The Reform Initiatives of the Korean Civil Service Commission
: A Brief Review
Chun-Oh Park
Myoung-Ji University
Ⅰ. Introduction
Over the last several decades, Korean Government periodically and
sporadically has undertaken administrative reforms to improve public
management and delivery of public services. One target of such reforms has
been the civil service system. This is not surprising given the importance of
personnel management in effective government operations. People are the
primary source of the public service. Government cannot do its jobs well
without a good civil service system, because public servants directly
influence the nature and productivity of government activities.
Recently the Korean civil service system has been undergoing significant
reforms. These reforms resulted mainly from two basic factors. One was the
influence of a particular wave of government reform known as NPM or
'reinvention of government' that swept through most Western governments
in the 1990s. The other was the 1997 Korean financial crisis and the
ensuing economic difficulties. These two factors called Korean people's
attention to the inefficiency of their government activities.
Since late 1990s, in a stream of government-bashing caused by the above
two factors, popular sentiment towards government became more negative,
and majority of scholars and politicians began to stress the necessity of a
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drastic government reform. Under these circumstances former President
Kim, Dae-Jung's Administration undertook a number of initiatives to reform
and revitalize the government.
In the case of civil service system, the perceived inflexibility of the
existing civil service system was targeted. Many of the reform efforts
driven by Kim, Dae-Jung Administration are still under way in current
administration
by
President
Roh,
Moo-Hyun.
Korean
Civil
Service
Commission(CSC), as the central personnel agency, has had much of the
responsibility for such reforms.
This paper reviews the civil service reform efforts of the CSC to
date.
The review is partly based on the information obtained from the CSC
documents and partly on the relevant research findings.
Ⅱ. The Role of Civil Service Commission
The Korean Civil Service Commission(CSC) is an independent government
organization newly created in 1999.
CSC's main functions include
establishing basic policies for personnel administration, appointmentscreening of senior civil servants, inspecting of personnel management
system, administering performance management, and others.
It currently
has a staff of 105.
Though
the
Ministry
of
Government
Administration
and
Home
Affairs(MOGAHA), another central government agency responsible for
public personnel, had some functions of personnel management such as
recruiting, training, discipline, and pension & welfare, CSC was assigned
with the major role of designing and implementing civil service reform.
One of the central goals of CSC's reform has been to construct an open and
competent personnel administration. For this goal, CSC has been taking
several steps. First, CSC has promoted the flow of personnel between
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private and public sectors. Second, CSC has tried to build a competent and
knowledge-based government staffed with civil servants who can work
better in the changing administrative environment. Finally, CSC has worked
to establish a performance-based civil system by reforming the existing
classification
system
and
introducing
new
performance-based
pay
programs.
CSC's goal of constructing an open and competent government was set to
cope with some features of the existing civil service system such as lifelong job security, closed recruiting
practices, the direct relationship
between grade and salary, and promotion based on seniority. These features
have been seen as negatively affecting the efficiency and productivity of
public administration.
CSC has showed its strong committment to the goal. It has originated and
launched several reformative measures to break the past pattern and to lead
the desirable changes in the civil service system. Following the reform
trends and precedents in many OECD countries, CSC has pursued reforms of
recruiting practices as well as the spread of certain private sector
management techniques (i.e. performance appraisal and performancerelated pay) in the public service. CSC has also actively sponsored
researches concerning public sector human resource management. Further,
CSC has worked to remove the obstacles to the women's participation in
public affairs.
For the last five years, the landscape of civil service system
has altered to some degree as a result of such efforts by CSC.
Ⅲ. Reform Initiatives
At present, a wide range of reforms in civil service system are in practice.
The CSC's main reform initiatives include Open Position System (OPS), Job
Analysis & Performance Management System, 360-degree Feedback
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Appraisal, Compensation Based on Performance, Personnel Exchange
System, and E-Government (PPSS). These reform initiatives are the
working frameworks for achieving reform goals. The following is the
features of the initiatives.
1. Open Position System (OPS)
In 1999, the CSC introduced the "Open Position System" (OPS) to gain better
performance and higher levels of competency, those characteristics which
would be been difficult to achieve in the former system where top positions
were limited to be filled by the officials who passed Senior Civil Service
Examinations or those who have worked in that particular ministry.
The OPS refers to a system designed to recruit the best person through a
fair and open competition among government employees and experts in the
private sector. Under the OPS, 20% of senior positions in all ministries are
designated as Open Positions (142 position as of October, 2003).
Each Ministry is required to set qualifications for open positions. Anyone
who meets the qualifications may apply for these open positions. The
ministry then selects the most qualified person among the applicants through
a Selection Board.
While appointees with previous civil service experience retain their current
civil service status, others from the private sector are appointed as noncareer contracted service. A civil servant of an open competitive position
should not be transferred during his or her fixed contact term,
the maximum length is five years.
2. Performance Management System
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for which
CSC tries to change pay system from a rank-based to accountability and
performance-based one. For this, it pursued job analysis and provided new
performance management system.
1) Job Analysis
CSC hopes to shift away from the rank system that has caused great
bureaucratic rigidity in the Korean government and to introduce a more
flexible Job Classification System. Job analyses have been carried out
scientifically as a grounding work for personnel reform. The analysis was
tried out in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and Korea
Meteorological Administration (KMA) in 2000. In case of the MOFAT, ranks
were abolished and at present only job titles remain. Pay levels were
decided in accordance with job value.
A more comprehensive job analyses in several other ministries are in
progress in cooperation with CSC. Job analysis on all Director-General
positions is expected to be accomplished by 2004. Analyses of Grade-4
posts and below will be conducted gradually in the future.
The Job Analysis project of CSC is expected to provide a solid foundation
for the civil service reforms through the clear redefinition of the roles and
responsibilities of each position. The Job Analysis project of CSC consists of
such elements as defining the 'accountability' of each position, measuring
the differential value of each position (job value) that makes the basis for
differential
payment
scheme
for
each
position,
and
designing
the
'performance-based pay' scheme matching differential bonus with individual
performance.
2) Performance-Based Pay Programs
5
CSC is changing its pay system from a rank-based to performance-based
one in which the amount of pay is determined by the performance of each
civil servant. The pay structure for Korean civil servants has been based on
the rule of seniority, under which pay rate has been determined according to
the length of service with an automatic salary increase granted every year.
Here the pay could not function as an incentive for better job performance.
This is the very reason CSC introduced the new pay system. The main goals
of introducing a performance-based pay system are to create a hardworking atmosphere and to encourage a competitive attitude in the public
organizations so that every civil servant can carry out his/her tasks more
efficiently and creatively.
There are two types of programs in the performance-based pay system:
the annual merit incremental program and the performance bonus program.
(1) Annual Merit Incremental Program
The annual merit incremental program consists of two portions: the fixed
pay portion and the variable performance-related pay portion. The variable
pay portion is paid separately according to the appraisal grade. The
appraisal grade is determined on the basis of the appraisal result of the
MBO. This applies to civil servants in Grade 3 or higher ranking and the
contracted service.
The operating standard for the performance-based pay portion is
structured so that each ministry can determine the amount and grade of the
performance-based annual salary on the basis of the performance appraisal
of the MBO. The appraisal grade has four categories (S, A, B, C).
The
performance-based annual salary is not paid to civil servants that belong to
the low-ranking 30 percent of Grade C. A civil servant's annual salary is set
within a range of maximum and minimum amounts for each grade as the
result of the performance appraisal.
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(2) Performance Bonus Program
This program applies to all civil servants in the rank of division director
and below in whole categories. In determining the bonus scope, bonuses for
civil service in Grade 3 (division director level) and 4 are based on the MBO,
while bonuses to those in Grade 5 or below are determined by the
performance appraisal system. This is granted as a lump sum bonus and will
vary in size from 110 percent to 40 percent. It is not paid to civil servants
who belong to the bottom
10 percent of Grade C.
3. 360-Degree Feedback Appraisal
For a long time, civil servants in Korea have been subject to the careless
or unbalanced feedback appraisal from one or a few superiors. Handing out
rewards to the wrong people while ignoring others has impaired the
performance and committment of many organizational members.
For this reason, CSC introduced 360-degree feedback appraisal system in
2003. It is an approach that gathers behavioral observation from many
layers within the organization. In 360-degree appraisal, the role of an
evaluator is shared. Shifting this responsibility from one individual to
many reduces the problems resulting from any one person's shortcomings
as an evaluator, such as errors of leniency, personal bias, and subjectivity.
In support of the new appraisal program, CSC developed a 360-degree
feedback appraisal software and distributed it to all ministries. CSC strongly
recommended each ministry to use 360-degree feedback as a key part of
the performance appraisal process. Most of ministries now use this new
feedback instrument to supplement the existing appraisal system.
4. Personnel Exchange System
CSC is pursuing a free exchanging system of talents and experiences
between the private sector and the government. It introduced the Personnel
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Exchange System (PES) to that purpose.
By allowing a three-year leave by
the middle-manager level civil servants (Grade 4 and 5) for the private
sector experience, the PES is expected to touch off the exchange of talents
between the private sector and the government. CSC hopes to share the
knowledge and dynamism of the private sector by exposing the civil
servants to the reality in the market. In 2002, 12 officials applied for the
PES and worked in a few private corporations.
5. Personnel Policy Support System
CSC has established Personnel Policy Support System, which is an
electronic human resource management system making use of the most
updated information technology. PPSS builds an overall network of
personnel information of all the government departments in order to provide
real time information on the personnel management from employment to
retirement. The PPSS can reduce the labor of document management,
increase the transparency and impartiality of personnel management, and
make recruiting information open to the public.
6. Senior Executive Service
CSC is planning to introduce Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2006. The
overall objective of the establishment of the SES is to create an effective
government-wide personnel management system for selecting, assigning,
developing, advancing, rewarding, and managing senior civil servants who
administer important government programs in many ministries. The SES in
advanced countries was designed to broaden senior civil servants'
perspectives and responsibilities by facilitating their mobility across agency
8
boundaries. Accordingly, a well-developed SES can prevent the rivalry
among ministries and bring their interests together. It can also increase the
professionalism of the civil service.
CSC is now preparing for the introduction of the SES. The SES in Korea is
expected to apply to civil servants in Grade 3 or higher ranks.
Ⅳ. Evaluation of Reform Initiatives
1. Open Position System (OPS)
After conducting a comprehensive evaluation of overall implementation of
OPS in 2000 and 2001, CSC found some positive effects of the new system.
According to CSC, such effects are several. Principle of competition is being
accepted among civil servants.
Frequent transfers of senior managers are
being reduced to some degree. The inflow of new knowledge, information,
and technology into the public sector is increasing.
However, there are some concerns that the OPS is not bearing fruits as
much as expected. First of all, there were insufficient non-governmental
candidates for the jobs. Not many qualified people such as executives of
government-invested corporations, experts in private corporations, and
college professors applied for the job. The total of the appointments from
outside is about 20%. Compared with those of advanced countries, the
percentage is relatively low.
With a lack of qualified candidates who were
non-incumbent public officials, it was criticized that the OPS functioned
merely as a mechanism to justify the existing promotion system.
The lack of flexibility in the labor market, the closed culture of the
bureaucratic organizations, short contract term, and the low level of
payment are pointed out as barriers to civilian participation in application.
9
Recently, to encourage more participation of talents from the private sector,
CSC took several measures such as extending contract terms, and
expanding OPS to some middle-manager positions.
The OPS program must be a major step toward an open civil system.
However the system still requires revision in many respects. Since the
inflow of well-qualified personnel from outside is one of the most important
goals of introducing the OPS program, in order to promote it, additional
measures such as position adjustment, higher salary, and better working
conditions should be considered (Namkoong, 2003).
2. Performance-Based Pay Programs
One of the traditions of Koran public personnel systems has been that
individuals in the same grade of the civil service would be paid the same
amount. This tradition is now being replaced with a merit principle, which
says that better performance should be rewarded with better pay.
Performance-based Pay Programs are based on a utilitarian approach which
assumes that an employee's psychological ties to government or a public
organization
are
controlled
through
calculative
process.
However,
Performance-based Pay Programs may alienate many public servants. It
also could deflect managers' attention from alternative motivational
programs.
Public service motivation consists primarily of norm-based and affective
factors. Norm-based motives are sources of actions generated by efforts to
conform to such norms as civic duties and the public interests. Affective
motives are triggers of behavior that are grounded in emotional responses
to various social contexts such as compassion and self-sacrifice. These
public service motives are more likely to build psychological ties between
civil servants and government or organizations than utilitarian motives
(Perry & Wise, 1990).
10
In addition, the success of Performance-based Pay schemes depends on the
capacity of public organizations to measure the performance of its
employees. Unfortunately, many number of studies have demonstrated the
severe difficulties encountered in attempting to perform this seemingly
simple managerial task, especially if performance is to be measured at the
output or impact level, rather than merely at the activity level. These
difficulties are observable in many OECD countries. As a result of these
difficulties, adoption of managerial performance evaluations and pay
schemes will tend to introduce some bias. In the U.S. federal service,
the
pay for performance system, despite more than a dozen years of
experience, has failed to gain acceptance and, more importantly, to achieve
the goals established for it (Peters, 1994: 304).
The performance-based Pay Programs are viewed by some Korean
scholars as wrong prescriptions. According to this skepticism, to evaluate
individual performance is very difficult in the collective culture of Korean
bureaucracy in which work tends to be done collectively. Moreover, Korean
civil servants are emotionally not prepared to accept the individual-based
reward structure. It is a well-known fact that civil servants distribute the
money paid for better performance equally and very confidentially to
everybody who has worked in the same organization (Im, 2003).
So far, the performance-based pay programs are not popular among
Korean civil servants. The performance evaluation and reward inside the
ministries led to 'less than satisfactory results'. As far as these programs
are concerned, there is still some way to go. Transition of policy toward
gradual implementation and introduction of a bonus system based on team
performance may be needed in the near future(Park, 2002).
3. Personnel Exchange System
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PES is not working as well as expected. The number of officials applying
for the PES is decreasing every year. According to a research findings, this
phenomenon is due to the lack of incentives for the participants. Incentive
systems and conditions of employment should be reviewed to ensure that
they are attractive to the potential participants. In addition, PES system
should be expanded to include the personnel exchange between government
and diverse organizations in the private sector such as universities, NGO,
and research institutes. PES should develop as a mechanism which also
operates to help the private sector learn the unique features of the
government and understand the realities of public policy.
4. 360-Degree Feedback Appraisal
The introduction of 360-degree Feedback System has brought forth some
positive effects to the civil service system. Many civil servants report that
the new appraisal system has improved communication and human relations
among members of the organization. However, some are still concerned that
in practice, the system could be abused by the popularity-based or
emotion-based evaluation. In fact, many agree with the possibility of
evaluation being influenced by the typical factors in Korea such as academic
linkages, local linkages, seniority, duration of working together, and
personality.
One important objective of 360-degree process is to identify areas for
both organizational and individual improvement. Good feedbacks tell
individuals whether they are doing well, and points out where they could
improve. Many 360-degree feedback programs in advanced countries,
therefore, emphasize employee development more than performance
evaluation, and some organizations use the mechanism as a needsassessment device. However, in Korea the results of 360-degree feedback
appraisal are seldom used for development purposes.
12
To maximize the potential benefits of 360-degree feedback, there are many
issues to be addressed such as the following. What behavior should be
measured? How should 360-degree feedback be combined with other
appraisal systems?
How will staff be trained to use the instrument
effectively? How can the evaluators become more familiar with 360-degree
feedback? In addition, the limitations and failures of 360-degree feedback
appraisal which were already
observed in advanced countries and
corporations in the private sector should be reviewed (Antonioni, 1996).
5. Senior Executive Service
Civil servants in Grade 3 or higher ranking labor at the interface of the
deciding and the doing in government. They also act as the interface
between political appointees at the top of government and the career civil
servants below them who deliver its services. The efficacy of many public
institutions, therefore, depends in large part on their skills and expertise.
This particularly is the case if government is ever to be reinvented. To have
an effective personnel management system such as SES for these
individuals, therefore, is very important. The introduction of the SES is
particularly needed in Korea where most of civil servants spend their entire
career in the same ministry.
However, the results of American experience suggest a considerable
disparity between theory and practice. According to the data concerning
SES in America, SES corps despite its good quality has been seriously
suboptimized by the human resources management policies that govern it.
Above all, the SES corps is not managed across agency boundaries.
Organizational boundaries appear impenetrable (Sanders, 1994: 235-236).
There are two prerequisites to realizing the full potential of SES. First, its
members must have the qualities necessary for leading people and managing
environmental changes. Second, and more important, the SES corps must be
13
managed
strategically
in
a
way
that
reflects
and
contributes
to
administrative priorities. CSC should ensure that these prerequisites are met
when it designs and applies SES in Korea in the near future. It also has to
endeavor to increase the level of support within the civil service.
Ⅴ. Conclusion
Reform and change are very much on the current agenda and are likely to
be the agenda in the future. Modernizing the old structures and practices of
civil service system is what accounts for most of CSC's reform efforts.
CSC's reform initiatives including OPS, Job Analysis, Performance-based
Pay Programs, 360-degree Feedback Appraisal, Personnel Exchange
System, and SES are all within these efforts. However, many other reforms
are yet to be designed and implemented. The old systems and old attitudes,
of course, are the target of change.
Although CSC's reform initiatives seem to have made some positive
contribution to the overall efficiency or effectiveness of government
administration, the evidences available are still sketchy. In the absence of
well conducted studies and evaluations, not much is known about the real
and specific impact of the reforms.
Consequently, there are many questions to be answered both about CSC's
reform initiatives and about their outcomes.
Key questions include: Can we
conclude with confidence that any of the reform initiatives of CSC has been
really successful? How successful has the implementation been and how
much change is really taking place? What impacts are the reforms having
and are they leading to the desired results? How can we assess them? How
14
are the challenges and opportunities offered by the reforms being
experienced from the perspective of civil servants?
What effects do the
reforms have on morale and commitment of civil servants? Do the reforms
cause additional stress, tension and insecurity to them?
There are additional questions which are more serious and fundamental. For
example, do the private sector or advanced governments provide adequate
models or guidances?
Are CSC's choices of initiatives most effectively
designed considering the unique culture of Korean bureaucracy and the
needs of Korean civil servants? Is it impossible to build a modern personnel
mechanism without hurting much traditional values and culture of Korean
bureaucracy?
Theses questions deserve serious studies and examinations, for culture and
morale are very important management issues. The reform efforts that fail
to consider the influence of culture are unlikely to succeed, at best. At
worst they may aggravate the situation. Without concern for the needs of
civil servants, reform efforts cannot tap their energies and creativity in
reinventing government.
So far, the reforms do not appear to be fully settled in and real benefits
of reforms have yet to be reaped.
The results will unfold over a long
period of time. To create favourable conditions for reforms to take roots is
certainly not an easy job. CSC must keep the perspective that reforming is
learning, which includes experimenting and correcting.
Meanwhile, with the revision of the Government Organization Act in
February, CSC will take over most of personnel functions the MOGAHA has
had, and become the consolidated personnel authority by June of this year.
This means CSC will have many more reform agendas to carry out in the
years to come.
Some attention is needed in this regard. In the early stages of the reform
process the central agency should assume the full responsibilities for
driving reforms forward. However, once key reforms begin to take roots,
15
the role of the central agency should focus less on control and prescription
and more on disseminating best practices and promoting effective strategies
for change.
Reforms should be sufficiently flexible to be capable of being tailored to the
particular needs of individual ministries and agencies. Fortunately, CSC has
a plan to delegate some personnel functions and authorities to each ministry
and agency on the ground of the principle of autonomy and decentralization.
16
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