CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCE
Feasibility of the German-type model of Universal
Banks in the Post-Communist Economies. The Case
of Russia
Professor: Jacek Rostowski
Prepared by:
Asenka Asenova
MA in Economics, 1styear
ID# 161801
Spring Semester, 2006,
Budapest
Pages of Contents
Introduction
I.
The German-type model of universal banks
1. Key characteristics
2. The German model and economic growth
II.
Feasibility of the German model in the post-communist economies in the early
years of transition
III.
Feasibility of the German model in the later stages of transition
IV.
The case of Russia
1. General overview of the Russian banking sector
2. Empirical evidence for the bank-enterprise relationships
Conclusions
Appendices List
Appendix no 1: Indices of real credit and real GDP in Russia, 1992-1995
Appendix no 2: Credit and non-performing loans in the Russian banking sector, 19921997
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Abstract
This paper examines the feasibility and desirability of the German-type model of universal banks for
the achievement of sustainable economic growth in the post-communist economies. This issue is
addressed taking into consideration the economic conditions in the countries in transition in the
early and medium stages of reforms. The paper also presents empirical evidence from the evolution
of the banking system in Russia in the early to mid- 1990s from the viewpoint of the relationship
between banks and industry. The main conclusion drawn is that the applicability of the German-type
model requires the presence of certain conditions that were at large not established in Russia; hence,
the banking system had a rather contradictory effect on investment and economic growth.
Introduction
Banks are essential for each country’s economy, since no growth can be achieved unless
savings are efficiently channeled into investment. In this respect, the lack of a full-fledged
banking system has often been identified as a major weakness of the centrally planned
economies. Therefore, reforming the banking sector in the former communist countries and
creating a new culture of trust and confidence has been a crucial task in the process of
transition to a market economy.
Because of the vital importance of the banking reforms in the post-communist economies, a
considerable amount of literature has focused on the issue of designing an optimal financial
system as a critical element of structural reforms. Undoubtedly, the fact that establishment of
a German-type model of universal banks in the former communist countries from Central and
Eastern Europe has occurred is probably proof that it was the most desirable outcome, and
moreover, an outcome that complies with the ‘spirit of the European financial institutions’
(Grosfeld, 1994).
However, in this paper I shall examine the feasibility and desirability of the German-type
model in the transition countries in the early and intermediate stages of transition for the
accomplishment of sustainable economic growth. In analyzing this issue I will provide
empirical evidence from the evolution of the banking system in Russia in the period between
1991-1995 from the viewpoint of the relationship between enterprises and banks, and the
impact of these relationships on investment and economic growth.
3
I. The German-type model of universal banks
1. Key characteristics
Following Grosfeld (1994) I shall use a distinction of three major functions performed by the
financial institutions, while characterizing the main features of the German-type model of
universal banks, namely: financing, information and control. Financing is defined by the
author as creating channels to transform savings into investment; the information aspect here
is analyzed from the viewpoint of generation of information on the value of the firms and on
different investment opportunities. Finally, control, is viewed as imposing monitoring on the
corporate management.
A major distinction of the German-type financial system is the dominance of a relatively
small number of banks (the ‘big three’ or ‘big four’ largest banks), involved in both
commercial and investment banking and, maintaining close relationships with the industry.
German-type banks provide a wide range of financial services but the element of key
importance is the accent on long-term money lending to enterprises. On the information part,
little information on the value of securities is made publicly available; instead, banks have a
rather privileged access to it through the established close links with the industries (Grosfeld,
1994). Lastly, with respect to corporate control, the German-type model has as a main feature
high concentration of ownership, i.e. companies own substantial stakes of each other. As
expected in this situation, banks have both the incentives and the ability to take active
participation in shaping the major decisions of the enterprises. The last means that banks are
in a position to also influence the investment decisions of non-financial companies. Hostile
takeovers and leveraged buy-outs are rare in the German-type model.
In short, the German-type model of universal banks has as a core element the ‘close
participation in the ownership and control on non-financial firms’ (Rostowski, 1998, p. 320).
The impact of this particular system on economic growth has been a source of numerous
arguments and the next section will present some of these views.
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2. The German model and economic growth
Many authors have eloquently supported the idea of German-type banks. According to
Mayer, for example, ‘the distinctive feature of successful financial systems is their close
involvement in industry’ (Mayer, 1988). Additionally, Gerschenkron (1968) argues that in
the middle of the nineteenth century universal banks in Germany – a combination of
commercial and investment banks – strongly contributed to the industrialization of the
economy serving as a substitute for the insufficiency of wealth and entrepreneurial expertise
(Gerschenkron through Rostowski, 1998). A similar case regarding provision of funds
available for investment, has received large support by several authors claiming that a bank’s
stake in an enterprise would prevent banks from behaving too cautiously when providing
credit through allowing them to reap some benefits from financing riskier projects (see e.g.
Dewatripond and Tirole, 1991). Another, mostly theoretical, argument in support of the idea
of German-type banks rests on the concept that banks would help reduce the existing moral
hazard problem between providers of finance, managers and employees via the creation of
long-term commitment.
The first, and probably most obvious, counterargument questions the very idea of
Gerschenkron for the universality of the German model, claiming that no particular kind of
system by itself could do well in explaining economic growth. One possible reason for this is
the fact that there are too many other factors, such as macroeconomic policy and legal
framework that play a considerable role for realization of growth. Empirical evidence shows
that Austria, for instance, had the same banking structure as Germany but banks had a
completely different behavour: they preferred to provide credits to well-established profitable
firms, avoiding both risky work out of long-term plans and providing entrepreneurial
expertise (Cameron, 1972). More importantly, some authors provide arguments against the
introduction of the German model, since banks as large investors might be too soft because
they fail to terminate unprofitable projects they have invested in (Gertner, Scharfstein &
Stein, 1994).
Naturally, the process of transition from centrally planned to market economy in the postcommunist countries has given rise for new arguments in favour and against the German-
5
type banking system. A significant number of economists have been favouring the idea of
implementing a German model with strong universal banks in the former communist
countries as being the best suitable solution with respect to the needs of these economies.
Moreover, they argue that it is exactly this type of system that emerges in these economies,
including the particular case of Russia (see eg. Belyanova, Rozinsky, 1995). The main point
of introducing such a model in the post communist countries is that universal banks could
mobilize a considerable amount of savings and make them available as capital for investment
in strategic projects of the firms, as well as impose a better corporate control structure on the
firms; thus, they might play the role of an instrument thought which the economy would
catch up with the advanced market economies. However, most authors, who believe in the
potential of the German model to boost investment and economic growth in the postcommunist economies, often underline that fact that this mechanism is only possible if banks
hold concentrated equity of their debtor clients (see e.g. Gorton and Schmid, 1994). This can
be regarded as an important precondition for the introduction of this model, together will all
other conditions that will be discussed further on.
Another argument supporting the bank-based system in general relies on the idea that the
development of efficient security markets on average takes much longer time as compared to
the time period needed for the establishment of a stable banking system. (e.g. Popov, 1999).
At the same time, however, another body of literature gives rise to various counterarguments
claiming that the initial conditions in the transition economies provided little scope to
develop banking systems of German type, at least for the early years of transition
(Rostowski, 1998). Hence, the main question raised is whether banks in the post-communist
countries could play the role of universal banks of German type, taking into consideration the
specific conditions in these economies. This issue will be addressed in the next section of the
paper from the viewpoint of the situation in transition economies in the early stages of
transition and its later evolution.
6
II. Feasibility of the German model in the post-communist economies in the early years of
transition
A key feature of the post-communist economies in the early years of transition was the
exceptionally strong degree of uncertainty due to fundamental macroeconomic changes
taking place (e.g. trade and price liberalization), as well as to high indebtedness of the stateowned enterprises. At the same time, the new state-owned commercial banks, separated from
the Central bank, were flawed with a major weakness: lack of adequate banking skills. These
two factors taken together, led to significant money loss from short-term lending in most
transition economies. And, although, it is namely the long-term money lending which is
supposed to ensure support for the introduction of the German-type system, paradoxically it
provides a strong argument against the German model, for had the banks been involved in
long-term money lending the scale of the losses incurred would have been even greater
(Rostowski, 1998). Moreover, short-term lending would allow the banks to acquire some
expertise in dealing with short-term debt – a precondition to develop skills for medium and
long-term money lending; the later being an absolutely necessary condition for the feasibility
of the German model.
Another point closely related to the feasibility of the German model in the early years of
transition concerns the ownership structure of the post-communist economies. Due to the
different pace of the reforms in the different macroeconomic sectors, the situation in most
transition economies was such that privatization of the state-owned enterprises was done
prior to privatization in the banking sector. At the same time, as already mentioned, first and
perhaps most noticeable characteristic of the German-type banks is their ‘close participation
in the ownership and control on non-financial firms’ (Rostowski, 1998). Consequently,
introduction of the German model in a situation where banks remain state-owned and a great
deal of enterprises has already been privatized would imply re-nationalization of the
economy – result neither politically, nor economically desirable (Rostowski, 1998).
An argument very much linked to the ownership structure is also proposed by Grosfeld
(1994): on the one hand, a key feature of the German system is that little information on the
enterprise value is publicly available, while banks have a privileged access to information on
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the firms’ value and liabilities; on the other hand, it is crucially important for the
restructuring of the former centrally planned economies, aiming at starting an efficient
allocation of resources, to generate adequate information on various investment opportunities
and strategies. Based on this contradiction, Grosfeld argues that if chosen in the early process
of economic transformation, the German model may hinder, rather than facilitate, the quality
of the much needed restructuring process.
One last counterargument for the introduction of the German model concerns the major aim
of the banking reforms in the post-communist economies, i.e. that banks switch from
providing ‘systematically bad’ to providing ‘systematically good’ loans (Rostowski, 1998).
Thus, the German model creates a risk that banks in the post-communist countries would
become a crossing point of various interests: governmental, political or these of large
financial-industrial groups (as in the case of Russia), which might harm the process of their
transformation into efficient institutions.
All the abovementioned arguments provide enough grounds to conclude that the German
model of universal banks is neither desirable, nor feasible in the early years of transition to
market economy characterized by state ownership and poor banking skills. Thus, in the next
section I shall further the applicability of the German system in the post-communist
economies in the later stages of transition.
III. Feasibility of the German model in the later stages of transition
What characterizes the later stage of the transition process is that banks have already
developed certain skills for medium and long-term lending; enterprises have started a more
efficient allocation of resources and some output growth has been achieved. The later also
implies growing enterprise demands for investment capital.
The relevance of the German model for the transition economies in these conditions would
depend on various considerations; for instance, one such consideration, is that in this
particular situation the German model would provide cheaper sources of long-term funds to
8
firms at the cost of more expensive external equity (Steinherr, Huveneers, 1992), as well as
that it provides cheaper capital in general. Of all such factors I will discuss two in more
details because of their key importance. These are the implemented method of privatization
and the inflationary history of the country.
The role of privatization method for the development of a certain type of banking system in
the post-communist economies could be seen in at least two directions. On the one hand,
introduction of a particular bank model might be favoured taking into consideration its
potential effects on the speed and quality of the privatization process; in this respect some
authors argue that banks of universal type lower the incentives to privatize since they are
unwilling to give up their special relationships with the SOE sector (Grosfeld, 1994). Hence,
the German-type model would slow down the speed of privatization, although it would
possibly increase its quality as ‘flotations would become harder’ (Rostowski, 1998).
At the same time, it has been argued that the type of banking model that emerged in the
transition economies was not a matter of a conscious choice of policy makers but could be
seen as a result of a number of factors, among which the chosen privatization method
together with the ownership concentration (Popov, 1999). In this respect, mass-privatization
scheme, creating a huge number of shareholders and implying widely dispersed ownership,
would facilitate the development of security markets and, thus, an Anglo-Saxon type of
banking system1. Conversely, direct sale of assets (via auctions or tenders) is much less
favourable for the development of the security markets; it creates a concentrated ownership
and hence, would facilitate emergence of banking systems of a German-type. One such
possible example is Poland, where voucher privatization has been rather modest, and banks
were given incentives to take equity in holding of firms.
Another factor of crucial importance that shaped the type of the emerging banking system in
the post-communist economies is the inflation history of the countries (Rostowski, 1998).
1
It is arguable whether this theoretical argument worked well in practice. One counterexample is the voucher
privatization scheme implemented in the Czech Republic, which created a huge number of owners and
dispersed ownership and, indeed, boosted the development of the stock market. However, through the stock
market ownership was later on re-concentrated; moreover, big bulks of shares ended up in the hands of bankmanaged financial investors.
9
The role of the inflation record could be sought in the following direction: high inflation
implies high volatility of the nominal interest rates, which, in turn, leads to an increased risk
to both creditors and debtors (regardless of the fact whether contacts are based on fixed or
non-fixed interest rates). In this situation, choice of a variable nominal interest rate would
mean a high depreciation of loans, while at the same time a fixed one would imply extremely
high volatility of the real interest rate. In consequence, one can conclude that in these
circumstances both suppliers and demanders of capital can protect themselves from interest
rate volatility by using equity rather than debt. Hence, these initial conditions provide a
strong case in favor of a model of close bank-enterprise relationships.
In the particular case of the post-communist economies a good proxy for the feasibility of the
German-type model of banking system is the ratio of bank credit to non-government sector to
GDP (Rostowski, 1998). As expected, in countries with higher inflation the general public
would minimize holdings of domestic currency, which in turn, would mean a collapse of real
credit available in the economy. This factor, among others, leads to the conclusion that
countries with low credit to non-government sector/GDP ratios cannot adopt the German
model of banking system simply because the amount of credit available to the banking
system would be far from sufficient in order to respond to the enterprises’ capital needs.
All these considerations provide a logical answer to the first main question of the paper: even
in the later stages of transition the German-type model of banks is not feasible for most of the
countries; in fact, the only countries for which the German type universal banking system
was applicable in the intermediate transition stage were the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia (Rostowski, 1998). But this does not answer the question about the situation in
Russia, which has quite often proved to be the exception of the rule. In the next section I will
focus on the pattern of banking sector development in Russia and the bank-enterprise
relationships in the first half of the 1990s, as well as on the impact of the particular banking
structure that emerged in the country on investment financing.
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IV. The case of Russia
1. General overview of the Russian banking sector
Russia started reforms in the banking sector at the end of the 1980s with the establishment of
a two-tier banking system, composed of the Central bank responsible for carrying out the
monetary policy, and five large state-owned specialized banks dealing with deposit collecting
and money lending. Most authors argue that by the end of the 1990s three major types of
banks developed in Russia: joint-venture banks, domestic commercial banks, and the sonamed ‘zero’ or ‘wildcat’ banks. The last were formed by their shareholders - in most cases
groups of public institutions and/or industrial firms (the so called Financial Industrial Groups
(FIGs) - with the major purpose to finance their own non-financial businesses. As a result of
the low capital requirements and practically nonexistent bank regulation, the number of these
new banks grew rapidly and as early as January 1, 1996, Russia had 2,598 banks2, of which
the great majority (in number) was constituted of the ‘zero’ banks.
The banking system adopted a German-type structure with banks being allowed to hold
substantial stakes in non-financial firms. At the same time, through cross-shareholdings the
Russian firms literally owned the banks they borrowed from, thus ‘giving new meaning to
the concept of ‘insider’ lending’ 3(Bernstam and Rabushka, 1998). Such lending practices
worked well because the government underwrote the implicit debt created by enterprise
banks making risky loans to themselves. In addition to this, in the early reform stage the
government-directed credits dominated money lending; thus, the banks’ main function was to
borrow money from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) at subsidized rates and then channel
the finances to designated enterprises, the last being in most cases the de facto owners of the
banks. The overall effect of this situation was, regarding the enterprise sector, that many new
enterprises were left out with extremely limited access to funds, and, concerning the bank
sector, it implied high risk exposures as banks were subject to risk both as creditors to the
2
Source: Central Bank of Russia, http://www.cbr.ru
One may argue that the banks’ holding in non-financial firms in Russia were not concentrated enough; rather it
was the case that firms owned outright the banks they borrowed from. This is one of the reasons why some
authors raise the question whether the system adopted was of a German-type at all (see e.g. Popov, 1999). I
shall briefly discuss this argument later on.
3
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industries and as shareholders in them. Moreover, there was an added source of risk to banks
since, at least theoretically, the banks bear the risk of government-directed credit to
enterprises.
In addition, the macroeconomic situation in the early 1990s was characterized by extremely
high inflation rates and thus, negative interest rates (e.g. in 1992-1993 the real interest rates
were -93%; in 1994 through early 1995 -40% before finally turning positive for time deposits
during the second half of 19954). As a result, the amount of total credit to enterprises
dramatically dropped during this period; in 1991 the share of credits to enterprises comprised
31% of GDP, while in 1995 the banking system had a book value of loans to enterprises of
$26 billion, representing 8.1% of GDP (see Appendix no 1). All these factors taken together
led to a rapid growth of overdue credit: as shown in Appendix no 2 by the end of 1995 one
third of the total bank loans were non-performing, a share amounting to almost 3% of GDP.
Equally important, long-term credits amounted to around 5% of total bank loans; in other
words, banks focused mainly on short-term money lending (which, taking into consideration
the high level of uncertainty had a relative advantage as compared to long term money
lending).
The above described characteristics of the Russian banking sector in the first half of the
1990s highlight the difficult macroeconomic situation in which a German-like model of
universal banks was introduced. And even in this initial stage, one has enough grounds to
question the feasibility of this decision, for instead of a clear inflation history – an absolutely
necessary pre-condition for the introduction of a German-type banking system, Russia had
experienced extremely high, persistent inflation rates and a great macroeconomic instability.
Moreover, some authors argue that banks shareholding in non-financial firms was rare (see
e.g. Popov, 1999) thus, it did not reach a sufficient level of concentration that would allow
the mechanism proposed by Gerschenkron to work. Introducing a German-type of banking
system in Russia, therefore, seems not to be an outcome of a well-thought strategy by the
policy makers, but unfortunately, as seen by most observers, a result of regulatory capture by
some influential private interests.
4
Source: Central Bank of Russia, http://www.cbr.ru
12
Still, many authors claim that given Russia’s background, the chosen system of close bankenterprise relationships was optimal and that banks played a major role in facilitating
investment (Perotti, Gelfer, 1998). In this respect, the next section of the paper will focus on
providing empirical evidence on the bank-enterprise relationships in Russia and on assessing
the relevance of the chosen bank model for Russia’s economy in the early transition stage. In
particular, two major questions will be raised: 1) how did the close bank-enterprise
relationship affect (if at all) the distribution of bank credit and the decisions of the
enterprises; and most importantly, 2) did this model play the role of an instrument to boost
firms’ investment as believed by Gerschenkron.
2. Empirical evidence for the bank-enterprise relationships
As already mentioned, due to various factors the Russian banking system experienced
extremely high levels of bad credits – a situation not distinctive for Russia but rather
common for most transition economies. In such circumstances, one of the most important
bank’s right as a creditor, is the right to repossess collateral in case of a debtor’s failure to
repay. However, a study on Russia’s banking sector executed by Fan, Lee and Schaffer
(1996) provides surprising results in this regard: no matter that in principle, most bank loans
in Russia are short-term and collateralized, in practice, regardless of the huge number of
cases when firms fail to duly serve the credits, banks have taken no actions towards
repossession of collateral; instead, a regular practice is capitalization of interest and
rescheduling of the principal. These findings provide strong evidence that Russian banks are
too soft in their dealings with enterprises, thus giving rise to a severe moral hazard problem
for even a healthy bank that is able to duly serve its debt would have incentives to deviate.
One possible explanation for the softness of the banking system comes from the fact that
banks are large investors in the industries they finance, i.e. that it is the implementation of a
model with tied bank-enterprise relations that is to be held responsible for the problem. In
order to further investigate the issue Fan et al. examine the bank-enterprise relationships and
the impact of these relationships on credit provision. Somewhat surprisingly, the authors find
13
no evidence that a bank shareholding in an enterprise translates to an easier access to credit,
neither do the results imply that enterprise ownership in the bank significantly affects the
easiness of obtaining a bank loan. Thus, they conclude, the results suggest the presence of
adverse selection in the Russian credit market, i.e. the problem comes from the fact that
many badly-performing firms are borrowers.
Another direction of thought, suggests that it is possible that bank-enterprise links are such
that banks’ rights regarding Russian industrial firms are much more protected in their
capacity as shareholders rather than as creditors. Findings of Fan et al. with respect to this
hypothesis suggest that banks’ shareholding in enterprises is a good indicator of bank
influence on enterprise decisions as significantly higher fraction of enterprises with some
bank shareholding indicates the shareholding bank influences their decisions (especially with
respect to financial matters), as compared to enterprises with no equity shareholding by
banks. Thus, evidence confirms the notion that, in general, banks as creditors have much too
little influence on enterprises; however, they do have a strong impact on the financial
decisions of firms they own shares in.
Regarding the second question of interest, I will first focus on the empirical work of Perotti
and Gelfer (1998), who study the role Russian FIGs play for firms’ corporate governance and
investment. Comparing firms members of the Russian FIGs and/or owned by banks on the
one hand, and a control group of independent firms on the other, the authors find evidence
that investment is sensitive to internal liquidity (measured as cash flow) for the second type
of firms, while the group-firms are less dependant on internal funds to finance investment
expenditures. The possible interpretation of this finding could be sought in two directions:
one feasible view suggests that FIG firms do a better reallocation of resources within the
group through their internal capital markets in order to finance profitable projects;
alternatively, one may argue that rather than providing entrepreneurial expertise and capital,
FIGs reallocate finances among the member-enterprises in order to serve private benefits of
the controlling shareholders, in other words, well-performing, profitable enterprises are used
as ‘cash cows’.
14
In order to test these opposing hypotheses, Perotti and Gelfer compare the quality of
investment in FIGs and bank-owned firms and individual firms via using a basic regression
of individual firms’ investment on a proxy for Tobin’s Q (Q being a sufficient a sufficient
statistic for investment). Furthermore, following Johnson (1997) the authors distinguish
between bank-led groups and industry-centered groups in view of their structural differences,
and presumably the different type of behavour of these groups. The results confirm the high
degree of redistribution of financial resources among the group, but at the same time the
authors still interpret them more as a proof the positive role played by the bank-led FinancialIndustry Groups in terms of influencing the quality of investment (since investment decision
is much more driven by the expected profitability of investment and not that much by the
availability of internal funds), while they refrain from giving a definitive answer about the
extent to which redistribution was driven by private benefits.
Hence, the empirical evidence provides no clear view on the role played by the bank- and
industry-based groups in Russia; still, most economists continue to believe that in the end,
the banking structure in Russia allowed banks to simply redistribute financial resources: from
the CBR to favored industries, as well as, within the groups from one firm to another, this
way serving mostly private benefits (see e.g. Perotti, 1998). Of course, there is no doubt that
these groups to a certain extent facilitated investment and provided corporate governance,
thereby playing an important role in Russia’s economic development, but this role was rather
controversial. Moreover, the difficulty in assessing the true role played by the close bankenterprise links based on the empirical evidence provided comes especially from the fact that
the German-type model of universal banks did not bring observable economic improvement
of the Russian economic performance, neither did it lead to any improvement in the living
standard.
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Conclusions
The main conclusion that could be derived from this study is that the applicability of the
German-type model of universal banks crucially depends on the presence of certain preconditions, probably the most import of which are macroeconomic stability and low inflation
rates. It also calls for policy makers to carefully analyze all the possible impacts of the
introduction of such a model in important aspects of the reforms like privatization and
enterprise restructuring. And, while most transition countries started their banking sector
restructuring rather cautiously via introducing numerous restrictive bank regulations and
gradual liberalization, Russia literally ‘jumped’ into universal-type of banking system.
Moreover, this happened in a situation characterized by extremely high levels of inflation and
macroeconomic instability. Introducing a German-type of banking system in a situation
which implied infeasibility of this model had considerable implications both for the banking
systems and the enterprise sector, leading to rather contradictory results in terms of
investment and growth. The introduction of the German model in the post-communist
economies before the establishment of all the necessary conditions can, therefore, be
summarized using the words of Enrico Perotti to characterise Russia’s banking sector as an
‘[…] attempt to leapfrog the intermediate stages of financial development […]’.
16
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E. and Gelfer, S., 1998, ‘Investment Financing in
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Central Bank of Russia, http://www.cbr.ru
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