Research Statement
Wylie Breckenridge
Although I am still working on the semantics of ‘look’ sentences (the topic of my thesis),
my research has taken me into several new areas as well. I am currently interested in issues
in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology that can be grouped into the
following six areas:
Visual experience
In my doctoral thesis I develop an account of what we mean by ‘look’ sentences such as
‘The ball looked red to Sue’ – ones that we use to describe visual experience. This account
of ‘look’ sentences yields an adverbial account of visual experience, one that is better
equipped to deal with problems traditionally thought to be decisive against adverbial
accounts. I have a book-length version of my thesis forthcoming with Oxford University
Press (‘Look’ Sentences and Visual Experience), in which I develop more fully these
consequences for the nature of visual experience, and am developing a more accessible
paper-length version (‘A New Defence of the Adverbial Theory’). It seems to me that one
of the underlying assumptions of rival representational accounts of visual experience – that
visual experiences have representational content – is false. I have made a start towards
arguing this (‘Against One Reason for Thinking that Visual Experiences have
Representational Content’), and I am developing this into a stronger case (‘Against
Experiences having Representational Content’). The account of ‘look’ sentences in my
doctoral thesis also provides a new reason to think that looking the same as is a transitive
relation, contrary to what is widely believed. I am working on a paper (‘The Transitivity of
Looking the Same As’) in which I lay out the case for transitivity, and offer an explanation
of why anyone might think that it is not transitive. Much of the above work proceeds on the
assumption that semantic theories have metaphysical consequences, an idea which I am
elucidating and defending in a paper in preparation for Philosophy Compass (‘The
Metaphysical Impact of Semantic Theories’).
Ways
In my thesis I appeal to ways. I make some remarks there about the nature of ways, but not
in much detail. I am working on two papers (‘Ways’, ‘Ways of Knowing’) in which I
investigate in greater depth the nature of ways, a task that is becoming increasingly
important as more and more philosophers appeal to ways of one kind or another in their
theorizing. I am investigating the extent to which we need to appeal to ways to give the
semantics of natural language constructions (‘Ways in the Semantics of English’). I am
developing an account of ways of thinking, and using this to give a new and improved
theory of Fregean sense, including a new account of how the sense of an expression might
become a part of its meaning (‘A New Theory of Fregean Sense’). I am working on a paper
(‘Propositions as Properties’) in which I argue that propositions are ways, and use this to
give a new account of truth, predication, assertion, and entailment.
Meaning
Work on my thesis forced me to think about the connection between the meaning of an
expression and the way that it is used. I have come to think that the fundamental semantic
phenomenon, in terms of which all other semantic phenomena should be explained, is the
meaning event: an event in which someone uses something (typically a linguistic
expression) to mean something. As a first step in this project I am working on a paper
(‘Semantic Facts are Generics’) in which I argue that facts about what words mean are
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generic facts about meaning events: the fact that w means m is the generic fact that w is
used to mean m. I show how this can account for how words acquire and change meaning,
for why there are normative facts about word use, and for why there is a connection
between meaning and use. The next stage in the project is to extend this idea to complex
expressions (which can, I will argue, be done). Related to this, I am developing some new
ideas about the nature of word conversion and lexical categories (‘Word Conversion and
Lexical Categories’).
Generics
In much of my work I make claims that are to be understood generically, as we naturally
understand the claim that cats are good pets. My account of word meaning, for example, is
that for w to mean m is for w to be used to mean m, where the claim that w is used to mean
m is to be understood generically. Although I am under no obligation to give an account of
the nature of generic claims, it is nevertheless something in which I have become
increasingly interested. I am working on a new account of generics (‘On Generic Uses of
Sentences’), according to which generic claims are ones in which two properties are said to
stand in a certain non-extensional relation.
Epistemic modals
I have become interested in the way that we use epistemic modals such as ‘might’ and
‘must’. I am working on a survey article to appear in Philosophy Compass (‘Epistemic
Modals’), and a second paper (‘A New Theory of Epistemic Modals’) in which I develop a
new and slightly radical approach, according to which we use epistemic ‘might’ to express
disjunctions, and thus on which this use of ‘might’ is perhaps neither epistemic nor modal.
Related to this, I am exploring a new account of predicates of personal taste, according to
which our claims about how things taste are generic claims about tasting events.
Arbitrary reference
(With Ofra Magidor). We are developing the idea that we can refer arbitrarily: when I say,
“Let John be an arbitrary Frenchman”, I succeed in fixing the reference of ‘John’ to some
arbitrary Frenchman. But I do not know and cannot know which Frenchman that is. In one
paper (‘Arbitrary Reference and Instantial Reasoning’) we argue that we can and do refer
arbitrarily in this way, and propose a new account of the so-called instantial reasoning
employed in many mathematical proofs. In a second paper (‘Arbitrary Reference and
Vagueness’) we appeal to arbitrary reference to give a new epistemic account of vagueness,
one that differs from Williamson’s in several key respects. I am also investigating whether
or not arbitrary reference is involved in other well-known phenomena in the philosophy of
language, such as donkey anaphora and the distinction between particular and nonparticular readings.
I am also working on various miscellaneous papers. In ‘Making’ I develop an account of
what it is to make an object, and use it to defend the position that a statue that coincides
with a piece of alloy is identical to that piece of alloy. In ‘Frege’s Puzzle’ I argue against
one standard way of showing that the meaning of a name cannot be the object to which it
refers. In ‘Against Saying what we Believe’ I argue that we should stop the widespread
practice of saying whether or not we believe the positions for which we are arguing are true
– rather, we should just give the arguments.
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