Summa Fratris Alexandri
trans. Joshua C. Benson
Book Three, Part One, [Q. 23]
Title Two: On the suitability of the incarnation if nature had not fallen.
Next it is asked about the fittingness of the incarnation, if nature had not fallen through
sin, whether in fact there would be reason or fittingness for incarnation.
And it is show that there is.
a. Dionysius says: “The good is being diffusive of itself.” So we say that in the divine
the Father diffuses his own goodness into the Son through generation and from both there is a
diffusion into the Holy Spirit through procession. This diffusion is in the Trinity and this is the
supreme diffusion, while no creature yet existed. Therefore, if the supreme good, while a
creature does exist, does not diffuse itself into the creature, it will be possible to think of a
greater diffusion than its diffusion. Therefore if there ought to be a supreme diffusion of it
because it is the supreme good, it is more fitting that it diffuses itself in a creature. But this
diffusion cannot be understood as supreme, unless it is united to a creature. Therefore it is fitting
that God is united to a creature and especially to the human creature, as was show.1 Therefore
having supposed that nature had not fallen, the supreme good would still be united to it.
b. Again, there is not beatitude except in God. Again, the whole rational creature is
capable of beatification. But the rational creature that is the human being has a twofold
knowledge: sensitive and intellective and has delight in both. If, then, the whole is capable of
beatification, then [this is so] according to both sense and intellect. Therefore it is fitting that in
God it is beatified as to both. But the sense cannot be beatified in God by considering God
according to himself and in his proper nature, but only the intellect. This is because the sense is
only beatified or delighted in the sensible alone or in that which is corporeal. If then the whole
human being ought to be beatified in God, it is necessary that God be corporeal and sensible.
But it is not fitting that he take any corporeal nature, but only a human nature, as it was said.2
c. Again, it is the case that we understand three persons in a unity of substance, and at
the opposite end, three substances in a unity of person and between these two, three persons in
three substances. Now one of the extremes is in the nature of things, namely, three persons in
one substance, as in the Trinity. The middle, three persons in three substances, is demonstrated
by three men or angels, or by one person in the Trinity, one angel and a human being. Then it is
the case that we can posit a third, namely one person in three substances. But this can only occur
through the union of divine nature to the human, because in no other creature is it possible to
posit two substances than in man namely spiritual and corporeal like soul and body. Likewise no
creature can perfect a human being in such way that it is united with him. An angel cannot do
this since a human being according to the superior part is equal to the angel. Therefore it is
appropriate that there is a union of divine nature to human nature in the unity of person so that
there is perfection in the universe of things, so that just as the three persons in one nature and
three persons in three natures, so three natures in one person, namely divinity, body and soul.
1
2
Book 3.16-17.
Book 3.16-17.
1
Summa Fratris Alexandri
trans. Joshua C. Benson
d. Again, we find unity of nature in three person and this belongs to the perfection of
nature as in God. Again, we find unity of person in many natures, as in the human being. If then
what is in many persons belongs to the perfection of nature, then it will also belong to the
perfection of a person that it can be in many natures. If, then, what is more perfect must always
be attributed to God in terms of nature and person, just as the divine nature is the being in many
persons, so the divine person will be capable of being in many natures. But this cannot be
posited eternally, because many natures cannot be from eternity. Therefore some divine person
is in many natures in time. But this is not possible unless it is united to a created nature.
Therefore it is fitting for demonstrating the perfection in the divine personality, that the divine
nature is united to the created nature in a divine person. But it is not suitable to just any, as it
was said,3 but only to the human, nor even to just any person in the Trinity but to the Son alone,4
as it was said above. Therefore it is admitted that having set aside the fall of human nature, there
is still fittinginess for union in the person of the Son.
For the opposite position there is an authority. 1. “It was of no value that he be born,
unless it would have been of value [for us] to be redeemed.”5 Therefore the incarnation is not
useful unless redemption would have followed. But if nature had not fallen, there would have
been no redemption. Therefore supposing that nature is not fallen, there is no fruit for the
incarnation. Therefore it is not fitting that God be incarnated, since it is not fitting for God to do
something to no purpose.
I respond: Without prejudice it must be conceded that even if human nature had not
fallen, there is still fittingness for incarnation, according as Blessed Bernard says, on Jonah 1:12:
Because of me this storm has arisen, explaining that verse of the Son of God, saying that Lucifer
foresaw the rational creature assumed into unity with the person of the Son of God “he saw and
was jealous.” Hence jealousy was the cause of the devil’s fall and motivates him to tempt the
human person, whose happiness he envied, so that through sin human nature would not merit
assumption and unification to God. From which it is clear that Lucifer understood the union of
human nature to God with the fall of human nature not existing, and he understood the fall as a
impediment to the union, on account of which he procured the fall. Therefore from this it is
admitted that, with the fall set aside, it is still possible to posit the suitability of the incarnation.
Furthermore, what Blessed Augustine says in the book De anima et spiritu is for this position:
“Moreover God was made human, so that the whole human being would be beatified in him, so
that whether the human being goes within through the intellect, or goes out through the sense, he
would find pasture in his Creator, pasture within in knowledge of the deity, pasture without in
the Savior’s flesh.” However, this argument remains even when the fall of human nature is set
aside.
[To the objections]: 1. Therefore to what is objected, it must be responded that the
authority is understood having supposed the guilty state of fallen nature. Hence the sense is that,
if the Son of God were incarnated and would not have freed the guilty state, it would not have
profited human nature, because it would not have been beatified nor redeemed. But the situation
is different, if the fall of human nature is set aside, as was said [in the Response].
3
Book 3.16-17.
Book 3.14-15.
5
Praeconium paschale in Sabb. S.
4
2