Lecture to the Royal Aeronautical Society - Air Power in Ages of Austerity
President, members of the Royal Aeronautical Society, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you
very much for that kind introduction and warm welcome. It is a great honour to be invited to
give the 98th Wilbur and Orville Wright lecture in front of such a distinguished audience. I
welcome the opportunity to discuss the continuing critical importance and relevance of the
business of air power and space, especially when there are so many actual and potential
challenges facing us. The scope of these challenges can be gleaned from a quick glance
at today's newspapers, covering the Copenhagen summit on climate change, and the
Chancellor's pre-budget report. On the latter, personal circumstances will have influenced
whether your eye was drawn first to the 50% tax on banking bonuses, the increase in
national insurance, or the two year cap on public service pay. But its central message was
clear: we are overdrawn and must cut our cloth accordingly. My talk tonight takes this as its
starting point. I will argue that innovation, and the ability to adapt, has in the past allowed
the armed forces to cut our cloth more efficiently, during times of significant fiscal restraint,
while remaining effective in defending the national interest. But first I must take this
opportunity to thank the outgoing chief executive, Keith Mans, for the excellent job that he
did for the Society, and for all the support gave the Royal AirForce during his tenure. I
know he cannot be here tonight but I wish him the best of luck in his new role. Looking
ahead, of course, I would wish the Royal Air Force to continue as a very significant partner
for the Royal Aeronautical Society, and so I also look forward to working with the incoming
chief executive: Simon Luxmore. The Royal Aeronautical Society embodies what might at
first seem an oxymoron: a legacy of vision. It was founded in1866 to promote heavier than
air flight, a full thirty-seven years before Orville and Wilbur Wright realised that particular
dream. It has maintained that tradition of looking ahead throughout its history, and has
been a vital conduit between governments, academia, industry and the Forces. The
recently opened National Aerospace Library represents a record of all this achievement. It
acknowledges the importance of referring backwards before looking ahead. The future, of
course, is ultimately unknowable. Steering a strategic course has been described as
driving blind, with only the rear-view mirror to guide you. So in my address tonight I intend
to review briefly our shared aerospace history, but only to better inform the decisions we
have to make, as we position ourselves to cope as well as we can with an undoubtedly
turbulent future. You will forgive me if I concentrate on the military experience. A topical
thread for my address is provided by the financial crisis from which we may now be
emerging. It has affected us all, and the nature of the turbulent future will be shaped by the
new world order that crystallises from it. We can be sure that the global balance of power
will have tilted, but not yet quite where or how much. The topicality has been further
heightened by the Chancellor’s pre-budget speech yesterday. In it he did not include
Defence spending within his list of ring-fenced spending departments - though I welcome
his comment that the Government will recognise the special circumstances of the armed
forces when it comes to the cap on public sector pay settlements. Regardless of who wins
the next election, it is clear that a fundamental review of public finances will happen. Quite
whether that will amount to an 'Age of Austerity' as many have predicted is still moot.
However, it will be clear that all Whitehall departments have to assume that they are likely
to be tightening their belts significantly. We will have to make some hard decisions. I will
not attempt tonight to conduct a Strategic Defence Review on the hoof. That is properly
business conducted through the Defence Board, where you can be sure I will highlight the
ciritical value of air power in defending the national interest, both in the UK and overseas.
Rather I will précis the Royal Air Force's contribution to defending that national interest in
previous ages of austerity. And I will draw out some of the valid lessons about Air Power’s
ability to have strategic effect in highly cost-effective ways, that might shape our future
Defence thinking. My thesis is that Defence has often had to look for innovative sometimes counter-intuitive - solutions to strategic problems during ages of austerity. Air
power - as delivered primarily by the Royal Air Force - has often provided novel options
that have proved cheaper in the long run. Cheaper that is in financial, political and human
terms. But to do so the Royal Air Force has had to remain conceptually agile and
anticipatory in practice. It has also had to remain open to working with a range of global
partners while understanding complex political contexts. I contend that such agility,
openness to partnership, political awareness, and desire to reduce costs, will be even
more important in the future in proving air power’s cost-effective advantage. Whilst I will
illustrate the relevance of the arguments through reference to examples from the current
campaign in Afghanistan, it is absolutely indisputable that there will be many, and very
different demands, for military action, well beyond counter insurgency in Afghanistan. And
we must make real and concrete contingency preparations for such eventualities.
Nevertheless, while we plan for the future I do not want anyone to think we have lost sight
of the imperatives of today. The Afghanistan campaign remains our main effort. But, when
all the armed forces are committed on such a demanding and important campaign, it would
be wrong not to begin with a very brief analysis of its strategic importance. The Prime
Minister has made several speeches recently in which he has outlined the reasons why
the Afghan campaign is vital to the national interest. Afghanistan is important in itself as a
failing state that has in the recent past - under Taliban rule - become a haven for those with
demonstrable capacity and intent to harm us. Sharing a border with Pakistan, it is also key
to the regional dimension. If the Afghan-Pakistan border region became, once again, the
untouchable base of extremist activity, we would all be less secure. Pakistan's future
stability as a nuclear power is in everyone's interests. With many Britons having Pakistani
ties it is of particular interest to us. What affects that country affects us here. Finally, there
is the reputation and future of NATO to consider. If NATO should appear to fail in
Afghanistan, then every extremist in the world would feel emboldened, and the security
institution that has provided our security since 1949 would be dangerously weakened. This
is why President Obama’s commitment of 30,000 additional service personnel to join the
NATO campaign, complemented by the 7,000 additional personnel from Europe, is so
important. The current campaign in Afghanistan is the UK’s Main Effort and the Royal Air
Force's top priority. This may sound obvious, but the air and naval services of an island
nationstate have always been given defence of the homeland as the over-riding priority.
Now the Afghan campaign is a form of forward defence. But I cannot take my eye of the
homeland defence ball while we put every possible effort into Afghanistan. Given air
power's rapid deployability, it follows that air power also forms the country's main reserve,
held at readiness against a raft of contingencies. We must get the balance of effort right
across all these responsibilities. And so our priorities are under constant review to ensure
we buy just the right amount of insurance for each possible type of commitment. In a world
of infinite resource we would have no need for strategy - we would be able to over-insure
against every possible threat. But we don't live in such a happy world, and every power even the hyperpower of the USA - is having to prioritise and carefully weigh its strategic
thinking and planning. With limited means one has to continually re-assess ends and find
ever more efficient ways. Thus we have taken some risk in drawing down earlier than
planned the Tornado F3 air defence fighter force, while we enhance the availability and
capability of our helicopter fleets. Doubling the number of MERLIN squadrons and
deploying a detachment to Iraq, and more recently Afghanistan, is but one example. Let
me digress slightly to give you a human flavour of what that commitment means in
practice. Our Chinook crews are now almost totally devoted to Afghanistan. They will
deploy for 2 months, during which they will work extended periods flying in high-threat
environments. One hundred hours flying a month is not uncommon. On return to the UK
the flying is strictly rationed. They take leave, and complete the routine administration of
Service life, around periods holding the national standby commitment. After 6 months they
re-enter work-up training for their next Afghan deployment. In a 2 and a half year tour they
can expect to complete 3 tours of duty in Afghanistan. I am sure that you can all appreciate
the strain this puts on their families who wait at home. Incidentally, many of our Tornado
GR squadrons have completed twenty-plus such tours in the Gulf over the past 18 years.
And RAF Chinook crews have completed up to 8 tours in Afghanistan, over a much shorter
period. To return to priorities, there are many commitments the Royal Air Force retains
while we prioritise our effort in Afghanistan. Given the pace of technological advance, and
the lead-time for aerospace equipment development, we must keep an eye on the future to
ensure we retain our edge and remain relevant. I cannot, as CAS, let that drop, and hope
to pick it up when we have handed the Afghan security task back to the Afghan authorities.
The rest of the world will have moved on and we would risk being left stranded and
irrelevant in future scenarios if we do not keep developing and adapting – technologically,
tactically and in our doctrine. This would not be a good return for the taxpayers who have
invested much over the years in our capacity to defend them against a range of threats.
These threats have not gone away, as North Korea and Iran's current nuclear
brinkmanship, and the increases in approaches to our airspace and piracy off the Horn of
Africa, remind us. What those future scenarios might include is the subject of much
debate. Indeed, the Department’s future Green Paper will consider, in some depth, the
character of future conflict. This is vital analysis, and needs careful thought and review,
and I welcome similar thinking by independent academics, such as Hew Strachan and
Colin Gray, who have theorised on future conflict. All are agreed to varying degrees that
large scale, peer competitor warfare, as envisaged during the Cold War, whilst still
possible, is unlikely in the mediumterm. However, few, if any, serious analysts see
counterinsurgency as the only scenario we are likely to face. Limited inter-state wars for
limited ends have been fought many times in the recent past. Kuwait, Iraq, Kosovo,
Afghanistan in 2001 and the Falklands have all seen UK forces involved in limited interstate conflict in the last quarter century or so. And other clear examples that warrant
serious analysis are epitomised in last year’s Russia/Georgia conflict. High-tech weaponry
is proliferating as states rearm, and we have seen technology and know-how transfer
between regimes that while not hostile are not necessarily friendly either. For example,
during the period of the Iraqi no-fly zones, Serbian air defence expertise was exported to
Iraq. Iran is known to run proxy forces, and has demonstrated a vested interest in seeing
us embarrassed. N. Korea and Iran have collaborated on weapons programmes. Sabres
are rattling in South America where Venezuela now operates state of the art Russian
fighter aircraft. The world remains an unpredictable place - and geopolitical conditions are
unstable, to the extent that Niall Ferguson has coined the term, 'the age of upheaval', to
describe the volatile era in which we live. But we have lived through volatile eras of great
change before. They look pre-ordained and determined in the rearview mirror, but were
destabilising and fraught at the time. The Cold War looks relatively stable and even cosily
predictable in retrospect. It did not seem that way, in 1962, for example, during the Cuban
missile crisis. These volatile periods often had their origins in geopolitical events that also
left us in a parlous financial position: previous ages of austerity. After the two world wars, in
1919 and 1945, the country had to cope with crises arising from the changed strategic
context, while being effectively bankrupted by the costs of war. The 1960s and 70s was an
era of relative economic decline for the UK, while the vestiges of imperial commitments
continued to make demands of our armed forces. And in 1989 the end of the Cold War,
and to some "The End of History", seemed to allow a peace-dividend but simultaneously
unleashed a wave of suppressed nationalism, confrontation and conflict. Let me briefly
review examples from these four periods to show how air power, delivered by an agile and
adaptable Royal Air Force, found novel ways to integrate military operations with the other
levers of national power, in order to deal with strategic problems. The costs of the First
World War - both human and financial - still resonate today. Britain lost 6.3% of its male
population. The overall cost to the world has been estimated at 260 billion dollars, or over
6 times the world national debt accrued from the end of the 18th century, to the war’s
outbreak in 1914. At its end the United Kingdom was in a dire financial position. Yet it
faced an increasing burden of imperial commitments as the political ramifications of the
global conflict emerged. Nationalist movements had been emboldened, often encouraged
by the political exigencies of our wartime government - as in the encouragement of Iraqi
revolt against Ottoman rule. So the administration of the day faced a dilemma: The
intuitive solution to the problem of imperial policing - provide a bigger garrison - was,
simply, financially unaffordable. Nor would the electorate stand further significant
casualties after the trauma of the trenches. As so often during periods of financial restraint
and budgetary drawdown, the individual Services were at loggerheads. None felt more
vulnerable than the nascent Royal Air Force, which had to adapt to a post-war role in an
era defined by imperial policing. At the war’s end in 1918 the troops deployed in Iraq
numbered 420 thousand. This reduced rapidly on demobilisation. But the post war garrison
strength remained high: 25 thousand British and 80 thousand Indian troops costing at least
18 million pounds a year to sustain. The serious but ultimately unsuccessful uprising in
1920 cost 2,300 British casualties and over 8,000 Iraqi casualties in just 3 months.
Churchill turned to the RAF and asked if they could "take Mesopotamia on?", for an uplift
in the Air Estimate of 5 million pounds – in other words, and these are using very
conservative figures, just over a quarter of the ‘land-heavy’ option. In 1922 the RAF took
overall command of the policing duties, with a force comprising 8 RAF squadrons, and a
mixed army formation of just 2 British and 2 Indian army brigades. By 1929 a more
peaceable Iraq, with a less belligerent Turkey on its border, required a presence of just 4
squadrons and 2 brigades. Much has been written over the years about this period of air
policing, or 'air control' as it has come to be known. Much of it has been unhelpful. Airmen
have been guilty of overselling air power's contribution, as being independently and solely
decisive. While critics have over-played the brutality of the air control policy; concentrating
on the punitive bombing raids as its defining feature. What can be said was that ultimately
the overall approach worked, and at much reduced cost in both financial and human
terms. I prefer to look at the measured words of one of my predecessors as CAS - Air
Marshal John Salmond, who was the first commander of the joint force in 1922. He
appears to have been aware of the political context and of the sensitivities required of him
when he wrote: ‘No action is ever taken except at the request of the British civilian adviser
on the spot, and only after this request has been duly weighed by the (Iraqi) Minister of the
Interior and by the British Adviser and by the High Commissioner (in Baghdad). Even after
a request has passed this three-fold scrutiny, I have on more than one occasion, as the
High Commissioner’s chief Military Adviser, opposed it on the military grounds that I did not
consider that the offensive action which I had been asked to take would lead to the result
desired…' Salmond was aware that it was a broader concept of air policing – that is,
allying it with conventional diplomacy at ground level – that had stabilised a potentially
disastrous situation. Another of the pre-eminent strategists and air power thinkers of his
day, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, was also much more measured about the contribution of
air power. In weighing the virtues and vices of the policy he noted that casualties on both
sides had been much lower under air control. He also stressed the point that far from
acting in splendid isolation, aircraft were used extensively in direct cooperation with land
forces; in reconnaissance duties; patrolling convoys; photographic survey and mapmaking; civilian evacuation; medical re-supply and evacuation; antislavery patrols; famine
relief; fishery protection; troop transport; and the development of air routes. In short, air
power was the advantage that supported almost all the limbs of the state. The lesson that
advocates of air power should be drawing from this list is that the ubiquity and agility of air
power renders it a key advantage to any commander. Many of the tasks facing us today
chime with the roles enumerated by Slessor. (And I will give you several examples later!) I
would also note that it required imagination - and great flexibility of approach within the
joint environment - to conceive of such a policy and to enact it so swiftly. Indeed, this was
true adaptability and agility. For the purposes of this lecture, I also make the point that the
fundamental factor driving this policy, and necessitating this invention, was the financial
austerity of the era. Before I move on to the next era of austerity, let me take a brief
diversion (into conceptual agility and breadth of vision). It was only ten years after these
events - that is in 1939 - that the RAF was called upon to fight a very different war and
threat - the defence of Britain against the battlehardened Luftwaffe. It did so through
employing a sophisticated early warning, and command and control system, that hinged
on the unproven technology of RADAR. RADAR had been developed following
experimental collaboration between the National Physical Laboratory and the RAF. This
gave the RAF, and hence Great Britain, an edge when it didn't have the advantage of
numbers. RADAR was a force multiplier for a force still hurriedly expanding after the
drawdown of the inter-war years. There are lessons here about continued innovation,
experimentation, and not planning, nor configuring, to fight the last war. I shall return to
these themes later. The next era of austerity mirrors the first - it is the post World War 2
period. Another era of rapid demobilization, while adapting to austerity, and seismic
geopolitical upheaval. Britain had emerged from the war victorious, only to find it was no
longer one of the two superpowers. It was also nearly bankrupt, and once again had the
remnants of empire to manage. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki the rules of geopolitics were
redrawn, and possession of nuclear weapons became a defining characteristic of power,
as it remains today. The descent of Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' and the maintenance of a new
balance of power posed strategic questions that sat uneasily on a nation with a shattered
economy. Could we afford to be a nuclear power; could we afford not to be? It is
illuminating that when the Soviet Union cut the land routes to West Berlin in 1948, it was
the economic implications that caught the Foreign Office's immediate attention. Its analysis
read: If the Soviet Government were to succeed in their efforts to force us out [of Berlin] in
humiliating circumstances the effect would be extremely grave not only in Berlin but in
Europe at large. It might prove impossible for the Western powers to maintain their position
at all in Western Germany, if Berlin were lost to them, except by heavily reinforcing the
military there. As Dr Sebastian Cox of the Air Historical Branch notes: With the British
economy struggling to recover from 6 years of total war, this was a deeply uncomfortable
prospect. So the blockade of Berlin was immediately recognized as a crisis whose
outcome could have strategic implications of the utmost importance. The Allied powers had
no contingency plans for this occurrence, and no plans for the use of air power to resupply
Berlin. Clearly the Kremlin had calculated that it couldn't be done, and that the costs of
forcing a land line of communication were too terrible to contemplate, and self-defeating in
any case. To the Soviets it must have appeared a check-mate move. It is worth thinking on
this, as we are now so familiar with the outcome of the Berlin Airlift, that we can unwittingly
assume it was pre-determined. It certainly wasn't, and the success of the airlift was due to
innovative thinking, rapid adaptation, and determination to take a significant level of
operating risk, to mitigate a strategic one. Given that a DC3 Dakota only carried 2.5 short
tons, the thought that they could be used to supply a city whose food requirement alone
was over 2000 tons a day took a bold imagination. At a time when the nuclear bomber
captured the imagination, as the most terrible weapon and force ever realized, who would
have thought that the Cold War's first use of strategic air power would involve the humble
cargo plane? A clever trap, set in the two dimensions of the land environment, had been
stepped around by an even cleverer use of the third dimension. I would add there was a
marvelous psychological dimension for the people of West Berlin. They saw the airlift as a
very obvious, and dramatic, manifestation of resolve, and a demonstration of Soviet
impotence. One thinks of the famous US airman Gail Halvorsen, known across the world
as “the candy-bomber”, dropping sweets to German schoolchildren. Less well known is
that crowds used to turn out on the banks of the river Havel, to see hastily-converted RAF
Sunderland flying-boats bringing supplies into Berlin. The use of air power had a political
dimension in its own right. The Berlin airlift reflected the practice of the end of World War 2
and what was to become the pattern of the Cold War, where western air power was used
to offset Soviet strength on the ground. My final point is that the Berlin Airlift involved
partnering with civilian companies to provide effect. In a precursor to the Future Strategic
Tanker Aircraft programme of today, Flight Refuelling LTD was contracted to fly fuel into
Berlin in the prototype air-to-air refuelling tankers then being developed. So moving
forward to today, we see the continuing importance of strategic and tactical airlift. The
airbridge to Afghanistan is this country's vital link with the operational theatre. It is
maintained day in and day out. Despite that importance, we cannot forget our other global
commitments. Earlier this year we took a Tristar tanker aircraft directly from supporting the
Afghan air effort and sent it overnight to Ascension Island, to refuel four Typhoons on their
deployment to the Falklands. The Tristar was back on the strategic airbridge before many
folk had noticed its temporary absence. Air power's ability to quickly deploy and redeploy
on a global scale confers unique advantages. A theme that I shall return to later. In
Afghanistan, tactical airlift shrinks the country, and makes it manageable with a smaller
ground force. In addition, we work with Afghan government agencies, to reinforce the
sense of national governance, and to step around problems posed by the insurgents. RAF
tactical air transport has been used to ferry wheat seed into Helmand, and so enable the
harvest in 2008. It was also pivotal in facilitating the training of Afghan National Police
recruits. They are now trained, away from their tribal influence, in specialist training
centres, similar to those successfully used by the Afghan army. To facilitate this vital
programme we have had to fly recruits around the country. While this appears a simple
task, I am sure that I don't need to remind you of the tragedy of the rogue Afghan
policeman who killed five British soldiers last month. Flying Afghan police recruits straight
off the street - some of whom may well have been ex-Taliban - posed especial security
risks. These were accepted and mitigated by commanders in theatre, who were aware of
the strategic imperative to build up Afghan Security Force capacity. In Afghanistan today as
we are seeking to hand control to Afghan Security Forces. In the interim we will continue to
reinforce fledgling Afghan capacity. We will give them the advantage through the high-end
support from British Army training teams, special forces, and coalition air and space power.
The RAF continues its pragmatic approach as described by Corum and Wray. Let me give
you one recent example. You may remember the Kandahar Prison breakout of June last
year. In many ways, though, I hope you do not. Eleven hundred Afghan prisoners,
including 400 hard-line Taliban, escaped from the Afghan-run prison into Kandahar city.
Febrile news reporting trailed it as a looming political disaster for ISAF, forecasting that a
resurgent Taliban would now take Kandahar; [pause] Forty-eight hours later it had become
a non-story. Commander ISAF - then General McKiernan - was determined that the
problem would be seen to be handled by Afghan security forces. But the most capable
Afghan forces were based in Kabul, three days away by road. RAF transport aircraft were
diverted, in flight, from routine tasking, to land in Kabul and ferry an Afghan army battalion
down to Kandahar. In conjunction with US Air Force aircraft, they had done so by that
evening. A plan was put together for the Afghan army to deploy into Kandahar city at first
light. Overnight, all RAF missions were retasked, in support of the ISAF operation to
stabilize the situation, pending the Afghan army's arrival. The operation became ISAF's
main effort. RAF Harriers provided continuous overwatch for ground forces, using their
advanced, infra-red targeting pods. Notably - remembering here Salmond's words, on
understanding the political dimension of using force in a counter insurgency - they
provided essential support to the Canadian ground forces, without once having to resort to
dropping weapons. They were aware of Commander ISAF's intent - that coalition forces
should hold the ring as discretely as possible, not engage Taliban forces directly, nor risk
civilian casualties. Our REAPER unmanned aircraft extended their missions to 17 hours,
using state of the art surveillance systems to provide ground commanders with excellent
intelligence. Meanwhile, the Hercules reroled, to undertake leaflet drops, in support of
Psychological Operations, to reassure the civilian population of Kandahar. This was an
undeclared, and unpracticed, capability that was resurrected and executed within 4 hours
of receipt of the task. In the morning the Afghan army very quickly, and efficiently, cleared
the insurgents from the populated areas of Kandahar. The story, and the political liability,
evaporated. Not only had the problem been addressed, but in showcasing Afghan army
capability, it had been turned to coalition advantage. My final example of air power in ages
of austerity brings us almost up to date. It concerns the era of the Peace Dividend after
1989, and the Exchange Rate Mechanism shock of 'Black Wednesday' in 1992. Since that
time the RAF has shrunk from a force of over 90 thousand, to one of just over forty
thousand today. 1990 saw Saddam invade Kuwait, and since then we have been
continually deployed on operations in the wider Middle East and South Asia. The level of
conflict has waxed and waned, between relatively benign periods patrolling the no-fly
zones, to the intense combat of Iraq and Afghanistan. Concurrently, we were also
deployed in the Balkans, culminating in the Kosovo conflict of 1999. There is much here to
consider, but I wish to concentrate on the no-fly zones, and the uses of air power to
achieve limited political ends. Few outside the worlds of Defence and foreign relations
remember with any clarity Operation DELIBERATE FORCE in 1995. This was the
operation commanded by General Rupert Smith, when he led the UN Force in BosniaHerzegovina. A bold and dramatic use of limited force, it took many, especially the Bosnian
Serbs, by surprise. In a skilled use of a small ground force, and an intense air campaign,
IFOR swung the balance of power in Bosnia, and broke the political stalemate. Within one
month, the warring parties had agreed to the Dayton peace conference, at which a political
solution to the five-year civil conflict was hammered out. This was a classic example of the
'utility of force', a term Rupert was to make famous through his book of the same title. Air
power, in the form of precision strike, close air support to otherwise vulnerable troops, and
extensive reconnaissance, had been used with great discrimination, within a well-analysed
political context, to achieve precise political effects. To be more specific, air power had
targeted the assets of the power-brokers not the population, and had been very skillfully
interleaved with the diplomatic process. (There are shades here of Salmond in
Mesopotamia, as discussed earlier.) It had been an instrument in the carrot-and-stick
approach to coercing the warring parties. Air power's strength here was the ability to
deploy it rapidly, leave it poised and available over the horizon as negotiations developed,
and then re-commit it swiftly when the diplomacy required it. The lack of a footprint on the
disputed territory itself removed a political liability and area of risk. You may remember the
political debate at the time was focused on the liability of exposing coalition ground forces
in such a hostile environment, given the political stakes. This question was also to bedevil
the Kosovo campaign four years later. At the same time the Iraqi no-fly zones were
successfully containing Saddam Hussein's excesses. The RAF alone flew many thousand
sorties in support of this UN mandated mission. At an overall cost to the coalition of a
billion dollars a year - of which the cost to the UK was a gross 30 million pounds, even less
when offset against the costs of routine training sorties foregone - and very little political
exposure, this represented a relatively cheap option with a small footprint. The definitive
analysis of recent operations in Iraq is still to be written. But I note that political
commentators are reevaluating the no-fly zones, and suggesting that they offer a good
example of containing and limiting a political problem. In modern parlance they offer an
effective method of riskmanagement, with limited political liability and exposure. That has
been a canter through some examples where air power was used innovatively, during a
period of parlous national finances, to provide a relatively cheap and effective solution to a
strategic problem. Let me now justify those assertions, and draw some lessons, before
looking ahead to assess how those lessons might shape our approach in future. My first
point is that context is everything. I could have used the Aden campaign in 1967 as an
example. Air power certainly made the military contribution more effective, but the result
was still political defeat. So I am not advocating that actions undertaken on the successful
campaigns I have briefly rehearsed here tonight should blindly be followed on all outwardly
similar occasions. I am not, for example, following the air power zealots who uncritically
cite 'air control' in the 1920s as a template for independent air action in the future. Rather,
what I am saying is that Defence has often turned to air power to generate innovative
options on many occasions when financial straits precluded a more conventional
approach. To be effective, air power, as all forms of combat power, has had to be
commanded sensitively, by strategically adept commanders able to integrate air power
with all other levers of national power. Simply deploying and operating airframes is not
enough. In painting air power as an easily applied panacea cure-all, some theorists have
oversold the medicine and under-appreciated the role of the doctor. Further, air power has
carried a limited liability, and conferred lower political risk, when engaged to deliver limited
strategic ends. Indeed, an argument could be made, that part of the success of these
operations, was that financial necessity mothered invention; [pause] and invention and
innovation at the operational level can lead to the surprise that unbalances one's
opponents. This sounds obvious, so it is a little disappointing to conclude that, too often, it
has taken financial necessity to get us to be so inventive. Some may find it counterintuitive that I say that air power is cheap. Many critics of air power and air forces point to
the admittedly heavy cost of modern platforms. Let me make three points in reply. Firstly:
the up front cost of a platform may be high, but must be set against the value bought
through its life. The Tornado ground-attack aircraft cost about 20 million pounds in 1982
when it came into service. It then provided an arm of the nuclear deterrent, at high
readiness 24/7 during the Cold War. In 1990 it deployed for the Gulf War, and conducted
the full range of precision-attack and reconnaissance missions. It policed either, or both, of
the no fly zones of Iraq, for twelve years, continuously. It was the mainstay of UK air power
in the Kosovo campaign, where, in 78 days of operations, no coalition lives were lost, while
successfully achieving the political objective. It is now deployed in Afghanistan, providing:
close air support; overwatch, including a live, day and night video link for troops on the
ground, from its state of the art targeting pod; and superb imagery from its high resolution
RAPTOR reconnaissance pod, which we are looking to adapt to help better in the fight
against Improvised Explosive Devices. The modern Tornado can deploy graduated and
discriminate force from its highly accurate, laser-ranged cannon, sophisticated
BRIMSTONE guided missiles with a low explosive yield - and it has laser- or GPS-guided
bombs in extremis. Seeing the simple 'Cold War' bomber, now carrying this full range of
stores on each mission, conducting multiple tasks on a single sortie, is to see adaptation
and evolution in action. How many other platforms, in any environment, have ever
undertaken such a variety of roles, or been on active service so continuously? And how
much political risk has it mitigated, compared to other options that did not exploit air
power? Secondly: some question why we need high-technology platforms for counterinsurgency. But the advantages bestowed by technology are just as necessary in conflicts
that are often erroneously considered to be 'low-intensity'. It confers a comparative
advantage, and allows a reliable, and discriminating, response, in a range of
circumstances. Not only does this provide better protection for our ground forces. In
displaying discrimination we reduce the force applied to the minimum necessary. It saves
lives on both sides. As it did in Oman and Mesopotamia. And we also reduce political risk.
We do not do counter-insurgency better by mimicking the low-tech approach of our
adversaries and underemploying our asymmetric advantage. Thirdly: what would conflict
look like if we did not command the third dimension? How expensive, in blood and
treasure, would a conflict be, if our adversaries could roam at will above us? In all the
examples I have considered, Western air power was the dominant force. It could quickly
generate almost complete freedom of manoeuvre, and then exploit the third dimension as
a force multiplier. In 2007, General Eikenberry, now US ambassador in Kabul, estimated
that without air power, coalition ground forces in Afghanistan would need to be 400 to 500
thousand strong, vice the 50 thousand that were then deployed. Western air forces have
become so proficient in generating air dominance, in all the conflicts in which we have
recently fought, that this vital capacity risks being taken for granted. An associated risk is
that smart, potential adversaries have now had many decades to study our methods and
will have been developing strategies to neutralize our comparative advantage.
Complacency here could be very costly indeed. Moving on from costs to concepts. A
further lesson I draw is that air power has been most effective when it has been fully
integrated within a joint and combined, civil and military construct. Resources preclude
every agent having his own air force, and so the onus is on the RAF to work widely with
both military and civilian partners to fashion an advantage wherever it is required. This is
not easy in a complex coalition, and requires great agility, tact, and a broad understanding
of the civil and military environment. But our ability to command the third dimension and
act as a force multiplier is our value added, and vital ground. This view leads me to
question whether the rather rigid doctrinal delineation of 'supported' and 'supporting'
commanders is always appropriate. It can tend to limit air power to the provision of a
series of generic combat services. Air power becomes an enabler rather than an agent and
can be wasted. True integration requires a more balanced approach to working together in
the planning at all levels of warfare, as well as delivering overwhelming effect once the
fighting begins. To that end, and as the Commander in Chief Air Command, Air Chief
Marshal Chris Moran said when he addressed the Society earlier this year, we have reevaluated our command and control model for the expeditionary era. In 2006 we
reintroduced the Expeditionary Air Wings and Expeditionary Air Groups that had fallen into
disuse during the Cold War. This allows us to command more flexibly in the
counterinsurgency environment, by devolving appropriate risk management to the level
best able to exploit it. In this way innovation can happen at all command levels. For
example, No. 903 Expeditionary Air Wing in Basra not only ran the Deployed Operating
Base situated on the abandoned Basra International Airport. It also worked with the Iraqi
government to rebuild and refurbish the airport, before returning it to Iraqi control. This
airport is now well-placed to provide a vital hub for the economic regeneration of the whole
region. Many of the examples cited earlier from Afghanistan came from local commanders
exploiting fleeting opportunities. Finally, I am very aware that we need to continue to
experiment and innovate. Unless human nature has changed irrevocably in recent years,
we can be sure of two things. One: there will be conflict and confrontation after
Afghanistan. And two: it is likely to be unexpected and different to that which has gone
before. That will not be the time to find that we have dropped our guard and lost our edge
because we had stopped thinking ahead to what might be a very much more demanding
3-dimensional fight. This brings me to my conclusion, in which I will attempt to give you an
idea of how the RAF might adapt to face the challenges of an ultimately unknowable
future. I promised at the start not to give a geopolitical tour d'horizon, and I won't. You will
remember I briefly looked at the character of future conflict, changes in the balance of
power, and the risks but also opportunities we face in a rapidly evolving, globalised world.
So, what does this uncertainty and upheaval mean, for air power, in a modern age of
austerity? How will we position ourselves against a range of threats on a diminishing
budget? Well, it will not be easy! Some options are obvious, well-tried, and we continue to
push them: Multi-role platforms, a limited number of airframe types, better 'buy-tofly' ratios,
and international cooperation to realise the economies of scale. Sadly, I do not have the
opportunity tonight to give you a comprehensive review of all facets of air power. But I will
explore three cross-cutting themes from our thinking that will give you a flavour. They are:
unmanned aviation; the increasing importance of simulation; and the emergence of space
and cyber-warfare as a current, not future, arena of conflict. There are few things more
galling than having to defend oneself against an assumed attitude. I suppose I shouldn't
be surprised that there is a widespread view that the RAF is against un-manned aviation
because of the number of pilots in our senior ranks. Yet the truth is very different. The RAF
is in the vanguard of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle development (known as UAVs or
sometimes UASs, or even ‘remotely piloted aircraft’). In Afghanistan today we are
operating a growing fleet of REAPER aircraft that are providing excellent service and are
in great demand. The laws of physics and biology give unmanned aircraft increased utility
in certain roles. The REAPER can stay airborne for greatly extended periods, and followon systems will surely measure their airborne time in days not hours. This finally gives air
power the attribute that was a significant omission: persistence, and over a wide area.
With persistence we can maintain observation for protracted periods; we remove our
adversary’s ability to hide in the fourth dimension. Our troops on the ground remain
supported, even on extended patrols. The enemy must live in the constant fear of
observation – and attack. There are efficiencies to be realised too, as the size of fleet
required per effective sortie hour is greatly reduced. Operating UAVs poses some
interesting challenges as well as opportunities. You are probably aware that our mission
crews operate their REAPERs over Afghanistan via a satellite link, from a shared facility in
America. On a twoyear tour these crews will operate every working day within the
environment of Afghanistan, without ever setting foot closer than 8 thousand miles from it.
On one level they are our most continuously experienced Afghan warriors, on another they
cannot claim a visceral knowledge of the country – or even a campaign medal. After what
might be an emotionally draining mission, making life and death decisions, they drive back
to suburban homes. What sort of command challenges does this place on us? (Though we
are perhaps better placed than the other services in this regard given our experience.
Lancaster crews spent their days in Lincolnshire and their nights over Berlin.) REAPER,
though, is a relatively unsophisticated air vehicle optimised for a low threat environment.
We have been working for some time with industry on concepts for unmanned aircraft that
combine the benefits of UAVs with the characteristics of today's best low-observable - or
stealth - fighter aircraft. These have an obvious combat utility, but let us try and imagine
what other benefits might accrue. Firstly, while the crews will need training, that does not
necessarily equate to flying hours as we currently generate them. UAV crews operate in a
remote and synthetic world. So there will be a much-reduced requirement to fly real aircraft
for training: we will be able to generate completely realistic virtual environments, through
simulation. Further, these virtual worlds can be more operationally realistic, and simulate a
limitless variety of scenarios and tactical problems. We are already doing this. At RAF
Waddington, in Lincolnshire, we have a hangar that contains a virtual Helmand. It is being
used day in, day out, by a joint audience. In realistic mock-ups, we link Forward Air
Controller dugouts, army fire support coordinating teams, and ground attack aircraft
cockpits. All receive simulated imagery from UAVs, correlated mapping, and virtual targets
and threats. It is an incredibly realistic simulation. And that assessment comes not from its
creators, but from soldiers recently returned from Helmand, who took part in this summer's
ferocious fighting on Operation PANTHERS CLAW. Through clever simulation, we can
represent important elements of the real world of Helmand better than we can with live
training. This effective simulation is not only saving the lives of soldiers and airmen; it is
saving money. We can also link our simulators across the Atlantic, and so give our young
soldiers the experience of working with American aircrews. Indeed, we now have proven
global links, and have recently completed a test exercise connecting American, Australian
and Canadian participants at 22 training bases. In the longer term, we will be able to
simulate ever more demanding high-intensity conflict scenarios, on the same coalition
basis. In fact, the current generation of weapons systems such as Typhoon, and especially
the Joint Strike Fighter, have such complex sensor suites and weapons, that exerciseflying in the benign airspace of the UK will not give the space, or present the threats
necessary, to test air crews adequately. The mix of synthetic and live flying is continuously
under review and we have no definite answers yet. But I can say that training is going to
involve more synthetic simulation not less, and is going to be increasingly distributed via
networks so that we can involve our coalition allies in routine training. Far from limiting
training, synthetics, just as they already are for Helmand, will allow much better simulation
of operational theatres, and an ability to experiment routinely with future scenarios, tactics
and equipment. It will also be a lot cheaper. Taken to extremis, and I do not say we are
even close yet, one can imagine a future where the virtual world will provide the majority of
our training. In this version of the future we would rely on our partners in industry to
maintain the infrastructure of our training environment, while our servicemen concentrate
on generating deployable, operational capability. This model will require continuous liaison
with intelligence agencies, industry, academia and coalition partners to maintain the
veracity of the training provided. It will look remarkably different from the RAF of today that
is based on training through generating flying hours, on garrison airfields. This is not such
a conceptual world as one might think. On seeing what we have done at RAF Waddington,
MOD scientists are already talking about every new piece of equipment being mandated to
arrive in service with a plug and play simulator, that can seamlessly enter the virtual
training world. Finally let me turn to another two areas too long shrouded in secrecy, and
assumed to be part of the future: space and cyber. Both are very much part of the here
and now, but have rather crept up on us. I would imagine that many of you who drove here
tonight did so with the aid of a GPS navigation system. So trusted are these now that
some drivers have literally followed them off cliffs. Haulage and transport companies in all
domains rely on them and their tracking systems. If GPS failed there would be serious
disruption that would have economic repercussions. But how many people know that our
cash-point machines, too, rely on a GPS signal? Space is part of our everyday lives to an
extent we might find disturbing. Turning to cyber-space, we are now so reliant on e-mail
that when asked to write a letter we have to think about it. Ditto for accessing information
quickly from the web. This change has occurred in the last ten years. If we extrapolate
from our own experience we can begin to imagine the extent to which global finance is
dependent on the reliability of information transfer. So cyber-space resilience is vital to our
economic health. This is why the Cabinet Office is taking such an interest in the subject. In
fact our space and cyber dependencies are intimately entwined. From an RAF perspective
I would add that the UAV capability that I discussed earlier is dependent on satellite
communications and navigation, and on computer networking through cyber-space to
control it. We appreciate that these are vulnerabilities that we must protect. Just as there
are vulnerabilities across the wider aerospace world, an arena that relies on computer
networked systems for its vital air traffic services, and other aids to safe navigation. This is
one reason why the RAF has been in the vanguard of work in these spheres; indeed the
RAF is now truly an aerospace organisation. (Mirroring, I note, the Royal Aeronautical
Society with its charter's inclusion of astronautics.) I do not set out a speculative claim to
RAF primacy in these areas. But, as with the development and adoption of RADAR, the
technological focus and dependency of the RAF has placed us squarely in the forefront of
conceptual as well as technical development for both space and cyberspace arenas. Let
me develop the scale of our national dependencies a little more. The UK of previous
centuries was dependent on flows of goods and information by sea. The UK of today is
dependent on many such flows. That by sea is still vital, but information flows by space
and cyberspace need policing, just as the Royal Navy guaranteed passage by sea lines of
communication. Hostile forces in cyberspace comprise a multfarious mix of state and nonstate actors, often acting in ad hoc alliances of convenience or through proxies. Our
adversaries are showing great agility and adaptability. We have seen cyber attacks against
banking systems, our networks are probed and attacked regularly, and Hamas and Israel
used cyber warfare against each other recently. (Incidentally, Hezbollah has been
operating UAVs for many years.) Commercial providers in both space and cyberpsace can
be used unwittingly to aid hostile forces. Because of this, it is often difficult to identify
unambiguously who has mounted an attack, and this is a boon to those powers who would
use proxy forces against us as an asymmetric advantage. General Wesley Clarke, NATO's
ex Senior Allied Commander Europe, strikes a warning note in an article written only this
month when he writes: ‘There is no form of combat more irregular than an electronic
attack; it is extremely cheap, is very fast, can be carried out anonymously, and can disrupt
or deny critical services precisely at the moment of maximum peril.’ He concludes that:
‘The US government can no longer afford to ignore the threat from computer-savvy rivals
or technologically advanced terrorist groups, because the consequences of a major breach
would be catastrophic.’ The 9/11 attacks took us by surprise. They were a strategic shock.
Would anyone bet against a cyber attack aimed at seriously damaging western financial
markets that are underpinned by networked IT systems? These are but three areas of
interest we are currently exploring. There are many more, and most are more
conventional. But I chose these three to demonstrate that we are not resting on our laurels
or sticking with the comfortable world we know and understand. While the Red Arrows
continue to display to the electorate the skill of our people in the business of manned
aviation, which will be with us for some time to come, we are forging ahead in many other
arenas. This address has covered much ground [in forty-five minutes]. From the biplanes
of World War One that Orville and Wilbur Wright would have recognised, to the
possibilities of cyber-warfare emerging from the conflicts of today. I hope that I have
convinced you that air and space power has had utility across the spectrum of conflict and
confrontation. As useful in delivering security as it does defence. If I could offer you five
key points that sum up my talk, they would be these: First, while we are focused
operationally on achieving success in Afghanistan in the coming years, we must
strategically focus on security and defence requirements beyond the narrow geographical
and time-bound situation of Helmand. Not to do so, risks the time-honoured practice of
preparing to fight yesterday’s war and not being ready for tomorrow’s, and we should not
fall into that trap again. The world has not stopped because we are focused on Afghanistan
in the short term and neither should our prudent preparation for future operations. Second,
that Air power has often been used innovatively when Defence was forced to think laterally,
as it could not afford the intuitive option. To be most effective it must be fully integrated
with all the levers of national power. Third, that air power is a subtle instrument, that
demands of its commanders a sure touch in navigating the complexities of the civil/military
boundary. Used well it can reduce the liabilities of a large national footprint and the
corresponding risk to valuable lives on the ground. And in all this, air power, developed
and resourced wisely, can significantly reduce concomitant political risk. Fourth, that we
have taken great steps to reduce the costs of air power. While platforms remain relatively
expensive they are also becoming more flexible, have greater utility and longevity, are truly
multirole, and are providing increasing persistence on operations. And finally, that the
Royal Air Force remains a highly agile, adaptable and capable Service, keen to adopt
emerging technology and concepts to better sustain the national interest, in the uncertain
future of global security. And that seems as fine a note as any to stop and offer you the
opportunity to ask any questions. Thank you very much for listening so politely.