Challenges of Political Violence and the Roles of Youth Organisations1*
By
Francis Abayomi2*
Background: Nigerian State and the Politics of Violent Conflicts
Political violence in Nigeria is a reflection of the malaise that heralded post-independence
politics and subsequently became entrenched during the long year of military rule. Following
independence, violent conflicts became the substrate upon which politics of self-aggrandizement
was sustained. The dearth of concrete ideology and people-oriented programmes that
characterized politics also gave free reign to violence. Nigerian State, like most creation of
colonialism is fraught with the arbitrariness of violence in form and content. Ake (1996) provides
an in-depth illustration of the background and dimension to the political violence that heralded
post-colonial nation-states in Africa thus:
The dominant faction of political elite found itself utterly isolated, increasingly
relying on violence, at war with the rest of society and with rival factions among
its own ranks. Political competition now assumed the character of warfare and
paved the way for the ascendancy of the specialists of violence, the military.
The rash military coup that came later essentially formalized a reality that was
already firmly established. It was not the military that caused military rule in
Africa by intervening in politics; rather, it was the character of politics that
engendered military rule by degenerating into warfare, inevitably propelling the
specialists of warfare to lead the role1.
No doubt, Political manipulation by the elites finds expression in the perpetration of violent
conflicts following independence to the extent that post independence polity was also enmeshed
in violence that was proportionate to its thriving. According to Kuna (2003), “violence is indeed
integral to all polities based on massive inequalities. Such inequalities are fundamental to social
Presented at a Roundtable for Enhancing the Capacity of Youth Leaders in Conflict Areas
of Nigeria held at Obafemi Awolowo University Guest House, Idle–Ife Osun State, July 2006
1
2
*Francis Abayomi is Director, Peace and Development Projects (PEDEP)
exclusions wherein the majority of the people over whom government is exercised do not
participate nor do they have a choice in decisions that influence their lives” 2. This is supported
by Egwu’s (1993) assertion to the effect that “vast majority of Nigerian people are alienated from
State power and have become apathetic3. It is precisely in this context that Nigerian elite sees
violence as a weapon for enforcing legitimacy and for retaining political power.
Ordinarily, politics should not be reduced to continuous struggle for political power and retention
of political relevance without a clear definition of the means as well as the ends of political
power. Essentially, politics ought to be a vehicle for showcasing ideas by contending political
interests, in seeking popular mandate for legitimate authority. Periodic elections are therefore
necessary in determining the preference of the majority within a defined tenure. The choice of
the people in electoral democracy must be unhindered and the mandate arising thereto must
also be respected. It is conceded that conflict within the context of the game of politics is normal,
if not legitimate. In the case of Nigeria, conflicts more often than not, degenerate into violence as
a result of the intrigues and manipulation of political actors.
In the context of Nigeria, the dominant conflicting interests are those struggling to consolidate
hold on power and those resisting political domination, real or imagine. Political contests had
never really been dictated by debates about ideas and how to deploy political leadership into
benefiting the majority of the people. Politics is continually suffused with issues that divide the
people rather than unite them. As I have argued elsewhere “politics has always been played with
exclusionist tendencies in which elections have always resulted in widening the differences
between political contenders rather than bringing them closer”4. For instance, the elite exploit
ethnic and religious differences in manipulating political process for selfish advantage.
Therefore, as political activities become heightened, these intrigues or manipulations are playedup beyond what could easily be resolved with existing machineries of political organizations. In
most cases, political organisations lack required authority and credibility to mediate in these
conflicts. As a result, aggrieved individuals and groups deploy violence when they have lost faith
in the system.
Historical Excursion into Political Violence in Nigeria
The history of political violence in Nigerian politics is as old as the game itself. Beginning from
the first republic, violence in the southwestern part of Nigeria led to the termination of the first
military coup in January 1966. The political violence in the southwest, “Wetie” as being called,
had its origin in intra party squabbles within the defunct Action Group (AG), which was a
dominant political party in the southwest. Although the AG was a party some form of manifested
ideological clarity, later events prior to the political crisis that engulfed the region demonstrated
that internal cohesion had collapsed within the party; leading to sharp cleavages along two
dominant divides. At end, the crisis degenerated into full-scale violence that not only engulfed
the southwest but also consumed the very first attempt at instituting democracy in Nigeria.
Though the southwest is reputed as the wildest, going by that account, the region didn’t enjoy
the monopoly of violence during the first republic. There were pockets of violence across the
country. For instance the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) led by late Joseph Tarka and the
dominant Northern People’s Congress (NPC) engaged in violent confrontations in parts of
northern region. The agitation of the UMBC against the manipulation of the NPC led to series of
violent clashes. Interestingly, both the NPC and UMBC from the Northern part of the country
later found allies in political groupings that were dominant in the Southwest. The UMBC
strengthened its alliance with the mainstream Obafemi Awolowo’s Action Group (AG) while the
NPC found a willing ally in the splinter AG under the leadership of Chief S.L. Akintola. This was
indeed the shape of division that later came on stage in national politics as the NPC, which
control power at the centre, deployed State power in backing its faction of the Action Group. In
the final analysis, none of the parties really won at the end. The military coup of January 1966
effectively ended the political ambitions of the first generation of politicians. Democracy also
suffered for a total of 13 years (1966-1979) before it was restored albeit, briefly between 1979
and 1983.
Military option never really solved the problems of political violence but somehow aggravated it
in a different form and manner. Military rule ensured that a few privileged individuals enjoyed
monopoly of violence. It is argued that the worst form of political violence took place during
military rule. Oyerinde captures the connection between military rule and culture of violence that
pervades the society thus:
The military’s capacity to mobilize and deploy firepower enables it to loot the treasury
without resistance. Part of the pathology of this violent kleptocracy is the legitimation
of rogue elite, which finds ample attraction among ordinary citizens. Since political
power amounts to a leverage to accumulate in the public realm, there has also been a
corresponding tendency in the civic realms to build and deploy power to appropriate
advantages5.
Between 1966 and 1979, political power was undemocratically and violently rotated between
Aguiyi Ironsi, Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo. A common feature
of these military regimes was the deployment of violent force in legitimizing misrule. As it turned
out, except for Obasanjo who ‘willingly’ handed over to a democratically elected government in
October 1979, all the military usurpers were violently removed from office.
The return of the civilians in 1979 in flowing Agbada, well-starched Babaringa, high-class;
custom-made suits and bowler Caps only concealed for a while the character that had become
ingrained in politics. It soon showed thereafter, that no lessons were learnt from the mistakes of
the past. In actual fact, a few new things were learnt from the military. With time, the attitude of
supposed elected representatives of the people showed a predilection for maximum deployment
of State power apparently, as a demonstration of political legitimacy. Between 1979 and 1983,
violent political activities had taken the nation by the loins. The new reality was that political
rallies were theatres of wars for political opponents. The ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN)
deployed state power irrationally by ensuring that the newly fashioned mobile (kill and go)
policemen intimidated political opponents into submission. In some of the States, the use of
brutal force by rival political parties became the order of the day.
However, it was during Babangida’s era that the current trend in political violence began to take
root. Babangida’s political script was essentially centered on ruthless and aggressive pursuits of
political power. He taught his new breed politicians that political parties were nothing in the
pursuit of political ambition. He created political parties, since no one was credible enough to
initiate one and encouraged his new breed politicians to join the parties. Since everybody was a
joiner, nobody really respect party platform or leadership. The important thing was to mobilize
enough cash and be ruthless at the slightest provocation. Though his experiment could not have
lasted beyond the June 12 struggle, politicians, especially the new breeds, had had enough
tutelage. Much of the things being witnessed presently are the direct consequences of the
vicious misrule of the Babangida years. The Abacha regime came in to consolidate on the
violent pace of the Babangida regime; using the political struggle enhanced by June 12 as
launch pads for the worse form of autocracy. With Abacha, there was neither finesse nor
pretense about the deployment of violence. Abacha was so engrossed with power that the full
fang of despotism was recklessly unleashed.
Forms and Dimension of Political Violence in Nigeria
Politicians never really understood the legitimacy of power and the need to be civil and tolerant
in their approach to politics. Instead, the experience under the present dispensation has shown
that politicians have not learnt much about past misdeeds. Politically motivated killings and
violence under the present dispensation have out-numbered what was witnessed in the past.
Political violence should not be treated in isolation of other negative consequences of the failure
of the State. To be sure, the form and dimension of political violence are more readily
manifestations of ramified socio-economic and political crises. Forms of political violence are
categorized into four in this paper namely, but they are not restricted to these:
-
State organized violence
-
Electoral violence
-
Intra party violence
-
Inter party violence
State Organized Violence- The role of the State as a major actor of violence as witnessed
variously under military rule and on two occasions under the present democratic dispensation is
clear indications that violence perpetrated by the State represents the most tragic. Political
violence should be understood beyond the activities of political parties or political actors alone. A
form of political violence that has remained the most vicious is perpetrated through the
machineries of the State. State organized violence usually comes in the form of executive fiat or,
simply put, the lawlessness of the executive. This form of violence is enhanced through the
abuse of State apparatus within the whims and caprices of individuals who occupy political
offices. What took in Odi Bayelsa State (2000) and Zakibiam, Benue State (2002) under this
administration readily comes to mind as State organized violence in some respects. Though it
could be argued that government needed to take steps to curtail the situation in Odi and
Zakibiam but the way and manner violence was visited on the two communities speaks volume
of the immense capacity of the State as a major actor of violent conflicts. It is against the spirit
of good governance and good sense of judgment for government to visit violence on innocent
citizens for sins committed by others. In actual fact there is nothing like collective guilt in law.
State organized violence also come in isolated cases as has been reported in some states
where state governors have visited violence on citizens as a way of either reasserting their
authority or cowing political opponent into submission.
Electoral violence- Electoral violence may be organized or spontaneous depending on the
situation. Electoral violence arises from intimidation and actual molestation of the opponents
during electioneering process. Electoral violence is a very common form of violence because of
the centrality of election to the attainment and retention of political power. As noted earlier,
political parties tend to employ the instrument of violence to pervert the wishes of the electorates
by intimidating opponents either through organized violence or spontaneous violent activities.
Electoral violence undermines consolidation of democracy because the kernel of democratic
principles which is fair and free election is subverted by undemocratic imposition of unpopular
candidate over the majority of the people. When this happens the purpose of democracy is
defeated and popular participation in government is denied.
Intra party Violence- Intra party violence is very prevalent under the present dispensation. The
reason for this type of violence, which has been the order of the day in three dominant political
parties, could be traced to the destruction of real party politics by the Babangida regime.
Because party structures are weak and party leadership is rarely respected, there has been
raging fire of internal bickering in the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian Peoples party
(ANPP) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). It is difficult to ascertain the situation in
UNPP, NDP, and APGA because these new parties really have nothing to fight over. Maybe
APGA will offer the opportunity for another reflection with its late-hour victory in Anambra State.
However, internal bickering within any of the other political parties can only take a short while to
become public knowledge, considering the fact that Nigerian politicians do not have the patience
to build political structure but rather prefer to look for convenient platform to further their
immediate ambition.
In the last five years, the Secretariats of the AD, ANPP and PDP have been turn into boxing
arena because the parties lack the cohesion to arrest the crises and proffer enduring
mechanisms for conflict management within their fold. The situation will continue until political
parties are allowed to evolve along shared vision and demonstrated commitment to political
philosophy and ideology.
Inter party Violence- Intra party violence also constitutes a form of political problem under the
Nigerian experience. Under the present dispensation, pockets of inter party violence have been
recorded. However, the incidents so far are a reflection of the fact that these parties are really
the same. The political parties are not offering anything different and membership is defined by
immediate personal ambition rather than commitment to philosophy or ideas.
Dimension of Political Violence and the Involvement of Youths
The difficult challenge of consolidating democracy in Nigeria is a reflection of the deepening
violent conflicts, which have become dominant feature of ethnic relations and political activities.
Several years of military rule brought about socio-economic and political crises, which
deteriorated progressively and became worsened following the annulment of the 1993
presidential elections. The political crises of the 90s, which culminated in protracted prodemocracy struggles, further gave momentum to organized struggles that enlisted active
participation of wide spectrum of interests in the civil society. Over the years, chaotic political
situation weakened the State; not in terms of the capacity for coercion, but in terms of providing
legitimate intervention that could forge political tolerance and negotiated consensus on issues
that promote political intolerance and violent conflicts. Consequent upon the failure of the
political class to provide leadership, various interest groups in the society became negatively
orientated and radicalized. The teaming population of unemployed youths became breeding
grounds for mercenaries of violent conflicts.
Beginning from the last quarter of 2000, self-determination groups assumed nationwide
phenomenon with consequence rise in violence. What however became worrisome was that
deployment of small arms and light weapons in violent conflicts appeared to be on the increase.
A marked dimension of violence is the emergence of ethnic militias and self-determination
groups. This is precisely a fallout of the struggles against military rule that has remained a major
challenge of democratic consolidation is the emergence of self-determination groups across the
country. The formation of these various ethnic militias heralded the current democratic
experiment and has continued to gain momentum as demands for political reforms heightened.
Notable amongst these are O’odua People's Congress (OPC), Arewa People’s Congress (APC),
Onitsha Traders Association (OTA), Bakassi Boys, Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities
(FNDIC), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Niger Delta
Vigilante (NDV), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Hisbah groups, Zamfara State
Vigilante Service (ZSVS), Al-Sunna Wal Jamma (otherwise referred to as ‘Taliban’). The primary
implication of this is that predominant populations of the youths have been absorbed into these
groupings.
No doubt, increasing wave of violent conflicts across Nigeria under the current democratic
regime is partly a direct consequence of the activities of some self-determination groups and
ethnic militias. The involvement of self determination groups and ethnic militias in political
activities leading to 2003 elections marked the highpoints of insecurity and electoral
manipulation in Rivers State and across the southwest geopolitical zone. The implication is that
the more non-state actors that are entrenched as actors of small arms and light weapons, the
more precarious the political situation and the more likely the propensity for violent conflicts.
Youth Organizations and the Emerging Challenges of Political Violence
At the heart of the problems created by prolonged military rule is the militarization of politics,
which represents an aspect of the culture of violence unleashed by military autocracy. Virtually
every aspect of national psyche was militarized and some of the dangerous consequences are
very obvious today. Arising from long years of military rule, politics is now purely regarded as a
zero-sum game and therefore elections must be won at all cost. The situation within the political
parties is such that the mechanisms for conflict management are weak because legitimate
authorities within the political parties have been subdued by intricate maneuvering backed up
mostly by the influence of State power. More importantly, the manifestation of military culture in
politics finds a large followership in youths who have embraced participation in politics at
different level. In a sense, the challenges of political violence means that wide ranges of political
actors are to be targeted for effective reorientation. However, the aspect of the youths however
remains very crucial in the sense that the actual wielders of instruments of violence are the
youths who belong to different organisations.
In most communities today there are vibrant youth organisations committed to the cause of the
communities. However, violent approaches to genuine struggles have not only limited the
chances of positive results but have also accounted for the intensification of state organized
violence against the youths and their communities. Over the years, there have been deliberate
and conscious attempt by political leadership to isolate the youths in terms of education and
meaningful empowerment. The situation is the same all over the country. Ikime (2001) paints the
picture of conscious disempowerment of youths in the Niger Delta thus.
Post-independence politics, which was initially ethnic-driven and later became
oil-mineral-resource-driven, brought the worst on the Nigerian youth. Greed and
avarice took over the minds of leadership, which was largely military, and
national consciousness was completely blunted. Youth development became a
non-issue, and in fact the youth became abused and exploited. The state couldn't
care less what happened to his education or his health or how he lived, fed or
clothed. He was often terrorized by horsewhip/gun toting soldiers. His psyche
became maligned and dominated by negativity. His vocabulary was inundated
with negative innuendos such as "419", godfatherism, kickback, "matching",
["settling"], smuggling and bunkering6
It is clear from the above that Nigerian youths found themselves in a mess created by the State.
The challenges of political violence therefore place a lot of responsibility on youths and their
organisations. Although the emerging challenges of political violence may look enormous, it is
also a historic responsibility to rise up to the challenges. Youths represent a critical segment of
the civil society. Youth organizations can imbue the society with the right synergy for positive
changes. Youth organisations can be very relevant in absorbing relevant ideas about
participatory approach to politics and in deploying these ideas to influence socio-political
activities for national development. In our reckoning youth organisations must emerge based on
the principle of internal democracy.
It must also be stressed that most of the vociferous youth organisations that are prominent in
national politics today are at best self-serving or creation of selfish elite who although ‘genuinely’
recognized the roles of youth organisations in political development are bent on sabotaging the
future. Whereas it is good to have as many youth organisations as possible within the frame
work of the proposed national agenda, it is important to stress the need for value-based
association especially at the grassroot where most of the youths today have negatively oriented.
It is also necessary to give attention to youth organisations that are prone to violence and design
programme to meet the peculiarities of their situation.
Conclusion
Political violence is a major threat to democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The first and second
republics (1960-1966) and (1979-1983) respectively were aborted as a result of widespread
political violence across the country. Under the present dispensation, political disagreements are
fast degenerating into violence more than it was the case in the first and second republics. The
reason for the tense political situation can also be attributed to long year of military rule, which
subverted peaceful means of seeking redress but rather unleashed violence on the psyche of
the people. Democratically elected representatives behave as dictators while their opponents
also result to means that are everything but democratic.
Generally, the spate of political violence has brought about series of disturbances, arson,
maiming and killings across the country. Lately, the number of unresolved cases of politically
motivated murder in Nigeria has been abysmally increased by the ongoing incidence of political
violence. Political tolerance and culture of non-violence appeared to be the only roadmap that
guarantees secured political future for Nigeria. Therefore there is the need to educate citizens on
responsible political conducts and as well empower civil society actors to demand accountable
and responsive political leadership. This is precisely where the emerging roles of the youths as
critical segment of the civil society become crucial. There is the need to mobilize popular youth
organisations towards a national agenda to promote the ideals of non-violent approach in
political participation. In view of the divisions that have been created by sectional solidarities
following the emergence of ethnic groupings, there is the need to revive national agenda to
harness the passions and energies of youths towards productive engagement in politics. Youth
organisations must also form units and cells where informed discussions and feedback would be
encouraged amongst members. There is the need therefore to discourage faceless youth
leaderships that neither have base amongst the people they claim to represent nor enjoy the
popular mandate of their members.
The only option left under the present situation is to reduce political tension by restoring the faith
of the people in a democratic system. In the meantime, it is clear that democracy as presently
practiced offers little hope for the reversal of the deep-seated divisions in the society in the
foreseeable future unless political leaders emerge under tolerable political situation and violentfree electoral process. Political violence could only be mitigated by spirit of consensus amongst
the actors. It is only through consensus that major differences could be resolved without people
resulting to violence as a means of furthering political struggle. However, the teeming population
of the youths could champion the cause of non-violent political participation by demonstrating
commitment to positive changes through their organisations and platforms.
1
Ake, Claude (1996), Democracy and Development in Africa, Ibadan Spectrum Book
Limited p.6
2
Kuna, J. Mohammed The History and Dimensions Of Political of Political Violence in
Nigeria in Bash Olasupo (ed) Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives Lagos
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) p. 134
3
Sam Egwu (1993) Integrated Public Policy Approach to Popular Groups Mobilisation in
the Nigerian Political Emergency presented at National Workshop on Mobilisation of
Popular Organisation Towards the Success of the Transition Programme Jos Nigeria, July
1993
Abayomi, Francis (2003) The Press in Nigeria’s Emerging Democracy: The Challenges of A
New Era in Kunle Ajayi and Bonnie Ayodele (eds) (2004) Perspectives on democracy and
development in post-military Nigeria, Ibadan Julius and Julius Associate p. 136
4
5
Oyerinde, Olaitan (1999) Cult Menace and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in
Violence and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Lagos Centre for
Prevention and Control of Violence (CPCV) (now PEDEP) p.13
6
Ikime, Obaro (2001) Youth Activism, Ethnic Harmony and Development Of Delta State
presented at 2nd anniversary of the administration of Governor Chief James Onanefe Ibori in
Warri from 31st May - 2nd June 2001.