Notes on Pragmatics
GXNU Graduate Program in Linguistics & Applied Linguistics
Edited by Shaozhong Liu
Vol. 1
Issue No. 2005(4)
Address: College of Foreign Studies, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin, 541004, China
Website: http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/cofs; Email: szliu@mailbox.gxnu.edu.cn
 From the Editor…………………………………………………………………………………...2
 Pragmatic principles
Chen Huai……………………………………………………………………………………………………..2
He Ning……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3.
Jing Andian…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..3
Lai Tao…………………………………………………………………………………………………….….4
Li Handong……………………………………………………………………………………………….…..5
Liao Jinchao……………………………………………………………………………………………….….6
Liu Bin…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..7
Liu Taomei……………………………………………………………………………………………….……8
Liu Tingting…………………………………………………………………………………………………..9
Meng Jieqin…………………………………………………………………….……………………………10
Ou Lianfen…………………………………………………………………………………………………10
Song Yuge…………………………………………………………………………………………………….11
Sun Yan……………………………………………………………………………………………………….12
Tang Wensheng……………………………………………………………………………………………….13
Tang Xia……………………………………………………………………………………………………...14
Wang Kaiwen………………………………………………………………………………………………...15
Wang Liyuan……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..16
Wang Wenbo………………………………………………………………………………………………….16
Wei Yunhui……………………………………………………………………………………………………17
Xu Hui………………………………………………………………………………………………………..18
Xu Zhaojuan………………………………………………………………………………………………….19
Zhou Yanqiong……………………………………………………………………………………………….20
Zhou Yuping………………………………………………………………………………………………….20
1
From the Editor
One big feature of pragmatics is its obsessed concern on principles of language use,
instead of rules, which help to separate it from other branches of linguistic occupations. Under
the title of “Pragmatic Principles”, Mey (2001, Chapter 4, pp.67-91) makes an attempt to
showcase the fundamentals of what it is meant by pragmatic principles, through an elaboration
on the following:
4.1 Principles and rules…………………………………………………………………………67
4.2 Some Principles discussed………………………………………………………………….68
4.2.1 The Communicative Principle……………………………………………………………68
4.2.2 The Cooperative Principle………………………………………………………………..71
4.2.2.1 Dostoyevski and the rubber ball………………………………………………………..72
4.2.2.2 Cooperation and ‘face’…………………………………………………………………73
4.2.2.3 Cooperation and ‘flouting’……………………………………………………………..76
4.2.3 Politeness and other virtues………………………………………………………………79
4.3 Rethinking Grice…………………………………………………………………………...82
4.3.1 Horn’s two principles…………………………………………………….………………83
4.3.2 Relevance and ‘conspicuity’……………………………………………………………..85
Liu, SZ, UNCG
Pragmatic principles
Chen Huai
(jesschenh@yahoo.com.cn; Sat, 9 Apr 2005 22:15:00 +0800 (CST))
This chapter comes to talk about some pragmatic principles, which are very close to our communication.
At first, the author explains the term “principle”, the concept which is very familiar to linguistics as well as
other branches of science. Principles are applied not only to ‘elements of understanding’, but also ‘prerequisites
to understanding’. Thus, linguists often lay down ‘principles’ for the sound description of a language.
Another term should be mentioned is that of ‘rule’. With the ‘Chomskyan revolution’, the grammar is
regarded as the rules of the language. However, this kind of grammatical rules is purely syntactic, which
probably may be unable to solve the problem of the domain of semantics, or even pragmatics. Then, “it seems
reasonable … that we restrict the use of rules primarily to syntax; in pragmatics, we prefer to work with
principles.”(Mey, 2001) So, our attention is directed towards some pragmatic principles naturally.
The first principle discussed in the book is the Communication Principle — “People talk with the intention to
communicate something to somebody; this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior.” Mey considers the
Communication Principle as the basis of pragmatic principle even though it is not mentioned in the pragmatic
literature. Other principles discussed later are correlated with it to some extent. Communication is not a matter
of logic or truth, but of cooperation in that “given that I want to communicate, what I do communicate depends on
what I can communicate, given my circumstances, and on what I must communicate, given my partner’s
expectation.”
As the Communication Principle is something about cooperation, we cannot put aside the Cooperative
Principle without placing any notice on it. H. Paul Grice highlighted it, which consists of four pragmatic
subprinciples, or ‘maxims’. It is said that without cooperation, communication wouldn’t be possible, hence we’d
better cooperate. But people’s actual use of language seems to tell more stories than just obey this set of maxims.
For example, ‘face’ (or politeness) is one layer of human interaction, and people apply the strategy of politeness
for conversational cooperation with least cost and maximum benefit to all interlocutors. Nevertheless, the action
of ‘flouting’ CP is still one of the issue in pragmatic discussion.
Grice’s CP, however, is under attack almost from the very beginning. And efforts are made to develop his
notion. One is Horn’s neo-Gricean theory, the other Relevance Theory (RT) by Sperber and Wilson. Horn’s two
principles, Q-principle and R-principle, keep relevance with Gricean theory. Here, ‘Q’ refers to ‘quantity’, i.e.
‘say as much as we can’, and ‘R’ ‘relation’, means ‘say no more than we must’. These two principles explain a
variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, in an elegant and economical
2
manner; they stand out as a worthwhile attempt to simplify the matter of pragmatic principles.
As far as Relevance Theory is concerned, it is a minimalist theory of communication. The point is that
“communicators do not ‘follow’ the principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to.
The principle of relevance applies without exceptions”, as Sperber and Wilson maintained that the principle could
solve all the problems of communication. RT simplifies the Communication Principle, and it turns out to be an
all-encompassing notion. Lots of people tend to relate RT with many domain of language, whereas they may
overlook that RT does not include the social dimension of language (Mey, 2001: 87).
At last, even though I do not like ‘principles’, we still cannot live without follow some so-called ‘principles’
in our communication.
(To the top)
He Ning
(elvahening@eyou.com; 9 May 2005 19:32:52 +0800)
In chapter 4, Mey mainly discusses some pragmatic principles including communicative principle and
cooperative principle. Horn’s two principles and the Relevance Theory are also mentioned in this chapter.
Firstly, Mey talks about why we use the term “principles” instead of “rules”. He thinks that since the
Chomskyan rules were purely syntactic, we need to use another term for phenomena of a semantic or pragmatic
nature in order to make a contrast to the transformational modle of language description. The chief function of a
grammatical rule is to predict, while the semantic or pragmatic “rule” is about the usage with the user being in the
first place.
Secondly, Mey introduced the communicative principle. “people talk with intention to communicate
something to somebody; this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior. I call this the communicative
principle.”(P68 Chapter 4) This doesn’t mean that users actually always communicative what they plan to do, or
what they think they do, but it has nothing to do with whether the users observe any rules of grammar. According
to the Communicative Principle, we avoid giving our interlocutors either an over- or underdose of information. But
why don’t we sometimes say exactly the truth or what we really mean. The answer is given by the communicative
principle. “Given that I want to communicative , what I do communicate depends on what I can communicate,
given my circumstance, and on what I must communicate, given my partner’s expectation. Communication is not a
matter of logic or truth, but of cooperation.” (P70 Chapter 4) The fact that we sometimes use vague expression
shows that the communicative principle, unlike a grammatical rule, operates in a concrete context, rather than in
the abstract space of linguistic speculation.
Thirdly, Mey discusses the Cooperative Principle. Cooperation was elevated to the status of an independent
principle by H. Paul Grice. His Cooperation Principle consists of four pragmatic subprinciples: the maxim of
quantity, the maxim of quality, the maxim of relation and the maxim of manner. These four maxims can be seen as
instances of one superordinate Cooperation Principle: “Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”(Grice 1975:47) In this
section, Mey also mentions the notion of “face”. Face , as an explanatory concept in human interaction, was
originally introduced by Coffman(1967). Face has two aspect: a positive one and a negative one. Being
cooperatively, people try to establish their interlocutors’ positive face and try to avoid posing threats to their
negative face.
Fourthly, Mey briefly introduced Horn’s principles and the Theory of Relevance. The principles of horn are:
the quality principle, telling us to “say as much as we can” and the relation principle, which says that we should
“say no more than we must”. But Sperber and Wilson think that pragmatics needs only one principle, which is
relevance. “According to Sperber and Wilson’s presumption of relevance, we are ready for something that will
make sense (is relevant), and we will build our understanding around the assumption.”(P86 Chapter 4) Then Mey
mentions some problems of RT. One is that the notion of relevance itself may become so all-encompassing as to
lose its explanatory force. Another problem is that RT says very little about real communicative interaction as it
happens in our society.
What is of my special interest is that people tell lies almost everyday for various reasons although it obviously
violet the principle of quantity. Sometimes people even intend to tell wrong information. Then how to clearly and
satisfactorily explain the lies with the pragmatic principles remains to be solved. Although someone explained
something about it, I think further research is still needed. (To the top)
Jing Andian
(robertbai2003@163.com; Mon, 11 Apr 2005 21:47:22 +0800 (CST))
3
This chapter is basically about some principles in the understanding of conversation pragmatically. In this
chapter the author puts his focus on the discussion of communicative principle, cooperative principle, politeness
principle, Horn’s principle and relevance principle.
There are six things addressed in this chapter as the following.
First, the differences between principle and rule. In the first part the author distinguishes principle from rule.
In his opinion, rule is relevant to syntax, whereas principle is relevant to pragmatics.
Second, the communicative principle. In the communication it is not important for the language user to
observe a particular rules but to communicate something to his partner. He argues that this is the foundation of all
linguistic behavior, which is called Communicative Principle. According to this principle, whatever the speaker
addresses in the conversation he always intends to express his thoughts or feelings in accordance with his status
and the context. At the same time, the communicators always try to express themselves properly so that they could
be understood but not misunderstood by their communicating partners.
Third, the cooperative principle. During the process of communication, in order to be understood the
communicators must try to be cooperative. In other words, they must observe the cooperative principle, which is
proposed by the philosopher Grice. The principle consists of four subprinciples, or maxims, that is ,the maxim of
quantity, the maxim of quality, the maxim of relation and the maxim of manner. In Grice’s opinion, while
communicating the communicative parties should observe these principles in order to make the conversation
forward smoothly. But in the actual condition the fact is that the communicators always violate these principles.
Through the reading it seems that the author does not put his focus on the violation of these principles from the
perspective of conversational implicature. On the contrary he discusses the violation from the view of face.
Fourth, the politeness principle. Since the cooperative principle does not explain the entire phenomenon in the
conversation, the linguist, Leech, advocates the politeness principle. In this chapter the author first of all tell us
what being ‘polite’ means. Then he argues the politeness of the order depends on the positive or negative effects it
has on the person who is given the order. The last point he makes is that in the communication the principle of
politeness demands the communicators to minimize the effects of impolite statements or expressions and to
maximize the politeness of polite illocutions. In my opinion, during the communication if the speaker addresses in
accordance with his status, then he is polite, or he is impolite. As the author suggests, one of the functions of
politeness is to create or manifest a distance between the interlocutors.
Fifth, Horn’s principles. In the last part the author evaluates the Horn’s principles and relevance
principle.Since Grice’s principle is open to question, it is necessary to modify or rethink it. Among of them Horn’s
two principles draw more attention. Horn introduces Q-principle and R-principle. It seems Horn’s principles are
the simplification of Grice’s principle.
Sixth, relevance principle. In Sperber and Wilson’s opinion, pragmatics needs only one principle, that of
relevance in a particular context. The author considers relevance principle is the further specification of Grice’s
principle. Even this principle is able to account for all the phenomena that earlier had been assigned to the other
maxims for their explanation, it says little about real communicative interaction as it happens in the society, that is,
it does not include the social dimentions of language.
(To the top)
(byyourside@sina.com;
Lai Tao
Mon, 11 Apr 2005 08:49:10 +0800)
This chapter mainly consists of three parts: principles and rules, some principles discussed and rethinking
Grice. The emphasis is put on “some principles discussed”, i. e. the communicative principle, the cooperative
principle and politeness principle. And Horn’s two principles (Q-principle & R-principle), Sperber and Wilson’s
“Relevance Theory” (RT) are also evaluated.
Firstly, the concept of “principle” and “rule” is discussed. The former one is taken as being equivalent to
“proposal for description” by Reuland (1979:2). While “rule” is generally related with “grammar” or “semantics”.
As Leech has suggested (1983:5), we prefer to work with principles in pragmatics.
Secondly, the communicative principle is defined as “people talk with the intention to communicate
something to somebody; this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior.” That also means, when communicating,
speakers try to be understood correctly, and avoid giving false impressions. No matter how logically correct and
true my speech is, if it confuses or misleads my hearer, then my utterance will not have its proper effect: I will not
have communicated what I had in my mind. (4.2.1: 69) Then, the cooperative principle (CP) id assessed by giving
three very daily examples. The four maxims are analyzed in actual linguistic usage. As the author points out:
Communication requires people to cooperate, the “bare facts” of conversation come alive only in a mutually
accepted, pragmatically determined context. Next, Leech’s politeness principle is carefully discussed, which is said
to rescue the CP, but actually Cp is not in need of rescued at all. Furthermore, politeness principles are neither
4
theoretically nor practically on the same level as the cooperative principle. (4.2.3: 81)
Thirdly, Horn’s two principles and Sperber & Wilson’s “Relevance Principle” (RT) are evaluated. Horn’s
Q-principle covers the Gricean maxim of quatity1 (being the first half of the maxim), whereas the R-principle
contains within it the second half of the quantity maxim (quantity2) plus the maxims of manner and relation. These
two principles explain a variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, in an
elegant and economical manner. (4.3.1: 84) Then, RT is thought to be a variant of the CP. As Sperber and Wilson
claims, this assumption is a central trait of human communicative behavior, even to the point that one cannot
properly maintain that one “follows” the principle of relevance: “Communicators do not follow the principle of
relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to. The principle of relevance applies without
exceptions” (1986: 162). That is the Achilles’ heel for the theory, for the notion of relevance itself may become so
all-encompassing as to lose its explanatory force. Even worse, RT says very little about real communicative
interaction as it happens in our society. It does not include the social dimensions of language. (Mey and Talbot,
1989) (To the top)
Li Handong
(winter180@sina.com; Sun, 10 Apr 2005 14:47:50 +0800)
This chapter is basically dealing with pragmatic principles. There are three things addressed in the reading.
First, principles and rules:
Principles can be not only elements of understanding but even prerequisites to understanding, going all way
from elementary knowledge to high-level, theoretical and metatheoretical speculation.
As referring to rules, in language, rules are the grammar. Chief grammatical rule is its ability to predict.
Leech has suggested that we restrict the use of rules primarily to syntax, in pragmatics; we prefer to work
with principles.
Second, some principles:
1) Communicative Principle
a. People talking with the intention to communicate something to somebody, this is the foundation for all linguistic
behavior. All-important in fact is that people engage in communicative activity whenever they use language.
Whether or not they observe a particular syntactic rule is not too important.
b. Communicative Principle given that I want to communicate, what I do communicate depends on what I can
communicate, given my circumstances, and on what I must communicate, given my partner’s expirations.
Communication is not a matter of logical or truth, but of communication.
c. The example of “many” and “all” show s that how the communicative principle, unlike a grammatical rule,
operates in a concrete context, rather than in the abstract space of linguistic speculation.
2) Cooperative principle: Grice’s this principle consists of four pragmatic sub-principles, or maxims:
The maxim of quantity
Make your contribution as informative as required
Do not make your contribution more informative than required
The maxim of quality
Do not say what you believe to be false
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
The maxim of relation
Make your contribution relevant
The maxim of manner
Be perspicuous, and specifically
Avoid obscurity
Avoid ambiguity
Be brief
Be orderly
As Grice said: make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs by the accepted purpose
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
3) Cooperation is a complex concept, involving many layers of interactive behavior, including politeness and
“face”.
“face” has two aspects: a positive one, by which a person’s status as an autonomous, independent, free agent
is affirmed; and a negative one, which stressed a person’s immunity from outside interference and undue external
pressure.
Acting cooperatively, people try to build up their “interlocutors” “positive faces”, while trying to avoid posing
5
threats to their “negative faces”
4) Cooperative and “flouting”
This part is based on the maxim of quantity. Mey points out three problems.
There is cooperation itself, taken as a general, inviolable and indisputable rule of behavior.
There are important intercultural differences in cooperative behavior.
‘Flouthing’: when people blatantly fail to observe one or several maxim, we speaking a maxim, either semantically
or pragmatically.
Mey gives us several examples and concludes that ‘flouting the maxim’ can be many things, there is no way of
prescribing or proscribing a particular violation as useful or detrimental. He compares linguistic to consumption he
producer is judged by the willingness of his or her clientele to buy into the violated maxim: the proof of the
pudding is, as always, in the eating.
5) Politeness and other virtues
(1) Politeness is advocated by Leech, according to whom “some illocutions are inherently impolite, and others are
inherently polite”.
Mey points out that such a view is wrong on two counts. First, the social position of the speaker may indicate
different politeness valued for individual vases. Second, the politeness of the order also depends on the positive pr
negative effects it has on the person who is given the order.
(2)Leech thought that one of the functions of politeness is to create a distance between the interlocutors.
Mey thinks that some of Leech’s politeness principle is neither theoretically nor practically and they are under
cooperative principle in some form or other.
Third, rethinking Grice:
(1)Horm’s two principles
The two principles introduced by Horn are: the Q-principle (Q for quantity), telling us to “say as much as we
can”; and the R-principle (R for relation), which says that we should “say no more than we must”.
Mey thinks that the Q-principle covers the Gricean maxim of quamtity1, and the R-principle contains within
the second half of the quantity maxim plus the maxim of manner and relation.
But still Mey point out that Horn’s two principles explain a variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness,
negation, the lexicon and so on, in an elegant and economical manner. They stand out as a worthwhile attempt to
simplify the matter of pragmatic principles, bringing them to some common denominators.
(2) Relevance and ‘conspicuity’
According to Sperber and Wilson, pragmatics needs only one principle --- relevance. This ‘Principle of
Relevance’ can be seen as a further specification of the Gricean notion of cooperation. Principle of Relevance is a
variant of the Communicative Principle.
For Relevance Theory, in accordance with the Communicative Principle, achieving successful in conversion
by way of the relevance of what is being said is a sufficient aim in conversion or other verbal interaction. RT is
thus a minimalist theory of communication.
Mey point out two shortcomings of RT: a. Sperber and Wilson assume their principle to operate without
exception, which will make it lose its explanatory force. b. RT says very little about real communicative interaction
as it happens in our society. (To the top)
LIAO Jin-chao
(samliao1@163.com; Mon, 11 Apr 2005 01:02:11 +0800 (CST))
This chapter is basically about some pragmatic principles. These principles include the Communicative
Principle, the Cooperative Principle, the Principle of Politeness and the Relevance Principle.
1. The Communicative Principle
Mey proposes this principle. He thinks that people talk with the intention to communicate something to
somebody and this is the foundation of all linguistic behaviors. Though any linguist does not mention this principle,
Mey regards it as the hidden condition for all human pragmatic activity and the silently agreed-on premise of
linguistic investigation into such activity. According to Mey’s Communicative Principle, when communicate,
speakers try to be understood correctly, and avoid giving false impressions. What is of special interest to us is that
communication seems to be a process for speaker to intentionally make himself understood by his hearer. And this
might the very basis for communication.
2.The Cooperative Principle
Communication requires people to cooperate and the “bare facts” of conversation come alive only in mutually
accepted, pragmatically determined context. The American philosopher H. Paul Grice elevated cooperation to the
status of an independent principle in his works. His principle includes four pragmatic maxims. And Grice thinks,
6
“ Make your contribution such as is required …by the accepted purpose of the exchange in which you are
engaged.”
As for the notion of cooperation, there exist some problems between cooperating humans. Fist, the notion of
cooperation, being regarded as a general rule of behavior, is too broad and not specific; second, there are
intercultural differences in cooperative behavior, and cooperation is in fact defined relative to a particular culture.
What is of special interest to us is that to what degree cooperation does play its role in communication.
As for the Cooperative Principle, there are questions about its maxims. First, do the maxims have the same weight,
and are they used in the manner in different situations? Second, the necessity of having all of the maxims and
could they be simplified?
But cooperation is a quite complex concept. It involves many layers of interactive behavior, including
politeness and face. In communication, politeness is our strategy for conversational cooperation with least cost and
maximum benefit.
3.The Principle of Politeness
Grice’s cooperative principle has been under criticism ever since the very beginning. And one of the
criticisms is that the maxims can be interpreted as a moral code of behavior. And Leech proposed his Principle of
Politeness.
In his principle, politeness is assumed as an abstract quality without any regard for the particular
circumstances under which the communication occurs. Mey thinks this is wrong. First, the social status of the
speakers may indicate different politeness values for individual cases. Second, the politeness of the order also
depends on the positive or negative effects it has on the person who is given the order. In other words, politeness
involves different cultures and circumstances.
4. The Relevance Principle.
In Sperber and Wilson’s view, pragmatics needs only on principle and they proposed the Relevance Principle.
In Relevance Principle, in any given context, what people say is relevant. In communication, communicating
something meaningful may be supposed to be relevant to the partners. Relevance principle is a minimal theory of
communication and relevance is all we need.
The RT principle is regarded as a further specification of Grice’s Cooperative Principle and it is more explicit
than the former too. But the RT still has some problems. One of these problems is that it has said little about real
communicative interaction as it happens in our society. (To the top)
LIU Bin
(liubin54100101@sohu.com; Tue, 5 Apr 2005 19:53:27 +0800 (CST))
In this chapter, the writer talks about several principles which are very essential in pragmatic study of
conversations. In the first section the author discusses the difference between the two terms: “principle” and “rule”.
Principles may be simple considered as conditions for a sound description of a language, and should not be
confused with the rules of description themselves. The “rules” are the grammar, not to say: the language. Since the
Chomskyan rules were purely syntactic, the need arose to have another term for phenomena of a semantic or
pragmatic nature; a term, moreover, that would create a contrast to the transformational model of language
description. So we restrict the use of rules primarily to syntax; in pragmatics, we prefer to work with principles.
The second section discusses some pragmatic principle in more detail. The first principle discusses is the
Communicative Principle. People talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody; this is the
foundation of all linguistic behavior. We call this the Communicative Principle. Even though this principle is not
mentioned in the pragmatic literature, it is nevertheless the hidden condition for all human pragmatic activity, and
the silently agreed-on premise of our investigation into such activity. Communication, furthermore, requires people
to cooperate; the “bare facts” of conversation come alive only in a mutually accepted, pragmatically determined
context. Cooperation has itself been elevated to the status of an independent principle in the works of Grice, whose
Cooperative Principle consists of four pragmatic sub-principles. They are the maxim of quantity, the maxim of
quality, the maxim of relation and the maxim of manner. These four maxims can be seen as instances of one
superordinate Cooperative Principle. When people discuss the CP, two views often clash. One is that of
cooperative behavior as a kind of abstract, philosophical rationality. The second view raises problems of moral
philosophy and practical ethics. In its usual interpretation, “face” has two aspects: a positive one, by which a
person’ status as an autonomous, independent, free agent is affirmed; and a negative one, which stresses a person’s
immunity from outside interference and undue external pressure. Politeness is another important principle in
pragmatics. To understand Politeness, one has to know what being “polite” means. One view assumes politeness to
be an abstract quality. Such a view is wrong on two counts. First, the social position of the speakers may indicate
different politeness values for individual cases. Second, the politeness of the order also depends on the positive or
7
negative effects it has on the person who is given the order.
The third section discusses some new development after Grice’s four maxims. Grice’s four maxims and the
associated principles of cooperation have been under attack almost from the very beginning. On the one hand, the
critique has focused on the values attached to the maxims. A further question is whether the maxims have the same
weight, are used in approximately the same manner, in deferent situations. On the other hand, one may also
question the necessity of having all of the maxims around. As to the maxim of relevance itself, this has been the
subject of two major efforts of rethinking Grice. Horn focuses on a central problem in conversational cooperation:
some utterances, on a certain reading, have a clear and unambiguous meaning. While other interpretations require
a special effort on the part of the listener. The two principles that Horn introduces are: the Q-principle, telling us to
“say as much as we can”; and the R-principle, which says that we should “say no more than we must”. According
to Sperber and Wilson, pragmatics needs only one principle, that of relevance. The assumption, or principle,
underlying relevance theory is that in any given context, what people say is relevant. (To the top)
Taomei Liu
(ltaomei@126.com; Tue, 12 Apr 2005 22:48:20 +0800 (CST))
This chapter is basically about the pragmatics principles. There are 4 things addressed in the reading, namely,
the Communicative Principle, the Cooperative Principle, politeness and other virtues, Horn’s two principles and
Relevance .
Firstly, Mey reviewed some principles discussed. He first talked the Communicative Principle. People engage
in communicative activity whenever they use language, whether or not they observe a particular syntactic rule is
not too important. People talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody; this is the foundation of
all linguistic behavior. And Mey calls it the Communicative Principle. Even though this principle is not mentioned
in the pragmatic literature, it is nevertheless the hidden condition for all human pragmatic activity, and the silently
agreed-on premise of our investigation into such activity. When communicating, speakers try to be understood
correctly, and avoid giving false impressions. No matter how logically correct and true my speech is, if it confuses
or misleads my hearer, then my utterance will not have its proper effect: I will not have communicated what I had
in mind.
Secondly, Mey talks about the Cooperative Principle. Communication, furthermore, requires people to
cooperate; the ‘bare facts’ of conversation come alive only in a mutually accepted, pragmatically determined
context. Cooperation has itself been elevated to the status of an independent principle in the works of the late
British/American philosopher H. Paul Grice(1975,1989), whose Cooperative Principle (CP) consists of four
pragmatic principles, or ‘maxims’: the maxim of quantity; the maxim of quality; the maxim of relation; the maxim
of manner. Cooperation is a complex concept, involving many layers of interactive behavior, including politeness
and ‘face’. By being polite, we conserve our integrity as interlocutors while being considerate of our partners’
faces------in one fell sweep. Politeness is our strategy for conversational cooperation with less cost and maximum
benefit to all interlocutors.
Thirdly, Mey discusses politeness and other virtues. First, one has to know what being ‘polite’ means.
According to Leech, “ some illocutions are inherently impolite, and others are inherently polite”(1983:83). This
view assumes politeness to be an abstract quality, residing in individual expressions, lexical items or morphemes,
without regard dor the particular circumstances that govern their use. Being ‘inherently’ polite implies being
always polite, without regard for the contextual factors that define what is polite in a given situation. Such a view
is wrong on two accounts. First, the social position of the speakers may indicate different politeness values for
individual cases. Second, the politeness of the order also depends on the positive or negative effects it has on the
person who is given the order.
Fourthly, Mey discusses some proposals that want to do away with (some or all of )the maxims, yet retain the
notion of cooperation as the basis of conversation. They are Horn’s two principles and Relevance . Grice’s four
maxims and the associated principle of cooperation have been under attack almost from the very beginning. On the
one hand, the critique has focus ed on the values attached to the maxims. A further question is whether the maxims
have the same weight, and are used in approximately the same manner, in different situations. As to the maxim of
relevance itself, this has been the subject of two major efforts at rethinking Grice. The first is due to Horn(1984);
the other to Sperber and Wilson(1986). They are different in that Horn’s model keeps relevance within the general
framework of Gricean theory, whereas Sperber and Wilson make the maxim of relevance the cornerstone of their
own approach to ‘communication and cognition’, aptly described as Relevance Theory (RT). Horn focuses on a
central problem in conversational cooperation: some utterance, on a certain reading, have a clear and unambiguous
meaning, while other interpretations require a special effort on the part of the listener. The two principles that Horn
introduces are: the Q- principle (‘Q’ for ‘quantity’), telling us to ‘say as much as we can’; and the R-principle (‘R’
8
for ‘relation’ ), which says that we should ‘ say no more than we must’. Horn’ s two principles explain a variety of
phenomena in the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, in an elegant and economical manner; they
stand out as a worthwhile attempt to simplify the matter of pragmatic principles, bringing them to some common
denominators.
According to Sperber and Wilson, pragmatics needs only one principle, that of relevance. The assumption, or
principles, underlying relevance theory is that in any given context, what people say is relevant. Sperber and
Wilson’s approach is thus useful in many ways because it forces us to rethink a number of central questions in
linguistics, especially in semantics and pragmatics. The purpose of communication, according to RT, is not to
“duplicate thoughts”, but to “enlarge mutual cognitive environment”(Sperber and Wilson 1986:193).
RT is said to be able to account for all the phenomena that earlier had been assigned to the other maxims for their
explanation. Actually, this may seem rather a tall order for any theory; but as if this were not enough, Sperber and
Wilson also assume their principle to operate without exception, being, indeed, irrefutable. In the end, either
something relevant may be obvious and hence not interesting, or the notion of relevance itself may become so
all-encompassing as to lose its explanatory force. Another serious problem lies in the fact that RT, despite its
pronounced commitment to communication, says very little about real communicative interaction as it happens in
our society. (To the top)
Liu Tingting
(hetao1126_2000@chinaren.com; Thu, 14 Apr 2005 15:37:51 +0800 (CST) )
This chapter is basically about pragmatic principles. In this chapter the author discuses several pragmatic
principles and illustrates how to use these principles to conduct our practical conversation.
There are 3 things addressed in the reading: principles and rules; some principles discussed; rethinking Grice.
First, principles and rules. In this part, by comparing with the concept and use of rules, the author discusses
what is principle from pragmatic view. The rules are the grammar, not to say: language. The rules of grammar
contain all the information needed to establish the entire set of correct sentences of language, and only these; as far
as syntax is concerned, language is rule-generated. Thus we restrict the use of rules primarily to syntax. However,
we prefer to work with principles in pragmatics. Principles, as the a familiar concept in linguistics, can be not only
‘elements of understanding ’ but even ‘prerequisites to understanding’, going al the way from elementary
knowledge to high-level, theoretical and metatheoretical speculation. These principles are simply conditions for a
sound description of a language, and should not be confused with the rules of description themselves, as often
happens in modern uses of the word.
Second, some principles discussed. This part is the circus of this chapter. The author discusses some
important pragmatic principles such as the communication principle, the cooperation principle, and the politeness
principle; at the same time he makes a comparison of these principles. First of all, the author mentions the
communication principle: people talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody; this is the
foundation of all linguistic behavior. From the view of the author, the communication principle is nevertheless the
hidden condition for all human pragmatic activity, and the silently agreed-on premise of our investigation into such
activity. Thus communication principle, unlike a grammatical rule, operates in a concrete context, rather than in the
abstract space of linguistic speculation. Next the author shifts his discussion to the cooperative principle. Basing
on the four pragmatic sub-principles (the maxim of quantity; the maxim of quality; the maxim of relation; the
maxim of manner) in communication, which are mentioned in the works of H.Paul Grice, Cooperative Principle,
the author illustrates what the ‘cooperation ’ is and how to behavior according to the cooperative principle. He
discusses that communication, furthermore, requires people to cooperate; the bare facts of conversation come alive
only in a mutually accepted, pragmatically determined context. Otherwise, communication would be very difficult,
and perhaps break down altogether. Also, the author believes that cooperation is a complex concept, involving
many layers of interactive behavior, including politeness and ‘face’. By being polite, we conserve our integrity as
interlocutors while being considerate of our partners’ face-in one fell sweep. Politeness is our strategy for
conversational cooperation with least cost and maximum benefit to al interlocutors.
Third, rethinking Grice. First of all, the author make a further emphasis on the status of cooperative principle
as an independent pragmatic principle. He discusses that the cooperation that Grice talks about cannot be excluded
even in the case on the grounds that the partners to the interaction either hate each other, or do not want to
cooperate in other ways. People cannot verbally insult an institution, or a dead body, or an animal; even an insult
requires a modicum of cooperation on the part of the insulter, if only insofar as the other needs to have a minimal
understanding of what the speaker is trying t do with his word. Furthermore, the author makes a comment on
Hotn’s two principles (the Q-principle and R-principle) and Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory. From the view
of the author, Horn’s model keeps relevance within the general of framework of Gricean theory. As a neo-Grice
9
theory, Horn’s two principles has remained a more isolated effort, still deserves close attention for its painstaking
analysis and elegant formulation of some rather original thoughts on the Gricean maxims. Horn’s two principles
explain a variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, in an elegant and
economical manner; they stand out as worthwhile attempt to simplify the matter of pragmatic principles, bringing
them to some common denominators. So far as to Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory, the author argues that it
can be seen as a further spcification of the Gricean notion of cooperation; moreover, since “the principle of
relevance is much more explicit than Grice’s Co-operative principle and maxims”, as Sperber and Wilson say
(1986: 161), it also carries less of functional burden. For Relevance Theory, in accordance with the
Communicative Principle, achieving successful communication by way of the relevance of what is being said is a
sufficient aim in conversation or other verbal interaction. From the view of Sperber and Wilson RT is thus a
minimalist theory of communication; relevance is all we need. However, in the author’s opinion, if the notion of
relevance itself becomes so all-encompassing, as Sperber and Wilson mention, it would lose its explanatory force.
Furthermore, the author points out that RT does not include the social dimensions of language. Add to this that the
conceptual backdrop of Sperber and Wilson’s theory is the familiar current orientation toward the computer as a
metaphor for human thinking processes, coupled with a pervasive tendency to see human mental processes as
instances of economically rational behavior.
What is of especial interest to us in this chapter is the cooperative principle discussed in the second part of
this chapter. Since the cooperative principle as an independent principle plays an important role in pragmatic
principles as well as a complex concept, we should make great effort in the study and apply this principle, at the
same time use it to operate our practical conversation in daily life. (To the top)
Meng Jieqin
(mjqwb5172@21cn.com; Sun, 10 Apr 2005 19:35:55 +0800 (CST))
Chapter four is basically about pragmatic principle.
There are 3 things addressed in the reading:
First, it discusses rules and principle. It seems that we restrict the use of rules primarily to syntax, and the
rules are the grammar; in pragmatics, we prefer to work with principles.
Second, it discusses some principle.
(1), it discusses the communicative principle. People talk with the intention to communicative something to
somebody. When communicating, speakers try to be understood well and avoid giving false or over-or under dose
of information. (2), it discusses Grice’s maxims and the cooperative principle from three points of view. One, it
gives a story to illustrate that the interlocutor failed to use cooperative principle because of the violation of the
maxims of manner and quantity. Two, it introduces the notion of face. Acting cooperatively, people try to build up
“positive face”, while trying to avoiding posing threats to “ negative face”. Three, it introduces three important
areas where problems may arise between cooperating humans. They are cooperation itself, intercultural differences
and forms of social behavior. When people speak of ‘flouting Grice’s maxims’, they want to obtain effects by their
linguistic behavior. (3), it discusses the politeness principle. According to Leech, some illocutions are inherently
impolite, and others are inherently polite; and politeness is able to collaborate with, and even rescue the
cooperative principle. But according to Mey, politeness depends on the social position of the speaker and who
giving the order; politeness and being nice (mitigation) are not necessarily connected.
Three, it rediscusses Grice’s maxims from Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Horn’s neo--Gricean theory.
(1), it discusses Horn’s two principles—the Q—principle and R—principle. (2), it discusses Sperber and Wilson’s
relevance theory (RT). Being relevant to the partners in communication can achieve successful communication.
According to RT, when being accessible as part of our mutually recognized, common cognitive environment, the
utterance is relevant. But RT does not include the social dimensions of language, under pragmatic aspect, the RT
fail to honor all of its promises.
Ou Lianfen
(willie9830@sina.com; Sun, 10 Apr 2005 14:53:38 +0800)
The chapter introduces Mey’s communicative principle, Grice’s cooperative principle, Horn’s two principles:
the quantity principle and the relation principle, and Sperber and Wilson’s relevance principle.
People talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody; this is the foundation of all linguistic
behavior. It is the communication principle. It is the hidden condition for all human pragmatic activity, and the
silently agreed-on premise of the investigation into such activity. The communicative principle, by which it is
10
understood that people, when communicating, have something to tell each other. Communication requires people
to cooperate with. Grice’s cooperative principle consists of four pragmatic maxims: quantity, quality, relation and
manner.
When people discuss the CP , two views often clash. One is that of cooperative behavior as a kind of abstract,
philosophical rationality; the notion of cooperation reduces to what is minimally necessary to explain people’s
actual use of language. The second view raises problems of moral philosophy and practical ethics. Face has two
aspects: a positive one ,by which a person’s status as an autonomous, independent, free agent is affirmed: and a
negative one , which stresses a person’s immunity from outside interference and undue external pressure. Acting
cooperatively, people try to build up their interlocutors’ positive faces , while trying to avoid posing threats their
negative faces. Cooperation is a complex concept ,involving many layers of interactive behavior , including
politeness and face.
Mey identifies three important areas where the problems that occur between cooperating humans may arise.
First cooperation is taken as a general, inviolable and indisputable rule of behavior. Second there are significant
intercultural differences in cooperative behavior. The third is that certain forms of social behavior are preferred
while others are subject to sanction.
Leech’s politeness principle is supposed to collaborate with and even rescue the cooperation principle and its
associated maxims. Politeness resides in individual expressions, lexical items or morphemes, without regard for
the particular circumstance that governs their use. The politeness of the order depends on the positive or negative
effects it has on the person who is given the order.
Grice’s four maxims and the associated principle of cooperation have been under attack almost from the every
beginning. On the one hand the critique has focused on the values attached to the maxims, on the other hand one
may also question the necessity of having all of the maxims around.
Horn introduces the quantity principle, which tells us to say as much as we can, and the relation principle ,
which says that we should say no more than we must.
The relevance principle can be seen as a further specification of the Gricean notion of cooperation and is a variant
of the communicative principle. (To the top)
Song Yuge
(songyg2005@163.com; Wed, 6 Apr 2005 12:35:52 +0800 (CST))
This chapter is basically about some principles in pragmatics, namely, the communicative principle, the
cooperative principle, Horn’s two principles and principle of relevance. I will elaborate on them one by one.
First, Mey differs the words “principle” and “rule”, he points out “these principles are simply conditions for
a sound description of a language” while “rule” is the grammar, which contains all the information needed to
establish the entire set of correct sentences of a language. Then Mey introduces the communicative principle to us,
he said, “People talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody; this is the foundation of all
linguistic behavior. I call this the communicative principle.” And he gives us some examples to explain and verify
the principle. In his examples, both of the interlocutors utter from his own perspective and want to convey some
meaning beyond the utterance, and eventually, the other one can understand what he means in the concrete context.
Second, Mey takes the trouble to elaborate on the cooperative principle, which he thinks “the status of an
independent principle”, and he gives us the details:
The maxim of quanitity
The maxim of quality
The maxim of relation
The maxim of manners
Mey proposes three questions about cooperative principle, and then he explains them one by one. He values
the principle high and agrees that if the interlocutor violates the maxim of the principle, conversational implicature
will be produced. But two views clash, one is that of cooperative behavior as a kind of abstract, philosophical
rationality, the other is the problems of moral philosophy and practical ethics. The author emphasizes the former
one and introduces another notion, “face”, and thinks that cooperation is a complex concept, involving many layers
of interactive behavior. He goes on to discuss the relationship between cooperation and flouting, and politeness. In
his opinion, flouting one or two maxim of the principle occurs often in our daily life, and even the interlocutor
flouts the maxim, however, he is still cooperative, or the talk will break down. Even sometimes, flouting is
necessary, especially in literature. Mey has some comments on the Politeness Principle, “it is supposed to
collaborate with , even rescue the cooperative principle and its associated maxims. However, it is not at all clear, as
we have seen, that the CP is in need of being rescued.”
At last, Mey treats the two proposals, Horn’s two principles and Relevance Theory, separately. Horn proposed
11
the Q—principle(Q for quantity ), telling us to say as much as we can, and R—principle(R for relation), which
says we should say no more than we must. Surely, Horn’s two principles come from the cooperative principle,
however, they explain a variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, in a
elegant and economical manner. Mey introduces and gives a comment on Relevance Theory, which is proposed by
Sperber and Wilson, who think “the principle of relevance is much more explicit than Grice’s cooperative principle
and maxims.” But, RT is still a variant of the communicative principle. Mey points out, “RT is said to be able to
account for all the phenomena that earlier had been assigned to the other maxims for their explanation. Actually,
this may seem rather a tall order for any theory; but as if this were not enough, they also assume their principle to
operate without exception, being, indeed, irrefutable. In the end, either something relevant may be obvious and
hence not interesting, or the notion of relevance itself may become so all—encompassing as to lose its explanatory
force.
In all the three parts, I like the cooperative principle best, for in the past, when I was reading such pragmatic
books, I am always puzzled about if the interlocutor flouts the maxim, and if they really violates the principle,
perhaps the talk will break down, but the other one can infer what the real meaning is .Now, I see. Cooperation is
needed in any talk. (To the top)
Sun Yan
(yanyansun@126.com; Wed, 13 Apr 2005 20:37:45 +0800 (CST))
In this chapter, the author introduces us some pragmatic principles. Three things are addressed here, namely,
principles and rules, some principles discussed and rethinking Grice.
First, the choice of ‘principles’ in pragamtics as compared to ‘rules’ in syntax is discussed. People use ‘rule’
a lot in modern, grammatical writing. After ‘Chomskyan revolution’, grammars are thought of as simply consisting
of rules. The rules are then the grammar, not to say: the language. The chief property of a grammatical rule is its
ability to predict, viz. its possibility to generate correct sentences of a language. What we are discussing here is
syntactic rules instead of a semantic or pragmatic one. An utterance itself and its semantic meaning is an
exclusive concern, not to say privilege, of the person who utters it; hence semantic ‘rules’ only make sense outside
of actual language use, like that in a dictionary, or in constructed examples. Therefore semantic rule is a rule of
usage, not of prediction. The same chareacteristics apply to pragmatics. Thus, as Leech has suggested, we restrict
the use of rules primarily to syntax; in pragmatics, we prefer to work with principles. Scientists often use the word
‘principle’ as having to do with understanding. Principles can be not only ‘elements of understanding’ but even
‘prerequisites to understanding’. In the parlance of Chomskyan grammatical writing, ‘principled’ usually is a mere
synonym for ‘reasoned’, or simply ‘ justified’.
After stating why principle is used in the field of pragmatics in place of rule, the author goes on to introduce
some popular principles, ie., the communicative principle, the cooperative principle, politeness and other virtues.
This author advocates the terminology of Communicative Principle as the foundation of all linguistic behavior
because people talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody. This principle should be taken as
the silently agreeed-on premise of our investigation into human pragmatic activity Three examples are listed here
to illustrate that people can convey different communicative aims with different wording though they may be
talking about the same fact. Thus, communicative principle, unlike a grammatical rule, operates in a concrete
context, rather than in the abstract space of linguistic speculation. This principle is interpreted in the pragmatic
literature by various authors in different ways.
The cooperative principle advocated by H. Paul Grice is among them. The four maxims of Cooperative Principle,
that of quantity, quality, relation and manner, are presented. They are necessary in the first place because otherwise
communication would be very difficult or even break down altogether. The first anecdote of Dostoyevski and the
rubber ball is described to tell how the CP works in actual language use, rather, when do people fail to use them.
In this case, the host, owner of a roomful of books, failed to get it across to the little six-year-old girl that her
bouncing ball was hidden behind a row of books by telling her that her ball was behind Volume 6 of Dostoyevski’s
Collected Works. The answer explicitly violates the amxim of manner and that of quantity by offering information
not ‘perspicuous’ to a six-year-old and containing too much information that the child does not know and too little
information for the child to look for the ball on her own.
People studying cooperation phenomena from a practical point of view can not have failed to notice the concept of
face. It has two aspects: a positive one, by which a person’s social status is affirmed, viz. the freedom to express
oneself; and a negative one, which stresses a person’s immunity from outside interference and undue external
pressure, ie. Being free from oppression, from threats to one’s safty etc.. Acting cooperatively, people try to build
up their interlocutors’ ‘positive faces’, while trying to avoid posing threats to their ‘negative faces’.
Cooperating humans may sometimes flout the maxims. It is so because first, there is the question of cooperation
12
itself. From a societal point of view, cooperation may have different interpretations. Second, there are significant
intercultural differences in cooperative behavior. The third issue is that certain forms of social behavior are
preferred, while others are subject to sanction.
Besides cooperative principle, there is also the politeness principle advocated by Leech. He takes some illocutions
to be inherently impolite, and others, polite. Such a view is criticized on two counts. First, the social position of the
speakers may indicate different politeness values for individual cases. Second, the politeness of the order also
depends on the positive or negative effects it has on the person who is given the order. Leech’s Politness Principle
is supposed to collaborate with, and even ‘rescue’, the Cooperative Principle and its associated maxims. However,
it seems harder to handle this principle than that of cooperation. Therefore, some proposals appear to do away with
the maxims, yet retain the notion of cooperation as the basis of conversation.
The third section puts forward Horn’s neo-Gricean theory and Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory as
pragmatists rethink Grice’s four maxims and the associated principle of cooperation, which have been under attack
almost from the very beginning. Horn’s proposal concentrates on relevance but keeps it within the general
framework of Gricean theory. His two principles are the Q-principle and the R-principle Horn’s two principles
explain a variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, in an elegant and
economical manner; they stand out as a worthwhile attempt to simplify the matter of pragmatic principles, bringing
them to some common denominators.
Since Sperber and Wilson believe that in any given context, what people say is relevant, they put forward the
‘Principle of Relevance’as a further specification of the Gricean notion of cooperation. Communicating something
meaningful may be supposed to be relevant to the partners in communication. In this sense, the Principle of
Relevance is a variant of the Communicative Principle. Besides, achieving successful communication by way of
the relevance of what is being said is a sufficient aim in conversation or other verbal interaction. RT is thus a
minimalist theory of communication; relevance is all we need. RT is said to be able to account for all the
phenomena that earlier had been asigned to the other maxims for their explanation. In the end, the notion of
relevance itself may become so all-encompassing as to lose its explanatory force. Another serious problem lies in
the fact that RT, despite its pronounced commitment to communication, says very little about real communicative
interaction as it happens in our society. It does not include, let alone focus on, the social dimensions of language.
The author has successfully given us an overview of the development of some popular pragmatic principles in
literature and provided us with his own interpretation of that principle. This will not only equip us with a basic
understanding of pragmatic principles but also enable us to have a background knowledge of them; and hence the
ability to choose the classical works for our further exploration in this aspect.
(To the top)
Tang Wensheng
(wwsstang@sina.com; Sat, 09 Apr 2005 11:29:44 +0800)
This chapter is basically about pragmatic principles.
There are 4 things addressed in the reading:
First, it’s about the Cooperative Principle (CP).
Before the talking about the Cooperative Principle, the author gives us an account of the Communicative
Principles. People talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody; this is the foundation of all
linguistic behaviors. He called this the communicative principle; even though this principle is not mentioned in the
pragmatic literature, it is nevertheless the hidden condition for all human pragmatic activity. Unlike a grammatical
rule, the communicative principle operates in a concrete context, rather than in the abstract space of linguistic
speculation. Communication requires people to cooperate.
Cooperation has been elevated to the status of an independent principle in the works of the late
British/American philosopher H. Paul Grice. His cooperative principle consists of four pragmatic subprinciples, or
maxims:
The Maxim of Quality – Try to make your contribution true.
The Maxim of Quantity – Give no more and no less information than required.
The Maxim of Relation – Be relevant.
The Maxim of Manner – Be clear, unambiguous, brief, orderly.
Second, it’s about the Politeness Principle (PP). Leech’s Politeness Principle is supposed to collaborate with,
and even ‘rescue’, the Cooperative Principle and its associated maxims. Acting cooperatively, people try to build
up their interlocutors’ ‘positive face’, while trying to avoid posing threats to their ‘negative faces’. Expressions that
take the edge off face-threats are often called ‘mitigation devices’. However, the author maintained that it is not at
all clear that the CP is in need of being rescued and that it is even less clear that a principle of politeness indeed
would be able to do so.
13
Third, it talks about Horn’s two principles. The two principles that Horn introduces are: the quantity principle
and the relation principle. Horn’s two principles explain a variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness,
negation, the lexicon and so on, in an elegant and economical manner; they stand out as a worthwhile attempt to
simplify the matter of pragmatic principles.
Finally, it talks about the Relevance Theory (RT). According to Sperber and Wilson, pragmatics needs only
one principle, that of relevance. The principle underlying relevance theory is that in any given context, what people
say is relevant. Sperber and Wilson make the maxim of relevance the cornerstone of their own approach to
‘communication and cognition’. For Relevance Theory, in accordance with the Communicative Principle,
achieving successful communication by way of the relevance of what is being said is sufficient aim in conversation
or other verbal interaction. RT is thus a minimalist theory of communication. Rt is said to be able to account for all
the phenomena that earlier had been assigned to the other maxims for their explanation.
What is of especial interest to us is “conversational implicatures”.
Grice is interested in the question of how it is that uttering a sentence can imply more than “what is said”
(more than the semantic content of the sentence). He proposes that many implications are derived by the hearer on
the basis of the conversational maxims. They follow from the combination of the semantic content of the utterance,
the conversational maxims, and further background assumptions. Such implications are called by Grice
“conversational implicatures.” For example,
I went into a house.
This sentence implies that it wasn’t the speaker’s house. If it was his own house, the speaker would have
known this and it would be relevant information. The speaker is being cooperative; therefore, by Quantity, he
would not withhold relevant information. So if it was his own house, he would have said so. But he didn’t. Hence,
it was not his own house. (To the top)
Tang Xia
(lenatx01981@yahoo.com.cn; Thu, 7 Apr 2005 18:39:57 +0800 (CST))
This chapter is mainly about some pragmatic principles: the Communicative Principle, the Cooperative
Principle, the Politeness Principle, and Horn’s two principles, the Relevance Principle.
There are 5 things in the reading:
First: the Communicative Principle Proposed by Mey.
Communicative Principle: people talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody. (P68) This
is the foundation of all linguistic behavior. It’s the hidden condition and the silent agree-on premise. (P68-69)
People will engage in communication action whenever they use language. According to Communicative Principle,
when communicating, speakers try to be understood correctly, and avoid giving false impression. (P68-69).
Communicative Principle requires people to cooperate; it operates in a mutually accepted, pragmatically
determined concrete context. What I do communicate depends on what I can and must communicate.
Second: the Cooperative Principle Proposed by British/American philosopher H.Paul Grice (1975-1989).
Four maxims of CP: the maxim of quantity, quality, relation and manner. (72)
Cooperation and face
Face theory: originally introduced by Goffman (1967).
Two aspects of face: (established by Brown and Levison, 1987).
A positive one: affirms a person’s autonomous independent status.
A negative one: stresses a person’s immunity from outside interference and undue external pressure. (74)
Acting cooperatively, people try to protect their interlocutors’ ‘positive face’ and avoid threat their ‘negative
face’.
If one of faces is threaten, both faces come under attack.
The relation and social distance between the speaker and his interlocutor also do effect on the cooperation and
face.
Cooperation and ‘flouting’
Three reasons that why CP are flouted
A: The CP is taken as a general, inviolable and indisputable rule of behavior. This assumption is too broad and
sweeping.
B: Intercultural difference in cooperative behavior.
C: Some forms of social behavior are subject to sanction. (77)
Two kinds of flouting:
Semantically and pragmatically.
‘Flouting the maxims’ cannot be prescribed or proscribed.
14
Third: Politeness Principle
Mainly advocated by Leech (1983).
Pay attention to two points on “polite”
The social positions indicate different politeness values.
The politeness of the order depends on the positive or negative the person gives.
Mitigation
According to PP, we must minimize (mitigate) the effects of negative politeness and to maximize the positive
politeness. (80)
Politeness can create a distance between the interlocutors.
PP tries to collaborate with and rescue CP, but the necessary and possibility aren’t very clear. The maxim of tact,
generosity, approbation have descriptive value,but the others can be subsumed under CP.
Forth: Horn’s two principles Proposed by Horn (1984).
To the relevance maxims, two major schools do effects at rethinking Grice:
Horn: keeps relevance within the general framework of Gricean theory.
Sperber and Wilson: make the maxim of the relevance the cornerstone of their own approach to Relevance Theory.
The two principles:
The Q-principle: say as much as we can.
The R-principle: say no more than we must.
The two principles: as the pragmatic deductive theory(语用推导机制) of neo-Gricean
Theory, include:
The Gricean maxim of quantity1 (covered by Q-principle).
The Geicean maxim of quantity2 (covered by R-principle).
Maxim of manner and relation. (84)
Fifth: Relevance Principle
Proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986).
According to RP: in any given context, what people say is relevant, and the purpose of communication is to
“enlarge mutual cognitive environments”.
The principle of relevance can be seen as a further specification Gricean cooperation, a variant of the
communicative principle, and a minimalist theory of communication.(85).
The principle of relevance applies without expectation. Communicators do not follow the principle of
relevance; they could not violate it even if they wanted to.
The weakness:
The notion of relevance itself may become so all encompassing as to lose its explanatory force.
It says very little about real communicative interactions of language.
Fall short of the expectations and fails to honor its promises
(To the top)
Wang Kaiwen
(loadstar97kw@sina.com; Sun, 10 Apr 2005 21:55:36 +0800)
Chapter four mainly talks about pragmatic principles. In particular, there are three principles or rules, which
people should take into account when they use language. They are as follows:
First, it’s principle of CP (cooperative principle) proposed by Grice (1975) that has been wildly quoted and
highlighted in pragmatics. People talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody, and this is the
foundation of all linguistic behavior. When communicating, speakers always try to be understood correctly, and
avoid giving false impressions. Moreover, they avoid giving their interlocutors either an over- or an underdose of
information. And so came out the CP. It is based on the fact that communication is a matter of cooperation in
nature. Grice defines the CP as follows: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-exchange in which you are engaged”. Grice went
on to propose that the CP consists of the following four maxims:
QUALITY:
Say what’s ture
Don’t say what’s false
QUANTITY:
Say enough and no more
RELATION:
Be relevant
MANNER:
Be clear, concise, orderly, and to the point
We ought to act and have the mutual assumption that people act in accordance with the CP. Once the CP is violated,
there would be some implicatures in the talk. Take a telephone call as example:
1 H: wanna go to the game Saturday?
15
2 D: sounds grea:::t but I gotta work Saturday.
3 H: too bad. Maybe you can make the next home game.
Given some interpretive work, D’s response should be either an acceptance, rejection or deferral of the invitation.
however, D’s response looks like an excuse. If H is being relevant and is giving sufficient information, then D may
be implicating that he cannot accept the invitation due to a prior commitment that conflicts with the game. H’s
response, line 3, to D’s utterance displays that H treats D as declining the invitation.
The second principle is the PP (principle of politeness) that was advocated by Leech (1983). Speaking of
something is doing something, and be a good conversationer requires being polite. But it is also questionable. One
is that the social position of the speakers may indicate different politeness values for individual cases; the other is
that politeness of the order also depends on the positive or negative effects it has on the person who is given the
order.
The third is the PR (principle of relevance), which originally offered by Sperber and Wilson (1986). Contrast
to the above two principles that resulted in researching pragmatics in sociology, the PR came from cognitive
motivations of communication. According to the PR, in any given context, what people say is relevant. The
successful communicator is one who makes his or her intention to convey information, to persuade, to make
believe etc. “manifest” to both himself or herself and his or her partners.
Among these principles, the CP is much easier to operate for its concrete maxims by which we can deal with
language appropriately. On the other hand, while the other two are more obscurer it also useful means in
researching languages.
Wang Liyuan
(catherine200661@sina.com; Sat, 09 Apr 2005 20:54:40 +0800)
This chapter is mainly about some pragmatic principles: the communicative principle, the cooperative
principles, Horn’s two principles and relevance principle.
There are 3 things addressed in this reading.
First, the communicative principle. This principle is proposed by Mey,.i.e., people talk with the intention to
communicate something to somebody. This principle is also the foundation of all linguistic behavior.
Communicative principle, unlike a grammatical rule, operates in a concrete context, rather than in the abstract
space of linguistic speculation.
Second, the cooperative principle. It is proposed by British/American philosopher H.Paul Grice(1975,1989).
It consists of four pragmatic sub-principles, or ‘maxims’, to wit: the maxim of quantity, the maxim of quality, the
maxim of relation and the maxim of manner. Then the writer talks about the relation between cooperation and face.
According to Brown and Levinson, ‘face’ has two aspects: a positive one, by which a person’s status as an
autonomous, independent, free agent is affirmed; and a negative one, which stresses a person’s immunity from
outside interference and undue external pressures. Next, it talks about cooperation and flouting. Flouting is a
maxim, either semantically or pragmatically. Pragmatic kind of flouting a maxim, we must consider the effects
people want to obtain by their linguistic behavior. Politeness is advocated by Leech(1983). According to Leech,
politeness is: “ some illocutions are inherently impolite, and others are inherently polite”(1983:83). This view
assumes politeness to be an abstract quality and implies being always polite, without regard for the contextual
factors that define what is polite in a given situation. Such a view is wrong on two counts. First, the social position
of the speakers may indicate different politeness values for individual cases. Second, the politeness of the order
also depends on the positive or negative effects it has on the person who is given to order.
Third, Horn’s two principles. The two principles that Horn introduces are: the Q-principle(‘Q’ for ‘quantity’),
telling us to ‘say as much as we can’; and the R-principle(‘R’ for ‘relation’), which says that we should ‘say no
more than we must’. Principle of relevance is proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986:161). The principle of
relevance is a variant of the communicative principle. RT is thus a minimalist theory of communication; relevance
is all we need. RT is said to be able to account for all the phenomena that earlier had been assigned to the other
maxims for their explanation. But the writer thinks the principle of relevance may become so all-encompassing as
to lose its explanatory force. (To the top)
Wang Wenbo
(bobomaoheboboyu@tom.com; Sun, 10 Apr 2005 22:16:38 +0800 (CST))
This chapter discusses the main principles in pragmatics.
First, what are principles in pragmatics?
16
Scientists often use the word “principle” as having to do with (elementary) understanding, such as in the
parlance of Chomskyan grammatical writing, “principled” usually is a mere synonym for “reasoned”, or simply
“justified”, but we restrict the use of rules primarily to syntax; in pragmatics, we prefer to work with principles.
Second, the main principles in pragmatics.
The Communicative Principle:
People engage incommunicative activity whenever they use language; whether or not they observe a
particular syntactic rule is not too important. People talk with the intention to communicate something to
somebody; according to the author, Communicative Principle is very important, and this principle is interpreted in
the pragmatic literature by various authors in different ways.
Grice and other authors called it Cooperative Principle (abbreviated: CP) consists of four pragmatic
subprinciples, or “maxims”, to wit: the maxim of quantity, the maxim of quality, the maxim of relation and the
maxim of manner.
But Grice’s CP only explains the conversational implicature of people using indirect language and their
understanding of conversational implicature, neglecting to explain why people squirrel away and niggardly hand
out small nuggets of information in a manner that to let interlocutors deduce the conversational implicature, so
when people discuss the CP, two views often clash---rationality and “face”. “Face ”, as an explanatory concept in
human interaction, was originally introduced by Goffman(1967). It is believed to derive from common Far Eastern
notions of deference and politeness(Scollon and Scollon 1995:34), “face” has two aspects: a positive one by which
a person’s status as an autonomous, independent, free agent is affirmed; and a negative one, which stresses a
person’s immunity from outside interference and undue external pressure.
Politeness principle:
It mainly advocated by Leech(1983).This view assumes politeness to be an abstract quality, residing in
individual expressions, lexical items or morphemes, without regard for the particular circumstances that govern
their use.
Such a view is wrong on two counts. First, the social position of the speakers may indicate different politeness
values for individual cases. Second, the politeness of the order also depends on the positive or negative effects it
has on the person who is given the order.
Horn’s two principles:
The two principles that Horn introduces are: the Q-principle (“Q” for “quantity”), telling us to “say as much
as we can”; and the R-principle (“R” for “relation”), which says that we should “say no more than we must”.
According to Sperber and Wilson, pragmatics needs only one principle, that is relevance. The principle is that
in any given context, what people say is relevant. It is “the principle of relevance is much more explicit than
Grice’s co-operative principle and maxims”(1986:161). According to the principle, the utterance we’re hearing or
reading is “accessible” as part of our mutually recognized , common cognitive environment or context; by contraxt,
we are not equally ready for something that would not be easily accessible, because it does not belong in such
acommon, cognitive environment. (To the top)
Wei Yunhui
(whitman@163.com; Fri, 29 Apr 2005 12:00:26 +0800 (CST))
This chapter is mainly about several principles of pragmatics, viz. the communicative principle; the
cooperative principle; Horn`s two principles and principle of relevance.
The first principle Mey touches is the communicative principle, which is defined as: people talk with the
intention to communicate something to somebody, and this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior. Even
though this principle is not mentioned in the pragmatic literature, actually this is a variant of ‘Principle of
Relevance’. The Communicative Principle, unlike a grammatical rule, operates in a concrete context, rather
than in the abstract space of linguistic speculation.
The second one is the British/American philosopher H. Paul Grice`s cooperative principle(CP), which
consists of four pragmatic subprinciples, or maxims:
The maxim of quantity: 1 Make your contribution as informative as required; 2 Do not make your
contribution more informative than required.
The maxim of quality: 1 Do not say what you believe to be false; 2 Do not say that for which you lack
adequate evidence.
The maxim of relation: Make your contribution relevant.
The maxim of manner: Be perspicuous, and specifically.
Mey also illustrates when we use the maxims and when we fail to, and why the maxims are necessary
in our communication.
17
The third one is the Politeness Principle, mainly advocated by Leech. According to Leech, being ‘being
polite’ means that illocutions are inherently impolite, and others are inherently polite. This view assumes
politeness to be an abstract quality, residing in individual expressions, lexical items or morphemes, without regard
for the particular circumstances that govern their use. Mey points out that this view is wrong on two counts. First,
the social position of the speakers may indicate different politeness values for individual cases. Second, the
politeness of the order also depends on the positive or negative effects it has on the person who is given the order.
Leech`s Politeness Principle is supposed to collaborate with, and even ‘rescue’, the Cooperative Principle and its
associated maxims. However, Mey indicates that it is not at all clear, as we have seen, that the CP is in need of
being rescued,\. It is even less clear that a principle of politeness indeed would be able to do so.
Lastly, Mey accounts for Horn`s two principles and Relevance Theory respectively. He argues that the two
proposals are a bit alike in that they both concentrate on relevance, and they are different in that Horn`s model
keeps relevance within the general framework of Gricean theory, whereas Sperber and Wilson make the maxim of
relevance the cornerstone of their own approach to ‘communication and cognition’, aptly described as Relevance
Theory(RT). Horn`s two principles are: the Q-principle(‘Q’ for ‘quantity’ ), telling us to ‘say as much as we can’;
and the R-principle(‘R’ for ‘relation’), which says that we should ‘say no more than we must’. Horn`s two
principles explain a variety of phenomena in the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, in an elegant
and economical manner; they stand out as a worthwhile attempt ot simplify the matter of pragmatic principles,
bringing them to some common denominators. As to Sperber and Wilson`s Relevance Theory, Mey treats it as a
variant of the Communicative Principle which he describes at the beginning of this chapter. The ‘mutually
manifest assumption’ of an informative intention is at the core of Sperber and Wilson`s RT. Mey comments on RT
that it is said to be able to account for all the phenomena that earlier had been assigned to the other maxims for
their explanation. Actually, this may seem rather a tall order for any theory; but as if this were not enough, Sperber
and Wilson also assume their principle to operate without exception, being, indeed, irrefutable. In the end, either
something relevant may be obvious and hence not interesting, or the notion of relevance itself may become so
all-encompassing as to lose its explanatory force. Another serious problem lies in the fact that RT, despite its
pronounced commitment to communication, says very little about real communicative interaction as it happens in
our society. Besides, RT, despite its many useful insights, falls somewhat short of the expectations raised by its
program of research, and fails to honor all of its promises.
In fact, Mey indicates that the Cooperative Principle, the Politeness Priciple, Horn`s two principles, and the
Relevance Principle, they all belong to the Communicative Principle. (To the top)
Xu Hui
(echowaiting@sina.com; Sun, 10 Apr 2005 10:58:36 +0800)
This chapter is basically about some pragmatic principles, such as cooperative principle and communicative
principle. In this reading report three points will be addressed.
First, the author introduces and differs two terms ‘principle’ and ‘rule’. Scientists often use the word
‘principle’ as having to do with understanding. For some linguists, it is taken as being equivalent to ‘proposal for
description’. The term ‘rule’ is frequently encountered in modern, grammatical writing. In the wake of ‘Chomsky
revolution’ the rules are the grammar, language is rule-generated. However, in pragmatics, the user ‘rules the
waves’. Thus, it seems reasonable as Leech have suggested (1983:5), that we restrict the use of rules primarily to
syntax; in pragmatics, we prefer to work with principles.
Second, some important principles are discussed. People talk with the intention to communicate something to
somebody; this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior. The author calls this the Communicative Principle.
Communication is not a matter of logic or truth, but of cooperation, which can be deduced from the use of vague
expression such as ‘some’ or ‘many’. One point that should be stressed here is that the Communicative Principle
operates in a concrete context, rather than in the abstract space of linguistic speculation. Next, the author
introduces Cooperative Principle, ‘face’ and Politeness Principle one by one. One point we should remember here
is that cooperation is a complex concept, it involves many layers of interactive behavior, and includes both
politeness and ‘face’. Acting cooperatively, people try to build up their interlocutors’ ‘positive faces’ while trying
to avoid posing threats to their ‘negative faces’. Politeness is our strategy for conversational cooperation with least
cost and maximum benefit to all interlocutors.
Third, the author focuses on Horn’s neo-Gricean theory and Relevance Theory (henceforth RT). Horn
introduces two principles: the Q-Principle and the R-Principle. These two principles stand out as a worthwhile
attempt to simplify the matter of pragmatic principles, bringing them to some common denominators. According to
Sperber and Wilson who proposed RT, pragmatics needs only one principle, that of relevance. RT is a minimalist
theory of communication, relevance is all we need. The ‘mutually manifest assumption’ of an informative intention
18
is at the core of Sperber and Wilson’s thinking. The purpose of communication, according to RT, is to “enlarge
mutual cognitive environments” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:193 Relevance: Communication and Cognition).
However, RT also has some problems. The author points out two: one of which is that RT says very little about real
communicative interaction as it happens in our society. RT does not include the social dimension of language.
What interests us most in this chapter is that how people cooperate with others under such principles, that is,
how these principles affect people’s communication. (To the top)
Xu Zhaojuan
(ajuan2003@163.com; Wed, 6 Apr 2005 08:36:49 +0800 (CST))
In this chapter, the author talked about three issues: the first is principles and rules, the second one is some
principles discussed, and the third one is rethinking grice.
In the first issue, the author distinguished the principles and rules. The concept of ‘principle’ is a familiar one
in linguistics (as in other branches of science). One encounters the term in many standard titles of linguistics, old
and new, and of widely varying content: from Hermann Paul’s order work Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (1874;
English translation 1891), through Louis Hjelmslev’s theoretical exposition Principes de grammaire générale(1929)
to contemporary dissertations in the Chomskyan tradition, such as Eric Reuland’s Principles of Subordination and
Construal(1979).
Principles can be not only ‘elements of understanding’ but even ‘prerequisties to understanding’, going all the
way from elementary knowledge to high-level, theoretical and metatheoretical speculation. Thus, Reuland takes
‘principle’ as being equicalent to ‘proposal for description’(1979:2); in the paralance of Chomskyan grammatical
writing, ‘principled’ usually is a mere synonym for ‘reasoned’ or simply ‘justified’.
Another term that is frequently encountered in modern, grammatical writing is that of rule. Even before
Chomsky arrived on the scene, people knew that they had to look in the grammar to find the rules of the language;
but it is only in the wake of the ‘Chomskyan revolution’ that grammars are thought of as simply consisting of rules.
The rules are the grammar, not to say: the language.
In the second one, which am I the most interested in, the author talked about the communicative principle, the
cooperative principle, politeness and other virtues. People talk with the intention to communicate something to
somebody; this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior. So the author call this communicative principle; even
though this principle is not mentioned in the pragmatic literature, it is nevertheless the hidden condition for all
human pragmatic activity, and the silently agreed-on premise of our investigation into such activity.
As an example, consider the ‘scalar implicatures’ discussed by Gazdar.
Many of the delegates opposed the motion.
On a normal reading, such a sentence would convey the impression that although many delegates voted for
the motion, there were a number of them that were against, and voted according. The sentence would thus not be
taken to mean that all of the delegates voted against the motion, even though, strictly speaking, such a reading
would be consistent with the Norman reading-especially if I complete my utterance by adding something like:
In fact, all of them did.
The question is why anybody would say ‘many’, if in actual fact there were no others? If I could have used
the stronger expression (‘all’), why didn’t I?
There seems to be a general understanding that people, when they give out information, prefer to do so with a
certain parsimomousness. But what we’re confronted with here is, rather, an instance of the communicative
principle: when communicating, speakers try to be understood correctly, and avoid giving false impressions. No
matter how logically correct and true (according to some abstract semantic ‘rule’) my speech is, if it confuses or
misleads my hearer, then my utterance will not have its proper effect: I will not have communicated what I had in
mind.
Consider now the following:
Many of the delegates opposed the motion,
Or uttered:
Not all delegates opposed the motion.
This sentence is both more ‘rigorous’ and easier to verify than the original one, so why don’t I just say this
and avoid all misunderstandings?
The answer to this question is given by the communicative principle given that I want to communicate, what I
do communicate depends on what I can communicate, given my circumstances, and on what I must communicate,
given my partner’s expectations. Communication is not a matter of logic or truth, but of cooperation.
Communicative principle, unlike a grammatical rule, operates in a concrete context, rather than in the abstract
space of linguistic speculation. (To the top)
19
Zhou Yanqiong
(higherjojo@tom.com; Sat, 7 May 2005 23:48:48 +0800 (CST))
In this chapter1.First introduced two terms: priciple and rule. Principle are often used when having to do
with elementary understanding; rule is frequently encountered in grammatical writing. Through question Mey
thought the use of rules was primarily restricted to syntax, while in pragmatics principles were prefered. After then
four matters are mainly talked about:(1) communicative principle (2) the cooperative principle (3) politeness
principle (4) Horn’s two principles and Sperber and Wilson’s relevence principle
1. Communicative principle: Mey gave the definition of it: people talk with the intention to communicate
something to somebody. Then Mey gave examples to illustrate (1)when communicating, speakers try to be
understood correctly and avoid giving false impresstion;(2) the carrying on of communication, what I want to
communicate depends on mutual circumstances, what I do communicate depends on what I can communicate .
2.The cooperative principle.Mey first introduced the four maxim of Grice’s cooperative principle:the maxim
of quantity, quality, relation and manner,then gave a story to illustrate how the CP works in actual language use
and when fail to use the maxims.
In ‘cooperation and face’ section, Mey mainly talked about ‘face’; ‘face’ was originally introduced by
Goffman and it has two aspects: a positive one by which a person’s status as an autonomous, independent and
free agent is affirmed and a negative one which stresses a person’s immunity from outside interference and undue
external pressure. Acting cooperatively people try to build up their interlocutors’ ‘positive faces’, while trying to
avoid posing threats to their ‘negative faces’. and then some examples are given to demenstrate that cooperation
is a complex concept,involving many layers of interactive behavior.
In ‘cooperation and flouting’ section, three important areas where the problems occuring between
cooperating human may arise are discussed: first, the cooperation itself, second, there are intercultural
differences in cooperative behavior. Third, the flouting a maxim.Mey mainly explained what is flouting a maxim:
that is when people fail to observe one or several maxims either semantically or pragmatically. And Mey gave
example to state the pragmatic effects intended by the flouting. But in some cases the effects may not be
immediately available for inspection,because they are postponed for better results, such as jokes and stories, as to
it some examples are givened.
3.In ‘politeness and other virtues’ section, Mey talked about Leech’s politeness principle. As to Leech’s
explanation of what being ‘polite’ means, Mey pointed it was wrong on two counts:first, the social position of the
speakers may indicate different politeness values fo individual cases. Second, the politeness of the order also
depends on the positive or negative effects it has on the person who is given the order. At last Mey talked about
mitigation and gave some examples to explain what is mitigation: to minimize the effects of impolite statements
and to maximize the politeness of polite illocutions.
4.Mey introduced two proposals: Horn’s two principles and Sperber and Wilson’s relevence principle
Horn’s two principle is;
(a)Q-principle
Make your contribution as informative as required
Provide as much information as possible
(b)R-principle
Give out only the relevant information
Do not make your contribution more informative than required
As to Sperber and Wilson’s relevence principle,Mey thought it was a variant of the Communicative Principle and
can be seen as a further specification of the Gricean notion of cooperation. Mey also criticized that despite RT’s
pronounced commitment to communication it says little about real communicative interaction as it happens in our
society. (To the top)
Zhou Yuping
(bingxueping123@163.com; Mon, 9 May 2005 15:36:15 +0800 (CST))
This chapter mainly concentrates on pragmatic principles, including its specific branches, such as principles
and rules, and all kinds of pragmatic principles defined by famous linguists as well.
The first involves with the difference between principles and rules. Both of them are familiar concepts in
linguistics. Scientists often use the word ‘principle’ as having to do with understanding, as in Euclid’s famous
treatise Principles of Geometry and Hjelmslev’s Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. But these principles are
20
simply conditions for a sound description of a language, and should not be confused with the rules of description
themselves. ‘rule’ is another term that is frequently encountered in modern, grammatical writing. In the period of
‘Chmskyan revolution’, people attained to a common realization that the rules are the grammar, not to say: the
language, that is, language is rule-generated.
The second section is concerned with some basic principles, such as the communicative principle, the
cooperative principle, cooperation and flouting, and politeness principles and so on.
Firstly, the writer tells us what is the communicative principle. He says, people talk with the intention to
communicate something to somebody, this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior. This concept was posed by
the US psychiatrist Watzlawick and his coworkers more than a generation ago, but it is unfortunately never
attracted the attention it deserved among linguists. As we know, in fact, when communicating, no one never try to
be understood correctly and avoid giving false impressions, so the basic communicative principle is no matter how
logically correct and true one’s speech is, the only intention is to be understood correctly and clearly.
Secondly, communication is not a matter of logic or true but of cooperation, the ‘bare facts’ of conversation
come alive only in a mutually accepted, pragmatically determined context. The famous American philosopher
H.Paul Grice had expressed cooperation in his works which consists of one Communicative Principle and four
subprinciples: the first one is the maxim of quantity, the second the maxim of quality, the third is the maxim of
relations, and the fourth is the maxim of manner.
Thirdly, this section is mainly concerned with cooperation and ‘face’. When the CP is put into use, there
rises two conflicting views. One is that of cooperative behavior as a kind of abstract, philosophical rationality, the
notion of cooperation reduces to what is minimally necessary to explain people’s actual use of language. Many
linguists questions whether the Communicative Principle is robust enough to make people with conflicting
interests, and who sometimes in fact are battling with one another, adopt cooperation as the basis for their
communicative behavior. On the other hand, ‘face’, as an explanatory concept in human interaction , was
originally introduced by Goffman. It is believed that ‘face’ has two aspects: a positive one and a negative one.
Acting cooperatively, people try to build up their interlocutous ‘positive faces’, this is especially important in
linguistic interaction. But another situation can’t be avoided, when one conform to the CP to protect his own
profits, his locators ‘face’ maybe come under attack. Therefore, we can see how cooperation is a complex concept,
involving many layers of interactive behavior, including politeness and ‘face’. But to make two of them be balance
in interaction, we expect more concise definition to appear in the near future.
Fourthly, ‘flouting’ is another term which has intimate relationship with cooperation. In this division, the
author poses that when acting cooperatively, there are three important areas where many problems as ‘flouting’
opposite the CP may arise. The one is cooperation itself taken as a general, inviolable and indisputable rule of
behavior. The next is that there are significant intercultural differences in cooperative behavior, and the other is
that one can’t help noticing that certain forms of social behavior are preferred, while others are subject to sanction.,
Thus, during the analysis of expressed in context, the author think that ‘flouting the maxims’ can be many things,
there is no way of prescribing or proscribing a particular violation as useful or detrimental.
In the end, this section is mainly concerned with politeness and other virtues. A criticism that is often offered
of Grice’s maxims is that they can be interpreted as a moral code of behavior, sure, it is not the aspect of the matter
that has kept linguists busiest. But it can’t be avoided in interaction. According to Leech, what the term of ‘polite’
means is that some illocutions are inherently impolite, and others are inherently polite’. One of the functions of
politeness is to create a distance between the interlocutors. In a word, Leech’s Politeness Principle is supposed to
collaborate with and even ‘rescue’, the Cooperative Principle and its associated maxims.
The third section is involved with rethinking Grice. Grice’s four maxims and the associated principle of
cooperation have been under attack almost from the very beginning. Many problems are questioned, such as
whether the maxims have the same weight, and are used in approximately the same manner in different situation.
The first linguist who put up this question is Horn, he posed two principles that explain a variety of phenomena in
the realm of politeness, negation, the lexicon and so on, just in an elegant and economical manner. The other is
Sperber and Wilson, they make the maxin of relevance the cornerstone of their own approach to ‘communication
and cognition’, aptly described as Relevance Theory. This ‘Principle of Relevance’ can be seen as a further
specification of the Gricean notion of cooperation, what’s more, it is much more explicit than Grice’s co-operative
principle and maxims.
However, the most interesting one for me is the application of the CP when used in our native language. I
want to know what it can explain and what not. This is a good way to understand and master our own
language—Chinese more clearly and concisely. In fact, it is a important part of intercommunication of culture. In
this way, we can make the useful culture serve for us all. (To the top)
21