Japan in War and Peace
The Occupation: Democratisation and Demilitarisation 19451952
The Occupation of Japan began officially on the 2nd September 1945 with
the signing of the instruments of surrender on board the USS Missouri and it
ended at 11 AM 28th April 1952. The purpose of the occupation was phrased in
the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (USIPPJ) (In Lu
Documents) which stated that it was to insure that Japan will not again become a
menace to the peace and security of the world. This was to be achieved not by
destroying Japan as a nation but by turning her into a peace-loving nation. It
consisted of a 2 pronged attack. Demilitarisation and Democratisation. The
Occupation was carried out by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP)
under, first of all General Douglas MacArthur and from 1950 General Matthew
Ridgeway.
Mark Gayn in Japan Diary published in 1948 stated ‘The experiment in
Japan is without parallel in our history, for we have sought to convert a
great and aggressive nation into a democracy in our own image.’(p. 492)
The Americans had begun the occupation assuming that democratic tendencies
existed in Japan, and that they could unleash them by changing the domestic
balance of power. But how successful were they in creating a truly democratic
and demilitarised society? In any assessment of those seven years several factors
are crucial:

The political biases of individual occupiers.

The failure to reform the bureaucracy.

The failure of trust busting.

The impact of the Cold War and the ‘Reverse Course’.

Continuity and discontinuity.
The aim of this lecture is to provide you with an overview of the Occupation
Period. Firstly I am going to examine the position of the emperor and the
question of why did SCAP decide not to try him as a war criminal. Secondly we’ll
examine the drafting of the new Japanese constitution which was essentially an
American imposition. But the Americans didn’t have it all their own way – so in
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what ways did the Japanese seek to influence Occupation thinking? As for
assessing the successes and failures, the debate is divided into affirmative views
of the 1960’s scholarship and the more negative views of 1980’s and 90’s and it
is this latter view which concentrates on the impact of the Cold War and the
Reverse Course and I will be discussing this at the end of the lecture.
OH Emperor and McArthur
Indirect Rule
Civilian government continued uninterruptedly even after MacArthur
arrived on 30 August followed by units of the American 8th Army. But there was
uncertainty about how they would treat the Japanese government in the early
days of the occupation. The Americans had not made up their minds whether
there should be a military government run by SCAP or a civilian government run
by the Japanese under the broad policy control of SCAP. As the Japanese saw it,
they had a valid government still in being and making rational decisions. They
wanted to have a say in the future reform programme which the Potsdam
Declaration had promised. The civilian government, unlike the allied Occupation
in Germany, was allowed to continue and General MacArthur eventually decided
to conduct an indirect occupation, working through the existing Japanese
governmental structures rather than replacing them.
Despite this General Douglas MacArthur was the indisputable overlord and
it is undoubted that there was an extraordinary concentration of power at the
centre which was complemented by the stationing of civilian and military
personnel throughout the country as well as by hands on manipulation of
Japanese culture, institutions and social life. The Occupation began officially on
the 2nd September 1945 with the signing of the instruments of surrender on
board the USS Missouri and it ended at 11 AM 28th April 1952. The purpose of
the occupation was phrased in the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for
Japan (USIPPJ) which stated that it was to insure that Japan will not again
become a menace to the peace and security of the world. This was to be
achieved not by destroying Japan as a nation but by turning her into a peaceloving nation. It consisted of a 2 pronged attack: Demilitarisation and
Democratisation.
Demilitarisation
Of Immediate concern was the problem of demilitarisation –
demobilisation and disarmament and the attendant problems of repatriation and
the prosecution of those deemed responsible for the war. Also the basic political
and social institutions that were responsible for the war or which contributed to
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the war were to be eliminated or reformed. Many assumptions underlay the
reforms and these reflected the full range of the American political spectrum: left,
liberal, New Deal, mainstream American, conservative and military. A key issue
was the position of the Emperor who had offered to take responsibility for all
other war criminals, but MacArthur refused and made a pragmatic decision not to
prosecute the Emperor.
Refer to handout.
In this decision MacArthur was profoundly influenced by Brigadier General
Bonner F. Fellers, MacArthur’s military secretary and chief of Psychological
warfare operations. Fellers had prepared a research study in the mid 1930s
entitled ‘The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier.’ He had been fascinated by the
intensity of Japanese loyalty and Military discipline. During the later stages of the
war the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) noted that ‘the desirability of
eliminating the present Emperor is questionable; it is probable that he inclines
personally toward the more moderate faction and might prove a useful influence
later.’ Towards the end of the War MacArthur’s command like the OSS and the
other intelligence agencies believed that the Emperor held the key not only to the
surrender but also to postwar reform. The task as Fellers put it was to drive a
wedge between the military leadership and the emperor (with his subjects) by
persuading the Japanese that he had been duped by the militarists.
Ref. To Handout
The Emperor was, therefore, retained amidst constant rumours that he
may abdicate. During the trials the occupation authorities worked carefully to
insulate Hirohito from any taint of war responsibility. The Emperor was forced to
renounce his divinity in a statement which read:
I stand by my people. I am ever ready to share in their joys and
sorrows. The ties between me and my people have always been formed by
mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends or
myths. Nor are they predicated on the false conception that the emperor is
divine, and that the Japanese are superior to other races and destined to
rule the world.
The Showa Constitution
The Emperor’s new position was defined by the postwar Constitution which
replaced the 1899 Meiji Constitution this action was later deemed ‘probably the
single most important accomplishment of the occupation’. On March 6, 1946, a
draft outline of a new constitution was presented to the public as the Japanese
government’s own handiwork and subsequently submitted to the Diet for
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deliberation and adoption. In fact it had been hastily drafted in English by
members of GHQ’s Government Section in a secret week long session after the
Matsumoto committee - the Japanese government’s body responsible for the
drafting of the new charter - failed to produce a radical enough document. On
February 1st the Supreme Commander took the constitution out of Japanese
hands on the grounds that he possessed ‘unrestricted authority to take any action
[he deemed] proper in effecting change in the Japanese constitutional structure’.
No task could be more suited to the idealistic, messianic personality of MacArthur
- a fervent Christian. Why did MacArthur act so swiftly even imposing a deadline
of February 12th 1947? One reason was that MacArthur believed the imperial
dynasty to be under threat both from those Japanese whose ‘republican’ ideals
were growing stronger by the day and by those in the Allied camp who still
harboured strong anti-emperor feelings. There was also pressure from the Far
Eastern Commission who were in a position to override MacArthur if he didn’t act
swiftly enough.
Though the Constitution was Japanised by some tinkering with words and
phrases when it was translated into Japanese, the present Japanese constitution
remains an American document. Yet American-style democracy was considered
too radical so the model is that of a Westminster style government using a British
blueprint. Sovereignty was transferred to the people and it also brought about
the separation of the state and religion and thus the disestablishment of Shinto.
Article 9 renounces war, which though effectively depriving Japan of sovereignty
created the Jieitai the self-defence force which is nevertheless extremely
powerful.
Japanese influence in the occupation reforms overall was enhanced by
several factors:

Internal political change within the US. In 1944 the Democrats lost to
the Republicans. The radical New Dealers were pushed aside by technocrats
and reform in the US itself began to slow down. Likewise in Japan the
emphasis was less on reform than on making Japan self-sufficient and this
played into Japanese hands.

Disagreements within SCAP itself between the reformers and the
military minded allowed the Japanese to play off one faction against another.

Staff members poor knowledge of Japan and the language which
forced them to rely on Japanese interpreters and interest groups.

When the occupation ended in April 1952 General Matthew B.
Ridgeway was in office. (April 1951) The Korean war had been going for two
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years and Ridgeway was concerned more with Korea than about reforms in
Japan which allowed the PM Yoshida a great deal of leeway in framing laws.
So the Japanese did influence reform in various subtle ways. But how successful
were these reforms? In particular how successful was SCAP in creating a
democracy. Mark Gayn was of the opinion that if the yardstick of Democracy was
used the Occupation had failed:
A democracy is not a democracy when its Constitution springs not out of a
nation’s soil, but out of the conqueror’s office. A democracy is not a
democracy when this democratic Constitution is served by an undemocratic
government, interpreted by an undemocratic supreme court, and enforced
by an undemocratic police. A democracy is not a democracy when we – its
mentors – profess out devotion to free speech, and then allow our censors
to bar a free discussion by the Japanese people of their own government,
Constitution, and the problems of living. A democracy, finally, is a sham
when a political and social system supposedly democratic is erected on a
foundation of feudalism, complete with an emperor.
Though political reforms were the centre piece other reforms included:

Landlord-tenant relations

Labour rights

The civil code

The penal code

The electoral system

The cartel structure of Japanese business

The education system

The family system

The legal status of women
The question is how successful were they? Or perhaps the question should be: did
the occupation make a difference? Few would disagree that the occupation had
some effect – so did it make some difference or did it make a big difference?
Historians tend to be divided into two camps. (See H/O)
Historiographical Debate
One of the questions asked is did the occupation do too much or too little?
Those who believe that the occupation did too much usually regard its effects as
major and the for the most part undesirable. Some historians are particularly
critical of censorship – that it set a bad precedent and has become to this day
entrenched in the Japanese media. Yet Kawai ed. of the Japan Times stated that
censorship was unavoidable and has had few adverse effects. Similar arguments
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are thus aired regarding nearly all the reforms – i.e. that they went too far.
Those who wanted the Occupation to do more, however, focus on the reverse
course, due in large part to the effects of the Cold War in 1947-48, and the
abandonment Japan to the old elites. John Dower is particularly critical of one
omission – the failure to curb the power of the bureaucracy. Other historians are
critical of the failure to restructure the old Zaibatsu.
There is also the question of continuity and discontinuity – the idea of
‘deferred change” e.g. Japan’s spectacular postwar economic growth – was that a
legacy of the occupation? From one point of view the war and its immediate
aftermath can be regarded an interruption in normal development i.e. the takeoff point may have occurred in 1937-1945 had Japan remained at peace. As it
was it was deferred until the 1950s and the occupation might have impeded or
helped this recovery to “normal rates”. The enfranchisement of women might
have come about anyway since there was a significant women’s movement before
the war and it seems likely that eventually Japanese women would have obtained
the vote. The occupation might have made a difference of, say – a generation.
In education the reforms opened up access to higher levels of education to far
greater numbers. (OH) Before the war only 10% of young adults
(overwhelmingly men) went through higher secondary school and only 1% of
males through university. Now these figures are 95% through senior high and
40% through college or university with a better balance f males and females. But
before the war Japan, though lagging behind the US, was similar to Europe and
growth in education would have been inevitable.
The Cold War and Occupation Policy
Dower in Japan in War and Peace points to more recent scholarship in
Japan and the West and the opening up of US archives in regard to opinion about
the Cold War. A younger and more sceptical generation of scholars emphasises
Japan’s contribution to the occupation, the influence of special interest groups
and especially the context of US global policy and the Cold War. They tend to
emphasise the repressive aspects of the so-called reverse course. In this context
Dower has seen the Occupation as conforming to three distinct stages:
1. The Soft Cold War Policy 1947-1949: In 1947 MacArthur announced that it
was time to end the occupation on the other hand George Kennan in the State
Department was a spokesman for the new Japan as a Cold War ally and he
opposed an early end to the Occupation. Dower has called this period ‘soft’
because there was no coherent vision and there were many critics of
Occupation policy. Moreover the threat of Soviet attack on Japan was
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minimised and critics were more concerned with Japan going communist.
Japan was thus of negative importance – emphasis on simply denying it to the
enemy.
2. Hard Cold War Policy 1949 – 1951: From 1949 it was now considered
essential to incorporate Japan in a positive manner in US Cold War Strategy.
The question of remilitarization came up – Japan must play an active role in
US military policy. So long term bases in Japan and Okinawa were agreed in
1950. There was a strong reaction against remilitarisation in Japan (Peace
Problems Symposium) vanguard of the Japanese Peace Movement.
Rearmament was most strongly urged by John Foster Dulles but Yoshida
Shigeru enlisted the help of MacArthur in turning Dulles’ request aside.
Domestically the hard Cold War policy was reflected most notably in actions to
weaken the labour movement and the radical left. (Internal Reverse Course).
By the end of 1949 there was a Red Purge – affected 11,000 workers by June
1950 especially union activists. Depurging of alleged militarists and
ultranationalists.
3. Integrated Cold War Policy 1951-2: The San Francisco Peace Treaty in
September 1951 linked the US militarily with Japan, Philippines, Australia and
New Zealand and led to the creation of the self-defence force – Japan became
‘Fortress Japan. Between 1951 and 1960 military special procurement by the
US pumped millions of dollars into the Japanese economy and Yoshida called
the Korean War the ‘gift of the Gods’.
Mark Gayn criticised US containment policy in Asia stating that its image was that
of a powerful and greedy nation, allied with reaction and determined to put down
every mass movement left of centre. With chilling insight, in 1948 he summed
up American policy in Asia:
Force and repression are not the answers to unrest. The answer is
enlightened social reform. Had we supplied it, we would need have
no fear of communism or Russia. The men who drew the Initial
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan understood this fact. The men who
took over in Washington, and the men who executed the policy did
not . . .
“Our greatest error,” Justice William Douglas of the Supreme Court
said recently, “would be to fashion our foreign policy merely in
terms of anti-communism. We will fail miserably if we do no more
than that. For then we will end by railing and ranting at the specter
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of communism, but do nothing to eliminate the conditions on which
communism thrives. If we follow that course, war will soon appear
as the only alternative.”
The policy of “containment” and of “get tough” has proved its
bankruptcy. It has committed us to alliances with feudal and
undemocratic men and factions, opposed by their own peoples and
surviving only with our aid. A military and political system based on
such alliances rests on rotten props. It is no match for the
dynamics of Communist policy and slogans.
Conclusion
Many Americans, therefore, involved in the great experiment and many
American scholars have come to view the occupation as an opportunity that was
missed. American pragmatism during the Cold War meant that the reforms had
only gone halfway and there was a sense of general failure particularly with
regard to the democratisation of Japan. Democratisation was compromised
before the end of the occupation by both the Americans and by the Japanese.