DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
GOLDEN JUBILEE COLLOQUIUM, 1-2 MARCH 2007
THEME: GHANA AT FIFTY: GOVERNMENT, POLITICS
AND DEVELOPMENT
CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RULE IN GHANA
Alexander K. D. Frempong
kaadupong2002@yahoo.co.uk
INTRODUCTION
A constitution enjoys a special place in the life of any nation; a fact which makes
constitution-making and constitutional practice a useful starting point of analyzing
the government, politics and development of any state. A constitution regulates not
only the exercise of political power, but also the relationship between political
entities and between the state and citizens. Being the supreme law, it helps to shape
the organization and development of society both for the present and future
generations, and sets objective standards upon which the people and the
international community can judge government performance. Further, a
constitution sets out the rights and duties of the citizens, and provides mechanisms
to enable them to protect their interests. Overall, a constitution can contribute to the
development of a politically active civil society as well as promoting good
governance, accountability and the rule of law (Hatchard 1998: 381).
Constitution-making, then, offers a unique practical opportunity for the democratic
participation of different political, economic and social interests in an important
national project. The way a constitution is crafted can secure essential political
1
compromises between opposing political interests, eliminate mutual suspicions and
instill confidence in each other (Jonah 1991: 77). Simply put, constitution-making
entails consensus building; and if handled with care and tact, the process can result
in a constitution that every citizen can defend with pride. In practice however, there
has always been the tendency on the part of the powers that be to attempt by subtle
and sometimes overt means to exclude their political opponents from full and
effective participation in the constitution-making process, with all the attendant
acrimony.
Ghanaians (Gold Coasters) had the benefit of participating in constitution-making
for nearly a decade before the 1957 Constitution which granted independence.
However, in the discussion about constitutional development throughout the 19471956 period, neither the public nor the political leaders had any genuine choice as
to structure and contents of the final document (Hatchard 1998: 381) Newly
independent Ghana, then, started life with the Westminster model constitution
bestowed on it by the British colonial power.
In 1960, Ghana witnessed another constitution-making exercise which introduced a
constitution designed largely to enhance executive power, remove checks and
balances, and undermine the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms (Ibid:
381). Subsequently, Ghana’s constitutional history was seriously affected by the
many intrusions of the military into politics in the 1966-1992 period. In addition,
Ghana has also run a whole gamut of systems of government - parliamentary,
presidential and hybrid; single party as well as multiparty.
What accounted for the quick succession and varied nature of constitutions in
Ghana over the last fifty years? How inclusive have the various constitution-making
processes been? To what extent has the manner of constitution-making impacted on
the practice of constitutional rule in Ghana? To what extent have changes in
constitutional arrangements affected politics in Ghana? What has sustained the
current constitutional dispensation in spite of the initial hiccups?
This work examines these trajectories of constitution-making and constitutional
practice in Ghana over the half-century since independence. Against the background
2
of a historical sketch of the pre-independence era, we give an overview of Ghana’s
constitutional development with special emphasis on the nature and dynamics of
the various constitution-drafting processes; essential features of the various
constitutions, and how they fared in practice. We conclude distilling lessons for the
future.
CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING
Duchacek has argued that constitutions are not only frames of government but also
"power maps"; they reflect the realities of the distribution of political power in a
polity; as well, they reflect explicitly or implicitly, the moral principles underlying
polities or regimes. Therefore, a constitution which does not sufficiently reflect and
accommodate socio-economic power realities remains a dead letter (Duchacek
1973). In most of post independence Africa, however, constitutions have often
created or sanctioned elaborate bureaucratic, legislative, executive and judicial and
structures that assumed levels of mass literacy, communication, cultural
homogeneity and national identification that did not exist at the time, rendering the
constitutions themselves irrelevant and meaningless to the bulk of the citizenry and
undermining stability (Owusu 1979: 94).
As a result, constitutions in Africa have frequently been abolished and rewritten, or
suspended, as military alternated with civilian rule with virtually every new
leadership pushing for a new political process (Ibid: 93). Interestingly, while on the
surface there is an apparently frequent change of documents, there exists
substantial continuity in their contents. While each constitution is presented as new
with specifics to reflect each new regime, there is usually great continuity of basic
articles from one document to the next (Ostrom 1980; 1987).
Constitution-Making and Constituent Assemblies
Constitution-making, ultimately, involves choices; not only what is chosen but who
does the choosing, and how (Ostrom 1980; 1987). These choices however are made
under constraints; for the conditions that induce constitution-making are
characterized by crisis1 (Elster 1995: 365 370-71). Constitution-making therefore
entails some paradoxes. First, given the intrinsic importance of constitutions,
3
crafting them require maximally calm and undisturbed conditions and procedures
based on rational and impartial argument, yet the call for a new constitution usually
arises in turbulent circumstances which tend to foster passion rather than reason
(Ibid: 394). Second, being written for the indefinite future, constitution-makers
legislate for future generations who have no representatives in the assembly. It thus
becomes part of task of the drafters, who have their own interests, passions and
prejudices, to look beyond their own horizon and their own interests (Ibid).
In a similar vein, two conflicting schools of thought exist on the role of constituent
assemblies. The first, the ‘idealized’ or ‘statesman’ school postulates that
constitution-makers should act as impartial law givers above the normal political
struggles, abstractly considering issues of constitution-making with the aim of
creating an ‘ideal’ document attuned to the needs of the state for which it is being
devised (Swanson, Kelleher & English 1972: 184). According to this view, the
constituent assembly should be created on the basis of rational disinterested
choice.2 The process and overall operation of the assembly are to be viewed as quite
separate from the normal functioning of the state political system; to be apart from
normal legislative politics (Swanson, Kelleher & English 1972: 184-185; Carrol &
English 1985: 593).
On the contrary, the ‘legislative’ or ‘realistic’ model argues that constitution-making
is very much a creature of the times and is not likely to rise above the prevailing
political partisan levels nor escape the established patterns of political leadership.
Constitution-making, though not a frequent phenomenon, is still an integral part of
the political process. This school further argues that constitution-making bodies are
more accurately described as mere extensions of normal legislative politics;
delegates come to the assembly wedded to distinct sets of interests they wish to see
reflected in the new/revised constitution. Thus, rather than acting as disinterested
and independent servants of general interest, the constitution-maker functions as a
representative of a constituency, party or interest group that in one way or another
supported his election and from whom the political process dictates that he will
accept some cues (Ibid). Which of these conflicting role expectations more
4
accurately describe the way in which constitution-makers have done their jobs in
Ghana over the last fifty years?
Constituent assemblies face further constraints; those imposed before an assembly
starts to deliberate and those towards the end. The former arise from the
institution/individual that takes the decision to convene the constituent assembly
and the institutional mechanism that selects delegates to the assembly. The latter
constraints are linked to the group that would ratify the constitution. For example, if
the framers know that the document they produce will have to be ratified by
another body, knowledge of the preferences of that body will act as constraints on
what they can produce/propose (Elster 1995: 373).
The making of a constitution is only part of the story. Formal procedural safeguards
are also essential in order to protect this document, which is expected to survive
generations, against retrogressive amendment (Hatchard 1998: 383). Devising an
appropriate, formal amendment, however, is not a simple matter. An over-rigid
procedure may deter efforts to strengthen constitutional provisions, while a
constitution with ‘weak’ amendment provisions carries with it the possibility of its
wholesale amendment and a resultant undermining of key provisions (Ibid: 384).
An interesting nexus to this work therefore is to examine ways in which various
constitution-makers in Ghana have grappled issues of constitutional amendment?
PRE-INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS
The Gold Coast (Ghana), in between the two World Wars had three constitutions,3
but it were the events following the 1948 Riots that got Gold Coasters involved in
the drafting of their constitutions, nearly a decade before Ghana’s independence.
The Watson Commission set up to report on the 1948 Riots described the existing
1946 Constitution as outmoded and made the ‘revolutionary’ recommendation for
an all-African constitutional committee to draft a new constitution for the Gold
Coast.
The resultant 40-member Coussey Constitutional Committee formed in 1949 was
all-African, but the colonial authorities deliberately excluded radical elements of
society.4 Given this first opportunity by Gold Coasters to draft their own
5
constitution, the Committee recommended measures to increase the membership
and geographical representation on the Legislative Council as well as allocation of
African ministerial positions on the Executive Council; but it fell short of self
government. This however formed the basis of the 1950 Constitution which led to
the first general election in 1951.
Following its massive victory in the 1951 election, Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention
People’s Party (CPP) which partially assumed the reins of power was allowed to
draft the 1954 Constitution. That constitution provided for the election of all the 104
members of the Legislative Assembly and internal self government; in the hope that
full independence would be granted not long after the 1954 election. The emergence
of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) in September that year delayed the
march towards independence. More significantly, the NLM’s demand for a
federation had serious impact on Ghana’s Independence Constitution of 1957
(Boahen 1975: 179-180).
THE 1957 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution-Making Process
The NLM was uncompromising in its demand for a federal constitution and given
the spate of violence that followed the formation of that party, the colonial
authorities in 1955, appointed Sir Frederick Bourne to investigate and recommend
the feasibility or otherwise of the federal system for independent Ghana. The
Bourne Report recommended a compromise formula of a unitary system with
devolutionary powers to regional assemblies which formed the basis of the 1957
Constitution.
Main Features of 1957 Constitution
The Independence Constitution, officially titled, The Ghana (Constitution) Order in
Council, was firmly based on the cabinet system in line with British political
tradition. The executive consisted of the Prime Minister and his cabinet selected
from the National Assembly to which they were individually and collectively
responsible (Section 7). The head of state was a Governor General with generally
6
ceremonial functions representing the British monarch (Section 6). The
Constitution had very few guaranteed rights such as the right to vote (Section 69),
the right to property (Section 34) and others safeguarding minorities rights.
Section 32 provided special amendment procedures. According to Article 32(1)
amendment to ordinary constitutional provisions needed 2/3 majority of
Parliament, while entrenched provisions needed a prior approval of not less than
two-thirds of all the Regional Assemblies and in some cases the Regional Houses of
Chiefs (Section 32(2). This cumbersome procedure of amendment was significant
given the polarized politics at the time.
Perhaps the most significant provision in terms of the ‘compromise formula’ was
Article 64 which called for the establishment, by an Act of Parliament, of a Regional
Assembly in each of the then five regions of the country. Section 64(1) gave the
regional assemblies effective powers in nine specified areas- local government,
agriculture, education, communications, medical and health services, public works,
town and country planning, housing, police- and ‘such other matters as Parliament
may from time to time determine’ (Section 64 (2).
Application of the 1957 Constitution
The colonial authorities had introduced the regional assembly system into the 1957
Constitution as a concession to an opposition which controlled 43% of the popular
votes. But it was a compromise that satisfied neither the government nor the
opposition. The ruling CPP felt the Independence Constitution had been forced upon
it (Kraus 1969:117). Nkrumah reportedly said his Government and the CPP had
accepted with grave misgivings the Constitution as was drawn in Britain but they
preferred to take what was offered rather than see independence delayed (OheneDarko 1977:78). For the NLM and its allies, anything short of the federal system was
not desirable and they continued to boycott important stages in the transition
process5, a strategy which the CPP cleverly exploited to its own advantage.
The CPP adopted the uncompromising attitude of using its majority in parliament to
adopt measures aimed at destroying the opposition. For example, in December
1957, the CPP-dominated parliament passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act
7
(ADA) which sought to render illegal all the opposition parties on grounds that they
were not national. The regionalist opposition parties however outwitted the CPP by
coming together to form the United Party (UP) before the ADA could be passed.
Similarly, the passage of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in 1958 made it
possible to detain without trial for five years and without right of appeal for conduct
considered by the government to be prejudicial to the defence and security of the
state. The CPP also resorted to amending significant portions of the Constitution;
measures that turned the very rigid constitution flexible. In this respect, the fate of
the regional assembly system is most illustrative. The CPP government had
‘induced’ the opposition to boycott both the parliamentary debate on and election to
the Regional Assemblies and succeeded in legislating the assemblies out of
existence.6
Thus, while the 1957 Constitution was intended to operate on compromise and
tolerance, both commodities were scarce between the Government and the
Opposition. In the middle of 1960, therefore, Nkrumah and the CPP threw away the
Independence Constitution wholly and wholeheartedly and introduced a new one
on their own terms (Dale 1993:72).
THE 1960 REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE FIRST REPUBLIC
The Constitution-Making Process
Nkrumah and the CPP justified the shift from the Independence Constitution to the
Republican Constitution on grounds of the need for a strong government to bring
about rapid economic development (Hitchens 1979:173). In February 1960, the
CPP-dominated National Assembly passed the Constituent Assembly and Plebiscite
Acts to empower itself to sit at as a constituent assembly to draw the new
constitution. The National Assembly ‘dutifully’ approved within one month, the CPP
government’s draft constitutional proposal (Ohene-Darko 1977:80).
In April 1960, Ghanaians went into a double-barreled poll (a plebiscite-cumelection) to approve the Republican Constitution and to elect the first president,
which overwhelmingly, went in favour of the group in power.7 The National
8
Assembly was in turn rewarded with a five-year extension of its term with effect
from 1 July 1960 (Schweb 1960: 634).
Main Features of the 1960 Constitution
The 1960 Constitution was tailor-made for Nkrumah to all intents and purposes.
Article 8(1-3) made the President, who was also Head of State, Fountain of Honour
and Commander-in-Chief, responsible only to the people. This ‘responsibility to the
people’ was amorphous and in the hands of a man who was bent on having his way,
the principles of a responsible and accountable government were seriously called
into question. Further, Article 8(4) further provided that “Except as may be
otherwise provided by law, in the exercise of his functions, the president shall act in
his own discretion and shall not be obliged to follow advice tendered by any other
person.” These were very wide powers particularly for a country coming from a
background of collective responsibility.
Article 55 gave the First President the power virtually to rule by decrees. He could,
whenever he considered it to be in the national interest, rule by legislative
instrument which may alter any enactment, other than the constitution. By this, he
could prevent the passage of a bill or alter a law passed by the National Assembly;
and in effect, this rendered ineffective the sole authority vested in parliament to
make laws. This article was most offensive not only because of the special
unprecedented powers it granted to the president but also because they were given
to Nkrumah personally and singularly. Above all Article 55 was an entrenched
clause which could only be amended through a referendum.
While executive action was by virtue of Article 55 beyond judicial review; legislative
actions were so subjected; another clear indication of a deliberate attempt to
strengthen the hand of the executive at the expense of the legislature.
Legislative powers were vested in Parliament which consisted of the President and
the National Assembly, acting jointly. But the National Assembly’s control of the
public purse was taken away by at least two provisions: No expenditure was to be
made for any public expenditure from any public fund except under a warrant
issued by authority of the President(Article 31(1). Also, by Article 31(2) while the
9
National Assembly could vote on the annual budget estimates, ‘no amendment of the
estimates shall be moved’. In other words, the National Assembly was either to
accept or reject the budget in full; but given the political situation, there was no way
that it was ever going to be rejected. Worse still, the President on behalf of the
republic could enter into any agreement for the granting of a loan out of any public
fund or account.
Article 13, contained a nine-point Declaration of Fundamental Principles, to be made
by the President on assumption of office. Though the Declaration was intended to
replace a formal Bill of Rights, only three of its principles dealt specifically with
individual liberty – protection against discrimination; freedom of speech, religion
and assembly; and right to property. The rest were on issues as varied as
independence of Ghana, African unity, social policy and maintenance of law. This
clearly was to further diminish the limited human rights provisions of the
Independence Constitution. Worse still, the Declaration was not enforceable in the
court of law but a pious statement of political ideals likened to the British
coronation oath (Folson 1980:41).The idea of African unity also found expression in
the new constitution. The possibility of surrendering Ghanaian sovereignty in
pursuit of African unity was provided for in Article 13, as part of the Declaration of
Principles.8
The common thread linking all these unique features was the very wide powers it
conferred on Nkrumah and effectively turned him into a constitutional dictator.
The 1960 Constitution in Practice
From the inception of the First Republic in July 1960 to the fall of the CPP
government in February 1966, there were a number of constitutional amendments
and measures with serious implications for constitutionalism.

In September 1962, a private member’s motion was passed to make
Nkrumah Life President.

Nkrumah used the legislature to extend the operative life of the Preventive
Detention Act (PDA)9 for another five years in 1963 and he used it to
10
terrorize not only his political opponents but members of his government
and party as well.10

In January 1964, a national referendum was held seeking two amendments
to the Constitution: to decide on the One-Party State for Ghana and to invest
the President with power in his discretion to dismiss judges of the superior
court at any time and for any reasons which appeared to him sufficient11. The
results were reminiscent of the April 1960 plebiscite.12

The Chief Justice and two Appeal Court judges were dismissed13 for
acquitting three CPP functionaries implicated in the Kulungugu assassination
plot.14

The parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 9 June 1965
never took place. Nkrumah was nominated unopposed in May by the Central
Committee of the CPP and he in turn in a radio announcement declared
automatically elected the CPP parliamentary nominees, a week before
Election Day.
The above measures, in particular the 1965 electoral ‘no show’, created serious
doubts about constitutional and peaceful means of changing the CPP regime. Under
the circumstances, when Nkrumah was overthrown in the1966 coup, the
Republican Constitution was regarded as the lynchpin of the authoritarian political
system he had operated in the 1960s (Folson 1980:42)
THE 1966 COUP, THE 1969 CONSTITUTION AND THE SECOND REPUBLIC
The sceptre of Nkrumahism haunted Ghanaians following the February 1966 coup 15
and the desire to prevent a recrudescence of the political and constitutional
arbitrariness of the previous regime, impacted greatly on the process which led to
the crafting of the 1969 Constitution (Twumasi 1968: 43).
The Constitution-Making Process
The ruling military junta, the National Liberation Council (NLC) established, on 18
November 1966, an 18-member Constitutional Commission under the chairmanship
of the Chief Justice, Edward Akufo-Addo to ascertain the opinions of the Ghanaian
11
public on a new constitution for the country (NLCD 102). A significant aspect of the
composition of the Commission was that it was dominated by anti-Nkrumah
forces.16
The popular reaction to this offer to help make a fresh constitutional start was
overwhelming17 and Ghanaians were united in their determination never to allow a
repetition of anything resembling the 1960 Constitution (Owusu 1979: 99). In
response, the Constitutional Commission in its Report,18 rejected preventive
detention and the one party system, but recommended sovereignty of the
constitution and entrenched fundamental freedom of the individual (Twumasi
1968: 43). The 150-member Constituent Assembly,19 subsequently adopted a
constitution that made the President neither purely ceremonial nor purely
executive, as a balancing act to prevent the concentration of powers in the hands of
any one person.
Main Features of the 1969 Constitution
The main features of the 1969 Constitution sought to tackle different aspects of the
constitutional and other problems of the Nkrumah era. Article 3 barred Parliament
from passing a law to establish a one-party state. Also certain categories of persons
were disqualified. Article 71 disqualified in particular those against whom there
were adverse findings by Commissions of Enquiry from contesting to the National
Assembly. In practice, this became a major weapon for excluding members of the
previous regime of which the Gbedemah case was legendary.
The 1969 Constitution was unique in the manner in which constitutional powers
were diffused among several personalities and institutions. As earlier indicated, the
President was not a purely ceremonial head but wielded some powers of
appointment which he exercised either exclusively or in consultation and/or on the
advice the Council of State20, the Prime Minister or the Chief Justice (Articles 4849). The authority of the National Assembly in law making was also limited by the
presidential power of veto (Article 84). But the Speaker of the National Assembly
acted in the absence, resignation or death, of the President (Article 39(3).
12
The Supreme Court was vested with the power of judicial review over legislative
enactments and governmental actions (Article 2). In addition, the Constitution set
up a number of independent and semi-independent bodies, to control the exercise of
powers granted to the government. These included the Ombudsman (Articles 100101), the Public Services Commission (Article 139), the Police Council (Article 143),
the Armed Forces Council (Article 150) and the Prisons Service Board (Article
(147).
The Constitution made provisions to ensure that the Westminster parliamentary
system worked particularly with reference to the role of the opposition. Apart from
making the Opposition Leader a member of the Council of State (Article 53), his
salary was fixed at two-thirds that of the Prime Minister (Article 72) . Also, MPs
were debarred from crossing carpet (Article 75). This last provision was
particularly significant provision given the manner in which pressure to cross
carpet during the Nkrumah era depleted the opposition in Parliament and paved the
way for the one party system.
In place of the controversial Declaration of Fundamental Principles, the new
constitution made very elaborate provisions on Fundamental Human Rights. Among
the intriguing provisions was the recognition of the family as the unit of society
(Article 13). These were all enforceable in the law courts (Folson 1980: 42).
The constitution was very rigid. Seven articles were entrenched and could not be
amended under any circumstance.21 Amendment to 45 other articles needed prior
approval of the Supreme Court. Even 82 or so other articles which were not
entrenched needed 2/3 majority across two parliaments (Article 169).
The two most significant transitional provisions, because they bore the imprints of
the outgoing military junta, were the Presidential Commission (Section 1) and the
Indemnity Clause (Section 13). The NLC at the last minute introduced a threemember Presidential Commission,22 to perform the functions of the President for up
to three years in the hope of ensuring a graduated transition. The Indemnity Clause
was even more controversial. It debarred any court action against the 24 February
1966 coupists and their collaborators (Section 13(3)). This provision has become
13
part of the two other constitutions since then and has always generated
controversy. The 1969 Constitution, then, was a sharp riposte to the arbitrary rule
of Nkrumah. But somehow by their obsession with the immediate political past, the
constitution makers hardly took into account the long term problems of Ghana
(Twumasi 1968: 50).
The Second Republic/1969 Constitution in Practice
In the parliamentary election held in August 1969, the Progress Party, led by K. A.
Busia won 105 out of the 140 seats to form the government, while K. A. Gbedemah’s
National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) with 29 seats formed the opposition. But the life
of the government and the 1969 Constitution was cut short by the 13 January 1972
coup.
A number of issues cropped up within the 27-month Second Republic which affected
constitutional practice. First, there was the disqualification of Gbedemah under
Article 71.23 The absence of the experienced Gbedemah from Parliament removed
the moderating influence he would have had on his younger opposition colleagues.
His presence could also have avoided the stand-off between government and
opposition particularly over the issue of ethnicity.
Second, was the purge of 568 public servants (Apollo 568) in 1970, ostensibly as a
drive against overstaffing and inefficiency. Though supposedly in line with Section 9
of the Transitional Provisions, the general impression was that majority of those
sacked were opposition sympathizers. Worse still, there were indications that in
some cases the government had acted in breach of Section 9.
Third, and related to the second, was the Sallah Case in relation to the power of
judicial review (Article 106).24 The Busia government refused to reinstate Sallah
and others. The shout of “No Court, No Court’ by Busia and the government’s
insistence that it was rather the Court that had exceeded its competence were
particularly regrettable since they were reminiscent of the treatment the Nkrumah
meted to the judiciary after the treason trial, of which the then opposition was very
critical.
14
The fourth, the J. H. Mensah Affair was in violation Article 61.25 An oppositioninitiated censure motion calling for Mensah’s resignation fell through by 24-81 and
Mensah kept his job when Prime Minister Busia refused to sack him. The matter
however cast further doubts on the government much touted democratic
credentials.
Two other constitutional omissions were the non- declaration of asset by ministers
in violation of Article 67 and non-establishment of the office of the Ombudsman as
provided in Articles 100-101.
The attitude of the Busia government to the constitution was rather worrying, given
that several members of that government had been influential members of the
Constituent Assembly also. Worse still, those constitutional omissions and
commissions provided part of the excuses for the 13 January 1972 led by Col. I. K.
Acheampong. It was ironical that like the 1966 coup, the military intervened in 1972
supposedly to restore democracy (Owusu 1979: 102).
UNION GOVERNMENT
The Acheampong regime from 1972 to 1976 was insistent that it would not hand
over until it had put the Ghanaian economy on a sound footing.26 But under pressure
from students and several professional groups, Acheampong in October 1976
introduced the Union Government (Unigov) concept (Oquaye 1980: 27). This was
supposed to be a ‘no-party community democratic government’ in which the army
and the police would share power with civilians (Hitchens 1979:171-172).
At the start of 1977, the government formed an Ad Hoc Committee to collate views
Union Government and soon the date for a referendum on the adoption of the
concept was fixed for 30 March1978, well before the committee had finished its
work. Return to constitutional rule was scheduled for July 1979 (Oquaye 1980: 91).
The Ad Hoc Committee report in December 1977 indicated that majority of the
Ghanaians rejected the institutional representation of the police and the military
(Owusu 1979: 104 & 107); yet the Acheampong government was bent on carrying
15
on with its initial plan; confirming fears that Unigov was a device for the
perpetuation of military rule. Considerable opposition, then, arose to Unigov,
particularly in the run up to the 30 March 1978 referendum. The opposing groups
included the People’s Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ), the Third Force
and the Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship in Ghana. These groups were made
up of a motley assortment of politicians from the two precious republics and the
first military regime, who charged that the campaign was one-sided and the debate
had been hampered by intimidation of opponents of Unigov (Owusu 1979: 104).
The referendum did not do much to clarify the debatable issues surrounding
Unigov. The government after claiming 54%-46% victory, even after the electoral
commissioner had run for his dear life before counting could be completed, banned
the three opposing groups and had their leaders detained, supposedly, for their own
safety (Ibid). In April 1978 a Constitutional Commission was formed to submit a
draft constitution by October the same (Ibid). This determination on the part of the
Acheampong regime to impose Unigov on Ghanaians was however halted as a result
of the 5 July 1978 palace coup which removed Acheampong from office.
THE 1979 CONSTITUTION AND THE THIRD REPUBLIC
The Constitution-Making Process
The new Head of State, General FWK Akuffo and his SMC-II announced new
proposals to return Ghana to civilian rule. It introduced the concept of ‘national
government’, also a non-party form of government, which would rule for at least a
transitional period of four years (Oquaye 1980: 118). Late 1978, however, following
the poor voter turnout at the no-party local government elections, Akuffo publicly
endorsed the pluralist party system and the ban on parties was lifted on 1 January
1979. Like all governments before it, the SMC-II tried to influence the process by
proscribing all former Ghanaian parties, their names, their slogans and symbols,
from being utilized in the election campaign.27 The Constituent Assembly within
January-March 1979 formulated a constitution which was closer to the American
model than the British, the political tradition that had dominated the constitutional
evolution of Ghana.
16
Main Features of the 1979 Constitution
While the shift from the American model was the most significant feature of the
1979 Constitution, it is interesting how much of the 1969 Constitution was retained.
Among the new features was a full presidential system with separation between
executive and legislature. The President as Head of State and Head of Government
was vested with executive powers and to be assisted by a Vice President was to be
directly elected for a four-year term and eligible for a second term (Chapter 8).
Ministers were to be appointed by the President with the prior approval of
Parliament and MPs appointed ministers had to resign from Parliament. Members of
the legislature were elected separately for a five-year-term, a year more than the
President.
Another innovation was the legally enforceable Directive Principles of State Policy
which purported, with the support of the courts, to force governments to achieve
certain social and economic objectives irrespective of the state of public opinion,
government’s priorities and the state of the economy (Chapter 4, Articles 6-18).
The 1979 Constitution retained from the 1969 Constitution the Bill of Rights
(Chapter 6), the sole-commissioner Electoral Commission (Chapter 7), the Council of
State (Chapter 10) the Ombudsman (Chapter 11); while introducing other
independent institutions as the Press, the National Development, and the Forestry
Commissions.
Significantly, the 1979 Constitution introduced a somewhat more rigid method of
amendment. Ordinary articles could only be changed with the approval, by secret
ballot, of two-thirds of the total number of district councils in the country, twothirds of all members of the Council of State, and two-thirds of all members of
Parliament on two separate occasions. For entrenched articles that procedure had
to be preceded by a popular referendum (Chapter 25).
The 1979 Constitution/ The Third Republic in Practice
17
Like the 1969 Constitution, there were a number of constitution-related events over
the 27months that the 1979 Constitution was in force. The first was the Chief Justice
Apaloo saga28 which threw up the inherent contradictions of transitional
provisions29 vis-à-vis the provisions of the main constitution. At the same time, the
manner in which the matter was resolved demonstrated how upholding judicial
decisions could contribute to the growth of constitutionalism.
Unlike the Second Republic, the President and Parliament in the Third Republic
performed their constitutional duty of establishing the Office of the Ombudsman.30
Even more significant was the fact that, the length of the Third Republic like the
Second was 27 months.
There was also the clash between the Limann government and the Electoral
Commission (EC) over voter registration. In July 1980, an attempt of the EC to
update the electoral roll was opposed by the PNP government ostensibly because
the EC had not coordinated its activities with the government. The minority had
challenged the government’s position on grounds that it violated the independence
of the Commission as enshrined in Article 37(8). In the end, the enabling bill in
parliament failed to secure the needed 2/3 majority when it was defeated by 69
votes to 64 (Essilfie-Conduah 1991: 74-75).
The defeat of the PNP government’s 1981-82 budget in July 1981 was significant not
least because the PNP had majority in Parliament. It was unprecedented in the
country’s political history and even though it did not lead to the fall of the
government, it was an indication of the legislature asserting its independence from
executive control (Ibid: 123-124)
Like the 1969 Constitution, the life of the 1979 was cut short midstream by the 31
December 1981 coup, and with that the growth of constitutionalism that had begun
to emerge in the Third Republic. This was followed by eleven years of nonconstitutional rule under the Jerry Rawlings-led Provisional National Defence
Council (PNDC).
THE 1992 CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
18
The milieu preceding the crafting of the 1992 Constitution was, to say the least, not
conducive for constitution-making. By 1991, the entrenched military-based
authoritarian PNDC which had been in office for a decade, had succeeded in
intimidating and disorganizing the middle classes of professional and business
people and in suppressing their civic associations including political parties (Ninsin
1998: 6). Again, Rawlings was least interested in, or committed to,
constitutionalism, given that he had confessed to that umpteen times during the
regime (Ibid: 7). Above all, the Rawlings’ regime like Acheampong’s was interested
in self-succession.
The Constitution-Making Process
The process that culminated in the crafting of the 1992 Constitution can be traced to
the regional fora that the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) organized
from mid-1990 to collate ideas on a new constitution for Ghana. On 25 March 1991,
the NCD published its report, Evolving a True Democracy, which contrary to the
widely known preference of Rawlings and the PNDC, recommended a return to
multiparty politics and the exclusion of the military from partisan politics (Bluwey
1998: 107-108).
The PNDC accepted the report and in response appointed a nine-member
Committee of Experts to propose a constitution for Ghana’s Fourth Republic (Ibid:
108). The Committee’s report, in the form of a draft constitution and corresponding
explanations for the proposals, contained ideas like a split executive of a President
and prime minister, direct participation of the military, police, civil servants and
traditional rulers in politics, and a non-partisan local government system; all of
which were preferred by Rawlings and the PNDC (Ibid: 108-109).
A 260-member Consultative Assembly (CA) was subsequently established to draft a
definitive constitution. On the surface, the composition of the CA covered broader
interest groups than ever before (Hatchard 1998: 382), but a close study revealed a
deliberate attempt of the incumbent regime to marginalize, if not exclude opposing
19
forces.31 Protests over the composition, like other demands related to the transition
process, were virtually all rejected by the PNDC.
On the whole, however, the CA exhibited its independence and produced a
constitution that was different in many respects from the draft presented by the
Committee of Experts (Ibid). The draft constitution was approved through a
referendum in April 1992. This was followed by the lifting of the ban of political
parties the following month to set in motion the process which resulted in the
November/December 1992 elections and the start of the Fourth Republic on 7
January 1993.
The Main Features of the 1992 Constitution
The new constitution followed the American presidential system with formal
separation of powers and checks and balances but with a few exceptions. It vested
executive power in an executive president elected together with his vice president
for four years and eligible for second term only (Articles 57, 60 & 66). Legislative
power is vested in Parliament whose members are also elected for a four year term
(Article 93); while judicial power is vested in the judiciary with a wide measure of
independence and the power of judicial review (Articles 125 & 2 respectively).
But according to Article 78(1) majority of the President’s ministers must come from
Parliament. In addition, the vice president and non-MP ministers can participate in
parliamentary proceedings though without a voting rights (Article 112). These
provisions introduced aspects of the British parliamentary system but without the
attendant collective responsibility to Parliament. Another provision that upsets and
viable system of separation of powers is the limitation expressly imposed on
Parliament’s legislative powers by Article 108. That article conferred exclusive right
on the President to introduce into Parliament bills that have financial or tax
implications. This is repugnant to Parliament’s constitutional control of the purse
(Asante 2002: 16-17).
The 1992 Constitution retains the Directive Principles of State Policy (Chapter 6,
Articles 34-41).32 Even more outstanding is the wide-ranging Bill of Rights, entitled
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, in Chapter Five(Articles 12-33). In
20
addition to well known political, civil, social and economic rights and freedoms,
special provisions are made for the property rights of spouses (Article 22), women’s
rights (Article 27), children’s right (Article 28) rights of the disabled (Article 29),
and the rights of the sick (Article 30). In addition, for most of these special rights,
Parliament is specifically mandated to enact such laws as are necessary to ensure
the enforcement of those provisions.
Furthermore, the 1992 Constitution made it mandatory for the establishment,
through Acts of Parliament within six months of the start of the Fourth Republic, a
number of constitutional commissions that would facilitate good governance,
accountability and political participation. These were the Electoral Commission
(EC), the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the
National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the National Media
Commission (NMC). To ensure their independence, their composition and functions
were prescribed in the Constitution (Articles 43, 216, 232 and 166 respectively) and
once appointed, they were to be accountable only to the Constitution (Articles 46,
225, 234 and 172 respectively).
Another unique feature of the 1992 Constitution is the elaborate provisions on
Decentralization and Local Government (Chapter 20, Articles 240- 256), as a
mechanism for enhancing local participation in the decision process, promoting
accountability of local officials, and grassroots development. However there are
some inherent contradictions. First, a non-partisan local government (district
assembly) system has been superimposed on a multiparty system at the national
level and has created situations where known party functionaries during national
elections become ‘non-partisan’ actors during local elections (Frempong 2003).
Second, the appointments the District Chief Executive (DCE) and thirty percent of
assembly members, have retained the national executive control of local
government and tended to undermine the expected democratic outcomes of the
decentralization process (Asante 2002: 17).
The 1992 Constitution / The Fourth Republic in Practice
21
From a not-too-inclusive constitution-making process through acrimonious
transitional elections in 1992, the Fourth Republic has taken several positive strides
forward. Three more peaceful and generally acceptable national elections have since
been held in 1996, 2000 and 2004; and Ghanaians are gearing themselves for a
historic fifth consecutive election in December 2008.The 2000 election produced an
alternation of power from the NDC to the NPP. These electoral successes have been
achieved, in no small measure, through an elite consensus building mechanism, the
Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). It was initiated by the Electoral
Commission in1994 and has since provided a forum for political parties and other
stakeholders to iron out their differences and contribute to electoral reform.
The other constitutional commissions- NCCE, CHRAJ and NMC- have all contributed
in their own ways to facilitate civic education, the promotion and protection of
human rights and freedom of expression and thought, respectively.
The emergence within the parameters of the constitution vibrant civil society
groups in the form of academic/research think tanks, civic educators, election
observers/monitors, have all contributed to the electoral/democratic progress
chalked over the last fifteen years. Also, the liberalization of media which has led to
proliferation of private electronic and print media has been very much instrumental
in all the above respects.
However, a lot still remains done particularly in terms of imbibing the ethos of
constitutionalism. The heightened fear and threats to stability that characterize
successive elections is a clear indication that the Ghanaian political elite and their
followers are yet to fully imbibe the democratic culture. Indeed, it is not one of the
norms of democracy and constitutionalism to play on the electorate’s fear as an
electoral strategy.
Another threat is that Ghana’s democratic progress has been paralleled by increased
ethnicity. Particularly since 2000, elections have been shaped by the Akan–NonAkan divide. The ruling NPP has gained most of its votes from the five Akan regions
while it has performed poorly in four Non-Akan regions; and for the opposition NDC
the reverse has been the case. The only exception here is the cosmopolitan Greater
22
Accra Region, which though traditionally Non-Akan, voted for the NPP, not least
because, majority of the people there are Akans. The sad aspect is that in 2004 the
people of Central Region who had not voted along ethnic lines were mocked rather
than hailed.
The frequent boycott of parliamentary sessions by opposition groups casts doubts
on how deeply the political elite have imbibed the ethos of consensus building.
While in opposition the NPP had boycotted parliament over issues like vetting of
presidential ministerial nominees and the budget. The current opposition NDC has
continued and deepened the boycott ‘tradition’. Issues like, national reconciliation,
national health insurance, extension of the franchise to Ghanaians abroad, and the
conviction of one of its members by a court of law33, have all attracted boycotts by
the NDC parliamentary caucus.
In spite of the several measures aimed at leveling the playing field electoral
resources remain skewed in favour of incumbency; the 1996 and 2004 election
campaigns in particular demonstrated the affluence of incumbency and the penury
of opposition. The intriguing point, as Election 2000 amply demonstrated, is that
incumbency is not always an advantage. Can Election 2008 produce another
alternation of power?
CONCLUSION
In this post mortem of Ghana’s constitutional history the following issues stand out.
First, there has been a general tendency on the part of the powers that be, whether
civilian or military, to exclude their political opponents from the constitutionmaking process. The CPP in 1960, the NLC in 1966-69, the SMC in 1977-78 and the
PNDC in the 1990-1992 periods, were typical examples.
Second, lack of consensus among the political elite on the fundamentals of the
constitution has had the potential of introducing violence into the political process
as the 1954-56 federalist agitation, the Unigov campaign of 1977-78 and the
immediate post 1992 election period, amply demonstrate.
23
Third, since independence, Ghana has passed through several different
constitutional arrangements; but these changes have not really changed the
characteristic way in which politics in Ghana has taken place.
Fourth, confrontations over constitutional issues or the deliberate neglect of
constitutional provisions have provided part of the pretext for military adventurers
to intervene. The Busia regime had a whole catalogue of such constitutional
omissions and commissions.
Fifth, the intrusion of the military into Ghanaian politics has had serious impact on
constitution-making and constitutional rule. Military interventions have prevented
carefully crafted constitutions from operating long enough for effective and critical
analysis. The 27-month life spans of the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions readily come
to mind in this respect. In addition, outgoing military regimes had imposed
transitional provisions which have proved controversial and sometimes ran counter
to the very tenets of the constitutions. Particularly, significant in this respect are the
indemnity clauses that have been ‘smuggled’ into the 1969, 1979 and 1992
Constitutions. Above all, interludes of military regimes have had negative impact on
imbibing ethos of constitutionalism. Some positive lessons from the Limann era
such as the president’s acceptance of the judicial verdict of the ‘Chief Justice saga’
and the defeat of the government’s last budget in parliament in spite of its
parliamentary majority were quickly forgotten following the 31 December 1981
coup.
Sixth, the merits and demerits of a constitution emerge when it is practised long
enough. Over the last fourteen years that the 1992 Constitution has been in
operation a few rough edges have been identified including Articles 78(1) and 108
which have somewhat weakened the legislature in relation to the executive; but
there have been general acceptance of the constitution’s workability.
Lastly, the success of a constitutional dispensation depends on the extent to which
the principal political actors agree on the institutions and rules that are necessary
for the efficient mediation of competing claims and be able to shape norms in line
with the new political order. In this respect, consensus building among political
24
parties, electoral authorities and civil society have played a crucial role in sustaining
the Fourth Republic in spite of its initial hiccups.
ENDNOTES
1
These include social and economic crisis, a revolution, regime collapse, fear of regime collapse, defeat in
war, reconstruction after war, the creation of a new state and liberation from colonial rule.
2
It prescribes for example that delegates be chosen by a non-partisan method designed to emphasize
individual as opposed party or other group attitudes
3
These were the Clifford Constitution of 1916 and the Burns Constitution of 1946. From a largely
appointive Legislative Council in 1946, subsequent constitutions made provision for increasing number
elected members.
4
While it included six leaders of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), Kwame Nkrumah, its
General Secretary and the most radical politician at the time was included. There were also seven chiefs on
the Committee but workers, farmers, miners, petty traders and the trade union movement were not
presented.
5
For example, the opposition was on a boycott and did not take part in the debate on the ‘Motion of
Destiny’ tabled by Nkrumah on 4 August 1956 calling for the granting of independence in March 1957.
Though the Opposition returned to endorse the draft constitution early 1957, they again boycotted the
debate in 1958 of the Regional Assemblies Bill.
6
In accordance with Section 64 of the 1957, the Governor-General had formed the Van Lare Committee
(composed of the chairman, 13 CPP and 8 opposition MPs) to work on the modalities of the regional
assembly system. The Committee had drawn a careful compromise between the wide and extensive powers
of the Regional Assemblies demanded by the opposition and their reduction to advisory bodies as
demanded by the CPP. But the CPP government grossly altered the compromise formula when it
introduced the Regional Assembly Bill in Parliament. The opposition boycotted the deliberations and
subsequent elections to fill the Assemblies. Not surprisingly, the CPP-dominated Assemblies legislated
themselves out of existence. This was approved by 2/3 majority in Parliament that enabled constitutional
amendments to be made by a simple majority in the House. In addition, the Houses of Chiefs had their
powers modified and chieftaincy matters came under direct government control.
7
The Plebiscite recorded 1,008,740 yes votes against 131,425 no votes; and in the presidential poll,
Nkrumah of the CPP defeated the UP candidate, J. B. Danquah by 1,016,076 to 124,623(Boahen 1975:
211; Badu & Larvie 1996: 4).
8
The President was to solemnly declare that ‘the union of Africa should be striven for by every lawful
means’ and that ‘the independence of Ghana should not be surrendered or diminished on any grounds other
than the furtherance of African unity’.
9
The Preventive Detention Act (PDA) first passed in July 1958, empowered the CPP government to arrest
and detain without trial for up to five years, any person whose activities were perceived to be a threat to the
security of the state. Initially, it was a weapon against the Opposition, but from 1960, some CPP
functionaries suffered under it
10
For instance, in 1963, P. K. K. Quaidoo, a minister, was sacked and detained following a speech in
parliament in which he had asked MPs to assert their independence from the extra-parliamentary party
organs which Nkrumah encouraged to undermine parliamentary authority (Twumasi 1968: 48)
The 1960 Constitution had provided in Article 44(3) that the appointment of the Chief Justice ‘may at
any time be revoked by the President by instrument under the Presidential Seal”; while by Article 45(3)
judges of the Supreme Court could only be removed from office after a resolution passed by 2/3 majority in
Parliament on grounds of stated misbehaviour or infirmity of body or mind’. The referendum therefore was
to remove this latter limitation.
11
25
12
There was an overwhelming endorsement of 2,773,920 to 2,452. With 2,877,464 registered voters, it
meant 92.8% of the voter population went to the polls.
13
Chief Justice Arku Korsah had on the basis of Article 44(3) been removed soon after the Court’s verdict
and the two other judges Van Lare and Akufo-Addo, following the 1964 referendum.
14
Following an assassination attempt on Nkrumah at Kulungugu in the Upper Region in August 1962,
three top CPP functionaries were implicated; but after their acquittal and the removal of the judges another
special court was set up, had them retried and convicted.
15
All public utterances made covert or overt references to the political and economic experiences under the
Nkrumah regime; and all newspapers, Commissions of Enquiries, radio and television, educational
institutions and public speakers were preoccupied with exorcising that scepter (Twumasi 1968: 43).
16
The chairman, Akufo-Addo was a member of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), Adam
Amandi, M. K. Apaloo, William Ofori-Atta, and A. Kargbo were top members of the United Party (UP)
and mostly PDA detainees; Akua Asaabea Ayisi, J. A. Braimah, Saki Scheck, were CPP activist who had
fallen out with Nkrumah
17
Large groups of people from every walk of life appeared before the Constitutional Commission to
present oral and written evidence and memoranda. Many others expressed their opinions in articles and
letters to the press, in magazines both domestic and foreign and in booklets and pamphlets (Owusu
1979:99)
18
The Report was entitled Explanatory Memorandum of the Constitutional Commission for a Constitution
for Ghana.
19
The Constituent Assembly, which was composed of 49 elected representatives of district councils, 91
representatives of professional and other interests and 10 nominees of the NLC, was formed late December
1968 to consider the proposals of the Constitutional Commission (Owusu 1979:101),
20
The membership of the Council of State, the body empowered to ‘aid and counsel the President’
included the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Leader of the Opposition and the
President of the National House of Chiefs (Article 53)
21
These included the provisions that related to the Supremacy of the Constitution (Articles 1-2), the
enforcement of the Constitution and Democracy (Article 3), the authority of Parliament to impose taxation
(Article 128) and to raise an armed force (Article 149) and the institution of chieftaincy (Article 152).
22
The commission comprised the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the NLC and the Chief of Defence
Staff of the Armed Forces.
23
Gbedemah, leader of the opposition NAL could not assume his parliamentary when the Supreme Court
upheld a petition by his PP opponent in the Keta Constituency, E. B. Awoonor-Williams, to disqualify him
on the basis of Article 71 in relation to adverse findings from a commission of enquiry.
24
E. K. Sallah, one of the victims of Apollo 568 appealed against his dismissal in the courts. The Supreme
Court decided that the government’s power to dismiss was limited to offices created by the NLC and called
for Salah’s reinstatement.
25
In the course of the Busia administration it was discovered that Finance Minister J. H. Mensah contrary
to Article 61(4) was engaged in business as Director of Odumasi Farms Ltd. According to Article 61(4)
ministers while in office could not ‘hold any other office of profit or emolument whether private or public
and either directly or indirectly’.
26
General Acheampong had argued at a press conference in Burma hall on the fourth anniversary (13
January 1976) that to hand over to civilians in the face of the prevailing world economic situation would be
‘tantamount to running away from a problem. See Oquaye 1980 for details
27
In addition, over a hundred prominent individuals were also prohibited from running for office, partly as
a result of adverse decisions against them by one or more of the numerous commissions probing the
legality of politicians’ assets (Lumsden 1980: 473)
28
In 1980, President Limann had submitted a list of Supreme Court nominees, which included the
incumbent Chief Justice Fred Apaloo to parliament for approval. Earlier in October 1979, the Chief Justice
had taken the oath of office in line with Section 7(1) of the Transitional Provisions. Parliament however
vetted and rejected his nomination in a vote that the minority parties had boycotted and this degenerated
into a constitutional crisis. The opposition was of the view that the Chief Justice should not have been renominated in the first place. In line with the provisions of Article 2 of the Constitution Dr. Amoako
Tuffour sought the Supreme Court’s declaration on the legal status of the Chief Justice. The Court upheld
the status quo before the President’s nomination list. Unlike the Busia government, the Limann government
26
accepted the Courts ruling gracefully and retained the Chief Justice. The peaceful ending of the crisis
turned out to be the first anniversary gift for the Third Republic (Essifie-Conduah 1991: 84-88)
Section 7(1) of the 1979 Constitution provided that: “Any person who before the coming into force of
this Constitution held or was acting in an office in existence immediately before the coming into force of
this Constitution shall be deemed to have been appointed as far as is consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution to hold or act in the equivalent office under this Constitution.”
29
30
Articles 110- 112 of the 1979 Constitution enjoined Parliament to pass a bill within six months for the
establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the officer, to be appointed by the President in
consultation with the Council of State and the approval of Parliament.
31
Not only did it include hitherto non-political associations such as butchers, hair-dressers, traditional
caterers, etc, but also institutions closely related to the PNDC like the Committee for the Defence of the
Revolution (CDR) and the 31 December Women’s Movement (DWM) had ten representatives each
compared to the one each for Ghana Bar Association (GBA),the University Teachers Association of Ghana
(UTAG), the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), the Christian Council and the Catholic Bishops
Conference (Bluwey 1998: 109-110).
32
The Directive Principles, according Article 34 ‘shall guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the
Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or
interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions, for the
establishment of a just and free society’.
33
As at 15 February 2007, the opposition NDC had boycotted Parliamentary sessions for two weeks,
because the NDC MP for the Keta in the Volta, Daniel Abodakpi had been convicted by a Fast Track High
Court over issues related to his tenure as a Deputy Trade Minister in the NDC Government. In their
absence the President had presented the constitutionally-mandated State of the Nation Address on 8
February 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Asante, S.K. B (2002) Reflections on the Constitution, Law and Development, Accra:
Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Badu, Kwasi Afriyie &John Larvie (1996) Elections 96 in Ghana, Part 1, Accra:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Boahen, Adu (1975/2000) Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries ,London: Longman/Accra: Sankofa Educational Publishers Limited.
Brandon, Mark (1995) “The ‘Original’ Thirteenth Amendment and the Limits to Formal
Constitutional Change”, in Sanford Levinson, ed. Responding to Imperfection: The
Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, Prineton.
Bluwey, G. K. (1998)”State Organisations in the Transition Constitutional Democracy”
in K.A. Ninsin, ed, Ghana: Transition to Democracy, Accra: Freedom Publications, pp.
105-111.
Carroll, John J. &Arthur English (1985) “Constitution Making Roles and Delegates
Behaviour”, POLITY, Vol. 17, No.3, Spring, pp. 586-594.
Corwin, Edward S. (1995), The ‘Higher Law’ Background of the American
Constitutional Law, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Cowen, D.V. (1961) “Constitution Making for a Democracy, African Affairs, Vol. 60,
No. 238, January, pp. 77-108.
Dale, William (1993) “The Making and Remaking of Commonwealth Constitutions”, The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 42, No.1, January, pp. 67-83
27
Duchacek, Ivo (1973) Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions (Santa
Barbara, Calif.: A.B.C.-Clio.
Elster, Jon (1995) “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process”, Duke
Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2, November, pp. 364-396.
Ephson, Isaac S. (1968) Reflections and Refractions on the Ghana Draft Constitution,
Accra: Liberty Press.
Essilfie-Conduah, Nana (1991) Ghana: The Third Republic, Accra: Assemblies of God.
Folson, Kweku G. (1980) “1979 Constitution: A Virtually ‘Unchangeable’ Document”,
Africa, No.103, March, pp. 41-43.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2000) “Six Years of Constitutional Rule in Ghana: An Assessment
and Prospects of the Executive and the Legislature” in Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Six
Years of Constitutional Rule in Ghana: 1993-1999 Accra: Gold Type Ltd. p. 2.
Gyimah-Boadi, E.(1991) “Tensions in Ghana’s Transition to Constitutional Rule” in
K.A.Ninsin & F.K.Drah, ed, Ghana’s Transition to Constitutional Rule, Accra: Ghana
Universities Press, pp. 35-43.
Hatchard, John (1998) “Perfecting Imperfections: Developing Procedures for Amending
Constitutions in Commonwealth Africa”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.
36, No.3, September, pp.381-398.
Hitchens, Diddy R. M. (1979) “Towards Political Stability in Ghana: A Rejoinder in the
Union Government Debate”, African studies Review, Vol. 22, No.1, April, pp. 171-176.
Jonah, Kwesi (1991) “The Monopolisation and Manipulation of the Constitution-Making
Process in Ghana” in Kwame A. Ninsin and Francis K. Drah, ed. Ghana’s Transition to
Constitutional Rule,Accra: Ghana Universities Press, pp.73-83.
33
Kraus, Jon (1969) “On the Politics of Nationalism and Social Change in Ghana”, The
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, April, pp. 107-130.
Lumsden, D. Paul (1980) “Towards Ghana’s Third Republic”, Canadian Journal of
African Studies, Vol. 13 No.3, pp. 471-477.
Miller, Arthur S. & Ronald F. Howell (1960) “The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication”, University of Chicago Law Review, 27, Summer, pp. 661-695.
Ninsin, K. A. (1998) “Introduction” in K.A. Ninsin, ed, Ghana: Transition to
Democracy, Accra: Freedom Publications, p.14.
Ohene-Darko, I. E. (1977) Government and Politics in Ghana (1850-1972), Akrokerri:
Reliance Series.
Oquaye, Mike (1980) Politics in Ghana, 1972-1979, Accra: Tornado Publications.
Ostrom, Vincent (1980) "Hobbes, Covenant and Constitution," Publius 10:4 Fall.
--------------------- (1987) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the
American Experiment, 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987.
Owusu, Maxwell (1979) “Politics without Parties: Reflections on the Union Government
Proposals in Ghana”, African Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, April, pp. 89-108.
Richard Jeffries (1980)” The Ghanaian Elections of 1979”, African Affairs, Vol. 79, No.
316, July, pp.397-414.
Schweb, Egon (1960) “The Republican Constitution of Ghana”, The American Journal of
Comparative Law, Vol.9, No.4, Autumn, pp. 634-656.
Swamson, Wayne R., Sean A. Kelleher & Arthur (1972) “Socialization of ConstitutionMakers: Political Experience, Role Conflict and Attitude Change”, The Journal of
Politics, Vol. 34. No.1, February, pp. 183-198.
Twumasi, Yaw (1968) “Ghana’s Draft Constitutional Proposals”, Transition, No. 37. pp.
43-52.
28