Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
Conceptual Background:
It is a common place for scholars in the social sciences and humanities to claim that certain human
categories, such as gender, race, sexual orientation, and others, are socially constructed. Recently some
philosophers have become interested in the question of what it means to say that a given category is
socially constructed, and more importantly, what kind of evidence can be used in order to show that a
given category is socially constructed or not (Hacking 1999, Haslanger 1995, 2003, 2005, 2006, Stein
1992, 1999).
A useful definition of social construction within philosophy is that a category (say, woman, or
black) is socially constructed when the property that unifies all the individuals that fall under the category
(that is, the property that all those individuals have in common) is social (such as the property of being
oppressed), as opposed to being natural (such as having XX chromosomes) (Haslanger 2006, Stein 1999).
Research Objectives:
In this research project, my aim is to clarify, develop and defend this account of what social construction
is. In order to do this, I will be focusing on two crucial questions:
(1) This characterization of social construction relies on the notion of a natural property, or, as
philosophers usually put it, a ‘natural kind’ (that is, a group of things or individuals that have some
basic, naturally fixed property in common, such as tigers, or electrons). However, many philosophers
have argued that this notion is problematic, because nothing actually satisfies the conditions for being
a natural kind (Dupré 1981, 2002, Goodman 1978). If these arguments against the notion of natural
kind turned out to be successful, then the notion of social construction, as characterized above, would
be trivially applicable to everything: if there were no natural properties or kinds, only social
properties, then every category would turn out to be socially constructed, and consequently the notion
of social construction would no longer be useful. My first objective is to critically examine these
arguments against the notion of natural kind, and to show that they do not pose a challenge to our
characterization of social construction.
(2) This account of social construction gives rise to the question: assuming that it has been established
that a given category (say, white, or lesbian) does not refer to a natural kind (that is, members of that
category do not share any fundamental, naturally fixed property), in what cases should we say that the
category refers to a social kind (that is, that the property that all members of the category have in
common is merely social, as Haslanger 2000 argues regarding genders and races), and in what cases
should we say that the category is an empty term which does not refer to any actual kind or property
(as Appiah 1996 and Zack 1997 argue regarding race)? The second objective of this research project
is to provide a justified criterion for answering questions of this form.
Research Hypotheses:
Regarding question (1), my working hypothesis is twofold: On the one hand, I will argue that we can
develop a coherent account of the notion of natural kind, in terms of kinds that play a fundamental
explanatory role in our theories (following the lines of Bird 1998, Bird & Tobin 2008, Boyd 1991,
LaPorte 2004, Lewis 1983, Stein 1999 and others); and on the other hand, I will show that this notion of
natural kind is neither too general (that is, it does not apply to groups of things that do not seem,
intuitively, to be natural kinds, such as artifacts or other human creations), nor too restrictive (that is, I
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
will argue, contra Dupré 1981, Goodman 1978 and others, that the notion of natural kind can actually be
satisfied, that is, that there are groups of things that have natural properties in common).
Regarding question (2), my working hypothesis will be that there are two crucial factors that
determine whether a given category refers to a social kind or not: (i) conceptual aspects having to do with
our intuitions concerning the use and application of that category in different conceivable situations, and
(ii) empirical aspects having to do with what properties the individuals that fall under the category
actually have in common. This proposal is inspired, first, by the work of philosophers such as Chalmers
1996 and Jackson 1998, who have proposed a general account of meaning along these lines, and second,
by recent accounts of social kinds proposed by Haslanger 1995, 2003, 2005 and 2006, and Stein 1992,
1998 and 1999. My own account will develop and defend the idea that what makes a given kind a social
kind is the fact that what members of the corresponding group have in common are merely certain social
features and social structures, for instance, being subject to certain social forces, norms and expectations,
or being placed in certain positions of privilege or discrimination.
Research Outcomes:
I plan to write three research papers in which I will present new arguments for the hypotheses mentioned
above. A first paper, provisionally entitled “Natural Kinds vs. Social Kinds: A Principled Distinction”
will survey some arguments against the notion of natural kind, and will present an account of natural
kinds that can solve these problems and serve as a basis for drawing a useful, non-trivial distinction
between natural and social kinds. A second paper, provisionally entitled “Social Kinds and the Role of
Conceptual Analysis” will discuss the role of conceptual analysis in the study of social kinds and will
argue, contra Haslanger 2005 and 2006, that our intuitions concerning the proper use of the
corresponding concepts play a central and indispensable role in the study of social kinds. A third paper,
provisionally entitled “Social Kinds and Social Structures” will explore and clarify the notion of social
structure, which is essential to my characterization of social construction.
Significance of proposed research:
The results to be achieved from this project have clear theoretical and practical significance since they can
be used to settle disputes in the humanities and social sciences concerning whether a given category is
socially constructed or not.
In addition, the research hypotheses to be established in this project would have a wide appeal in
contemporary analytic philosophy, the field within which this work is situated. First, the account of
natural kinds would be applicable to many other areas in philosophy in which the notion of natural kind
plays a crucial role, such as metaphysics and philosophy of science, and a principled distinction between
natural and social kinds would be an extremely useful resource in philosophical debates about social and
political issues; and secondly, the discussion about the role of conceptual analysis in the study of social
kinds also has clear broader applications, concerning the role of conceptual analysis in different areas of
analytic philosophy.
Methods and Procedures:
The methodology of this research project is that typical of contemporary analytic philosophy, which
involves reflection on central concepts, in order to clarify them and challenge common assumptions. The
method of analytic philosophy relies on a combination of logical abilities and common sense, and
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
typically involves consideration of arguments and counterarguments for different definitions or analyses
of the concepts at issue, as well as counterexamples to these definitions. In this research project in
particular, the relevant concepts to be clarified are those of social construction, natural kind, natural
property, social kind, social structure, and empty kind.
In order to carry out this project, a literature review--in which different positions and definitions
concerning the central concepts are identified--will be essential. The objective of a literature review is not
merely historical, but theoretical: the aim is to explore and assess the different arguments and
counterarguments for the different relevant analyses provided so far, in order to develop and defend the
most successful account of the concepts involved. Three student research assistants will be hired, who
will help with the review and analysis of relevant literature. A reading list with weekly assignments will
be distributed (see attached Appendix), and they will be asked to write a short (1-page) report on each
paper. We will meet weekly during 9 weeks (February to April 2009), to discuss their reports. This will
provide training in philosophical reading, writing and presentation skills for the students, as well as
forming the basis of a useful literature review for my research project. In addition, the first drafts of the
research papers outlined in the Research Outcomes above will be distributed among them, and we will
have three final meetings to discuss them (August-September 2009). Additional dissemination plans
include presenting these research papers at international conferences, as well as online discussion.
Timetable for completion:
Dec.
Start-up
X
Student Recruitment
Literature Review
Analysis
Write-up
Dissemination
Grant Proposal
Final Report
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
April
May
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Oct.
X
X
X
Future Research Plans:
This project will provide the conceptual foundations for a longer-term project on the nature of gender,
race and sexual orientations. In future work, I want to investigate the issue of whether these categories are
socially constructed. In order to pursue this larger project, it is essential to have a good grasp of what
social kinds are, and what kind of evidence can settle disputes concerning the alleged social construction
of a given category. For this reason, the results obtained in this project (especially those concerning the
distinction between natural and social kinds, and the criteria for finding out whether a category refers to a
social kind, as opposed to being an empty kind) will put me in a better position to articulate and carry out
this research project concerning the nature of gender, races and sexual orientations, in which I plan to
review and assess some relevant available evidence for and against the claim that those categories are
socially constructed. I intend to submit an application to the SSHRC Standard Research Grants Program
in the fall of 2009.
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
References:
Appiah, K.A. (1996) “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections”, in K.A. Appiah & A.
Gutmann, Color Conscious, Princeton University Press, 30-105.
Bird, A. (1998) “Natural Kinds”, in A. Bird, Philosophy of Science, UCL Press, 95-120.
Bird, A. & Tobin, E. (2008) “Natural Kinds”, in E. Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/
Boyd, R. (1991) “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds”, Philosophical
Studies 61 (1-2), 127-48.
Chalmers, D. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press.
Dupré, J. (1981) “Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa”, Philosophical Review 90 (1), 66-90.
Dupré, J. (2002) Humans and Other Animals, Oxford University Press.
Goodman, N. (1978) Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett, 1978.
Hacking, I. (1991) “A Tradition of Natural Kinds”, Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2), 109-26.
Hacking, I. (1999) The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press.
Haslanger, S. (1995) “Ontology and Social Construction”, Philosophical Topics 23 (2), 95-125.
Haslanger, S. (2000) “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be? Nous 34
(1), 31-55.
Haslanger, S. (2003) “Social Construction: The ‘Debunking’ Project”, in F. Schmitt (ed.) Socializing
Metaphysics, Rowman and Littlefield, 301-25.
Haslanger, S. (2005) “What Are We Talking About? The Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds”,
Hypatia 20 (4), 10-26.
Haslanger, S. (2006) “What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds”,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (Supp. Vol.), 89-118.
Jackson, F. (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford University
Press.
LaPorte, J. (2004) Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change, Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. (1983) “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4),
343-77.
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
Stein, E. (1992) “Essentials of Constructionism and the Construction of Essentialism”, in E. Stein (ed.)
Forms of Desire: Sexual Orientations and the Social Constructionist Controversy, Routledge,
325-53.
Stein, E. (1998) “Essentialism and Constructionism about Sexual Orientations”, in M. Ruse and D. Hull
(eds.) Philosophy of Biology, Oxford University Press, 427-42.
Stein, E. (1999) The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation,
Oxford University Press.
Zack, N. (1997) “Race and Philosophical Meaning”, in N. Zack (ed.) RACE/SEX: Their Sameness,
Difference, and Interplay, Routledge, 29-43.
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
Appendix: Reading List
Week 1: Natural Kind Terms
Research Assistant 1:
Schwartz, S. “Introduction”, in S. Schwartz (ed.) Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Cornell
University Press, 1977.
Research Assistant 2:
Mellor, D.H. “Natural Kinds”, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 28, 1977.
Research Assistant 3:
Zemach, E. “Putnam’s Theory on the Reference of Substance Terms”, Journal of Philosophy 73, 1976.
Week 2: The Nature of Natural Kinds
Research Assistant 1:
Bird, A. & Tobin, E. “Natural Kinds”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008.
Research Assistant 2:
Boyd, R. “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds”, Philosophical Studies
61, 1991.
Research Assistant 3:
Hacking, I. “A Tradition of Natural Kinds”, Philosophical Studies 61, 1991.
Week 3: Are There Natural Kinds?
Research Assistant 1:
Dupré, J. “Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa”, Philosophical Review 90, 1981.
Research Assistant 2:
Dupré, J. “Is ‘Natural Kind’ a Natural Kind Term?”, The Monist 85, 2002.
Research Assistant 3:
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
LaPorte, J. (2004) “What is a Natural Kind, and Do Biological Taxa Qualify”?, in J. LaPorte, Natural
Kinds and Conceptual Change, Cambridge University Press, 8-32.
Week 4: Social Kinds vs. Natural Kinds I
Research Assistant 1:
Stein, E. “Essentials of Constructionism and the Construction of Essentialism”, in E. Stein (ed.) Forms of
Desire: Sexual Orientations and the Social Constructionist Controversy, Routledge, 1992.
Research Assistant 2:
Stein, E. “Essentialism and Constructionism about Sexual Orientations”, in M. Ruse and D. Hull (eds.)
Philosophy of Biology, Oxford University Press, 1998.
Research Assistant 3:
Stein, E. The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation, Oxford
University Press, 1999, Ch. 3.
Week 5: Social Kinds vs. Natural Kinds II
Research Assistant 1:
Haslanger, S. “Feminism in Metaphysics: Negotiating the Natural”, in J. Hornsby & M. Fricker (eds.)
Feminism in Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Research Assistant 2:
Hacking, I. “How "Natural" Are "Kinds" of Sexual Orientation?”, Law and Philosophy, 21-1, 2002.
Research Assistant 3:
Stein, E. The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation, Oxford
University Press, 1999, Ch. 4.
Week 6: Social Construction
Research Assistant 1:
Hacking, I. The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press, 1999, Ch. 1.
Research Assistant 2:
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
Haslanger, S. “Ontology and Social Construction”, Philosophical Topics 23, 1995.
Research Assistant 3:
Haslanger, S. “Social Construction: The ‘Debunking’ Project”, in F. Schmitt (ed.) Socializing
Metaphysics, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.
Week 7: The Role of Conceptual Analysis
Research Assistant 1:
Kitcher, P. "Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture", in L. Harris (ed.) Racism, Humanity Books, 1999.
Research Assistant 2:
Glasgow, J. "On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
Research Assistant 3:
Andreasen, R. “The Meaning of ‘Race’: Folk Conceptions and the New Biology of Race”, The Journal of
Philosophy 102 (2005): 94-106.
Week 8: Empty Terms? The Case of ‘Race’
Research Assistant 1:
Appiah, K.A. (1996) “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections”, in K.A. Appiah & A.
Gutmann, Color Conscious, Princeton University Press, 30-105.
Research Assistant 2:
Zack, N. (1997) “Race and Philosophical Meaning”, in N. Zack, RACE/SEX: Their Sameness, Difference,
and Interplay, Routledge, 29-43.
Research Assistant 3:
Hardimon, M. “The Ordinary Concept of Race”, Journal of Philosophy 100, 2003.
Week 9: Social Kinds and Social Structures: The Case of Gender
Research Assistant 1:
Haslanger, S. “Future Genders? Future Races?”, Philosophic Exchange 34, 2003.
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Part B: Description of Proposed Research
E. Diaz-Leon
Research Assistant 2:
Mikkola, M. “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008.
Research Assistant 3:
Fausto-Sterling, A. “The Problem with Sex/Gender and Nature/Nurture”, in J. Williams, L. Birke & G.
A. Bendelow (eds.) Debating Biology: Sociological Reflections on Health, Medicine and Society,
Routledge, 2003.
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