Ethical Egoism
Ethical Egoism is the claim that what one morally ought to do, in
any given situation, is determined by one’s own self-interest. In
particular, one ought always do whatever best serves one’s own
self-interest.
Put differently, the claim is that one has no duties to other people;
one has duties only to one’s self—when those duties require that
you act so as to further the interests of others, they do so only
because in furthering the interests of others you further your own.
One’s self-interest is not simply whatever serves your immediate
interests. Rather, one’s self-interest includes the effects of your
behavior own your interests in the long run as well as the short.
Hence, no matter how much one might enjoy imbibing single malt,
one’s best interests are not served by imbibing a fifth per day, as
this leads to an early death, and so is contrary to one’s self-interest.
There are in fact two forms of ethical egoism which out to be
considered.
Version 1: One ought always do whatever is in one’s own selfinterest (without regard to the ways in which the effect of your
actions on the interests of others will affect your self-interest in the
future).
Version 2: One ought always do whatever is in one’s own selfinterest (considering explicitly the ways in which the effect of your
actions on the interests of others will enable or retard your future
efforts to satisfy your self interest).
The versions differ in that the first considers human beings to be
inherently self-sufficient individuals, while the second takes
seriously that we are all embedded in a social context. So both
rules might imply that one should treat others as one would wish to
be treated, but on the first version actions that help others for no
immediate gain will not be encouraged: one supposes that as a
self-sufficient individual one will never need or want charity from
others, hence one should never render it. Conversely, the second
version might recommend (well publicized) charitable acts on the
grounds that it cannot be harmful to your own interests if your
neighbors think well of you, and it might, by some bad chance, be
really important to you in the future that they do so.
Rachels’ Account.
Rachels notes an apparent conflict between our common-sense
notions of morality and Ethical Egoism, he considers 3 arguments
for ethical egoism, and then three arguments against it.
The Conflict:
Our everyday notion of morality seems to require us to act
beneficently in ways that could not possibly serve our own selfinterest. E.g., most of us will have the intuition that we really
ought to do more than we in fact do in order to save starving
people in third-world countries. But such charity, say my giving
$10 a week to Feed the Children, cannot possibly serve our selfinterest. The beneficiaries are unlikely ever to be in a position to
return the favor, and no one else will much care. Nonetheless,
morality seems to imply that we have duties to relieve famine, just
because the beneficiaries of such charity are people who could be
helped or harmed by our actions.
The First Argument for Ethical Egoism
This argument turns on a theory about economics, which says
roughly, that the most productive economies depend on free agents
who rationally pursue their own best interests, and a further claim
which holds that societies with the most productive economies will
have the fewest people in need of charitable help. The argument in
outline is this:
1. We ought to do whatever will promote the best interests of
everyone alike.
2. The interests of everyone will be best promoted if each of us
adopts the policy of pursuing our own interests exclusively.

3. Each of us should adopt the policy of pursuing our own
interests exclusively.
The idea is that you are not well situated to determine the needs of
others, and not well situated to effectively pursue them.
Attempting to do so generally gets things wrong in ways that are
seriously inefficient. But you are well situated to determine your
own needs, and to effectively pursue them. If others are rationally
pursuing their own interests, but not interfering with your pursuit
of your interests, you are likely to be successful. So the best way
to promote the well-being of all, is to actively promote your own.
Greed, as it turns out, is good!
The problem here, says Rachels, is that while this is a defense of
the claim that one ought to pursue one’s own self interest, it is not
a defense of ethical egoism. It is not, because the argument
presumes that, in the first instance, what we ought to do is promote
the interests of everyone alike; it just turns out that the best way to
do this is to act as if ethical egoism were true. But in fact one does
have duties to others, as is made explicit in premise 1, so ethical
egoism is false.
The Second Argument: Rand and Individualism
The idea behind the second argument is that the only things of real
value are human lives. Each person has in her care her own life.
An ethical theory which properly values human lives will direct
those in a position to care for a life to make it as rich and full, as
valuable, as possible. One does that by pursuing the interests of
the person whose life it is. So, since each person has her own life
in her care, she ought pursue her own interests. To do anything
else is fail in one’s duty to care for the human life over which one
has power (i.e., your own).
The argument is this:
1. A person has only one life to live.
Hence
2. If we value the life of a human individual morally, each person
must regard her life as of supreme importance (because one has
only one life).
3. Altruistic ethics forces one to regard one’s life (or, the time,
energy, money, projects etc. which comprise that life) as a thing to
be sacrificed for the good of others.
Hence,
4. Altruistic ethics does not value individual human lives morally.
5. Ethical Egoism does value individual human lives morally.
6. We ought to value morally individual human lives.

7. We ought accept Ethical Egoism.
Rachels objects to this argument on the grounds that 3 is false.
Altruistic ethical theories, ethical theories that require one to
sacrifice some of one’s interests in order that others can satisfies
some of their interests, do not require than any interest one has
must be sacrificed for any interest had by someone else. Some
altruistic ethical theories do this, but many other altruistic ethical
theories require only that in some circumstances one must forego
some relatively minor interests in order that others can satisfy some
relatively important interests. As, for example, when others are
starving but you are well off, you might be required to sacrifice
you interest in seeing a movie in order that someone else can
satisfy his interest in not starving to death. Claim 4 simply does
not follow from a revised version of 3 which does correctly capture
what is distinctive about altruistic ethics (i.e. that you are
sometimes required to sacrifice your interests in order that others
can satisfy their interests)
The Third Argument:
The third argument accepts the idea that our common-sense moral
intuitions about, e.g. the permissibility of lying, the duty to be
charitable, and so on are correct. But it claims to provide a
theoretical basis for the correctness of these rules. They are correct
because following them turns out to be the best way to maximize
our own self interest. On this view, ethical egoism explains why
our pre-theoretical moral theory is more or less correct—doing
what that theory tells one to do is the way to best pursue one’s own
interests.
The explanation is pretty good:
A. If we harm others, they will be more likely to harm us.
B. If we lie, we will not be trusted, but that trust is essential for
pursuing our own projects, in business say, when they require the
cooperation of others.
Hobbes and Contractarian accounts of normative rules.
Problems:
1. There appear to be cases in which harming others (or failing to
help) does serve one’s best interests, but seems to be immoral.
2. There might be other explanations of our common-sense moral
intuitions that do as good a job as the ethical egoist theory, but
which do not claim that it is always right to pursue one’s own best
interests. No argument that such an alternative theory is
impossible has been given.
Arguments against Ethical Egoism
Argument 1 (No Resolution of Conflicts)
1. The purpose of an ethical theory is to tell us what we should do
when our interests conflict with others, in order that we can resolve
the conflict.
2. Ethical Egoism will not in general do this: if Igor and Ivan are
running for office (both want to win more than anything else), it is
to Igor’s advantage to have Ivan killed, and to Ivan’s advantage to
foil any such attempt by Igor. Ethical Egoism does not resolve the
problem, rather it enjoins Igor to liquidate Ivan, and Ivan to foil
Igor’s plot.

3. Ethical Egoism cannot be a correct moral theory.
Problem: The ethical egoist might, and perhaps should, deny the
claim that a good moral theory ought to resolve conflicts. What it
ought to do is tell us how we ought to behave. If it does this in was
that lead to conflict resolution, well and good. But if not, so long
as it guides each party to the conflict, there is no problem.
Argument 2 (Leads to Logical Contradiction).
1. Suppose it is each person’s duty to do what is in his own best
interests.
2. It is in Igor’s best interest to liquidate Ivan.
3. It is in Ivan’s best interest to prevent Igor from liquidating him.
4. Therefore Igor’s duty is to liquidate Ivan, and Ivan’s duty is to
prevent Igor from doing this.
5. But it is wrong to prevent someone from doing their moral duty.
6. Therefore it is wrong for Ivan to prevent Igor from liquidating
him.
7. Therefore it is both wrong and not wrong for Ivan to prevent
Igor from liquidating him.
8. But an act cannot be both wrong and not wrong-- this would be
a self contradiction.
9. Therefore the assumption in 1 is wrong.
Problem:
Premise 5 is contentious: it is not clear that it is wrong to prevent
someone from doing his duty, and in particular, the ethical egoist
should reject this claim. For him, 5 will be true only when it is to
one’s advantage not to prevent someone from doing his duty.
When this is not true, there is nothing wrong with preventing
someone else from doing their duty.
Argument 3 (Argument from Prejudice).
Argument 3 turns on a meta-ethical principle.
It is claimed that:
An ethical theory which treats some people differently from others
is wrong unless there is some factual difference between the two
groups of people which is relevant to the different ways of treating
them.
Some Cases:
Supposed justifications of Racist, Sexist, Religiously
Discriminatory Political Institutions are all cases in which a moral
theory is used to justify treating one group of persons differently
than another. The justifications fail because the moral theories are
wrong. They are wrong because there is no difference between the
groups which is relevant to the differences in treatment they
receive.
The argument:
1. Any moral doctrine that assigns greater importance to the
interests of one group than to those of another is unacceptably
arbitrary unless there is some difference between the members of
the groups that justifies treating them differently.
2. Ethical Egoism would have each person assign greater
importance to his or her own interests than to those others.
3. But there is no general difference between oneself and others to
which each person can appeal that justifies this difference in
treatment.

4. Ethical Egoism is unacceptably arbitrary.
We should care about the interests of others for the very same
reason we care about our own interests.