille located about 420 miles south of Panama
City, Florida, forecasters issued a hurricane watch for the Gulf coast from
Biloxi, Mississippi, to St. Marks, Florida (USACE 1970). By 11 o'clock Saturday
morning, the winds had increased to 115 mph, with hurricane-force winds
extending about 40 miles from the center and gales extending out 150 miles.
At this time, officials issued hurricane warnings for the northwest Florida coast
from Fort Walton Beach to St. Marks (USACE 1970). Reconnaissance aircraft
on late Saturday afternoon indicated the storm was slowing in its course and
intensifying rapidly. Maximum winds were estimated at 150 mph near the
center, then located about 380 miles south of Fort Walton Beach. By Saturday
evening, Camille's forward speed had increased to about 12 mph near the
center, and hurricane winds extended 50 miles in all directions (USACE 1970).
On Sunday, August 17, Camille was located 250 miles south of Mobile,
Alabama. Officials issued hurricane warnings, already in effect for the Florida
panhandle, to include the Alabama and Mississippi coasts to Biloxi. The
Weather Bureau alerted communities, now affected by the watch and the
warnings, and the tempo of preparation increased. Camille continued to move
toward the mouth of the Mississippi River and by 9 a.m. hurricane warnings
had been issued for the all the Mississippi coast as far west as New Orleans
and Grand Isle (USACE 1970). About 15 hours before landfall, National
Hurricane Center forecasters warned, 揚 resent indications are that the center
of Camille will pass close to the mouth of the Mississippi River late this
afternoon and move inland on the Mississippi coast tonight" (ESSA, 1969a). At
3 p.m., warnings east of Apalachicola, Florida, were discontinued. At this time,
the storm was located about 120 miles southeast of New Orleans and was
expected to pass close to the mouth of the Mississippi River late in the
afternoon.
The last reconnaissance flight was made early Sunday afternoon, and the
crew recorded a central pressure of 26.61 inches (901 mb) and clocked
maximum winds at more than 200 mph near the center (USACE 1970).
Hurricane-force winds extended 60 miles from the center and gales outward
about 180 miles. The storm was now at its peak and was located less than 100
miles from the mouth of the Mississippi River. No hurricane this intense had
ever struck the mainland of the United States in recorded history.
By 7 p.m., Camille was 60 miles south of Gulfport, moving north-northwest
about 15 mph and was expected to move inland near Gulfport that evening
(USACE 1970) (Figure 2). An offshore drilling rig was raked by winds
estimated to be about 170 miles per hour. Three barrier islands off the coast
separate the Mississippi Sound from the Gulf of Mexico, normally providing
some buffer from landfalling storms, but during Camille, these islands were
ravaged by the storm's power. Two islands lost more than 300 acres to erosion,
and the third, Ship Island, was breached (Leyden 1985). On the Mississippi
shore, the wind increased until 10 p.m., its sound a continuous roar (ESSA,
1969a).
Evacuation
The wide range of possible landfall locations greatly complicated preparation
efforts. Figure 3 shows the forecast displacement errors. By official estimates,
81,000 out of 150,000 people in the evacuation area were moved to safety. In
the early hours of Sunday morning, 18 hours before landfall, some residents
began boarding up homes and businesses, and a trickle of vehicles moved
north. (ESSA, 1969a). As the threat to the low-lying coastline became evident,
the trickle of evacuees became a flood. People hastily loaded what few
belongings they could carry and fled.
In the hours immediately prior to landfall, evacuation was impossible due to a
number of of low-lying (eventually swamped) bridges. Local officials appeared
on radio and television stations to point out the danger and to plead with
people reluctant to abandon their homes (ESSA, 1969a). Police and Civil
Defense officials went through the areas of special hazard to individually
contact them. The need to remove everyone from the tidal beaches was urgent
and, in at least one case, arrests were made in a desperate move to save lives
(ESSA, 1969a).
Although the warnings for Camille evacuation were judged largely successful
by local officials, confusion existed between the public and forecasters.
Confusion surrounded the predicted landfall area of Camille until as late as
Sunday night, only 4-6 hours prior to landfall. Many people had retired for the
night Sunday, convinced that the storm would veer north into the Florida
panhandle, or at least into Alabama as predicted (Wilkinson and Ross 1970, p.
24). Most people relied primarily on radio and television, then on
communication with relatives as an information source.
Yet, the location along the coast greatly influenced what information was
received, as broadcasts varied, depending upon their source. Pass Christian
residents generally received information from New Orleans television rather
than from Biloxi, which was watched by many residents to the east. The
messages coming from different sources led to dire consequences and likely
resulted in many misinformed residents remaining in their homes when they
should have evacuated. The New Orleans listeners (in Pass Christian and
Long Beach) did not receive the detailed, localized interpretations of the
warnings provided by the local officials at Biloxi (Wilkinson and Ross 1970).
Wilkinson and Ross (1970) provides an example where a 揾 ighly emotional
plea to get out" was being issued over Biloxi television Sunday, as a
newscaster in New Orleans was reported to have read only the general
forecast and then returned to broadcasting music. Another example from
Wilkinson and Ross (1970) tells of an out-of-town radio station re-running
earlier bulletins, even after new ones had been broadcast over another station.
Weather bulletins said accurately that the hurricane would strike land 搉 ear
Gulfport," but the urgency to low-lying areas was conveyed only in messages
from local newscasters.
II. Impacts
Landfall
Camille made landfall shortly before midnight in the Bay St. Louis area
(USACE 1970). At this time, the eye of the storm was about 12 miles in
diameter and crossed almost directly over the town of Waveland at a forward
speed of 15 mph. The great volume of water moving inland up the Jourdan
River floodplain was typical of other estuary streams along the coast. The
volume flowing inland at the tide crest was estimated to have been at least
90,000 cfs. This volume is more than three times the flood discharge expected
on the Jourdan River on the average of once in 50 years (Hudson 1970).
Camille's intensity in Harrison County was compounded by the geography of
the area in which sections of the county were inundated from both the north
and south (Leyden 1985). Maps depicting the extent of flooding show that the
community of Pass Christian and parts of Biloxi were completely inundated by
flood waters. Storm waters rose to 22.6 feet at Pass Christian, 17 feet behind
Pass Christian, 21.6 feet at Long Beach, 21 feet at Gulfport, 19.5 feet at Biloxi,
and 15 feet on the Biloxi Bay (USACE 1970) (Figure 4).
Although warnings were posted, there were a number of persons who were
thought to be safe when they were not. A local minister's wife was swept to her
death as tides destroyed the 100-year old church where she and her husband
sought protection (Figure 5). Another woman climbed into the rafters of her
mother's house along with seventeen other adults and thirteen children to
escape the rising waters. The ladder on which they climbed was later used to
pull two people to safety. Another family in a beachfront house sat in their
downstairs living room watching the storm until water seeped in under the door.
A mop, then towels, then a rug were used to try to stop the flow. The husband
opened the door and was swept across the room by a surging wave. As the
lower floor filled with water, the family retreated upstairs where adults gave
instructions to children on where to go should they survive (Wilkinson and
Ross 1970).
At the Weather Observatory at Boothville, Louisiana, just north of Venice, five
weathermen were prepared to ride out the storm and make detailed
observations. The observatory was designed to withstand hurricane conditions,
and the structure had been built on prestressed concrete pilings with the main
floor 12 feet above ground. Emergency power was operating, and radio
contact was maintained with the Hurricane Forecast Center in New Orleans. At
about 6:40 p.m., a pressure of 959.7 mb was recorded. About the same time,
the wind-speed equipment became inoperative after having indicated wind
gusts to 107 mph. Soon after, one meteorologist noticed that the water was
rising rapidly and had reached the catwalk just below the floor of the
observatory. Shortly after, the water rushed into the building. The emergency
generator room was flooded, and the weathermen lost all contact with the
outside world. They sought refuge in the electronics shop, and the water
continued to rise until it was chest-deep on some observers. They lost all track
of time, and it was several hours before the water began to recede (Rohlfs
1969) (Figure 6).
Sea going vessels and small craft alike were swept inland and deposited
among the remnants of buildings. A large diesel fuel barge was lifted out of the
harbor, carried ashore, and deposited on the medial strip between the east
and west lanes of US Highway 90. Farther up on the beach, a large oil storage
tank floated several miles from its original position (Rohlfs 1969).
Eyewitnesses reported that the storm surge remained ashore very briefly -only for some 20-30 minutes -- sucking a large amount of debris back into the
Gulf of Mexico with astonishing speed (ESSA, 1969a).
The strongest winds east of the eye struck between Pass Christian and Long
Beach, Mississippi. Destruction in this area was almost complete (Figure 7).
One survivor reported that she was invited by friends concerned for her safety
to leave a safe location and move into an apartment building (Richelieu
Apartments in Pass Christian). This apartment building occupied a low site
formerly known as the 搑 ice field." It was destroyed and 21 lives were lost
(Wilkinson and Ross 1970) (Figure 8). A total of about 150 people died along
the Gulf Coast during Camille's passage.
There were no records of winds near the eye of the storm, but estimates
ranged up to 190 mph. The tidal surge reached an unprecedented height of
22.6 feet above mean sea level at Pass Christian and was nearly 6 feet above
mean sea level as far east as Gulf Shores, Alabama (USACE 1970). Near the
west end of the Bay St. Louis bridge, of 26.85 inches of pressure was recorded.
Rainfall over southern Mississippi, southeastern Louisiana, and southwestern
Alabama averaged from 2 to 6 inches, with a, maximum of 10 inches in
Hancock County and 10.6 inches in Hattiesburg (USACE 1970).
Overland
The storm began to weaken as it moved northward across Mississippi. As
Camille passed Jackson, Mississippi on August 18, the pressure fell to 28.93
inches, with winds gusts to 67 mph (USACE 1970). Identifiable circulation
continued into southern Quitman County. Thereafter, the storm weakened
rapidly and became a tropical depression before reaching the northern
Mississippi border (USACE 1970).
The Virginia Floods
Camille's remnants moved north-northeastward through central Kentucky and
eastward through extreme southern West Virginia and southern Virginia. As
Camille reached Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, it encountered large masses
of moisture-laden air and again became active (OEP 1969). Late Tuesday
August 19, the tropical depression produced torrential rainfall that caused flash
floods and landslides along the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge Mountains
and record flooding in Virginia's James River watershed (USACE 1970).
The heavy rains began about 7 p.m. on August 19 and continued without a
decrease in intensity for the next eight hours. By 10 p.m., a band of rain and
thunderstorms some 40 to 50 miles wide extended in a general east-west
orientation from the vicinity of White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, to
Fredericksburg, Virginia (Figure 9). Around midnight, the low-pressure center
intensified as it moved eastward into Virginia along a track south of Roanoke
and Lynchburg (ESSA, 1969b). Rainfall to the north and east of the
low-pressure center increased rapidly along the western slopes of the Blue
Ridge Mountains, with more than 10 inches accumulating at Clifton Forge,
Virginia. The rainfall continued to intensify on the eastern slopes of the Blue
Ridge Mountains until it reached catastrophic proportions (ESSA, 1969b).
The rains, flash floods, and rain-induced landslides accompanying the storm's
passage led to the worst natural disaster ever to strike Virginia (Figure 10).
Most of the residents of the mountain hollows, hamlets, and towns were asleep
during the fatal hours of the storm. Little warning was possible -- only one
report of excessive rain was received by the Weather Bureau during the night
from a cooperative observer (DeAngelis 1969). Rapidly rising streams and
landslides caused by the rainfall not only destroyed homes as the occupants
slept, but communication lines and roads were destroyed, preventing
downstream inhabitants from being alerted. Large uprooted trees acted as
battering rams, crashing through houses and overturning automobiles.
As of September 8, 1969, the state had counted 107 dead and 102 injured.
The majority of death and damages occurred in Nelson County, Virginia. Of
the 313 houses destroyed, 250 were located in Nelson County. Of the 415
houses suffering major damage, 225 of these were located in this county. Of
the 153 people dead or missing in Virginia, 126 were residents of Nelson
County ?a little more than 1 percent of the county's population; 54 people were
killed along a 4-mile stretch of Davis Creek and Huffman's Hollow (DeAngelis
1969). Communications, including roads, were completely destroyed in many
communities (Figure 11). After the flood, only one highway in Virginia was
intact. Some 133 bridges were destroyed or damaged, and 25 miles of primary
and 175 miles of secondary roads were obliterated, with damages totaling $19
million (DeAngelis 1969).
By Wednesday afternoon, the storm moved off the Atlantic coast east of
Norfolk and regained tropical-storm intensity (USACE 1970). By Friday August
22, it merged with a frontal system and lost its identity as a tropical storm some
175 miles southeast of Cape Race, Newfoundland, and quietly drifted out to
sea, leaving in its wake billions of dollars in damages and more than 250 dead
(USACE 1970).
Economic Damages
Hurricane Camille caused significant damage to much of the United States
Gulf Coast and Virginia. The most severely damaged areas (Figure 12)
included the southeastern portion of Louisiana, including Plaquemines and St.
Bernard Parishes, the entire Mississippi Gulf Coast, and the southwestern
portion of Alabama along the Gulf. Additional damage occurred well inland
from the coast in all three Gulf states. In Virginia, significant rainfall produced
catastrophic flooding in the James River Basin. Hancock, Harrison, and
Jackson Counties of Mississippi, and Mobile and Baldwin Counties of Alabama,
suffered the most severe damage and garnered the most in-depth evaluation
following the storm.
Economic impacts can be summarized in three areas: immediate damages,
relief costs, and recovery costs. The immediate damages included damage to
homes, cars, personal belongings, and roads, as a result of the wind or water
associated with the storm during its landfall and overland stages. Relief costs
encompass the efforts put forth by various federal and non-federal agencies to
provide emergency services such as housing in the months following the storm.
Recovery costs are more long-term than immediate damages or relief costs.
These costs include the loss of taxable property value and tax revenue due to
depressed economic development. Recovery costs may also include the value
of funds provided to rebuild farms, roads, homes, and industries. These three
areas of impact do not include overlapping costs. When totaled they provide
an assessment of the economic impact of Hurricane Camille. Of course, not all
damages are accounted for with economic losses, e.g., psychological impacts
or environmental damages.
The direct and immediate damages from Hurricane Camille are shown in
Tables 2 and 3. They were generated from information gathered during an
in-depth examination by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of the coastal
district in the days immediately following landfall (USACE 1970). The Army
compiled a comprehensive damage record incurred to the coastal counties
within the Mobile District. Their report does not document damage in Louisiana,
Virginia, or inland counties within Mississippi and Alabama. Other counties had
significant damages, but a detailed breakdown is not available. The damages
suffered by those regions excluded from the Engineers report are included in
the aggregate totals for the states or Districts.
The tables provide a summary of damages, divided by categories, to the five
primary counties. These damages are divided into those which occurred either
inside or outside of the flooded area. The total cost of the relief effort is
included in Table 2. The total statewide damage cost to Louisiana and Virginia
is also included in Table 2.
Recovery Costs
Recovery costs include the financial impact to local governments from loss of
revenue, drop in property value of tracts located along the beachfront, building
permit fees, and the temporal lag following the storm. Many of these costs take
place over several years or decades. Some examples of community specific
costs, from Leyden's Recovery and Reconstruction after Hurricane Camille,
are outlined below.




Removal of storm-damaged property from tax rolls in Harrison County
pushed total municipal revenues $3.7 million below operating expenses
in a two-year period following Hurricane Camille
30% of taxable property was lost in the community of Long Beach, and
70% was lost in Pass Christian.
Total loss of tax revenue in Pass Christian was $5 million.
Assessed value of property in Long Beach dropped 23% from
1969-1970 to 1970-1971.
Assessed Property Value
1969-1970
1970-1971
1971-1972
$11,911,910 $9,165,940 $12,397,620


Building permit fees in Gulfport increased by 347% during 1969-1970.
Estimated Federal disaster relief funds totaled $750 million. These
costs reflect the structural damage suffered by the Mississippi and
Alabama Gulf Coast.
By totaling the results from Tables 2 and 3, a total cost value for Hurricane
Camille is determined to be $1.122 billion (1969 dollars), which compares to
the National Weather Service's official cost value of $1.420 billion. The
discrepancy between total cost values may occur for a number of reasons: The
Engineers' report does not provide complete data for Mobile and Baldwin
Counties. The damages to Louisiana are reported as a lump sum incurred in
the New Orleans 揇 istrict" (USACE 1970, p. 74). The geographical area of
that district may affect the cost value given for the state. Another significant
discrepancy may be the exclusion of Florida damage values. The map of the
county impact area includes flood damage to two Florida counties, Escambia
and Santa Rosa. Yet, no Florida damage values are included in any economic
impact statement for Hurricane Camille.
Structural Damage
On Monday, August 18, 1969, survivors emerged from shelters and observed
skeletal foundations and remnants of buildings left by the storm (Figure 13).
Residents of Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, returned to see all traces of
civilization removed by a massive tidal surge washing over the Mississippi
River levees (ESSA, 1969a). In the community of Buras along the Mississippi,
six structures remained standing in an area where 6000 people had previously
made their homes.
Hurricane Camille caused incredible damage to the buildings and structures
along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, particularly to the waterfront areas of
Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties. Damage in the Mississippi Delta
area was caused primarily by high water from the Gulf of Mexico. Some wind
damage was evident, but the effects were secondary to the damage resulting
from wind-driven waves on the surface of the storm surge (Criswell and
Cummins 1970, p. 16). The most intense damage from Camille was sustained
in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, and in the first several blocks inland along a
27-mile segment of shore between St. Louis Bay and Biloxi Bay. Many
structures were completely leveled along certain sections of the coast (Figure
14). Based on Red Cross survey data, the impact of Hurricane Camille on
property in Mississippi and Louisiana is summarized below (OEP 1969, p. 79):
5,662 homes destroyed
13,915 homes with major damage
33,933 homes with minor damage
1,082 mobile homes destroyed
621 mobile homes with major damage
775 farm buildings destroyed
2,289 farm buildings with major damage
679 small businesses destroyed or with
major damage
In addition, 32 boats were destroyed or severely damaged; at least five
trucking terminals were completely destroyed, with damage to highways,
bridges, railways and waterways running into millions of dollars (ESSA, 1969a).
The port of Gulfport was almost completely destroyed, with at least 94 vessels
sunk or grounded in the Mississippi River (Figures 15 and 16). Oil rigs
foundered, pipelines were smashed, and land bases were destroyed.
Enormous agricultural losses in crops, timberland, tung, pecan, and orange
trees occurred, with some 5,000 head of cattle drowned (ESSA, 1969a). The
majority of the damage to structures occurred in an area parallel to the
Mississippi Gulf Coast and extending inland up to several blocks.
The extent of damage along the coast depended largely on local topography;
some areas having greater elevation, were less exposed than others. Due to
the circulation of Camille, the wind in the coastal areas changed direction
numerous times. This change was partially responsible for the appearance of
complete destruction in certain coastal areas. The tidal rise and wave action
came from the south to southeast (Criswell and Cummins 1970, p. 17). The
upper extent of vigorous wave action could be seen on tree trunks; the bark
was torn off the seaward side of many trees at a height of 12 to 15 feet
(Criswell and Cummins 1970, p. 18). The most heavily damaged areas along
the Mississippi Gulf Coast included the Pass Christian vicinity, parts of Long
Beach, and local waterfront areas between Biloxi and Gulfport (Criswell and
Cummins 1970, p. 17) (Figure 17).
The coastal area along U.S. Highway 90 sustained significant damage (Figure
18). This area had previously been built up with a variety of construction types,
including many large, old residences and several multistory hotels, motels, and
apartments, as well as gasoline stations, restaurants, and retail stores
(Criswell and Cummins 1970, p. 18). Many of the motels and apartments were
completely leveled. Some of the older multistory buildings remained standing,
although they sustained extensive damage to the lower stories. The first floors
of many of the buildings, except for the framework, were completely
demolished due to high water and the pounding of waves.
The downtown area of Gulfport and inland coastal areas had only relatively
small amounts of structural damage. Some windows and signs were broken in
the downtown area of Gulfport, and many first-floor areas suffered significant
water damage (Criswell and Cummins 1970, p. 18). Other areas within
Gulfport suffered window damage and destroyed roofs. Isolated pockets of
residences inland were heavily damaged, with some homes leveled.
Building Codes
In the region affected by Camille, some modifications had been made to
building standards following the severe hurricanes of Audrey (1957) and Betsy
(1965). These preparatory measures included the 搊 pen beaches" decision
which maintained an artificial sand beach south of Highway 90 and the seawall.
Biloxi had enforced a local building code since a particularly severe hurricane
caused significant damage in 1911. In 1965, after another major hurricane,
Biloxi, Gulfport, and Long Beach adopted the Southern Standard Building
Code. In addition, an informal standard of 10 feet above mean sea level was
used as a guide by architects and the Federal Housing Authority as a criteria
for mortgages (Leyden 1985). Despite these measures, a uniform building
code with hurricane-related stipulations had not been adopted by the coastal
counties. Had a code been implemented in the years before Hurricane Camille,
the damages would have been less.
For the entire length of the Mississippi coast extending three to four blocks
inland, the destruction from Hurricane Camille was almost complete.
Residences, motels, apartments, restaurants, and other buildings were swept
off their foundations, demolished, and deposited in piles of scrap lumber and
rubble together with fallen trees, smashed automobiles, and grounded boats
(USACE 1970, p. 65) (Figure 19). Only a stairway remained from a house
designed by a local architect to be 揾 urricane proof". The designer's body and
those of several of his friends who had attempted to wait out the storm in his
house were found 45 days later (Leyden 1985, p. 4). The survival of various
structures depended largely upon design and materials used for construction.
Some types of structures withstood the wind and water impacts far greater
than others.
Many commercial buildings and apartment complexes along the Gulf Coast
were constructed with masonry block structure. These structures generally did
not withstand the water and wind (Criswell and Cummins 1970, p. 19). A large
number of buildings collapsed totally with little evidence remaining to indicate
the original appearance of the structure. (Figure 20). Light steel or concrete
frame buildings were adequate; often the frame was still standing, but the walls
and roof had collapsed. Heavier frame and masonry structures, such as
multistory hotels in downtown areas, sustained only superficial damage to
windows, signs, and awnings. Nearly all piers and boat docks along the Gulf
Coast were completely destroyed (Criswell and Cummins 1970, p. 22). Piling
is generally all that remained of the piers. However, the seawall extending
along US Highway 90 sustained little damage. Levees were breached or
washed out in many areas on the Mississippi River (Criswell and Cummins
1970, p. 22).
Many concrete and steel structures collapsed, whereas the less rigid wooden
structures were more successful. The topography had a large influence on
wooden frame buildings. Those that were more exposed were often leveled or
destroyed (Criswell and Cummins 1970, p. 20). The older wooden buildings
were better constructed, and so functioned as a unit, whereas the
unconsolidated masonry structures collapsed (Zornig and Sherwood 1969, p.
14). The design mechanisms utilized in construction of the older wooden
buildings also paid closer attention to structural integrity of the materials they
were using. This in turn created buildings with very high safety factors (Criswell
and Cummins 1970, p. 20).
III. Response
Federal, State and Local Response
Throughout the day immediately following the storm, many agencies and
volunteer groups aided the thousands of residents whose homes were
destroyed or severely damaged. Thousands of displaced persons were
provided shelter, food, clothing, and medicine by various federal, state, and
local agencies and by donations through relief organizations (USACE 1970, p.
32). These actions are summarized in Table 4.
On August 19, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) announced that
the President had declared portions of Mississippi and Louisiana to be major
disaster areas and therefore eligible for federal disaster relief funds. OEP then
took over the coordination of the numerous relief agencies and instructed the
Mobile District to begin the process of cleanup of debris and temporary repairs
to the public facilities not included within the federal jurisdiction (USACE 1970,
p. 71). There were 8 agencies involved extensively in the post-storm relief
process, and 17 other agencies who were involved to a lesser extent. The
activities of the eight major agencies are described below; the response of all
involved agencies outlined in Table 4.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided mobile
homes to house the victims as soon as authority was given. Despite difficulties
in transportation, failure of suppliers, problems of site clearance, and
restoration of water and sewage services, about 5,000 mobile homes were
delivered (USACE 1970, p. 71). Victims of the storm began moving in one
week after Camille hit. Over 3,000 of the mobile homes delivered were used in
Mississippi.
The Department of Defense contributed greatly to the relief process, with a
total of 16,500 military personnel from numerous divisions (OEP 1969, p. 9).
The Army aided in helicopter rescue operations removing people from
locations cut off from all other access. Army personnel also brought
much-needed food, medical supplies, and potable water for the thousands of
displaced people. Battalions cleared 575 miles of roads and removed more
than 37,000 tons of debris (OEP 1969, p. 10). The Army Corps of Engineers
alone removed 1 ?million tons of debris by mid-November, culminating a $49
million (1969 US dollars) operation (OEP 1969, p. 13).
The Department of the Treasury responded quickly to the financial concerns
and demands of the communities affected by the hurricane. Emergency offices,
at a cost of $20,000 (1969 dollars), were established to disburse checks to
those receiving rehabilitation loans. Through December 10, 1969, 75,000
checks were delivered, totaling $25 million (1969 dollars) in rehabilitation loans
(OEP 1969, p. 5). The Treasury also allowed redemption of savings bonds in
advance of the normal waiting period. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
distributed information on casualty deductions, offered assistance and
counseling, and arranged for speedy refunds to special claims in the 1970
filing period (OEP 1969, p. 7).
The Community Relations Service (CRS), a division of the Department of
Justice, acted as a vital link between the survivors and the available resources
arriving in the affected area. CRS placed 400 emergency telephone calls
between survivors and concerned family members throughout the rest of the
country and world. Employees of CRS acquired, stored, and distributed 30-50
tons of bedding that survived the storm in the Hotel Biloxi (OEP 1969, p. 20).
CRS also arranged for storage and distribution of 40,000 textbooks donated by
New York School Districts (OEP 1969, p. 21). In addition, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation assisted the coroner in the processing of 30 unidentified
victims.
The Department of Agriculture responded immediately to the growing pest
problem which developed following the hurricane. The Plant Pest Control
Division (PPC) was called upon to mitigate growing numbers of mosquitoes
and flies, but the lack of phone lines obstructed communication between
outside agencies and the PPC. The home telephone of the PPC administrator
provided a key link between Gulfport and the outside world. Fire ants moving
from flooded areas to higher grounds became a major problem, stinging
survivors, rescue workers, and invading homes. Over 2.5 million US $ (1969
dollars) of emergency conservation funds were allocated to rehabilitate
farmlands and replace damaged conservation structures (OEP 1969, p. 30). In
addition, as of November 28, 1969, the Farmers Home Administration had
approved 353 out of 661 emergency loan applications from Mississippi farmers,
totaling almost 3 million dollars (OEP, 1969, pg 32).
The Department of Commerce was closely involved with the plans for
economic rehabilitation of damaged communities. The Economic Development
Administration (EDA) did extensive economic planning and development work
to deal with the sudden rise in unemployment, as well as to plan and
coordinate the redevelopment following the hurricane. Following the hurricane,
some 28 public works and business loan projects totaling $30 million (1969
dollars) had been identified for further consideration for EDA assistance (OEP
1969, p. 37). Immediately following Hurricane Camille, the Weather Bureau
with the Department of Defense began a study of ways to better predict the
direction and intensity of hurricanes. This study was spurred by Vice President
Agnew's statement that Hurricane Camille forecasting may have been
inadequate.
The Department of Health furnished more than $ 4 million in materials,
services, and funds to the stricken areas (OEP 1969, p. 42). Cots, blankets,
typhoid vaccines, and other medications were supplied to the survivors. The
Food and Drug Administration spent more than 1500 man hours surveying the
Mississippi food establishments to ensure safety and proper health codes. The
Health Department also brought in temporary classrooms to aid the 21 local
school districts which received damage from the hurricane.
The American Red Cross played a key role in providing some semblance of
comfort and accommodations to the displaced people. Shelters for 85,000
people were established prior to the storm. Relief centers manned by
volunteers were accessible after the storm to provide financial assistance and
services such as food stamp disbursement to the victims. In total, 913
volunteers and 805 professional staff members were assigned to the affected
area (OEP 1969, p. 79). Red Cross personnel questioned the survivors for an
inventory of deaths, damages, and to determine what assistance was
necessary. The cumulative Red Cross relief operation totaled almost 15 million
US $ (1969 dollars) (OEP 1969, p. 82).
Mitigation
The damages caused by Hurricane Camille have been examined by several
people in the interest of reducing the vulnerability of the coastal counties
(Leyden 1985; Godschalk et al. 1989; Metasystems 1970; Petak and Atkisson
1982; Black 1970; Dikkers et al. 1971). Prior to Hurricane Camille, many of the
Gulf Coast communities did not have any planning or zoning in place. The
development and building practices in existence at the time of Camille had
been greatly influenced by the gradual uncontrolled and disorganized growth
which had taken place in the coastal communities for the previous 100 years
(Leyden 1985). Many buildings existed in areas vulnerable to possible storm
surge. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) had very recently been
passed and was in its infant stages of implementation. Therefore, no
properties were covered under this plan. Of the total damages resulting from
Hurricane Camille, only 20% were covered by existing flood insurance (Leyden
1985, p. 32).
Many of the buildings were poorly constructed to withstand the high winds and
wave action natural to hurricanes. Leyden (1985) found that conventional
construction of any type proved to be inadequate to resist the storm surge and
accompanying wave action. Evacuation routes had been planned, but in
Harrison County many extended over low-lying bridges which were eventually
inundated by the high waters of Camille. Coastal Highway 90 was flooded to
depths of 12 feet, and both the Biloxi-Ocean Springs Bridge and the Pass
Christian-Bay St. Louis Bridge were washed out (USACE 1970). In addition,
only 50% of inhabitants (50,000) evacuated (USACE 1970). This left a large
portion of the coastal population at risk in their own homes or shelters (15,562
in emergency shelters, 50,000 stayed at home) (USACE 1970).
A massive rebuilding effort took place in the months and years following the
hurricane. Ironically, hurricane mitigation was not a key thought to those
rebuilding immediately after Camille. A need for structures to live and work out
of led to a rapid rebuilding effort. The same characteristics which led to
absolute destruction of homes and businesses were repeated in the months
immediately following the hurricane. Confusion immediately following Camille
allowed unregulated repairs and rebuilding. Building permits were initially
waived, then a non-uniform moratorium was imposed, then lifted again, prior to
the new building code being in place (Godschalk et al.1989, p. 59). Once the
new building code was imposed it helped raise Gulfport revenues from building
permit fees by 347% in 1969-1970 (Leyden 1985, p. 31).
The building code was not enforced in many locations where previously poor
construction led to complete destruction of homes. The implementation of the
code was adopted by municipalities at various times throughout 1969 and
1970. Leyden (1985) remarked that the inability of people involved in the
development of the code and the regional enforcement scheme contributed to
the inefficiency of, and lack of acceptance for, the program. Godschalk et al.
(1989) proposes that 揳 ll new structures built within the affected counties
must meet a lateral wind force standard equivalent to three times that of the
1973 Universal Building Code."
The rebuild of the Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama Gulf Coast following
Hurricane Camille could have acted as an impetus to develop a coastal
community development plan allowing for economic growth and resurgence,
and guaranteeing preparedness in the event of a repeat storm of equal
magnitude. Rather than supporting unchecked growth with no regard for future
hazard mitigation, development could have been steered in a direction that
was conscious of the vulnerability of local residents and communities. Hazard
mitigation policies might have been adopted at the county or state level,
thereby eliminating the discrepancy in level of preparedness between coastal
municipalities.
Leyden (1985) found that the introduction of development management by
regional authorities and the state and federal governments was politically
unpopular, but 揷 rucial to the acceptance of even the barest minimum of land
use regulation after the storm." Leyden also proposed that legislation which
enables states might have improved planning to the affected counties.
Hurricane Camille decimated buildings at Henderson Point with waves up to
22.4 feet above mean sea level. Yet, in 1984 a 69-unit condominium project
was built on land leveled during Hurricane Camille at Henderson Point (Leyden
1985, p. 73). This project is built as a replica of the old Biloxi Yacht Club on the
south side of Highway 90 in a location where the original building was washed
away by Hurricane Camille.
Godschalk et al. (1989) recommended that new waterfront construction be
restricted only to water-dependent uses. In addition, he suggested that the
existing uses on the Gulf side of Highway 90 be designated as non-conforming,
in order to bring about their eventual elimination. Many municipalities along the
Gulf Coast have showed some support for movement away from development
concentrated upon the coast. Commercial and residential building records for
Harrison County indicated a shift in development to the northern, non-hazard
areas of the county following Camille (Godschalk et al. 1989, p. 59). Prior to
Camille, Biloxi acquired 45 parcels of beachfront property in an area
designated at that time by the city for an urban renewal project. In September
1969, following destruction of this area by Camille, and motivated by the dire
and immediate need to provide ample low-income housing, the property was
discussed and a contractor hired to create a neighborhood redevelopment
plan. On the same evening that the redevelopment study was granted, Biloxi
approved a 198-unit, 13-story high rise apartment on the waterfront
immediately adjacent to the urban renewal land (Leyden 1985).
Other proposals include allowing no further growth on the 50-year floodplain
after 1980 (Petak and Atkisson 1982). Since 1980, the communities of Gulfport,
Long Beach, Pass Christian, and Biloxi have implemented floodplain
ordinances that allow construction within the floodplain but require all projects
to comply with the minimum elevation and flood proofing requirements of the
Federal Insurance Administration and the Federal Emergency Management
Association (Leyden 1985, p. 64). Limiting the growth on the floodplain is
targeted at reducing the growth of property and people vulnerable to a storm
surge.
Godschalk et al. (1989) suggests limiting the allowable density in high hazard
areas, including the down-zoning of multi-family areas. After Camille, many
residential areas were rezoned for commercial use. The two causes for this
rezoning were: the opportunity to enlarge the municipalities' sorely depleted
tax base, and the argument that land parcels under eight feet of water during
Camille were not suitable for the higher-priced homes that the typical large lot
size dictated (Leyden 1985, p. 62). Much of the beachfront property zoned
after Camille to remain as open beach in 損 ublic use" has been manipulated
to the degree where 損 ublic use" now includes marinas, amusement parks,
zoos, circuses, carnivals, sports venues, and so forth.
IV. Lessons Learned
This review of Hurricane Camille supports the notion that we as a society have
learned a great deal about how to respond to hurricanes. Pielke and Pielke
(1997) provided a list of ten important lessons from hurricanes. These lessons
are repeated here and discussed in the context of Camille.
1. Hurricanes, (generally called tropical cyclones) are the most costly
natural disaster in the United States (and worldwide).
Hurricane Camille, at the time, was called the most costly natural disaster ever
to occur. The same was said of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. In aggregate, only
large earthquakes have the damage potential that a storm like Camille
presents to developed coastal locations. This is true not only in the U.S., but
around the world as well.
2. Hurricane damages in the United States have risen dramatically during
an extended period of hurricane quiescence.
After Camille, it was 20 years until another storm of Category 4 strength (much
less Category 5) hit the US (Hugo). During this time, tremendous growth
occurred along the nation's coasts. Pielke and Landsea (1998) estimate that
Camille would cause more than $11 billion in damages were it to occur in 1998,
which is dwarfed by the estimated $80 billion in damages that a recurrence of
the 1926 Great Miami Hurricane would cause in 1998. A direct hit of a storm
like Camille on Miami or New Orleans could exceed even this large amount.
3. A large loss of life is still possible in the United States.
Camille occurred when there were many fewer people in vulnerable coastal
locations. Consider that only 150,000 people were ordered to evacuate during
Camille's approach, this compares with more than 750,000 ordered to
evacuate when Andrew approached south Florida in 1992. Inhabitants along
the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts are fortunate in that hurricane watches and
warnings are readily available, as are shelters and well-conceived evacuation
routes. However, this should not give reason for complacency -- the hurricane
problem cannot be said to be solved. Disaster planners have developed a
number of scenarios that result in a large loss of life here in the United States.
For instance, imagine a situation of gridlock as evacuees seek to flee the
Florida Keys on the only available road. Or imagine New Orleans, with much of
the city below sea level, suffering the brunt of a storm like Camille, resulting in
tremendous flooding to that low-lying city. Scenarios such as these require
constant attention to saving lives. Because the nature of the hurricane problem
is constantly changing as society changes, the hurricane problem can never
be said to be solved.
4. Tropical cyclone forecasts (seasonal and of intensity and landfall) can
continue to improve; however, societal benefits associated with them
depend upon using them effectively.
Forecasters have come a long way since Camille. Forecasters can show great
improvements in forecasts over the past 30 years. But achieving benefits from
improved forecasts will remain a challenging task. Consider that at the same
time that hurricane forecasts have become more accurate, the actual length of
coastline warned per storm by the National Hurricane Center (NHC) has
increased from less than 300 nautical miles (nm) in the late 1960s to about 400
nm over the past ten years. According to the authors of a recent paper that
documented the increase in miles-of-coast warned, Jerry Jarrell (current NHC
Director) and Mark DeMaria, 搕 he increase is somewhat surprising, because,
since 1970 . . . official NHC track forecasts have been decreasing at about 1%
per year. They speculate that the improvement in track forecasts has instead
translated into longer lead time, which has increased from about 18 hours to
24 hours, from the time the first warning is issued to the time that the storm's
center crosses the coast. But there are other possible explanations as well,
including (a) the desire of emergency managers (and elected officials) to base
evacuation decisions on the NHC warnings, and thus request warnings be
extended to cover their communities; (b) a desire throughout the evacuation
decision process to avoid the error of a strike on an unwarned population,
(thus, the forecast improvement could have translated into lower risk); and (c)
the fact that more and more people inhabit the coast, meaning that evacuation
times are much larger, making necessary longer lead times and greater
lengths of coastline warned. Unfortunately, in spite of the existence of these
hypotheses, it has not been convincingly demonstrated why the
coastline-warned-per-storm has increased during a period of decreasing
forecast errors. Given the large costs involved with overwarning, both in
unnecessary preparations and in potential public response, it would seem to
be in the best interests of forecasters, policy officials, and the general public to
obtain a greater understanding the use of hurricane forecasts.
5. The climate varies on all measurable time scales.
Hurricanes have occurred with different frequencies over time. A storm like
Camille is indeed a rare event. But a storm like Camille can ?and will ?occur
again. The only question is where and when. Therefore, as scientists work
diligently to better understand the nature of hurricane climatology, it is
important for decision makers to understand that their experiences might not
be representative of the future climate. The next decades could be quiet, or
they could be active. Are we prepared for hurricane variability?
6. Recent trends in hurricane frequencies and intensities are not
evidence of global warming, and there is considerable reason to better
prepare for hurricanes independent of concern about global warming.
The phrase "global warming" refers to the possibility that the earth's climate
may change because human activities are altering the composition of the
atmosphere. Scientists first raised this possibility more than a century ago, and
in recent decades policymakers have begun to express concern about the
possibility of climate change. Hurricane are often mentioned as a future
consequence of climate change.
Does one need to rely on concerns about global warming to motivate improved
hurricane preparedness? No. On the contrary, there are many reasons for the
public and policy makers to have an increasing concern about the impacts of
hurricanes; and this concern is independent of the global warming hypothesis.
Given the extensive social and demographic changes since the period of
relatively high hurricane incidence earlier this century, it is not only important
but imperative to ask whether our current hurricane preparation and response
strategies would stand up should the high incidence of landfall along the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts return. Before asking if we are prepared for the future,
we ought to ask if we are prepared even for past known events and climate
fluctuations. The future is uncertain, the recent past, however, is certain. The
thirtieth anniversary of Camille's impact provides a convenient opportunity to
ask such a question.
Once we consider ourselves "prepared for the past," - so to speak, - we can
seek additional proactive improvements for the future. While analysis based on
global warming remains inconclusive, history tells us with some degree of
certainty that the incidence of hurricanes will eventually increase. What will we
do if the next several decades were to witness the hurricane activity of the
1940s and 1950s?
7. Tropical cyclone landfalls highlight the existing level of societal
preparedness.
Hurricane Camille, like every storm, provides a real-world test of the existing
level of preparedness. Without exception, each storm reveals areas where
society could have been better prepared or, less vulnerable. If we are to
identify those actions needed to improve a community's preparation for
hurricane impacts, then we must focus attention on ways to ascertain a
community's exposure before a hurricane strikes. This means that we must
support efforts to grapple with the messy and challenging task of assessment
of hurricane preparedness. Instead of relying on a storm to show us how well
we are doing, we could take on this challenge as a 揷 ost of doing business"
and perhaps over the long run reduce our vulnerability to hurricanes.
8. Short-term decisions are based upon decision processes developed
over the long term.
When a hurricane makes landfall, it results in extreme disruption to affected
communities. Lines of communication, power, transportation, and other
infrastructure will likely be severed. People will face dislocation and, in worst
case scenarios, injuries and possible death. In contrast to the normal pace of
community decision making, the situation is complicated further by the relative
speed with which a hurricane appears and makes landfall. Consequently,
there is little time for careful consideration of alternative courses of action, and
there might be tendencies for snap decisions without reasoned assessment of
the possible consequences.
For all of these reasons, societal responses to hurricanes made in the face of
an approaching storm and in its immediate aftermath are most effective when
they are based upon decision processes developed over the long term.
With Camille, the preparations for the event and the response were based on
processes put in place long before the storm made landfall. Coordination
between government agencies as well as with state and local officials was
enhanced because of preexisting plans. Experience with other storms, such as
Andrew in 1992, shows that coordination is an ongoing challenge. Attention to
the health of hurricane decision process can help to ensure that when an event
does occur, preparations result in effective decisions.
9. Better knowledge of hurricanes, by itself, is generally not sufficient for
behavior change.
Just because society has 搇 earned a lesson" does not mean that the lesson
will be implemented. Indeed, many of the lessons to be gleaned from the
experience with Hurricane Camille were also learned in the aftermath of
Andrew. Lessons gleaned from experience with past disasters are central to
proactive action. Without fail, in the aftermath of every hurricane's impact,
general lessons for coping with hurricanes are drawn, but typically are soon
forgotten, only to have to be relearned by another community (and sometimes
in the same community) in the aftermath of the next hurricane. The difficulty in
learning lessons is vividly underscored, as in the aftermath of Camille when
land developers and home owners rebuilt in vulnerable locations. One element
in motivating proactive action with respect to hurricanes is a solid foundation of
knowledge of the lessons of experience. Of course, also necessary is the
dedication of people and communities who have the foresight and will to act
before a storm strikes.
The final lesson is that "society knows, in large part, how to respond to
hurricanes." One of the most frustrating aspects of society's response to
hurricanes (and natural hazards more generally) is the realization that in many
cases society currently knows enough to take effective actions to reduce its
vulnerabilities. Hurricane Camille revealed many lessons that are as important
today as they were 30 years ago. As the nation continues to increase its
vulnerability to hurricanes it will be more and more important to take the
knowledge that has been gained from research and experience and to turn it
into practical action. As Camille showed, the stakes are high.