Colombia’s Struggle: Implications of Civil War on Regional and Domestic
Policy
By Vaughn Hester
EDGE Fall 2003
Armed insurgents and guerilla warfare are by no means unique
occurrences, especially not in Latin America’s weak democracies with high
instances of social inequality. In this regard, Colombia’s civil war is not to
be considered an unusual or special chapter in Latin American history.
However, the combination of Colombia’s violent history in the context of
the development of the political “South” and the current political status in
South America has led to a situation by which domestic violence may
indeed make or break Colombia’s chances for a stable, prosperous
political and economic future. This paper intends to examine to origins of
Colombia’s tradition of violence and the implications that the civil war is
having on the nation’s domestic and regional politics.
A Precedent of Violence
Colombia is a nation nestled on South America’s northern Pacific
coast between Venezuela and Ecuador. Its population is approximately 42
million, making it the 3rd most populous country in Latin America behind
Brazil and Mexico. In economic terms, however, Colombia ranks 5th in
terms of domestic wealth. It has perennially been plagued by problems of
corruption, political turmoil, and of course, violence.
The violent conflict began decades ago and stemmed from problems
of socioeconomic inequality. Complaints over social inequality and unfair
patterns of land ownership began as early as the colonial regime, when the
lifestyle in Colombia was dominated by the encomienda and hacienda
systems. Rigid class structures emerged and the socioeconomic divide
widened. Rural poor workers were excluded from all forms of political
participation and social inclusion and thus took up arms to revolt against
their patriarchal oppressors. These violent methods of resolving social
conflicts became the norm. Violence was also used by landlords in their
intraclass disputes, and a failing justice system could do little to curtail this
pattern. 1
Historically, the military has occupied an extremely important and
powerful role in Colombian politics and affairs. Beginning in the early
decades of Colombia’s independence, the military was seen as a
wonderful opportunity for members of the lower and middle classes to gain
and education and ascend the social ladder into the ranks of the political
elites who controlled the nation’s resources. The military also began to
gain a considerable amount of political power, gaining concessions and
benefits through calculated negotiations with the government, rather than
through the use of force. The military retained this powerful yet covert
political role for decades, heeding the poor examples of neighbors Brazil
and Argentina and strategically avoiding a transformation into a military
1
Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia 12-14.
regime. 2 However, as insurgent movements grew more violent, the armed
forces were required to increase the level of force they used in order to
maintain the peace and stability. The evolution of conflict through the 20th
century has been fostered by a sense of acceptance of violence as an
answer to political or social wrongdoings in Colombia, and this unspoken
permission for violence continues today.
The Modern Political System
The current political system of Colombia could best be described as
democratic yet unstably so. Since the 1990s, Colombia’s presidents have
been plagued by high levels of turmoil and turnover within their
administrations, as well as accusations of scandals. Ernesto Samper, who
won the presidential election in 1994, was accused of and nearly
impeached for allowing contributions to his presidential campaign from the
drug cartels. Around this same time, in 1995 and again in 1997, the United
States decertified Colombia’s efforts in the war on drugs. Guerilla activity
during this time was rampant, as the groups began to kidnap soldiers and
policemen in an effort to capitalize on Samper’s weakness.3
In 1998 the U.S. reinstated its certification conditionally just before
2 Richani 20-30.
the new president, Andrés Pastrana, was elected. Shortly after taking
office, Pastrana initiated a demilitarized zone (DMZ) by ordering the army
to retreat from five municipalities in the southwest region of the country
and also began peace talks with the FARC (see page 4). During
Pastrana’s administration, relations with the U.S. were further improved
when he visited Washington D.C. In the spring of 1999, the U.S. certified
Colombia in full, and the Colombian government and the FARC solidified
an agenda for the peace talks. 4
In 2000, a major scandal in the Colombian congress erupted, and
President Pastrana proposed to dissolve the legislature, which in turn
created a possible constitutional crisis. He later withdrew this threat and
attempted to restore governability by inviting come members of the Partido
Liberal (PL) to join his cabinet. The PL and its opposition, the PSC (Partido
Social Conservador), are the two dominant parties today in Colombian
politics. The following year, peace talks with the FARC broke down and
evidences of grave abuses within the demilitarized zone arose. Violence of
the guerrilla conflict escalated greatly. The FARC murdeder the wife of the
attorney-general and blocked an important political demonstration as it was
moving to the DMZ. The presidential election race began in May 2002.
Alvaro Uribe, a PL candidate with independent platform issues, won.
3Economist Country Profile Colombia.
4Economist Country Profile Colombia.
Violence during and after his inauguration on August 7th of that year forced
him to declare a 90-day state of emergency and to press ahead with
radical policies to improve security.
5
President Alvaro Uribe’s time in office has to date been inconsistent.
Although he took office promising a hard line with regard to the guerillas,
the actual implementation of and results from these promises has been
patterned. No peace discussions have yielded notable results, violations of
human rights and general regulations have occurred within the
demilitarized zones, and violence is at a record high.
Guerrilla Groups
Guerrilla activity in Colombia today is relentless and gruesome.
Although the major organized groups have lost much of the political
motivations and agendas of days past, the violence is at an all-time high.
Additionally, the structure and methods of each group varies greatly. At
least 1/4th of the country is in control of these groups at any given time.
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is
currently the largest and most active guerilla group in the nation. One of
the world's oldest surviving insurgencies, and largest in the Americas, the
FARC was organized amid Cold War tensions of the mid-1960s, but its
5Economist Country Report Colombia.
origins date to the devastating civil war between rival political factions that
lasted from 1946 to 1964. During La Violencia, brutal gangs funded by
leaders among the Liberals and the Conservatives roamed the countryside
committing atrocities against civilians. Most sources estimate that between
200,000 and 300,000 people died.
"Resistance committees," or self-defense groups, were established
in some rural communities. Many ended up rebelling against the
government. During this period, some of the FARC's founding members
attempted to establish independent republics in rural Colombia, a
movement that by the mid-1960s had been suppressed by the Colombian
army. Between 1964 and 1966 Manuel Marulanda and other members of
the Communist Party of Colombia organized the FARC. Joining them were
noncommunist peasants, many of whom had been active during La
Violencia. Marulanda took the nom de guerre of Tirofijo, or "Sureshot." He
is now in his 70s and remains in charge.
The FARC, like many movements born in Central and South
American during that time, espoused a Marxist ideology. It reportedly
received funding and weapons from the Communist Party of Colombia
during its early years. At one point Cuba probably also provided training
and refuge. With the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s that aid
disappeared, and Cuban President Fidel Castro has since declared that
such armed struggles are no longer appropriate in Latin America. As it has
since its inception, the FARC still advocates widespread reforms and
redistribution of wealth in Colombia.6
The FARC was active throughout the 1960s and 1970s, staging
raids against government forces with mixed results. In the mid-1980s the
FARC declared a truce with the government and attempted to enter the
political mainstream by establishing a legal party called the Union
Patriotica, or UP. An estimated 3,500 UP members were killed, or
"disappeared," in the ensuing years, presumably by the government,
according to Rafael Pardo, president of the Bogota-based Milenio
Foundation and formerly Colombia's first civilian minister of defense.
Pardo, writing in the July/August 2000 Foreign Affairs Magazine, says the
UP killings "not only increased rebel suspicions but lowered the prospects
for the eventual creation of a democratic leftist political party."7
The FARC's cease-fire with the government ended in 1987. In the
1990s, following the breakup of the notorious Cali and Medellin cocaine
cartels and successful anti-drug operations in neighboring Peru and
Bolivia, coca-growing operations in the region shifted to remote southern
Colombia -- a FARC-controlled zone. FARC came to an understanding
with the drug operatives in FARC-controlled regions, imposing "taxes" on
them to finance its campaign against the government. Colombian officials
6 CNN.com
7 CNN.com
allege the FARC involved directly in the cultivation and trafficking of
cocaine and heroin. FARC leaders deny the allegation.8
U.S and Colombian officials estimate the FARC brings in hundreds
of millions of dollars a year from drug money. As much as 54 percent of
the FARC's funds may come from drugs, according to Jane's Intelligence
Review of June 2000, and 36 percent from other criminal activities such as
kidnapping and extortion. A recent TIME magazine article estimated the
FARC's drug take at $700 million annually. A report prepared by the U.S.
Congress says, however, the take may be as low as $30 million.
Shortly after his election in 1998 Colombian President Andres
Pastrana, in an attempt to bring the FARC to the negotiating table,
declared that a massive chunk of FARC-controlled rain forest in southern
Colombia would be a demilitarized zone. This despeje, or "clearance
zone," covers 42,000 square kilometers (16,800 square miles), an area the
size of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island combined. The
FARC now controls about 40 percent of Colombia -- including its safe
haven. Its troops are estimated to number about 15,000, according to
Jane's Intelligence Review of June 2000, and are better paid than their
Colombian army rivals. Formal peace talks between the government and
the FARC began in January 1999 but have yielded no concrete results.
Frustration within the Colombian government over the FARC is such that
8 CNN.com
Pastrana openly criticized it in a televised speech in July 2000:
"Despite the fact that we're seated at the negotiating table, the
insurgents insist on kidnapping ... destroying families and attacking
small defenseless townships in a clear and flagrant violation of
international law."9
The Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) is the second-largest
guerilla group, and it began in the mid-1960s, around the same time as the
FARC emerged. Founded by intellectuals and students who had studied in
Cuba and were influenced by Che Guevara, and joined by radical Catholic
clergy, the ELN posed a major threat to Colombia's military and
government for its first several years. In the 1970s, government antiguerrilla offensives reduced the ELN's to only several hundred combatants.
But it continued to harass the government--killing the army's inspector
general in the mid-1970s -- and to fund its actions through kidnappings and
bank robberies. The ELN initially refused to take part in peace talks in the
1980s -- a move criticized by Cuban President Fidel Castro. It later signed
a temporary truce with the government. ELN once trained in Cuba, but
such aid dried up when the Soviet Union collapsed, and Castro has since
distanced Cuba from such insurgencies, saying they are inappropriate in
Latin America.
The ELN is under intense pressure from the Colombian army and
paramilitaries. It also suffered a setback in 1998 when its longtime leader,
Spanish priest Manuel Perez, died. The ELN's principal role in Colombia's
power struggle now seems to be harassing and blackmailing the nation's
petroleum and energy industries. Since the early 1980s ELN has launched
hundreds of bombings of the nation's economically vital oil pipelines, and
lately has added power lines to its list of targets. Kidnappings, of course,
remain part of its repertoire. In April 1999, the ELN garnered international
headlines when it hijacked a domestic Avianca airliner over northeastern
Colombia, forced the plane to land in a remote area and kidnapped the 46
people on board. One month later ELN fighters raided a church service in
Cali and kidnapped more than 100 people. Most of the hostages were
released in the weeks following each incident, but as of July 2000 four
people from the airliner hijacking remain captive.
The ELN now has about 5,000 armed members. In April 2000, the
government announced the tentative creation of an ELN safe haven in oilrich northern Colombia -- a territory of about 5,000 square kilometers, or
3,125 square miles, slightly larger than New York's Long Island. "The ELN
... is unable to defeat the military through conventional means and must
rely on traditional guerrilla tactics," according to a recent commentary on
Stratfor.com, an intelligence-analysis Web site. "The ELN's real strength,
9 CNN.com
however, lies in its propensity for attacks on infrastructure. With Colombia's
flagging economy, giving the ELN access to an economically important
region allows the rebels to hold a knife to the nation's throat." In July 2000,
Colombian government and ELN negotiators met in Geneva, Switzerland,
for several days of talks mostly regarding the release of hostages being
held by the ELN. Representatives from Switzerland, Spain, France,
Norway and Cuba also attended the talks, which ended without any
agreement.10
Another guerrilla group that once was a main contender among the
large insurgent organizations but has recently transformed its structure
from a violent organization to a functioning political party is the M-19
(Movimiento 19 de Abril). The former guerrilla organization got its name
from the date of Colombia's 1970 presidential election that M-19 claims
was stolen from candidate and former dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla by
Conservative candidate Misael Pastrana Borrero. M-19 members were
notorious in the 1970s for their audacious acts -- stealing Simon Bolivar's
sword from a museum, killing a prominent labor leader, digging their way
into a Bogota arsenal and stealing weapons, and kidnapping guests from a
party at the Dominican Republic Embassy. By the start of the 1980s, M-19
was Colombia's most influential left-wing guerrilla groups. In 1982,
10 CNN.com
President Belisario Betancur offered an amnesty for all guerrilla groups
and began peace talks. Two years later guerrilla leaders and government
officials agreed to a cease-fire, but scattered fighting continued, and the
minister of justice was assassinated for trying to clamp down on the drug
trade.
In June 1985, M-19 left the peace talks, accusing the government of
continued harassment by the military and failure to make political reforms
promised under the truce. In November, M-19 guerrillas made international
headlines when they stormed the Palace of Justice in Bogota and took
scores of hostages. Betancur refused to negotiate, and 100 people were
killed, including 41 guerrillas and 11 Supreme Court judges, when troops
assaulted the building. Two years later, in 1987, M-19 joined with FARC,
ELN and other guerrilla groups to form a joint front called Coordinadora
Guerillera Simon Bolivar to negotiate with the government. In March 1989,
the government and M-19 signed an agreement in which M-19 promised to
demobilize in exchange for a full pardon for its members. M-19 also agreed
to reintegrate into Colombian society and form a political party. By March
1990, all M-19 guerrillas had surrendered their weapons and the group
became Alianza Democratica, or ADM-19, the M-19 Democratic Alliance, a
political party.
11
The Added Dimension of the Drug Trade
Drugs in Colombia are perhaps the greatest factor in the political and
social instability of the country. Colombia supplies an estimated 90 percent
of the cocaine and two-thirds of the heroin in the United States, according
to White House drug czar Barry McCaffrey. Despite increased anti-drug
efforts by the Colombian government, cocaine production has risen
dramatically over the past three years, according to the U.S. State
Department. The country now produces and distributes more cocaine than
any other country in the world and is a major supplier of heroin, a March
2000 State Department report says. Global sales of cocaine and heroin
add as much as $4 billion to Colombia's annual gross domestic product,
according to a report prepared by the U.S. Congress. If accurate, the figure
is just ahead of the $3.7 billion generated by petroleum exports and nearly
twice the amount attributed to coffee exports. Until recently, the bulk of the
Colombian drug trade was controlled by the highly organized Medellin and
Cali cartels. These cartels have been largely dismantled and dozens of
small smuggling rings have taken over the narcotics business.
The rebel groups and paramilitaries battle over the rights to extract
lucrative taxes from farmers when they sell the raw materials of coca
11 CNN.com
leaves and poppies to drug makers. The FARC controls the southern
states of Putumayo and Caqueta, where most of the country's coca is
produced. FARC earns from $30 million to $100 million a year from taxes
and protection money paid by traffickers, according to the congressional
report. The drug industry in Colombia reaches into every facet of society,
from rural peasants who grow the coca to the highest levels of
government. Former President Ernesto Samper was exposed as receiving
$6.1 million from the Cali drug cartel to win election in 1994.
Those politicians and law enforcement officials who do not succumb
to bribes by the drug lords sometimes pay the price with their lives--drugrelated assassinations are a common occurrence in Colombia. The
Colombian government recently put together a more comprehensive antidrug plan, to include a military invasion into rebel-controlled coca-growing
regions. The U.S. Congress has approved $1.3 billion in aid for the
Colombian drug fighting effort. Critics of the aid package say that fighting
drugs on the supply side is ineffective. They point out that a previous
crackdown on drug producing regions in Peru resulted in much of the
production moving to the jungles of Colombia.12
One of the greatest social problems created by the decades of
violence and a tragic result of the recent policies enacted towards
eradicating coca is that of refugees. Nearly 2 million Colombians have
been forced to flee their homes sometime during the past 15 years
because of guerrilla violence and paramilitary campaigns. Last year alone,
288,000 Colombians became refugees, according to the Bogota-based
private monitoring group, the Consultancy for Human Rights and
Displacement. Aid agencies describe the masses of displaced people in
Colombia as the worst humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere -and one of the most overlooked. Rural peasants, most of them women and
children, are pouring into miserable shantytowns around Colombia's major
cities or heading for overcrowded camps in border towns. Traumatized and
bereft of belongings, they face malnutrition and unsanitary conditions. Most
of the children are unable to attend school. They grow up angry and
unskilled -- making them ideal recruits for the warring groups that forced
them from their homes, enabling the cycle of violence to keep churning.13
Most of those displaced remain within Colombia, so technically they
do not fall under the category of refugees. They often slip out of their
remote villages in small groups at night. As a result, they have received far
less attention or aid than the smaller exodus of ethnic Albanians from
Kosovo. The World Food Program told the Associated Press recently that
its appeal in 1999 for $9 million to help displaced Colombians did not draw
12 CNN.com
a penny from international donors. What U.N. refugee experts are already
calling a humanitarian emergency could be worsened by a stepped-up
anti-drug campaign that the Colombian government plans to launch. A
drive by the military into southern regions that grow coca, the source of
cocaine, would likely uproot thousands more peasants, at least
temporarily.14
The cartels use terrorist attacks and assassinations in response to
efforts aimed at curtailing their activities or extraditing their members to the
U.S. for criminal charges. In 1991, the cartels succeeded in using bribery,
blackmail and violence to obtain the incorporation of a ban on extradition in
the revisions to the national constitution. Government authorities have
been able to reach some small but important victories against the cartels,
such as killing Pablo Escobar, the country most infamous and powerful
drug lord in the country. His death contributed to the fall of the Medellin
cartel and to a slight reduction in terrorism related to the drug trade.
15
Although this victory against the cartel was impressive, soon after it
occurred a major political scandal was uncovered involving the substantial
links between drug traffickers and government authorities. Evidence
surfaced that large amounts of funds from the Cali cartel had infiltrated
13 CNN.com
14 CNN.com
15
Country Profile: Colombia “Politics: Important Recent Events” Economist Intelligence Unit
1994 presidential and congressional campaigns. More than a dozen
politicians were imprisoned as a result of this information, including
members of President Samper’s election campaign team and one of his
ministers. A vote was taken in Congress as to whether or not President
Samper deserved to be impeached as a result of his involvement in and
knowledge of the scandal. He was not impeached, but the administration
nevertheless suffered heavy political damage, including widespread public
distrust and a hostile attitude from the U.S.
Paradoxically, the cartels occupy a dualistic position; they are
neither entirely on the side of the guerrillas, nor entirely supportive of the
government. The drug traders walk a shadowy line between the two sides
and rarely have to answer to anyone. The U.S. cannot even give nearly
enough aid to extinguish the drug trade in its neighbor to the south,
Mexico, so it is clear that there is still room for progress in terms of
Colombian anti-drug efforts. However, Colombians maintain that countries
where illegal drugs are consumed must show a much greater commitment
to reaching a definitive solution to the problem of drug-trafficking. The
extent of their violence, power and political clout may never be fully agreed
upon, but the influence the drug traffickers wield is considerable and they
definitely deserve to be examined as major yet illegitimate actors in the
domestic and international arena.
The Military-Paramilitary Connection
Opposition to the guerilla activity comes primarily in the form of the
organized national military and paramilitary groups. Today the military has
5 branches and approximately 300,000 members. Its primary objective
comes from combating the armed rebels and preventing attacks against
the civilian population.
Paramilitary groups are smaller, heavily armed and specially trained
units that operate around the nation. Their official purpose is to reduce the
number of guerilla attacks on the civilian population. The "Sixth Division" is
a phrase used in Colombia to refer to these paramilitary groups.
Colombia's Army has five divisions, but many Colombians told Human
Rights Watch that paramilitaries are so fully integrated into the army's
battle strategy, coordinated with its soldiers in the field, and linked to
government units via intelligence, supplies, radios, weapons, cash, and
common purpose that they effectively constitute a sixth division of the
army. Increasingly, paramilitary fighters are arrested. This is a stark
contrast to years past, when military commanders denied that
paramilitaries even existed and government officials were largely silent
about their activities. Today, Colombian officials routinely describe
paramilitaries as criminals. Nevertheless, the reference to the "sixth
division" reflects a reality that is in plain view. Evidence exists that certain
Colombian army brigades and police detachments continue to promote,
work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary groups, treating
them as a force allied to and compatible with their own.16
The Colombian military has not been autonomous, however, in the
training of its members or the members of the numerous paramilitary
squads that exist in the country. The US Army School of the Americas
(SOA), located at Fort Benning, Georgia, now called the Western
Hemispheric Institute for Security and Cooperation (WHISC) has trained
16 HRW.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/1.htm “Summary and Recommendations”
over 60,000 Latin American troops in commando, combat, counterinsurgency, and counter-narcotics tactics since 1946. SOA graduates
22
consistently are linked to some of the worst human rights atrocities in the
hemisphere, including the assassination of Guatemalan human rights
champion, Bishop Juan Gerardi, and the massacre of 900 civilians in the
community of El Mozote in El Salvador.
Since 1997, the US has provided more than $2.2 billion in aid to the
Colombian military. Noted human rights reports document the extensive
ties between the US-supported Colombian military and rightwing
paramilitary forces. The paramilitaries are responsible for nearly 80% of
the human rights abuses committed in Colombia. The Colombian army
regularly facilitates the gruesome work of the paramilitaries or looks the
other way as violence occurs. SOA-trained Colombian army officers are
among the most egregious offenders.17
Intervention and Aid From the United States
The link between U.S. policy and Colombia’s domestic strife is
complex and considerable. Involvement has increased by stages since the
original counterinsurgency program was designed under the Kennedy
administration. One of the initial stages was the creation of a CIA and
Special Forces program in 1962 for training police and paramilitary groups
(autodefensas) in counterinsurgency techniques, including sabotage in
23
terror. Decades later, in 1986, National Security Decision Directive 221
was enacted in April of that year. It defined for the first time drug trafficking
as a national security matter, allowing in 1991 for the use of U.S. troops in
Colombia in alliance with the CIA. In the year 2000, President Clinton
approved a $1.3 billion aid program in support of Plan Colombia. The
following year President George W. Bush took measures to expand the
U.S. role outside of strict counternarcotic activity, including creating a
program to underwrite Colombian army security for oil pipelines.18
US military aid and training in Colombia is promoted under the guise
of the "War on Drugs." Some US policy makers make a simplistic equation
of guerrillas equal drug traffickers, so aiding the army is the solution
offered for the drug problem. The reality is much more complex. While
guerrillas profit by taxing the drug trade, paramilitaries are also directly tied
to traffickers. Aiding the army risks aiding the paramilitaries and deepening
Colombia's human rights crisis. Furthermore, evidence shows that the
military solution does not stem the drug epidemic. Despite a 17-fold
increase in US drug war spending since 1980, illicit drugs are now
cheaper, more potent, and more accessible than when the "War on Drugs"
began.19
17 http://www.colombiamobilization.org/article.php?id=38
18 Scott, Peter Dale, Drugs, Oil, and War p 71.
19 http://www.colombiamobilization.org/article.php?id=38
24
Colombia has also been a top priority in years past when the U.S.
Congress finalizes the details of its annual foreign aid bill. In 2003 the
foreign aid bill included no less than $731 million specifically for combating
drug trafficking and armed insurgencies in the Andean region. 20 Colombia
will receive $426 million of this appropriation. Like most instances of U.S.
intervention in Latin America over the past century, American interests and
assistance to a nation do not come without strings attached or ulterior
motives. In the case of Colombia, a reasonable explanation for the degree
20
NY Times 2.
25
of U.S. involvement is that multinational interests in the oil industry and the
major pipeline that runs through guerrilla territory.
The Role of Colombia in Regional Politics
On a higher level, the implications of Colombia’s domestic conflict do
have an integral role in terms of Latin America’s participation in global
politics. Most countries in the region, especially those sharing borders with
Colombia, have a sincere interest in seeing a lasting peaceful resolution to
the guerrilla conflict. Brazil’s president, Lula da Silva, has been vocal about
wanting to commit to a productive peace process in Colombia.
Another important issue that will determine the course of Colombia’s
future participation in South American politics is that of free trade.
Currently, Colombia is indebted to and dependent on the U.S. for its
billions of dollars of aid. It can be presumed, then, that the U.S. would like
Colombia’s support for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the
highly-anticipated agreement that would drastically lower tariffs throughout
the hemisphere. Although there potentially are benefits for Colombia if it
supports such an agreement, certain regional neighbors would prefer to
see Colombia align itself with other South American nations in
strengthening the MERCOSUR agreement. Brazil, specifically, is adamant
26
that the region’s members bond together to strengthen MERCOSUR and
then sign a community agreement between the pact and the U.S., and that
they choose this option over support for the FTAA or any other kind of
individual trade agreements with the U.S. or other nations.21
At the 14th Summit of the Andean Community of Nations held in Rio
Negro, Colombia, in June 2003, President Uribe urged his colleagues to
“respect Andean Community norms and the political framework that is
agreed” in the event that they choose to make separate bilateral trade
deals with the U.S. ahead of the desired community accord through
MERCOSUR.22 These comments are indicative of the pressure Uribe and
his nation have felt to support both sides of this issue. He realistically
recognized that some nations might have to act before a community
accord can be reached, yet he diplomatically hosted the summit with its
ultimate goal of defining “how we are going to move forward on
MERCOSUR in political, social, and economic matters.”23 This dualistic
position is understandable and necessary, but may prove problematic in
the future.
A Web of Complexities
21
22
“Colombia urges Andean members to forge ahead on Mercosur deal” 2 .
Ibid.
27
To reiterate, the nature of the challenges facing Colombia is difficult
and sensitive. On the most elementary level, it is clear that the government
struggles to maintain a stable grasp over its divisions, officials and
constituents. It has outright failed to maintain control over the entirety of its
geographic area, a problem which makes it difficult to laud any sense of a
true democracy. Even President Uribe, who entered office promising no
remorse towards the guerrillas, has been unable to reduce the number of
attacks or formulate any significant plan for a peace process among the
groups.
The existence of what might possibly be the largest drug trafficking
industry in the world makes analysis of the situation intricate. First, there is
no true knowledge of exactly how large, in terms of dollars, the drug trade
in Colombia is, nor how directly connected it is to every level of the
government. A complete lack of transparency can only leave one to
assume that drugs are, unofficially, of course, the primary export of this
struggling third world nation and the element that upholds much of its
economic and social framework. Unfortunately, the drug trade and its
sizeable financial assets are what fuel the insurgent activity. Furthermore,
the biggest consumer of Colombian drugs just happens to be the nation
also claiming to have a vested interest in eradicating the drug cartels. The
U.S. could easily achieve equivalent reductions in drug abuse within its
23
Ibid.
28
borders by spending far less money on drug therapy programs at home
than on highly-specialized military “aid” to an impoverished nation which
just happens to be the largest supplier of these drugs.
Policy Recommendations
Latin America is poised to make considerable advances in terms of
its political clout and economic stability. Colombia will face many important
policy decisions in the near future related to the role of the continent as a
whole, and related to its individual role within these markets. As the
situation lies today, Colombia must realize that the consequences of
continued violence are only going to make its future decisions increasingly
difficult. It is the position of this author that the highest priority for the
Colombian administration should be the fair and immediate negotiation of a
lasting peace among all guerrilla groups. The guerrillas’ demands for more
social benefits and greater transparency are reasonable and could only
stand to benefit the greater population.
A second strategy that should be highly prioritized is that of the
elimination of the connection between the drug traffickers and politicians in
Colombia. Evidence shows that a complete elimination of drug use, trade,
and production on a global level is highly unlikely, primarily because the
29
demand for these products is too great. Unfortunately yet realistically, drug
trade and production will endure in Colombia. A concerted effort should be
made, however, to sever the corrupt practices of bribery and extortion
between the cartel members and government officials. Transparency, yet
again, is a formidable objective that would undoubtedly bring about a
wealth of improved practices and a break from the stagnant, detrimental
political legacy Colombia has already endured for far too long.
A final test will relate to Colombia’s dependency on U.S. aid and its
subsequent obligations to comply with U.S. policy objectives in the region.
Obviously the U.S. is motivated to some degree by economic interests in
the oil pipeline. If Colombia was hoping to maintain a positive relationship
with the U.S. while also pursuing its own goal of helping create a unified
economic bloc in Latin America, its best course would be to focus
specifically on the issue of pipeline areas when dealing with the guerrillas.
It would be of the highest benefit to Colombia in terms of political
maneuverability on a regional level to end the disruption of foreign oil
activity in the nation.
Conclusion
To be both a developing nation and one ravaged by violent conflict is
a challenging scenario for any politician to face. Colombia’s administration,
30
however, must continue to embrace a spectrum of political views and
suggestions on how to resolve its complex trials. The tradition of violence
that the country has known for too long will only continue to disintegrate the
social and political foundations further unless a clean break is made. The rebel
groups represent, on some level, a failure of the government to completely
address the needs of a significant sector of its constituency. Therefore the
government will need to resolve that priority if it wants to have any hope of
solving the myriad of challenges that lie ahead.
31
Bibliography
“Colombia Urges Andean Members to Forge Ahead on Mercosur Deal.” Resist
the FTAA. AFP.
http://www.geocities.com/ericsquire/articles/ftaa/afp030627.htm.
“Congress Adds to Global Spending for AIDS Fight.” The New York Times. The
New York Times Online.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/18/politics/18AIDS.html.
“Country Profile: Colombia.” Economist Intelligence Unit. 1 October 2002. The
Economist Online. http://db.eiu.com.
Richani, Nizah. Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace
in Colombia. 2002, State University of New York: New York.
“School of the Americas.” National Mobilization on Colombia. 2003.
http://www.colombiamobilization.org/article.php?id=38.
Scott, Peter Dale. Drugs, Oil and War: The United States in Afghanistan,
Colombia, and Indochina. 2003, (Rowman & Littlefield: New York).
32
“The Sixth Division: Military-paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia.”
September 2001. Human Rights Watch.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/1.htm.
“Special Report: Colombia.” CNN Online, 2001. http://www.cnn.com.