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CHAPTER 3A:
ORDER IS FREE: ON THE ONTOLOGICAL
STATUS OF ORGANIZATIONS
Kimberly B. Boal and James G. (Jerry) Hunt
Institute for Leadership Research @ Texas Tech
And
Area of Management
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, TX USA
Stephen J. Jaros
College of Business Administration
Southern University
Baton Rouge, LA USA
Debating Organizations:
Point/Counterpoint in Organizational Studies (2004).
Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Send communications to: J. G. Hunt, jhunt@ba.ttu.edu, 806/742-3175, 806/742-3848
(Fax), Institute for Leadership Research, Texas Tech University, 15th Street and Flint
Avenue, Lubbock, TX 79409, USA.
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Order is Free:
On the Ontological Status of organizations1
Kimberly B. Boal
James G. (Jerry) Hunt
Stephen J. Jaros
There is an old story about a young man, who on visiting England was told he
must “see” Oxford University. On returning from his visit, he was asked what he thought
of Oxford University. He reported that while he had seen trees, rocks, people, and
buildings, but he did not “see” Oxford University. Is Oxford University not real? Are
only things that one can see and touch real? What about quarks, black holes, and gravity?
What about organizations? On what basis can we conclude that they are real? We argue
that organizations, like trees, rocks and gravity are real: All are real in their
consequences. Thus, we defend a realistic view of organizations against those who deny
that reality.
Let us illustrate with a thought experiment. It is becoming increasingly popular to
speak of competence-based competition (e.g., Hamel and Heene, 1994). The business
press often, in fact, speaks of an organization’s competences. Postmodern critics might
argue that organizations don’t have competences. People have competences. Therefore,
organizational competences exist only to the extent that people have competences. To
argue otherwise, they might say, is to engage in the process of anthropomorphizing and
reifying the concept of organizational competences.
However, let us imagine that we conducted a study of the effects of
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organizational competences on product quality. Now imagine that we collected
information from every individual in every organization in the study with respect to their
perceptions and beliefs as well as information on each of the organizations. Further
imagine that we entered both the data from every individual and separate data on each
organization’s competences into a giant regression analysis. After accounting for all of
the variance attributable to individual perceptions and beliefs, would there still be
variance attributable to our categorization of organizational competences. We argue yes
-- yes, because competences are defined as complex, interconnected combinations of
tangible basic resources (e.g., specific machinery) and intangible basic resources (e.g.,
specific organizational policies and procedures and the skills and knowledge specificemployees) that fit coherently together in a synergistic manner (Hunt, 2000: 144)2.
Thus, because organizational competences are more than the sum of their parts,
they are real. Therefore organizations are real. This reality can be inferred by its
consequences, much in the same way a physicist infers the existence of a black hole by
the effect it has on surrounding gas clouds, stars, and so forth. This argument is
consistent with the fundamental tenet of realism: all versions of realism hold that the
world exists independently of its being perceived (Moore, 1903; Russell, 1929). We
contrast this realist perspective against those who take a subjectivist (e.g., Kuhn, 1962,
1972; Lincoln and Guba, 1985), symbolic or interpretive interactionist, (e.g., Blumer,
1962), social constructionist, (e.g., Berger and Luckman, 1966) and especially what
Weiss (2000), among others, labels “post modernist” or “post positivist” perspective
(e.g., Alvesson and Deetz, 1996; Burrell, 1997; Clegg, 1990; Deetz, 2000).
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While most subjectivists are to some degree realists because they seek to
transcend “mere” opinion and ultimately reveal some deeper social reality assumed to
represent the “truth” or “truths” (Jacobson and Jacques, 1997), at the extreme,
postmodernists/poststructuralists hold that attempts to discover the genuine order of
things are naïve and mistaken and that the language produced by the empirical process
does not equate with an increasingly accurate correspondence with reality (Hassard,
1993). Rather, collections of interrelated discourses and the associated practices of
textual production make the world meaningful. That is, discourses, rather than revealing
some pre-constituted reality, create the world (Lawrence and Phillips, 1998).
Such perspectives reject the notion that searches for true theories by objective
methods can exist. Objectivity is impossible (Mick, 1986) because observations are
theory-laden (Kuhn, 1962). Often, these schools of thought juxtapose their position
against both a mistaken view of “positivism” and contemporary social science (see Hunt,
1994b; McKelvey, 1997; Phillips, 1987). However, as Baum and Dobbin (2000) point
out, “…the paradigm war’ in OMT is based upon an antiquated understanding of the
philosophy of science….OMT’s ‘positivists’ are not positivists” (400). Also, we would
add, neither is contemporary social science--positivist.
Let us be clear, the positivist and logical positivist tradition that began in 1907 at
the University of Vienna (often referred to as the Vienna circle) in an attempt to deal with
quantum mechanic’s challenge to Newtonian physics, as well as logical empiricism that
followed (e.g., Carnap, 1950; Hempel, 1965), is not the “received” wisdom of today’s
contemporary social science (Hunt, 1990, 1993, 1994b; McKelvey, 1997). Indeed,
Popper’s (1968) falsificationist philosophy; and the burgeoning literature in
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postmodernist and postmodernist-inflected feminist and “critical” organization studies
belies the claims of positive /realist hegemony (Hunt, 1994b). (For example, see a
special issue of the Academy of Management Review in 1992.) If anything, realistic
perspectives are derided today as “received ignorance,” not received wisdom, within the
field of organization studies.
While it is true, as McKelvey points out, “most researchers…go blissfully about
their empirical work without worrying about all that philosophical stuff’—pick a theory,
propose an hypothesis, find some results at p<.05, get published, get tenure, get
promoted…”(1999b, 402-403), there is a distinction to be made between the research
practices of the field as a whole (as reflected by the kinds of journals publishing the
above work), and the prevailing beliefs within that area of organization studies that
explicitly addresses issues of organizational ontology and espistemology.
In the above area of inquiry, postmodernist views are ascendant and realist ideas
are under attack (this book is an example). Lyotard (1984) argues, “to the extent that
science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is
obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game…”(xxiii). Thus, one goal of this paper is
to rehabilitate realism as an approach to studying the nature of organization and processes
of organizing.
First, we describe the tenets of scientific realism along the fundamental
philosophy-of-science dimensions of determinism, causality, ontology, and objectivity,
and contrast differences between realism and positivism. Second, we compare and
contrast how scientific realism differs from postmodernism and argue why we believe the
scientific realism perspective is superior. Third, we extend the previous discussion by
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looking at our scientific realism perspective within the context of chaos, complexity, and
dynamic systems perspectives. Finally, we revisit some of our earlier notions by arguing
for a critical pluralist approach to directly compare realist and alternative perspectives. It
also is important to note that in order to make sure we cite all positions accurately, we
rely more heavily than usual on direct quotations. These direct quotations are absolutely
critical in position papers such as this one.
Scientific Realism
McKelvey (1997) notes that organizational scientists have always been “…much
more realist than positivist.” Despite this, one might conclude that contemporary science
is based on the philosophical movement that originated in Vienna at the turn of the 20th
century. This philosophical movement, “logical positivism” and its successor, “logical
empiricism” are often treated as the “received view” and “normal science” (Kuhn, 1962,
1970). But, while positivism and scientific realism do share some common themes--they
differ in important ways as well. In order to clarify, here we describe what we mean by
“scientific realism” in terms of determinism, causality, ontology, and objectivity. We
also highlight differences between realism and positivism.
First let us be clear, the term “normal science” is a term of art that Kuhn used, and
is not to be confused with contemporary science that is realist in its orientation. That
notwithstanding, given that many postmodernists (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Van Maanen,
1993) juxtapose their views against “positivism,” it is useful to be clear about what
positivism held in contrast to contemporary science. We draw upon Hunt’s (1994b)
historical analysis to address seven (mis) characterizations of positivism.
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Tenets of Scientific Realism
Quantum mechanics destroyed the deterministic certainty of Newtonian physics.
Logical positivists embraced “instrumentalism.” For positivists, the purpose of theory
was to predict, not explain (Bynum, Browne and Porter, 1985). Furthermore, in keeping
with quantum mechanics, the best that could be accomplished was “probabilistic”
prediction. As Einstein (1923) said, “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality,
they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality” (28). Hunt
(1994b: 227) concludes, “to be positivist is not to be determinist.”
Do realist seek causal explanations? Contrary to positivism, which has its roots in
Humean skepticism that rejects many forms of causality as an unobservable metaphysical
concept, the answer is yes. However, scientific realism recognizes that most
organizational phenomena are complex, in the sense of having multiple, interacting
causes and that sometimes causation is difficult to determine. Here, the crucial
distinction between realists and positivists lies in the third dimension of our analysis,
ontology--the researcher’s belief about whether anything exists other than directly
observable entities (e.g., trees, rocks).
According to Manicas (1987), positivists adopted a minimal realism (i.e., tangible
objects like trees and rocks exist independently of our perception and labeling). But
drawing on Hume, positivists insist that theories contain only observables. In contrast,
realism holds that unobservables (e.g., motivation, job attitudes, culture, cognitionsphenomena not directly apprehendable by human senses) can exist and are appropriate
for theory construction. Thus, unlike positivists, realists can fall victim to reification – the
error of wrongly treating unobservables as if they are observables.
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Were positivists “functionalists”? Functionalism (e.g., Parsons, 1937; RadcliffeBrown, 1952) generally seeks to understand a behavior pattern or a sociocultural
institution by determining the role it plays in keeping a given system in proper working
order or maintaining it as a going concern. Burrel and Morgan (1979) argue that
functionalism is characterized by a concern for providing explanations of the status quo,
social order, consensus, social integration, and solidarity.
However, positivists were strongly critical of drawing parallels between
biological and social systems, and of functionalism and functional explanations. Hempel
(1959: 297) claimed that functional explanations are mere “covert tautologies,” and
“devoid of objective empirical content” (330). Functionalism is not positivistic.
Therefore, if contemporary science or management theory is functionalist, it is not
positivist.
Does positivism predispose the use of quantitative methods? Many of the
members of the Vienna Circle were physicists and mathematicians (e.g., Phillipp Frank,
Moritz Schlick, Herbert Feigl, and Hans Han, Fredrich Waismann, Karl Menger, Kurt
Odel and Rudolph Carnap, respectively). Thus, they were sympathetic to quantification
in science. However, as Hunt (1994b) notes, “equating positivism with quantitative
methods is ahistorical”(226). According to Phillips, (1987), “There is nothing in the
doctrine of positivism that necessitates a love of statistics or a distaste for case studies”
(96). Likewise, Broadbeck (1968) states, “…quantification…is neither necessary nor a
sufficient condition for science” (574). Hunt (1994b) calls for a rhetorical cease-fire on
the qualitative-quantitative wars. As he notes, “most qualitative research is neither
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distinctively nonpositivist nor positivist. And much quantitative research is realist and
not positivist” (227).
According to Suppe (1977: 649), “…it is a central aim of science to come to
knowledge of how the world really is….” Thus for the scientific realist, the products of
science are theories that seek to explain and predict. The arbiter of the adequateness of
our explanations and predictions is truth (“genuine knowledge”), or “truthlikeness”
(Popper’s, 1972, verisimilitude), and the degrees or probabilities of truthlikeness (De
Regt, 1994). Any empirical test involves two high level theories: an interpretive theory
to provide the facts and an explanatory theory to explain them (Boal and Willis, 1983;
Lakatos, 1968). Inconsistencies between these two theories constitute the problem-fever
of science.
Growth in science occurs in our attempts to repair these inconsistencies, first by
replacing one theory, then the other, and then possibly both and opting for a new set-up,
which represents the most progressive problem-shift, with the biggest increase in,
corroborated content. Growth in science can occur without refutations, and need not be
either evolutionary or linear. What is required, is that sufficiently many and sufficiently
different theories are offered. According to McMullin (1984), scientific realism claims,
“the long run success of a scientific theory gives reason to believe that something like the
entities postulated by the theory actually exist” (26). We now elaborate on these
statements lest they be misunderstood.
Are realists objectivists? Yes. Realism holds that science should pursue
objectivity in that its statements should be capable of public tests with results that do not
vary essentially with the tester (Hempel, 1970). However, this is not to be confused with
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a caricature of objectivism that implies that science has access to a “god’s-eye view” or a
“unique privileged position” to reach an absolute truth. Realists recognize that any
observations we make, and any evidence we claim to accumulate are inevitably filtered
through and limited by the characteristics of our senses, our methods of measurement,
and the social-cultural context in which our research is conducted. The purpose of the
scientific method is to attempt to enable us to arrive at a defensible knowledge claim.
However, these claims are based on the recognition that they are contingent--subject to
future refutation or revision.
Scientific realism strives for objectivity. As Hunt (1976) states, “Scientific
knowledge, in which theories, laws, and explanations are primal, must be objective in the
sense that its truth content must be inter-subjectively certifiable.” This notion of
objectivity is not to be confused with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) characterization of
objectivism as the claim that there is an objectively reality, about which we can say things
are objectively, absolutely, and unconditionally true and false about it.
But as Beach (1984) notes, objectivism is
the thesis that there exists a systematic method of reasoning and a coordinate set
of beliefs embodying its principles….These principles may contain errors or half-truths,
and yet may never attain a fixed and final form. Yet insofar as (a) their consistency is
publicly verifiable, (b) their development is rational, and (c) their truth-content is
demonstrably greater than that of rival contenders, they do constitute reliable criteria by
which to evaluate subsidiary beliefs and hypothesis (159).
The above thesis is consistent with Popper’s (1959) notion that science is
revolution in permanence. He suggested that the ontological status of a theory is better
than its rival, “(a) if it has more empirical content, that is, if it forbids more ‘observable’
states of affairs, and (b) if some of this excess content is corroborated, that is, if the
theory produces novel facts” (163).
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Scientific Realism Versus Its Critics
Scientific realism acknowledges fallibilism and probabilism in its knowledge
claims (De Regt, 1994; Hunt, 1990, 1993). It rejects, however, arguments put forth by
relativists (e.g., Fyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1962) that objectivity is impossible because: (a)
language and culture determines reality (e.g., Sapir, 1949; Whorf, 1956); (b) paradigms
that researchers hold are incommensurable (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1962); facts
undermine theories (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1962); and (d) espistemically significant
observations are theory-laden (Kuhn, 1962, 1970).
In terms of the first argument, linguistic relativism maintains that the language of
culture determines reality that its members see. As Hunt (1993) notes, “if the thesis of
linguistic relativism were true, objective inquiry across cultures (languages) would
indeed be problematic” (81). However, Steinfatt’s (1989: 63) extensive review of the
literature on linguistic relativism leads him to conclude, “the differences between
languages are not to be found in what can be said, but what it is relatively easy to say”
(italics in original).
Postmodernists (e.g., Gergen and Whitney, 1996), and our counterpoint, argue
that word meaning depends primarily on its contextual embedding or its social use within
a material context. Meanings are determined through the historical development of
specific language games (Mauws and Phillips, 1995). Only through the rules and
conventions established through social interaction is it possible to speak of the things that
are in the world.
Postmodernists (and our counterpoint) argue that since languages are
representational they cannot perfectly capture the nature of that reality. However, we
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argue, a language’s ability to represent can itself be improved even though it may not be
perfected. This is the goal of construct validity. Furthermore, it is one thing to point out
that our medium(s) of communication influence our perception of reality, and another to
claim (as does our counterpoint) that the “medium is the message,” implying there is little
if any correspondence between language and reality.
We accept that specific letters and words used to label reality are arbitrary (e.g.,
that the English language uses the letters t, r, e, e, to identify a particular type of plant).
This arbitrariness does not mean that there is not an object that exists in the world—an
object with some kind of non-discursive existence—that humans understand discursively
to be a “tree.” If all humans were suddenly to vanish, a “tree,” as we understand it by
any language would cease to exist (i.e., the concept of “tree” that is a product of the
imperfections of a language’s system of representation would cease to exist). However,
does anyone think that “trees” as objects would cease to exist? Could squirrels no longer
run up and down them?
To avoid the trap of solipsism, our counterpoint would seem to argue that there is
a fundamental ontological difference between physical objects, such as trees, which are
“directly observable,” and what the counterpointers call “social objects,” such as
“organizations”, which are not. The former being real, while the latter are merely
reifications created by language. But this line of argument is incoherent because the
concept of “direct observability” seems to imply that perceptions of physical objects are
not filtered by language. Thus, physical objects can be perceived in an unmediated (nondiscursive) way. But this view would be contrary to that held by many postmodernists
(e.g., Lennon and Whitford, 1994) who argue that, “all our interactions with reality are
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mediated by conceptual frameworks or discourses which themselves are historically and
socially situated” (4).
Thus, on what basis can a distinction be made between the effects of discourse
and language on our perception of physical objects (i.e., objects with “thing like”
properties) and what our counterpointers call social objects? If our perception of
everything is discursively constructed, how can they even know that a tree is “thing like”
and an organization is not? If language constructs the social world, it would seem to
construct the physical world as well. If all reality is a “forest of signs,” how can we
apprehend “thing-like” objects without the mediation of language any more than what
they call “social objects”? What is the ontological basis for claiming trees are thing-like
and organizations are not?
Based on the incommensurability argument, we ask, “Do Copernicus and Ptolemy
see the same thing when the sun rises”? According to the view that objectivity is
impossible because all knowledge claims are embedded in paradigms that are
incommensurable, the answer is no! However, McKelvey (1999a) observed that if
paradigms such as positivist, interpretist, and postmodernist were incommensurable, then
the editors of the Handbook of Organization Studies, (Clegg, Hardy and Nord, 1996),
were put in the awkward position of editing a book, much of which they did not
understand. Further, Hunt (1993) points out, the very claim that two paradigms are
incommensurable must imply that one can compare them. “For incommensurability to
pose a threat to objectivity, one would have to put forth a rival ‘paradigm’ that not only
resulted in a conflicting conclusion, but a situation where the choice could not be made
on objective evidence” (82).
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In terms of the facts undermining theory contention, despite the fact that scientific
realism accepts fallibilism and probabilism, critiques of objectivism continue to succumb
to Humean skepticism and the “problem of induction”. According to this critique, since
no conceivable number of facts conclusively proves a theory’s truth, any process that
reasons to the truth of a theory is improperly inductive. Note, the claim is that only
deductive, and not inductive, logic is permissible (Watkins, 1984) because “to know” is
to know with the certainty of the deductive logic of mathematics.
Many (e.g., Gomez and Jones, 2000) continue to uncritically accept such a
position, as did Popper (1968). Postmodernists also make this claim when they discuss
the impossibility of knowing for sure whether our knowledge claims are free of cultural
or linguistic or ideological bias. However, restricting “knowing” to “knowing with
certainty” amounts to nothing less than nihilism. Scientific realism, in contrast, embraces
fallibilism. As such, all knowledge claims are tentative, subject to revision on the basis
of new evidence. The concept of “certainty” does not belong to science (Hunt, 1993).
The final, critique of the impossibility of objectivity is premised on the contention
that all epistemically significant observations are theory-laden. The claim is that all
observation is “interpreted” by theory, thus objectivity is impossible. However, Shalpere
(1982) and Greenwood (1990) note that advocates of the theory-laden argument fail to
distinguish between the two very different kinds of theories that are involved in empirical
testing. On the one hand are the explanatory theories that we test empirically, and on the
other hand are the interpretative theories that inform the data.
In addition, Boal and Willis (1983), note that there is an implicit “theory of
testing” manifested in how we choose to analyze the data. Therefore, unquestionably,
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epistemically significant observations are not theory free—nor should they be. Indeed,
the real question is whether they are theory neutral; that is, neutral with respect to the
explanatory theory under investigation (Hunt, 1994a). What is required is that our
measurement theories and our theories of testing must not presume the truth of our
explanatory theory, that is, they must not beg the question.
Postmodernist critiques of realism typically juxtapose themselves against a form
of “naïve realism” that assumes the ontological status of organizations as real, that posits
deterministic and totalizing accounts of the causes of that reality, and that identifies such
reality as some kind of essential (usually functionalist) social process. Yes, scientific
realism purposes that organizations are real; but real in a fallible, probabilistic way--one
that acknowledges that knowledge claims about their reality are contingent, and part of a
never-ending, subject-to-revision process of discovery. Scientific realism also makes no
claims about whether the ontological status of organizations should buttress existing
social relations. Clearly, many forms of organizations have served both reactionary and
progressive ends.
When compared to scientific realism, postmodernist claims that organizations are
“invoked texts” or “linguistic creations” fall short on the very criteria (determinism,
totalization, and existentialism) that are invoked to attack such realism. Postmodernists
tend to ascribe determinism to “hegemonic” social processes that inevitably result in
functionalist, disciplinary organizational forms. At the same time, postmodernists tend to
ascribe totalizing claims to the power of discourse and language. They also often argue
that organizations are, in their essence, products of a functionalist, pro-capitalist society.
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But how do the postmodern theorists escape discourse and culture to know all of
this? What “god’s eye” power enables these theorists to see what the realist cannot? As
Eagleton (1983) remarked, poststructualism “allows you to drive a coach and horses
through everybody else’s beliefs while not saddling you with the inconvenience of having
to adopt any yourself” (144). And is not the claim that organizations are not real--that
they are reified artifacts of language--itself, essentially, a “truth claim”?
The point of this piece is not to counter the straw-man of naïve realism with a
straw-man of naïve postmodernism. Postmodernist-inspired scholars of organizations
have analyzed the problems of determinism, existentialism, truth claims, and totalization
in their own work (see, Calas and Smircich, 2000; Jermier, Knights and Nord, 1994;
Knights and Willmott, 1999). Yet none of these authors could claim to have solved these
problems. Crucially, whereas scientific realism argues for theory testing subject to
verification (or what we later term “critical pluralism”), that has proven fruitful in
numerous areas of knowledge creation (medicine, physics, chemistry, mathematics),
postmodernists have established no such standards for judging their knowledge claims
other than the “trust” we have in those making them. Thus, we would argue that as of
now, scientific realism holds the best prospects for knowledge claims and acquisition
within the organization sciences.3
We agree with the authors of our companion paper that “the organization” does
not have a “straightforward and unproblematic existence independent of our discursively
shaped understandings” (
). But we do hold that the best available evidence suggests
that organizations do have a problematic, non-straightforward existence – an existence
that can better be understood within a scientific-realist ontology and epistemology.
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Consistent with our argument, we draw on advances in the natural sciences and that are
gaining momentum in the social sciences. These advances focus on complexity and
dynamic systems perspectives to describe recent evidence produced on the nature of that
reality (cf., Anderson et al, 1999; J. Hunt and Ropo, forthcoming; Ilgen and Hulin, 2000,
Marion, 1999).
Complexity, Chaos, Dynamic Systems and Order
Earlier, we presented arguments of those attacking scientific reality in terms of
determinism. Frequently, these arguments have been virtually a caricature. Of course,
we do not subscribe to this deterministic caricature. Rather, following a modification of
J. Hunt (1991: 45-46) and Morgan and Smircich (1980), we conceive of scientific realism
along a six-position realist/social constructionist philosophy of science continuum. On
the extreme left is the reality as a concrete structure position with a machine metaphor
and predictable, deterministic underlying laws. On the extreme right is the social
constructionist, reality as a projection of human imagination position, where the
“transcendental” metaphor is used and described in the following way:
…knowledge here rests within subjective experience. The appreciation
of world phenomena is seen as being dependent on the ability to understand
the way in which human beings shape the world from inside themselves.
….In each case, [Husserl’s, 1965, phenomenological tradition, studying
experiential learning phenomenologically, and drawing on non-Western
modes of philosophy], the grounds for knowledge demand that human
beings transcend conventional scientific modes of understanding and begin
to appreciate the world in revelatory, but as yet largely uncharted, ways
(Morgan and Smircich (1980: 497).
Returning to the left side of the continuum, McKelvey (1997) captures its essence
in the first part of his quote:
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Organization scientists have a truly archaic eighteenth century view of
science, a worst case scenario really, in that it is a linear deterministic
Newtonian mechanics [view] without the power of mathematics: this is the
‘normal science straightjacket’ alluded to by Daft and Lewin (1990). Now,
twentieth century natural science is dramatically different from the
eighteenth century version (Favre et al, 1995; Mainzer, 1994; Prigogine and
Stengers, 1984 (357).
Thus, McKelvey’s organization scientists, as would those earlier mentioned, tend
to see scientific realism as the machine metaphor position. However, our own realism
position would put us close to the middle of the six positions on the realist/social
constructionist continuum. This position conceives of reality as a “contextual field of
information”. “This ontological position calls for epistemologies based on cybernetic
metaphors, which emphasize the importance of understanding contexts in a holistic
fashion” (Morgan and Smircich, 1980:496). Here, there is an emphasis on how
organizations and environment evolve together. Causality is not a concern because it is
impossible to find a point at which causal forces begin. Relationships change together
and cannot be reduced to a set of determinate laws and propositions. The whole is stored
in all the parts (see, J. Hunt, 1991: 46-47; Morgan and Smircich, 1980: 495-496).
As scientific realists, we focus our realist position on what McKelvey (1997: 357;
1999a: 297-298) calls “stochastic idiosycracy”, where idiosyncratic process event
occurrences in firms fit some probablistic distribution, as opposed to uniformity
assumptions about organizational phenomena. He argues that social constructionists such
as Guba (1985) and Weick (1985), among others, express ideas consistent with
stochastastic idiosyncracy assumptions. These assumptions deal with such complexity
notions as: multiple causality, nonlinearity, self-organization, and adaptive learning (see,
e.g., Cramer, 1993; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989).
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McKelvey goes on to point out that physicists, chemists and biologists have used
the above assumptions to develop a modernized twentieth century natural science that
still upholds: objective measurement, replication, prediction, generalization,
falsifiability, and finally, self-correction – all traditional hallmarks of “good” science
(e.g., Favre et al; 1995; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989).
We elaborate our position, first, by reiterating crucial concepts suggested by
Newton’s work (cf. Marion, 1999: 16-17) and we then juxtapose our position against that
summary:

All physical events can ultimately be understood.

Every event has a predictable cause or causes.

Causal relationships are linear (proportional) and one-way.

All stable motion is based on periodic attractors—trajectories to which motion
gravitates. A periodic attractor is stable; if perturbed it will return to its
original motion. A pendulum is a good example and exhibits two stable
attractors—back and forth motion, and no motion, as represented by a point
on what is termed a “phase space plot”. This point is termed a “point
attractor”. An attractor also is finite with bounded behavior (its phase space is
restricted to a confined area). Attractors here are periodic or quasi periodic
and provide predictable motion.
The essence of our contrasting position is captured with an extended description
of complex systems by Levy (1992):
A complex system is one whose component parts interact with sufficient intricacy
that they cannot be predicted by standard linear equations; so many variables are at work
in the system that its over-all behavior can only be understood as an emergent
consequence of the holistic sum of the myriad behaviors embedded within.
20
Reductionism does not work with complex systems, and it is now clear that a purely
reductionist approach cannot be applied; …in living systems the whole is more than the
sum of its parts. This is the result of….complexity which allows certain behaviors and
characteristics to emerge unbidden. (7-8)
Or as Marion and Uhl-Bien (forthcoming) state, “In contradiction to Einstein, God does
play dice with the universe” (9).
Be that as it may, we now examine the previous description in more detail. The
system emerges from interactions (among components) and resonances (the release of
potential energy through interactions) of individual units, where the behaviors of the
components tend to correlate (share resonances, i.e., individual behaviors) with each
other because of the interactions and to catalyze (speed up a process or make things
happen that otherwise would not) interactions (a process termed autocatalysis) because of
the energy contained in the resonance. These forces create the system order previously
mentioned; that is, they are self organizing. Marion (1999) uses a husband and wife
example, where the two gravitate together in their attitudinal structure because they
discuss and live their beliefs together. Autocatalysis begins when the behaviors mutually
stimulate each other and these mutual stimulations lead to another cycle.
Unpredictability is a key part of this process. Correlation and autocatalysis build,
but unpredictability is what inspires creation and renewal (Marion, 1999: xiii). Unlike
the periodic attractor, above, involved in linear and periodic relations, the predictor here
is labeled “strange” (Ruelle and Takens, 1971; Sanders, 1998). It is not periodic or even
quasi periodic. The behavior of the systems it represents never repeats itself. However,
the attractor is patterned, that is it has a geometric structure in finite phase space and it
also is stable. This strange attractor is the product of non-linearity and interactivity. Its
21
lack of predictability is not only a function of interaction, resonance, correlation and
autocatalytic forces but also a function of sensitive dependence on initial conditions
(path-dependency). This dependence is known as the “Butterfly Effect”—a butterfly
flapping its wings in one location can have an effect on a system far remove (cf. the
discussion by Marion, 1999: 17).
We essentially have described some key aspects of complexity theory above. It is
considered to lie in a transition zone between stable systems and chaotic systems—this
location is typically referred to as “the edge of chaos”. Neither stability nor chaos is
capable of exhibiting the characteristics of complex systems—such behavior can exist
only at the edge of chaos. Edge of chaos attractors, mentioned above, are stable enough
to maintain information about themselves and their environment while being sufficiently
vibrant to process that information. They map their environments by resonating or
correlating with their environments and by interacting with and becoming a part of their
environment. Different attractors within a system resonate with each other and augment
the capabilities of the broader organization. In turn, they influence the “self-organizing”
capabilities mentioned previously (cf. Marion, 1999).
Unlike complex systems, chaotic systems have no memory. Thus, they are
incapable of adapting (cf. Marion, 1999: 72-74). Clearly, the ideal organizational state
is, indeed, complex, somewhere between stability and chaos and Marion considers
complexity theory to be a branch of chaos theory. He summarizes complexity and chaos
theories quite comprehensively in the context of organization theory. He also
demonstrates how one might empirically examine the growth in organizational
populations using a chaotic model based on a general logistics equation (see, Marion,
22
1999: 273-307). At the same time, he shows empirically how to test social systems for
chaos. Finally, he demonstrates procedures for identifying complex social structures.
John Holland’s (1995) book, Hidden Order provides an extended example that
helps pull together our previous points, especially, those emphasizing order and
consequences and is especially relevant for the social sciences. Holland observes that in
any given city there is a vast, interdependent network of grocery stores, clothing stores,
banks, service stations, schools, restaurants, malls factories, transportation systems and
the like. All these are focused on supporting the city’s inhabitants. Consistent with our
previous arguments, these very complex networks and their very high levels of efficiency
and effectiveness, emerge naturally.
Note that there are no committees coordinating the process, determining services,
submitting bids for various roles, and the like and in general making sure everything fits
together. As we pointed out previously, all this order comes from the bottom up and
helps reinforce Kauffman’s (1995) argument that “order is free” since it is a bottom up
phenomenon with no over-riding centralized ordering force from above (see, Marion,
1999: 245-246). The key point is that human agency is sufficient but not necessary to
obtain order, although, of course, it may be operative, along with numerous other agents,
such as size technology, leadership, belief systems, and the like. Thus, social
constructionism is not required for such order. Additionally, as we have argued
throughout, all of these events and activities are consequential—all are real in their
consequences, as are the organizations that bracket and are bracketed by them.
23
Finally, it also is important to recognize that this means of obtaining order is in
sharp contrast to that in our counterpoint piece. There it is argued, essentially, that order
is carved out of disorder, primarily by language.
Two important points about the nature of change are important to reiterate from
our discussion of chaos, complexity, and dynamic systems perspectives. First, small
changes at the beginning of a process of evolution can have very large effects
downstream. Second, the outcome of a process is dependent upon the path it took to get
there. Therefore, small, almost random changes accumulate over time to make the
developmental path of every system in nature unique, if only slightly. Thus, on every
tree, the leaves are similar, but not identical.
Closely related to complexity and chaos theory, in terms of its assumptions about
nonlinearity, predictability, causality, attractors, and order, is dynamic systems theory (J.
Hunt and Ropo, forthcoming). One, of numerous approaches, to dynamic systems theory
is that of computational modeling (see, Ilgen and Hulin, 2000). Without going into
detail, we argue that computational modeling illustrates well our “reality as a contextual
field of information” position on the previously mentioned continuum and reflects
previous arguments concerning stochastic idiosyncracy, and related notions, while
allowing for the kinds of “good” science arguments mentioned earlier by McKelvey
(1997). Computational modeling, as well as other related dynamic systems approaches,
is receiving increasing emphasis in the social sciences. (For more details, see J. Hunt and
Ropo, forthcoming, and Ilgen and Hulin, 2000.
Revisiting Organizations as Reality
24
A crucial point raised by McKelvey and discussed earlier, is that complexity,
chaos, and dynamic systems perspectives are realist ways of dealing with stochastic
idiosyncrasy and that they are not unlike the idea set forth by numerous social
constructionsts and post modernists. It also was argued, following McKelvey, that a
major virtue here was that the complexity notion manifestation of scientific reality
upholds the tenets of “good” science, especially self-correction.
For those social constructionists and post modernists who disagree with our
previous arguments, let us make it clear that we do not believe in incommensurability, as
suggested by those such as Burrell and Morgan (1979) and briefly treated earlier. Rather,
we put forth the challenge of rapproachment, based on extensions of J. Hunt’s (1991: 5254) treatment of “critical pluralism”. This term was originated by Siegel (1988) as a way
of characterizing how scholars should view their own and others’ ways of knowing. The
“critical” part of the label argues that non-evaluational, non-critical or mindless pluralism
(considering rival candidate approaches as thwarting comparison and evaluation) is as
bad as dogmatism. Here, all knowledge claims not only can, but must be, subjected to
critical scrutiny (see, S. Hunt, 1991). In other words, all knowledge claims must have
appraisal standards.
Hirschman (1986) and Wallendorf and Belk (1989), marketing scholars, have
been working toward such standards in the marketing field, which, like the management
and organization field, has had a history of debates such as those in this book. We briefly
touch on Hirschman's (1986: 244-247) approach to convey the flavor of such assessment,
recognizing that she would be considered a “social constructionist”, using our previous
25
terminology. She argues that the criteria appropriate to her mode of inquiry consist of
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
Credibility. For social constructionists, traditional realist internal validity is
inoperative. Multiple constructed realities operate rather than one true reality composed
of discrete causal processes. To determine the credibility of a particular interpretation,
one should submit it to those upon whom it is based and seek their responses concerning
authenticity. Of course, the social constructionist researcher must understand and probe
the respondents’ answers for truthfulness.
Transferability. This criterion is analogous to assessing external validity in realist
research. Here, however, one is concerned with the transferability of a phenomenon to a
second manifestation, recognizing implicitly that no two social contexts are ever
identical. The transferability must be compared with interpretations constructed in other
contexts. It can be knowable only on a post hoc basis.
Dependability. This criterion is roughly analogous to reliability in realist
research. The researchers themselves are the instruments and must demonstrate
reliability. Having multiple human investigators enhances dependability.
Confirmability. Confirmability for social constructionists is functionally
analogous to neutrality and objectivity for realists. However, the interpretation generated
by researchers is not assumed to be value free (as with realist research) but is expected to
be supportable from the data as gathered by the inquirer.
Hirschman (1986) goes on to argue essentially, as we have, for a form of critical
pluralism… “designed to reach as many different knowledges as possible” (248).
26
Wallendorf and Belk (1989:69) argue that “trustworthiness” is the bottom line.
Consistent with Hirschman, they advocate “triangulation of sources, methods, and
researchers” (p. 70) to evaluate the criteria she discusses.
Conclusion
Connell and Nord (1996a, 1996b) have argued that debates between realists and
post modernists have proven to be as much, if not more, about competing interests and
values as about “genuine” philosophical differences. They characterize these
disagreements as saturated with emotions and ego efforts (the threat we experience and
the defensiveness engendered when our life’s work is fundamentally challenged), and
politics (whether we see ourselves as questing for the truth for its own sake, or seeking
knowledge to improve the world; and debates over what an improved world should look
like in terms of political and economic structures and institutions). But they also argue
that the influence of emotions, interests, and values has had a substantive impact on the
technical aspect of the debate, primarily as a source of attribution error—the
mischaracterizations of realism, positivism, and post modernism (as “anything goes
relativism”) identified in this paper and in some of the other pieces in this book, and by
others as well (see, Hunt, 1994b).
Thus, Connell and Nord imply that the intellectual atmosphere surrounding this
debate has to an extent become polluted. They advocate a rhetorical “cease fire”. But
does this mean that too many raw nerves have been exposed and picked at for fruitful
discourse to occur? We think not, as long as researchers on both sides recognize their
fallibility. We advocate a realist perspective and have attempted to explain why we
believe that it is more constructive than postmodernism as an approach to studying
27
organizations. But scientific realism and our argument for critical pluralism demand that
we recognize that we could be wrong about this. We welcome further exchanges between
researchers advocating differing perspectives on organizational reality as a means of
learning more about it.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND NOTES
1
We graciously acknowledge the help of Shelby D. Hunt on this manuscript.
2
Not related to present co-author.
3
As our title indicates, our charge was to focus on the ontological aspects of reality.
However, in so doing, our treatment sometimes unavoidably shades over into
epistemological (knowledge claims) concerns and even touches on method. We have
tried to minimize this epistemological emphasis, so as not to detract from the authors who
were assigned to emphasize epistemology.
28
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