Philosophy of Language—Chapter 2: Definite Descriptions
The Gist:
In response to the result of Chapter 1, we might think that though the referential theory may not be correct for all kinds of terms, it seems plausible at least for singular terms (terms that refer to single individuals, such as proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions). Can we then claim that the referential theory is correct, but limited in its application, namely, only to singular terms?
Russell shows that the answer to the above question is not straightforward. He points out that most sentences containing proper names or definite descriptions are only superficially of the subject-predicate form; they are logically a trio of generalizations.
So, most singular terms, in Russell’s view, do not refer. This makes us to re-think what the meaning of a singular term is.
Outline:
1. Four Puzzles about The Referential Theory of Singular Terms
2. Russell’s Theory of Descriptions
3. Some Objections to Russell’s Theory, including Donnellan’s Distinction and the “Anaphori” uses
1. Some examples of singular terms. (p. 13)
2. Four Puzzles about The Referential Theory of Singular Terms
(A) The problem of apparent reference to nonexistents
Consider sentence (1) the present King of France is bald.
Is this sentence meaningful, according to the referential theory? (p. 13-4)
(B) The problem of negative existentials
Consider sentence (2) The present King of France does not exist.
What problem does this sentence create for the referential theory? (p. 14)
(C) Frege’s puzzle about identity
Consider sentence (3) 媽祖是林默娘。
What problem does this sentence create for the referential theory? (p. 14-5)
(D) The problem of substitutivity
Consider sentence (4) John believes that 媽祖 is one of the most famous religious figure in Taiwan.
What problem does this sentence create for the referential theory? (p. 15)
3. Russell’s Theory of Descriptions i) Russell methodological claim that the best way to test the adequacy and correctness of a philosophical theory is by seeing how many puzzles it is capable of solving. He

thus aims to offer a theory to solve the above four puzzles. ii) Consider sentence (5) The author of Waverley was Scotch.
Russell’s main thesis is that this sentence looks like of a subject-predicate form, but it is not. Its logical form composes of the following three generalizations: a) At least one person authored Waverley, and b) At most one person authored Waverley, and c) Whoever authored Waverley was Scotch.
(p. 16. See its expressions by predicate logic on p. 17)
Russell’s claim is that we have to analyze “the so and so” carefully: “the” has to be analyzed in quantified terms. A parallel example is this:
I saw Mary.
I saw nobody.
These two sentences have a similar grammatical structure, which easily misleads us to think that “nobody” is some individual, just like Mary. This is evidently absurd. A correct logical analysis of “nobody” reveals that it has to be analyzed as a quantified term. iii) Russell’s application of his theory to the four puzzles a) reference to non-existents
Russell uses his theory of descriptions to paraphrase sentence 1) as a trio of generalizations. The result can clearly show that sentence 1) is false. (p. 18) b) negative existentials
Russell analyzes sentences 2) as:
Not (the present King of France exists), which is in turned analyzed as
Not (a trio of generalizations) (see p. 19)
By marking the scope distinction, and noting that sentences with negative existentials have “wide scope”, Russell shows how we do not have to commit to the existence of something when denying the existence of something. c) Frege’s puzzle
Again, Russell’s analysis of identity sentence (3) into a trio of generalizations shows why sentence (3) can be informative. (p. 19-20) d) substitutivity
Russell’s analysis of a belief sentence like (4) shows why two co-referring terms cannot be substituted, since they actually describe different contents. (p. 20-21)
Note: In Russell’s view, many proper names are disguided in form; they are actually definite descriptions, and hence are subject to a similar logical analysis.
4. Objections 1-3 by Strawson
Strawson raises three related objections, based on a different view of language. He thinks that a referring relation does not exist between a linguistic term and the thing to

which it refers, as Russell suggests. Rather, the referring relation is an act done by a person at a time on an occasion. Russell’s view of language is that a sentence is meaningful because it expresses a proposition, which is abstract, and which has a logical form to be uncovered. In contrast, Strawson’s view of language is that a sentence is meaningful because it can be used or uttered by a person in a certain context to do certain things; language is not abstract, but is live and concrete.
Objection 1:
So, uttering sentence 1), according to Strawson, does not say anything true or false. A hearer would simply question what the speaker means, or what he presupposes. (p.
21-23) (More discussion on this in Chapter 13)
Objection 2:
When one asserts sentence 1), one obviously does not assert the paraphrased sentence of a generalization form. Hence, Russell’s theory can’t be right.
Lycan responds to this objection on Russell’s behalf. (p. 23)
Objection 3:
Many descriptions are context-bound, and Russell’s theory has no other way but to incorporate the notion of context of utterance in his description-analysis. Otherwise,
Russell’s theory would be in trouble. E.g., the second conjunct in the Russellian logical analysis of sentence (6)
(6) The table is covered with books. will mean that there is at most one table in the universe, which is evidently wrong.
But if Russell adopted Strawson’s suggestion of the idea of context into his logical analysis of a sentence, Russell would be giving up his theory.
Lycan points out that there may be at least two ways in which Russell could try to avoid this objection. One is to argue that “the table” is elliptical, short for a more elaborate description that is uniquely satisfied such as “the table in this room”. But this has a problem: we won’t want to say that “this room” is contained in the logical analysis of the term “the table”. Another way is to appeal to the notion of “restricted quantification”. But there remains problems concerning how quantifiers get restricted in context, what determines the exact restricted domains, and how hearers identify the right domains (p. 24-5)
Objection 4: Donnellan’s distinction (p. 26-30)
Donnellan notices that certain descriptions are used to refer to single individuals. So
Russell’s view is obviously incomplete, or inaccurate.
Donnellan makes the distinction between “the referential use”, and “the attributive use”, of a definite description.
Consider sentence (7) Smith’s murderer is insane, which is uttered by a person in a court, looking at a cold-hearted defendant.

Donnellan complains both about Russell and Strawson: each writes as if a definite description is used in only one way, and fails to note its ambiguity.
The point of Donnellan is that an important distinction has to be made: speaker’s referent and semantic referent, when a certain definite description is used. This distinction helps us to better analyze and understand sentences such as (8) and (9):
(8) I know that’s right because I heard it from the town doctor.
(9) I wish that her husband weren’t her husband.
Russell’s theory obviously has a hard time analyzing these sentences.
Objection 5: Anaphora (p. 31-32) a) What is an anaphoric expression? b) Geach’s (1962) explanation of an anaphoric expression, which is consistent with
Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions c) Evans’s (1977) critique of Geach, and the problem for Russell’s theory