October 18, 1999
U. S. Department of Transportation Dockets
Docket No. [FAA-1999-5401]
400 Seventh Street, SW
Room 401
Washington, DC 20509
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. FAA-1999-5401; Aging Aircraft
Safety
The National Air Transportation Association (NATA) represents the interest
of over 2000 aviation businesses nationwide including a number of scheduled air
carriers operating under 14 CFR Part 135 using Part 23 aircraft with nine or fewer
seats affected by this Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). Many of these
scheduled air carriers are providing essential air transportation to hundreds of small
communities throughout the contiguous United States and the isolated States of
Alaska and Hawaii. Relief from the devastating cost of developing damagetolerance-based inspection criteria is essential if cost effective essential air service
is to be continued to these rural communities.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The Aging Aircraft Safety Act of 1991 was not intended to require small businesses
to invest more than twice the price of the aircraft to develop and implement an
inspection program based on an accident of a large transport category pressurized
aircraft. The Aging Aircraft Safety Act of 1991, following the Aloha Airlines
accident involving a Boeing 737 aircraft, focused on Large Transport Category
aircraft undergoing, specifically, heavy maintenance checks. Section 2 (b) (2) of
the Act specifies that the “inspection and reviews required under paragraph (1)
SHALL be carried out as part of each heavy maintenance (emphasis added) of the
aircraft…” Light general aviation aircraft do not undergo heavy maintenance
checks and therefore are outside of the scope of the Aging Aircraft Safety Act of
1991. The Act intended the Agency to develop inspections to enhance existing
heavy maintenance checks accomplished on large aircraft to address specific
findings of the effect of aging. This proposal disregards the current and unique
inspection program for light aircraft and has not found deficiencies with the current
maintenance programs of light general aviation aircraft.
NATA Comments
Docket No. [FAA-1999-5401]
Page 2 of 4
The FAA was directed to evaluate the aircraft and maintenance programs to assure
that the aircraft are in a safe condition. In the case of light twin-engine general
aviation aircraft, the Agency has not documented inspections, maintenance reviews,
or research that has determined these aircraft are in an unsafe condition. In fact, the
Agency currently does not know whether after investing $250,000 to $1,000,000
dollars in the stress analysis determination to meet the requirements of the proposal
that any supplemental inspection would be warranted for smaller aircraft commonly
used in Part 135 scheduled operations.
IMPACT ON PART 23 AIRCRAFT
The Agency has not evaluated light general aviation aircraft and their maintenance
programs, and therefore has not determined them to be unsafe nor in need of
specialized inspections. Since all of the published reviews are for aircraft with a
seating capacity greater than nine passengers, the cost benefit of this proposal has
not been determined for the small general aviation type aircraft involved. The
inclusion of these aircraft is therefore inappropriate.
The FAA has failed to adequately evaluate the affected aircraft to determine the
appropriate solution for the unique operations of small nine-passenger general
aviation aircraft. NATA recommends that the FAA initiate an aging aircraft study
of twin-engine Part 23 aircraft with nine or fewer passenger seats to review the
impact of age and proper maintenance practices on the continued airworthiness of
the aircraft. Once evaluated, the data provided to the Agency can be utilized to
evaluate less costly alternatives that would insure continued airworthiness of the
affected aircraft. The Association believes that further review is necessary to
determine first if a systemic unsafe condition exists and second whether the
proposed damage-tolerance-based inspection is the most cost-effective alternative
to resolve the unsafe condition.
NO UNSAFE CONDITION
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking implies that “an unsafe condition exists in a
product and that condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same
type design.” By definition, this type of condition is addressed in 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 39 and must be addressed as such through the issuance of
an Airworthiness Directive. Should, after engineering review and analysis, the
Administrator determine that indeed an unsafe condition exists then, as prescribed
NATA Comments
Docket No. [FAA-1999-5401]
Page 3 of 4
in Section 39.11, the Administrator, not the operator, shall prescribe the appropriate
inspection — an action that was implemented for large transport category aircraft in
1988.
By ignoring 14 CFR Part 39, the Agency has selected a course of action that is
discriminatory towards small businesses, knowing the resulting action will devalue
a company’s assets. Without evaluating the affected aircraft, the Agency is
implementing a program that for administrative, not safety reasons, will essentially
ground these aircraft from air carrier operations. Knowing that the operators of
these aircraft do not have the financial resources to develop damage-tolerancebased inspections and that the manufacturers of many of these aircraft are not
available to support these aircraft, the Agency has selected the most costly and least
supported alternative available.
Damage-tolerance-based inspections have been required for large transport category
aircraft for over twenty years. With support from the aircraft manufacturers, the
FAA issued a series of Airworthiness Directives in the early 1980s which adopted
Structural Inspection Programs for transport category aircraft certificated prior to
1978. Having failed to receive support from general aviation manufacturers, the
Agency elected to burden the operators of the affected aircraft — an action that is
inconsistent with the Agency’s previous action affecting large corporations
operating large transport-category aircraft. The manufacturer, not the operator, is in
the best position to develop these programs.
The Association has not been able to identify any systemic structural problems with
the affected aircraft that could be the basis of further review. Through contacts with
affected NATA Part 135 scheduled carriers, the Association has been unable to
identify any failures of properly maintained aircraft that would warrant the
development of a supplemental structural inspection program. In addition, we were
able to document the results of non-destructive testing of critical wing structures in
affected Piper Aircraft. The results of the inspection certainly meet the concern
raised by Congress by showing that age and operations have not compromised the
airworthiness of this aircraft. The results of this inspection, although limited to a
single aircraft, DO NOT support the FAA’s cost prohibitive proposal.
NATA RECOMMENDATION
In lieu of the FAA’s cost prohibitive proposal of burdening the small business
operator of the affected aircraft with developing a damage-tolerance-based
inspection for aircraft certificated prior to 1993, the Association proposes an
NATA Comments
Docket No. [FAA-1999-5401]
Page 4 of 4
alternative inspection program. Specifically, for Part 23 aircraft with a seating
capacity of nine or fewer passenger seats certificated prior to 1993, NATA proposes
the following:
1. The Agency identify those Part 23 aircraft for which a damage-tolerance-based
inspection has been developed and approved by the FAA.
2. The Agency identify those Part 23 aircraft for which the manufacturer has
developed a supplemental Structural Inspection Program and a supplemental
Corrosion Inspection Program.
3. Any aircraft not covered by (1) or (2) above, the FAA shall develop a special
inspection to enhance the scheduled periodic/annual inspections currently
required by regulations for those aircraft. This FAA-developed inspection shall
be created for each make and model-series aircraft affected by this proposal
through the use of Service Difficulty Reports and other reports available to the
Administrator.
4. The owner/operator of any affected aircraft in air carrier service shall be
required to implement not later than 14 years after the date of manufacture a
supplemental Structural Inspection Program designated by the manufacturer. If
the manufacturer has not designated such a program, the operator shall
implement the FAA’s supplemental structural inspection program.
NATA has reviewed the proposal and the Aging Aircraft Safety Act of 1991 and
believes that the FAA is responsible for the development and implementation of the
inspection program. Further, the Agency has not reviewed or inspected the affected
aircraft to determine whether or not an unsafe condition exists. The Association
strongly believes that the Agency is not conforming to Congress’ intent when
passing the Aging Aircraft Safety Act of 1991.
NATA, through its membership, will assist the FAA in conducting a multi-year
evaluation of the current inspection and maintenance requirements for Part 23
aircraft with nine or fewer seats used in scheduled air carrier service to assist the
Agency to collect the necessary data to determine if, in fact, an unsafe condition
exists. The Association proposes that while this review is being conducted this
NPRM be suspended for scheduled Part 135 air carriers operating Part 23 aircraft
with nine or fewer passenger seats.
Sincerely,
Andrew V. Cebula
Vice President