Egypt’s Perspective towards the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam Project
(GERDP)
 Ten years ago within the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), the three Eastern Nile Countries
(Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan) jointly agreed to study their national plan projects
through an agreed mechanism which was named the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action
Program (ENSAP). A regional power trade study was conducted, in which two sites
in Ethiopia were identified for potential dam projects, and an international
consultancy firm was hired by the three countries to conduct pre-feasibility studies of
two dams, which were finalized in year 2008. The two proposed dams were to be
located on the Blue Nile, the first called Mandaya, with a total capacity of 49.2 BCM,
and the second called Border with a capacity of 14.5 BCM. In the mean time, the
Norwegian Government, upon the request of the government of Ethiopia, started to
conduct separate feasibility studies for additional two Dams, named Mandaya and
Beko Abo.
 Unexpectedly, and without any prior notification, the Government of Ethiopia (GOE)
declared in February 2011 its intention to construct a new dam on the Blue Nile
named “Project X”. This declaration led the Norwegian government to cancel the
studies of the additional dams due to the unclarity of Ethiopian plans and preferences.
 By the end of April 2011, Ethiopia announced unilaterally the construction of a large
dam on the Blue Nile called “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” (GERD) with a
height of 145 m, storage capacity of 74 BCM, installing capacity of 6000 MW, and a
total cost of US$ 4.78 billion. Ethiopian officials claimed at the beginning that the
downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) would not be harmed and in fact would
benefit from the project. However, these statements were then changed gradually to
reflect the recognition of the GOE that the dam would have impacts on the
downstream countries, but that those impacts would be mitigated and compensated
through water saving projects in South Sudan.
 Former Prime Minister, Dr. Essam Sharaf, Prime Minister of Egypt at the time,
agreed with the late Ethiopian Prime Minister “Meles Zinawi” during an official visit
to Addis Ababa in May 2011, to establish an International Panel of Experts (IPOE),
composed of two National members from each of the three countries, in addition to
four international experts, in order to provide sound review/assessment of the
potential impacts of the project on the two downstream countries, and any associated
benefits to be expected.
 The IPOE held six meetings from May 2012 to May 2013, during which the
documents provided by the GOE on the GERD in the field of Dam Safety, Water
Resources, Environment, and Socio-Economic were reviewed and evaluated. The
IPOE finalized its Final Report and submitted it to the three Governments on the end
of May 2013.
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 The Final Report, which was approved and signed by all members of the IPOE,
submitted the following main findings and recommendations:
o Most of the submitted and reviewed documents have been finalized after starting
the implementation of GERD, some of them have been finalized and submitted
after the establishment of the IPOE.
o The environmental and socioeconomic report fails to address the impacts on the
downstream countries.
o The dam engineering and safety documents are level 1 design and not good for
construction, and attention should be given to the saddle dam which is the
weakest point.
o The cost/benefit analyses studies of the project were not provided.
o Some of the identified documents were not submitted to the IPOE (i.e. Dam
Break Analysis).
o The present Hydrological and Reservoir Simulation Study shows detrimental
impacts on Egypt's water demand and High Aswan Dam (HAD) Hydropower
generation, taking into account the current specifications and proposed filling
criteria suggested by the Ethiopian side (filling the GERD in 6 years).
o The IPOE Report further illustrated, the necessity of conducting two additional
studies in the followings areas:1) Water resource system/hydropower model study
2) Transboundary Environmental and Socio Economic Impact Assessment
study.
 In a further step, and in the spirit of cooperation and willingness by Egypt to
reach agreement with the GOE on the project, the Egyptian Foreign Minister
visited Addis Ababa in June 2013 to exchange views and discuss with his
counterpart the way forward regarding the implementation of the IPOE
Report. Both Ministers agreed to embark on consultations at the technical
and political levels, with the participation of the Republic of the Sudan, to
implement in a speedy manner the International Panel of Experts’
recommendations. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister announced publicly
during
the
visit,
his
country’s
commitment
to
implement
the
recommendations of the IPOE Final report, and not to cause any harm to
Egypt.
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 Despite the agreement on the urgency of starting the tripartite consultations
on the implementation of the IPOE recommendations, especially in light of
the Ethiopian government’s unimpeded construction at the site of the project,
the first trilateral meeting at the level of ministers of water resources and
irrigation was not held in Khartoum until five months later, in November
2013, followed by two rounds of talks in December 2013 and January 2014.
 Throughout the three rounds, Egypt was keen to reach agreement with both
Ethiopia and Sudan on the establishment of a joint mechanism for the
implementation of the IPOE recommendations. Some issues were agreed
upon at the second meeting held in December 2013, such as the overall
objective of the tripartite committee, the decision to resort to a sound
international consultancy firm to conduct the missing studies, and the need to
finalize all the studies in a timeframe of one year. However, there was a
deadlock on other significant issues such as the establishment of an
International Panel of Experts, due to the Ethiopian continuous rejection to
include any International Experts in the work of the proposed joint tripartite
committee which would supervise on the conduct of the recommended
studies and evaluate them, in accordance with a proposal presented by Egypt
to ensure efficiency, professionalism and a neutral technical opinion in case
of differences between the national members of the tripartite committee.
Furthermore, Ethiopia also refused to discuss an Egyptian proposal on
Confidence Building Measures, although it was drafted in a manner that
reflected previously publicly announced commitments by Ethiopian officials
regarding the impact of the dam on Egypt’s water interests.
 In view of the above, the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt
conducted its own hydrological transboundary impact assessments of the
GERDP according to the announced dimensions. These assessments provide
strong grounds to believe that the GERDP would cause appreciable harm,
including material environmental and socioeconomic harm to Egypt.
 Egypt has never denied the right of Ethiopia and/or any other Nile Basin
country to develop and utilize its water resources for developmental needs.
On the contrary, Egypt has always supported and participated in such
programs for the benefit of its brotherly riparian countries and continues to
be ready to do so.
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 However, regrettably despite the absence of complete environmental and
hydrological impact assessment studies, Ethiopia has continued the
construction process at the dam site in violation of all the well-known
international legal principles regarding projects and/or constructions on
international rivers, particularly; the obligation to prevent harm to other
riparian states, the general obligation to cooperate, the obligation of prior
notification and prior consultations with the potentially affected states, the
obligation to determine through an impact assessment whether the planned
activities may have an adverse effect upon another riparian state sharing the
same international watercourse, and the obligation to exchange data and
information on a regular basis.
 It’s worth mentioning as well, that the conduct of the Ethiopian government is
inconsistent with its obligations according to the 1902 Treaty between Great Britain
and Ethiopia in which article 3 reads “His Majesty the Emperor Menilik II, King of
Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty
not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana,
or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters except in agreement with
His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of Sudan”, and the the
1993 Agreement on the framework for cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia, in
which each party is committed to “refrain from engaging in any activity related to the
Nile waters that may cause appreciable harm to the interests of the other party” in
pursuance of Article 5 of the Agreement.
 It is important to note as well, that Egypt stands ready to engage in a
transparent and serious negotiation process with the governments of Ethiopia
and Sudan to ensure the agreement on a win win scenario that would ensure
the fulfillment of Ethiopia’s developmental needs, as well as the interests of
Sudan, while preserving Egypt’s water security. However, absent of such an
agreement, and the continued construction by the GOE of the said dam,
creates a fait accompli that potentially constitutes a significant threat to
Egypt’s national and water security.
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