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Materials of the International Conference
“Civil-Military Relations in Conflict Regions”
Civil Society and Military in Russia
By Dr. Alexander I. Nikitin,
Director, Center for Political and International Studies
General role and place of the military organization in Russian society:
evolution in last 15 years
In the years of existence of the Soviet Union and especially during the “Cold War”
scale of the military organization and its size were defined according to the notion of
“general parity of forces” with the West. That parity never was interpreted as pure
arithmetic equality. In fact, there were several “layers” of parity: between combined
forces of the Warsaw Pact and combined forces of NATO, between the USSR and the
USA (that parity mainly was estimated on a nuclear level), between the USSR from
one side, and combined forces of the West plus forces of the oriental rival – China,
from the other side. As a result, scale of the military organization was obviously
excessive, but society, under propagandistic pressure, never questioned publicly,
whether it can afford that “inflated” military sector.
It’s also important to understand that in Soviet society since Stalin’s times internal
structures of stabilization and/or oppression (forces of the Ministry of Interior, KGB
apparatus, penitentiary system, etc.) were perceived as subjects of different social
functions, belonging to a different “basket”, than Armed Forces of the Ministry of
Defense. Even in the beginning of the XXIst century the concept of wider “security
sector”, which covers all of them, is not yet widely accepted and shared by the
Russian public, politicians and even experts.
Collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to painful and lengthy (somewhere until
mid-90s) period of division of formerly united Soviet Armed Forces and all military
infrastructure onto 15 unequal parts with different fate. Some of the parts (like in the
emerged Baltic states) were quickly dismissed as “dangerous elements of the past”, in
some other new independent states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, some other NIS) these
remnants of the Soviet military structure were used as a seed of new national armies
with minor changes.
Russian Federation inherited armed forces of above 2,800.000 men in size, which by
the year 2000 were cut down to 1,200,000 military. In years 2000 and 2001
significant quantities of 47,400 and 90,000 military respectively were demobilized.
Plans of further demobilization for the period 2003-2005 count demobilizing another
365,000 officers and soldiersi. By the year 2005 Russian armed forces, if everything
goes as planned, would have about 800,000 men.
Process of demobilization of large quantities of former military in a society with
limited job opportunities and under economic reforms created a lot of socially and
personally painful consequences. According to the estimates of the Ministry of
Defense, half of demobilized officers required new education or retraining plus
reintegration support. Of those demobilized in 2000, 31 percent were under thirty
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years old, and yet able to undergo through realistic requalification, while 38 percent
were in the age over fortyii. They were most disadvantaged group, as far as had no yet
pension rights upon demobilization, but were already too old for a second start in
career. Another seriously disadvantaged group are former military demobilized in
remote garrisons with no civil sector jobs and no seed money to move with the family
to some other place.
In approximately 1990-1993 Russian military were in the lowest point in public
perception and prestige. Dismantlement of the old “vertical” of state and ideological
power led to public accusations that military are “as much responsible” for the
failures and problems of socialism, as the Communist party. It was a period when
about 250 political parties and movements were mushroomingly emerging, and
bustling and “young” yet not fully born civil society mostly shared alerted or
negative attitude to the military. In its radical manifestations that attitude proclaimed:
“It’s indecent to be a military”. Massive flow of officers and specialists, especially
young, were leaving the armed forces.
But eruption of at least seven large scale conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet
Union in the first half of the 90s (Tajikistan, Transdnestria/Moldova,
Abkhazia/Georgia,
South
Ossetia/Georgia,
North
Ossetia/Ingushetia,
Armenia/Azerbaijan over Karabakh, and, finally, wide conflict in Chechnya) and
numerous smaller conflicts seriously frightened and shocked the society, and partially
returned to the military role and esteem. By participation in all these conflicts at any
side military seemed like undermined and erased step by step their affiliation in public
minds with previous Communist regime and tied to “new threats, new challenges”.
On a parallel track, events in the former Yugoslavia, efforts of the United Nations
peace-keeping missions (in which Russia participated), and later – anti-terrorist
campaign, all served as external factors showing to the Russian civil society necessity
of the military and their renewed roles. But now from being formerly a “pillar” of the
state, military organization was converted into a “servant of the society”. General
psychology of perception of the military in the Russian society shifted to a more
healthy “sectoral” view: military represent a sector in society with limited functions.
They are not more, but also not less important than other sectors (like business, like
state bureaucrats, etc.), and this sector deserve only limited resources, comparable to
its limited modern tasks.
How much does it cost?
But how limited is that “piece of pie” which society still is ready to share with the
military? In absolute figures, Russian ”national defense expenditures”, approved by
Parliament, raised from 214,7 billion current rubles (that would mean about 30 times
lower in USD equivalent) in 2001 to 344,5 bln rubles in 2003 (though actual
expenditures are, as a rule, 5-10 bln lower than allocated). If we add to these figures
allocations for military pensions (67,7 bln rubles in 2003), separate financing for
some items of military reform and mobilization capabilities, then total military
expenditures of Russia can be estimated as 250,1 bln rubles in 2001, 341,5 bln in
2002 and 428,4 bln rubles in 20031.
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Being recalculated in US dollars under fluctuating exchange rate, last figure approximately equals to
14,3 billion USD for the year 2003.
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With fluctuations, and taking into consideration inflation, that figures represent
around 3% of the Russian annual GDP. But being recalculated as a sector in a state
federal expenditures, these figures look already not as small: 22,4% and 21,5% as
share of military expenditures in all state federal expenditures in years 2001 and 2002
respectivelyiii, which means: every fifth ruble in the Russian state budget goes directly
or indirectly for the military purposes.
Structure of relations between civil society and military in the Russian
Federation
It’s widely recognized today that a military organization of a state includes not only
troops under the control and command of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, in some
countries experts start to use instead of the notion of “the civil control over the
military structure of the state” the broader notion of “civil management of the security
sector”. As for Russia, such “security sector” includes up to 30 ministries and
departments (out of the entire 59 agencies funded from the State budget), possessing
one or another kind of “troops”, “forces” or uniformed militarized servicemen. All of
them belong to the “military organization of the state”, so it will be more appropriate
to talk about “civil guidance or/and management over the military structures of the
state”.
Semi-formed system of such a civil guidance (including civil oversight) is multi-level
and multi-faceted. It includes non-governmental components as well as some
elements of civil executive, legislative and juridical branches of power on a state
level.
The whole institute of parliamentary legislation on military affairs and civil-military
relations is a wide flow of interaction between civil society and military. That would
be too broad to call the whole Parliament “an instrument of civil oversight over the
military”, but in a certain sense Parliament (and its specialized committees, like
Defense and Security committees of the Duma and Council of Federation) translate
interests of the electorate into the laws regarding military and into budgets.
Unfortunately, Russian parliament by Constitution does not possess control functions,
which seriously limits its civil oversight capabilities.
In certain moments Constitutional Court, Chief Military’s Procurator’s Office,
General Procurator’s Office, Advocacy as institutions play serious or some role in
civil-military disputes, reorganization of civil-military relations, recognition of public
complaints and inquiries. In Russian political system human rights protection has its
specialized channel, open to the civil society at one end, and connected to the
Presidential branch of power at the other: that is an institution of Commissioner
(Ombudsman) on Human Rights in the Russian Federation (created by the
Presidential branch of power). Such an Ombudsman with its limited administration
represents another component of civil-military connection. At present he deals with
numerous public requests both regarding rights of the people in the uniform and rights
of the civilians affected by the actions of the military.
Another component of civil-military connection are organizations created by the
military themselves in course of their civilian self-identification and protection of
their rights.
Among them:
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various editions of trade unions of the military (efforts started in early 90s and were
ended by the current legislation on the status of the military, prohibiting trade union
type activity in the army);
organizations of veterans, retired, decommissioned military and military pensioners;
associations for military reform and dealing with various aspects of this reform;
organizations of professional re-training and re-qualification for the military;
associations of anciens and former military professionals of certain specialization
(for example, Association of former military observers, who participated in UN
peace-keeping missions abroad); etc.
Another circle is composed by civilian NGOs, whose activity touches upon military
issues or is directly connected to the military sphere.
Among them:
Associations of soldiers’ mothers and relatives of victims of conflicts or use of
armed force;
organizations aimed at establishing alternative military service;
institutes and centers conducting research on defense and strategic matters,
armament/disarmament, etc.;
clearinghouses and information/consultative centers and services on human and
professional rights of the military;
military-industrial lobbies;
interest groups organized around any concrete ‘knot” in civil-military relations (good
recent example is an organization “Women of ZATO – Closed AdministrativeTerritorial Entities”, uniting women living and working at “military-industrial cities”
of the Ministry of Atomic Energy).
Conflicts in CIS, two Chechen wars and attitudes of the public
Conflicts with the use of armed forces on the territory of the CIS, as well as inside
Russia, which occurred during the 90s, seriously influenced relations between the
military organization and the civil society.
First of all, significant quantities of soldiers and officers were periodically involved
into the real use of armed force, witnessed bloodshed and victims from all conflicting
sides, and were the subject of “front-line news” on Russian TV screens practically
during all the decade. Up to 6 Russian battalions (2200 men) were involved at early
stage into disengagement mission in Moldova/Transdnestria, above 1750 Russian
military still are positioned in Abkhazia/Georgia, around 500 Russian soldiers were
placed on rotation basis in South Ossetia/Georgia during the mission there.
Presence in Tajikistan was by factor more significant: about 7,000 Russian soldiers
and officers from the 201st Division participated in Collective CIS Peace-keeping
Forces aimed to stop a civil war in this country, while up to 15,000 Russian borderguards were involved into sealing the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
Russian presence in international forces in Bosnia was (with rotation) at the level of
1,500 men, and same quantity was sent to Kosovo during the active phase of UN
operation there. All-in-all, during the 90s and up to now, between 10,000 and 20,000
Russian soldiers and officers constantly were participating at military missions
beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. In 2003 Russian military had some
contingents or bases in 10 out of 12 CIS states.
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Inside Russia around 7,000 military from MoD and Ministry of Interior troops
participated at military operation of disengagement between North Ossetians and
Ingushes in 1992, and many dozens of thousands (well above 100,000) of military
went through the active stages of military campaign in Chechnya. That created inside
Russian population by the beginning of the XXIst century a whole “new military
generation” with syndromes somewhat similar to “post-Afghan syndrome” so
characteristic for former soldiers in late 80s- early 90s.
At the same time, different campaigns got very different attitudes in Russian public
consciousness. Russian peace-keepers returning from UN-led campaign in former
Yugoslavia were greeted as “heroes”. President Yeltsin greeted with military medals
para-troopers commanded by General Zavarzin who participated in raid to Pristina
airport in Kosovo. Russian peace-keepers in Moldova and Georgia, who stopped
bloodshed in three conflicts there, were perceived with no glory, but as a kind of a
post-imperial “white man’s burden”. At the same time participants of campaigns in
Chechnya (especially of the first one in 1992-1994) often got critical and alienated
attitude from some media sources and significant sectors of public.
In a certain degree, public attitude to the first stages of the Chechen war (first half of
the 90s, until the period of so called Hasav-Yurt Agreements) could be compared to
the American public attitudes to late stages of the Vietnam war of the 60s: in both
cases television, media and public movements practically stopped military
involvement. In 1992-1994 the public movement of “Soldiers’ Mothers” raised great
public support and attention, protesting against sending conscripts, inadequately
trained young soldiers to often deadly missions in Chechnya. On later stages
authorities were forced to convert to the system when mostly soldiers and officers in
Chechnya were sent to serve based upon voluntarily signed contracts, and a system of
“war conditions” compensation was expanded.
At the same time it is important to understand, that Russian authorities never
recognized military actions in Chechnya to be legally “a war”, as far as such a
definition requires to apply Geneva conventions and protocols, recognize the status of
captured Chechen mojaheddins to be “prisoners of war” with all outgoing legal
consequences. Rather all military activities in Chechnya were codified as “internal
police operation”, “actions against public disorder”, and – after 2001 – as “antiterrorist operation”. That allowed to treat captured Chechen fighters as criminals, and
apply domestic Criminal law. But at the same time, this legal aspect was an obstacle
to recognition of full rights of the Russian military participating in operations to have
compensations and special conditions of service which are characteristic for the time
and conditions of war. That has become and still is a subject of pressure from some
public organizations and organizations of campaign’s veterans.
Both operation of military disengagement between Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia in
1992 (two conflicting ethnic subjects of the Russian Federation) and early stages of
operation in Chechnya before 1993 raised a serious internal legal complaint. It was
impossible to the central authorities to limit the use of force only to the Interior Forces
of the Ministry of Interior (which would correspond to the status of internal police
operation on country’s own territory), but the use of heavily armed and differently
trained troops of the Ministry of Defense inside the country was prohibited by then
existing military doctrine. Logic and field conditions of both operations led to actual
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use of MoD forces inside the country (in violation of legal norms existing by that
moment). And only in 1993 a new Military Doctrine was adopted (as well as the new
Constitution) which legitimized the use of Armed Forces for operations on country
owns territory.
“Second Chechen war” (or, more precisely, series of military operations of changing
intensity between 1996 and 2001) took place already in a different societal
atmosphere:
1) Russian state was actively rebuilding a “vertical” of power;
2) Separatist moods of many subjects of Federation (like, for example, Tatarstan)
ended in finding political compromise with the central authorities regarding the
share of responsibilities and control; thus “domino theory” that after Chechnya
many regions may quest for independence didn’t work anymore;
3) Numerous terrorist acts initiated and performed by Chechens in various cities,
from Caucasus to Moscow, alienated majority of even most liberal public from
moral support of Chechen “freedom-fighters”;
4) It has become clear that attempts to allow Chechnya factual independence
wouldn’t resolve problems in the region: infrastructure of local power was ruined,
as well as local economy, and “fail-state” in Chechnya could only lead to
“terrorist paradise”;
5) Central Russian authorities undertook serious propagandistic campaign and
skillfully controlled presentation of news from Chechnya under political
supervision;
6) Some economic assistance to restore basics of living infrastructure (schools,
hospitals, etc.) in Chechnya were initiated by central authorities, and some
political process of relative normalization started on the basis of temporal and
unsteady cease-fire.
As a result of these and some other factors, public attitudes to the military (federal
troops) involved in Chechnya changed. Military stopped to be perceived in the public
consciousness as a self-driving force within the conflict. They rather start to be
perceived as an instrument, used (and sometimes obviously misused) by politicians.
Legal background also changed: some court trials were started against concrete
officers who mistreated Chechen civil population or violated human right regulations,
while, at the same time, numerous captured Chechen fighters or terrorists were
imprisoned, punished or put under trial. Elections and referendum took place in
Chechnya in 2003, and though human rights activists still continue to blame central
authorities and military in overuse of force, general public seems being diverted from
Chechen events to some other problems (except for moments of widely reported by
the media terrorist acts).
Are Russian military a self-minding force and a political player in a Russian
society?
“Putsch” of 1993 (when mostly Soviet-minding obsolete Supreme Soviet got in
forceful conflict with Presidential branch of power) occurred to be a serious test for
the relations between Russian military and the civil society. When conflict reached a
violent stage, everybody was expecting, whose side armed forces would take. Both
President Yeltsin and leader of the rivals, vice-president Rutskoy (former Air Force
General) were “struggling” for the support of the military.
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In some countries military at certain stages of history played a decisive role as an
independent political force or “king-makers”. Examples of General Pinochet in Chile,
“black colonels” Greece in the 70s, some Latin American and South-East Asian
regimes, military ruling elite in Pakistan, are quite self-explanatory. Though in
Russian history of XVIIIth and XIXth centuries there was quite a significant role of
the military elite (coup of so called “decembrists” is an example), still Russian
military have no historic tradition of independent political role in the society. Events
of 1993 proved not to be an exception. In a situation of internal split among political
elite, most military commanders tended to alienate, quit and wait. Some small
contingents followed the rivals (Supreme Soviet), another contingent (mainly from
elite Tamansky division situated 50 kilometers from Moscow) followed the orders of
Yeltsin and started shooting at the building of parliament where Supreme Soviet
members were blockaded. But all putsch went under the active participation of multithousand crowd of public which practically surrounded the parliament and was in a
constant communication with soldiers and officers, in many documented cases
motivating them to change sides in the conflict. Some APCs which were sent to
offend building of Parliament finished protecting it, and some others leaded the public
crowd.
Split of the army in 1993 (and even more visibly – paralysis of most of the military in
case of necessity to take any political decisions regarding loyalty in a crisis) stresses
the urgency of de-politicization of the army. Military, under all attractiveness of
democratic mode of thinking and political self-consciousness, must in all situations
follow the orders of the legitimately elected power of the state. This is why
prohibition of creation of political parties units in the army harrisons, as well as
prohibition of political propaganda by various political movements among soldiers
and officers are important components of steady civil-military relations.
At the same time, that does not mean that military must be excluded from the political
life as such. They are “citizens in a uniform”, and at elections they should be allowed
to express their individual political preferences. And to be able to make a conscious
choice they must have a constant access to general political information, media news,
and be protected from imposing to them a political choice through the misuse of chain
of military command.
Comparative analysis of situation in Russia and in other CIS new independent states
provides enough foundations to the general conclusion that the modern trends of
mastering of the Russian legislation in the military sphere, and first of all trend
towards the legal introduction of the civil control over the military organization of the
state, are quite similar, in general, to tendencies existing in other CIS and Baltic
states, as well in Central and Eastern Europe. Wider international cooperation and
further exchange of experience in this field are timely and important.
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i
Demobilization data are quoted according to: Rossiyskaya gazeta, 2002, March 29.
Conversion Survey 2003. Bonn International center for conversion, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, 2003, p.67.
iii
Statistics of the RF Ministry of Finance at www.minfin.ru; and periodical
“Commersant”, January 17, 2003.
ii