[2015] IELCA 4
THE HIGH COURT
COMMERCIAL
2011 10238 P
(2011 / 244 COM)
BETWEEN
FLOGAS IRELAND LIMITED
PLAINTIFF
AND
LANGAN FUELS LIMITED
DEFENDANT
RULING ON DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
1. The Defendant’s Objections herein raise a net point in relation to my assessment of the
instructions fee, namely that in measuring the fee at the sum of €23,500 I was in error given
that I had indicated in giving my said ruling, that the costs associated with only one Solicitor
attending Court would be allowed. Further it is asserted that a total of 37.5 hours was worked
by the relevant Solicitor which indicated that the fee could not be measured at more than
€9375.
2. I have considered the submissions of the respective parties and have again reviewed the
Plaintiff’s Solicitors’ files and papers.
3. I am satisfied that this Objection is misconceived in relation to the extent of the work carried
out by Ms. O’Keeffe, Solicitor. In fact the reference to 37.5 hours only related to the first period
of relevant work running from 3 October 2013 to 27 March 2014. However, other fee earners
were also involved which involvement I took into account but excluded any additional costs
referable to their attendance at Court. I applied the same principle to my consideration of the
costs referable to the Solicitors’ second account.
4. However, I did not base my assessment of the instructions fee on the number of allowable
hours referable to the case multiplied by a rate per hour. Such methodology of assessment is
impermissible as between Party and Party.
5. My obligation was to ascertain the nature and extent of the work and to evaluate it pursuant
to the criteria outlined at Order 99 Rule 37 (22) (ii) of Rules of the Superior Courts. I am
required to take time into account in such assessment as it is one of the factors of relevance to
the assessment. Equally I must take into account the complexity of the matter, its importance,
the extent of the documentation perused, the value of the subject matter and any novelty
attaching to the Application. In fact, as adverted to in my original ruling the work was quite
extensive and there was a novel aspect to the ultimate application for costs. I also referred to
the importance of the matter and the extent of the work.
6. During the course of my ruling I noted that the costs in this matter arose directly out of the
manner in which the Defendant chose to defend the application.
7. I am satisfied that my assessment of the instructions fee was correctly carried out having
regard to the Statutory criteria to which I have alluded. The essential point raised by the
Defendant, in effect, that the indemnity principle had been breached is not tenable as the
material upon which this contention was made cannot support such contention.
8. I am satisfied that this instructions fee was correctly assessed, in accordance with the
applicable legal principles.
Dated the 16th day of March 2015
Declan O’Neill
Taxing Master.