One
PUBLIC POLICY DISCOURSE ON PEACE
William C. Gay
1. Discourse on Peace in Public Policy Forum
Can peace be an issue for public policy? For democratic societies, this
question may seem rhetorical, since contemporary democratic states stipulate
that citizens, or at least their representatives, give consent before war is waged.
As far back as 1795, Immanuel Kant contended that whenever the consent of
citizens is not necessary for waging war, genuine peace is not possible and, for
this reason, supported constitutional, representational government. i However,
because debate on whether to wage war is an issue for public policy in a
constitutional, representative government does not mean that discussion of
whether to pursue genuine peace will be an issue for public policy. Moreover,
the structure of public policy discourse may itself thwart pursuit of genuine
peace. While I believe that genuine peace, what many call “positive peace,”
can be pursued within the public policy forum, I also believe that discourse is
generally distorted.
Public policy occurs as a specific form of discourse, one forged
within the political sphere. Public policy discourse comprises a distinct type of
discourse that is governed by specific norms. Some philosophers, building on
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, see such discourse as a distinct language
game.ii Going further, sociolinguist Pierre Bourdieu has shown that discourse
is inseparable from the distribution of power in society. iii (This insight is
becoming common in treatments of language and politics.iv) In my work, I
stress how the dimension of power within discourse is manifest in various
forms of linguistic alienation and linguistic violence. v In this chapter, I focus
more narrowly on public policy discourse. My thesis is that relations of power,
even within democracies, structure public policy discourse in ways that
disadvantage peace activists.
In the following sections, I discuss three obstacles that must be faced
in efforts to infuse the language of positive peace into public policy discourse.
First, I address how the pervasiveness of the war myth often rules out serious
consideration of peace in the public policy forum. Second, I note ways in
which, when peace is addressed in the public policy forum, the language of
negative peace is more privileged than the language of positive peace. Third, I
comment on problems that delegation causes for peace advocates, namely,
ways in which spokespersons for peace groups are frequently linguistically
alienated from the public policy establishment and even from their
constituents. Finally, I suggest that, despite these obstacles, some encouraging
prospects exist for advancing positive peace within the public policy forum.
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Public Policy Discourse on Peace
Before turning to the effects of the war myth, I acknowledge that,
despite the importance of advancing peace within discussions of public policy,
the primary vehicle for shaping public opinion is the news media. Three main
theories of communication show some of the ways in which the news media
shape public opinion.
(1) Cultivation theory, which investigates factors that shape public
beliefs and values, has found that mainstream social values in the United
States do not arise from the masses; instead, they are cultivated through
repeated exposure to ideologically consistent messages. Exposure to the news
media, which is widespread and regular, largely absorbs or overrides
differences in perspectives among viewers, creating a homogenized view of
the world that downplays more diverse viewpoints. vi
(2) Agenda setting, which addresses what the public regards as important
and how the public understands the world, has established that most people
turn to news sources for their information and that the news that gets covered
is controlled by a small, but powerful, group of “gatekeepers.” This research
has shown that newspaper editors, station managers, news directors, and
individual reporters, themselves products of their culture, nonetheless decide
what stories get covered.vii
(3) Parasocial interaction, which focuses on how authorities connect to
those who rely on them, has shown that authorities enhance their influence
when the public regards them as a members of their peer group. In this regard,
anchors in broadcast news have this prospect to a much greater degree than
public policy analysts.viii Nevertheless, insofar as we are interested in depth
and cogency of analysis, the public policy forum provides a more appropriate,
if less influential, mechanism for forging informed positions among the public.
2. War Myth and the Language of War
Duane Cady coined the term “warism” to refer to the way in which within
almost all societies war is taken for granted. ix Connecting Cady’s observations
with the treatment of myth developed by Roland Barthes, I characterize
warism as a myth that asserts as fact and without explanation that war is
natural. In Mythologies, Barthes presents myth as depoliticized speech and
asserts:
myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about
them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a
natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that
of an explanation but that of a statement of fact. x
While the account that Barthes gives is similar to the one provided by Cady, it
stresses how myths present phenomena as natural and sever them from their
history, specifically from the political forces that shaped this history. When
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3
war is understood as part of our nature, rather than our history, the war myth,
in the terms of Barthes, provides us with “the simplicity of essences” and “a
blissful clarity” that masks the complexities of our past and alternatives for our
future.xi
If myth is depoliticized speech, then the priority of the political
dimension of human existence needs to be recognized. This point is made
explicitly by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi when he says, “No real operation on
language can be only linguistic. To operate on language, one has to operate on
society. Here as everywhere else, politics comes first.” xii The way in which
myths work against recognition of the priority of the political strikes me as the
point behind Fredric Jameson’s discussion of the political unconscious. xiii He
suggests that, in order to advance social goals, we need to expose the political
dimension that so often lies beneath the surface of discourse. This political
dimension needs to be retrieved if we are to recognize that the power relations
legitimated by, yet masked in, myth can be challenged and political structures
that correspond more closely to broadly shared values can be constructed.
One of the dangers is that myth can pass as “common sense.”
Drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas,
Norman Fairclough asserts that commonsensical assumptions are ideologies
and that language is the form of social behavior in which we most rely on
commonsensical or ideological assumptions.xiv Reaching the same conclusion
as did V. N. Volosinov much earlier in this century, xv Fairclough contends “the
ideological nature of language should be one of the major themes of modern
social science.”xvi From his study of language, he concludes that a dominant
discourse which largely suppresses dominated discourses ceases to be seen as
arbitrary and comes to be regarded as natural and legitimate. He terms this
process “the naturalization of a discourse type.”xvii Bourdieu suggests that:
any attempt to institute a new division must reckon with the resistance of
those who, occupying a dominant position in the spaces thus divided,
have an interest in perpetuating a toxic relation to the social world which
leads to the acceptance of established divisions as natural or to their
symbolic denial through the affirmation of a higher unity . . . . xviii
I make these points about myth in order to stress the need to repoliticize
public policy discourse, especially when it concerns issues of peace. Since
societies generally take war for granted, the assumption of the language of war
as natural poses the greatest obstacle to peace. Societies have created a warist
discourse that deals abstractly and indirectly with the horrors of war.xix The
public who hear or read warist discourse and even the officials who
promulgate this discourse may not realize what is really occurring, let alone
question whether there might be an alternative. The language of the military
establishment, such as the U.S. department of defense, if not also the language
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Public Policy Discourse on Peace
of the diplomatic corps, such as the U.S. department of state, exemplifies the
primacy of warist language.xx
Endeavors to establish a legitimate discourse about war, to propound
an acceptable theory of war, have been ongoing. From Sun Tzu’s The Art of
War in ancient China to Carl von Clausewitz’s On War in nineteenth century
Europe, the public policy debate has not been on whether war is moral or
whether it should be waged, but how to wage war effectively. xxi While the
advent of nuclear weapons may have led strategists to pull back from the
concept of “total war” in favor of a concept of “limited war,” it has prompted
them to make a genuine call for an “end of war.” xxii
The language of war moves from the use of euphemisms that mask
the horror of war through the use of propaganda that demonizes the enemy and
legitimates violence against them.xxiii At the level of euphemism, an aggressive
attack by a squadron of airplanes which ordinarily would be called an “air
raid” may be referred to as a “routine limited duration protective reaction,” or
defoliation of an entire forest may be spoken of as a “resource control
program.” A more stark example of euphemism is found when the term
“pacification” is used to label actions which involve entering a village,
machine-gunning domesticated animals, setting huts on fire, rounding up all
the men and shooting those who resist, prodding and otherwise harming the
elderly, women, and children.
At the next level, the language of war moves from euphemism to
propaganda designed to legitimate this violence. For example, in times of war,
each nation involved typically presents its adversary as an evil enemy and
itself as the embodiment of good. Such distortion of language was used to
defend British rule in India, Soviet purges, and the United States’ atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; in these cases, officials resorted to
arguments which contradicted the purported aims and values of their
governments. Over the last several decades governments and subnational
groups have turned to “totalitarian language” in their efforts to “win” the
hearts and minds of the masses in support of their political agendas, though,
fortunately, such efforts have had only limited success in achieving the goal of
thought control.xxiv
3. Language of Negative Peace in Public Policy Discourse
I turn to the next challenge for those who wish to influence public policy
discourse about peace. The language of peace is an important component in
the pursuit of peace and justice. The language of peace, like the condition of
peace, can be negative or positive. The challenge posed is well-known to
peace activists: contentment with negative peace can thwart pursuit of positive
peace. In relation to discourse, the language of negative peace is generally
privileged within public policy discussions. In commenting on the distinction
between the language of negative peace and the language of positive peace, I
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5
focus on how the structures and rules of public policy discourse provide
greater linguistic capital to speakers of the language of negative peace, but I
also address the requirements for a language of positive peace.
The elimination of the language of war may do little to advance the
cause of peace. For example, a government and its media may cease referring
to a particular nation as “the enemy” or “the devil,” but private and even
public attitudes may continue to foster the same, though now unspoken,
prejudice. Just as legal or social sanctions against hate speech may be needed
to stop linguistic attacks in the public arena in order to stop current armed
conflict, there may be a need for an official peace treaty and a cessation in
hostile name calling directed against an adversary of the state. Just as arms that
have been laid down can readily be taken up again, even so those who bit their
tongues to comply with the demands of political correctness are often ready to
lash out vitriolic epithets when these constraints are removed. In the language
of negative peace, the absence of verbal assaults about “the enemy” merely
masks the lull in reliance on warist discourse. xxv
Often, members of the public take idealistic stands that lack solid
grounding in a factual understanding of security issues. Consequently, many
professionals within the public policy establishment grant rather limited value
to public opinion. Robert Bell observes that while those who have spent their
lives mastering the various policy alternatives are more sophisticated, policy
makers “have to reckon with the limited rationality of public discussion.” xxvi
The issue, for him, is how to respond to a public that may not be “receptive to
rational policy analysis.”xxvii To assume that public policy professionals are
more rational, just because they are better informed, is fallacious. Bell reveals
how public values are often of peripheral importance to those charged with
implementing policies:
OMB is in the business of reexamining and reformulating the purposes of
government programs. It is the duty of OMB examiners to refuse to take
public formulations of needs as given. OMB instead strains toward
policy principles that are more abstract than the needs felt by special
interests . . . . To perform these functions, OMB of course makes use of
public finance theory, which, in turn, actively resists the way issues are
ordinarily discussed in public and substitutes a disciplined approach
characteristic of a particular professional group.xxviii
In his essay “Public and Private Choice,” R. Paul Churchill makes
several points that are relevant to this discussion. He argues for an approach to
public policy that takes into account “public choices that represent the
expression of social values which play a central role in the definition, by
people, of their community or society, and in the formation of their collective
purposes and conceptions of meaningful life.” xxix Churchill argues that the
effort to “maximize the preference-satisfaction of individuals,” and I would
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Public Policy Discourse on Peace
add the aim to follow the “rational policy analysis” of bureaucratic experts,
inappropriately relegates the consideration of values to the private sphere.
Churchill concludes that in order for public policy to formulate and debate
social values, “we need to develop what Jürgen Habermas called our
‘communicative-moral rationality’ and to remember that the ‘instrumental
rationality’ of policy analysis is only the means by which to attain the ends we
ought to seek.”xxx
From the perspective of Mohandas K. Gandhi, much public policy
discourse, in searching for an efficient means, quickly reduces itself to the type
of instrumental rationality criticized by Churchill. xxxi The nature of the
language of negative peace becomes clear when, within social movements
facing frustration in the pursuit of their political goals, a division occurs
between those ready to abandon nonviolence and those resolute in their
commitment to it. Such a commitment to nonviolence is manifested in the
discourse and not just the actions of nonviolentists, such as, Martin Luther
King, Jr., Vaclav Havel, and Nelson Mandela.
The language of positive peace facilitates and reflects the move from
a lull in the occurrence of violence to its replacement with justice. Since the
language of negative peace perpetuates structural injustice, establishment of
the language of positive peace requires a transformation of cultures oriented to
war. The language of positive peace has a variety of correlative nonviolent
actions by means of which to continue politics nonviolently––by more
intensive means of diplomacy, rather than turning to war, which Clausewitz
defined as the pursuit of “politics by other means.” Peace making and its
discourse are a continuation of politics by the same means. xxxii I return to some
of these points about the language of positive peace in my conclusion.
4. Delegation and Linguistic Alienation
The third and less well-known challenge for those who wish to influence
public policy discourse about peace concerns problems associated with
delegation. For a peace movement to have public policy sway, it must put
forward spokespersons who will face dual linguistic alienation. xxxiii They must
contend with linguistic alienation from the terminology of the public policy
establishment, they face the prospect of linguistic alienation of their
constituents in the process of delegation.
Bourdieu has analyzed the problems involved in bringing alternative
social values to public attention. In order to challenge the dominant discourse,
a social group needs to be heard. Their messages may be understood, but that
is not the point. Their messages need legitimacy. For a message to have
authority, it needs to be spoken or written by someone with authority, someone
with a title who represents a constituency. A representative or delegate is
needed. As Bourdieu says, “Individuals . . . cannot constitute themselves (or
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be constituted) as a group, that is as a force capable of making itself heard . . .
unless they dispossess themselves in favor of a spokesperson.” xxxiv
Although the group puts forth the delegate to represent its interests,
the delegate, by representing the group, gives the group a status that it
previously did not possess. Imagine a mob at the doors of government,
clamoring for an audience. The “natural” question is “Who speaks for you?”
The delegate, not the social group, enters the halls of government. The
delegate has voice but is literally separated from the group. Real alienation is
only about to begin.
The spokesperson, as an outsider to the public policy sphere,
experiences linguistic alienation. This linguistic alienation goes beyond a
fundamental difference in values. Although the spokesperson speaks the same
language, some terms have different meanings and many terms are completely
outside the prior, non-technical lexicon of the spokesperson. Until the
spokesperson becomes fluent in the “linguistic coin of the realm,” namely, the
technical terminology in vogue among the public policy elite, the
spokesperson’s effectiveness on behalf of the group is limited. In speaking the
official or dominant discourse, part of the message of the delegate is coopted.
In learning the technical terminology of the public policy
establishment, the spokesperson overcomes linguistic alienation from this type
of discourse only to face the prospect of linguistic alienation from the people
the spokesperson is trying to represent. Progress made within official circles is
hard to “translate” back into the vernacular of the social group being
represented.xxxv The delegate can begin to sound even more like a member of
the establishment. As Bourdieu observes, “Usurpation already exists
potentially in delegation.”xxxvi Delegates can conflate what is good for them
with what is good for the group. At this point, the delegate has succumbed to
the power of delegation. The delegate may be able to perform various feats of
“social magic” that bring status and resources to the group, but the delegate
may have become as much, if not more, a functionary of the apparatus as a
genuine representative of the group.
A distinction can be made between spokespersons who arise from the
ranks of grassroots movements and representatives from the ranks of experts
within the establishment who “go over” to the side of the people. In recent
times many of the leading anti-nuclear activists formerly held governmental,
military, or civilian positions in which they worked as nuclear planners. This
group of highly trained and formerly powerful individuals represents a very
small minority among the voices who speak with technical proficiency about
nuclear issues. The vast majority of “experts” remain pro-nuclear.
The few who have “defected” to the side of the people, such as many of
the members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, have not been alienated
from the technical jargon of the nuclear establishment, but they have not
escaped the dangers that face the “outsiders” from the ranks of grassroots
movements who become spokespersons for their groups. For both defectors
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Public Policy Discourse on Peace
and outsiders, the basic task remains of trying to decipher and demystify the
codes of warist discourse for the average citizen. In this move to the general
citizenry, both groups of spokespersons face the prospect that their discourse,
if it remains too technical, will continue to cause linguistic alienation.
A look needs to be taken at the delegates of a social group and at the
name of the social group that a delegate represents. Bourdieu observes:
The name of groups, especially professional groups, records a particular
state of struggles and negotiations over the official designations and the
material and symbolic advantages associated with them . . . . The
professional name . . . is a distinctive mark . . . which takes its value from
its position in a hierarchically organized system of titles. xxxvii
Just as a delegate brings a social group to life, the group comes into existence
by a name that situates it politically and historically in relation to other groups.
Its significance is much like that of a linguistic sign, determined by others in
relation to which it stands in opposition. Changes in names of peace groups,
perhaps much more than changes in their delegates, mark historical stages in
their quest for legitimacy and influence.
While these issues surrounding delegation cannot be eliminated,
recognition of them can mitigate against the adverse effects of linguistic
alienation and possibly can significantly reduce the prospects for usurpation.
In order for peace groups to advance their goals, they have no other choice but
to face these risks. As Bourdieu notes, “One must always risk political
alienation in order to escape from political alienation.”xxxviii
5. Public Policy Discourse Fostering Positive Peace
The fact that words and language games, even forms of life, are conventional
means a natural basis exists for their maintenance does not exist. New
conventions can be adopted. From individual words to entire forms of life, we
can make changes which serve broader and loftier interests than current
conventions. A peace movement can make an important contribution toward
the shifting of public policy discourse toward social values that denaturalize
the war myth and repoliticize the quest for peace and justice.
In Peace Politics, Paul Joseph observes:
Peace Movements are expressions of hope. People give their time,
money, talent, and energy against what appear to be overwhelming odds.
By almost any measure, the resources of a peace movement are far less
than the political, economic, and symbolic assets possessed by the
national government. And yet a vision of peace remains. Governments
cloak themselves in national glory, national duty, and the national
interest. Citizens are sometimes swayed by these appeals. But many are
Public Policy Discourse on Peace
9
also moved by the images of children sacrificed for no apparent gain,
economic destruction for no possible good, and the perpetuation of
international violence as a totally illegitimate method to solve
problems.xxxix
Joseph stresses that a peace movement should not be judged by narrow
criteria of whether it was successful in the legislative initiatives it sought to
stop and the ones it sought to pass. If the scorecard were based on such
criteria, many peace movements would have to be judged as not being
successful. In a more general way, Joseph notes that the peace movement in
the peace movement in the United States contributed to ending the cold war. xl
Maybe a peace movement may make its greatest contributions to change in
other forums than that of public policy per se. It may be its passionate
proclamations, its massive marches, and its peaceful protests that attract the
attention of the media gatekeepers. These efforts play a role in shaping the
social values that inform public policy.
In challenging dominant discourse, social groups are engaged in what
Bourdieu terms “heretical subversion.” By linguistically challenging the
established order, heretical discourse seizes on “the possibility of changing the
social world by changing the representation of this world.” xli The practice of
heretical subversion is similar to what Richard Rorty means by abnormal or
edifying discourse.xlii Heretical subversion exposes the system of
representations as non-natural, arbitrary conventions like Foucault’s epistemes
and is able to “contribute practically to the reality of what it announces by the
fact of uttering it . . . of making it conceivable and above all credible.”xliii
According to Bourdieu, when social groups engage in heretical
subversion in an informed manner, they can find:
in the knowledge of the probable, not an incitement to fatalistic
resignation or irresponsible utopianism, but the foundations for a
rejection of the probable based on the scientific mastery of the laws of
production governing the eventuality rejected.xliv
In simpler terms, Bourdieu suggests that we need not give into “fatalistic
resignation;” linguistic change that can further the cause of positive peace is
not an “irresponsible utopianism.”
Many times the first step in reducing linguistic violence is to refrain
from the use of offensive and oppressive terms. Just because linguistic
violence is not being used, a genuinely pacific discourse is not necessarily
present. The pacific discourse that is analogous to negative peace can
perpetuate injustice.xlv For instance, broadcasters in local and national news
may altogether avoid using terms like “dyke” or “fag” or even “homosexual,”
but they and their audiences can remain homophobic even when the language
of lesbian and gay pride is used in broadcasting and other public forums.
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Public Policy Discourse on Peace
Governmental officials may cease referring to a rival nation as “a rogue state,”
but public and private attitudes may continue to foster prejudice toward this
nation and its inhabitants. When prejudices remain unspoken, at least in public
forums, their detection and eradication are made even more difficult. The
merely public or merely formal repression of language and behavior that
express these attitudes builds up pressure that can erupt in subsequent
outbursts of linguistic violence and physical violence.
The language of positive peace facilitates and reflects the move from
a lull in the occurrence of violence to its negation. The establishment of a
language of positive peace requires a transformation of cultures oriented to
war. The discourse of positive peace, to be successful, must include a genuine
affirmation of diversity both domestically and internationally. The effort to
establish the language of positive peace requires the creation of a critical
vernacular, a language of empowerment that is inclusive of and understood by
the vast array of citizens.
Several attempts have been made to spread the use of nonviolent
discourse throughout the culture.xlvi The Quakers’ “Alternatives to Violence”
project teaches linguistic tactics that facilitate the nonviolent resolution of
conflict. Following initial endeavors at teaching these skills to prisoners, this
project has been extended to other areas. Related practices are found in peer
mediation and approaches to therapy which instruct participants in nonviolent
conflict strategies. Educational institutions are giving increased attention to
Gandhi in order to convey nonviolent tactics as an alternative to reliance on
the language and techniques of the military and to multiculturalism as a means
of promoting an appreciation of diversity that diminishes the language and
practice of bigotry and ethnocentrism.
At an international level, UNESCO’s “Culture of Peace” project seeks to
compile information on peaceful cultures. Even though most of these cultures
are pre-industrial, their practices illustrate conditions that promote peaceful
conflict resolution. This project, which initially assisted war-torn countries in
the effort to rebuild (or build) a civic culture, can be applied more broadly.
The language of positive peace is quite compatible with the
democratic spirit and is diametrically opposed to authoritarian traditions. Since
the language of positive peace resists monologue and encourages dialogue, it
fosters an approach to public policy debate that is receptive rather than
aggressive and meditative rather than calculative. The language of positive
peace is not passive in the sense of avoiding engagement; it is pacific in the
sense of seeking to actively build lasting peace and justice. In this sense, while
the language and practice of positive peace facilitates the continuation of
politics rather than its abandonment, it also elevates diplomacy to an aim for
cooperation and consensus rather than competition and compromise. The
language of positive peace provides a way of perceiving and communicating
that frees us to the diversity and open-endedness of life rather than the
sameness and finality of death that results when diplomacy fails and war
Public Policy Discourse on Peace
11
ensues. The language of positive peace, by providing an alternative to the
language of war and the language of negative peace, can introduce into public
policy discourse shared social values that express the goals of a fully
politicized and enfranchised humanity.
NOTES
1. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1983), p. 113.
2. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, “Wittgenstein: Old and New,” Semiotics Unfolding, ed. Tasso Borbé (Berlin: Mouton, 1984),
vol. 1, pp. 327–344; Ranjit Chatterjee, “Rossi-Landi’s Wittgenstein: ‘A Philosopher’s Meaning Is His Use in the Culture,’”
Semiotica, 84:3/4 (1991), pp. 275–283; and William C. Gay, “From Wittgenstein to Applied Philosophy,” The International
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 9:1 (Summer/Fall 1994), pp. 15–20.
3. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson
(Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). See also William C. Gay, “Bourdieu and the Social Conditions of
Wittgensteinian Language Games,” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11:1 (Summer/Fall 1996), pp. 15–21.
4. See Fred R. Dallmayr, Language and Politics; Why Does Language Matter to Political Philosophy? (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Language and Power, ed. Cheris Kramarae, Muriel Schulz, and William M. O’Barr
(Beverly Hills. Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1984); Michael J. Shapiro, Language and Politics (New York: New York
University Press, 1984); and John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California
Press, 1984).
5. See William C. Gay, “Exposing and Overcoming Linguistic Alienation and Linguistic Violence,” Philosophy and
Social Criticism, 23:2/3 (Spring 1998), pp. 137–156; and William C. Gay, “Linguistic Violence,” Institutional Violence, ed.
Robert Litke and Deane Curtin (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 1999), pp. 15–34.
6. George Gerbner, Larry Gross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorelli, “Growing Up with Television: The Cultivation
Perspective,” Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research, ed. Jennings Bryan and Dolf Zillmann (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1994), p. 27.
7. Maxwell McCombs, “News Influence on Our Pictures of the World,” Media Effects, ed. Bryan and Zillmann, pp. 12–
13.
8. Dominick A. Infante, Andrew S. Rancer, and Deanna F. Womack, Building Communication Theory (Prospect Heights,
Ill.: Waveland Press, 3rd ed., 1997), pp. 370–372.
9. Duane Cady, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), pp. 3–19.
10. Roland Barthes, Mythologies, ed. and trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 143.
11. Ibid.
12. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, “Ideas for the Study of Linguistic Alienation,” Social Praxis, 3:1/2 (1975), p. 90.
13. Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1981), esp. pp. 17–20, 283–284.
14. Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (London: Longman Books, 1989), p. 2.
15. V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik (New York:
Seminar Press, 1973).
16. Fairclough, Language and Power, p.3.
17. Ibid., p. 91.
18. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 128.
19. See William C. Gay, “The Language of War and Peace,” Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, ed. Lester
Kurtz (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 303–312.
20. See William C. Gay, “Star Wars and the Language of Defense,” in Just War, Nonviolence, and Nuclear Deterrence:
Philosophers on War and Peace, ed, Duane Cady and Richard Werner (Wakefield, N.H.: Longwood Academic Press, 1991), pp.
245–264.
21. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
22. See William C. Gay and Michael Pearson, The Nuclear Arms Race (Chicago: The American Library Association,
1987), pp. 70–71, 163–164.
23. Gay, “The Language of War and Peace,” pp. 307–309.
24. See John Wesley Young, Totalitarian Language: Orwell’s Newspeak and Its Nazi and Communist Antecedents
(Charlottesville, Vir.: University Press of Virginia, 1991).
25. See William C. Gay, “Nonsexist Public Discourse and Negative Peace: The Injustice of Merely Formal
Transformation,” The Acorn: Journal of the Gandhi-King Society, 9:1 (Spring 1997), pp. 45–53.
26. Robert Bell, The Culture of Policy Deliberations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1985), p. 114.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 122.
29. R. Paul Churchill, “Public and Private Choice: A Philosophical Analysis,” The Moral Dimensions of Public Policy
Choice: Beyond the Market Paradigm, ed. John Martin Gillroy and Maurice Wade (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1992), p. 341.
30. Ibid., p. 350–351.
Public Policy Discourse on Peace
13
31. H. J. Horsburgh, “The Distinctiveness of Satyagraha,” Philosophy East and West, 19:2 (April 1969), pp. 171–80.
32. See William C. Gay, “The Prospect for a Nonviolent Model of National Security,” On the Eve of the 21st Century:
Perspectives of Russian and American Philosophers, ed. William Gay and T. A. Alekseeva (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield, Inc., 1994), pp. 119–134.
33. See William C. Gay, “Nuclear Discourse and Linguistic Alienation,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 18:2 (Summer
1987), pp. 42–49.
34. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 204.
35. See Henry A. Giroux and Peter McLaren, “Teacher Education as a Counterpublic Sphere,” Philosophy and Social
Criticism, 12 (1987), pp. 51–69.
36. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 209.
37. Ibid., p. 240.
38. Ibid., p. 204.
39. Paul Joseph, Peace Politics: The United States between the Old and New World Orders (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1993), p. 140.
40. Ibid.
41. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 128.
42. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 360,
365–366.
43. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 128.
44. Ibid., p. 136.
45. William C. Gay, “The Practice of Linguistic Nonviolence,” Peace Review, 10:4 (1998), pp. 545–546.
46. Gay, “The Language of War and Peace,” p. 311.