China in Africa:
- Economic Relations and the quest for Good
Governance and Human Rights in Africa.
Aalborg University
Master degree in Development and International Relations
Thesis
18 December 2008
Preface
This thesis is prepared on the tenth semester on Aalborg University’s Master programme of
Development and International Studies.
Finished 18 December 2008
Supervisor
Poul Yaw Opuku-Mensah
Written by
…………………………………..
Signe I. Andersen
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION WITH PROBLEM FORMULATION ............ 6
1.1. Introduction of the Thesis ....................................................................................................... 6
1.2. China’s Engagement in Africa and Why I Chose this Topic .............................................. 6
1.3. China’s First Encounter with Africa ..................................................................................... 7
1.4. The Bandung Conference – African and Asian Nations Meet ............................................ 8
1.5. Introducing The Five Core Principles in Chinese Foreign Policy ...................................... 8
1.6. Chinese Aid to Africa – a Brief Historical Outline............................................................... 9
1.7. Focus and Problem Formulation ......................................................................................... 10
1.8. Assumptions, Objective and Theoretical Framework ....................................................... 12
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ...................................... 14
2.1. Structure of the Thesis .......................................................................................................... 14
2.2. Choice and Application of Theories..................................................................................... 15
2.3. Limitations of the Thesis ....................................................................................................... 15
2.4. Commentary on Data, Material and Sources ..................................................................... 16
CHAPTER 3: THEORIES ....................................................................................... 19
3.1. Presentation, Relevance and Use of Theories ..................................................................... 19
3.2. Introduction of Theories of Growth and Modernisation ................................................... 20
3.2.1. Modernisation and Stages of Growth: Lewis and Rostow .......................................... 21
3.3. Introduction of Neo-Marxist Theories of Underdevelopment and Dependency ............. 23
3.3.1. Metropoles and Satellites: Andre Gunder Frank ........................................................ 24
3.3.2. Dependent Development: Cardoso, Senghass and Menzel ......................................... 25
3.4. Introduction of a Theory of Foreign Policy: The Two-Good Theory............................... 26
3.4.1. The Assumptions of the Two-Good Model ................................................................... 27
3.4.2. Determination of Maintenance and Change ................................................................. 29
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3.4.3. Resources and a State’s Abilities ................................................................................... 30
3.4.4. Single-Policy Hypotheses................................................................................................ 32
3.4.5. Substitutability ................................................................................................................ 33
CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL INPUTS ..................................................................... 35
4.1. Introduction of Empirical Inputs......................................................................................... 35
4.2. The Three Main Eras in China-Africa relations from 1949 to the Present Day ............. 35
4.3. The FOCAC Meetings. ......................................................................................................... 40
4.3.1. The Beijing Consensus ................................................................................................... 42
4.3.2. China’s Africa Policy 2006 ............................................................................................. 43
4.4. China’s Interests in Africa.................................................................................................... 47
4.4.1. Investment and Trade .................................................................................................... 52
4.5. China’s Engagement in Africa: Why these Four Case Countries .................................... 54
4.5.1. Angola: History and Economic and Political Background ......................................... 56
4.5.1.1. Investment, Oil and Trade with China ............................................................................... 58
4.5.2. Nigeria: History and Economic and Political Background......................................... 60
4.5.2.1. Investment, Oil and Trade with China ............................................................................... 60
4.5.2.2. Oil Violence in Southern Nigeria......................................................................................... 61
4.5.3. Sudan: History and Economic and Political Background .......................................... 62
4.5.3.1 The Conflicts in Darfur ......................................................................................................... 63
4.5.3.2. China in the UN Security Council in relation to Darfur ................................................... 64
4.5.3.3. The UN Arms Embargo ....................................................................................................... 64
4.5.3.4. Investment, Oil and Trade with China ............................................................................... 65
4.6. Zimbabwe: History, Economic and Political Background ................................................ 66
4.6.1. Investment, Natural Resources and Trade with China ............................................... 69
4.6.2. Chinese Arms Supply Incident ...................................................................................... 70
4.7. Economic Overview of the Four Case Countries in relation to Economic Development72
4
4.8. Cultural Relativism ............................................................................................................... 73
4.8.1. Asian Values .................................................................................................................... 74
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 76
5.1. Introduction of the Analytical Chapter ............................................................................... 76
5.2. Economic Development: Application and Analytical Discussion of the Theories of
Growth and Modernisation ......................................................................................................... 76
5.3. Economic Underdevelopment and Dependency: Application and Analytical Discussion
of Neo-Marxist Theories of Underdevelopment and Dependency ........................................... 79
5.4. Foreign Policy Theory: Application and Analytical Discussion of The Two-Good
Theory............................................................................................................................................ 81
5.5. Economic Implications for Africa as a Whole, Including Distinct African features, and
for the Four African Case Countries by Engaging with China Economically ....................... 83
5.6. The Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs and its Influence on Good
Governance and Human Rights Issues in the Four African Case Countries ......................... 88
5.7. China’s Adherence to Cultural Relativism in relation to a Different Prioritisation of
Human Rights and its Influence on the Engagement with Pariah Regimes ........................... 93
5.8. How will China fit in, and will the Engagement be Limited due to the Complexity found
in Distinct African Features in terms of History and Economic, Political and Cultural
Structures and long-lasting Relations with the West? .............................................................. 96
5.9. African Perspectives on China in Africa ............................................................................. 98
5.10. African Perspective on China in Sudan .......................................................................... 100
5.11. African Perspectives on China in Zimbabwe ................................................................. 102
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 106
6.1. Main Findings and Implications ........................................................................................ 107
SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 111
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 113
ANNEX 1: CHINA’S AFRICA POLICY OF 2006 .............................................. 119
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION WITH PROBLEM FORMULATION
1.1. Introduction of the Thesis
The emergence of China as a global economic power introduces new opportunities and challenges
to the developing world. China’s fast economic advance, from the economic periphery of the world
into the core group of the world’s leading industrial powers and membership of the WTO since
December 2001, will have an impact on Africa in a number of ways.
In January 2006, China released its first major policy document on its relations with the African
continent – China’s Africa Policy.1 With this release, China’s aim is to enhance cooperation
between China and Africa in the following fields: politics, economics, education, science, culture,
health and social aspects and peace and security.
The document reaffirms overriding Chinese priorities and the need for accessing African raw
materials and commodities, but is also strong in emphasising political cooperation and in
responding to African concerns. There is also a strong emphasis on Chinese support for peace and
security on the continent. Furthermore, emphasis is also put on co-operation in the multilateral
arena by calling for a strengthening of the UN and by appealing to the international community to
give more attention to Africa and to peace and development on the continent. Support to African
regional organisations is also expressed.
In 2000, China initiated the permanent Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). The forum
is a platform that serves as the chief instrument and mechanism for collective consultation, dialogue
and co-operation between Africa and China. It represents its adherence to South-South
cooperation.2
1.2. China’s Engagement in Africa and Why I Chose this Topic
As to China’s engagement in Africa, the Chinese ‘oil diplomacy’ has, in financial terms, been the
most visible. China and the Chinese state owned oil companies have struck a number of multibillion dollar deals in many African oil exporting countries such as Angola and Nigeria. Chinese
investments outside the oil sector and other extractive industries are limited, but growing.3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
Retrieved from: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm (13 Nov. 2007)
2
Retrieved from: http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/183734.htm (18 Dec. 2007)
3
Tjønneland, Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), p. VI
1
6
Furthermore, Africa is receiving an increasing amount of favourable loans and foreign aid – often
being tied aid though.
As to Chinese foreign policy, it has undergone a lot of changes since the Cold War when the
relations between China and Africa was mostly linked to ideology but what is currently evident in
China’s approach in dealing with Africa is that its foreign policy is firmly anchored in the principle
of ‘non-interference’ in internal affairs of other countries. This fact has implied involvement and
investments with/in countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, also characterised as pariah regimes. As
China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a lot of debate and heavy criticism from
the international community have occurred - especially due to the serious allegations of genocide in
the Darfur region of Sudan and arms supply to a number of African states that oppress their own
population – allegedly with these weapons. Zimbabwe is one of such arms receivers. The core of
recent criticism has been in China’s several abstentions from voting in the Security Council
regarding Sudan and Darfur, until it finally put bilateral pressure ‘behind the curtains’ on the
government in Khartoum which succeeded the UN together with the African Union (AU) in sending
peacekeeping troops off. As to Zimbabwe, it has yet to be confirmed whether China has actually
broken off relations with the country in mid 2006 as practical evidence in form of arms supply
collide with the alleged ‘break up’ circulating in some academic circles. An alleged ‘break up’ can
suggest that China is concerned about its image and wish to present itself as a country rising in
peace.
This increased political and economic engagement of China in Africa, and its relation to broader
issues of development and international relations, provides the immediate context for my interest in
this topic. Specifically, the economic and foreign policy insights provided by China’s engagement
in Africa, and its implications for development and international relations provides the context for
this study.
1.3. China’s First Encounter with Africa
China’s first encounter with Africa goes back to the 15th century when Zheng He was placed as the
admiral in control of a huge fleet and armed forces that would conduct a series of seven naval
expeditions in the period of 1405-1433 sponsored by the Yongle Emperor of China (reigned 1403–
1424), the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty.4 These journeys established China as the world’s
4
The Encyclopedia of World History
7
top naval power and, in all, the fleet landed in more than 40 countries including e.g. present –day
Vietnam, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India.5 He reached East Africa on his fourth voyage
between1413-1415 and diplomatic and trading relations started between China and the African
continent.6
1.4. The Bandung Conference – African and Asian Nations Meet
The beginning of an interest in and policy toward Africa began in 1955 when a meeting of
representatives from 29 African and Asian nations was held at Bandung, Indonesia. The conference
marked the beginning of Chinese appreciation of the role of the Third World in combating
adversaries and winning international recognition and support. The aim of the conference was to
promote economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism, and it was more or less
achieved in an atmosphere of cordiality. China played a prominent part and strengthened its friendly
relations with other Asian nations.7 As to China and Africa, the solidarity lay in the feeling of
‘belonging’ to the same club. They agreed on anti-colonialism, anti-hegemonism and on supporting
liberation movements.8 It was also at this conference that China introduced The Five Principles that
still are, as seen in China’s Africa Policy9, an integrated part of its foreign policy.10
1.5. Introducing The Five Core Principles in Chinese Foreign Policy
The Five Core Principles in Chinese foreign policy are also known as The Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence.11 Originally, they were a series of agreements made between China and India
due to the increasing conflict with India which started when the Central Chinese Government took
control of Tibet in 1951. However, as both nations were newly-established and interested in finding
ways to avoid further conflict, the two nations drew up the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
in 1954 which are:
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
Retrieved from: http://www.bartleby.com/67/376.html (19 Dec. 2007)
5
Time Magazine Asia Edition
Retrieved from: http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/journey2001/intro.html (3 Dec. 2007)
6
Retrieved from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zheng_he (3 Dec. 2007)
8
Delman, Jørgen (2007), slide 3.
See Annex 1: China’s Africa Policy
10
Delman, Jørgen (2007), op.cit.,slide 3
11
or Pancha Sila (also spelled Panch Sila or Panchsheel).
9
8
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-existence
1.6. Chinese Aid to Africa – a Brief Historical Outline
The first phase of China’s aid to Africa can be said to have begun from the mid 1950s to 1979.
During this period, aid to Africa was a central foreign policy instrument to support other socialist
countries and liberation movements. In this way Moscow’s influence could be minimised and the
‘renegade province’ of Taiwan could be fought by making it a criteria for African countries not to
recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state in order to receive aid from China.12
In operational terms, China’s policy was to court and recognise those African states that had
achieved independence, while encouraging and supporting African liberation struggles in progress.
A major foreign aid campaign was launched where Premier Zhou Enlai announced China’s Eight
Principles of Economic and Technical Aid13 in Ghana in 1964 whereby China’s role in Africa’s
development was stressed. By the end of 1965, seventeen of the 38 African states had recognised
China (compared to fourteen who continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan), and linkages had
been established with at least a dozen African liberation movements. However, with the outbreak of
the Cultural Revolution in 1966 the direction of China’s policy and behaviour was changed. Similar
to its foreign policy globally, China’s relations with Africa were curtailed. Even if operational
activities were reduced and relations even suspended or terminated in a few instances, relations
were intensified with select African states as e.g. Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania and Zambia. 14
From 1975-1978 Chinese aid projects in Africa were seen in the light industry, agriculture, health
and transport where the latter was especially seen in the construction of the TAZARA15 Railway.16
The railroad was a key project financed and executed by China. Construction was started in 1970
and operation commenced six years later. At that time, it was the largest foreign-aid project ever
12
Kragelund, Peter (2007), slide 3
E.g. mutual benefit, non-interference, low- or no interest loans, equal standards of living.
Ibid
14
Yu, T. George (1988), pp. 853-854
15
Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority
16
Kragelund, Peter (2007), op. cit. slides 3-4
13
9
undertaken by China. It was built to serve the landlocked Zambia as an alternative to rail lines via
Rhodesia and South Africa. The Chinese government sponsored construction of the railway
specifically to eliminate Zambia's economic dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa. 17
The second phase of China’s aid to Africa can be said to be from 1979-1989 where the rhetoric
remained unchanged but Chinese aid was heavily cut down due to changing relations with Moscow
and Washington, an internal reorganisation of the Chinese economy which was also ailing. Focus
was now on mutual benefits and economic sustainability. By 1988, only thirteen African countries
received Chinese aid.18
The current third phase started in 1989 with the Tiananmen incident that among other things
changed the international agenda, and put a renewed focus on Africa with an increase in aid from
US $ 60 million in 1988 to US $ 375 million in 1990. An expansion of collaboration was necessary
due to China’s demand for resources, markets and investment possibilities, and these circumstances
led to the establishment of the China-Africa Forum in order to have a means to increase political
power by providing an alternative to the orthodox development route for African governments.
China’s Africa Policy of 2006 and the development of the Beijing Action Plan 2007-200919 show
that China’s interest in Africa is increasing.20
1.7. Focus and Problem Formulation
Despite what, rhetorically at least, seems to be a mutually beneficial relationship, there is growing
concern that in reality China’s engagement in Africa is unidirectional focusing only on the
economic interests of China. And this economic focus of China’s engagement comes at a time when
democratic consolidation, and broader issues of democratic governance, is high on the agenda of
African countries. Specifically, there is growing concern that China’s lack of support for, and
engagement in issues of democracy and human rights is undermining political accountability on the
continent. In some instances, as in the case of Sudan and Zimbabwe, China’s economic engagement
is said to prop dictatorial regimes responsible for untold suffering in their countries. This lack of
support for the democratic aspirations of African countries, more so, is said to be premised on
China’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This raises a paradox
17
Robinson, Thomas W. and Shambaugh, David L. (1994) p. 287.
Kragelund, Peter (2007), op. cit. slide 5
19
The plan includes economic, political and social development. Will be elaborated in the Empirical Chapter.
20
Kragelund, Peter (2007), op. cit. slide 6
18
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which this thesis seeks to address. That is, at the same time that China’s engagement in Africa is
providing much needed investment resources for Africa, its lack of support for democracy and
human rights threatens to undermine the foundations of Africa’s long term development. This
raises critical questions to which this thesis responds. More specifically, this thesis asks, and seeks
to provide answers to the following main research question:
How, and to what extent, can the principle of non-interference in internal affairs in China’s
Africa Policy be reconciled with the challenge of good governance and the respect of human
rights?
This question will be answered in the context of a study of China’s engagement in the energy and
natural resource sectors of four African countries: Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. The
underlying question that shapes the analyses of these four countries is:
What economic and developmental implications will China’s sole engagement in the energy
sector of oil, minerals and other natural resources have for the four case countries of Angola,
Nigeria, Sudan, Zimbabwe - and Africa in general?
In other words, what will be the overall impact of China’s engagement in these countries - and
the continent in general - when such engagement is only focused on energy and natural
resources?
With point of departure in these overarching research questions above, I will present, identify and
review the current economic and political Chinese engagement in Africa in the context of the four
case countries: Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. In short, the link between China and the
first three countries is oil and as to Zimbabwe it is other natural resources. Due to China’s most
visible political engagement in Sudan and Zimbabwe, and the scope of the political turmoil and
complexity that surround these issues, I will dedicate some more space to these two case countries.
A more detailed argumentation for chosing these four case countries can be found in chapter two;
the methodological reflections and chapter four; empirical inputs. Regarding the areas of good
governance and human rights issues, the concept of cultural relativism including the so-called Asian
Values will be included in order to understand the Chinese view on and prioritisation of human
rights.
Moreover, I will identify and analyse the economic and developmental implications for the four
case countries and for Africa by engaging with China. How will these economic involvements
influence good governance and human rights issues, particularly in the Darfur region of Sudan and
11
in relation to Zimbabwe? Furthermore, I will look into whether one can speak of China primarily
using Africa in its oil and natural resources supply strategy.
1.8. Assumptions, Objective and Theoretical Framework
My research questions and field of work will be underpinned by an economic and foreign policy
theoretical framework in the form of two economic theoretical strands of thought and one foreign
policy theory. The first is found in the theories of growth and modernisation representing the
‘Western’ view on economic development. The second one is found in the Neo-Marxist theories of
underdevelopment and dependency. The foreign policy theory will be the Two-Good theory whose
main assumption is that all states at all times pursue two goods; change and maintenance of which
none of the two goods mutually exclude one another and can be sought simultaneously. This
assumption makes the theory interesting in relation to identifying and subsequently analysing
China’s activities in Africa that so far have taken place on all levels; bilaterally, regionally and in
the multilateral arena involving economic and more or less obvious political agendas. I therefore
believe that this particular theory will serve as a useful and relevant tool in my exploration of
China’s relations with Africa. The exploration will be done by looking into official and rhetorical
statements expressed at the FOCAC meetings, in the Beijing Consensus including the five core
principles in China’s foreign policy and in China’s Africa Policy of 2006. That will be followed by
case studies of the four African case countries including an economic overview of the four case
countries to be used in relation to the analysis of the economic implications for Africa. The latter
will in the analysis include distinct African features in terms of history and economics, political and
cultural structures and long-lasting relations with the West.
Moreover, analyses will be made on the main research questions posed in the problem formulation
that include China’s adherence to cultural relativism in relation to a different prioritisation of human
rights and its influence on the engagement with pariah regimes.
On the basis of all of this, I believe that a nuanced understanding of the China-Africa relations will
be obtained and thus serves the objective of finding out what the economic implications for Africa
will be when engaging so heavily with China, particularly in the energy sectors, and what the
influence on good governance and human rights will be.
12
13
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
With an aim to chart the major structure of the thesis, this chapter firstly discusses how the theories
are used, and what the limitations of the thesis are. Furthermore, I will show how the coherence
within and among the chapters is achieved, and how the problems posed in the first chapter are
analysed by using the empirical material. Last but not least, I will comment on the choice and use of
data, material and sources. An overview of the methodological structure of the thesis is shown on
the last page of this chapter.
2.1. Structure of the Thesis
The thesis falls into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject of the thesis and poses
questions to explore based on my preliminary research in the field of China-Africa relations with an
emphasis on their influence on good governance and human rights issues. The third chapter presents
the theories; two economic strands of thought, the theories of growth and modernisation and the
Neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment and dependency; and a foreign policy theory, the TwoGood theory. The fourth chapter initially provides empirical inputs by initially giving an historical
account of the China-Africa relations and how they have evolved since 1949. The chapter also
includes a presentation and review of the official policies used towards Africa in the form of;
the FOCAC meetings and China’s Africa Policy of 2006, and facts and figures on where and how
China is engaged in Africa economically. Besides referring to Africa in general, the countries of
Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe will serve as so-called case countries.
The fifth chapter will be the analytical insights including a discussing of the theories and analyses
based on what has been presented and reviewed in the former chapter by looking into the economic
implications for Africa in general but also for the four case countries by engaging with China. The
focus point will be the influence of China’s principle of non-interference in internal affairs on good
governance and human rights issues by including China’s adherence to cultural relativism when it
comes to the understanding and prioritisation of human rights, followed by an assessment of how
China actually fit in Africa when considering distinct African features and relations with the West.
The last part will be analytical African perspectives on China in Africa. Lastly, the conclusion will
sum up the thesis and first of all answer the research questions posed in the first chapter and
conclude on the assumptions made as well. It will furthermore conclude on the applicability of the
economic and foreign policy theories used based on what has been presented and reviewed in the
empirical chapter as that part besides from illustrating the China-Africa relations from its formal
14
and rhetorical side also shows the relations played out in practise through China’s economic and
political engagement in Africa in general but also in the four case countries. Finally, the conclusion
will draw from the analytical insights in the analysis.
2.2. Choice and Application of Theories
The reason why the economic theories of growth and modernisation and the Neo-Marxist theories
of underdevelopment and dependency have been chosen is that these two economic theories
respectively can represent the ‘Western’ traditional way of economic development and a socialist
view on underdevelopment and dependency. Together, they are interesting in relation to China and
its view on development as the characterisation of the country is that it officially still is a
Communist country, but economically it practises state capitalism – also in relation to its
engagement in Africa. The third and last theory; the Two-Good theory is a foreign policy theory
which is relevant and useful in the sense that it can help to explain why China behaves as it does in
relation to Africa and the making of its official policies as e.g. China’s Africa Policy. As the theory
takes its point of departure in the two goods being change and maintenance considered the ‘goals’
of all states, it is though useful as it in a way can be applied to all states in general, but as the theory
does not believe that the two goods mutually exclude one another and furthermore considers the
situation of trade-offs between states, it is of interesting relevance regarding China-Africa relations
that are also characterised by trade-offs in many aspects.
2.3. Limitations of the Thesis
The broadness found in the topic of China-Africa relations automatically means that there are
certain limitations of the thesis as to relevant issues to explore. I have chosen to focus on China’s
investments in the energy sectors – oil and other natural resources –and the economic implications
for Africa by being so deeply engaged with China economically and such relations’ influence with
China’s use of the non-interference principle on good governance and human rights issues out of
particular interest to how relations affect Sudan and Zimbabwe. That is also why some unevenness
can be detected regarding the four case countries, as the cases of Sudan and Zimbabwe have more
issues and incidents to be explored in order to fully grasp and understand the criticism from the
international community towards China’s engagement here.
Due to the amount of time available and the limitation on the number of pages allowed, the section
covering the African perspectives in the analytical chapter only have two extra subsections
15
dedicated to Sudan and Zimbabwe and not to all of the case countries. One can without doubt list a
vast number of other very interesting fields to explore as to China-Africa relations like e.g.
hegemony theories and the question of whether China is an actual rising hegemon, and how China’s
role as an economic power for instance affects its relations with the US.
Some of the limitations are not only related to the many other aspects that could have been
explored, but also to finding substantive, objective in certain contexts, and accessible data and
material to work with when dealing with very poor, unstructured but also academically ‘isolated’
countries such as especially Zimbabwe.
2.4. Commentary on Data, Material and Sources
I have used books, articles, e-articles and various internet websites in my quest for finding
substantive good data and material. The reason why I have used CIA World Fact Book a lot as a
source for the case countries in the empirical chapter is, that I wanted a source that was objective in
this context with come sound factual knowledge where the information was worked out in the same
way, so it could constitute the ‘base’ and then other various sources could be added on. Even
though some of the figures from Figure 5 are not from the same year in each country but from the
same source, I believe that they have served their purpose.
In my talk with Professor Maxi Schoeman21 from the University of Pretoria, South Africa, she
recommended to use material from the author Chris Alden22 who is a very known author and
scholar in the field of China-Africa relations. He provides consistent and sound material in which
she agreed could be very difficult to find elsewhere when dealing with countries such as Zimbabwe.
The variety found in my sources also reflects the complexity of my topic which requires a multiangle address in order to assess the topic correctly, and I believe that I have done my best to use
objective, though often Western, sources, but also Chinese ones including, among others, a rare
opportunity to openly discuss China’s role in Africa and Sudan in particular with the Chinese
Professor Zhang Shengjun from the School of Politics and International Studies at Beijing’s
(Normal) University in Aalborg, Denmark on 28 November, 2008. African perspectives by African
21
Schoeman, Maxi, (2008).
Chris Alden is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. He has researched and published on Asian-African relations for over fifteen years. He has previously
taught at the University of the Witwatersrand, and held research fellowships at the University of Tokyo, the Ecole
Normale Supérieure and the University of Cambridge.
Retreived from: Alden, Chris (2007), p. 1
22
16
authors have also been included through the very informative and analytical book ‘African
perspectives on China in Africa’ by Manji Firoze and Stephen Marks (2007).
I have thus used a data triangulation approach in which I believe that all these sources together
allow me to arrive at a relatively holistic/nuanced understanding of China’s engagement in Africa.
17
Methodological Structure of Thesis
18
CHAPTER 3: THEORIES
3.1. Presentation, Relevance and Use of Theories
In this chapter, theoretical strands of thought within two categories will be presented; 1) economic
development and 2) foreign policy. The first category contains two economic theoretical strands of
thought within development; the theories of Growth and Modernisation, and the Neo-Marxist
theories of Underdevelopment and Dependency. The second category consists of a foreign policy
theory; the Two Good Theory.
The two economic theories will serve as the foundation within economic development representing
two opposite directions – the one of growth and modernisation expressed by the capitalist and more
Western focus on the rising per capita, after going through a modernisation process, or that of
ending in a dependency relationship where developing countries become the source of surplus by
engaging with developed and rich countries as stated in the neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment and dependency.
This question links the two theories to the analysis of China’s engagement in Africa in chapter five.
By using the two theories as the basis and point of departure, I will find out what China’s
engagement is leading to – growth and modernisation or dependency or perhaps both with the
former being the case in some areas and the latter in other areas.
In relation to China’s investments in Africa, the two directions become interesting as China
officially is a Communist state and therefore theoretically should be in favour of a Neo-Marxist
economic development strategy, but in practice China embraces an authoritarian capitalist system
which exercises state capitalism. The theories can therefore be useful as they include such two
opposites as expressed in China’s official ideology, rhetoric and actions towards Africa, and
therefore they could be explanative of the tendencies stemming from China’s policies and whether
they benefit Africa, and if so in what way.
Furthermore, the growth and modernisation theory also represents a more ‘Western’ view and
thereby also partly the Western way of looking at economic development which makes room for
analytical insight in chapter five as that is considered to be the alternative to the Chinese way of
development in Africa.
19
The two theories of economic development are therefore relevant when the economic implications
for Africa as to the Chinese investments will be determined through the analytical chapter.
As to the Two-Good theory, it is to start with relevant as it is a foreign policy theory, and thereby it
works as a tool in order to understand the motivations and actions of China in its engagement in
Africa. The theory is firstly interesting because it illuminates the trade-offs decision makers face in
selecting among policies to maximize utility, given a state's goals by assuming that all states pursue
two goods – maintenance and change . The theory therefore stands out from most other approaches
despite a few similarities to Realism and Neo-Realism. Secondly, it includes how the allocation of
foreign policy resources like e.g. foreign aid is done which is presumed to be done as efficiently as
possible to maximize utility. Thirdly, the theory is not motivated by a desire to explain and
understand only one state’s foreign policy or only one type of behaviour. Instead, the theory’s goal
is to understand the factors that affect the foreign policy portfolios of all states at all times. It might
be abstract but it makes it useful and interesting as many and very different countries interact in the
realm of China-Africa relations.
The theoretical aspect of trade-offs becomes relevant as China plays an important role in the
multilateral arena, and it is allegedly using its power to ‘protect’ African countries. As to the
allocation of foreign policy resources, analytical insights can be made on the basis of this theoretical
point as e.g. China has invested heavily in African countries rich in oil and minerals, provided loans
with ‘no strings attached’ as well as donated foreign aid, and many diplomatic meetings have been
arranged. With these aspects reflected in the theory, it serves as a useful tool when the foreign
policy objective of China has to be determined. The analysis (in chapter five) of reality put up
against the Two-Good theory thereby throws light on the question of reconciliation in China’s
Africa Policy as the theoretical basis gives room for a structured insight into the Chinese rhetoric,
national interests and question of an altruistic motive when providing such favourable loans as well
as foreign aid. This part then becomes important as to the answer of whether the principle of noninterference in internal affairs in China’s Africa Policy can be reconciled with the challenge of good
governance and the respect and practice of human rights in Africa.
3.2. Introduction of Theories of Growth and Modernisation
The classical development economists pioneered within their field from the late1940s to the
beginning of the 1960s. They did not agree on what the most important sources of growth were, or
20
how the process was best set in motion. Each of the various theoretical strands of thought have had
an influence on subsequent theory formation and the international debates on development
problems, but the two economists W. Arthur Lewis and W.W. Rostow have in particular left an
important foot print within the field due to elaborate and detailed analyses. Since the 1960s and
onwards, they have functioned as mutually supplementary theoretical frames of reference,
especially in the Western world’s development debate.23
3.2.1. Modernisation and Stages of Growth: Lewis and Rostow
To Lewis and Rostow, economic development is a modernisation process where focus is put on the
rising per capita income which is also considered as the central measure of growth. Their starting
point is a model of developing countries with an abundant supply of labour in the traditional sector
where the savings rate is regarded as the central determinant for the investment rate and further for
the overall growth rate. The driving force behind the economic growth is the capitalist or
entrepreneurial class which is essential, in particular, for initiating the process.24
Lewis uses a two-sector model of a closed backward economy with an unlimited supply of labour at
a subsistence wage with one capitalist sector and the other characterised as the subsistence sector.
The capitalist sector employed wage earners, used reproducible capital and paid capitalists for the
use of capital. The subsistence sector consisted of family labour where reproducible capital was not
used and the labour productivity low. The abundant labour reserves (not necessarily unemployed
but underemployed) was found in this sector, and they could be transferred to the capitalist sector
without resulting in a decline in the total production in the subsistence sector, and the wage would
be determined by the average in the subsistence sector and not by the productivity in the capitalist
sector. Lewis’s argument was that the lack of accumulation of productive capital by the low rate of
savings was the most important barrier to economic growth, and his answer to that central problem
was that the poor in the subsistence sector, and the workers in the capitalist sector could not create
the needed increase in savings as they were too poor to save a significant proportion of their
income. The rich in the subsistence sector could either, as they were most landowners, who spent
their rents and other income unproductively to buy existing assets rather than creating new ones.
The increase in savings therefore had to come from the other component of the rich in the basic
model; the capitalists as their profits, according to the classical political economics’ assumption,
23
24
Martinussen, John (2003), pp. 56-57 + p. 61
Ibid p. 61
21
would be both saved and invested. It was now a question of how the profits could be increased as a
proportion of national income which Lewis saw achieved through the inherent dynamics of the
capitalist sector. He asserted that when a core capitalist sector was established with unlimited
supply of cheap labour, at least a part of the capitalists’ profits would be reinvested resulting in an
increase in the total amount of capital available.25
The outcome would be that more workers from the subsistence sector would be ‘drawn’ into the
capitalist sector where their productivity would be higher than reflected in their low wages
(primarily determined by the subsistence sector). Finally, sustained economic growth would be the
outcome, pushed forward by the capitalists whose role could also be played by the state and not
necessarily by private capital owners.26
Lewis extended his model to cover an open economy where one of his main conclusions was that
trade between developing countries and industrialised countries did not promote growth and
economic progress in the former. He explained this by saying that wages in the poor countries,
according to his model, were determined by the supply (subsistence) price of labour arguing that the
increased productivity of labour coming from the transfer to the capitalist sector would be passed on
to the consumers in the industrialised countries in the form of lower prices on products.27
Rostow’s theory of stages of economic growth and modernisation used Lewis’s model as one of the
important starting points as he also distinguished between the traditional sector and the modern
capitalist sector. On the point of the necessity of a significant increase of savings and investment in
national income in order to get the necessary precondition for stopping the low income stagnation,
was something that Rostow shared with Lewis. However, Rostow’s focus lay more on the stages
through which a society develops. He wanted to identify strategic or critical variables that could
constitute the right conditions for change and transition to reach a new stage. Rostow’s unilinear
and universal stage theory divided the development process into the following five stages:

The traditional society

The establishment of the preconditions for take off

The take-off stage
25
Martinussen, John (2003) op.cit. pp. 61-62
Ibid pp. 62-63
27
Martinussen, John (2003) op.cit. p. 63
26
22

The drive to maturity

The époque of high mass consumption28
One of Rostow’s central points was that all societies, sooner or later, will go through these five
economic stages. The question of when was primarily determined by natural and economic
circumstances with some importance assigned to political and cultural conditions. The
conceptualisation of the five stages is not that precise and the same internal consistency of
reasoning as in Lewis’s theoretical model is not found with Rostow but he does describe how, prior
to their take-off, the industrialised countries – some of them for an entire century – went through
several changes which were all seen as part of breaking out of the traditional structure. The
following three specific conditions had to be in place immediately before take-off:
1) A marked increase in the investment rate, 2) the emergence of particular growth sectors
functioning as engines of aggregate economic growth, and 3) the establishment of political,
social and institutional frameworks that made it possible to use the potential in the modern
sector and, thereby, reaching self-sustaining growth.
Rostow adhered to a mono-economic approach by imagining the developing countries following the
same pattern despite the quite different international economic system than that of the industrialised
and advanced countries. That placed him outside the mainstream of development economics.29
3.3. Introduction of Neo-Marxist Theories of Underdevelopment and Dependency
Until the 1970s, a dichotomy had evolved with the dependency theories on one side and the growth
and modernisation theories on the other. However, development researchers realised that none of
these schools, in their original forms, could interpret and explain the causes and dynamics of
development and underdevelopment. The Third World should no longer be conceived as a large
group of countries with uniform economic structures, development conditions and potentials no
matter whether these countries were described as underdeveloped, as dual economies, satellites, or
as peripheral societies. To illustrate the process of differentiation, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979
and the continued stagnation of the world economy in the beginning of the 1980s showed that the
less developed countries reacted and had to react in dissimilar ways confirming the new necessity of
looking at the Third World as a non-homogeneous group of countries. One of the few common
28
29
Martinussen, John (2003) op.cit pp. 63-64
Ibid p. 64
23
traits was that economic progress almost everywhere remained limited to small geographic
enclaves, to some narrowly limited sectors, and to small prosperous social groups – the
phenomenon characterised as ‘Singaporisation’ after the city-state of Singapore.30
3.3.1. Metropoles and Satellites: Andre Gunder Frank
Andre Gunder Frank was interested in identifying the causes of underdevelopment but his focus
was not on the social classes and their control over the economic surplus. Frank argued that the
crucial mechanism for extraction of the surplus was trade and other kinds of exchange of goods and
services – not only international trade, but also exchange internally in the peripheral societies. He
rejected the concept of the underdeveloped countries made up two separate economies with one
modern and capitalist and another traditional and non-capitalist. He claimed that capitalism
permeated the periphery to a degree where the Latin American and other peripheral societies had
become integrated parts of a one-world capitalist system due to the first penetration by metropolitan
merchant capital. The capitalist exchange relations and networks therefore created a link between
the poorest agricultural labourers in the periphery with the executive directors of the large
corporations in the US. These relations and networks were called metropoles and satellites in a
pyramidal structure by Frank. The bottom would be the agricultural labourers and the small farmers
in the rural regions of the periphery and functioning as satellites. They were connected, mostly
through trade, to the landowners and local centres of capital accumulation that would act as local
metropoles. These would in turn be satellites in terms of regional economic elites and centres of
surplus extraction. Through several links, the structure grew until reaching the ruling classes and
world centres of capitalism in the US. The surplus stemming from this pyramidal structure was
appropriated by the centres which, in turn, were subject to the surplus extraction activities of higher
level centres. According to Frank, empirical evidence showed that the economic surplus generated
in Latin America was drained away as it was transferred to the affluent capitalist countries, the US
in particular, instead of being invested in the countries of origin. Frank’s point was that the interests
of the metropoles would lay the way for the development of the satellites, and he also believed that
neither the US nor the other industrialised countries had any interests in genuine development of the
Latin American countries. Furthermore, it was indicated that those countries and regions that had
the closest ‘relationship’ with the industrialised countries were also the least developed. The
economic progress was therefore believed to be blocked by the metropole-satellites relations and
30
Martinussen, John (2003) op.cit., p. 93
24
thus actively causing underdevelopment. Frank’s answer was therefore that all Latin American
countries – and other Third World countries – should delink themselves from the world market and
thereby also from the US and other industrialised countries.31
The delinking meant that some kind of socialism had to be introduced in the peripheral countries as
the de-linking could not be expected to be done by the ruling classes and the landowners (read:
capitalists) as the source to their own surplus then would be removed.32
3.3.2. Dependent Development: Cardoso, Senghass and Menzel
In relation to Frank, a number of more open theories appeared where differences between Third
World countries were taken into account. The Brazilian social scientist F.H. Cardoso rejected the
notion that peripheral countries could be treated as one group of dependent economies, and that the
world market and other external factors should be seen as more important than intra-societal
conditions and forces. He claimed that external factors would have different impacts depending on
the various internal conditions. These conditions would be economic structures, social classes, the
distribution of power in the society, and the role of the state thus combining economics and political
science.33
Cardoso regarded the national bourgeoisies of the dependent societies as potentially powerful and
capable of shaping development. These classes could be so weak that they mostly functioned as an
extended arm of imperialism. The national business community and its leaders could, however,
under other circumstances (as in the case of Brazil) act so autonomously and effectively that
national, long-term interests were taken into account and embodied in the strategies pursued by the
state. However, the result was not autocentric reproduction, but rather development in dependency
also characterised by Cardoso as dependent, associated development – i.e. development dependent
on, and linked to, the world market and the centre economies. In his further characterisation,
Cardoso relates to the scholar Samir Amin34 on the emphasis on the unbalanced and distorted
production structure with its too large sector manufacturing luxury goods only to the benefit of the
bourgeoisie and the middle class. The result would then be a dependency on importing machinery
31
Martinussen, John (2003) op.cit. pp. 88-89
Ibid
33
Martinussen, John (2003) op.cit. pp. 94-95
34
Egyptian-born and Paris-trained, Samir Amin is one of the better known Neo-Marxian thinkers, both in development
theory as well as in the relativistic-cultural critique of social sciences. Promoter of the conscious self-reliance of
developing countries, particular for the Arab world.
Retrieved from: http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/amin.htm (5 May 2008)
32
25
and equipment due to the absence of a sector that produces capital goods. Cardosa, though, mostly
referred to Brazil where he saw the need of democratic reform as a precondition for turning societal
development, so that it would benefit the majority of the people. To him, socialism was not on the
agenda, and going that way was not as unproblematic as Frank and Amin had claimed. He was
reluctant to recommend general strategies for dependent countries. 35
Parallel to Cardoso’s efforts to adjust the classical dependency theories to the more complex reality
of Brazil, some German development researchers with Dieter Senghass and Ulrich Menzel in the
lead completed extensive historical studies of both centre and peripheral societies that resulted in a
systematic and elaborate differentiation within both categories of countries. Their point was that the
centre countries too, like the peripheral societies, revealed very different individualised structures
and patterns of transformation. There were e.g. big differences between the Nordic countries and
France or Germany. Based on their historical studies, Senghass and Menzel arrived at the
dissolution of the dichotomy between centre and periphery. Instead, a number of patterns of
integration into the world economy and the resulting development trajectories were presented. They
concluded that whether or not a given society managed, or did not manage, to break out of the
dependency trap could not solely be explained by the international conditions. Internal socioeconomic conditions and political institutions were seen as far more important in determining
whether the economy in a given country could be transformed from a dependent export economy to
an autocentric, nationally integrated economy.36
3.4. Introduction of a Theory of Foreign Policy: The Two-Good Theory
The Two-Good Theory is a theory of foreign policy developed by the two American political
scientists Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer. The theory presents a general explanation of how
states develop their foreign policy. It stands in contrast to most approaches and especially the realist
and neo-realist concepts where foreign policy behaviour is seen as being policy motivated by one
central goal: security of the nation. They, however, assume that states pursue two things, or goods,
through their foreign policy: change and maintenance, and furthermore illuminate the trade-offs
decision makers face in selecting among policies to maximize utility, given a state's goals.
35
36
Martinussen, John (2003) op.cit. p. 95
Ibid pp. 95-96
26
3.4.1. The Assumptions of the Two-Good Model
In the Two-Good Theory, the notion is that politics, whether international or domestic, occur over
issues. An issue is anything meeting the following conditions: it can take on more than one value;
political actors have some influence over which value obtains; at least two actors have different
preferences over the range of values; and the actors are aware of these things. In the international
realm, common issues can be from the question of who rules a particular territory to the
determination of precise tariff levels to the decision regarding whether the citizen of one country
can enter another country. The core of politics is thus the struggle among political actors to achieve
favourable outcomes on issues. The actor identifies which outcome would be the most desirable and
compares two possible ones and determines whether it is indifferent between them or one is
preferred over the other. 37 The notion is presented in Figure 1.38
Figure 1: Issue Dimensions in Foreign Policy
In this figure, a world in which there are two actors are depicted, i and j, and two salient issues: the
level of military expenditures by actor i and the tariff level imposed by j. The units are left
unspecified, and it is presumed that as we move from left to right in the figure, the level of military
expenditure increases and that as we move from bottom to top the tariff level increases. Each actor
is indicated in the space by a dot that corresponds to its most preferred outcome on each issue (actor
j prefers higher tariff levels and lower military expenditures than does actor j), and the distance is
associated with preferences i.e. the farther away an outcome is from an actor’s ideal point (its most
preferred outcome), the less preferred it is. Furthermore, a dot also represents the status quo which
shows the current levels of military expenditure and tariffs. The figure therefore reads that actor i is
fairly satisfied with its level of military expenditure, though it would like an increase and would
37
38
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006), p. 19
Ibid, cf. Fig. 2.1.on p. 20
27
prefer to see j reduce its tariff levels. J on the other hand, would like to see a substantial reduction in
i’s military expenditures and has its tariffs set at its most preferred level.39
The theory presumes that international politics is characterised by an infinite number of issues. Not
every issue is particularly important to every actor, and some important issues may not be in
contention all the time. In order to comprehend political behaviour and thereby generalise and
analyse about the trade-offs political actors make over things they value, an abstraction from the
infinite list of goods that states could pursue is necessary. A political actor is asserted to be
relatively discontent with the status quo as to some issues and relatively content with the status quo
on other issues i.e. the behaviour will be devoted to changing the things it dislikes, and some will be
devoted to maintaining elements of the status quo it likes which makes the status quo
multidimensional. It can thereby be characterised that states seek to produce two composite goods
through their foreign policies; that of change and that of maintenance.40
According to Morgan and Palmer, the advantage of conceptualising two (rather than one) composite
good is that it becomes possible to consider trade-offs that actors have to make in their political
decisions. They believe that the model provides a more reasonable explanation by allowing for the
possibility of an actor who is willing to sacrifice maintenance for change; i.e., one that is willing to
risk losing outcomes it likes on some issues for the prospect of gaining outcomes it desires on
others exemplified by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and thereby an explanation for why two
states would come into conflict.41
The first aspect of the two-good conceptualisation is that it is abstract as maintenance and change
are not tangible goods. The two concepts are used to represent two foreign policy goals that involve
tangible issues (e.g. territory), and the authors consider the abstraction as necessary in order to make
analysis manageable. Secondly, it is assumed that all states, at all times, seek both change and
maintenance, and some states will emphasise one over the other but it is not expected that one is
sought to the exclusion of the other. The theory furthermore stresses that there lies no moral
judgement about states desires to preserve or change various aspects of the status quo – the desires
are considered rooted in state preferences regarding the underlying issues. The explanation for state
behaviour is therefore not dependent on whether any state’s preferences are moral or not. Finally,
according to the theory, the notion of the status quo is not static but constantly changing, more on
39
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op. cit. p. 20
Ibid p. 21
41
Ibid p. 22
40
28
some dimensions (issues) than others. Such a dynamic status quo is seen as a necessary
consequence of viewing politics as occurring over a multitude of issues. Thus, maintenance-seeking
behaviour is not aimed at preserving all aspects of the status quo; rather, it is aimed at preserving
some aspects over which the state has some control through its foreign policy.42
3.4.2. Determination of Maintenance and Change
In order to identify whether a particular behaviour is change or maintenance seeking when also
allowing for a dynamic status quo, the following example of the US and its allies going to war
against Iraq in 1991 can be used. The questions include whether the goal was to maintain the status
quo of an independent Kuwait or to change the status quo of an Iraqi-dominated Kuwait? This is
addressed by considering the status quo on an issue to refer to a trend43 that is generally (not
necessarily universally) accepted to identify actors’ anticipations on that issue for the foreseeable
future. A change then only becomes the new status quo when it becomes generally accepted as
such. Again, in order to illustrate, two examples can be used. The first is Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
which is a clear example of change-seeking behaviour because the change in the issue – from an
independent Kuwait to a state controlled by Iraq – was not generally accepted as a new status quo.
The actions of the US and its allies to liberate Kuwait were maintenance seeking. If the US had
continued the war and in order to overthrow Hussein, the behaviour would have been change
seeking as the accepted and established status quo included an Iraq led by Hussein.
The second example regards the current anticipation that China will continue to develop
economically. If a state put efforts into keeping China at its current level of economic development,
it would be change seeking behaviour as such efforts would be directed at altering the anticipated
trend.44
The theory notes that it does not distinguish between policies directed at producing ‘potential’
change or maintenance and realised change or maintenance. For example, many states devote
resources to the military in order to protect their territories from invasion, and this is considered as
maintenance seeking behaviour, even if there is no attack and the military is never used. However,
when many states adopt policies that are designed to gain influence over the actions of other states,
42
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. pp. 22-23
The trend can be flat i.e. unchanging. E.g. the trend regarding the territory contained within the US has been
unchanged for years and is expected to remain so in the foreseeable future.
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. p. 23 note 9.
44
Ibid pp. 23-24
43
29
it is considered change seeking even if the influence is not exercised overtly.45 The point of the
theory is thus that when a state is referred to as seeking maintenance or change of the status quo, the
reference is to its actions intended to affect the outcome on a particular issue.46
3.4.3. Resources and a State’s Abilities
Foreign policy actions require resources. These may be physical resources such as minerals,
agricultural produce, or human capital, economic resources such as cash or industrial produce,
diplomatic resources such as the time and attention of ambassadors, or anything else that can be
used to pursue foreign policy objectives. Environmental constraints determine the amount of
resources a state has available for foreign policy and the efficiency with which these resources can
be utilised to create change or maintenance i.e. states’ ability to produce change and maintenance is
thus related to the amount of resources it has, relative to other states, meaning that resourceful states
can produce more foreign policy goods.47
A number of factors could affect the proportion of a state’s resources devoted to foreign policy. For
instance, if a threat coming from the international system increases, the proportion of resources
devoted to foreign policy is thus expected to increase as well. States with more resources are
therefore expected to engage in more foreign policy activities. The theory sees two distinct patterns
in this regard. Firstly, it is assumed that as a state increases in resources, its ability to produce
maintenance increases at a decreasing rate while its ability to produce change increases at an
increasing rate. Additional resources thereby result in less additional maintenance for a strong state
than for a weak state and produce more change for a strong state than for a weak state. However,
once a state is so resourceful that it can do whatever it wants, additional resources will no longer
continue to increase its ability to produce change. It is though not believed that any state has ever
reached such a level, and it is not expected either in the future.48
45
E.g during the Cold War the Soviet Union rarely, if ever, overtly interfered in Finnish politics. It was believed though
that if the Finns had for instance elected a prime minister who was not liked by the Soviets, an interference would most
likely have occurred.
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. p. 24.
46
Ibid p. 27
47
Ibid p. 28
48
Ibid pp. 28-29.
30
Three justifications are put forward as to the assumption of such a ‘distinct pattern’. First, it is
considered easier to defend the status quo than to change it as scholars find it more ‘sticky’.49 It is
therefore only after a state has gained a quite big ‘reserve’ of resources that it sees its ability to
change increase substantially. On the other hand, a state high in capabilities can protect most of
what it values and further additional capabilities can do fairly little to enhance this ability. Second,
this assumption is partially motivated by the recognition that there are many states with few
capabilities, a few states with modest capabilities and very few states with great capabilities in the
international system. Thus, a weak state would be able to defend its interests against a larger
number of potential challengers than would a strong state if they enhanced their capabilities by the
same amount. The weak state would not necessarily be able to challenge others, though, given the
preceding reasoning. As there are relatively few states that the strong can surpass by obtaining
additional capabilities, growth does relatively little to increase the number of potential challengers
against whom they can defend. As they have sufficient capabilities to challenge others, additional
resources can be utilised to increase the number of issues over which they seek change and/or to
increase the amount of change they seek on issues already in contention. Finally, this assumption is
meant to partly include the traditional realist view that states must assure their security before
turning their attention to other matters also meaning that states defend aspects of the status quo they
like before they attempt to change the aspects they dislike.50
In addition to environmental constraints, the second factor determining the balance of change and
maintenance pursued by a state is preferences over the two goods. And these preferences are
generally believed to be affected by two factors. First, the distance (weighed by the importance of
the issues for the state) between the status quo and the state’s ideal point (its most preferred
outcome on every issue) directly affects its relative preferences over change and maintenance. The
closer the status quo is to the state’s ideal point, the more the state will prefer maintenance and the
farther the status quo from the state’s ideal point, the more will it prefer change. Second, the level
of threat coming from others affects state preferences regarding change and maintenance. It is
49
E.g. Typically it is a lot easier for the opponents of change to succeed in legislative bodies than it is for the
proponents of change. Proponents must pass several hurdles – committees, amendment procedures, floor votes, perhaps
two houses etc. Opponents need only win at one of these stages. Furthermore, in international norms, particularly those
respecting sovereignty, are typically conservative in nature, designed to preserve actors and their ’rights’. The greater
burden is on actors wishing to effect change.
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. p. 29.
50
Despite the realist insight in this regard, it does not mean that states must assure their ability to provide maintenance
before they will seek change.
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. pp. 29-31
31
assumed that as the level of threat increases, the relative preference for maintenance over change
also increases i.e. state preferences are partially determined by the actions, occurring and expected,
of other states. A state that faces no challenges to its interests will prefer to pursue more change
than will a state that is threatened with adverse alterations on many issues, all else being equal. 51
3.4.4. Single-Policy Hypotheses
At a general level, the theory recognises that virtually every type of foreign policy activity can be
used in the pursuit of either change or maintenance, depending on the intentions of the actor.
Military force can be used to change the status quo, as when one country attempts to overthrow the
government of another, or to maintain the status quo, as when force is used to keep sea-lanes open.
An alliance can be formed with the intention of protecting the signatories against the challenges of
another, or the intention of joining forces to attack another. Foreign aid can be given in an effort to
influence the recipient’s behaviour or in an effort to help the recipient defend its interests against
some threat.52
It is assumed that the initiation of militarised disputes is change-seeking behaviour and states that
initiate military conflict are usually (though not always) attempting to bring about some alteration
of the status quo. On the other hand, conflict reciprocation is considered as maintenance-seeking
behaviour. States that respond to another’s use of force in kind are generally attempting to prevent a
change in the status quo from occurring. Similarly, an emphasis is seen on covert operations, or the
support of ‘terrorism’, to be an example of change-seeking behaviour, in general. These activities
are almost always intended to alter the status quo in some way. Efforts at counterterrorism or to
combat other countries’ covert operations are seen as maintenance-seeking behaviour.53
As to defence spending , the state’s overall level of expenditures is viewed as indicative of the
degree of maintenance-seeking behaviour in its foreign policy and thus assumes that the spending is
typically designed to offer protection of the state’s interests rather than bringing about changes in
the international system. However, it is recognised that the military is often used to seek change and
therefore it is furthermore assumed that the degree of change-seeking behaviour in a state’s policy
is indicated by the particularities of the state’s force posture. This means that militaries that are
51
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. pp. 31-32
Ibid pp. 35-36
53
Ibid p. 36
52
32
organised around force projection capabilities (aircraft carriers, troop transports etc) indicate a
change-seeking state.54
In the case of foreign aid which is given with the expectation of some quid pro quo (which much is)
is clearly change-seeking. Similarly, aid given from a higher motive – to help those in need – is also
clearly change-seeking. However, a problem concerning the intent or goal of foreign aid arises
because some aid is provided to bolster weak regimes against their internal or external enemies but
much of this may actually be change-seeking. Firstly, some has strings attached; i.e. the recipient is
obliged to behave in a manner favourable to the donor. Further, supporting a regime that would be
expected to fall due to internal trends fits with the theory’s definition of change. Aid is therefore
only an example of maintenance when it is provided to defend a regime against an external threat
and when that is the primary motivation for the donor.55
Finally, regarding form of alliances some are seen as change-seeking and others as maintenanceseeking. This determination is based on the capabilities of the alliance partners. A state that has
aligned with a stronger power is considered as to be gaining maintenance from the alliance, while a
state that has aligned with a weaker power gains change from the alliance. This is believed to partly
reflect the realities of international politics. Weak states can only marginally add to strong states’
defensive capabilities, so the strong must usually get something else from the alliance which is also
often reflected in actual alliance treaties where it is required that a strong state comes to the defence
of its weaker ally while the weaker is required to allow the stronger trade concessions or some
control over the weaker’s policies.56
3.4.5. Substitutability
As to the concept of substitutability, the theory assumes that when states are deciding which foreign
policy tool to use in the pursuit of either change or maintenance, they select the tool which is most
efficient i.e. they will choose the behaviour that produces the most change or maintenance for a
given amount of resources consumed. For instance, if conditions suggest that a state will seek
additional change, it will engage in the change-producing behaviour or combination of behaviours
(such as dispute initiation, provision of foreign aid, or the imposition of economic sanctions) that
will provide the most change given the available resources. According to the theory, the efficiency
54
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. p.36
Ibid
56
Ibid p. 37
55
33
of a focus on a particular policy depends on why the increase occurred and thereby also how that
will affect other policies. In the context of the theory, there are three reasons for a state to devote
additional resources to a particular type of foreign policy behaviour and each has different
implications for what we should observe regarding other policies.57
First, if the overall amount of resources available for foreign policy increases (or decreases),
resources devoted to at least one policy will increase (or decrease). Generally, an increase in
change-seeking behaviour as well as an increase in maintenance-seeking behaviour will be
expected, and it is likely that more resources would be devoted to all types of foreign policy
activities. Second, the resources devoted to particular policies can be reallocated when the state’s
relative preferences over change and maintenance are altered. This means that when something
causes a state to increase or decrease its valuation for change relative to maintenance it will adjust
the components of its foreign policy portfolio accordingly. Finally, the allocation of resources
across policies can shift when something causes a change in the relative efficiency with which the
policies produce the foreign policy goods.58
57
58
Morgan, Clifton T. and Palmer, Glenn (2006) op.cit. p. 38
Ibid pp. 39-40
34
CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL INPUTS
4.1. Introduction of Empirical Inputs
In this chapter, empirical inputs will be presented and reviewed. They will together with the
theories constitute the basis for the analysis in chapter five. Firstly, there will be an historical
account of the China-Africa relations including three eras which will serve as basic and important
back ground knowledge about how the China-Africa relations have evolved since 1949 referring to
ideology, geo-political strategy and economics. In this way, an overview of the very broad spectrum
of China-Africa relations can be created. Following the historical account, mainly the FOCAC
meetings and the contents of China’s Africa Policy of 2006 will draw the picture of the official
political cooperation ‘on paper’. Thereafter, facts and figures from various scholars and authors will
show where and how China is engaged in Africa economically, thus also showing the Chinese
interests in the African continent when it comes to oil and natural resources. The countries of
Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe will serve as cases/examples. All these countries are in
particular important sources to China’s energy supply, but China’s involvement in Sudan and
Zimbabwe furthermore reveals its foreign policy approach to international relations when it comes
to economy but also to politics. The latter gives rise for an analysis of China’s foreign policy
approach towards Africa and the drivers of the policy in the following chapter. Social, cultural and
educational exchanges will briefly be reviewed through China’s Africa Policy of 2006.
4.2. The Three Main Eras in China-Africa relations from 1949 to the Present Day
The 20th century China-Africa relations can be periodised in a number of ways. Emma Mawdsley59
suggests three main eras: the Mao years (1949-1976), the first decade under Deng Xiaoping (19781989), and the post-Tiananmen Square years (from 1989). This section offers an overview of the
shifting ideological, economic and political underpinnings of China’s relationships with various
African governments, or the national liberation movements that preceded them, since the People’s
Republic of China’s inception in 1949.60
Before the Bandung Conference in 1955, the contact between China and some African leaders had
been limited. With the main themes and declarations of the Conference being respect for
sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of other nations, economical and technical
59
60
Dr Emma Mawdsley, PhD, Lecturer at Department of Geography, Cambridge University, England.
Mawdsley, Emma (2007), p. 408.
35
cooperation, mutual benefit, the needs and rights of developing countries (including investment and
the stabilisation of primary product prices), as well as peaceful coexistence, the multi-polar world
was envisioned, and thereby both the European colonialism and the US-USSR neo-imperialistic
superpower rivalry were rejected. However, these assertions were quickly underpinned by
economic and political weakness, by tensions and rivalries between the decolonising and newly
independent nations, and divisive measures from the West and the USSR. 61
In the short to medium term, the Chinese ideological commitment to Africa was expressed in the
modest aims of supporting anti-colonial liberation movements such as the National Liberation Front
(FLN) in Algeria and the growing number of independent African states in asserting their economic
and political autonomy. The foreign policy relations were also tactically driven by the need to create
allies in order to secure the more fledging PRC. However, the great political motivation for China’s
interest in Africa was its attempt to displace the Taiwan-based Republic of China at the UN which it
finally achieved in 1971 where 26 of the 76 votes in the PRC’s favour came from African
countries.62 In the long term, Maoist China’s goal in Africa was to encourage social revolution, and
the profound ideological commitment to the spread of Chinese socialism lay in the identification
with colonised and exploited nations. The humiliating national memory of the Opium Wars should
not be underestimated in the explanation of China’s promotion of an anti-imperialist axis.63
Due to China’s economic weakness and own domestic imperatives, solidarity with Africa was
largely expressed through technical assistance (doctors, nurses, agriculturalists and engineers),
educational scholarships, diplomatic ties and delegations. But other kinds of assistance such as
military equipment and infrastructural development (e.g. the TAZARA Railway) were also given.
During this period China also offered loans and grants to various African countries that, though they
were usually relatively small scale compared to other donors, they were often granted on distinctive
and very favourable terms.64 As stated by M.B. Yahuda, “in addition to consisting largely of
intermediate technology, all Chinese aid projects were given without ‘strings’, and since 1964
without interest”.65 Chinese workers were paid at the local rates, they trained their local equivalents
with the aim of leaving the projects, so that they could be locally managed, operated and
maintained, and thereby spare parts could be locally produced, Yahuda furthermore states.
61
Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p.408
Ibid p. 409
63
Ibid p. 408
64
Ibid p. 409
65
Yahuda, M.B. (1978), p. 409
62
36
Although ideological and geostrategic considerations were dominant over this period, economic
relations, while modest, were not unimportant. Trade relations often served to bolster alliances66.
On a number of occasions China accepted payment in kind, helping newly independent nations with
very limited levels of foreign exchange. However, on other occasions, commerce was foremost and
even undermined politico-ideological agendas. The growing Sino-Soviet rift of the late 1950s and
the early 1960s also eroded some of the goodwill generated by these policies, as Africa became one
of the theatres for the rivalry. Diplomatic relations were broken off with some countries such as
Angola as it was seen as being too close to the USSR while there was clear geopolitically driven
competition for the support of others. On some occasions, Chinese foreign policy in relation to
various African countries was driven more by opposition to the Soviets ‘revisionists’ and their
allies, than to the Western ‘imperialists’.67
As to the response from African states and movements in this period, the various political and
ideological dispositions, situations and preferences, and the role of specific governments and
leaders all influenced their diverse and changing relations with China. At various times, many
welcomed the example China provided of national autonomy; its identification with the oppressed
nations; its demand for greater equality and justice within the world system; its model of discipline
and frugality; and its moral, financial and technical support, often with little or nothing expected in
return. However, many African leaders were also cautious of Chinese ambitions and agendas,
particularly during periods like the Cultural Revolution, when Maoist fervour over-rode more
pragmatic, long-term and sensitive approaches. Moreover, some African leaders were not willing to
alienate the USSR, and the Sino-Soviet duelling did not improve China’s reputation on the
continent either. For instance in 1964, when China did its nuclear tests, the reactions from Africans
were mixed, and some like the then Kenyan President, Joma Kenyatta criticised it openly: “It is
naïve to think that there is no danger of imperialism from the East”68 and further claimed that in
world power politics, the influence of the East is as apparent as the one from the West and that they
both want Africa (‘us’) to serve their interests. Overall, the period between 1949 and 1978 was
marked by diverse but generally deepening relations between China and different African nations.
Abraham (2005) argues that the Non-Aligned Movement that arose from the Bandung Conference
In 1955, for example, China bought 15,000 tonnes of Egyptian cotton, earning Egypt’s gratitude at a time it was
having difficulty selling it to the West. In a similar manner, China bought 2 million tonned of tobacco from Tanzania in
1965, which it had been unable to sell to its usual buyers.
Source: Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 409
67
Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p.409
68
Larkin, B.D., (1971), p. 410
66
37
never lived up to its promise. Certainly in relation to China and different African countries,
divisions, betrayals, weaknesses, tensions and simply insignificance are seen – but it should also be
noted that there are success stories in relation to trade, political solidarity and general cooperation,
and importantly, its legacies in many parts of the continent today. China is not a new player in
African affairs.69
The late 1970s and 1980s marked a shift in Sino-African relations as Mao’s ideological fixations
were replaced by a more pragmatic approach adopted under Deng Xiaoping. Although trade
increased in this period, ideology was no longer a determinant of foreign relations. Now, it became
more important to secure economic growth.70 Instead, a ‘social modernisation’ project which
demanded economic investment and a non-conflictual approach to international politics was
‘launched’. The result was non-ideological relations with the US, Western Europe and Japan where
expanded trade links and cooperation were the priorities in the formulation of China’s foreign
policy.71
Overall, Chinese aid to Africa declined, as did the number of delegations and visits that acted as a
rough benchmark of diplomatic ties and political solidarity. Africa’s poor economic situation which
worsened almost everywhere in the continent over the 1980s, and its peripheral place within global
politics (including in relation to Sino-Soviet relations) further militated against Chinese interest.
Despite the rhetoric of South-South cooperation and solidarity, the reality was increasingly hollow,
and African nations confronted a ‘cold new realism’ in Chinese diplomacy. China’s focus now lay
on its own modernisation, and its scarce resources were deployed to that end rather than to aid
Africa. Economic pragmatism became the key recipe. For example, between 1976 and 1980,
Chinese exports to Nigeria rose from $128 million to $378 million; and overall trade with Africa
rose by 70% in this period. So did other forms of economic activity, including paid Chinese
consultants and technicians. But, according to Snow (1994), aid pledges fell,and this too with more
of an emphasis on practical benefits to both recipient and donor. However, China’s aid
commitments of $258.9 million in 1984 still made it Africa’s sixth largest donor.72
In this periodisation, the third and most recent phase of dramatically accelerating Sino-African
relations can be dated to 1989, when democratic uprisings in China were followed by reprisal –
69
Abraham, T.,(2005), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 410
Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p.410
71
Taylor, I.(1998), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 410
72
Snow, P.,(1994), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 411
70
38
Tiananmen Square acted as the place in which resistance and repression were played out and
observed globally. The negative reverberations in the Western world both alarmed and angered
China, prompting it to seek political allies, including Africa. It did not become a one-way process.
A number of African leaders, none of whom would have welcomed democratic judgement on their
own rule, sent messages of approval after China’s authoritarian crackdown. Angola’s foreign
minister stated his “support for the resolute actions to quell the counter-revolutionary rebellion”,
while Namibia’s president sent a telegram congratulating the Chinese Army on their actions. Many
Chinese and African leaders perceived the Western critiques as to human rights and democracy as
neo-imperialist arrogance. For some it evidenced the imposition of Western world views which they
argued act – perhaps intentionally so – to hold back the economic development and political
autonomy of the former trodden on nations. Tiananmen Square thereby put Africa back on the map
for high level negotiations and meetings73, and a dramatic increase was seen in aid. In 1990, 24 out
of 52 countries receiving Chinese aid were African. It also encouraged China to assert a number of
foreign policy principles as the basis for its return to a more internationalist foreign policy agenda,
albeit under very different internal and external conditions from those of the Maoist period.74
Even though Tiananmen became a useful incident to launch renewed relations, the demands of
China’s booming economy has been the enduring driver of change resulting in a sharp growth in
trade, investment and joint enterprises between China and various African countries. In 2002, trade
rose from $12 billion to nearly $40 billion in 2006, and according to Prime Minister Wen Jiabao;
this is set to rise to $100 billion over the next 5 years (Wild 2006).75 China is now Africa’s third
largest trade partner, with more than 700 Chinese companies (and most of them are state-run
enterprises) operating in 49 African countries. Smith (2005) argues that trade with China is “more
important to the [African] continent’s prosperity than [Gordon] Brown’s poverty-relief efforts”.76
Watts (2005) observes that Africa’s GDP rose by 5.8% last year which is the biggest increase in 30
years, and it is driven by China.77
The Chinese exports to Africa are dominated by manufactured goods, textiles and food grains.
Imports include manganese, iron, fish, timber, cooper and platinum. But for both economic and
73
The Chinese foreign minister made 14 visits to African countries between 1989 and 1992.
Source: Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 411
74
Ibid pp. 411-412
75
Wild, L.,(2006), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 412
76
Smith, D.,(2005), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 412
77
Watts, J.(2005), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 412
39
geostrategic reasons, it is China’s quest for oil (and to a lesser extent natural gas) that has got the
attention of the world. In 1999, Africa provided an estimated 18% of China’s imported oil (Jaffe
and Lewis 2002), a proportion that has risen since.78
4.3. The FOCAC Meetings.
Since 2000, the China-Africa relations have been expressed through the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) where conferences on a ministerial level have been held every three years.
The first conference was held in Beijing on October 10th-12th, 2000, where ministers of foreign
affairs and ministers responsible for foreign trade and international cooperation from China and 44
African countries met and discussed the future China-Africa cooperation.79 All 44 countries
acknowledged the principle of one China in 2007.80 On the first conference, two documents of
agreement were adopted: A Declaration of Ministers and a Plan of Action for the period of 20002003. The documents from the first meeting say very little about the political cooperation and in the
Declaration of Ministers, it is briefly stated that the parties will support each other politically in the
international arena, and that China promises to work towards debt cancellation without strings, and
that African countries should be represented in the UN Security Council by one seat. 81
On 15th-16th December, 2003, the second FOCAC conference was held in Addis Abeba in Ethiopia.
At this conference the same representatives from 2000 were present, and another plan of action was
adopted for the period of 2004-2006. At this meeting, the parties seemed to be more ready for a
deeper political cooperation and coordination of their foreign policies, as they concluded that the
China-Africa cooperation was gaining momentum in the international arena, and that they had
managed to help each other in order to protect the principles of respect for national sovereignty and
non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. China also promised to increase its participation
in UN’s peace keeping missions in Africa and provide financial assistance to the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union.82
78
Jaffe, A.M. and Lewis, S.W (2002), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 412
Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development
Retrieved from: http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/t404122.htm (2 June 2008)
80
Retrieved from: http://english.focacsummit.org/ (2 June 2008)
81
Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
Retrieved from: http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/t404124.htm (2 June 2008)
82
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation – Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006
Retrieved from: http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/t404123.htm (2 June 2008)
79
40
In 2006, a big FOCAC meeting was held in Beijing on November 3rd-5th as well as a third
ministerial conference. The participants were state leaders, government leaders, ministers of foreign
affairs and ministers responsible for economic cooperation from China and 48 African countries –
adding four more African countries to the meeting. At the meeting, like in 2000, two documents of
agreement were adopted: A Declaration of Ministers and a Plan of Action for 2006-2009. Here, the
agreements were further expanded regarding the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. An
increase in the coordination of the Chinese and African foreign policies should be seen through
political dialogue with the ministers of foreign affairs meeting every year after each FOCAC
ministerial conference parallel to UN’s general assembly in New York and thereby share their
views. The quite vague position on the UN from 2000 was clarified in 2006 when the parties
declared that they want a reform of the UN making it more democratic by giving developing
nations, especially the African ones, more power. Furthermore, they want a depolitisation of the
human rights, so that the ‘Western’ understanding of the rights does not become a condition for
receiving aid. At the same time, they want the right to economic development to come first and not
the human rights. The parties further wished another Doha round in the WTO where special
considerations should be made for developing countries. The parties were both in 2003 as well as in
2006 satisfied with the increase in political top meetings since 2000 and would like to see the
number of them increased further. Moreover, in 2006, the parties stated that they would like an
increase in the contact between the Chinese and African parliaments and an establishment of
friendship towns and states.83
As to the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), China expressed its
unreserved approval, and in 2006 China furthermore promised to help the AU build a congress
centre in Addis Abeba in Ethiopia.84
The increased coordination of the foreign policies fit well with the Chinese declared efforts to get
the developing countries to stick together and support each other, and the parties seem particularly
close on the issue of national sovereignty. The importance and support of the principle of multilateralism are expressed by the insistence of the UN to solve conflicts peacefully, and the fully
support of the AU and the NEPAD. The various paragraphs on political cooperation are similar in
themes and rhetoric to China’s Africa Policy from 2006 which will be presented in section 4.3.2.
83
Ibid and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)
Retrieved from: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm (3 June 2008)
84
Ibid
41
4.3.1. The Beijing Consensus
As seen in the various FOCAC documents, it seems that China and the African countries in overall
agree on some fundamental principles that have been named the Beijing Consensus. According to
Mawdsley,85 the Consensus refers to that Chinese leaders, over the last decades, have asserted a set
of foreign policy principles. Although the coherence implied by the term is somewhat misleading,
and more importantly, it is not a designation that the Chinese government uses or endorses the
following four elements can be drawn out from the term.

The present world order is unjust and inequitable, and developing countries should stick
together

The urge of greater south-south cooperation

The right to self-determination

Multilateralism and peaceful negotiation of international disputes
The first two elements are reflected in the following quote of the Chinese President Jiang Zemin in
his speech to the newly established FOCAC in 2000 in Beijing: “Globalisation currently presents
more challenges and risks than opportunities to the vast number of developing countries”.86
According to the President, developing countries should therefore act together to strengthen cooperation and consultation in multilateral institutions such as the UN and the WTO, so as to
safeguard common interests of the developing countries. Positions on reforming multilateral
economic and trade regimes and the formulation of new rules should therefore be coordinated, so
that the collective bargaining capacity of developing countries can be increased. Furthermore,
efforts towards the democratisation of international relations should be made in order to establish a
just and equitable new international economic order. President Zemin then believes that mutual
benefits will arise from investment, agreements, joint ventures, banking, technology and so on.
The third element of the right to self-determination, a rejection of the right of other countries to
meddle in internal affairs once again stresses the principle of non-interference in Chinese foreign
policy. With the fourth and final element, China asserts a commitment to peaceful multilateralism,
endorses peaceful negotiation of international disputes, nuclear non-proliferation, and the control of
the illicit light arms trade. However, a striking feature of this set of principles is the absence of
85
86
Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 413
Ibid
42
specific mention of human rights. China’s stance remains distinctive from the liberal discourse of
much of the West. The Beijing Declaration of 2000 makes it clear:
Countries that vary from one another in social system, development level, historical
and cultural background and values, have the right to choose their own approaches
and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own countries.
Moreover, the politization of human rights and the human rights conditionalities on
economic assistance should be vigorously opposed as violation of human rights.87
As a term, the Beijing Consensus refers to a comparison with the Washington Consensus and its
successor, the post-Washington Consensus.88 These have provided for the dominant economic and
political framework within which African and other postcolonial nations have sought to develop
over the last 20-30 years. Their recipe of development means a commitment to neoliberal growth
strategies including privatisation, deregulation, devaluation, cutting subsidies, opening markets and
export-led growth that have all been policied through Western, and specifically, US-dominated
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). With the Washington Consensus, loan and grant conditionalities are linked to
the political conditions such as democracy, good governance, decentralisation and anti-corruption
and transparency. The Beijing Consensus is therefore considered as a very welcome alternative by
many developing countries.89
4.3.2. China’s Africa Policy 2006
In order to find out what China is saying about its Africa policy and the China-Africa relations in
general, and how these are staged, a rhetoric insight of the document China’s Africa Policy of
87
Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. p. 413
For many supporters, the post-Washington consensus differs fundamentally from the original. While the Washington
consensus made economic growth the main goal of development, the new consensus moves away from the neo-liberal,
market-friendly approach and places sustainable, egalitarian and democratic development at the heart of the agenda.
This package of ideas and policies aims among other things to: 1)Manage liberalized trade, finance and monetary
systems, 2)include the creation of enforceable codes and standards, and concessions to social welfare through targeted
social safety nets, 3) create vertical and horizontal policy coherence, and 4) include businesses and firms in a Global
Compact for Development. Others argue that the original neo-liberal agenda still underpins the post-Washington
consensus, saying that the social safety net aspects of the new policies are put in place as an add-on to deal with market
failure.
Retrieved from: http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story074/en/index.html (10 Nov. 2008)
89
Mawdsley, Emma (2007) op. cit. pp. 413-414
88
43
200690 is necessary, so the reference in this section will be that document unless otherwise is
indicated.
In the foreword, China states that peace and development are the main themes and the greatest
challenge of our times. China speaks of itself as the biggest developing country in the world and
Africa as the continent with most developing countries. In the following Part I and Part II, Africa’s
position and role is described as a continent with a long history, rich in natural resources and with a
huge potential for development. The history of the two parts is described as similar and thereby
saying that they share the identity of developing countries. The friendship is “profound” and the
close political ties expressed by supporting each other in the struggle for liberation proves the
sincerity of a longstanding friendship. Furthermore, Africa’s participation in the South-South
cooperation by having relations with China is very much appreciated and expressed in a spirit of
common belongingness. In Part III about China’s Africa Policy, the intensification of the relations
are presented as “a new strategic partnership” based on political equality, mutual trust, economic
win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. These keywords including the Five Principles of
Peaceful coexistence are mentioned several times, and they are described as the basic principles for
the China-Africa cooperation where the one China principle (i.e. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan
considered as part of that China) at the end is said to be the political foundation for the
establishment and development of the relations. The ‘Beijing Consensus’ is not explicitly
mentioned, but there is no doubt that those keywords refer to and represent that ‘consensus’.
The principles of mutual benefit and the respect of national sovereignty are particularly interesting
in relation to Africa, and China stresses that the economic cooperation has to be beneficial to both
parties which could also appear as an indirect criticism of the Western policy in Africa, cf. The
Beijing Consensus stating that the international system is unjust and inequitable (dominated by the
West). In that sense, China considers itself as being an alternative to the West offering more dignity
and equal terms of cooperation. China stresses the respect of Africa’s choice of path to development
which in practise means a mutual understanding of a non-interference policy where China also
states to financially support Africa with no political strings attached. That can once again be
interpreted as critique of the Western countries conditions of democracy, protection of human
rights, anti-corruption efforts and adherence to specific economic policies.
90
Retrieved from: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm (13 Nov. 2007)
44
In Part IV, the document mentions the areas in which China wishes to cooperate with the African
countries. These areas are divided into the political field, the economic field and education, science,
culture, health and social aspects. In the political field, this is suggested by high-level visits that
include exchanges between legislative bodies and political parties and local governments in order to
create communication, understanding, friendship and mutual trust. Internationally, China opts for a
wide coordination of foreign policy where China and Africa can support each other in the
international community such as within the UN and the WTO. National sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national dignity and human rights are considered as areas where China and Africa can
support each other on the international stage, and development is considered a top priority on the
agenda together with a reform of the UN and the WTO, so that the two institutions become more
democratic and just. The tone is similar to the rhetoric seen in ‘the Beijing Consensus’ speaking of
solidarity between developing countries, and the importance of creating a united front of mutual
support. Furthermore, there is a section about peace and security where China states that it will
contribute to the UN’s peace keeping missions in Africa and continue to help train African military
personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own security. This
fits well with the principles of multilateralism and peaceful solutions to conflicts. China also speaks
in favour of judicial and police cooperation in order to combat transnational organised crime and
corruption, and intensify cooperation on matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and
repatriation of criminal suspects. This includes an exchange of information and intelligence to
address terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and the problem of illegal migration.
In relation to economic cooperation, trade and investment are two important areas. China wants to
increase trade with Africa, and state that they will adopt more effective measures to facilitate
African commodities’ access to the Chinese market and fulfil its promise to grant duty-free
treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries with a view to expand and
balance bilateral trade, so that the trade structure can be optimised. When conditions are ripe, China
is willing to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement91 with African countries and African regional
organisations. China will also support Chinese enterprises’ investment and business in Africa and is
ready to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end as well as securing an agreement on
bilateral facilitation and protection of investment which includes avoidance of double taxation.
91
A negotiated treaty among two or more countries to form a Free Trade Area which means that a group of countries
adopt free trade (zero tariffs and no other policy restrictions) on trade among themselves, while not necessarily
changing the barriers that each member country has on trade with the countries outside the group.
Retrieved from: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/f.html (10 Nov. 2008)
45
Furthermore, agriculture, infrastructure and (natural) resources are important areas of cooperation
where China believes that it can contribute with technology and education as to agriculture and
management as well as to infrastructure, but the importance of local capacity building is also
stressed. In relation to natural resources, China encourages cooperation between Chinese enterprises
and the African nations on the basis of mutual benefit and common development and develop and
exploit rationally the resources with a view to help African countries to translate their advantages in
resources to competitive strength and realise sustainable development in African countries and on
the continent as a whole. China states that it is willing to seek a solution to or cancel the debts that
African countries owe to China, as far as they can. The tone regarding the economic cooperation is
again similar to the one seen in the Beijing Consensus where the rhetoric stresses on ‘mutual-ness’
and win-win situations where both parties can benefit from the cooperation.
As to the area of social development and cultural exchanges, China opts for cooperation regarding
education, science, culture, health, media and the environment. In this paragraph, the tone of
mutual benefit is less apparent. Instead, China is presented as ‘the giver’ as it will continue to send
medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them
establish and improve medical facilities as well as train medical personnel in order to prevent and
treat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. China also encourages exchanges of students and that
it will increase the number of scholarships and continue to send teachers to Africa to help in
Chinese language training and carry out educational assistance projects. Furthermore, China will
work for an increase in cultural exchange within sports, arts and the media so that objective and
balanced media coverage of each other will be the case. As to the field of disaster reduction and
relief, China states that it will respond quickly to African Countries’ request for urgent
humanitarian aid.
In Part V, China describes the FOCAC as an effective mechanism for the collective dialogue and
multilateral cooperation between China and Africa. It is attached importance as a framework from
where political consultation and pragmatic cooperation can be strengthened, and that also includes
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).92
NEPAD: The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s renewal.
The NEPAD strategic framework document arises from a mandate given to the five initiating Heads of State (Algeria,
Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to develop an integrated socioeconomic development framework for Africa. The primary objectives are: a) To eradicate poverty;
b) To place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development; c)
92
46
In the final Part VI about China’s relations with African regional organisations, China appreciates
the role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region, and supports the union in
international affairs where China stands ready to provide assistance.
4.4. China’s Interests in Africa
After having been introduced to the China-Africa relations in the form of official statements and
policies, this section will look at the Chinese interests in Africa, and the following section of 4.4.1.
will then focus on how, and to what extent China is engaged in Africa economically and financially.
During the last two decades, the high level of sustained economic growth in China has
tremendously increased its energy needs, which will grow further in the future, as the country
prospers.“China was self-sufficient in oil until 1993, and its oil imports have been growing ever
since. China now imports about 3 million barrels of oil per day, and that number is growing about
500,000 barrels per day, every year”.93 China is now the second largest consumer of primary
commercial energy after the US, accounting for 15% of the world total. 94 Over the last four years,
2002 to 2006 inclusive, China’s total commercial energy consumption grew by more than 50%,
increasing as, if not more rapidly than its GDP.95 Reportedly, 60% of the world’s proven oil
reserves are located in the Persian Gulf /Middle East, and China imports 55% of its oil requirements
from this region.96
According to Philip Andrews-Speed, Professor of Energy Policy, and Director of the Centre for
Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at Dundee University, England, China’s energy
policy primarily focuses on two aspects: one, on constraining the energy demands; and two, on
fulfilling the energy requirements. China has undertaken measures to introduce relevant domestic
policies for energy conservation in order to constrain energy demands. To fulfil its energy
requirements, it has to engage and ensure secure energy supplies from various parts of the globe.
The majority of China’s energy supplies come from the Middle East, and are transported through
the sea-lanes which pass through the narrow Straits of Malacca, an area prone to attack by pirates
and terrorists and open to disruption in case of any hostilities between the US and China. The US is,
To halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the
global economy; d) To accelerate the empowerment of women.
Retrieved from: http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php (18 Dec. 08)
93
Alterman, John B. (2007), in Rahman, Fazal-ur-(2007)
94
Andrews-Speed, Philip (2007), in Rahman, Fazal-ur- (2007)
95
Ibid
96
Alterman, John B. (2007), op. cit.
47
as a strategic competitor, seen as posing a threat to China’s energy security, since US naval power
controls the global sea-lanes of communications. Thus, China is forced to diversify not only the
sources, but the transportation routes due to fear of disruption or blockade of energy supplies.
Therefore, the main priorities for China today are “to diversify and secure imports of oil, to gain
access to primary resources in the ground, and to enhance the security of oil and gas transportation
to China”.97
In 2005, China became the world’s second-largest consumer of petroleum products, and its imports
of natural gas, copper, cobalt, and other key resources are rising by as much as 20% annually98, and
by 2025 Chinese demand is forecast to more than double to 14.2 million barrels a day from the
current 7 million a day.99 Rapid Chinese economic growth coupled with dwindling domestic
Chinese petroleum and mineral deposits have encouraged China to look abroad for resources.100
Since 1998, when a White Paper of the Chinese Ministry of Defence proclaimed energy security as
an integral part of China’s overall security, the country’s global economic, foreign and security
policies have become closely intertwined. In line with this strategy, China has diversified its energy
sources since the 1990’s by expanding oil imports and diversifying its oil suppliers. 101 It is in this
connection that Africa has become interesting for China. Several sources agree on that oil and
natural resources is the main reason for China’s increasing engagement in Africa.102
“Africa’s resource- rich countries are in a position to provide an ample percentage of China’s
requirements. There is little doubt that natural resources are at the core of China’s economic
interests in Africa – or perhaps even its overall interest in the continent. In terms of China’s
imports from Africa, nine of its ten most important trading partners are resource-rich countries”.103
(Cf. Fig.1)
97
Andrews-Speed, Philip (2007), op.cit
Eisenman, Joshua and Kurlantzick (2006), pp. 219-220
99
Vines, Alex, (2007), p. 214
100
Eisenman, Joshua and Kurlantzick (2006), op.cit.
101
Tull, Denis M. (2006), pp. 468-469
102
Eisenman, Joshua and Kurlantzick (2006), op.cit. p. 219, ibid p. 465, and Vines, Alex (2007) op.cit. p. 213
103
Tull, Denis M. (2006), op.cit. p. 465
98
48
Fig. 1 China’s most important African trading partners in 2004 (imports)
One can agree with Tull as to the Chinese reason for engaging in Africa, if you look at the figures in
Fig. 2 for Africa-Asia trade patterns where Africa mainly exports petroleum and raw materials to
China. Oil and natural gas are the single most dominant category of products exported from Africa
to China, accounting for more than 62% of total African exports to China, followed by ores and
metals (17%) and agricultural raw materials (7%) in 2004.104 In addition, Angola, Sudan, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo provide 85% of African oil exports to China.105
104
105
Broadman, Harry G. with Gozde Isik, Sonia Plaza, Xiao Ye and Yutaka Yoshino (2007), p. 80
Ibid
49
Fig. 2 Product Distribution of Africa’s Trade with China and India
A. Africa’s exports to China and India
B. Africa’s imports from China and India
China’s oil imports from Africa have been increasing at an annual compounded rate of 30%,
slightly higher than the growth rate for imports from the rest of the world, which is 26%. While
China’s crude oil imports from Africa account for more than 25% of its total crude oil imports, its
petroleum product imports from Africa are quite insignificant. Among African oil-producing
countries, China imports oil mainly from Angola, Sudan, Republic of Congo, and Equatorial
Guinea, with Angola alone accounting for 50% of oil imports from Africa.106
106
Broadman, Harry G. with Gozde Isik, Sonia Plaza, Xiao Ye and Yutaka Yoshino (2007), op.cit, p. 82
50
As to the Chinese presence, one can speak of an advantage which is noticeable in cases where
China targets African states suffering from Western-imposed sanctions. These African countries
turn de facto into niche markets due to Western sanctions as China has no legal or political
obligation to abide by these sanctions and can thereby position itself as an alternative partner of
‘pariah states’ as exemplified through the strategy in Sudan and Zimbabwe.107 From a Chinese point
of view, niche countries and their oil sectors are characterised by limited competition, either
because Western multinational companies have no or only limited access for political reasons such
as the embargoes (e.g. Sudan, Iran), and/or because the countries are relatively new or emerging oil
producers offering significant opportunities. Furthermore, given the inadequate financial and
technological competitiveness of Chinese companies, the targeting of niche countries forms a
strategic decision to secure oil stakes.108 At the same time, China tries to make itself less dependent
on market-dictated pricing in case of a global crisis or a deliberate US attempt to cut China’s energy
supply lines.109 However, it should be pointed out that although oil is a major and obvious source of
Chinese interest in Africa, natural resources of every kind are also actively sought by China:
copper, bauxite, uranium, aluminium, manganese and iron ore, among others, are all being sought
out acquisitively by Beijing. In addition, Chinese textiles and clothing companies are investing
heavily in Africa.110 Besides natural resources, access to markets is also an important motive as
China’s economy is based on exporting, and thereby it is also looking for new markets to export
to.111 On the import side as well, China has become a major trading partner for African countries
accounting for more than 1/3 of Asia’s total exports to Africa (cf. Fig. 3). Japan used to be the
holder of that leading position.112
107
Tull, Denis M. (2006), op.cit. p. 468
Ibid p. 469
109
Eisenman, Joshua and Kurlantzick (2006), op.cit. p. 220
110
Taylor, Ian (2006), p. 938
111
Eisenman, Joshua and Kurlantzick (2006), op.cit. p. 219
112
Broadman, Harry G. with Gozde Isik, Sonia Plaza, Xiao Ye and Yutaka Yoshino (2007), op.cit. p. 80
108
51
Fig. 3 Growth in Africa’s Imports from China and India
Africa’s merchandise
imports from China and India
4.4.1. Investment and Trade
Trade expansion has been matched with a strong growth in Chinese direct investment in Africa but
the volume is more modest than that of trade. Over the last few years, over 800 Chinese companies
have invested nearly $1.2 billion in 49 African countries and 480 China-Africa joint ventures have
been established.113 Chinese investment in Africa is dominated by the four state-owned oil
companies. They have all entered into the exploration and production of oil and gas in all of the
major producing African countries. The strategy has been aggressive and strategic alliances have
been built with local state-owned companies where competitors have often been outbid through
record-breaking signature fees.114
However, Chinese investment is also seen in a number of other extractive industries in Africa.
Besides oil and mining, Chinese investment is expanding, though still being limited, in sectors of
apparel, agroprocessing, power generation, road construction, tourism and telecommunications. A
significant level, though still small, is targeting the privatisation of state industries (e.g. in
telecommunications in the Republic of Congo, in Niger and in Madagascar). A strong and
expanding Chinese presence of construction companies is also seen in many African countries.
113
114
Tjønneland, Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), p. 7
Ibid p. 8
52
These companies partly benefit from Chinese credits and tied aid, but are also winning international
tenders and successfully start up local businesses.115 But an increasing problem is also the rising
numbers of Chinese workers migrating to Africa in general that have been employed by the many
Chinese companies.
As to manufacturing sectors producing for third markets where the clothing and textile industry is
of particular importance, Chinese investment is also present, though the scale is small. Through that
industry come opportunities to access the US market. In Lesotho, this has led to a situation where
Chinese companies have turned the textile industry into the country’s biggest employer (at one
point having 50,000 employees) by using the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 116 to
penetrate the US market. However, when restrictions on Chinese textile exports to the US ended in
2005, the fall of employment in the Chinese textile companies in Africa was major (in 2005: down
to 35,000 in the case of Lesotho). In 2006, several incentives from Lesotho have secured a
significant expansion.117
When it comes to African investment in China, it is almost absent with the exception of South
Africa where a number of companies have made significant investments for $400 million in over
200 projects – being significantly more than what China has invested in South Africa.118
The Chinese state has been very active in promoting trade and investment and has actively used the
mechanism of FOCAC for this purpose. Export credits and tied aid are some of the means that have
been used. However, it is important to mention that China has taken action on a number of African
concerns which has implied zero-rating tariffs on a number of products from African countries as
well as voluntary export restraints.119
115
Tjønneland, Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), op. cit. p. 8
AGOA accords duty-free and quota-free treatment to almost all products exported by beneficiary sub-Saharan
countries to the U.S. until September 30, 2008. AGOA provides eligible sub-Saharan countries with the most liberal
access to the U.S. market accorded to any country or region that has not negotiated a free trade agreement with the U.S.
Source: http://www.ecatradehub.com/components/agoa.asp (11 Nov. 2008)
117
Tjønneland, Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), op. cit. p. 8
118
Ibid
119
Ibid
116
53
Fig. 4 Africa’s Development Pattern is Increasingly Diverse, with More and More Success Stories
4.5. China’s Engagement in Africa: Why these Four Case Countries
China is engaged in many African countries, and therefore one can speak of the term China-Africa
relations as justified where ‘Africa’ is understood in its literal sense of meaning the whole
continent. However, in order to make an analysis in the following chapter in the context of ChinaAfrica relations and China’s foreign policy towards Africa through its ‘China’s Africa Policy’ of
2006, the FOCAC meetings and the Chinese interests in oil and other natural resources, and if these
54
interests affect good governance and human rights in some African countries, it is necessary to
narrow down the number of African countries and chose a few ones as cases that also include the
problems of the latter. I have chosen to use Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
The countries that are to serve as cases are therefore, firstly, selected from the criteria of having
(had) deeper economic relations with China mainly in the area of oil but also as to other natural
resources. Secondly, all the countries face challenges when it comes to good governance and human
rights in various degrees, and thirdly a historical aspect of the relations might also weigh in.
To begin with, the case of Angola meets these criteria, but what is also interesting is that it is not
only a very important business partner to China because of its tremendous oil wealth but also owing
to the investment opportunities it offers in a range of sectors, as the Angolan government has been
very willing to open up the country to Chinese investment.120 Historically speaking, relations have
been strained as they were broken off due to the close ties to the former Soviet Union, and that fact
should not be underestimated, and thus makes Angola an interesting country to explore in relation
to China. Nigeria was picked because it is the largest oil producer in Africa and is the most
populous African country and thus considered an important potential market for China at the same
time as being very influential in the multilateral arena through its prominent role in the African
Union and NEPAD and is furthermore a member of OPEC. Finally, Nigeria’s ambitions of taking
up the proposed African permanent seat on the UN Security Council plays a major part in its
diplomacy with China.121 Sudan is a very interesting case as its economy has really felt the demand
of oil, and furthermore because it faces some very serious allegations of genocide in the Darfur
region. In this situation, China has also been involved the most politically in the multilateral arena
which is determining for the understanding of China’s foreign policy and its drivers. Lastly,
Zimbabwe is interesting because its link to China does not include oil but other natural resources,
and the friendship has been linked to common ideology in history. Furthermore, the country has
been heavily criticised by the international community, especially in the Western discourse, due to
very poor records on good governance and human rights, but China has – with current uncertainty
of whether relations have been broken off – been engaged in the country despite the very chaotic
economic situation. The cases of Sudan and Zimbabwe are therefore a bit longer than the other two,
as they contain a more complicated foreign policy dimension due to respectively: 1) the UN
embargo and the Darfur conflict, and 2) the extremely chaotic economic and fragile political
120
121
Alden, Chris (2007), p.67
Ibid p. 68
55
situations with a very poor human rights record, not to mention the rumours of the country being
‘sold’ to the Chinese which will be addressed in the analytical chapter. The significance of China’s
presence is therefore believed to be particularly detectable in these two countries.
In the following sections, I will, initially, go through the four case countries in terms of history and
economic and political background. That is essential in order to understand the current situation in
each country and the complexity of the many challenges that each country faces as to economy and
the domestic political situation, which also partly determines the link to the international
community, thus the role each nation plays herein, especially with the economic ties to China. After
the background knowledge, the subject of ‘investment, oil/natural resources and trade with China’
will follow, and if the country faces some specific challenges, these will be dealt with at the end of
each case.
4.5.1. Angola: History and Economic and Political Background
Angola has since 2002 with the end of a 27-year civil war been rebuilding its country. After the
independence from Portugal in 1975, fighting between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) followed
due to disagreements linked to ethnic affiliations. In 1992, peace seemed to have arrived with the
national elections but as MPLA won over UNITA at the polls, UNITA renewed fighting, and the
result has been 1.5 million people killed and 4 million people displaced. UNITA’s insurgency ended
due to the death of its leader Jonas Sawimbi, and that strengthened the MPLA’s hold on power.122
In September 2008, the first democratic election was held in 16 years, but it has sent the country
back to the one-party state system of the times of Socialism when MPLA ran the country till 1992
with Russia and Cuba as close allies and thereby securing a position of power that the party has
already had for 33 years. At the recent legislative election, the government party MPLA got 82% of
the votes even though the population lives in deep poverty while the rich political elite earns a lot of
money from the oil, and UNITA, the largest party in the opposition, got about 10%. 123 The result is
paradoxically a catastrophe to the budding democratic process. After the fall of socialism and the
election in 1992, democracy has officially existed, and the opposition has had about 35% of the
seats in the parliament as well as three ministries and a number of governor positions. José Eduardo
Agualusa, Angolan writer and dissident living in exile, has stated that the only difference from the
122
123
CIA World Fact Book – Angola (2008)
Hansen, L. Mille and Venâncio Simão (2008)
56
one-party state to the current system is that the party now can legitimatise its absolute power in the
name of democracy, and that there is no democracy without an opposition.124
What is interesting to look at is the way in which the election was won, as the Angolans probably
did not vote for MPLA because they believed that the party has the abilities to lead and develop the
country in a positive direction – not for the population anyway. Angola is currently about to
overtake Nigeria’s role as the biggest oil producer in Africa, and the MPLA has used the oil
revenues to strengthen its position with all possible means. In Angola, it is a public secret that
billions of dollars from state budgets have disappeared in recent years which has been documented
by reports by Human Rights Watch. Despite the richness in natural resources, the country holds the
position as number 162 out of 177 of countries ranked on UN’s Index of Poverty. 125 One of the big
problems is that the fertile ground cannot be cultivated due to landmines – 80.000 Angolans are
crippled due to the mines.126 There is basically no production in the country except in the oil sector,
and therefore no jobs either and no development has been seen since the war ended in 2002.
However, the majority still voted for MPLA. The power of MPLA is exerted through a hierarchical
network of personal relations and dependencies, and every citizen knows that in order to get a piece
of the cake, one must be friends with the MPLA, and as mentioned before the cake is big, and there
is a lot to share when an election is coming up. The employees working in the public sector have
experienced a significant raise of their salary. Traditional chiefs who still have a great deal of
influence on people in the rural areas have received money, cars and official titles. Furthermore, the
prices on food and alcohol have declined heavily, and right up till the election a number of the
leading politicians in the opposition have changed sides. All most everything is for sale in Angola,
and those who are critical are threatened, beaten up or simply “disappear”, e.g. a local chief was
beaten by 30 MPLA-members because he had raised the UNITA flag in his village during the
election campaign.127
The MPLA has continued the tradition from the Socialists times of crushing any kind of criticism of
the party. Most Angolans are therefore too afraid to involve themselves in politics. On top of that,
the level of education is extremely low, and the media which is state-run sends the message of
124
Hansen, L. Mille and Venâncio Simão (2008), op.cit.
Ibid
126
Ibid
127
Ibid
125
57
MPLA being the saviour of the people, and since the peace deal in 2002, President Dos Santos
through 29 years has been described as ‘the Architect of Peace’.128
4.5.1.1. Investment, Oil and Trade with China
Angola which became a member of OPEC in late 2006129 possesses big amounts of natural
resources and is a very important oil exporter to China. Originally, when Angola was a newly
independent country, relations with China were broken off as Angola was considered to be too close
to the Soviet Union, but now the story is completely different with Angola being China’s secondlargest commercial partner exporting 25% of its oil production to China.130
The special relationship between the two countries - with Angola also being China’s biggest oil
supplier and its closest African ally - was cemented in June 2006. During the 24-hour visit of Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao, it was announced that an extra $2 billion to China’s existing $3 billion creditline for “reconstruction and national development” would be given.131
In Angola’s petroleum sector licensing deals were concluded for the Sino-Angolan joint venture
Sonangol-Sinopec International (SSI) which paid $ 2.4 billion including a signature bonus of $2.2
billion which ensures a 40% controlling stake in parts of two offshore oil blocks.132 In 2006,
Sinopec predicted foreign direct investment to be about $23 billion in the petroleum sector over the
next five years with the goal of raising the current production of 1.4 million barrels per day to 2
million at the end of 2007.133 On top of that, lucrative energy contracts that included a $3 billion
new refinery at Lobito won, and that is set to produce 240,000 barrels per day and secured a 20%
stake in one of the deep water oil blocks.134
However, in 2004, China seemed to make an exception of its principle of non-interference as its
export bank, Eximbank, had approved a $2 billion line of credit in order to enable Angola to
reconstruct infrastructure – including electricity, railways and administrative buildings – destroyed
during 30 years of civil war in return of China receiving 10,000 barrels of oil a day, but when a
British watchdog on transparency, Global Witness, announced that the money was in danger of
being diverted to other purposes, the Chinese put pressure on the secretary of the Angolan council
128
Hansen, L. Mille and Venâncio Simão (2008), op.cit.
CIA World Fact Book – Angola, (2008)
130
Servant, Jean-Christophe (2005)
131
Africa-China ”Win-Win” Strategy (2006), p. 17001
132
Ibid
133
Ibid
134
Ibid
129
58
of ministers to resign – and they succeeded.135 The line of credit – at 1.5% over 17 years136 – might
look disadvantageous to China in the short term, but Chinese companies will secure its profits with
lucrative contracts for national reconstruction and some locals are unhappy. The independent
economist José Cerqueira pointed out: “There is a condition in the loan that 30% will be
subcontracted to Angolan firms, but that still leaves 70% which will not. Angolan businessmen are
very worried about this, because they don’t get the business, and the construction sector is one in
which Angolans hope they can find work”.137 Credit talks between Luanda and western lenders had
stalled over issues of transparency, and donors and the IMF have been wary about providing loans
to a country notorious for siphoning off oil wealth and a record for poor fiscal management. Angola
has therefore displaced the US as the country’s biggest oil customer, and close political ties with
China promise an increasing flow of investment and loans.138 Angola therefore needs the Chinese
money for its reconstruction efforts, and the country’s economy is highly dependent on its oil sector
which accounts for over 40% of GDP and almost 90% of the government’s revenue.139
It is mainly, but not all, about business.140 With Beijing’s courtship, Angola is given leverage in
diplomatic and economic relations with Europe and North America, and with the World Bank and
the IMF. The Chinese unconditional billion-dollar credits lift the pressure on Luanda to meet the
economic institutions’ conditions on transparency and accountability and provide, together with the
Chinese construction projects, an immediate relief to the Treasury. The cooperation with the World
Bank and the IMF could also reduce the massive premium paid to service Luanda’s oil-backed
loans. In 2005, trade between the two countries nearly totalled $7 billion according to the Ministry
of Finance.141
Angola also has major off-shore sources of gas. That industry and the one of oil are considered to
be highly promising and have since 2003 attracted over $20 billion in foreign direct investment. 142
Other natural resources contracts have been made as well as gifts given in the form of football
stadiums and cultural centres.143 In addition, times have changed in Beijing with pragmatism
135
Servant, Jean-Christophe (2005), op. cit. p. 1
Ibid
137
Ibid
138
Roughneen, Simon (2006), p. 3
139
Pan, Esther (2006),
140
Africa-China”Win-Win” Strategy (2006), op.cit. p. 17001
141
Ibid
142
Pan, Esther (2006),
143
Asia Needs Oil (2004), p. 16127
136
59
overcoming ideological rhetoric and foreign trade and economic cooperation portfolios being
handled by a single ministry.144
4.5.2. Nigeria: History and Economic and Political Background
The oil-rich Nigeria which became independent from the UK in 1960 has for a long time been
troubled with political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic
management, but has since May 2007 been facing a more reform-minded administration with
President Yaradua. In 2000, Nigeria signed an IMF stand-by agreement obtaining a debtrestructuring deal from the Paris Club145 and received a $1billion credit contingent on economic
reforms. However, two years later Nigeria pulled out of its IMF program as it had failed to meet
spending and exchange rate targets which took away the possibility of obtaining further debt relief.
In the last year, the government has begun to show some political will to implement marketoriented reforms urged by the IMF such as to modernise the banking system, curb inflation by not
allowing excessive wage demands, and to resolve regional disputes over the distribution of earnings
from the oil industry. In 2003, the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, a
domestically designed and run program modeled on the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility for fiscal and monetary management, was instituted and the government began deregulating
fuel prices and announced the privatisation of the country’s four oil refineries. 146
4.5.2.1. Investment, Oil and Trade with China
Nigeria is important to China on three counts: first, the oilfields; second, its potential market size;
and third because of its prominent role in the African Union and NEPAD. 147 Furthermore, the facts
of the OPEC-membership and by being the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh-largest
producer in the world speak for themselves.148 The oil sector provides for 20% of GDP, 95% of
foreign exchange earnings, and about 80% of budgetary revenues. The US accounts for 51.2% of
the exports, and Brazil and Spain for 7.9% and 7.6% respectively (2006).149 Thus, Nigeria is a
144
Servant, Jean-Christophe (2005), op. cit. p. 1
An informal group of financial officials from 19 of the world's richest countries, which provides financial services
such as debt restructuring, debt relief, and debt cancellation to indebted countries and their creditors. Debtors are often
recommended by the IMF after alternative solutions have failed. It meets every six weeks at the French Ministry of the
Economy, Finance, and Industry in Paris. It is chaired by a senior official of the French Treasury, currently the Director
General of the Treasury and Economic Policy Department Xavier Musca.
Retrieved from: http://www.slate.com/id/2082575/ (27 Sep. 2008)
146
CIA World Fact Book – Nigeria (2008)
147
Alden, Chris (2007), op.cit. p. 68
148
Pan, Esther (2006), op.cit. p.1-2
149
CIA World Fact Book – Nigeria (2008), op.cit.
145
60
major oil supplier to the US but also to Western Europe. However, China is Nigeria’s biggest
import partner accounting for 10.7% of Nigeria’s import150, and the Chinese Sinopec has signed an
annual supply deal with Nigeria.151 The country produces about 2.5 million barrels per day, and the
proven oil reserves are some 37.25 billion barrels, and by 2010 the plans of the Nigerian
government is to expand the amount of barrels to 40 billion barrels.152
In 2005, Nigeria did get an approval for debt relief worth $30 billion of the country’s total of $37
billion external debt. In exchange, Nigeria is required to undergo stringent IMF reviews. The
increase in oil exports and high global crude prices has been the major source to a significant rise in
the GDP of 2007. President Yaradua has pledged that he will continue economic reforms and put
emphasis on infrastructure improvements which are also considered to be the main impediment to
growth.153 Despite Nigeria’s wealth in resources, more than 70% of the population lives in
poverty.154
However, there have been complications in the relations with China. There has been open criticism
from the Nigerian business communities that have suffered from the Chinese competition. They
have complained about the Nigerian federal and state government incentives offered to the Chinese
(and Indian), and the case has been brought up at the Nigerian senate resulting in the government
taking temporarily action by closing the main trading centres of the Chinese traders. Furthermore,
the treatment of Nigerians, who with many other Africans mainly work as traders in Hong Kong
and the Guangzhou area, has been criticised openly as they were rejected by the Chinese authorities
when they called for the establishment of a ‘Nigeria’ town in Guangzhou.155
4.5.2.2. Oil Violence in Southern Nigeria
Furthermore, Nigeria has in the past three years had problems of ‘oil violence’ cutting the oil
production with 60% in some periods from normal daily output. It has also helped to send crude
prices to historical heights in international markets in 2008156. The ‘oil violence’ is carried out by a
loose alliance of various armed gangs operating in the southern Niger Delta. It has attacked military
positions, destroyed pipeline-switching stations and blown up pipelines that carry crude oil from
CIA World Fact Book – Nigeria (2008), op.cit.
Asia Needs Oil (2004), op.cit. p. 16127
152
Pan, Esther (2006), op.cit. p.1-2
153
CIA World Fact Book – Nigeria (2008), op.cit.
Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html#Econ (26 Sep. 2008)
154
Pan, Esther (2006), op.cit. p.1-2
155
Alden, Chris (2007), op.cit. p. 69
156
However, the effects of the global financial crisis on oil prices in the autumn of 2008 are not accounted for.
150
151
61
wells to export terminals in southern Nigeria making it increasingly difficult to get oil loaded and
exported, thus creating a nightmare scenario for the international petroleum companies in Nigeria.
The militant group emerged about three years ago, calling for more federally controlled oil-industry
revenue to flow to the southern states where the petroleum is pumped. The militants have focused
their attacks primarily on the country's oil infrastructure, seeking to heighten pressure on the
government. On the 21st September 2008, Nigeria's main militant group declared a unilateral ceasefire in the southern oil region, ending the worst period of many militant attacks in years on Africa's
oil giant. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta said it was ceasing hostilities
immediately after appeals from elders and politicians in the region. A military operation on
September 14, 2008 prompted the latest surge in violence, with rare clashes between the military
and militants that normally avoid outright confrontation. Afterwards, the militants declared a state
of war. The group said it would launch another wave of reprisal attacks because of another military
raid on one of the group's base camps. They state that “We hope that the military has learnt a bitter
lesson. The next unprovoked attack will start another oil war that will be so ferocious that it will
dim the pleas of the elders".157 The military unit welcomes the current development presupposing
that it holds.158
4.5.3. Sudan: History and Economic and Political Background
Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and national politics have since the country’s independence
from the UK in 1956 been dominated by military regimes favoring Islamic-oriented
governments.159 Arabic is the official language and Islam is the religion of the state, but the country
has a large non-Arabic speaking and non-Muslim population which has rejected attempts by the
government in Khartoum to impose Islamic Sharia law on the country as a whole. Sudan was in
most of the last half of the 20th century embroiled in two prolonged civil wars of which the first
ended in 1972 resulting in the south becoming a self-governing region, but the war broke out again
in 1983 between government forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The
same year the then President Numayri declared the introduction of Sharia. 160 The second war and
famine-related effects resulted in more than four million displaced people and more than two
million deaths over a period of two decades according to rebel estimates. The roots of the conflicts
157
CNN.com, Militant group halts attacks in Nigerian oil region (2008)
Ibid
159
CIA World Fact Book – Sudan (2008)
160
BBC News Country Profile: Sudan (2008)
158
62
between the mainly Muslim north and the Animist and Christian south were the northern economic,
political, and social domination of largely non-Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese where the
southern rebels said they were battling oppression and marginalisation. After two years of
bargaining, the final North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January
2005 including equal sharing of oil revenues between the north and the south as well as southern
autonomy for six years. A referendum is then expected to be held afterwards.161
4.5.3.1 The Conflicts in Darfur
However, in 2003 a separate conflict broke out in the western region of Darfur where progovernment Arab militias are accused of carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against nonArab groups in the region. The conflict has resulted in almost two million displaced people and the
deaths of estimated 200,000 to 400,000 people.162 On the political scene, the main party
representing the south, the SPLM, temporarily suspended its participation in the government in
October 2007 complaining that key elements of the peace deal were being ignored but resumed
participation two months later. In July 2007, the UN Security Council approved a resolution
authorising a strong force for Darfur, and Sudan said that it will cooperate with the UN-AU Mission
in Darfur. On 31 December 2007, the UN overtook the command of the peacekeeping operation
from the AU but has since the beginning of 2008 been struggling to stabilise the situation which has
worsened and created instability in eastern Chad as well as straining relations between the two
countries as they have both accused each other of cross border incursions. Sudanese incursions to
the Central African Republic have also contributed to fears that the Darfur conflict could lead to a
wider regional war. Furthermore, Sudan has faced large refugee influxes from neighboring
countries, primarily Ethiopia and Chad. The provision of humanitarian assistance to affected
populations has constantly been obstructed due to armed conflict with e.g. government planes
bombing rebel positions in West Darfur, poor transport infrastructure and lack of government
support.163
In May 2007, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for a minister and a
janjaweed militia leader suspected of Darfur war crimes, and in July 2008 the top prosecutor of the
ICC called for the arrest of President Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
Ibid and CIA World Fact Book – Sudan (2008)
CIA World Fact Book – Sudan (2008)
163
Ibid
161
162
63
in Darfur. The appeal is the first request ever to the ICC for the arrest of a sitting head of state.
Sudan has rejected the indictment.164
4.5.3.2. China in the UN Security Council in relation to Darfur
If one starts out in the western discourse on China’s role in the conflict in Darfur, there is no doubt
that China’s abstinence from voting in the Security Council for an UN intervention has been linked
to the oil interests in Sudan. With the humanitarian crisis worsening, the critique grew and was
called “Genocide Olympics”. However, with resolution 1769 that was adopted by the Security
Council at the end of July 2007 and passed unanimously, and which gave a mandate to a UN-AU
hybrid peacekeeping force, the critique subsided. The reason for the acceptance after having
abstained from voting for all previous resolutions, which suggested an intervention or the like in
Darfur was that the government in Khartoum had accepted the force after bilateral pressure from
China ‘behind the scenes’. This case shows that China has a different approach to international
relations and crisis solution, the circumstances and severity of the situation in Darfur taken into
consideration, as it did not want to compromise on the principle of sovereignty, but at the same time
it preferred an international solution to the crisis in Darfur.165 Therefore, there is room for an
analysis of China’s foreign policy and its drivers towards Africa in the analytical chapter as China
has, despite voting for the UN resolution, been accused of contravening an UN arms embargo on
Sudan in the summer of 2008.
4.5.3.3. The UN Arms Embargo
After a BBC programme found the first evidence that China is currently helping Sudan’s
government militarily in Darfur, it was accused of contravening an UN arms embargo on Sudan. It
might be the first evidence, but according to Alden (2007), Khartoum is secured arms by the
Chinese and even has its own manufacturing capacity with Chinese assistance.166The embargo
requires foreign nations to take measures to ensure they do not militarily assist anyone in the
conflict in Darfur. The terms of the embargo cover not only just the supply of weapons, military
vehicles, paramilitary equipment. It also covers training and technical assistance. 167
164
BBC Country Profile: Sudan Timeline (2008)
Barse, Christian and Biisgård Marie N. (2007)
166
Alden, Chris (2007), p. 62
167
BBC News (13 July 2008), China is ’fuelling war in Darfur’
165
64
In a BBC article from 13 July 2008, the BBC states that its Panorama TV programme has tracked
down Chinese army lorries that had been carrying anti-aircraft guns – one of them a Chinese gun.
The lorries came straight from the factory in China to Sudan and were consigned to Sudan’s
defence ministry. The guns were mounted after the lorries were imported from China. The UN
started looking for these lorries in 2005, suspecting they had been sent there, but never found them.
Ej Hogendoorn, a member of the UN panel of experts that was involved in trying to locate the
lorries, has stated that the panel did not have specific access to the Sudanese government army
stores and were not allowed to write down factory codes or model numbers or registrations etc. in
order to verify that kind of things. China has chosen not to respond to the BBC findings, but its
public statement is that it abides by all UN arms embargoes. China has stated before that it has told
Sudan’s government not to use Chinese military equipment in Darfur, and Sudan has told the UN
that it will use its military equipment wherever it likes within its sovereign territory. An
international lawyer, Clare da Silva, says that China’s point that it has taken measures in line with
the arms embargo’s requirements to stop weapons from going to Darfur is meaningless, as it is an
empty measure when assurance is taken from a partner who clearly has no intention of abiding by
the resolution. According to da Silva, China is violating the embargo because of BBC’s evidence
which the UN panel of experts on Darfur wants to examine.168
Eyewitnesses have stated that the guns on the army lorries have been used in an attack in the town
of Sirba in West Darfur where it fired straight into civilian houses, and as the gun carries high
calibre shells that explode on impact, spreading hot shards of metal, it has created terrible wounds.
With Sudan being accused of genocide against Darfur’s black Africans, BBC’s evidence is another
issue that weakens Sudan’s credibility in the eyes of the international community, and affects
China’s wish of being perceived as a responsible rising power.169
4.5.3.4. Investment, Oil and Trade with China
As to the economy in Sudan, it is booming because of the increases in oil production and the high
oil prices with large inflows of foreign direct investment which has meant a more than 10% growth
in GDP per year in 2006 and 2007.170 Sudan has since 1999 been exporting crude oil, and today oil
and petroleum products are the main export commodities where China is the primary export partner
BBC News (13 July 2008), China is ’fuelling war in Darfur’, op.cit.
Ibid
170
CIA World Fact Book – Sudan (2008), op.cit.
168
169
65
accounting for 67.8% (2006).171 China is also the primary import partner as 27.9% (2006) of
Sudan’s imports are from China.172 Agricultural production though remains important as it
contributes to a third of the GDP and employs 80% of the work force.173
As shown in Fig.1 in section 4.4., Sudan already in 2004 ranked as number three on the list of most
important African trading partners for China, and the country also benefits from being a ‘niche
market’ that Western countries do not trade with. Furthermore, since the Chinese entered the
market, state-owned Indian, Malaysian and Brazilian companies have shown an increased interest in
acquiring acreage creating local concern of the Chinese presence, as it may legitimise making it
easier for other countries to deal with a questionable human rights record. It is, however, important
to note that a range of Western oil companies also have been involved with regimes responsible for
significant human rights violations.174
However, because of the aftermath of two civil wars, the conflict in Darfur, the lack of basic
infrastructure in large areas and a reliance by most of the population on subsistence agriculture, the
population will remain at or below the poverty line for years despite rapid rises in average per
capita income. 175 The economic dividends of peace could be great as there are large areas of
cultivatable land, and the oil reserves are ripe for further exploitation.176 However, dam projects on
the River Nile like the Merowe dam (aka the Hamdab dam) are expected to displace more than
50,000 small farmers living on the riverbanks. Poor villagers are in most dam projects in Sudan
forcible resettled in a desert location.177
4.6. Zimbabwe: History, Economic and Political Background
The UK annexed Southern Rhodesia from the (British) South Africa Company in 1923 where a
Constitution in 1961 was formulated so that it favoured whites in power. In 1965, the government
unilaterally declared its independence but the UK did not recognise the act and demanded more
complete voting rights for the black African majority in the country (then called Rhodesia). Finally,
free elections were held in 1979 after UN sanctions and a guerrilla uprising, and independence (as
CIA World Fact Book – Sudan (2008), op.cit.
Ibid
173
Ibid
174
Total in Myanmar, Exxon Mobile in Equitorial Guinea, Statoil and Norsk Hydro in Iran and Libya, to name a few.
Source: Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), op.cit. p. 33
175
Ibid
176
BBC News Country Profile: Sudan (2008) op.cit.
177
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), pp. 78-79
171
172
66
Zimbabwe) became a reality in 1980 after Robert Mugabe, the veteran pro-independence leader and
his ZANU party and the first prime minister of the nation, won the British supervised independence
elections. Mugabe has been the only ruler of the country and has since 1987 been the president 178,
and by many Africans he is considered a hero due to his fight for independence. Mugabe has
dominated the country’s political system since independence. Ideologically, Mugabe belongs to the
African liberationist tradition of the 1960s – strong and ruthless leadership, anti-Western, suspicious
of capitalism and deeply intolerant of dissent and opposition. His chaotic land redistribution
campaign, which began in 2000, where squatters seized almost all white-owned farmers by force in
an ongoing and violent campaign to reclaim what they say was stolen by settlers because of the
Land Appointment Act in 1930179 which restricted blacks’ access to land, forcing many into wage
labour, caused an exodus of white farmers. 180
The land redistribution campaign crippled the economy as production fell sharply. That precipitated
the economic collapse as it had been based on agriculture. The country has since endured rampant
inflation (2008: rate of 2 mill. %),181 critical food and fuel shortages leaving many Zimbabweans to
survive on grain handouts where Mugabe e.g. in June 2007 put price controls on all basic
commodities causing panic buying and leaving stores empty for months.182 Hundreds of thousands
Zimbabweans, including much needed professionals, have emigrated. Aid agencies and critics
partly blame the land reform programme for the food shortages but the government blames a longrunning drought, and Mugabe has accused Britain and its allies of sabotaging the economy in
revenge for the redistribution programme.183
In 2002, the presidential election where Mugabe was re-elected was condemned as seriously flawed
by the opposition and foreign observers as it was marred by high levels of violence.184 Mugabe
ignored the international condemnation, and the ruling ZANU-PF party used fraud and intimidation
to win a two-thirds majority in the March 2005 parliamentary election, allowing it to amend the
constitution and recreated the Senate, which had been abolished in the late 1980s.185 In April 2005,
CIA World Fact Book – Zimbabwe (2008)
BBC Country Profile - Timeline: Zimbabwe (2008)
180
Ibid
181
Ibid
182
CIA World Fact Book – Zimbabwe (2008) op.cit.
183
BBC Country Profile: Zimbabwe (2008) op.cit
184
BBC Country Profile - Timeline: Zimbabwe (2008), op.cit.
185
CIA World Fact Book – Zimbabwe (2008) op.cit.
178
179
67
many shanties and illegal street stalls were destroyed as ostensibly a part of an urban ‘clean-up’
rationalisation programme initiated by the government. The UN estimates that it left 700,000 people
homeless and jobless186 – most of them being poor supporters of the opposition.187
In September 2006, a planned demonstration against the government’s handling of the economic
crisis was disrupted by riot police, and union leaders were taken into custody and later hospitalised,
allegedly after being tortured. 188 The parliamentary elections in March 2008 contained irregularities
but was won by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) founded in 1999, and its
leader Morgan Tsvangirai won the first round of the presidential poll and may have won an outright
majority, but official results posted by the Zimbabwe Electoral Committee did not reflect this. In
late June 2008, in the lead up to a run-off election, considerable violence was enacted against
opposition party members leading to the withdrawal of Tsvangirai from the ballot where he stated
that a free and fair election was impossible due to the violent intimidation of his supporters.189
Tsvangirai was already in 2002 charged with treason over an alleged plot to kill President Mugabe,
and again in 2003 he was arrested twice amid a week of opposition protests. He was acquitted of the
treason charges relating to the alleged plot to kill Mugabe in 2004, and in August 2005 the
remaining treason charges against him were dropped.190 According to the MDC spokesman in
London, Eliphas Mukonoweshuro, Tsvangirai was beaten unconscious by the police while in
custody in March 2007, as he had been arrested along with several colleagues after riot police broke
up a public meeting. The government said that they breached a ban on political gatherings and
claimed that the opposition had been involved in violence and that they had also beaten up people
and the police. The MDC spokesman said the rally was not political and therefore not subject to the
provisions of the public order act. A three-month ban on political meetings was imposed after
violence at an opposition rally in February 2007.191 In May 2007, Tsvangirai was hospitalised after
he was arrested again at a rally where riot police dispersed the gathering.192 Extensive evidence of
vote tampering and ballot-box stuffing in the run-off election in June 2008193 and systematic
186
Ibid
Ibid
188
BBC Country Profile: Zimbabwe (2008) op.cit
189
CIA World Fact Book – Zimbabwe (2008) op.cit.
190
BBC Country Profile - Timeline: Zimbabwe (2008) op.cit.
191
BBC News, (12 March 2007), Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai 'beaten up'
192
BBC Country Profile - Timeline: Zimbabwe (2008), op.cit.
193
CIA World Fact Book – Zimbabwe (2008),op. cit.
187
68
beating, arresting and harassment of the opponents, according to human rights groups194, the
process was internationally condemned, and calls for the creation of a power-sharing government
were made. Finally, in September 2008, President Mugabe and the opposition leader Tsvangirai
signed a historic power-sharing deal where Mugabe remains as president, and Tsvangirai takes up
the role as prime minister.195 The results and effects of the deal are now awaited.
4.6.1. Investment, Natural Resources and Trade with China
The Chinese have been friendly with Zimbabwe since 1980, when they and Mugabe, who led the
newly independent state, shared much the same Marxist ideology. However, with Zimbabwe’s
economy which has been ailing since 2000 and continued to worsen till today’s date, the friendship
turned on investments and goods that Mugabe’s government was increasingly unable to find
elsewhere till mid- 2006 when China allegedly broke off relations with Mugabe according to some
Western authors and scholars. Perhaps, it was due to the coming the Olympic Games in August
2008 where image is not an insignificant factor,196 and therefore the international condemnation of
Mugabe and the election process could no longer be ignored. However, the ‘break-up’ cannot be
confirmed.
However, until the ‘friendship’ allegedly ended in June 2006 , Chinese companies won contracts
worth hundreds of millions of dollars to provide hydroelectric generators for the national power
authority, run by Mugabe’s brother-in-law. China Aviation Industry, an aircraft maker, has
furthermore sold or given three 60-seat propjets to the beleaguered Air Zimbabwe as well as selling
1,000 commuter buses to the Zimbabwean government, and Zimbabwe’s air force has bought
Chinese trainer jets. In 2004, China also won a contract to farm 1,000 square kilometres of land
seized from the white commercial farmers. According to Zimbabwe, trade with China amounted to
$100 million in the first three months of 2005 and that year Mugabe stated that China was close to
becoming the country’s leading foreign investor, a claim that could be true because of the flight of
Western capital as Western leaders and investors have shunned Mugabe’s government for its human
rights policies. Some of the exchanges are almost good will from China as e.g. the $13 million
194
Dugger, Celia W. (19 April 2008), Zimbabwe Arms Shipped by China Spark an Uproar
BBC Country Profile - Timeline: Zimbabwe (2008), op.cit.
196
Wines, Michael (25 July 2005): Zimbabwe’s future: Made in China, ’Look East’ policy gets mixed welcome
195
69
palace to Mugabe. Mugabe himself has called his policy “Look East”, and to him it is a way of
turning his back to the former colonial ruler, Britain, and Britain’s allies, like the US.197
Among some average Zimbabweans, resentment can be felt towards the intensity of the pro-China
attitude and among the elite, eyebrows have been raised as some question whether Mugabe is
simply replacing British political domination with an Asian economic rule. It has been reported that
the Chinese have tried to get access to Zimbabwe’s platinum mines, which have the world’s secondlargest reserves, and in 2005 Mugabe’s government expressed that it might accommodate China’s
wishes. The principal operator of the mines denied being pressured to deal with China. In 2005,
Chris Maroleng, a Zimbabwe expert at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, and others
stated that many of the deals between China and Zimbabwe are hidden and unclear as they are done
through barter arrangements and front companies, reflecting Zimbabwe’s inability to pay China
with hard currency. It has been mentioned that e.g. China has taken a share of Zimbabwe’s tobacco
harvest in exchange for equipment.198
In June 2006, The Herald Newspaper said that China had signed a $1.3 billion deal with Zimbabwe
to help relieve an acute shortage of energy by letting Chinese companies build new coal mines and
three thermal power stations in the area of the Zambian border. In exchange China would be
provided with chrome.199 Like with many business deals between the two countries, it also remains
unclear whether the deal remains after China allegedly broke off relations with Zimbabwe that same
month, but individual investors have entered into cooperative agreements with state-owned
companies in the areas of telecommunications and power utility, but commitments to rehabilitate
the coal station in Hwange are beyond yet-to-be-realised.
4.6.2. Chinese Arms Supply Incident
In April 2008, an incident of weapons shipped to Zimbabwe from China with a stop in South Africa
caused an uproar and set off a political fight putting pressure on South Africa and China to reduce
support for the government. Furthermore, China had allegedly broken off relations with Zimbabwe
in June 2006. Dock workers at the port of Durban, backed by South Africa’s powerful unions,
refused to unload the ship and threatened with protests and violence if the government tried to do it
Wines, Michael (25 July 2005): Zimbabwe’s future: Made in China, ’Look East’ policy gets mixed welcome
Ibid
199
BBC News (12 June 2006): Zimbabwe signs China energy deal
197
198
70
without them. With an appeal to South Africa’s High Court to bar the transport of the arms across
South Africa by the Anglican archbishop with the argument of the weapons being used to repress
Zimbabweans, the shipment was stopped. The arms were apparently ordered from China before the
elections, but the arrival in the middle of Zimbabwe’s political crisis brought about deep
disagreement on how to respond, and scrutiny on China was emphasised as China was already
being heavily criticised due to the suppression of Tibetan protesters and the arms supply to the
government of Sudan. The Chinese ship, packed with ammunition, rockets and mortar bombs,
quickly became a symbol of the deep disagreements on how to approach the Zimbabwean dilemma:
Should South Africa confront Mugabe, or continue the policy of quiet diplomacy that has drawn
international criticism? The controversy came at a bad time with China being sensitive to criticism
due to the Olympic Games, but China has still been keen on keeping good diplomatic relations with
Zimbabwe in order to secure its access to minerals and other resources.200
However, the approach from the South African government led by the African National Congress
(ANC), a party that has trade unions as some of its most important members, was together with the
country’s arms procurement agency far more conciliatory as they actively helped Zimbabwe to
clear the shipment through customs. The explanation from Themba Maseko, a spokesman from the
South African government explained regretfully that no international body had yet imposed an arms
embargo on Zimbabwe, and as South Africa functions as a trading hub, the country had little choice
but allowing the deal, even if it is not satisfied with a particular transaction. He stated, “it is our
hope that these arms were not ordered because of current impasse, and that the guns will not be
used to resolve the political problems in Zimbabwe”.201 China’s stance was similar saying that the
shipment was just standard business, and the Foreign Ministry stated that “China has always had a
prudent and responsible attitude towards arm sales”, and that “one of the most important principles
is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”. According to the commercial invoice,
bill of lading and packing list of the equipment, the arms were shipped from the Chinese stateowned arms company Poly Technologies Inc. on March 15, 2008 to the Ministry of Defence in
Zimbabwe, and the shipment was worth $1.245 million.202 Nicole Fritz, who heads the South
African Litigation Center said that the South African government violated its constitutional
obligations and abdicated from its regional mandate role to bring about a peaceful resolution to the
200
Dugger, Celia W. (19 April 2008) op.cit.
Ibid
202
Ibid
201
71
crisis in Zimbabwe by actively facilitating the transfer of arms in these circumstances. It was argued
that the 2002 law on conventional arms included guidelines that directed the government to
consider, in the decision of whether to give permits for the transport of weapons, whether the
receiving government of the arms would commit violations on human rights. That request was
accommodated by a judge, but when the authorities approached the ship to serve the court order, the
ship sailed away, and the last thing they heard by radio transmission was: “Next port, Maputo”,
referring to the capital of Mozambique.203 After this incident, one can really question the reality of
the claim that China broke off relations with Zimbabwe in June 2006 as perceived by many
researches of China-Africa relations.
4.7. Economic Overview of the Four Case Countries in relation to Economic Development
In order to look into the possibility of applying the theories of growth and modernisation to China’s
economic relations with Africa and to analytically discuss it in the following chapter, it is necessary
to get an overview of some relevant economic figures for the four African case countries (cf. Fig. 5
below) that include GDP per capita, various work sectors and the supply of labour as these play an
explicative role according to Lewis.
Fig. 5 Relevant Economic Figures for the Four African Case Countries
Relevant
Angola
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
21.1%
6.4%
10.5%
-6.1%
$5,600
$2,000
$2,200
$200
GDP composition
Agriculture: 9.5%
Agriculture: 17.6%
Agriculture: 31.8%
Agriculture: 18.1%
by sector (2007)
Industry: 65.8%
Industry: 52.7%
Industry: 34.2%
Industry: 22.6%
Services: 29.7%
Services: 33.9%
Services: 59.3%
50.13 mill. (2007)
7.42 mill. (1996)
4.03 mill. (2007)
Economic
Figures
GDP –real growth
rate (2007)
GDP- per capita
(2007)
Services: 24.6%
Labour force:
203
6.64 mill. (2007)
Dugger, Celia W. (19 April 2008) op.cit.
72
Population (2008):
12,531,357
146,255,312
40,218,456
11,350,111
Unemployment
Extensive unemployment
4.9% (2007)
18.7% (2002)
80% (2005)
rate:
rate and underemployment
affecting more than half
the population (2001)
Labour force by
Agriculture: 85%
Agriculture: 70%
Agriculture: 80%
Agriculture: 66%
Occupation:
Industry and services:
15% (2003)
Industry: 10%
Industry: 7%
Industry: 22.6%
Services: 20% (1999)
Services: 13% (1998)
Services: 59.3% (2007)
Source: CIA – The World Fact Book – Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe (2008)
4.8. Cultural Relativism
Advocates of cultural relativism argue that the absolute universality of human rights does not and
cannot exist because rights and rules about morality are encoded in cultural context 204. This means
that notions of human rights differ throughout the world due to the diversity in views of right and
wrong, which is linked to various underlying cultures. Furthermore, the strong relativist position
attaches an important consequence to this diversity: “that no transcendent or trans-cultural ideas of
right can be found or agreed on, and hence that no culture (whether or not in the guise of enforcing
international human rights) is justified in attempting to impose on others what must be understood
as its own ideas.”205
To the relativists, the universality of human rights may suggest cultural imposition and imperialism
of the West. Throughout history, the West has viewed its own beliefs as universal and has attempted
to universalise them. According to some relativists, this push to universalisation of Western norms
is a destruction of the diversity of cultures and just another form of homogenisation in the modern
world. During the Cold War, such debates were dominantly between the Communist countries and
the Western democracies. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the debate continues in a North-South
or West-East framework, or in a religious West-Islam framework, or more broadly between
developed (Western/Northern) and developing (Third World) countries.206
The term ‘culture’ is used in a broad and diffuse way going beyond indigenous traditions and customary practices to
political and religious ideologies and institutional structures
Source: Alston , Philip and Steiner, J. Henry, (1996), p. 192
205
Ibid p. 193
206
Ibid
204
73
Daniel A. Bell notes three East Asian arguments for cultural particularism that contrast with the
traditional Western arguments for liberal universalism:
1. Cultural factors can affect the prioritising of rights. Conflict of rights is indisputable and
different societies may prioritise rights differently. For example, if only scarce resources are
available an East Asian society with a Confucian heritage might emphasise the value of
education.
2. Cultural factors can affect the justification of rights. The justifications for particular
practices should be made from the inside, i.e. from specific examples and arguments that
East Asians use and can relate themselves to.
3. Cultural factors can provide moral foundation for distinctive political practices and
institutions. The Confucian influence in East Asia means that the duties of the citizens must
be regarded specifically in terms of the realisation of those duties. For example, whether the
right to filial piety is best realised by means of law or through more indirect methods such as
tax breaks or housing benefits.
In short, these three arguments point to areas of justifiable cultural particularity in East Asia.
Although, Bell finds that it has been easy to dismiss the claim for Asian values, since the debate has
not been much of a challenge to the dominant Western political views, the above-mentioned three
points still sophisticate the Asian values debate and go beyond a simplistic dichotomy between
communitarian values and Western individualism.207
To sum up, the cultural relativists view human rights as rights defined by culture. A people’s
conception of what is and is not a human right depends primarily on cultural proclivities (at certain
points in time and space). Hence, cultural relativism can also be said to represent a major challenge
to the efforts of establishing an international human rights consensus.
4.8.1. Asian Values
One of the expressions of the cultural relativism is the so-called “Asian values”. In April 1993, East
and South East Asian nations signed the Bangkok Declaration, in which the uniqueness of Asian
values and the special nature of their historical condition was emphasised. On this ground, Asian
people’s perceptions of human rights and democracy would be radically different from those of the
Western people.
207
Bell, A., Daniel, (2003), Cross-Cultural Debates on Human Rights and Democracy: Asian Values and Beyond
74
The Asian values discourse refutes the universal validity of the liberal and democratic components
of human rights, i.e. civil and political rights, based on its view of Asia having a unique cultural
essence, which allegedly is alien to those rights 208. According to Tatsuo Inoue, an explaining factor
behind the emergence of the Asian values discourse is the rapid economic development and the
emerging presence of Asia in the global economic network, which has enhanced the self-confidence
of several Asian countries. Another source that has encouraged the Asian values discourse lies in
history and politics: Those arguing for Asian values appeal to Asian people’s deep-rooted
“resentment” (ambivalent mixture of resentment and inferiority complex) against Western
colonialism and hegemony.209
According to the Singaporean statesman Lee Kuan Yew, Western style civil and political rights
need to be modified in order to secure economic growth in a quicker pace. Especially in the initial
stage of the economic development, the Western-style democracy is likely to engender faction
opposition, which would weaken the government’s force of implementing some development
measures. The liberty of speech would possibly plunge the country into civil strife.210 To Lee, social
stability, which is believed to be secured merely through authoritarian governance, is of primary
importance. This voice is resonant among most of the Asian political leaders and paves the way for
the Chinese government’s vein of reasoning as to development.
208
Inoue, Tatsuo (2003), p. 124
Ibid p.116
210
Bell, Daniel A. (2000), pp. 35-36.
209
75
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS
5.1. Introduction of the Analytical Chapter
In this chapter, analytical insights will be made based on the empirical inputs found in the former
chapter. The first part in this chapter will relate to the economic and foreign policy theories in
chapter three where they will be discussed analytically by including their ability to be applied when
compared to the facts and actual practise of China-Africa relations found in the empirical chapter.
The second part of this chapter will include an analysis of the economic implications for Africa as a
whole and for the four case countries by engaging with China in the way that they have, and
China’s principle of non-interference in internal affairs and its influence on good governance and
human rights issues in the four case countries will also be assessed analytically. Following, in this
context, will be a cultural insight by taking China’s adherence to cultural relativism regarding
human rights into consideration and its influence on the engagement with pariah regimes.
Moreover, the question of how China actually fit in Africa when distinct African features in terms
of history, economic, political and cultural structures and long-lasting relations with Western
countries will be raised. Finally, of great importance, analytical African perspectives will address
China’s presence in Africa – in particular in Sudan and Zimbabwe - as China has been criticised
the most by the international community and the West because of its presence here, as these two
case countries have the biggest problems in relation to good governance and human rights
violations.
5.2. Economic Development: Application and Analytical Discussion of the Theories of Growth
and Modernisation
According to Lewis in the theoretical chapter, the central measure of growth is the rising per capita
income, so if one starts out by looking at the figures from Fig. 5 in section 4.7 in the former chapter,
the GDP per capita in the four countries ranks Angola as the “wealthiest”, Nigeria and Sudan in the
middle with respectively 6.4% and 10.5%, and Zimbabwe as the poorest with -6.1% also indicating
a totally chaotic economic situation. By using Lewis’ two-sector model consisting of a subsistence
sector and a capitalist sector, the four African countries can be used to represent the subsistence
sector as in three out of the four countries, the unemployment rate is high. In order to use the model
as a theoretical tool in an analytical context, China is used to represent the capitalist sector, as it has
the role of being the investor in these four countries, even though we know that the country is still
76
considered a developing country and officially is a Communist country, but it does practice state
capitalism.
However, as the theory initially was developed as a western approach for a backward closed
economy split in two sectors but later extended to cover an open economy of developing countries
and industrialised countries, the representation should not be understood in an original sense.
In this way, the economic implications for the four African countries can be determined through the
tendencies observed by using Lewis’ theoretical model and later Rostow’s stage theory. With this in
mind, and Lewis’ assertion that when the capitalist core – here China – was established with
unlimited supply of cheap labour from the other sector – here Africa - the inherent dynamics of the
capitalist sector would create an increase the total amount of capital available as at least a part of the
profits created would be reinvested. The result would then be African workers ‘drawn’ into the
capitalist sector, thus more jobs would be created and thereby sustained economic growth takes
place due to an increase in the savings rate and in consumption in the subsistence sector/developing
country. However, the problem here is the many employed Chinese workers who migrate to the
four African case countries – of course with differences between the four countries – and therefore
the Chinese economic presence limitedly benefit the average African as much of the profits go to
the African elite due to lack of transparency and good governance and various degrees of
corruption. Finally, the Chinese price of labour remains low, thus being a competitor to hiring a
large amount of African workers. Furthermore, the increased productivity of labour coming from
the transfer to the capitalist sector – China - would be passed on to consumers in the industrialised
countries – China - in the form of lower prices on products. And with oil and other natural resources
being the focus of China’s economic involvement in most of the four African case countries and
with the majority of its investments being within this area, this means that a constant supply of
energy resources keeps the Chinese production and consumer prices low thus allowing for the high
level of productivity in China which is used to secure the big market of exports to the rest of the
world and thereby again secure Chinese revenues.
Lewis’ main theoretical conclusions on trade between developing countries and industrialised
countries not promoting growth and economic progress in the former therefore seem to hold in this
context, but one must remember that the theory does not account for the GDP composition
according to sectors where the services sector in the present day African case countries make up a
detectable portion of the GDP compared to the agricultural sector and even in comparison to the
77
industrial sectors in Sudan and Zimbabwe for instance. The application of Lewis’ theory is
therefore only partly applicable and explicative in the process of determining the economic ChinaAfrica relations, and what the implications for Africa will be in the long term.
However, one should not forget that China has invested in infrastructure as well benefiting the four
African case countries in many areas and perhaps even in a detectable way in future, if that will
facilitate trade between the two partners, and the African countries succeed in exporting a larger
amount of non-raw material products. The actual benefits and profits from such improvements will
though probably remain low in the short term, if the African worker is not employed, the financial
and economic situation and institutions lack stability and transparency, or if the political situation is
so fragile that the economy remains locked as in the case of Zimbabwe. This leads to Rostow’s
stage theory in which the five economic stages are considered as being universal, and that all
societies would sooner or later go through them and thereby leave the traditional structure, and that
theoretically includes both China and the four African countries as they are characterised as
developing countries. However, as the three specific following conditions mentioned by Rostow
had to be in place before the take-off stage, this immediately eliminates the theoretical possibility of
reaching the take-off stage for the four African countries. Despite firstly experiencing a marked
increase in the investment rate due to the Chinese; and secondly the emergence of particular growth
sectors - here in the form of the extracting sector of oil and natural resources in particular; the third
condition of established political, social and institutional frameworks for making it possible to use
the potential in the up-coming modern sector, and thereby reaching self-sustaining growth, hinders
all four African countries in ‘taking-off’ and in the end reach sustained economic growth despite
Nigeria’s efforts of staying in the process of economic reforms.
China as a developing country has had other conditions which has secured the country economic
growth and even giving it the status of a big economic power. However, China has also been
affected by the current economic crisis, but the economy is well padded because of financial
reforms in the banking sector, and the Chinese stock market has been insignificantly affected. The
growth in exports has though dropped to approximately a bit under 10% compared to formerly
20%211 also finally resulting in economic help from the state in form of $480 in order to maintain
the building of infrastructure, so that more raw material can be imported, and the production of the
211
DR2 Udland, (Danish News Program), (21 Oct. 08)
78
enormous amount of export products maintained. Thereby the risk of a rise in unemployment will
decrease.212
5.3. Economic Underdevelopment and Dependency: Application and Analytical Discussion of
Neo-Marxist Theories of Underdevelopment and Dependency
With Andre Gunder Frank’s theoretical model of metropoles and satellites and his interest in
identifying the causes of underdevelopment arguing that the most important mechanism for
benefiting from the surplus was trade and other kinds of exchange of goods and services not only
internationally but also in the form of internal exchange in the peripheral societies, China will in
this context represent the metropoles and the African case countries the satellites. This fits well with
Frank’s rejection of the underdeveloped countries (here read: African case countries) making up
two separate economies but instead being an integrated part of a one-world capitalist system, as
capitalism (in this case through China’s economic engagement) was believed to have permeated the
periphery with its merchant capital. This means, conferring to Frank’s pyramidal structure and its
networks, that the African countries will benefit on a smaller scale if one only takes trade between
the four African case countries and China into consideration, but on a larger scale if the economic
surplus generated in the African countries is invested and not drained away to the affluent capitalist
country. The development of the four African countries is thus dependent on China’s interests in
genuine development. Africa’s developmental benefits from trading with China and receiving
investments thus become linked to China’s willingness to inject the generated surplus into projects
that not only serves one sector like the extracting of natural resources one which is then dependent
on the demand and prices on these resources, but also into areas such as infrastructure and health
care. So far, China’s investments in that sector seem to benefit the case countries with Sudan’s
economic boom due to its oil is the most visible in this sense. However, if it comes to the long term
positive developmental benefits a part of the argument in 5.2. can be used as the involvement of
African personnel in the form of enough local educated personnel to continue these projects without
the Chinese is determining for economic progress and each country’s success. According to Frank,
without such genuine interests in the metropole (China), the alternative is the necessity to delink
yourself from the world market and thereby from the industrialised countries that China also
represents in this context in form of its role as the metropole. One can therefore say that - for now –
as the long term results from the China-Africa economic relations still remain to be seen - that
212
DR2 Udland, (Danish News Program), (10 Nov. 2008)
79
Frank’s theory is partly applicable, as the three case countries with the exception of Zimbabwe have
experienced GDP- real growth mainly due to the large oil reserves, because China and the countries
themselves have prioritised investment and trade within this area. Without China’s choice and
willingness to do that, the theoretical alternative of delinking the satellites from the metropole and
the introduction of some kind of socialism which Frank suggests, becomes a theoretical option that
could be realised, but as world economic history shows, no socialist country has so far succeeded in
long term economic growth and progress, as China despite its official status as a Communist state
actually practices state capitalism, and therefore that option does not seem realistic. The conclusion
is thus that Frank’s theory is only partly applicable in relation to identifying the implications for the
four African countries, also because his point of departure is the Latin American countries and the
US as the main metropole that both differentiate themselves in many areas from ‘our’ two trading
partners, but it can serve as a useful tool in identifying the causes of underdevelopment which might
be the result for the African countries in the long run, as some claim that China is just a replacement
of the various former colonial rulers in terms of its economic power, but that is impossible to
foresee.
However, in relation to Cardoso, Senghass and Menzel’s theories of dependent development,
Cardoso rejects that peripheral countries can be treated as one group of dependent economies. With
his beliefs that external factors have different impacts depending on the various internal conditions,
this means – transferred to the four African case countries even if they are looked at separately that the national business community and its leaders in each country have an influence in the
strategies pursued by each state, if they dare act autonomously enough, so that national and longterm interests can be taken into account, when business is done with China. What is furthermore
applicable and explanative from the theory, are the problems of an unbalanced and distorted
production structure. Angola, Nigeria and Sudan are all three very dependent on the oil business
which means that a result of a dependency on imported machinery and equipment exists as a sector
that produces capital goods is almost absent – and that goes for Zimbabwe as well with its very ill
economy creating no surplus at all, and even if it had created just a minimal one in limited areas, it
would not be visible due to the enormous amount of corruption. Cardoso’s claim of needed
democratic reform as a precondition for securing societal development, so that it would benefit the
majority of the people also seems applicable to all the four countries, when the discourse is
Western. As with the Chinese eyes, the African countries’ opportunity for development lies in trade
and investment, and one cannot deny the rightness of such a belief, as the long-term effects of the
80
economic relationship remain to be seen. However, with point of departure in Senghess’ and
Menzel’s dissolution of the dichotomy between centre and periphery, and instead a number of
patterns of integration into the world economy with the focus on the internal socio-economic
conditions and political institutions as the explanative factor for, whether a society can escape from
its dependency trap or not, relates to Rostow’s third specific condition before a country can ‘takeoff’, the analytical conclusion thus becomes the same as to the China-Africa economic relations as
with Rostow’s theory, i.e. the four African countries cannot expect to experience development and a
nationally integrated economy unless such conditions are improved. The theory can thus be applied
in its entirety to the situation of the four African case countries and their economic relationship to
China.
5.4. Foreign Policy Theory: Application and Analytical Discussion of The Two-Good Theory
Change and maintenance are the two things, or goods, that Morgan’s and Palmer’s theory assume
that every state pursues as to its many issues of which it wishes to achieve the most favourable
outcome on each of them. In order to determine the change and maintenance that China is seeking
in its foreign policy towards Africa, it is interesting firstly to look at the official policies through
China’s Africa Policy of 2006, and what is expressed at the FOCAC meetings. Secondly, specific
incidents and the Chinese behaviour in the four African case countries furthermore will be
determining and explanative of the possible applicability of the theory.
First of all, China is a powerful state as, according to Morgan and Palmer’s theory, a state’s ability
to produce change and maintenance in its foreign policy is connected with its resources, and one
does not need to go into details about the economic growth which China has experienced in the last
decades. China is therefore also expected to engage in more foreign policy activities and in
producing change at an increasing rate with its sufficient capabilities to challenge others as it has
gained a ‘reserve’ of resources. The scope of China’s economic involvement around the world
from nations as the US to ‘our’ African countries as well as its important oil imports from the
Middle East and the text ‘made in China’ which occurs several times on various households’
products around the world confirms that this part of the theory is applicable.
To start out with the 44 African countries participating in the FOCAC acknowledging the principle
of one-China in 2007 quickly tells us, that that is expected as in the term ‘quid pro quo’ which
Morgan and Palmer state is descriptive of the nature of foreign aid as a part of exercising foreign
81
policy. The first step that the African countries must take in order to be ‘in the club’ thus relates to
the forming of alliances as it is stated that the parties will support each other politically in the
international arena followed by China’s statement of working towards debt cancellation as well as a
common wish to reform the UN. With these things in mind as well as the country’s capabilities,
theoretically speaking, China is seeking change. Even if aid is not the main theme of neither the
FOCAC meetings or in China’s Africa Policy, it is clear that it fits, as aid is given and a lot of it is
tied aid and sometimes also ‘with no strings attached’, and China is presented as “the giver”.
However, one must remember that tied aid is not a unique Chinese way of exercising foreign policy.
It is also the case sometimes with Western donor countries. Other elements that suggest that China
is change seeking are the four out of five foreign policy principles in the Beijing Consensus as well
as the statement at the FOCAC meeting of 2006 opting for a de-politisation of human rights and the
right to economic development to come first and not the human rights as allegedly claimed in the
Western discourse. By declaring that the present world order is unjust and inequitable and by urging
greater south-south cooperation, it is an expression of discontent with the present conditions in the
current international system and theoretically speaking, it can therefore be asserted that China is
expected to work for change in these issues also given its capabilities and resources. The following
quote of Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese republic, from an address delivered on March 2,
1924 can actually be used in this context: “When we learn from the West, it is evident that we
should learn the latest inventions instead of repeating the different steps of development.” 213 Even
though it is a long time ago that this speech was given, and the context was production of energy,
the essentials from the quote are still useful, as it sums up the Chinese way of thinking when it
comes to development in every aspect. The Chinese should not just copy the various stages of
development despite them having being useful to the West, but instead also use own ideas of
development, and in this theoretical context, it means working towards change; that the Western
discourse and way of creating development is not the only way – it is just an option that can be
replaced. It furthermore sheds light on the importance of the principle of non-interference and the
Chinese’s insistence on respect of this both in its own country as well as in the African ones.
The principle of multilateralism and peaceful negotiation of international disputes, another pillar in
the five foreign policy principles, both indicates change and maintenance, as it is a choice of tool
and use of forum to work with and within that can go in either direction. Maintenance is though
expressed through the very clear stress on the mutual-ness between China and Africa in regard to
213
Copeland, Lewis; Lamm, Lawrence W. and McKenna, Stephen J. (1999), p. 400
82
this principle in both all of the FOCAC meetings and China’s Africa Policy. One can thus say that
China seeks for equal opportunities and benefits. However, as Morgan and Palmer’s theory assumes
that all states at all times will seek both maintenance and change, and that it is not expected that one
is sought to the exclusion of the other, and that an adopted policy with the purpose of gaining
influence over the actions of others is regarded as change seeking, even if the influence is not
exercised overtly with the reference point being the actions intended to affect the outcome on an
issue, China is also change seeking in this context. The concept of substitutability thus seems
useful. To sum up, China’s bilateral pressure on Khartoum ‘behind the curtains’ in relation to
Darfur due to its seat in the UN Security Council serves as a good example, as it succeeded in
making the resolution that finally resulted in a peace keeping troop that probably would not have
been the case, if it had not been for China’s actions. Furthermore, President Zemin’s comment on
increasing the collective bargaining capacity of developing countries at the FOCAC in 2000
indicates a preference of multilateralism and working in an atmosphere of maintenance between the
developing countries in order to produce change by gaining influence when dealing with the rich
(Western) countries. Calling the intensification of the China-Africa relations in part III of China’s
Africa Policy “a new strategic partnership” further confirms such a goal. The theory is thus
applicable to the part of multilateralism and peaceful negotiation principle found in China’s foreign
policy and expressed in its relations with Africa. According to the theory, China’s aid to Zimbabwe
is change seeking as supporting a regime which is expected to fall due to internal trends fits with the
theory’s definition of change.
5.5. Economic Implications for Africa as a Whole, Including Distinct African features, and for
the Four African Case Countries by Engaging with China Economically
There is no doubt that the Chinese economic engagement with Africa in general and with the four
African case countries is significant and have created visible changes that will have a lasting impact
on development. So far, there is no conclusive evidence, based on the data available, on what the
engagement implies for African development in the long term which can give rise to imponderable
reasoning in certain areas, but the trajectory of development of Africa and the four case countries
may be transformed over the coming years. It is impossible to know. At this stage, the data
available can serve in order to identify possible negative and positive implications which in turn can
be helpful in order for Africa as a whole to develop appropriate responses and strategies.
83
History shows that the wide variety of African states and societies have had difficulties in dealing
with projects of social and economic transformation – far more than what is seen in Asian states and
societies, not to mention China itself. These problems of governance associated with this
intractability derive from the enduring features of the continent’s demography. The population is
unevenly spread over an immense size of land, it has been difficult to control not just only as to
simple physical communication which are also poor, but also more importantly in terms of the
attitudes, assumptions and forms of social organisation – ‘governmentalities’ – that Africans have
developed over a very long time and based their response on, no matter what situation they have
been in. Other difficulties for Africa have been the maintenance of established territorial states that
originally also were artificially ‘drawn up’ on the continent and to institutionalise appropriate social
organisation (e.g. not least in China) to the management of the dense and settled populations.
Instead, personal pre-eminence, genealogy and various forms of spiritual authority have played an
important role. Africa is, in short, extremely difficult to organise and manage, and these
circumstances did not only complicate the ‘colonial project’ and the function of modern African
statehood, but it will also create challenges to the Chinese present – perhaps in an even more severe
manner and to a great annoyance to the Chinese as these difficulties despite certain similarities
found in China, also contrast significantly to the attitudes of the Chinese.214
On top of the indigenous factors, comes Africa’s forcible and often damaging entrance into the
global economy and its nature of the structure of governments. This has been in form of an
‘invasion’ by external actors acting upon the premise of inequality and superiority to the African
populations that were being exploited. Even though, China’s entrance into Africa cannot at all be
compared to slave traders or colonialists that have characterised Africa’s meeting with the world,
the ideal of equality found in the rhetoric which both Chinese and African politicians like to relate
to, does by no means fit the actual relationship which is deeply unequal, as there is no African
economy that matches the size of China’s economy, and no African economy can engage in China
in the same way as China has engaged itself in Africa,215 in particular in the resource rich countries
such as in three of ‘our’ case countries.
Another factor that must be included in the analytical assessment of the economic implications for
Africa is that Africans have adapted themselves to certain mechanisms that are now well established
in order to deal with its often unfavourable position marked by inequality in relation to external
214
215
Clapham, Christopher (2006), Fitting China In, pp. 2-3
Ibid p. 3
84
actors. One of the mechanisms is identified as ‘extraversion’216 meaning appropriation by African
elites of resources provided by external actors in order to consolidate their own authority. And
China’s way of entering the continent therefore fits this pattern of rentier statehood and politics
perfectly, and with a brief period after the Cold War where Africa’s bargaining power was heavily
reduced, the Chinese provides a welcomed alternative to the Washington Consensus agenda.
Currently, China does not offer Africa a new model for involvement in the global economy and
political system, as Africa including Angola, Sudan and also to a certain degree Nigeria, still
‘survives’ through its export of raw materials.
With Angola being China’s biggest oil supplier and second-largest commercial partner and Sudan
depending on its main export of oil and petroleum products with China as its primary export
partner, China’s economic involvement plays an important role in the Angolan and the Sudanese
economies. In the case of Angola and Sudan, the economies here are too dependent on oil, as there
is basically no production except in this sector despite a big part of the population being occupied in
the agricultural sector in both countries, and therefore the creation of new jobs and development
remain to be seen. One can therefore argue, that China’s heavy engagement in especially the energy
sector reinforces the old model of engagement and prevents Africa from sustained development 217
despite benefits achieved through infrastructure projects, the building of hospitals and development
assistance, as no concrete strategy for development has been laid out. With China’s assumed longterm presence in Africa, it will also learn from the processes as other former external actors have
done and learn to cope with the uncertain and fast changing African environment and find ways to
best protect its economic and political investments.218
The good thing is though that a global commodity boom most likely will have a positive impact on
prices and improve the terms of trade for many African economies, including all of the case
countries, but the potential drawback with Africa still functioning as the raw material supplier
means that the composition of its exports does not change – instead they are diverted away from the
Western economies and towards other parts in East Asia. On top of that, the Chinese low-cost
industrial production furthermore undermines African attempts to break out of its historic
dependence on primary production. So, even though access to cheap products can be a good thing
216
Used by Jean-Francois Bayart
Source: Clapham, Christopher (2006), op.cit., p. 3
217
Ibid p. 3
218
Ibid p.4
85
for the (mostly urban) African consumers as they will experience an increase in their purchasing
power, and African producers relying on imported inputs may see the costs of production fall, local
manufacturers may suffer due to heavy competition from the cheap Chinese imports, especially
producers relying on labour-intensive production which has been most evident in the clothing and
textile industry. 219
Similarly, one may expect increased competition between Chinese and African producers in third
markets, in particular when trade preferences erode which tend to undermine the competitiveness of
African producers vis-à-vis the Chinese (and other low-cost producers from Asia). It is therefore
also important that the developed North maintains the trade preference schemes granted to African
countries in general and further support African producers, so that they can adjust to Chinese
competition. There is at this stage no conclusive evidence as to what extent Chinese imports have
displaced local production and their total impact on poverty, and it is noted that the Chinese have
introduced export restraints on certain products voluntarily.220
Another problem for all of the oil rich countries; Angola, Nigeria and Sudan is though that the
multiplier effect of investments in oil and mining is much lower than investments in
manufacturing221, and as this is where the Chinese concentrate their investments, it will minimise
the potential investment dynamics. The substantial and growing number of Chinese companies
present providing goods and services especially within construction is though a positive thing, as
they improve the infrastructure of the countries, as mentioned earlier. However, with much of it
owed to export credits and tied aid including entrepreneurial Chinese migrants, it is a big problem
for Angola and Sudan in particular, as they already have a high unemployment rate with 18.7% in
Sudan, and just characterised as ‘extensive’ in Angola (cf. Fig. 5), whereas Nigeria’s economy
seems more developed and resistant with 52.7% of its GDP stemming from the industry sector as
well as an unemployment rate of 4.9% (cf. Fig. 5). Nigeria, though, is less vulnerable as it is more
developed in general and economically, and it is not suffering from the same amount of instability
and political turmoil as seen in the three other case countries.
Furthermore, as to the role of the Chinese Diaspora and business networks in Africa in general, it
seems critical, as Africans are not integrated into the economy which is a decreasing element for
219
Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), op.cit. p. 15
Ibid pp.15-16
221
Ibid p. 16
220
86
industrial development as such factors were important catalysts for development in East and
Southeast Asia.222 The reasoning and arguments are thus in this context the same as the ones found
in the analytical discussion of the economic theories. A transfer of knowledge, skills and human
resources development and the right framework and financial institutions with consistent
improvement of the infrastructure attained with cooperation with the Chinese become crucial as to
the success of sustainable development in all African countries including the four case countries.
Specific about China’s entrance is also that it is done with multiple actors in the form of: top
leaders, provincial leaders, enterprises, a central administration, provincial administrations,
government organised NGO’s, aid actors, the military and migrants, and additionally some
extremely weak research networks. This creates a big problem of coordination, and one might even
speak of a lack of such, not to mention the Chinese’s preference of not talking too openly about its
relations with Africa.223
However, all in all, compared to the Maoist era, one can go as far as saying that no ‘project of
transformation’ seems to exist for Africa by being involved in China’s own project of transforming
its own economy. The feelings of solidarity expressed at diplomatic meetings, the FOCAC meetings
and in China’s Africa Policy seem more and more as mere rhetoric strategically stirred in the
direction of the African governing elites for whom China provides tangible benefits, and therefore
should not be expected to hold in the long run due to the divergence, likely to arise, in the two
parties’ interests.224
Despite the unequal relationship and Angola, Nigeria and Sudan being too dependent on their oil
sectors, one cannot deny the positive thing in the fact that these countries suddenly get an immense
amount of investments that they themselves have not been able to attract earlier, even though China
is ‘controlling the show’, but one should not forget either that China is very result-oriented. It is
therefore an economic alternative that should not be denied these African countries, as the whole
continent so far has been the looser in the West’s ‘recipe’ for economic development through a
wide variety of initiatives and structural adjustment processes, not to mention the we-know-what-isgood-for-you-attitude visible in some investment programs and aid coming from the West.
Furthermore, a surplus is created when the expenses usually spent on expertise consultants and
222
Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), op.cit p. 17
Delman, Jørgen (2007)
224
Clapham, Christopher (2006), op.cit. p. 5
223
87
NGOs that often found in and characterising the Western donor system towards Africa are
removed.225
As to Zimbabwe in particular, China’s economic involvement is very difficult to rightfully indentify
as Zimbabwe is currently in a state of emergency with an economic meltdown as well as a health
crisis due to cholera, and even before that, it has been impossible to verify and confirm the extent of
the economic relations with China due to lack of substantial data, barter deals and trade- offs. The
implications for engaging with China are therefore especially linked to political issues of good
governance and human rights which are also significant regarding Sudan because of the conflicts in
Darfur.
Finally, one can rightly assume that it is very likely that relations between China and Africa will
continue and even deepen in some areas due to the complexity of Africa’s many challenges, but
also because of China’s own export driven economy and its need of raw material which currently
remains to be Angola’s, Nigeria’s and Sudan’s major source of income.
5.6. The Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs and its Influence on Good
Governance and Human Rights Issues in the Four African Case Countries
The image of the new role of China in Africa in general and not just only in the four case countries
is perhaps to many illustrated by one of China’s leaders embracing a recognised African dictator in
many of the public gatherings during diplomatic visits. Until recently, it was an image which the
Chinese accepted, if not even encouraged. “Non-intervention is our brand, like intervention is the
Americans’ brand”, a Chinese diplomat has stated.226 This confident portrayal of the China-Africa
relations drew in part on China’s need to publicise its deliberate strategy of breaking into a
Western-dominated resource market. But this controversial approach clearly also reflected Beijing’s
own assessment of African politics with the elites of the regimes controlling the resource economies
and thereby possibilities of forging ties with like-minded actors was obtained through such an
approach.227
A concern is that the Chinese involvement in the oil sector may undermine attempts to improve the
governance in that sector in particular and to ensure that the revenues and competencies generated
225
Mensah-Opuku Yaw, Paul (2008)
Alden, Chris (2007), op.cit. p. 60
227
Ibid
226
88
in the sector benefits the country as a whole, and not only rent-seeking individuals working with the
sector. By accepting existing governance structures, corrupt officials are often empowered. 228
By first looking at the so-called ‘pariah’ regimes of Sudan and Zimbabwe (and sometimes Angola),
China’s principle of non-intervention in its engagement has a negative influence, as these states are
characterised by the elites presiding over the really big amount of extractive resources, mostly in the
energy or mineral sectors, but also as to unexploited timber, fisheries and agricultural areas in some
African countries in general. Furthermore, state control of these resources in form of direct
ownership of mines and land to licensing and leasing arrangements and with reliance of the
economy upon a single resource or a collection of resources, means that the chance of created
surplus and revenues produced from the Chinese investments to actually reach the population is
small because a system of elite enrichment in the midst of poverty in Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe,
has been the norm. Thus, no incentive to stop that is created as no requirements as to among other
things transparency is put forward, and not even the Chinese can avoid the immense problems of
corruption despite close diplomatic ties. Instead the elites continue to actively use their resources in
the service of security needs and to get military support. As exemplified in the empirical chapter,
only one incident in Angola of corruption through a loan from the Chinese resulted in the Angolan
Secretary of the Council of Ministers being fired.
In Zimbabwe, just the mere fact that China has been involved with Mugabe and supplied his rule
with arms, and the obvious harsh oppression of the opposition with use of torture of the MDC’s
leader are without doubt extremely detrimental to the practise of good governance and respect for
human rights. The interesting thing though is that no financial capital has been forthcoming in
Zimbabwe. In this case, China has proved to be elusive. The Chinese are only being said to be a
major buyer of tobacco, and that they have leased expropriated farms, and have interests in the
mining sector are also only based on rumours.
The absence of significant Chinese investment underscores the much greater level of anxiety felt by
Beijing towards any association with the Mugabe regime. Indeed, in spite of Mugabe’s vocal
celebration of ties with the Chinese “as..our greatest friends..[ ]”, and China as being “a new
paradigm..against the Anglo-American axis”, 229 the fact is that the Zimbabwean government has
received very little in comparison to Sudan. So, in a way one can conclude that the negative effect
228
229
Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), op. cit. pp. 32-33
Alden, Chris (2007), op.cit. p. 64
89
of the engagement in Zimbabwe is less substantial, as the relations do not go as deep as in the
similar states of Angola and Sudan. Even though, it is evident that it is justified to criticise China
for engaging with Zimbabwe at all, but eventually it is perhaps not the relations to China that make
the difference regarding good governance and the respect for human rights, said a bit cynically, as it
might just be a question of time before Mugabe will have to step down, as signs already show that
he is losing his grip on power in the country.
As to Sudan, the substantive economic interests are fundamental to the depth and character of ties
with Khartoum; Chinese involvement is sustained and features at all levels, diplomatic, financial,
developmental and symbolic, and thus the influence on good governance and the respect for human
rights might is great. The case of Sudan is though two dimensional. Here, it is without doubt
detrimental to good governance that the government in Khartoum is secured arms and own
manufacturing capacity with Chinese assistance and an economic growth rate through China’s
investments in the country’s oil sector in particular, when e.g. villages of the Nuer-dominated
region are forcibly cleared out by the Sudanese army and militia in order to lay down pipelines for
oil, and when China once and again delayed the process of getting resolutions through to secure
troops, so that the ethnic cleansing and genocide taking place in Darfur could be stopped by
abstaining from voting in the UN’s Security Council. However, one must remember that it was due
to China’s bilateral pressure on the government in Khartoum ‘behind the curtains’, thus a kind of
intervention, which in the end secured the resolution and the sending off of the necessary troops.
So, on this particular issue, China’s presence in Sudan and the close diplomatic ties played an
essential role in putting forward good governance and the respect of human rights – better late than
never though. Another discussion is whether the amount of troops is big enough to stop the
atrocities, if the Sudanese army is really committed and actively will step in, if it witnesses
cruelties, and if Sudan’s own militia, in particular, will continue the atrocities in some of the very
deserted areas in the Darfur region. That then becomes a question of willingness and trust of a
‘pariah’ regime, and that can seem unlikely. Worth mentioning though, is that the Chinese
government’s decision to remove Sudan from the list of countries in which it provides financial
incentives to Chinese companies to invest in,230 signals that China is not completely indifferent to
how its image is being perceived in the rest of the world, particular being a rising power.
230
Alden, Chris (2007), op.cit. p. 62
90
These examples of pariah partnerships suggest that the Chinese approaches with these regimes are
fundamentally opportunistic in nature and not necessarily driven by a desire to bolster or create a
‘league of dictators’, as claimed by Robert Kagan.231 For the Chinese government, overriding
economic considerations mandate a defence of the regimes in Khartoum, especially when potential
sanctions are aimed directly at their own investments, but there is not necessarily a need to go
beyond that position. And, like Westerners, China has recognised that the arbitrary conduct of the
Zanu-PF regime is a threat to its own prospective investments and, when taking much more
important relations to a nervous South African government into consideration (and to the West as
well), the partnership with Zimbabwe is preferred to be maintained with a certain distance.232
In a conversation with Professor and Deputy Director Mr. Zhang Shengjun233 from Beijing, he
claimed that Chinese scholars advise their government not always to follow the principle of nonintervention even though the Chinese constitution says that what is stated in the country’s foreign
policy including the five principles must also be followed. He said that the official China recognises
that genocide is taking place in Darfur, but prefers not openly to discuss it. Instead focus should be
put on solving the crisis. On this particular issue, China feels that it has the right approach, as the
Chinese say that their approach resulted in the peacekeeping troops going to Darfur. According to
China, the structured violence and ethnic conflicts are due to underdevelopment, and therefore the
development created with China’s engagement in Sudan will with time minimise the conflicts in the
same way as historically seen with the internal Chinese conflicts after the country developed. China
therefore feels misunderstood and misperceived, and it cannot be denied that China’s relations with
Africa in general therefore also are a political project that implies intervention, but in another way.
As expressed by Mr. Zhang Shengjun: China rarely chooses the direct way, but likes to zigzag.
Though China has involved itself with a broad category of African states with everything from
states emerging from conflict such as Angola to reasonably stable if weak democracies with a
commodity-based economy such as Nigeria – illiberal regimes and democratic regimes with
commodity-based economies represent a type of governance that displays broadly similar reactions
to external engagement. With regard to post-conflict regimes, though they may nominally be on the
road to economic recovery and often claim to conform to democratic principles, the use of elite
231
Alden, Chris (2007), op.cit. p.66
Ibid p. 66
233
Mr. Zhang Shengjun is a Professor and the Deputy Director at the School of Politics and International Studies at
Beijing’s (Regular) University. The conversation took place in Aalborg on 28 November 2008.
232
91
control over state resources as a means of securing rents is deeply ingrained in their conduct.
Similarly, states with a commodity-based economy that are democratic in character can show
similar behaviour, though sometimes checked by formal legal institutions or by the influence of
political forces in the country. To both kind of states, China is considered a strategic partner and a
new source of FDI, though the local business community and trade unions/civil society may be
concerned about their interests. This includes Angola and Nigeria that both show poor commitment
to full democratic practice and have economies that are dominated by export of commodities.234
Like its South African counterpart, the Nigerian government has ambitions of taking up the
proposed African permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and this plays a major part in its
diplomacy with China.235 The latter can therefore be a kind of catalyst in striving for more complete
democratic practice, good governance and the respect for human rights also meaning that China will
have a more indirect influence, as Nigeria itself is striving for such conditions. However,
expressions of dissatisfaction with the presence of the Chinese suggest that Nigeria is not desperate
but wants to diversify the sources of investment. Lastly, the challenges faced by dealing with the
Chinese might in the long run create a kind of national solidarity and genuine desire to show that
Nigeria is a ‘decent’ and regulated country that practices democratic principles as well as respects
human rights i.e. the Chinese then become a so-called push-factor to do better.
Whether China is welcomed as a source of stability, a new strategic partner, a provider of
development assistance or foreign investments, its ability and desirability of holding its stance of
‘non-intervention’ in African affairs is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as its own
embedded interests are subject to domestic influences and challenges by Africans in general from
all sectors. The realisation of the ambitions that drove China to engage now preclude it from
maintaining that position given that it is, by dint of its political associations or business activities,
part of the domestic environment and therefore subject to local politics. Managing this emerging
and troubling dynamic is one of the key challenges facing the Chinese as they seek to consolidate
ties with Africa.236
234
Alden, Chris (2007), op.cit. pp. 66-67
Ibid. p. 69
236
Ibid pp. 91-92
235
92
5.7. China’s Adherence to Cultural Relativism in relation to a Different Prioritisation of
Human Rights and its Influence on the Engagement with Pariah Regimes
China ‘s involvement in Sudan through its non-interference policy has been the main point of
criticism from the international community, as the regime is provided with financial resources that
are used to oppress the population, and it is argued that is undermines attempts to isolate some of
the worst human rights violators in Africa.237
The understanding of human rights is characterised by different views and different priorities, and
the call for a deeper analytical discussion on this issue thus seems suitable as China has been
heavily criticised by the international community both because of poor records in China itself but
also for engaging with so-called pariah regimes.
To begin with China’s perception and prioritisation of human rights with an adherence to cultural
relativism and Asian values has a big influence on its engagement with countries like Sudan and
Zimbabwe (and sometimes Angola). If China had looked at human rights in the same way as in the
West/the developed countries/the North, it would not have engaged themselves with so-called
pariah regimes. However, it remains open for debate, if one can actually claim to have the ‘correct’
view on human rights, and claim that what the majority and the most powerful states i.e. the West
perceive as universal human rights is justified and must be practised in the rest of the world, no
matter what stage of development the country is in and despite cultural dissimilarities. One should
not forget that e.g. the US also has been criticised as to the respect of human rights in relation to
torture and prisoner abuse in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, violation of the Geneva Conventions at
Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp and the very hidden incidents of the so-called CIA prisoner
flights.
In order to understand the complexity of the Chinese mind set in its relations to countries such as
Sudan and Zimbabwe, a closer look into the development of China is necessary. Human rights are
generally outlined in two categories, namely the civil-political rights and the socio-economic and
cultural rights, according to the two internationally recognised covenants on human rights 238.
237
Total in Myanmar, Exxon Mobile in Equitorial Guinea, Statoil and Norsk Hydro in Iran and Libya, to name a few.
Source: Elling N. with Brandtzæg, Bjørn; Kolås, Åsild & le Pere, Garth (2006), op.cit. p. 33
238
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) that developed from the UN treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). China signed The ICESCR in 1997 and ratified it in 2001. The ICCPR was signed in 1998 by China but has
93
However, when looking at the specifics of China and how fast the country has developed, the
Chinese understanding and prioritisation of human rights becomes clearer. What causes the disputes
is also the assumption that, if there are two sets of human rights, there must also be a kind of
hierarchical order, and this assumption lies behind China’s reasoning.
Since 1949, the Chinese government has put the socio-economic and cultural human rights ahead of
civil-political rights. The different types of human rights in China have been implemented with
different force. The most contentious types of rights remain the civil-political ones that are either
still lacking and criticised of being omitted or have been constitutionalised but not respected in
practise. When the Western democracies criticise China’s deficiencies, they assume that the
exercise of human rights takes a natural prioritisation in civil and political rights. To China, this
assumption is not natural as the cultural, historical and ideological tradition has long emphasised the
achieving of social and economic development (before anything else) as the foundation of growth in
society.
It can be asked whether it is plausible to oppose the civil and political rights with the social,
economic, and cultural rights. The accusations against China’s human rights records mainly focus
on the country’s lack of political and civil rights, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and
association. The critics (the West) furthermore require political transparency on behalf of the
Chinese citizens, but some Chinese officials find an authoritarian type of governance necessary in
order to maintain stability given the size and many different regions and ethnicities found in the
country which again is considered a prerequisite for economic growth. To China, the prioritisation
of some rights over another set of rights does not reflect the moral weighing of the different types of
rights but is rather considered a matter of accessibility and feasibility. This means that civil-political
human rights should be morally equal to socio-economic and cultural rights. In practice however,
the prioritisation remains, because the implementation of the rights always varies according to the
specifics of each country. As China considers human rights issues to be a matter of internal affairs,
international scrutiny cannot be justified.
The Chinese kind of reasoning explained through Bell’s three East Asian arguments for cultural
particularism and cultural factors affecting the prioritisation and justification of rights as well as
providing moral foundation for distinctive political practices can explain why the Chinese as such
not been ratified. Retrieved from: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm and
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/3.htm (17 Dec. 2008)
94
do not see a problem in engaging with countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. However, as
expressed by Alden (2007) it is fair to argue that it is mainly the depth of the economic ties and thus
the depth of China’s economic interests that has made it interfere in the Darfur crisis and thus put
aside its principle of non-interference in this case. As also expressed by Professor Zhang Shengjun
earlier, China’s engagement in Africa in general is also a political project, so one can argue that the
‘project’ becomes political when economic interests are at stake. The political issues are just dealt
with in a more indirect way. The latter again leads us in the direction of the complexity of culture
and the understanding of it in order to find possible explanations.
A cultural similarity seen in many Asian239 countries is the preference of dealing with a broad
variety of issues and in particular potential problems in an indirect way. By referring to China’s
involvement in Sudan and the ‘hidden’ bilateral pressure put on the government in Khartoum in the
case of the crisis in Darfur, such acts clearly reflects such a cultural feature, no matter what the
actual ‘motive’ was; securing its economic interests or a genuine feeling of responsibility in terms
of its position and role in the international community which is not an insignificant factor in the
perception of China’s image. As argued by the Chinese nationalist leader SunYat-sen: “When China
becomes strong again, it will be our duty to help these nations win back their freedom. This is a
great responsibility! If we cannot fulfil this great responsibility, what is the use of China being
strong and powerful?”240 and ”But your first step is to revive your spirit of nationalism!”241. In the
context in which he speaks, he refers to the small nations in Asia at that time, but the reference to
solidarity, strategy and forming of alliances is though useful, as similar rhetoric has been used at the
FOCAC meetings and in China’s Africa Policy.
Of relevance to remember though is that nationalism and the feeling of solidarity is a very important
and imbedded part of every Chinese, and criticism is therefore not taken lightly but almost
personally as e.g. seen as to the Olympics of 2008. This means that the more direct criticism the
country gets, the more ‘stubborn’ will the Chinese become in their behaviour and their need to show
the world that what they are doing is based on their very own decision and not due ‘pressure’ in the
form of criticism. They might respond to the criticism but will not do it immediately and definitely
239
The term Asia is in its original and literal sense understood as a whole continent covering a broad variety of
countries with many dissimilar features culturally speaking, but in this sense the term is used in a more general way
reflecting the many similarities found in Asian countries as to e.g. the indirect way of dealing with many issues and
potential problems and the concept of face.
240
Copeland, Lewis; Lamm, Lawrence W. and McKenna, Stephen J. (1999), p. 401
241
Ibid
95
not showing it directly as that would be losing face. All these cultural features should be taken into
consideration in the assessment and understanding of China’s relations with so-called pariah
regimes.
However, as to Zimbabwe one can argue that the costs for China of putting the principle of noninterference aside are too high and perhaps not even worth it, because the state that the country is in
is catastrophic both politically and economically, and China does not seem to have a deeper
economic interest in comparison to Sudan, and not to forget Angola if such economic interests
should be threatened there.
5.8. How will China fit in, and will the Engagement be Limited due to the Complexity found
in Distinct African Features in terms of History and Economic, Political and Cultural
Structures and long-lasting Relations with the West?
In order to assess how China actually fit in Africa including the four case countries in terms of
history and economic, political and cultural structures and long-lasting relations with Western
countries, it is of relevance to take distinct African features and challenges into consideration, and
then find out how they will affect relations with China, and what China should and should not
expect in the years to come.
To begin with, on the part of the Chinese, is the country’s pure adherence to the importance of
sovereignty and thus also the principle of non-interference. The insistence is to a certain degree
paradoxical for a very large and powerful state to adopt in its dealings with very small and weak
ones. In Africa, the support of the doctrine of sovereignty by external ‘patrons’ has served – as it
did for both Western states and the Soviet Union during the Cold War – to promote a particular
response to the problem of maintaining ‘political stability’. In practise, the patron (read: China) uses
this as a tool to protect its investments by giving almost unconditional support for that state’s
existing political order, and in many cases certainly for the individual ruler who controls it.242 This
is in various degrees illustrated well in Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Such a ‘deal’ works well as
long as that ruler remains in power and can control the territory in which the patron has invested in
with the risk being in the ‘client’ wanting to find an alternative patron. During the Cold War, such a
strategy has shown its deficiencies with the problem arising when the client ruler becomes
unpopular among its own population to such an extent that a reversal in external alliances begins to
242
Clapham, Christopher (2006), op.cit. p. 4
96
take form. The viability of the doctrine though becomes a struggle when the state’s actual level of
control over own territory and population is eroded. In this situation, external arms supply (by
China) that so far had enabled the client ruler to maintain control crates a counter-productive
impact.243
The main problem of ‘stability’ in Africa has not so much been lack of physical control (or the
possession of weapons needed to secure compliance), but rather social control – in other words; the
capacity to create forms of authority necessary to secure voluntary obedience. These weapons
therefore easily become a very dangerous source to destabilisation which was not the intention.244
One can only assume that China at a certain point will be confronted with a threat towards its access
to oil and mineral supplies given its role as a major arms supplier to Africa in general. Such a threat
will be hardly felt given the vast size of the African continent and the distance between many of the
sources of extraction and production, and the long and vulnerable lines of communication. Deals
with local actors (‘traditional’ authorities, disruptive local protesters, even criminal gangs) can
therefore be expected to be made as they manage the local political terrain as seen in e.g. the Niger
Delta with Western oil companies. The Chinese oil companies will likely be faced with the
necessity of forming that same kind of ‘alliance’ with local actors.245
In the longer term, no external power, i.e. China, with long-term economic interests in Africa, in
particular in vulnerable enterprises such as oil and mineral extraction, can escape the issue of
governance as that is an essential precondition for keeping economic relationships stable. As seen
with European powers who tried to handle this through the imposition of external colonialism, a
mechanism of establishing an effective legal order and ways to secure accountability, so that state
power is linked to the welfare of local populations becomes a suitable solution. It is therefore
expected that at least partial reliance on the Washington Consensus instead of the Beijing
Consensus will be practised.246
The role of ideology should therefore not be underestimated as it creates local resonance which
builds moral linkages that extend economic interests, neither should the importance of demand for
human rights for Africans. When one has been a victim of brutality under a domestic regime long
enough, it is only natural that a time will come where enough is enough, and no matter how difficult
243
Clapham, Christopher (2006), op.cit. p. 4
Ibid p. 4
245
Ibid pp. 4-5
246
Ibid p. 5
244
97
it might have been to institute democratic principles, a number of more accountable regimes on the
African continent have seen the light since the Cold war. If China keeps too great a distance to
changes in African governance, it risks presenting itself as an actor only there temporarily for shortterm economic gain, so it seems fair to say that the narrowness of China’s engagement in Africa, at
this stage, will likely prove to be damaging.247
Last but not least, it is worth mentioning the spiritual dimension in Africa’s relations with the West.
This is not an insignificant factor either, as any observer will agree to that the continent is deeply
and intensely spiritual with rivalries between Christianity and Islam and extensive indigenous
systems of belief that function as a way to make sense of human life under often very harsh
conditions. Such links to China are not created as with the Arab and Western countries, so no matter
how exploitative Africa’s experience with the West has been, such links are lasting as the Africans
themselves have come to value such beliefs. Another link is illustrated by the attempt of many
Africans to immigrate to Europe and other Western countries. Even though China is surely not
‘envious’ of sharing such a link with Africa, China also in this case remains outside such a pattern
of relationships and with its absence, in this case, China becomes a partial participant in Africa’s
engagement with the wider world.248
It can thus be concluded that there are certain constraints on China’s capacity to develop long-term
relationships in Africa when entering a continent with so deeply established structures relating to its
history, economy and political stability when so many of the African countries at the same time are
influenced by the West because of deep bilateral relations that have existed for so long.
None of this analysis should though be perceived as downplaying the very visible changes that
China’s engagement with Africa have created, especially in relation to the economies or wipe away
the likeliness that the recent relations between China and Africa will continue and even deepen. It
merely shows that China most likely will adapt to and modify the African experience, but it seems
very unlikely that it will fundamentally change it.249
5.9. African Perspectives on China in Africa
John Rocha, the senior project manager at NBF (NEPAD Business Foundation), firstly believes that
in order to respond to the challenge of China’s role in Africa, actions must be taken against the
247
Clapham, Christopher (2006), op.cit. p. 6
Ibid p. 6
249
Ibid p. 6
248
98
background of its original source in China’s raw materials needs. One must also look at the impact
of China’s operations on the ground where it is believed that an actual rape of natural resources is
taking place as well as violations of land rights due to infrastructure development and a repetition of
the same environmentally and socially destructive model formerly exemplified by the West. In
total, that has led some African authors and scholars to characterise China’s presence as new
colonialism. Of specific concern are China’s investments in Sudan and the links to Robert Mugabe
in Zimbabwe.250
To the question of whether there is a Chinese model for development, the answer is ‘yes’ in the
sense that, like in Japan and the smaller ‘Asian tigers’, China did not develop by following the rules
of the Washington Consensus. Despite understandable criticism from the West as to China’s
avoidance of good governance and human rights conditionality, substance is detected to the idea of
‘South-South’ cooperation as urged in the Beijing Consensus, as China has experience as to e.g.
rural development and intermediate technology precisely because it too is a developing country. At
the same time, China’s lack of conditionality means that visible results on the ground can be
produced quickly due to the characterisation of statism in China’s economy; in practise meaning a
‘one-stop shop’ approach where contracts guarantee China its desired access to oil and key minerals
as in Angola, or Nigeria. It is though noted that China is not the only player in the ‘South-South’
game, or the only one to promote the idea of ‘win-win’ benefits. India, Brazil and South Africa have
also established their own ‘south-south’ links. Furthermore, the Chinese MNCs (multinational
cooperations) are in many ways operating like other MNCs in Africa like the French where the
proximity between French business and political interests are manifested by the presence of oil
company executives in the inner circle at the Elysée Palace with the foreign policy makers
constructing the policy around a network of personal relationships with individual African leaders
including a web of bilateral agreements in trade, finance, development assistance and defence.251
Like at least some Western and ‘Southern’ states, the Chinese government also provides state
backing with preferential finance, tax concessions and political backing to ‘go global’ to those
MNCs that invest in the African extractive industries which is a risky business. China is though
more desperate in need of raw material. However, Rocha seems to agree with Alden and Davies
(2006) by pointing out that aside from the cases of Angola, Sudan and Equitorial Guinea, “the rest
of PetroChina and Sinopec activities on the African continent are not especially reprehensible” or at
250
251
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), p. 6
Ibid pp.6-10
99
least no more so than many of their Western counterparts.252 Ndubisi Obiorah253, a Nigerian human
rights lawyer though points out that “as Chinese companies move the global pecking order and
discover the considerable mark-up to be deprived from possessing premium brands and intellectual
property, they will seek to establish their own brands. As global branding and reputation become
more important to Chinese companies, they may become less willing to be associated with human
rights abuses and repressive regimes in Africa and elsewhere”.254 As a result, he suggests, Chinese
companies could become more vulnerable to ‘naming and shaming’ from NGOs in Western
countries and elsewhere.255
Ali Askouri, director of the London based Piankhi Reserach Group256 believes that numerous events
in different African countries since the beginning of the 21st century have shown that there is a
long-term Chinese strategy to control and exploit Africa’s natural resources, particularly oil due to
the growing internal demand. He believes that the key African countries targeted by the strategy
include, but are not limited to, Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Chad, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Ghana – thus including all of ‘our’ case countries. He further
believes that the top-down economic development approach and the Chinese economic assistance
has encouraged elitism, deepened social and class divisions and widened corruption, stressing that
the economic assistance provided seems targeted to reward or bolster whomever is in power,
regardless of how they got there257, thus relating to Jean-Francois Bayart’s term of ‘extraversion’.
5.10. African Perspective on China in Sudan
According to Askouri, there is no doubt that China’s approach encourages dictatorships and tyranny
in e.g. Sudan and Zimbabwe and elsewhere. To him, China’s statement of not interfering in internal
affairs is misleading and to many Africans such a statement is considered untrue, provocative and
252
Alden, Chris and Davies, Martyn (2006), in Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), p. 10
Ndubisi Obiorah: Nigerian human rights lawyer who works for the Human Rights Law Service, HURILAWS in
Lagos. HURILAWS started in 1997 as a specialist provider of human rights legal services and purveyor of skills in the
legal aspects of transition management. Today, HURILAWS is also a public policy think-tank and pressure group
working in partnership with multi-sector development and change actors to promote accountable and transparent
governance in Nigeria.
Retrieved from: http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Ndubisi_Obiorah and
ttp://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=HURILAWS (13 Dec. 2008)
254
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), op.cit. p. 10
255
Ibid p. 10
256
A reseach group which monitors the impact of foreign investment in Sudan. Mr. Askouri is also a member of the
community committee of the Manasir tribe, who are set to be forcible displaced by the Merowe dam in North Sudan.
Retrieved from: http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/water/voices/aliaskouri.htm (12 Dec. 2008)
257
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), op.cit. pp. 72-73
253
100
insulting as many African societies struggle to further democratic values and strengthen respect for
human rights and also aspire further values. In Sudan, the junta is considered unable to rule the
country without the heavy Chinese economic and military support meaning that the economic aid
given has come at an extremely high human cost in Southern Sudan and Darfur with massive
population displacement illustrating an obvious opportunistic nature of Chinese policy because of
the scorched-earth and depopulation policies carried out in oil-rich areas by the Sudanese
government through its army and splinter groups from the Sudan’s Peoples’ Liberation Movement.
Askouri claims that the behaviour of Chinese companies, relying on armed forces and security
personnel in Sudan, in all other projects is identical to the one in the oil sector - for instance when it
comes to the many dam projects.258
He furthermore argues that if the Chinese assume that the invested money are helping the poor
Sudanese living in these areas, it is odd that they believe that the dam site needs security protection
24 hours a day as staff working on such projects normally live among locals. And in that part of
Sudan the villagers are all connected and know each other meaning that theft or crime of any sort
are unheard of.259 Askouri therefore concludes that from the Sudanese experience the strategy of
China’s foreign policy is not built on initiative and entrepreneurship, it rather exploits the
opportunities resulting from contradictions in the international arena. Many Sudanese commentators
furthermore question the feasibility of maintaining close ties with China, and whether China is a
trustworthy and reliable political ally due to China’s initial failure as to the UN Security Council
Resolutions on Darfur including the referral of Darfur criminals to the International Criminal Court
(ICC). The Chinese presence must therefore be challenged on all possible ways making the
opportunistic involvement cost for trade and investment inside China. Support for pro-democracy
groups needs to be strengthened and investment that observes acceptable international standards on
the environment should be enhanced and above all, the international justice mechanisms have to be
more effective, so all perpetrators will face justice.260
258
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), op.cit. pp.73-74, 77-78, and p.80
Ibid p. 81
260
Ibid p. 82
259
101
5.11. African Perspectives on China in Zimbabwe
John (Blessing) Karumbidza261, an economic historian and researcher at the University of
KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, believes that whether the relationship between China and
Zimbabwe will turn out to be a win-win one first of all depend on how effectively Zimbabwe can
build institutional and bureaucratic capacity to harness Chinese funds and investment beneficial to
the country, and he doubts that that will actually be the case. China’s interests in Africa are
considered to be part of a calculated plan and policy to ‘go global’ where Africa is used as a
strategic training ground and opportunity for Chinese capital. To him, Mugabe is simply replacing
Western colonialism with Chinese imperialism as relations with Zimbabwe are actually with the
ZANU-PF (the Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front).262
According to Karumbidza, the temporary benefits include the political preservation the Mugabe
reign and personal aggrandisement through corruption and kick-backs by his ZANU-PF cronies
flowing from Chinese investment. On the whole, he does not believe that it is fair blame the
Chinese for acting in accordance to their interests as it is incumbent upon the government of
Zimbabwe and its people (and any other African country for that matter) to be in charge of and
create a programme and strategy for channelling funds and direct investment in a manner which
creates economic growth in its own country. It is simply each African country’s duty receiving FDI
to attract appropriate labour intensive technology that creates employment locally and ensure that
Chinese labour practices in Africa conform to local labour laws. The concern of China ‘s
indifference to human rights and democracy is growing, and Karumbidza further argues that China
justifies doing business with pariah states and dictators in the name of its principle of noninterference resulting in that the civil society and the citizens cannot hold them accountable for
dismissing environmental and labour laws. According to the Sierra Leonean ambassador to Beijing,
Lindsey Hilsum, the reason why China is able to dominate the African business space is that they
take immediate action and do not ‘waste’ time on environmental impact assessment, human rights,
bad governance and good governance. To her, that is not the same as saying that it is the right way
to do it, but the investment is succeeding because the bench marks are not set high.263
261
Economic historian and researcher in rural sociology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, and a
public intellectual who is seeking to promote the position that ‘another Africa is possible’.
Source: Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), op.cit. p. 103
262
Ibid p. 88
263
Ibid p. 88
102
As to the principle of non-interference, Karumbidza continues, that the Chinese are well aware of
that they cannot ‘use’ this principle permanently as they know that the deals that have been signed
with unpopular dictatorial regimes could be later be replaced with a new government and that is
why China protects such regimes by e.g. supplying the ZANU-PF with arms and radio jamming
equipment in order to block opposition broadcasts. However, China should be wary of loosing its
political capital and ‘credibility’ it acquired from supporting African liberation struggles by
conniving with dictatorial regimes as China so far does not have a burden of historical guilt as the
West, but that is also exactly therefore China gives credence to people like Mugabe when it claims
to protect African sovereignty.264
Furthermore, in the West, Africa is still perceived as a continent with almost impossible problems
to solve in some areas whereas China sees a business opportunity in Africa’s richness in resources
and market potential where China can bring effective practices and knowhow gained from its own
modernisation. China has the capacity to develop knowledge-based cooperation like capacity
building, training in human resources and exchanges of science and technology to promote valueadded processing of primary products so traditional industries can be upgraded. Local communities
thus have the chance of experiencing an enhancement of social development. With China also using
the UN’s five-point proposal to ‘assist’ developing countries accelerate development by granting
zero-tariff treatment for some exports from the least developed countries, increasing aid to the
heavily-indebted poor and least developed countries and cancelling their debts, providing
concessional loans and effective medicine for malaria and training professionals. All these steps
increase China’s access to raw materials, energy and food resources thus illustrating China’s pursuit
of economic self-interest in the form of access to raw materials, markets and spheres of influence
through investment, trade and military assistance – to such an extent that one can suspect it of
pursuing the goals of any classical imperialist. Moreover, according to Karumbidza, heavy
militarisation of the Zimbabwean government is taking place, so one can suspect that China has
global ambitions to develop strategic military bases in Africa.265
For Mugabe, democracy and development are considered as mutually exclusive where China serves
as a suiting example by raising 400 million out of poverty over two decades without democratic
elections and a free press considering China as having the potential of becoming the foundation of a
new global power paradigm. Zimbabwe has been committed to such a paradigm founded on the
264
265
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), op.cit pp. 88-89
Ibid pp. 91-92
103
principles of sovereignty and independence even though the fact is that the majority of the Chinese
have not felt the economic growth at home.266
Going back to the assumption that Western colonialism has been replaced with Chinese imperialism
and the ‘win-win’ economic cooperation between China and Zimbabwe being doubtful, the fact that
the control of strategic state firms have ceded and massive Chinese takeovers have taken place
including railways, the supply of electricity, Air Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Broadcasting
Corporation can validate and confirm the assumption. Moreover, due to Zimbabwe’s lack of
comparative advantage over China in any sector, the opening up of the economy is most likely to
benefit the Chinese perhaps even at the expense of Zimbabweans. The situation further becomes
critical as there is no institutional and strategic infrastructure to effect a needed economic
transformation, and thus the Chinese development loans become less useful. Since the land seizures
in 2000, there has been no apparent strategy for the necessary transformation in the agricultural
sector which could release the potential for an economic turnaround. However, as the country
currently has reached a level of economic meltdown with lack of hard currency, fuel and food
shortages, a high rate of skills turnover and an enormous inflation – drastic measures are even more
needed – also meaning a vicious circle in terms of an increase in indebtedness and the
disappearance of the potential for economic revival. Perhaps the debts will be ‘forgiven’ as long as
there are mineral resources to be mined. An additional fear is that the takeover of strategic national
firms by Chinese companies is a security threat and a way of losing national sovereignty with the
most sinister thing being that the Chinese authorities are well aware of this and uses this
‘opportunity’ to tighten the grip on Zimbabwean assets. According to Karumbidza, it is naïve to
think that China is motivated by the need to save the Zimbabwean economy; even the government
does not believe this. It is not admitted in order to save political face. With a politicised security
system, silenced media and partial judiciary, the Zimbabwean economy will be drained and future
generations will pay for it. This does not mean that there is no voice against the Chinese. Both in
South Africa and Zimbabwe abusive phrases are expressed about the Chinese and a visible number
of criminal acts and even killings of migrated Chinese are taking place. Mugabe’s response has
been an appointment of a minister of Chinese affairs as well as a Chinese desk at the central police
station in Harare that likely will increase the xenophobia against the Chinese even more due to such
high profile response. The economic background to the anti-Chinese sentiments is that the local
people are really afraid of a permanent takeover of strategic state companies which is also generally
266
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), op.cit. p. 92
104
perceived as a desperate way for the ZANU-PF to stay in power. Trade unionists are particularly
worried that companies will be forced to close because of losing their market to cheap imported
Chinese goods and about the abuse of workers. Allegedly, the Chinese managers have a negative
attitude towards local people and heavily dislike trade unionists and are also known to ‘forget’ to
understand English in order to avoid dialogue and criticism. Some evidence shows that the
Zimbabwean people realise that the Chinese goods are not good for their economy. 267
Karumbidza concludes that the Chinese are in Africa to pursue expansion, consistent with its search
for global dominance, and to avoid being out-competed by the US. It therefore requires resources,
raw materials, and markets, and space for its surplus population. As far as Africa is concerned, as
long as poverty is at the centre of the conflicts and crises and there is no African reconstruction and
development strategy, made and funded from local resources, China will continue from where the
colonialists and imperialists left off.268
267
268
Manji, Firoze and Marks, Stephen, editors (2007), op.cit pp. 95-100
Ibid p. 103
105
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This thesis has dealt with China-Africa relations with the focus on China’s major economic
engagement in the African energy sectors; oil, minerals and other natural resources, and China’s
principle of non-interference in internal affairs and its influence on good governance and human
rights issues. This has been done in the context of the four case countries: Angola, Nigeria, Sudan
and Zimbabwe. Whereas Angola and Nigeria ‘belong’ to the category of illiberal and weak
democracies, Sudan and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, belong to what can be regarded as pariah
regimes; although Angola is sometimes regarded as lying in between both categories. However,
given the broadness of the relations, reference to Africa as a whole has been used to show and
explain tendencies. As to the issue of human rights, the concept of cultural relativism including the
Asian values has been used in order to understand the Chinese view on and prioritisation of human
rights.
In this concluding section, the main findings of the study are brought together in an engagement
with the theories that have framed the analyses.
To recap, the objectives of the thesis have been to explore the China-Africa relations in terms of
economic and political engagement, and how such engagements affect good governance and human
rights issues in Africa. More specifically the thesis sought to answer one main research question:
How, and to what extent, can the principle of non-interference in internal affairs in China’s
Africa Policy be reconciled with the challenge of good governance and the respect of human
rights?
For the analyses, theories providing insights into the economic development and foreign policy
aspects of the relations have been used. First, to obtain a nuanced understanding of economic
development; both a Western theoretical approach and a Neo-Marxist one have been used –
respectively - the theories of growth and modernisation; and the Neo-Marxist theories of
underdevelopment and dependency. Together, they underpin the economic aspect of the thesis. The
two economic theories are also relevant given the particular characterisation of China as being an
official Communist country that practises state capitalism and its belief through its own
modernisation process and economic growth that an alternative way to development is possible. The
Two-Good theory has underpinned the foreign policy aspect of the thesis. Its assumption that every
state at all times pursues change and maintenance, and the fact that the situation of ‘trade-offs’
106
is included makes it an interesting theoretical framework when China’s behaviour and intentions
displayed through its policies and statements and in practice towards Africa have to be identified.
That further allows for an analytical insight of China’s insistence on its political principle of noninterference and its influence on good governance and human rights in Africa.
6.1. Main Findings and Implications
This thesis shows that the three main eras in China-Africa relations from 1949 to the present day
offers an overview of the shifting ideological, economic and political underpinnings of China’s
relationships with various African governments, or the national liberation movements that preceded
them. One can now conclude that Africa not only plays an important role for China in securing it
access to raw materials, but perhaps even geo-strategically as it is assumed that the relations will
deepen with e.g. military bases set up in Africa. History shows that no external power, i.e. China,
with long-term economic interests in Africa, especially in vulnerable enterprises such as oil and
mineral extraction, can in the long run escape the issue of governance, as it is an essential
precondition for keeping economic relationships stable. The case of Nigeria validates that claim to a
certain extent compared to the other case countries. By being more ‘stable’ economically and
politically, Nigeria is moving closer to ‘the road’ towards an economic ‘take-off’ stage which in the
end would lead to self-sustaining growth. This fact turns exactly the case of Nigeria into an
explanative and validating point as to the theoretical framework of the use and application of the
economic theories of growth and modernisation. By being the largest oil producer with a budding
internal political will combined with its role and ambitions in the multilateral arena, and wish to
diversify its sources of investments, it signals a country that wants to leave its position as a satellite,
as termed in the neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment and dependency theory. According to
these theories, all of the case countries will remain in such peripheral positions by relying so
heavily on natural resources, as their development opportunities continue to depend on the Chinese
willingness to inject the generated surplus into projects that not only serve one sector like the
extracting one, but also creates jobs and transfer of knowledge to local communities as the current
problems of using Chinese workers remain. So, despite benefits for Africa stemming from the many
construction and infrastructure projects initiated by the Chinese and various health and educational
assistance, the theories of growth and modernisation can be partly applicable in explaining the
necessary stages in the process of development related to Africa and the four case countries.
However, certain points from both strands of theories are applicable in their entirety. Firstly, there is
107
Rostow’s point that in order to reach an economic ‘take-off’ stage, political stability and the
establishment of the right institutions must be in place. Secondly, there is Senghess’ and Menzel’s
stress on that a number of patterns of integration into the world economy, and improved socioeconomic conditions and political institutions are prerequisites for development. The economic
implications for Africa and the four case countries are therefore deeply dependent on such
structures and improvements, as they still have the role as ‘the supplier’ in relation to China, and it
is China who benefits almost entirely from this as the African raw materials secure its export based
economy, and thus its economic growth. Unless such improvements are made, Angola and Sudan
will be worse hit compared to the more ‘stable’ Nigeria. Zimbabwe’s current crisis situation on all
levels though deserves some very drastic measures on all aspects before even being able to work
towards such improvements and at least reach a nominal status of being on economic recovery.
As to the Two-Good theory, it has proven to be very applicable when looking into statements from
the FOCAC meetings, the rhetoric found in China’s Africa Policy and the five foreign policy
principles illustrated in the Beijing Consensus. According to the theory, China is expected to
produce change rather than maintenance because of its ‘reserve’ of resources and thus increasing
abilities. The opting for a depoliticisation of human rights, the right to prioritise economic
development, the claim that the current world order is unjust, and that South-South cooperation is
urged show China’s discontent with the present conditions in the international system. This
confirms the assumption that China mainly is working towards change given its abilities. It is
furthermore validated in the China-Africa relations as they are described as “a new strategic
partnership” in China’s Africa Policy. However, the stress on multilateralism and peaceful
negotiation on international disputes with a wish for a UN reform shows an intention of working for
both change and maintenance simultaneously combined with the stress on mutual-ness expressed
both on paper and in official statements also illustrating a wish for maintenance. All these facts
together with China’s success using bilateral pressure ‘behind the curtains’ on the Sudanese
government that resulted in peacekeeping troops being sent to Darfur, further makes the concept of
substitutability from the theory useful as China in this context assessed which tool would be more
efficient. Moreover, as foreign aid is almost always considered change seeking, the aid given to
Zimbabwe becomes a signal of a deep Chinese wish to get access to the country’s natural resources.
In total, the Two-Good theory is thus very applicable as it also takes the ‘trade-offs’ that states
make into consideration.
108
As to the question of how/to what extent the principle of non-interference in internal affairs in
China’s Africa Policy can be reconciled with the challenge of good governance and the respect of
human rights in Africa, it can be concluded that the answer is ‘no’. The argument can be found in
the analytical result that China cannot escape the issue of governance if its economic interests are
long-term, which in reality it is due to its need of energy to sustain its booming economy. This has
been seen with China’s actions in the Darfur crisis as well as in its request of the Angolan Secretary
of the Council of Ministers being fired due to corruption and lack of transparency. That is, here we
see China putting aside its principle of non-interference when economic interests are at stake. The
risk of further destabilisation also occurs, when China’s investments and ‘presents’ mostly ‘feed’
the African elite, who control the raw materials, while the majority of the population continues to
live in deep poverty, combined with the fact that the roots to the general problem of ‘stability’ in
Africa lies in the lack of social control (because of the lack in capacity to create forms of authority
necessary to secure voluntary obedience). The dangerous source to the destabilisation then becomes
the arms supplied by China when the African state’s actual level of control over own territory and
population is eroded. Paradoxically, they were intended for the regime in power to protect its
resources. However, a number of more accountable regimes on the African continent, ‘born’ since
the Cold War also shows people’s will to fight for and demand human rights, and as ideology no
longer links China and Africa together as during the Cold War, there is no powerful link that
extends economic interests. Moreover, the Chinese view on development and human rights can be
found in the concept of cultural relativism and the so-called Asian values where it is believed that
the prioritisation of economic rights can be justified as development is possible without a complete
adherence to human rights which China itself believes it has proven through its own modernisation
process.
Lastly, many of the critical African perspectives, in particular in relation to Sudan and Zimbabwe,
further confirm a need and a wish for good governance and respect of human rights. The business
communities in all of the case countries have felt the detrimental effects from the Chinese
competition of especially cheap manufactured goods and the African governments’ supported
incentives. As the success of long-term economic engagement has proven both theoretically but also
practically to be dependent on more political engagement, the assumption for the China-Africa
relations is that they will continue and even deepen as China is dependent on Africa’s raw material.
So far, the Chinese activities in Africa have played out simultaneously at bilateral, regional and
109
multilateral levels but the African continent remains ill prepared for the dynamic growth in the
relations and the concomitant impact that China has had on African economies. Despite coordinated
action by African trade unions in mainly the textile industry and increasing attention to the Chinese
involvement on many areas from the African civil society, one can conclude that the African
governments have not been able to leverage the best possible gains from the Chinese involvement,
and in order for this to change and to experience improvements on good governance and human
rights, a more coordinated and strategic approach must replace the current one which is too ad hoc.
110
SUMMARY
This thesis deals with China-Africa relations with the focus on China’s major economic
engagement in the African energy sectors; oil, minerals and other natural resources, and China’s
principle of non-interference in internal affairs and its influence on good governance and human
rights issues. It is done in the context of the four case countries: Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and
Zimbabwe but also with reference to Africa as a whole. As to the issue of human rights, the concept
of cultural relativism including the Asian values is used in order to understand the Chinese view on
and prioritisation of human rights. According to China, the prioritisation of economic rights can be
justified as development is possible without a complete adherence to human rights as it itself
believes to have proven that through its own modernisation process and economic growth.
The objectives of the thesis are to explore the China-Africa relations in terms of economic and
political engagement, and how such engagements affect good governance and human rights issues
in Africa. The main research question is thus: How, and to what extent, can the principle of noninterference in internal affairs in China’s Africa Policy be reconciled with the challenge of good
governance and the respect of human rights?
In order to obtain a nuanced understanding of economic development; both a Western theoretical
approach and a Neo-Marxist one are used – respectively - the theories of growth and modernisation;
and the Neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment and dependency. The Two-Good constitutes the
theoretical base for the foreign policy aspect of the thesis.
According to the economic theories, all of the case countries will remain in their peripheral
positions by relying so heavily on natural resources, as their development opportunities continue to
depend on the Chinese willingness to inject the generated surplus into projects that not only serve
one sector like the extracting one, but also creates jobs and transfer of knowledge to local
communities as the current problems of using Chinese workers remain. So far, it is China that
mainly benefits from the access to the African raw materials as it secures its export based economy,
and thus its economic growth. The seriousness of negative economic implications for Africa thus
depends on whether Africa remains in ‘the supplier’ role. Nigeria’s more ‘stable’ position validates
that claim to a certain extent compared to the other case countries.
This thesis shows that the three main eras in China-Africa relations from 1949 to the present day
offers an overview of the shifting ideological, economic and political underpinnings of China’s
relationships with various African governments, or the national liberation movements that preceded
them. History shows that no external power, i.e. China, with long-term economic interests in Africa,
111
especially in vulnerable enterprises such as oil and mineral extraction, can in the long run escape
the issue of governance, as it is an essential precondition for keeping economic relationships stable.
Furthermore, China’s bilateral pressure on the Sudanese government in the Darfur crisis shows that
it does engage politically when its economic interests are at stake. This fits with the Two-Good
theory which assumes that all states at all times pursue change and maintenance, and resourceful
states such as China is expected to increasingly work towards change. China’s expressions and
policies on the opting for a depoliticisation of human rights, the right to prioritise economic
development, the current world order being unjust, and that South-South cooperation is too loose
show China’s discontent with the present conditions in the international system, i.e. change is
expected in reality.
African perspectives, in particular in relation to Sudan and Zimbabwe, confirm a need and a wish
for good governance and respect of human rights and many are critical because of the detrimental
effects from the Chinese competition as to cheap manufactured goods and the African governments’
supported incentives. So far, the Chinese activities in Africa have played out simultaneously at
bilateral, regional and multilateral levels but the African continent remains ill prepared for the
dynamic growth in the relations and the concomitant impact that China has had on African
economies. Despite coordinated action by some African trade unions and increasing attention to the
Chinese involvement from the African civil society, the African governments have not been able to
leverage the best possible gains from the Chinese involvement. In order for this to change and
experience improvements on good governance and human rights, a more coordinated and strategic
approach towards China must replace the current ad hoc one.
112
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Jaffe, A.M. and Lewis, S.W., (2002), Beijing’s oil diplomacy, Survival 44 (1), in Mawdsley, Emma
(2007)
Hansen, L. Mille and Venâncio Simão, Angolanerne valgte diktaturet (The Angolans Chose
Dictatorship), article, Information, (22 Sep.2008)
Retrieved from: http://www.information.dk/print/166360 (1 Oct. 2008)
Mawdsley, Emma (2007), China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power in
Geography Compass, Vol.1/3 2007
Pan, Esther (2006), China, Africa and Oil
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Roughneen, Simon (2006), Influence anxiety: China’s Role in Africa, ISN Security Watch, Run by
Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich.
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Servant, Jean-Christophe (2005), China’s trade safari in Africa
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Smith, D.,(2005), Roaring China shows how to help the poor, The Times, 20 February 2005 in
Mawdsley, Emma (2007)
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Studies 36 (3), in Mawdsley, Emma (2007)
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September.
Tull, Denis M. (2006), China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences,
Journal of Modern African Studies, 44, 3.
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Watts, J.(2005), No questions, no lies in China’s quest for oil: Inside Asia, Guardian Weekly 3,
June 2005 in Mawdsley, Emma (2007)
Wild, L.,(2006), China, Africa and the G8: The missing link, Institute for Public Policy Research,
article 11 July 2006 in Mawdsley, Emma (2007)
Wines, Michael (2005): Zimbabwe’s future: Made in China, ’Look East’ policy gets mixed
welcome, International Herald Tribune (25 July 2005)
Retrieved from: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/24/news/zimbabwe.php?page=2 (4 Nov.
2008)
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University of California Press.
Time Magazine Asia Edition
Retrieved from: http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/journey2001/intro.html (3 Dec. 2007)
Talks and comments:
Mensah-Opuku Yaw, Paul (2008), Ph.D., Aalborg University, comments from questionnaire on
China-Africa Relations written by Sacir Camo, 3 Dec. 2008.
Shengjun, Zhang (2008), Professor and Deputy Director at the School of Politics and International
Studies at Beijing’s (Regular) University. The conversation took place in Aalborg on 28 November
2008
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Schoeman, Maxi (2008), Professor, Head of Department, International Studies, at the University of
Pretoria, South Africa. The talk took place at a seminar on ‘China and Africa: Whose Opportunity;
Whose Challenge?’ held at the Danish Institute on International Studies (DIIS), in Copenhagen,
Denmark, on 15 October, 2008
TV: News and Programmes:
DR2 Udland, (Danish News Program), (21 Oct. 08)
DR2 Udland, (Danish News Program ), (10 Nov. 2008)
Websites:
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http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm (13 Nov. 2007)
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/183734.htm (18 Dec. 2007)
The Encyclopedia of World History
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zheng_he (3 Dec. 2007)
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/amin.htm (5 May 2008)
Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development
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http://english.focacsummit.org/ (2 June 2008)
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Retrieved from: http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/t404124.htm (2 June 2008)
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation – Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006
Retrieved from: http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/t404123.htm (2 June 2008)
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)
Retrieved from: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm (3 June 2008)
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story074/en/index.html (10 Nov. 2008
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm (13 Nov. 2007)
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/f.html (10 Nov. 2008)
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2007_files/no_2/article/a3.htm (10 Aug. 2008)
http://www.ecatradehub.com/components/agoa.asp (11 Nov. 2008)
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CIA World Fact Book – Angola
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html (1 Oct. 2008)
http://www.slate.com/id/2082575/ (27 Sep. 2008)
CIA World Fact Book – Nigeria
Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html#Econ
(18 Sep. 2008)
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php (13 Dec. 2008)
CIA World Fact Book – Sudan
Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/su.html (26 Sep.
2008)
CIA World Fact Book – Zimbabwe
Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/zi.html (26 Sep.
08)
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Ndubisi_Obiorah and
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=HURILAWS (13 Dec. 2008)
http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/water/voices/aliaskouri.htm (12 Dec. 2008)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm (17 Dec. 2008)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/3.htm (17 Dec. 2008)
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ANNEX 1: CHINA’S AFRICA POLICY OF 2006
Source: Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm (17 Dec 2008)
Foreword
The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in
the international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the
main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation,
which is the common desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other
hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security
issues of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more pressing.
China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and
pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations
and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as
to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world.
The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an
important force for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face
fresh opportunities under the new circumstances. By this African Policy Paper, the Chinese
Government wishes to present to the world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the
measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years,
with a view to promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing
the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.
Part I:
Africa's Position and Role
Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for
development. After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial rule,
wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to
the progress of civilization.
Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to
development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by
joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole,
regional conflicts are being gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The
NEPAD has drawn up an encouraging picture of African rejuvenation and development. African
countries have actively participated in the South-South cooperation and worked for the North-South
dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs.
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Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts
of African countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely
surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the new century.
Part II:
China's Relations with Africa
China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical
experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the
struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship.
The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered
in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close
political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral
trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good
results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has
provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also
rendered strong support to China on many occasions.
Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles
guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa
relations.
Part III:
China's African Policy
Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important
component of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward
the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the
Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa,
featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange.
The general principles and objectives of China's African policy are as follows:
- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African
countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavor
for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the
economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.
- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN
and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions
and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions
concerning peace and development in Africa.
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- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from
and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and
cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to
enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of
sustainable development.
The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of
China's relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government
appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China
principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause
of reunification. China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries
that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one China principle.
Part IV
Enhancing All-round
Cooperation Between
China and Africa
1. The political field
(1) High-level visits
China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese and African
leaders, with a view to facilitating communication, deepening friendship and promoting mutual
understanding and trust.
(2) Exchanges between legislative bodies
China favors increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis of mutual
respect between China's National People's Congress (NPC) on the one hand and parliaments of
African countries and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU on the other, for the purpose of
deepening understanding and cooperation.
(3) Exchanges between political parties
The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political
parties and organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence,
equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The purpose of such
exchanges is to increase understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.
(4) Consultation mechanisms
Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African countries, political
consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees on trade and economic
cooperation and mixed committees on science and technology should be established and improved,
so as to institutionalize dialogue and consultation in a flexible and pragmatic manner.
(5) Cooperation in international affairs
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China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on the
international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international
and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be
an equal partner in international affairs. China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN
play a greater role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new
international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit,
promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law in international affairs and
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.
(6) Exchanges between local governments
China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of
China and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship
aimed at facilitating bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.
2. The economic field
(1) Trade
The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities'
access to Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the
least developed African countries, with a view to expanding and balancing bilateral trade and
optimizing trade structure. It intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral
or multilateral friendly consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will
be made to encourage business communities on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional organizations.
(2) Investment
The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in
Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. The Chinese
Government is ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation
with African countries, and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide
guidance and service and offer convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in
China. The Chinese Government will continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the Agreement
on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double
Taxation with African Countries. The two sides should work together to create a favorable
environment for investment and cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and interests of
investors from both sides.
(3) Financial cooperation
To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese Government will
support the effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and cooperation with their
counterparts in African countries as well as regional financial institutions in Africa.
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(4) Agricultural cooperation
China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at
various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the
cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security,
agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will
intensify cooperation in agricultural technology, organize training courses of practical agricultural
technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects in Africa
and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program.
(5) Infrastructure
The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication,
water conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese
enterprises to participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their
contracts, and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects.
Efforts will be made to strengthen technology and management cooperation, focusing on the
capacity-building of African nations.
(6) Resources cooperation
The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa in resources
areas. It encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations
in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to
develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate
their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their
own countries and the continent as a whole.
(7) Tourism cooperation
China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African nations and,
grant more African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, Approved Destination Status for
out-bound Chinese tourist groups. China welcomes citizens from African nations for a tour of the
country.
(8) Debt reduction and relief
China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries with a view to seek
solution to, or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community,
developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and
relief for African nations.
(9) Economic assistance
In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and
gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.
(10) Multilateral cooperation
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China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade
systems and financial institutions and work together to urge the UN and other international
organizations to pay more attention to the question of economic development, promote South-South
cooperation, push forward the establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and
make the voices of developing countries heard in the decision-making of international financial
affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries and international organizations to support
the development of Africa and help realize Millennium Development Goals in Africa.
3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects
(1) Cooperation in human resources development and education
The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human Resources
Development Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify priority areas, expand areas
of cooperation and provide more input according to the needs of African countries so as to achieve
greater results.
Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of
government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in
Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's
weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and
distance learning while encouraging exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic
institutions of both sides.
(2) Science and technology cooperation
Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, China will
promote its cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, technological development and
transfer, speed up scientific and technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as
bio-agriculture, solar energy utilization, geological survey, mining and R&D of new medicines. It
will continue its training programs in applied technologies for African countries, carry out
demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilize Chinese
scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in Africa.
(3) Cultural exchanges
China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation plans
reached with African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural departments and
increase exchanges of artists and athletes. It will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse
forms between people's organizations and institutions in line with bilateral cultural exchange
programs and market demand.
(4) Medical and health cooperation
China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchange with Africa. It will continue
to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help
them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. China will increase its
exchanges and cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious
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diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional
medicine and experience concerning mechanism for public health emergencies.
(5) Media cooperation
China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchange and cooperation between the
media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced
media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant
government departments for the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with
media both domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.
(6) Administrative cooperation
China will carry out exchange and cooperation with African countries in civil service system
building, public administration reform and training of government personnel. The two sides may
study the feasibility of setting up a mechanism for personnel and administrative cooperation.
(7) Consular cooperation
China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during which the
two sides may have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions of common interest in
bilateral or multilateral consular relations in order to improve understanding and expand
cooperation. The Chinese side will work with Africa to facilitate personnel flow and ensure the
safety of their nationals.
(8) People-to-people exchange
China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of China and
Africa, especially the youth and women, with a view to increasing the understanding, trust and
cooperation of people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in
African countries.
(9) Environmental cooperation
China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water resources
conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by
facilitating technological exchange.
(10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance
China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the
fields of disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent
humanitarian aid, encourage and support exchange and cooperation between the Red Cross Society
of China and other NGOs on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.
4. Peace and security
(1) Military cooperation
China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out
military-related technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to help train African
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military personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own
security.
(2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations
China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African
countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity.
It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in
Africa. It will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.
(3) Judicial and police cooperation
China is prepared to promote exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and
law enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from each other in legal system building
and judicial reform so as to be better able to prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China
will work together with African countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption,
and intensify cooperation on matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of
criminal suspects.
China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the
problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an
unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange.
(4) Non-traditional security areas
In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is
necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer
cooperation in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic
crimes, etc.
Part V:
Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation And Its
Follow-up Actions
Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective mechanism for
the collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an
important framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long-term
stability, equality and mutual benefit.
China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in
strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and
stands ready to work with African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic
and Social Development and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan
(2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans. China will work with African countries within the
framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance mutual political trust, promote the
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comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve the mechanism of the
forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD.
Part VI:
China's Relations with African
Regional Organizations
China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region
and promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation with the
AU in all fields, supports its positive role in regional and international affairs and stands ready to
provide the AU assistance to the best of its capacity.
China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting
political stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to
enhance its amicable cooperation with those organizations.
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