Netherlands Chapter
The Future of Religion and Domestic Conflict
by
Jonathan Fox
Department of Political Studies
Bar Ilan University
foxjon@mail.biu.ac.il
26 june, 2006
VU Auditorium
Society for International Development
1
Abstract: The purpose of this study is threefold. First, it examines the nature of domestic conflict
in the post World War 2 era and what role religion plays in this conflict. This is done based on
the results produced by the quantitative branch of the social science study of conflict. Second,
the results of these studies are distilled into seven trends that are relevant to religion and
conflict. Third, these trends are used to make predictions regarding the future of religion and
conflict.
The eight trends in religion and conflict are as follows: (1) religious conflict is becoming
more common, (2) religion is rarely the sole cause of conflict and is the primary cause in at most
a minority of cases, (3) discrimination against religious minorities is higher than discrimination
against other minorities, (4) Islam is becoming increasingly associated with violence but most of
that violence is against other Muslims, (5) there is no clash of civilizations, (6) religion
influences international intervention, (7) religion can also promote peace (8) there exist macropatterns in terrorism.
Predicting long-term trends using this methodology is not an exact science. However,
based on the results presented here it is most likely that religious conflict will be a significant
proportion of world conflict for at least the short to medium-term future.
For much of the twentieth century social science paradigms like secularization and
modernization theory predicted an end of the era in which religion would be a source of
conflict.1 However, a series of events over the last few decades have made it increasingly
apparent that religion is a potential source of conflict in the modern era. This began in the late
1970s with the Iranian revolution and the Islamic opposition to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The 1980s and 1990s saw an increase in militant Muslim fundamentalist opposition
movements across the Muslim world as well as an increase in the number of other ethnoreligious conflicts–ethnic conflicts between groups that belonged to different religions. The fall
of the USSR unleashed a number of ethno-religious conflicts than had been thought to have been
permanently dormant and new militant Muslim opposition movements in the Muslim majority
former Soviet republics began to develop by the late 1990s. In 1993 the events of Waco Texas
1
For a full discussion of this body of theory and its critics see Fox (2002) and Fox & Sandler (2004).
2
showed that religious violence was a possibility even in the West. Finally, for many of those who
had not yet come to the conclusion that religious conflict remains prominent in the modern era,
the attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent mass terror attacks by Muslim groups against
the West drove the point home.
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, it examines the nature of domestic conflict in
the post World War 2 era and what role religion plays in this conflict. This is done based on the
results produced by the quantitative branch of the social science study of conflict. Second, the
results of these studies are distilled into seven trends that are relevant to religion and conflict.
Third, these trends are used to make predictions regarding the future of religion and conflict.
Some Definitions and Assumptions
Before discussing the empirical results regarding religion and conflict, it is important to
discuss some of the bases for such a discussion. This includes the assumptions upon which all
such studies rest, a social science definition of religion, and the nature of the data used to
perform the analyses. It is also important to emphasize that this study focuses on domestic
conflict within a state and accordingly does not include international conflicts.
Induction
Predicting the future is a difficult endeavor at best. The methodology used here is to
identify past trends and to extrapolate those trends into the future. In other words, the entire
thesis of this study rests upon induction. Induction is a flawed methodology because it rests on
the assumption that what was true yesterday will continue to be true today. This assumption is
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usually correct, but in a small percentage of cases it is not. Even worse, when dealing with social
and political factors over long periods of time there tend to be shifts in trends. Thus, when
studying the phenomenon of religion and conflict, induction can be very accurate in the short
term or even the medium term but it loses a significant portion of its accuracy in the long term.
Some of the trends described below prove this very point. Over the past few decades there have
been some dramatic shifts in the dynamics of religion and conflict
That the behavioralist branch of the social sciences has considerable difficulty in
predicting such shifts is a well known weakness. Yet, behavioralists persist in using the scientific
method and data collection to try and predict the future. The major justification for this is that
this methodology is better than the alternative. Predictions of the future based on intuition are not
uncommon. The difficulty is that nearly everything that can be predicted to happen in the future
is predicted by someone. For example Fukayama (1989) and Huntington (1993; 1996) predicted
very different futures in the wake of the Cold War. Despite the popularity of both of these sets of
predictions, the passage of time has shown that neither was exactly correct.
Induction based on past trends as measured by social science empirical methodology has
several advantages. First, it is based on empirically verifiable facts. Second, these facts tend to
include all of the facts and cases can not be ignored when they are inconvenient. Third, these
facts are fit into a rigid framework for coding information which is set up before the data is
collected and leaves little room for spinning those facts to fit into one’s preconceived notions.
Fourth, while some changes in some trends and relationships can occur over time, phenomena
like religion and conflict are complicated and associated with or influenced by multiple factors.
Thus, even if the dynamics related with one or a few of these factors change, it is most likely that
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many of the relationships that held true in the past will continue to do so. Thus, predictions that
reach decades into the future will likely be less accurate than predications that reach only into the
next few years but the long-term predictions are still likely to have some validity. Given this, the
likelihood of a reasonable amount of accuracy is arguably better than trying to guess which of
multiple non-behavioralist prophets is correct.
A Social Science Definition of Religion
Be that as it may, it is not advisable to discuss a complicated concept like religion
without some sort of framework for understanding what is being discussed. Religion is one of
those topics that few stop to define beyond an ad-hoc definition that was in the past applied to a
notably un-religious topic–I can’t define it “but I know it when I see it.”2 Yet, in order to
accurately discuss religion’s role in politics, society, and conflict a more specific framework in
necessary.
There are numerous philosophical and social science definitions of religion.3
Philosophical concepts of the nature of God and the supernatural are not the most efficient
approach to understanding religion’s role in society because they tend to focus on theological
distinctions rather than social ones. Accordingly, the social science definitions of religion tend to
focus on defining the social role of religion rather than its theological manifestations. In this
tradition, I define below five ways religion influences conflict:
First, religion is a source of many people’s worldviews. These worldviews are not just
2
This quote is attributed to Justice Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme Court when addressing the topic of obscenity and
hard-core pornography.
5
philosophical or intellectual constructs. Rather, they are the tools human beings used to
understand and interpret reality. They define the nature of the world and our place in it. They
define the community to which we belong and who are our enemies. They are intertwined with
our identities, self-images, egos, and unconscious minds. As such, they reside, at least in part, in
the irrational parts of the human psyche. Thus, a perceived threat or challenge to one’s religion is
a threat to the core of one’s being. Such threats provoke a defensive reaction which can often be
violent.
For example, the recent publication of political cartoons in a Danish newspaper which
were subsequently reprinted by other European newspapers which lampooned Islam’s perceived
intolerance provoked exactly such a reaction among many Muslims. That these cartoons touch
upon issues with a basis in fact, as there is a considerable amount of intolerance among at least
some Muslims and that the majority of the world’s current terrorists are Muslims, is not relevant
to this reaction because the cartoons are perceived by many as a challenge to Islam. In fact these
cartoons touched upon a sacred cow of Islam–an absolute prohibition against deriding
Mohammed. Similarly, rational arguments like support for the Western tradition of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press are also not relevant because the perceived challenge touches
upon the elements of the individual and collective beliefs of many Muslims which are not subject
to debate within those populations. Put differently, it is the one who feels that their religion is
challenged who defines what is a challenge to their religion. Arguments based on other
worldviews are not pertinent to this process.
Second, religions tend to have rules and standards of behavior. That is, they generally
3
See Turner (1991: 252-246) and Fox (2002:11-30) for a discussion of these definitions.
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contain instructions for how believers are expected to behave both in general and in specific
situations. This can lead to conflict in two ways. The first is that religions often have rules which
mandate then use of violence in certain circumstances. This includes traditions of holy war–the
concept that in certain circumstances a religious war is allowed, desirable, or required. The
second path between religious laws and violence is a bit more complicated. Often believers are
expected to follow laws which are not in and of themselves violent but which can be seen as a
provocation or threat by members of another religion. For instance, many religions include an
obligation to spread the religion. Yet members of the target audience of these efforts at
proselytization see this as a direct attach upon their religion. In 2002 at least 77 countries
somehow restricted missionary work by minority religions.4
Third, religion is a source of legitimacy. It can legitimate the actions of both governments
and opposition movements, including the most violent of activities.
Fourth, religions are often associated with institutions. As is discussed below these
institutions can have a dual role in conflict. On one hand, based on classic mobilization theory
existing institutions which organize people facilitate the process of political mobilization.5 For
example, if one wants to organize a demonstration in Washington DC in support of Israel, a
particularly efficient way to do so is to contact the country’s Synagogues and have the Rabbis
announce demonstration from the pulpit and perhaps contact members through those institutions
normal channels of communication. A list of fax numbers and e-mails of these institutions is
much more efficient than trying to contact all of the Jews in the US individually. On the other
4
This result is based on an analysis of the Religion (RAS) and State datset which includes information on the extent of government
involvement in religion for 175 governments. For more on the dataset see Fox and Sandler (2003; 2005).
7
hand, religious institutions tend to be conservative and support the status quo. Angering a
government has consequences including the loss of benefits that many religious institutions
receive from the government as well as potential retaliation against the institution itself or the
religion’s adherents. In the case of the United States these considerations are not particularly
relevant due to the protections for freedom of religion, the right to protest, and the lack of
government funding for religion that exist in the US. However, a study of 175 states shows that
in 2002 134 (76.6%) somehow fund religion or religious institutions and 131 (75.1%) place at
least some minor restrictions on minority religions.6 Thus, the threat of restrictions or rescinding
of funding is a real consideration in the overwhelming majority of states.
Finally, religion is a source of identity. While this concept overlaps with the concept of
worldviews described above it is worth noting separately because the social sciences have
developed a large literature linking identity with conflict.7
It is also important to single out identity because the majority of quantitative studies of
religion and conflict focus on identity. That is, they measure whether conflicts between groups
which belong to different religions are more common or violent than conflicts between groups
which belong to the same religion or they measure whether the extent of religious diversity or
religious polarization in a state is linked to conflict. A minority of studies look at whether
specific religious factors like religious discrimination, religious institutions, religious legitimacy,
or the presence of religious issues in a conflict influence the dynamics of conflict.
5
6
See, for example, Johnston and Figa (1988), Tarrow (1989: 7), McAdam (1982: 43047), and McArthy and Zald (1976: 1217-1218)
These results are based on the Religion and State dataset. For more on this dateset see the description in the Data section of this
stude.
7
See, for example, Anderson (1986), Dobratz (2001), Fox (2003), Isaacs (1975), Romanucci-Ross and DeVois (1995), and Seul
(1999).
8
This focus on religious identity in quantitative studies is likely because this type of
variable is much easier to design and collect than variables like the extent of religious
discrimination in a state. The results based on identity can be viewed in two ways. On one hand,
there is a theoretical basis for arguing that differences in identity create an in-group vs. out-group
dynamic which leads to conflict. On the other hand, if one finds that differences in religious
identity lead to conflict it is likely because other specific factors like religious discrimination,
legitimacy, or institutions are in play. Thus, the studies based on more specific variables give us
a better understanding of the dynamics of religion and conflict. Nevertheless, the religious
identity-based studies still have considerable explanatory value.
The data
The major basis for the findings presented here is previous analyses performed by the
author based on three datasets: the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, the State Failure (SF)
dataset, and the Religion and State (RAS) dataset.
The MAR dataset contains information on 337 ethnic minorities who were politically
active at some point between 1945 and 2003,8 many of which are ethno-religious minorities.
Ethno-religious minorities are defined here as minorities which are both ethnically and
religiously distinct from the majority group in the state in which they live. The unit of analysis in
the MAR data is an ethnic minority within a state. Thus the same minority may be coded in
several states, as is the case with the Hutus and Tutsis, both of which are coded for Rwanda,
Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also the same state may contain several
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minorities as is the case with India. However, each dyad of minority and majority group in the
dataset in unique.
Studies based on this dataset are particularly useful in understanding the causes ethnoreligious conflict for two reasons. First it is the most comprehensive database on ethnic conflict
and contains all groups which meet the projects criteria of either being politically active and/or
suffering from high levels of discrimination. Second, supplemental data collected separately for
use with the MAR dataset provides the most detailed data on religion and conflict available in
any empirical format at the time of this writing.9
The SF dataset includes major episodes of “state failure” which “encompasses a range of
severe political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by macro-societal events such as those
that occurred in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) in the
1990s.”10 The data used here comes from the ethnic conflict, revolutionary war, and mass killing
sections of the dataset. Thus, unlike the MAR dataset, the SF dataset includes all forms of violent
domestic conflict. However the violence threshold for inclusion ion the SF dataset is
considerably higher than the threshold for inclusion in the MAR dataset. The unit of analysis in
the SF dataset is a year of conflict. The dataset contains 733 years of ethnic conflict, 268 years of
mass killings, and 473 years of revolutionary wars between 1948 and 2004. As some of the cases
in the three categories overlap, the total number of years of conflict covered by the dataset is
8
Some of the studies are based on earlier versions of the MAR data which contained fewer cases.
9
Details on the MAR dataset and the variables contained in it, as well as a copy of the dataset itself, are available at the project’s
website at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar. The supplemental data on religion and details on the variables contained in it are also available at the
MAR website at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/links under the heading of Jonathan Fox, “Ethnoreligious Conflict Dataset for Use with the
Minorities at Risk Dataset”.
10
PITF Website: http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/. Downloaded February 1, 2006.
10
1184.11
The SF and MAR datasets compliment each other well because each dataset’s strengths
counter the other’s weaknesses. The MAR contains hundreds of variables which allows for
testing causality and controlling for the influence of a number of factors but is limited only to
ethnic conflict. The SF dataset covers all types of major violent domestic conflict but is not
suitable for multi-variate causal analyses.
The RAS dataset does not focus on conflict but rather on the extent of government
involvement in religion for 175 governments between 1990 and 2002. It includes data on
religious demographics, government support for religion (including whether or not a state has an
official religion), restrictions on the practices of religious minorities, regulation of the majority
religion, and the extent to which a government legislates religion. 62 individual variables which
fall in these categories are coded so the information is quite detailed.12
Most of the detailed analyses upon which this study is based are presented elsewhere but
tables and figures are presented throughout the study in order to illustrate major points or provide
more detail. Also, when relevant, studies by other scholars are referenced.
Trends in Religion and Conflict
This study identifies eight trends in religion and conflict. As noted above, the best
available prediction of future trends is the assumption that these trends will continue. However,
there is a strong likelihood that some of these trends will change over time.
11
Details on the SF dataset as well as a copy of the dataset are available at the project’s website at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/.
A copy of the supplimental religion data fr use with the SF dataset is available from Jonathan Fox at foxjon@mail.biu.ac.il.
11
Trend #1: Religious Conflict is Becoming More Common
Religious conflict was less common among domestic conflicts than non-religious conflict
for the entire second half of the twentieth century and through the end of 2001. Beginning in
2002, based on results from the SF dataset presented in figure 1, religious conflict became more
common than non-religious conflict. However religious conflict did not overtake non-religious
conflict overnight. The rise of religious conflict relative to non-religious conflict is a trend that
has been present for decades.
[Figure 1 about here]
Before continuing with this discussion it is important to note that for the purposes of this
analysis religious conflict includes two types of conflict. The first is religious-identity conflict
which includes any conflict between two groups which belong to different religions or different
denominations of the same religion. The second is religious wars which includes cases where the
issue in the conflict includes religious ones. This usually refers to cases where fundamentalist
groups are challenging a state which they consider to be too secular. Several of the religiousidentity conflicts included in the SF dataset are not in particular over religious issues. This
includes several of the various civil wars in the former Yugoslav republics and the conflict in
Cyprus, among others. These conflicts are mostly about separatism and who rules. Thus, this
12
For a basic description and analysis of this dataset with regard to non-conflict issues, see Fox (2006). A copy of this dataset is
available from the author at foxjon@mail.biu.ac.il.
12
definition of religious conflict is a very broad one. However, in recent times even conflicts like
these are beginning to have more of a religious nature. For instance, any conflict which involves
Muslims tends to attract militant Muslim fundamentalists who can often change the nature of the
conflict.
Returning to figure 1, the results show a long-term trend of a rise in religious conflict as a
proportion of all conflict. Conflict in general rose steadily in the post World War 2 era until the
early 1990s when it began to drop. In general religious conflict followed this pattern though the
specifics differ. The amount of religious conflict was stable until the late 1970s when the first
religious wars since the early 1960s took place. (The post-World War 2 religious wars included
in the SF dataset which took place before the 1970s all took place in Indonesia.) The first one to
start was the religious revolution in Iran, followed shortly by religious conflicts in Afghanistan,
Nigeria and Syria. These conflicts accounted for the initial rise in religious conflicts and,
interestingly, all involved militant Muslim fundamentalists challenging secular rulers. Between
1987 and 1990 a number of religious identity conflicts started, many but not all of which
involved Muslims. These include the Palestinian uprising against Israel, the ethnic war in Sri
Lanka, the civil war in Liberia, violence in the Kashmir province of India, and violent protests by
Muslims in the Xinjiang province of China.
In 1991 and 1992 a number of religious conflicts started which resulted in religious
conflicts being nearly as common as non-religious ones. This included militant Muslim
fundamentalist uprisings in Egypt and Algeria, the civil war in Afghanistan which started after
the Soviet forces were ejected and eventually resulted in the Taliban rule, and a number of ethnic
conflicts in the former Soviet Bloc. Beginning in 1993 the number of both religious and non13
religious conflicts began to drop dramatically at approximately the same rate. Beginning in 2002
the number of non-religious conflicts continued to drop but religious conflicts stabilized and
even increased slightly.
Thus, the fact that religious conflicts in 2002 became a majority of all religious conflict
was not due to a dramatic rise in religious conflicts at that time but because religious conflicts
were decreasing less swiftly than non-religious conflicts. The dramatic rise in religious conflicts
occurred much earlier in two waves, the first in the late 1970s to the early 1980s and the second
in the late 1980s to the early 1990s. In 2004 the number of religious conflicts was similar to the
number in the early 1980s. In contrast the last time the level of non-religious conflict was as low
as it was in 2004 was the early 1960s.
Conclusion for trend #1: The major shifts in religious conflict occurred between the late
1970s and early 1990s. Since the early 1990s, religious conflicts have been either almost as
common as non-religious conflicts or slightly more common than them. Assuming that this trend
continues, we can expect religious conflicts to be about as common, perhaps slightly more
common than non-religious ones.
Trend # 2: Religion is Rarely the Sole Cause of Conflict and is the Primary Cause in at Most a
Minority of Cases
It is arguable that religion is never the sole cause of a conflict because most conflicts
have complex origins. For example the numerous militant Muslim fundamentalist uprisings in
Muslim states, which on their face would seem to be conflicts that are solely about religion, upon
closer examination tend to also involve secular causes. Most of these uprisings tend to take place
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in authoritarian states where political expression is limited and the opportunities for meaningful
participation in government decision-making is even more limited. Often the only viable forum
for alternative elites to engage in political expression are religious institutions. Thus, it is not
surprising that it is religious groups which are often the venue for opposition movements in these
states.
Algeria is case in point. Algeria has been for all of its history ruled by a single party.
During the 1970s and 1980s Algeria experienced a number of economic, political, and social
crises including unemployment, underemployment–especially among those with university
degrees–, a severe housing shortage, population growth, insufficient agricultural production, a
failed industrialization program, and foreign debt. From about 1980 to 1988 the economic crisis
helped Islamic fundamentalists to transform economic discontent into support for their cause. In
1988 a new constitution allowed effective political opposition which allowed Muslim
fundamentalists to use mostly peaceful and democratic means to further their cause. The FIS,
Algeria’s most prominent Islamic political party, won surprising victories in local elections in
1990 and had considerable success in the first round of national elections in December 1991 and
were expected to have enough seats in the national assembly after the second round in January
1992. However, before this could happen, a military coup in January 1992 canceled the second
round of the national elections. Only then did the violent Islamic revolution against the Algerian
government begin. (Fox, 2002: 129-136) Thus, the violent religious conflict in Algeria includes
major economic crises as one of the basic causes and the closure of the democratic process
among its more proximate causes.
Based on results from the MAR dataset, presented in figure 2, it is arguable that violence
15
in all ethnic conflicts (which include the vast majority of religious identity conflicts which are
coded in the SF dataset) is not primarily caused by religion. These results show the combined
influence of religion and separatism on the level of ethnic rebellion13 and show that nationalism
is the primary cause of conflict with religion as an intervening variable which exacerbates ethnic
conflict. This is because throughout the 1945-2003 period separatist conflicts, whether they are
religious ones or not, are consistently more violent than non-separatist conflicts. Beginning in the
1980, among separatist conflicts, religious conflicts are more violent. However, among nonseparatist conflicts, the levels of violence between religious and non-religious conflicts are
similar and when there is a difference, the religious conflicts tend to be less violent.
[Figure 2 about here]
Put simply, separatism without religion is associated with ethnic violence, religion
without separatism is associated with low ethnic violence, and religion and separatism combined,
at least since 1980, is associated with the highest levels of violence. The logical conclusion based
on this finding is that ethnic conflicts are rarely very violent unless there is an element of
separatism to the conflict. If a conflict has a separatist element, religion can exacerbate the level
of violence but ethno-religious minorities are unlikely to engage in high levels of violence if they
make no separatist demands. Thus, the primary cause of ethnic violence is separatism. Religion
is not a primary cause and, rather, is an important intervening factor. Again, it is important to
13
For the purposes of this study separatist groups are those which are actively making demands for some form of independence or
regional autonomy. Rebellion is measured by the MAR dataset on the following scale: 0–none.; 1–political banditry, sporadic terrorism; 2–
campaigns of terrorism; 3–local rebellions; 4–small-scale guerrilla activity; 5–intermediate-scale guerrilla activity; 6–large-scale guerrilla
16
emphasize that this particular finding is specific to ethnic conflicts.
That being said, this finding can also be applied to the more international modes of
religious terrorism exemplified by groups like Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is not strictly a separatist
group or even a nationalist one. Yet its ideology can be called one of pan-Islamic nationalism.
One of the organization’s goals is to set up a pan-Islamic state ruled by Sharia (Islamic) law and
in doing so they must fight those they see as an obstacle to that goal. Thus in a sense they are
nationalist but their nationalism refers to a state larger than any which exists today. Also they are
similar to separatists in that they wish to take parts of existing states, in most cases entire states,
and build from them a new sovereign political entity. Thus, the violence perpetrated by Al-Qaeda
and like-minded groups can be said to fit into this pattern where the most violent conflicts are
those that combine religion and nationalism.
This combined with the argument above that most religious fundamentalist challenges to
the state involve a number of worldly factors lead to the major conclusion for trend #2: Few, if
any, conflicts are solely about religion and a minority of conflicts are primarily about religion.
However, a good number of conflicts which have other primary causes are influenced by
religion.
Thus, the findings in trend #1 that religious conflict has been increasing and since 2002 a
majority of the world’s most violent conflict can be classified as religious, while accurate can be
misleading unless taken in context. The findings in trend # 1 show that there are an increasing
number of conflicts with an easily identifiable religious element but the findings in trend #2
show that most of these conflicts which can be classified as religious are more complex and also
activity; 7–protracted civil war, fought by rebel military with base areas.
17
include many worldly elements. Thus, more properly, the religious influence in conflict has been
increasing since the late 1970s but this is not to the exclusion of the many worldly political,
social, and economic factors that cause conflict.
There are no shortage of quantitative studies which show that some aspect of religion
increases the level of violence in a state. Roeder (2003) found religious differences to be among
the important predictors of conflict . Collier & Hoeffler (2002), Rummel (1997), Reynal-Querol
(2002), Sambanis (2001), and Vanhanen (1999) found that religious diversity is correlated with
various forms of domestic conflict but also found that other factors were important, often more
important.
Trend # 3: Discrimination against Religious Minorities is Higher than Discrimination against
Other Minorities
Conflicts generally have at least two sides and conflicts that occur within states usually,
though not always, are between the state government, or in some cases the majority group which
controls that government, and a minority group. Despite the fact that the state government is
generally a party to most domestic conflicts, most studies of domestic conflict focus on the
behavior of the minority group which challenges the state. This oversight is a major weakness of
the literature on conflict. Many studies do account for regime-based factors like the extent of
democracy or the power of the state when predicting minority behavior but few use state
behavior as a dependent variable. This is unfortunate as most studies agree that state treatment of
minority groups is a major potential instigator of domestic conflict, though clearly not the only
one.
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An analysis of the levels of cultural and political discrimination14 against religious and
non-religious minorities using the MAR dataset, presented in figure 3, shows that discrimination
against religious minorities is consistently higher between 1990 and 2002, the years for which
data are available. The MAR dataset does not include detailed data on religious discrimination
but the RAS dataset contains a variable for religious discrimination based on 16 different types
of restrictions on religious activities by minority religions, each of which is rated for the severity
of the restriction. The change in the mean level of discrimination against religious minorities,
presented in Figure 4, shows that on average religious discrimination rose significantly between
1990 and 2002.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
Conclusion for trend #3: Discrimination against religious minorities is higher than
against non-religious minorities and religious discrimination against religious minorities is
increasing. This will likely reinforce trend # 1–that religious conflict has been increasing and has
reached the point where it is more common than non-religious conflict–as well as trend #2–that
religion is becoming an increasingly important factor in conflict.
Trend #4: Islam Is Becoming Increasingly Associated with Violence but Most of That Violence Is
Against Other Muslims
14
Each of these variables is based on a list of specific types of discrimination. For a full listing of the components of these variables
see the Minorities at Risk codebook at www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar.
19
Figure 5 shows the yearly percentage of religious conflicts in which at least one Muslim
group participated. With the exception of 1973 when 50% of all religious conflicts involved at
least one Muslim group, Muslims participated in a majority of all religious conflicts throughout
the period analyzed. Nevertheless there has been a measurable increase in Muslim participation
in religious conflict over the 1965 to 2004 period. Before the 1990s, Muslims never participated
in more than 82% of all religious conflicts except in 1980 when they participated in about 86%
of all religious conflict. From 1994 onward they participated in at least 88% of all religious
conflicts every year and in 2003 and 2004 all religious conflicts involved at least one Muslim
group. In contrast, Muslim participation in non-religious conflict was considerably lower in the
1965 to 2004 period never reaching more than one-third of all non-religious conflicts.
[Figure 5 about here]
Perhaps the clearest evidence of increasing Muslim participation in conflict is Muslim
participation in all conflicts (the results for religious and non-religious conflicts combined.) Until
1980 no more than 39% of all conflicts involved Muslim groups in any given year. Between
1980 and 1991 between 43% and 49% of all conflicts involved Muslims. From 1992 onward a
majority of all conflicts involved at least one Muslim group. This rise in Muslim participation in
all conflict mirrors the rise in religious conflict documented in trend #1. As most religious
conflicts involve Muslims this is not surprising.
However, as will be recalled, religious conflicts include both religious-identity conflicts
between groups which belong to different religions and religious wars among members of the
20
same religion. Thus, that Muslims participate in a large number of religious conflicts does not
mean that most of the conflicts in which they participate are inter-religious. As presented in table
1, this is the case. Muslim groups are most likely to be fighting other Muslim groups. The results
show that this trend of intra-religious conflict being more common than inter-religious conflict is
also true of Christian groups. As the “other” category contains numerous religions for which
sufficiently specific information was not coded it is not possible to tell whether non-Abrahamic
religions also follow this pattern.
[Table 1 about here]
Another important aspect of this trend is that studies which focus on terrorism show that
most new terror groups since 1980 are Muslim groups and most, but by no means all, terrorism
since 1980 has been perpetrated by Muslim groups. (Weinberg & Eubanks, 1998; Weinberg et.
al., 2002)
Conclusion for trend #4: Muslim participation in conflict, and especially religious
conflict, has increased to the point where in recent years all religious domestic conflicts involve
at least one Muslim group. However, as many of these conflicts are Muslim vs. Muslim religious
conflicts, most Muslim groups involved in domestic conflict are fighting other Muslim groups.
Trend #5: There is No Clash of Civilizations
The above results suggest that Huntington’s (1993; 1996) notorious prediction of a future
clash of civilizations is incorrect. He predicted that in the post-Cold War era that the world
21
would be divided into several civilizations, which were based to a large extent on religion, and
that most of the post-Cold War conflict would be between these civilizations. The fact that most
conflicts are within the same religion contradicts this. It is also important to note that from the
time the theory was first put forward, it has been controversial.15
It is possible to categorize the various participants in the conflicts in the SF dataset into
Huntington’s civilizations and examine how many conflicts in a given year are between
civilizations. This test is presented in figure 6. The results show that at no time between 1960
and 2004 were civilizational conflicts more than 45% of all conflicts. This is far less than one
would expect if Huntington’s paradigmatic claims that most posr-Cold War conflict will be
civilizational was correct.
[Figure 6 about here]
There was a rise in civilizational conflict which coincides with the rise in religious
conflict documented in trend # 1. This is not surprising as there is considerable overlap between
Huntington’s concept of civilization and religious identity. It is arguable that this overlap makes
civilization no more than an inferior surrogate variable for religion for a number of reasons.
First, the results presented here show stronger results for religion than civilization–with religious
conflicts becoming a majority of state failures in 2002 even though civilizational conflicts never
become a majority of all state failures. Second, the empirical studies of religion noted above find
that religion has an impact on conflict but most quantitative studies of domestic conflict which
15
For a full discussion of the clash of civilizations theory and its critics see Fox (2004) and Fox & Sandler (2004).
22
focus on Huntington’s theory tend to disprove the theory.16 Third, in the few causal studies
which compare the impact of religion and civilization on conflict, the religion variables tend to
have a stronger influence. (Fox, 2004; Roeder, 2003) Fourth, religion is a concept that is more
tangible than civilization. For instance religious discrimination can be defined as restrictions on
the religious practices of a group. There is no similar form of “civilizational discrimination” that
is distinct from other types of discrimination that can be placed on any minority whether it is a
“civilizational” minority or not.
Conclusion for trend #5: Civilizational conflicts were never a majority of all conflicts and
Huntington’s concept of civilizations is likely an inferior surrogate for religion.
Trend #6: Religion Influences International Intervention
An analysis of interventions in ethnic conflicts between 1990 and 1995 (the only years
for which data are currently available) in the MAR shows that religion influences international
intervention. As presented in figure 6, inter-religious conflicts are much more likely to attract
intervention by foreign governments than are intra-religious conflicts. Also, as presented in
figure 7, the vast majority of interventions by foreign governments in ethnic conflicts are cases
where the foreign government and the minority on whose behalf they intervene belong to the
same religion.
[Figures 6 and 7 about here]
16
See, for example, Tusicisny (2004), Fox (2004), and Henderson and Singer (2000).
23
This set of results is particularly important in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the
Cold War, international intervention in order to protect the human rights of minority groups has
become increasingly common and acceptable. These results show that religious minorities tend
to benefit from this more often than other ethnic minorities and that this is likely because they
are more likely to attract support from their co-religionists on other states. This dynamic
underscores the increasing importance of religion in all aspects of domestic conflict in recent
decades.
Conclusion for trend #6: Religious conflicts attract more international intervention and
religious affinities with minority groups significantly influence the decision to intervene.
Trend # 7: Religion Can Also Promote Peace
There is a growing literature which argues that religion can be used as a tool to promote
conflict resolution and peace.17 The basic argument is that religious traditions often have multiple
and complex theologies which allow room for interpretation and selective emphasis. Appleby
(2000) calls this “the ambivalence of the sacred.” Accordingly, it is possible to find elements of
religious traditions, dogmas, and ideologies which support peace and encourage religious leaders
to convince their followers to place the emphasis on these aspects of their traditions rather than
the violent ones.
Case studies show that this is possible in fact. Fawcett (2000) in a study of the role of
religious institutions in the conflict in Northern Ireland and in support for the Apartheid regime
in South Africa found that in some situations these religious institutions supported conflict and in
24
others supported conflict resolution. In the case of South Africa the Dutch Reformed Church
supported Apartheid until it became clear that their members were beginning to oppose
Apartheid, at which point the Church began to actively oppose Apartheid. Similarly religious
institutions in Northern Ireland at first supported conflict but as the conflict became less popular
supported power-sharing arrangements. Fawcett argues that these institutions changes their
stands on these issues in order to remain in line with the opinions of their congregants and to do
otherwise would have risked losing congregants. Thus both sets of religious institutions found
doctrinal justifications for both conflict and peace and the key to determining which aspects of
their doctrines would be emphasized were based on worldly factors rather than religious ones.
Gill (1998) similarly argues that the decision by the Catholic Church in various Latin American
states to oppose or support a regime is based on the extent to which that regime is popular among
its congregants.
Empirical results in Fox (2002; 2004) also show that the decision by religious institutions
to support or oppose violence is based at least in part on worldly concerns. In most cases of
ethnic conflict, the religious institutions of the minority group tend to support the status-quo.
However, there are two situations where they support conflict–when the religion itself is at issue
in the conflict and when the conflict involves issues of separatism. The first situation represents a
threat to the religion itself and the second represents a situation where a cause is too popular for
religious institutions to ignore.
Conclusion for trend #7: Religious institutions and leaders are capable of encouraging
both peace and war. Encouraging them to support the latter is a potential tool for conflict
17
Error! Main Document Only. See, for example, Abu-Nimer (2001), Appleby (2000), and Gopin (2000; 2002).
25
resolution.
Trend # 8: There Exist Macro-Patterns in Terrorism
David Rapoport18 argues that modern terrorism follows a pattern of waves which last for
about a generation. He describes four overlapping waves. The first was anarchist terror which
dates back to the 1880s, followed by the anti-colonial wave which began in the 1920s and lasted
about 40 years. The third wave, the new left wave began in the 1960s and diminished with the
end of the 20th century. Finally, the religious wave began in 1979 and, according to Rapoport, if
it follows the pattern of its predecessors will end around 2025. Islam is at the heart of this wave,
but it also involves groups from other religions.
Rapoport defines this type of wave as “a cycle of activity in a given time period, a cycle
characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international
character; similar activities occur in many countries driven by a common predominant energy
shaping participating groups and their mutual relationships.” These waves of terror are made up
of organizations. The organizations tend to have a life-span shorter than the wave with which
they are associated but tend to spawn splinter or successor groups which continue their ideology
and terror campaigns. When a wave’s energy is no longer able to inspire the formation of new
organizations, the wave dissipates. These waves follow a generational life-cycle “which is
suggestive of a human life cycle where dreams inspiring parents lose their attractiveness for
children.”
18
This discussion of David Rapoport’s theory is based on an unpublished updated version of David Rapoport “Modern Terror: The
Four Waves” Current History, 2001: 419-425.
26
Based on this theory, we are currently near the apex of the religious wave–about half way
between its formation and eventual ebb. Accordingly, if Rapoport’s predictions are correct, we
would expect it to start ebbing within 10 to 15 years and dissipate within 20 or 25 years.
However, before this wave finishes dissipating, a fifth wave with a new ideology will likely
emerge, perhaps one based on the new anarchist groups which currently protest globalization.
This is because of two factors. First, there will always be those who are dissatisfied with aspects
of the international system. Second, terrorism is an extremely effective tactic for groups who
wish to oppose modern states.
Others, like Enders & Sandler (2002) focus on shorter-term cycles which occur within the
waves described by Rapoport. These cycles are based around the tactics used by terrorists and
counter-tactics used by governments to stop the terrorists. In brief, terrorists develop a new tactic
for which governments are not prepared resulting in a rise in successful terror attacks.
Governments develop counter-tactics which reduce the effectiveness of these attacks forcing the
terrorists to develop new tactics. Similarly, new terrorist groups or cells emerge and perpetrate
terror attacks. Governments become aware of these groups or cells and, through various means,
harass them in order to reduce their effectiveness. This results in the formation of new groups or
cells of which the government is less aware and are, thereby, more free to perpetrate attacks.
Because international terror groups have links with each other, sometimes train together, and
certainly are influenced by demonstration effect–the effect where one group’s successful tactics
are adopted by others–it is possible to examine these cycles not only with respect to individual
terror groups but also all terror groups as a whole.
Thus, within a wave of terror there are cycles in which the number of deaths caused by
27
terror rises and falls. The length of the cycle increases with the logistical complexity of the terror
tactic involved. Furthermore, these cycles are not influenced by the number of attacks or failed
attacks. Rather it is the number of deaths caused. In other words, terror groups wish to inflict a
certain amount of damage and tend to be willing to do what it takes to accomplish that goal. Yet
government actions do influence their ability to do so which results in cycles of about two years.
(Enders & Sandler, 2002)
Conclusion for trend #7: Terrorism follows cycles which play out both on the
generational scale and shorter-term time-scales.
Conclusions
Overall this review shows that religion is becoming an increasingly important element of
intra-state conflict. It also shows that Islam is playing a significant role in this rise in religious
conflict. In 2002 religious conflicts became the majority of all intra-state conflicts listed in the
State Failure dataset. Beginning in 2003 all of the religious conflicts in the SF dataset involved
Muslims. While this it seems to have reached its high point thus far in the post-911 era, this
trend, as well as several other documented in this study, date back to the late 1970s with the
occurrence of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This initial rise in
religious conflict also coincides with the beginning of the religious wave of terror described by
David Rapoport. Thus, the trends that have become increasingly apparent in recent years can be
traced back to events nearly three decades ago.
Based on this, these trends are not a temporary phenomenon. If David Rapoport is correct
they are generational and will likely continue for another two decades, though they will likely
28
begin to ebb sooner. However, it is arguable that this religious wave of conflict may have more
staying power than previous waves for a number of reasons. Religious conflicts tend to be more
intractable than others. Most forms of political conflict are over issues that in theory can be open
to negotiation, no mater how reluctant one or both sides may be to enter such negotiations.
Religious conflicts are often over matters of principle which are not open to negotiation. That is
the motivation behind the conflict are generally of a non-bargainable nature. Wentz (1987) calls
this phenomenon the “walls of religion.” People build psychological, communal, and cultural
walls around their belief systems and defend them at all costs. Laustsen and Waever (2000: 719)
similarly argue that “religion deals with the constitution of being as such. Hence, one can not be
pragmatic on concerns challenging this being.” Thus, when a conflict includes people guided by
faith and not power gains, there is little room for compromise as faith is not something that is
easily compromised. This is exponentially true if both sides are guided by faith.
Thus, in many ways this is an ideological conflict between two world-views. The first is a
more secular western world-view that allows for religious freedom but generally does not seek to
impose religion upon those that do not want it. However, the West arguably does seek to spread
elements of liberalism including free trade, human rights, and democracy across the world and,
thereby, can be said to be seeking a form of ideological hegemony. The second world-view is a
set of religious ideologies whose advocates seek ideological hegemony. This attitude is most
readily apparent among militant Muslim fundamentalists but can be found among
fundamentalists of other religions.19
This clash of worldviews seems more analogous to the former East-West clash between
29
liberalism and communism which began in the early twentieth century and lasted at least until
1990. As there are still several communist states in the world it is arguable that the liberalismcommunism conflict has not fully ended, but it has certainly ebbed considerably. Given this type
of time-scale, the prominence of religious conflict could easily last another fifty years.
As noted earlier, predicting long-term trends using this methodology is not an exact
science. However, based on the results presented here it is most likely that religious conflict will
be a significant proportion of world conflict for at least the short to medium-term. This means
that the next ten to twenty years will continue to see a significant amount of religious conflict
and religious influence on conflict. Beyond that it is more difficult to tell but there remains a real
possibility of this trend of the prominence of religion in domestic conflict will continue for
several decades.
19
See Appleby (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the issue of militant fundamentalism.
30
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