The Social Production of Ecological Blind-Spots: Ignorance, Vulnerability and
the “Flood of the Century”
Dr. Christian Kuhlicke
Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research GmbH – UFZ, Leipzig (Germany)
Department of Urban and Environmental Sociology, Permoserstraße 15, 04318 Leipzig
Tel. 0049 341 235 1641; Christian.kuhlicke@ufz.de
Introduction
One of the most confusing findings of natural hazard research is almost as old as hazard
research itself: It was Gilbert F. White, who argued in the 1950s that an improvement of
dikes and levee systems is not, as intended, contributing to a reduction of material losses;
on the contrary, they rather seem to enable and even stimulate the conditions for an
increase of material losses. On a more general level, this example points to a gap between
intentional actions (protect people and their belongings) and unintended consequences
(more people and belongings are exposed). To find explanations for this paradox is surely
one of the central challenges research on natural hazards is confronted with and –
apparently – there are no straightforward answers. Some argue one simply needs to more
rigorously apply all the (scientific) knowledge accumulated during the last decades (White
et al. 2001). Yet, such a view is quite problematic. It reduces “knowledge” to the expertise
of scientists, engineers and bureaucrats and ignores not only the life-world of people and
their knowledge (Hewitt 1983), it oversimplifies the question of how knowledge is
constructed by and distributed among members of a society.
This paper develops a perspective on the vulnerability of people that tries to take into
account the uneven distribution of knowledge by the institutionalization of an expert
system and its (unintended) consequences. Its fundamental argument is that society
produces ecological blind spots, that is knowledge about the environment that has been
forgotten about, neglected or even suppressed, realms that lay outside of a societal
imagination and that are no longer or have never been part of a collective memory. If
such blind spots are discovered, they radically surprise people and unravel their
vulnerability.
The theoretical argument is illustrated and substantiated by referring to a case-study: the
2002 summer flood affecting large parts of Central and Eastern Europe. The Elbe flood
of 2002 was the single most expensive flood in German history amounting to economic
losses of 11.6 billion Euros (Schwarze and Wagner 2007). One of its decisive
characteristics was that it took most villages, cities, authorities and citizens by surprise. In
retrospect it was characterised as the “flood of the century” with an exceedance
probability of 1/200 – 1/250 years. The empirical material is based on a household survey
(n=327) and qualitative interviews with decision-makers and affected citizens (n=21)
(Kuhlicke 2008).
The final part of the paper offers a frame that allows to more precisely capture what
exactly the challenges are to come to a more resilient dealing with occurrences that are
located beyond the (current) imagination.
1
The “Flood of the Century” as a “Radical Surprise”
The case study was undertaken in the city of Eilenburg, a small town that had a
population totalling about 17,500 in 2005. As many other towns in Eastern Germany it
has experienced a decline of about 19% in its population since 1990. The historic centre is
located on an island surrounded by the Mühlgraben and the River Mulde. In the 2002
flood, the historical city centre, the industrial site of the former ECW (a chemical plant
that had closed down) and the residential district Karl-Marx-Siedlung were inundated due
to several dike breaches. Economic losses amounted to some 200 million Euros
(Steinführer and Kuhlicke 2007).
Fig. 1: Spatial Extension of the 2002 Flood (Eilenburg)
Generally, I was interested whether
people could envision such a flood
before it occurred. The empirical
reconstruction shows that in retrospect
most citizens construct it as simply
impossible to anticipate the extent of
the 2002 flood. The flood was far
beyond people’s power of imagination.
90% of the respondents of the
household survey states that they could
not imagine that such an event could
take place (n=237).
When did people discover this “radical
surprise”? Some decision-makers
report of “weak signals” pointing to
the possibility that such an event could
occur. In the upper part of the Mulde
River, for instance, the electronic water
gauge systems were washed away by
the flood. Therefore the information
was not displayed in the internet based
warning system. This was classified by
the local decision-makers according to an interpretational frame, which was considered
valid until this moment: One simply assumed that there was a problem with the transfer
of information (and not that the problem could be rooted in an exceptional flood). Only
after the flood one learned that the “usual” frame of interpretation was not sufficient to
decode the real extent of the 2002 flood.
Even “strong signals” like the announcement of an extraordinary flood or the call for
evacuation of entire neighbourhoods, did not result in questioning the validity of the
usual frame of interpretation. Many residents had a clear idea of what would happen:
They expected a flood that would not exceed previous “major” flood during the 20th
century. The Mulde River inundated parts of the settlements in 1932, 1954 and 1974.
Similarly as in previous floods, cars were evacuated from the assumed flooding areas,
small cabins situated in allotment gardens located outside the levees were secured and
2
windows and doors were stuffed with sandbags. The call for evacuation was followed
only reluctantly. There was a major gap between what people had experienced in the past
and what was suddenly announced in the early morning. Only when the streets,
basements, people’s entrances, stairs and finally, the entire ground floors of their livingareas were swallowed by the water, the citizens actually had to believe what was then
apparent. The surprise was radical, since many citizens only at this moment understood
that their previous knowledge about the river was no longer valid and helpful.
The Social Production of Ecological Blind-Spots—Theoretical reflections
This part of the paper tries elaborating some processes on the societal conditions that
prepare the ground for being radically surprised. Therefore the paper refers to Berger and
Luckmann’s thoughts on the process of objectivation (Berger and Luckmann 1967) as
well as Clausen’s “Macrosociological Process-model of a Catastrophe” (Clausen 1983;
Clausen 2003). Berger and Luckmann’s “Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge”
represents an intellectual amazement about the fact that the reality seems simply given
and familiar to us; that it appears as a coherent world. They try to explain how it is
possible to create in an uncertain world, which is filled with insuperable doubts, with
recurring problems, egregious insecurities and completely unknown spheres, a
relationship with the environment that appears as stable and certain. It is thus the “‘redefinition’ of unmanageable contingencies in manageable complexities” (Bonß 1995, 90)
that interests them. Clausen’s approach, in contrast, takes a different point of departure.
He starts his argument with a phase of all-encompassing freedom, which is defined, above
all, by an adequate solution of all problems. This phase of “peace-making” is the point of
departure from which Clausen’s argument proceeds by disclosing how during the
establishment and consolidation of reality of everyday life a society becomes increasingly
vulnerable and eventually collapses. Clausen is hence interested in the alteration of
manageable complexities towards unmanageable contingencies. His model is an attempt
to explain—no less than that—the total collapse of entire societies.
The process of institutionalisation
In a general sense, institutionalisation is a process which establishes rules as naturally
given and at the same time sanctions alternative meanings and actions; it is a social
process by which individuals develop a shared definition of social reality. Nevertheless,
institutions do not determine social actions and meanings, they rather guide them. All too
often social actions and meanings deviate from the “normative idealisations” of
institutions. Despite this difference between normative claims and real functioning, both
dimensions are interwoven as the “real” meaning of reality only receives its meaning in
contrast to the idealized description; it thus refers to it.
Despite their controlling character, institutions have another function: they relieve
individuals from tension. Humans save time and effort. “Their life together is now
defined by a widening sphere of taken-for-granted routines: Many actions are possible at a
low level of attention” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 57). According to Berger and
Luckmann, this is the background against which the division of labour is possible,
enabling and opening the way for innovations demanding a higher level of attention and
leading to specialization and differentiation.
3
At the same time goes the eventual institutionalisation of a certain segment of reality hand
in hand with the production of a blind spot. As Voss argues by referring to Clausen, the
formation of everyday life is defined by an ambivalent development: Its formation and
stabilisation, its unquestioned predominance has unintended and unacknowledged sideeffects—the reduction of complexity, eventually resulting in a constriction of possibilities,
in a loss of “’sensibility’ of the society as a whole” (2006, 66; translation C.K.). If a
problem is sufficiently solved and the solution all-embracingly effective, an inevitably
connected side-effect initiates: A loss of social attention. At this moment the process of
forgetting begins. An issue, which once stood at the centre of attention, is no longer of
importance. While antecedently every member of a society disposed qua personal
experience of similar stocks of knowledge, this knowledge starts fading into the
background; it loses its immediate value and becomes obsolete. At this stage a blind spot
is produced. However, this development is as yet unnoticed. It advances below the quiet
societal surface of everyday life.
Local successes and unintended consequences in Eilenburg
A similar process has initiated in Eilenburg as well as in other communities along the
Mulde River since the 1950s. During the 1950s, when large scale pumps were installed in
Eilenburg to route surface and ground water from the inner city to the river and when the
city centre was systematically protected by dikes, private measures play virtually no role in
the city of Eilenburg. The practical knowledge concerning floods is hardly existent
anymore, at least not within the areas protected by levees. While practical knowledge still
exists with regard to regular floods inundating the allotment gardens outside of the dikes,
it is (no longer) part of any regular praxis within the levees.
It is Timmermann’s modification of the organic-functional model that captures this loss
pointedly (1981). Generally, this model is based on the alteration of high-frequency/low
amplitude events towards low-frequency/high-amplitude events by technological
intervention (e.g. dikes). Interestingly, in Eilenburg both models exist: Within the levees
floods occur with low frequency and high amplitude; outside of the levees the highfrequency/low amplitude model dominates. Taking this model as an interpretational slide
one may state that within the dikes, local successes such as the protection of the city by
surrounding levees, prepared the stage for a major massive perturbation like the 2002
flood. The river seemed to be controlled and therefore the problem of flooding appeared
to be adequately solved. Only the flood showed that this solution was inadequate because
it promoted certainty and stability where uncertainty and instability were dominant.
The uneven distribution of societal knowledge
To return to the theoretical argument: With the institutionalisation of certain segments of
the reality of everyday, another process proceeds. There are certain stocks of knowledge
are established that are only relevant for specific people, more precisely for people who
are connected with specific roles: “In other words the social distribution of knowledge
entails a dichotomization in terms of general and role-specific relevance” (Berger and
Luckmann 1967, 77). While general knowledge is highly anonymous and represents
solutions of problems that everyone has to manage in daily life, role-specific knowledge
offers solutions to specific problems and is thus bound to specific roles being responsible
for solving these problems. The more life are institutionalised, the more fragmented this
4
very reality becomes. Therefore it is important to know “who the specialists are in case
their specialities are needed” (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 78).
With the establishment of an expert system an important and far-reaching transition with
regard to the societal distribution of knowledge initiates: Specialists are attributed
responsibility for the segment of reality they are experts for: “To have knowledge of
specialists leads to and/or is to be regarded as a motive for leaving differentiated stocks
of knowledge for the specialists” (Schütz and Luckmann 2003, 407; translation C.K.).
This means that an established expert-system claims to be responsible for a certain
section of reality and that it is ascribed responsibility for this segment by the “lay
members1”. As a consequence the uneven distribution of skills and practical knowledge
initiates and becomes eventually solidified. Thus a differentiation with regard to the
dispossession of the “material culture” of coping and adaptation techniques gained
through immediate practical experiences takes place (Clausen 1994, 30; cited in: Voss
2006, 67). The material culture is now extracted from a generally relevant stock of
knowledge and converted to a specialized stock of knowledge. Therefore, a gap opens up
and widens between experts and lay-people.
Trust and Mistrust in Experts
Prior to the flood, many residents in Eilenburg trusted in the ability of the experts to
manage and control the river and therefore neglected other techniques, stocks of
knowledge and measures constituting the material culture on the local level. The analysis
reveals that it is, above all, one expert system that people refer to—the Reservoir
Administration. It the sense of Giddens it has the technical capability and professional
expertise to influence large parts of the material and societal environment along the
Mulde River (Giddens 1995, 41). It created large retention basins in the upper part of the
Mulde River and its tributaries and it shaped large parts of the physical environment along
the Mulde by constructing technical flood protection measures. The analysis reveals that
people expected the experts of the authority to be able to reduce the dangers attributed to
the river and to hold ready the means for averting life-threatening situations.
To return to the theoretical argument: The establishment of an experts system leads to a
transformation of the distribution of knowledge. Knowledge that was previously relevant
for all actors is no longer relevant for all actors. Lay-people trust the experts to be
prospectively able to decipher all dangers and to hold ready the material culture for
averting life-threatening problems and therefore become “secondary lay people” (Clausen
2003, 67).
Clausen pushes the argument even further. He argues that the experts are increasingly
engaged in safeguarding their own status. Officially they still control a problem; however,
their ability is diminishing similarly to the lay people. They therefore become “secondary
This differentiation between experts and lay-people is problematic. Particularly the sociology of risk
shows that lay-people have stocks of knowledge that are much more contextual sensitive and reliable than
that of so called experts (Wynne 1996). However, this is not the central point of the argument I want to
make. What is of interest is whether the expertise of a person is regarded as institutionalised or not. The
argument relates mostly to what Collins and Evans refer to as “experts by certificate” (Collins and Evans
2003) and thereby does not want to deny that there also exists “experts by experience”.
1
5
experts” (Clausen 2003, 67). The negated and suppressed “destructive forces” (Voss 2006,
67) may become apparent eventually resulting in conflictive situations between experts
and lay people: “The experts ‘fight’ against the lay-people as a class, by generating
successes where no solutions were needed, while failures are reinterpreted” (Voss 2006,
67; translation C.K.). Therefore, the lay people may increasingly doubt the competence of
the experts and eventually lose their faith completely.
In the case of Eilenburg a strong feeling of dependency which was associated with
mistrust developed. Many citizens assumed that whenever the situation is not judged
appropriately by the experts, they have to bear the consequences in that their allotments
are overflowed or their properties are inundated. Therefore, one not simply has believed
in their ability and this not only since the 2002 flood. At least, some of the citizens have
expressed their concerns in one form or the other for a long time and as I know from
conversations and interviews, are confirmed in doing so by other citizens. Singular crises
and minor floods were interpreted as a sign that the Reservoir Administration is not
meeting its obligations adequately. People seem to doubt the competency of the experts.
However, the symptoms of crisis observed by the population (e.g. floods) are regarded as
temporary phenomena. A person did not follow the instruction, an expert misjudged the
situation, or—even more shattering—the general institutionalized instructions are simply
wrong, since other issues such as the supply of drinking water or the recreational
demands of the population are considered as more important than the issue of flood
protection. The mentioned mismanagement, however, is in principle redressable. One
simply needs to exchange employees, apply the right methods (cost-benefit) or install a
more appropriate model of governance (command and control). The non-controllability
is thus only a temporal phenomenon that is suppressible if the Reservoir Administration
refocuses more thoroughly on their duty of flood protection. It assumes that the problem
is deferred until a specific time in the future; it is eventually abolishable by applying better
modus operandi.
“Nature tolerant” and the 2002 flood
Yet this feeling of mistrust and dependency is embedded in a much broader contextual
construct helping to integrate confusing experiences and alienating events into the
respective life-world. This is what Berger and Luckmann refer to as legitimations. In a
very general sense legitimisations explain the institutionalized order. They explain the
institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings and hence
justify the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives
(Berger and Luckmann 1967, 93). This implies for the empirical analysis that any
substantial analysis of institutions should be grounded in the cognitive and moral framing
of acting and interpreting.
In Eilenburg, as in many other communities across Europe we may suppose, exists a
strong belief in the controllability: of the river. The river is in principle controllable and
manageable. While the trust in the expert system was substantially shattered by the flood;
the faith in the controllability of the river is not questioned. It is only the institutionalized
malfunctioning of the experts that resulted in a loss of control over the river. Therefore,
paradoxically, although the institutionalized order is challenged by referring to the expert
system its underlying legitimation is maintained and reproduced.
6
The most dominant legitimation about the human possibility to control the river
resembles what Holling describes as “nature tolerant” (1978). There existed prior to the
flood two different states of equilibrium: On the one hand the ordinary variations of the
river resulting in the inundation of the allotment gardens outside of the levee system. This
was considered as unproblematic and one adapted to these fluctuations. However, there
existed also a second state of equilibrium: The major variations resulting in the flooding
of parts of the city in 1932, 1954 and 1974. These variations were considered as
extraordinary, but still they were not perceived as threatening for the community, they
were still within an acceptable equilibrium for the community (cf. figure 1). It was known
by most narrators in Eilenburg that the river could inundate the gardens (ordinary
equilibrium) and that from time to time the city would be inundated by floods similar to
the one experienced in the 20th century (extraordinary equilibrium).
Fig. 1: Equilibrium Myths about the Mulde Rivers
It is in the final sense this widely held and apparently unquestioned myth, which helps to
explain the vulnerability of Eilenburg, since it did not consider variations exceeding both
equilibriums. This view on the river, however, has become so powerful since it is closely
related to the everyday experience, because the river—apart from single exceptions—
appears mostly as controlled and also the levees and other technical devices offer a sense
of security most of the time. The legitimation is hence not abstract, somewhat distanced
or appearing in a societal vacuum; on the contrary, it is deeply interwoven with the reality
of everyday life. The river was experienced as controlled and secured. This belief about
the river has been produced and reproduced in the daily interaction with the social and
physical environment. It has been tested and was sedimented in the collective
interpretation of previous experiences and hence part of the “natural world view”. That
this experience, however, is only valid “until further notice” was not part of everyday life
experiences and thus also not imaginable for most.
Lessons Learned: anticipating or being resilient to natural hazards?
How are actors along the Mulde River prepared for the occurrences of further surprises?
Are there any lessons learned from the 2002 flood? Interestingly, the institutionalized
order has hardly changed in the aftermath of the flood. One still believes in the ability to
control the river and one still trusts the promise of structural flood protection. To
7
systematise the empirical findings, I refer to the differentiation between anticipation and
resilience as proposed by Wildawsky (1991; Kuhlicke and Kruse under review).
According to Wildawsky, there are two strategies of dealing with an unknown future. A
first strategy tries to anticipate possible prospective occurrences. It aims at avoiding or at
least aims at mitigating the occurrence of harmful events through concrete planning. It
ties up resources and it is based on the assumption that reliable knowledge is available
about prospective occurrences. It is a strategy that creates “heavy expectations” since it
assumes to be able to anticipate prospective developments and hence has the tendency to
underestimate the possibility of the occurrences of surprises and disturbances.
A second strategy explicitly acknowledges the possibility that radical surprises may occur
and therefore tries to develop capacities that allow coping with such events. It is a strategy
that—paradoxically—expects the unexpected. It is not aiming at specific events, but
rather tries to develop an environment that is able to react flexible and that is prepared
for unforeseen events. It creates “light expectations” and is a strategy that explicitly
acknowledges the limits of knowledge.
Table 1: Anticipation and Resilience
Strategy
Principles
Anticipation
a. Assume that knowledge is certain to anticipate the future
b. “Heavy expectations”
c. Ties up resources
d. Relies on a clear defined repertoire of action
Resilience
a. Expects the unexpected
b. “Light expectations”
c. Flexibility
d. Learning, dialog and cooperation
The empirical reconstruction shows that the most dominant pattern that has established
in the aftermath of the 2002 flood is based on an anticipation strategy. Principles that are
based on the resilience-strategy are hardly pursued.
Expecting the unexpected?
Both decision-makers and citizens had to learn the bitter lesson that many events are not
foreseeable; they occur radically surprising. Most actors I talked to are aware that many
aspects are quite difficult to anticipate: Only certain things can be anticipated and planned
for; others can not. One decision-maker, for instance, states: “The next time something
completely different can happen, but we are aware of this, and one can only write down
certain things, one can plan only certain aspects”. However, such thoughts are not
pursued and/or developed further systematically. On the contrary, it is emphasised that
one wants to avoid to create a “culture of fear” that would openly admit that such an
event could happen again in the future.
8
Light Expectations?
The creation of “heavy expectations” was one of the major reasons that the flood could
surprise people to such an extent. In the aftermath of the flood a horizon of expectation
has established that is based—again—on such heavy expectations. On the web page of
the city of Eilenburg, for instance, it is suggested that Eilenburg will be flood safe after
the dike-system is renewed: “Although there exists no fail-safe flood protection,
Eilenburg will, most probably be flood secure in 2009. By then in Eilenburg along the
Mulde River and the Mühlgraben the government of the Free-state of Saxony will have
constructed 10 kilometers of walls and levees for 35 million Euros”. This communication
strategy is based upon principle of the anticipation strategy and creates the condition for
prospective vulnerability as it suggests certainty where uncertainty dominates.
Flexibility
In the aftermath of the flood the reconstruction of the technical flood protection
infrastructure is pursued with an enormous financial effort. In the sense of the
anticipation strategy a clear defined repertoire of action is applied with a clearly defined
aim (flood protection) and an enormous amount of financial resources is tied to these
projects. These measures, however, are a considerable intervention both in the
economical and ecological sense; an intervention that is inflexible and hardly reversible.
Learning, Dialogue and Cooperation
Before the 2002 flood, communication between the different actors who played a central
role during the flood (population, municipality, regional government and Reservoir
Administration) had hardly taken place. If it occurred at all, it was characterized by
misunderstandings, by the apportioning of blame and mistrust. This changed partially in
the aftermath of the flood. Citizens have tried to put pressure on the responsible
authorities and the authorities have tried to take more serious the concerns and wishes of
the population. At the same time, this communication rests within and therefore
reinforces the belief about the equilibrium of the river. The reestablishment of a save
Eilenburg by reinforcing the dikes is the issue of most discussions. There is no
(organizational) actor in sight who could break through this implicitly shared knowledge.
The empirical reconstruction, hence, shows evidence that there are not even rudimentary
approaches observable that would take into account principle of a resilience strategy.
With great effort technical flood protection has been implemented, the flexibility of the
system is reduced, “heavy expectations” created and the possibility that another radically
surprising flood might occur hardly openly communicated. These observations are
principles that are central for an anticipation strategy. This leads back to the initial
observation made by Gilbert F. White: The paradox between higher investments and
increasing losses. The life-world of both decision-makers and residents in the case study
is, above all, based on an anticipation strategy. This approach seems to be vital for local
and regional actors. A strategy that truly wants to reduce the vulnerability of flood prone
actors, should, first, be aware that resilience strategies are not easy to implement in a real
world context, and second; be aware of considerable differences between normative
9
claims (e.g. resilience discourse) and empirical findings. Any strategy should take them
into account.
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