PEAK OIL AND THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY
Stuart McCarthy, April 2009
Introduction
Strong evidence now exists that world oil production has reached its all-time
peak and will be declining within several years. The ‘peak oil’ phenomenon
marks a historical transition from the era of growing supplies of cheap,
abundant liquid fuels to an era of shrinking supplies of scarce, expensive
liquid fuels. This transition is coinciding with the worst global economic crisis
since WWII and the onset of global climate change, which are both leading to
fundamental shifts in the world economy even before peak oil is considered.
Most policy-makers have tended to regard resource depletion as a problem
that would not emerge until decades into the future. The near term onset of
peak oil presents the challenge of quickly developing and implementing the
necessary mitigation plans.
Peak Oil
The term ‘peak oil’ refers to the maximum rate, or ‘peak’, of production in a
given oil well, oil field, oil producing country or region, beyond which it goes
into irreversible decline due to physical limits. World oil production is already
at or near its historic peak. Oil discoveries peaked in the 1960s and the oil
production rate has exceeded the discovery rate since the 1980s. In 2007 the
production rate was approximately four times the discovery rate of new
reserves (see Figure 1), i.e. only one barrel of oil is being discovered for every
four that are currently being consumed, even before the long lead-times for
bringing new oil fields into production are considered.
Historical records show that oil production has already peaked in as many as
65 countries and most regions. For example, US production peaked in 1970,
North America & Mexico production peaked in 1997, OECD production
peaked in 1997, North Sea (UK/Norway/Denmark) production peaked in 2000,
Australian production peaked in 2000, production in Russia and China has
peaked and non-OPEC production peaked in 2003. Production in many of the
world’s “supergiant” oil fields is declining steeply. Production in Canterell,
Mexico, which was the world’s second most productive field until peaking in
2005, declined by 25 per cent in 2006 and has declined by more than 60 per
cent from its peak. Production in Burgan, Kuwait, now the world’s second
most productive oil field, also peaked in 2005, and it has been revealed that
Kuwait’s oil reserves were overstated by one half. Production in Prudhoe Bay
and the North Sea continues to decline steeply, with the British Government
aiming to achieve a decline rate in the latter of 7.5 per cent per annum.
-2-
THE GROWING GAP
Regular Conventional Oil
60
Past Discovery
50
Future Discovery
Gb/a
40
Production
30
Revisions backdated.
Rounded with 3yr moving
average Campbell, 2007.
20
10
0
1930
1950
1970
1990
2010
2030
2050
Figure 1. World Oil Production vs Discovery, Regular Conventional Oil, 19302050 (Campbell/ASPO).
Prospects for increasing production of crude oil are found in ever more
remote, technically difficult, politically unstable or even hostile locations.
Unconventional oil resources such as shale oil and tar sands, while the
potential reserves are large, are not able to be developed at sufficient rates to
meet the growing gap. Attempts to rapidly scale up the production of
alternative fuels such as biofuels and synthetic fuels are encountering serious
cost, thermodynamic and environmental constraints. These alternatives will
have only a marginal impact, at best, on the world liquid fuel production
situation.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) and other official agencies such as the
US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Australian Bureau of
Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE) have traditionally produced
demand based forecasts of oil production and simply assumed that reserves
and production capacity would meet demand. Typically these have forecast
world oil production continuing to increase until at least the 2030 timeframe at
rates of up to 120 million barrels per day, compared with the current 85 million
barrels per day. Notably, there was a shortfall of 1.5 million barrels per day
between the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2006 reference case and actual
production in 2008, i.e. production growth fell 50 per cent short of the forecast
over two years.
The 2006 Senate inquiry into peak oil examined a broad range of world oil
production forecasts.1 These were loosely grouped into ‘early peak’ forecasts
envisaging the peak in the 2005-2015 timeframe and ‘late peak’ forecasts
placing the peak beyond 2020. Since then most of the ‘late peak’ forecasts
have been revised by their authors into the ‘early peak’ timeframe, or
discredited. A number of further studies into world oil production prospects
-3have been published, examining the timing of the production peak, the overall
rate of decline in the world’s existing oil fields, and the extent to which
production from new projects will offset the overall decline in the short to
medium term.
Studies which examine the timing of the production peak based on the best
publicly available reserve estimates indicate that world oil production will peak
in the 2007-2015 timeframe. These include the Colin Campbell/ASPO Oil and
Gas Depletion Model (see Figure 2),2 the Energy Watch Group oil supply
outlook,3 Fredrik Robelius’ Giant Oil Fields study,4 and Chris Skrebowski’s
Megaprojects study.5 Studies which examine production from the world’s
existing oil fields indicate a current overall decline rate of 4.5 per cent to 6.5
per cent per annum. These include the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2008
(WEO 2008),6 and the Mikael Höök et. al. Giant Oil Field Decline Rates
study.7
OIL & GAS DEPLETION PROFILES
2007 Base Case
55
50
45
40
Gboe
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Regular Oil
Heavy etc
Deepwater
Polar
NGL
Gas
Non-Con Gas
Figure 2. World Oil & Gas Depletion Profiles, ASPO 2007 Base Case.
Assessments of production additions from new projects have been
undertaken by the IEA in WEO 2008, and by independent analysts based on
open source information. WEO 2008 found that 30 million barrels per day of
additional oil production capacity would need to be brought on stream by
2015, equivalent to three times the current production of Saudi Arabia, to
offset declining production in existing oil fields, including all currently planned
projects. This includes 7 million barrels per day of production capacity in
-4addition to current projects as the capacity additions from those projects tails
off after 2010.8
Analysis of Chris Skrebowski’s Megaprojects database, which itemises more
than 250 projects due to come on stream to the end of 2016, indicates that:
... there will be no net increases in oil flows after 2011 even if all planned
projects come onstream more or less on time and achieve the
anticipated production flows. That everything should go to plan is, on the
basis of recent experience, a distinctly optimistic assumption but it does
define an outer boundary, the best possible outcome that could
theoretically be achieved. The immediate conclusion from the analysis is
that the peaking of oil supplies is imminent and will occur in the window
2011-2013.9
Consistent with these forecasts, market participants including oil producers
now expect a near term peak in world oil production.10
Skrebowski’s analysis is reinforced by the open source Oil Megaprojects
Database (OMD), which incorporates oil production data for all significant
projects coming on stream from 2003 to 2020, compiled by an exhaustive
search of oil company annual reports and press releases.11 Figure 3 shows a
scenario which incorporates a slightly optimistic 4.5 per cent decline per
annum in the world’s existing oil fields, offset by new projects coming on
stream until 2010-2012, beyond which time production enters year on year
declines. In this scenario, world production declines by more than one quarter
from 2010 to 2020.
These assessments are particularly important as the peak in world oil
production makes its transition from theoretical projection to observed
phenomenon. Given the five to seven year start-up time for a typical major oil
project, and reasonable estimates of depletion rates in existing oil fields, the
project based assessments provide a good indication of actual production
capacities during the period to circa 2015, beyond which time underlying
depletion in the ageing supergiant oil fields will be the main determinant in
overall production rates. Notably, many of these projects are being postponed,
downscaled or cancelled due to the combined impact of the credit crisis and
the recent collapse in oil prices, which is discussed below in more detail.
World natural gas production will likely peak within a decade of oil production
peaking. With natural gas expressed in oil equivalence, the combined oil and
gas production peak will occur within several years of peak oil (see Figure 2).
Gas production has already peaked in various regions, including North
America. This is an important factor to bear in mind because natural gas is
increasingly used as a “clean” alternative fuel for transport and power
generation, and gas prices usually follow oil prices. In some cases, declining
gas production may also have a compounding impact on oil production where
it is used to provide energy in the oil production process, for example the
Canadian tar sands.
-5-
Figure 3. Oil Megaprojects Database, Moderate Decline Rate (4.5% per
annum) Scenario, world oil supply and megaproject contributions, compared
to observed EIA production data.
Countering the historical record and geophysical evidence, sceptics of the
proposition of a near-term oil production peak propose an economic argument
that increasing oil prices would ensure increasing discoveries and production.
World demand for oil has continued to surge largely as a result of rapid
economic growth in developing countries such as China and India. Oil industry
profits and spending on infrastructure and exploration have been at record
levels. However, as oil profits have increased steadily, world liquid fuel
production has been on a plateau at approximately 85 million barrels per day
since 2004, within a 4 per cent fluctuation band (see Figure 4), effectively
discrediting the economic argument. There no evidence that world oil
production can grow significantly above this plateau.
For oil importing countries the prospect of overall production declines is
already being compounded by growing domestic consumption in the key oil
producing and exporting countries, resulting in declining net exports available
on the market. Total net exports from the world’s top 20 exporting countries
have been trending downwards since mid-2005 (see Figure 5). A recent
independent study produced a ‘middle case’ scenario in which exports from
-6the world’s top five oil exporters decline by 6.2 per cent per year from the
present rate of approximately 24 million barrels per day to approximately 12.5
million barrels per day by 2015,12 i.e. a decline equivalent to one quarter of
the world’s internationally traded oil over the next seven years. This analysis
is reinforced by Jeff Rubin from CIBC World Markets, who recently estimated
that world exports would decline by 2.5 million barrels per day by 2011.13
Figure 4. World Liquid Fuel Production, 2002-2008 (Höök et. al.).
Peak oil is merely one of several systemic socio-economic shocks likely to
eventuate in the coming years. Thomas Homer-Dixon, among others,
identifies five converging “tectonic stresses” that will possibly trigger
“synchronous failure” in modern civilisation, either in isolation or combination.
These include population stress, energy stress (including peak oil),
environmental stress, climate stress and economic stress (for example the
current global economic crisis).14 Homer-Dixon considers energy stress to be
the most serious:
... energy is society’s critical master resource: when it’s scarce and
costly, everything we try to do, including growing our own food, obtaining
other resources like fresh water, transmitting and processing information,
and defending ourselves, becomes far harder.15
Bearing these factors in mind, it is likely that the next decade will feature not
only a transition to declining world oil production but periodic oil shocks, i.e.
sudden, serious disruptions to oil supplies. These may be triggered by
geopolitical events, such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution which caused a
sudden decline equivalent to six per cent of current world oil production, or
natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which shut in the
equivalent of one quarter of annual Gulf of Mexico production and contributed
to substantial oil price increases (see Figure 5). Events such as these will
have severe impacts upon the global, regional and domestic economies.
-7-
Major World Oil Supply Disruptions
(Source: International Energy Agency)
Nov 1956 - Mar 1957
Suez Crisis
Jun-Aug 1967
Six Day War
Oct 1973 - Mar 1974
Arab-Israeli War and Oil Em bargo
Nov 1978 - April 1979
Iranian Revolution
Oct 1980 - Jan 1981
Outbreak of Iran-Iraq War
Aug 1990 - Jan 1991
Iraqi Invasion of Kuw ait
Jun-Jul 2001
Iraq Halts Oil Exports
Dec 2002 - Mar 2003
Venezuelan Oil Workers' Strike
Mar-Dec 2003
Iraq War
Sep 2005
Hur. Rita & Katrina
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Peak Gross Loss of Supply (m illion barrels/day)
Figure 5. Major World Oil Supply Disruptions.
In summary, world oil production is peaking and will likely be declining within
several years. Production from the world’s existing oil fields is already
declining at approximately five to six per cent per annum, with new production
unlikely to offset this decline beyond 2010. Oil exports will likely decline even
more steeply and it is increasingly likely that sudden oil supply disruptions will
cause oil shocks. The peak oil phenomenon will be a major historical
discontinuity, between the era of increasing supplies of cheap, abundant
energy and an era of declining supplies of scarce, expensive energy, and is
likely to cause major, world-wide socio-economic upheaval.
Implications for the World Economy
Even among those who accept that world oil production is peaking, many tend
to dismiss the problem on the hopeful assumptions that “the market will sort it
out” or that there will be a seamless transition to “new technology.” Such
views ignore the importance of oil in the world economy, the enormity of the
transition to alternative fuels and/or technologies, the impact that high oil
prices are already having, and the compounding impacts of peak oil with other
global ecological and economic shocks.
Oil is the world’s most important primary energy source, providing more than
one third of all energy. 80-95 per cent of all transport is fuelled by petroleum.
All petrochemicals are produced from oil. 95 per cent of goods arrive at the
point of sale using oil. 99 per cent of our food involves the use of oil and/or
gas for fertiliser, pesticides, ploughing, cultivation, processing and transport.
For the last half century there has been a close correlation between world
-8economic growth and growth in world oil production. Robert Hirsch estimates
that a one per cent decline in world oil supply would roughly equate to a one
per cent decline in world GDP, in order of magnitude (Figure 6). 16 Four of the
last five global recessions were preceded by sharp increases in world oil
prices (Figure 7).17 In a seminal 2005 report commissioned by the US
Department of Energy (the ‘Hirsch Report’),18 Hirsch et. al. concluded:
The long-run impact of sustained, significantly increased oil prices
associated with oil peaking will be severe. Virtually certain are
increases in inflation and unemployment, declines in the output of
goods and services, and a degradation of living standards. Without
timely mitigation, the long-run impact on the developed economies will
almost certainly be extremely damaging, while many developing
nations will likely be even worse off.19
Figure 6. World GDP Growth vs Oil Production Growth, 1986-2006 (Hirsch).
Much of the Hirsch Report was devoted to scenarios for mitigating the liquid
fuel shortfall following peak oil, with each scenario assuming the
implementation of ‘crash programs’ in fuel efficiency and alternative fuel
production. A crash program to produce substitute fuel equivalent to of one
per cent of world oil production would cost at least $US100 billion and take
more than a decade. The scenario in which crash programs were
implemented 20 years before world oil production peaked offered “the
possibility of avoiding a world liquid fuels shortfall”, whereas “waiting until
world oil production peaks before taking crash program action leaves the
world with a significant liquid fuel deficit for more than two decades”, resulting
in the “world supply/demand balance [being] achieved through massive
demand destruction (shortages), which would translate to significant economic
hardship.”20 Given that no such crash programs have yet been implemented
and declines of several per cent per year are imminent, the most likely
scenario now is one of “significant economic hardship.”
-9-
Figure 7. Past Recessions and Oil Price Spikes (Rubin & Buchanan/CIBC).
Oil Vulnerability in Australia
Despite the notion of Australia as an emerging “energy superpower” which
arose during the recent resources boom,21 this country will not be immune
from the economic hardships arising from peak oil. Australia does indeed
have large fossil fuel and mineral reserves, and is an important exporter of
these commodities in world terms, particularly uranium and coal. In the case
of oil and gas, however, the situation is very different. Domestic oil production
is already in decline and most of our natural gas is being exported very
cheaply while we lack the wherewithal for it to be utilised as a mainstream
transport fuel. For many years the dollar value of Australia’s coal exports has
barely offset the value of its petroleum imports (see Figure 8).
In the coming years Australia will likely experience serious difficulty securing
affordable supplies of petroleum fuels at present or forecast consumption
rates. With its domestic oil production having peaked in 2000, Australia is
already about 50 per cent import dependent. Based on current Geoscience
Australia (GA) production forecasts and ABARE demand forecasts, Australia
will be two thirds dependent on petroleum imports by 2015 (see Figure 9).
Depending on oil prices, exchange rates and other variables, the petroleum
trade deficit alone could climb from its current level of $12 billion per annum to
the $40-80 billion range in that same timeframe.
- 10 -
Australian Coal Exports vs Petroleum Imports, 1999-2008
(Source: ABS 5368.0, International Trade in Goods and Services )
5
Monthly Exports/Imports ($ billion)
Coal Exports
4
Petroleum Imports
3
2
1
2008
2008
2007
2007
2006
2006
2005
2005
2004
2004
2003
2003
2002
2002
2001
2001
2000
2000
1999
1999
0
Figure 8. Australian Coal Exports vs Petroleum Imports, 1999-2008.
Australian Oil Production vs Demand, 1975-2020
(Source: Geoscience Australia, ABARE)
0.9
Demand
0.8
Production
0.7
net imports
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
actual
forecast
0.0
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
17
20
19
Oil Production/Demand (million bbl/day)
1.0
Figure 9. Australian Oil Production vs Demand, 1975-2020.
- 11 While there are contingency plans in place to address short-term supply
disruptions through cooperation with other OECD nations and various
emergency mechanisms for controlling domestic demand,22 these will not
address the sort of long-term supply disruptions and highly volatile prices that
will result from the permanent decline in world production. Australia is unique
among OECD nations for not maintaining a 90-day strategic petroleum
reserve, instead relying on the petroleum already coming through the supply
chain to provide a buffer for short-term shocks. This will leave the country’s
economy highly vulnerable to the oil supply shocks that will likely characterise
the peak oil era.
The domestic socio-economic implications arising from peak oil will likely be
severe. Recent economic modelling on the impact of a near-term peak in
world oil production by the CSIRO indicated fuel prices as high as $8 per litre
by 2018, a reduction in passenger and freight travel of up to 40 per cent and a
decline in GDP of at least three per cent.23 At the micro-economic level the
combined impact of rising oil prices and high debt levels has been the subject
of extensive ongoing research by Jago Dodson and Neil Sipe of Griffith
University, among others. In Unsettling Suburbia, the most recent in a series
of papers on the subject, Dodson and Sipe find that the car dependent
residents of outer suburbs that are poorly serviced by public transport are
highly vulnerable to the combination of high fuel prices and mortgage debt.
Notably, a disproportionate impact is being experienced by sections of the
community that are already socio-economically disadvantaged.24
Peak Oil, the Real Economy and the Global Financial Crisis
For several years Colin Campbell, Jean Laharrère and others have posited
that the economic impact of peak oil would transpire as a ‘bumpy plateau’,
triggering a severe shock in world financial markets and a cycle of oil price
shocks and recessions. Oil prices would rise steeply as increasing demand
exceeded production capacity, eventually reaching a point at which ‘demand
destruction’ would trigger a recession, then possibly collapsing as the market
over-reacted to small imbalances between surplus and shortage. As the
economy recovered, increasing demand would see prices increase once more
and the cycle would continue (see Figure 10).25
Peak oil began to affect the real economy before the US sub-prime mortgage
crisis, and is now exacerbating the global economic crisis in a positive
feedback loop. From early-2005 to mid-2008 oil prices quadrupled as strong
economic growth in China, India and other developing nations drove
increasing world demand for oil but production entered a plateau (see Figure
11). Increasing oil prices first affected the developing world, with as many as
100 developing countries having experienced fuel and/or energy shortages,
while demand for biofuel feedstock from food crops contributed to an
emerging world food crisis. From 2007 rising fuel prices began to significantly
affect developed economies, particularly in the road transport and airline
industries. Rubin observed that the Japanese and European economies
entered recession in the first half of 2008, largely due to their relatively high
dependence on oil imports.26 Vehicle mileage in the US, which broke a 25year long trend of constant increases in 2005, began to fall in absolute terms
- 12 in late 2007 and car sales declined by almost 50 per cent over the same
period. Demand for air travel and air freight began to fall “precipitously” in
early 2008,27 and for a period of several months North American airlines were
filing for bankruptcy at a rate of one per fortnight. The impact of rising oil
prices on global transport costs effectively offset all of the trade liberalisation
efforts of the past three decades.28 During this period the IEA observed
“devastating” demand destruction in the US and other OECD countries,
contributing substantially to a slowdown in the global economy. 29 Oil demand
in the OECD, which consumes three quarters of total world oil production,
declined by approximately eight per cent since the beginning of 2006.
Figure 10. Oil Price Behaviour on the ‘Bumpy Plateau’ (Campbell).
The onset of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis combined with these existing
problems in the real economy to create a ‘perfect storm’ of rising inflation,
slowing growth and over-valued financial instruments. The value of the US
dollar steadily declined through 2007 as the economic outlook worsened. As
oil prices rose through the US$100 per barrel mark in late 2007 and early
2008 the mainstream media began to cover the peak oil story and reputable
market analysts forecast prices of up to US$200 per barrel in the near to
medium term. The loss of confidence caused by the collapse of several major
investment banks and the worsening economic outlook in late-2007 and early2008 saw a flight of capital from financial and equities markets to
commodities. Oil prices rose sharply to as high as US$147 per barrel in mid2008, an increase of more than 500 per cent in five years, three times higher
than previous oil shocks. The prospect of a global recession and falling
demand for oil, combined with worldwide government intervention to stabilise
financial markets and stimulate economic activity, then saw a collapse of the
oil price back to 2005 levels.
- 13 -
World Crude Oil Production vs Price, 2002-2008
(Source: US Energy Information Administration)
$150
Oil Production
Oil Price
80
$120
60
$90
40
$60
20
$30
0
2002
World Oil Price (US$/barrel)
World Crude Oil Production (million barrels/day)
100
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Figure 11. World Crude Oil Production vs Price, 2002-2008.
Although coordinated government efforts managed to avert a systematic
collapse of world financial markets, the economic outlook continues to
deteriorate as the impact of several years of high inflation and the loss of
consumer confidence flows into the real economy. The US, European Union
and Japan are already in severe recession and there is a significant slowdown
in the economies of many of Australia’s other key trading partners, including
China.
World demand for oil has eased as the economic outlook has worsened. With
demand easing and prices falling, many commentators have concluded that
the peak in world oil production has been postponed, however the paradox is
that these circumstances will likely hasten the onset of peak oil. Much of the
enormous capital investment needed to complete the large new oil projects
that would marginally increase production over the next several years is falling
victim to the combined impact of falling prices and the credit crunch. Rubin is
now warning of “supply destruction” and a return to high prices:
Although capacity is ample for now, we expect supply strains to emerge
beyond mid-2009 as GDP growth and global demand turn the corner,
setting the stage for a return to the $100-barrel mark by year-end (2009)
... In the Alberta oil sands alone, we estimate that project cancellations
and delays, affecting $100 billion of investment, will shave over 800,000
barrels from daily new capacity, roughly half of earlier projected growth
in the next five years. And what is happening there is occurring in Brazil,
West Africa and the Middle East itself.30
With production in the world’s existing oil fields declining at more than five per
cent per annum, possibly higher, and new projects needed to offset this
- 14 decline being postponed or cancelled, there is a strong argument that the mid2008 production peak was the all-time production peak.
Regardless whether oil production peaks in the very near term, in WEO 2008
the IEA finds that fluctuations in the tight supply-demand balance are likely to
see oil prices remain volatile for some time and increase over the long term:
In nominal terms, prices double to just over $200 per barrel in 2030.
However, pronounced short-term swings in prices are likely to remain
the norm and temporary price spikes or sharp falls cannot be ruled out.
Prices are likely to remain highly volatile, especially in the next year or
two … Beyond 2015, we assume that rising marginal costs of supply
exert upward pressure on prices through to the end of the projection
period.31
While most economists are predicting a return to business-as-usual economic
growth in the world economy in the 2009-10 timeframe, the above analysis
indicates that this would merely trigger the next oil price spike and affect a
resumption of the bumpy plateau. This new cycle of oil price shocks and
temporary recovery will therefore likely continue for the foreseeable future,
even before the impact of physical oil supply disruptions is considered.
Conclusion
The onset of the global recession, which followed a four year plateau in world
oil production and a seven-fold increase in oil prices, marks the
commencement of the peak oil era. Although there are some uncertainties
about specific oil production decline rates and future oil prices, the general
socio-economic implications of peak oil for the world economy are now quite
clear. These include protracted economic contraction, rising unemployment,
highly volatile energy, food and transport prices, declining international trade,
declining investment and social unrest.
Australia is not immune from the impact of peak oil, indeed some of its key
industries are among those that will be the most seriously affected, including
resources, transport and tourism. Governments at every level, businesses and
the general community now need to begin to adapt to the realities of peak oil.
In particular, strategies will need to be developed to address key
vulnerabilities in Australia’s transport, agriculture and energy sectors. Peak oil
mitigation plans need to be implemented with a high degree of urgency in
order to alleviate the worst of the socio-economic impacts and maintain
community cohesion.
- 15 -
Notes
See Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport, Australia’s
Future Oil Supply and Alternative Transport Fuels: Final Report, Parliament of Australia,
Canberra, 7 February 2007, at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/oil_supply/report/index.htm.
2 Regularly updated at http://www.aspo-ireland.org/index.cfm/page/newsletter.
3 Werner Zittel and Jörg Schindler, Crude Oil: The Supply Outlook, Energy Watch Group,
October 2007, at http://www.energywatchgroup.org/fileadmin/global/pdf/EWG_Oilreport_102007.pdf
4 Fredrik Robelius, Giant Oil Fields - The Highway to Oil: Giant Oil Fields and their Importance
for Future Oil Production, Uppsala University, September 2007, at
http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=7625.
5 Chris Skrebowski/Peak Oil Consulting, “Risk from Oil Depletion”, in UK Industry Taskforce
on Peak Oil & Energy Security, The Oil Crunch: Securing the UK’s Energy Future, 2008, pp.
9-15, at http://peakoiltaskforce.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/oil-report-final.pdf.
6 Available at http://www.iea.org/weo/docs/weo2008/WEO2008_es_English.pdf.
7 Mikael Höök et. al., “Giant Oil Field Decline Rates and their Influence on World Oil
Production”, Energy Policy, 2009 (forthcoming), full text available at
http://www.tsl.uu.se/uhdsg/Publications/GOF_decline_Article.pdf.
8 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
9 Skrebowski, op. cit., p. 11. Skrebowski is a Consulting Editor and former Editor of Petroleum
Review.
10 Pedro de Almeida and Pedro D. Silva, “The Peak of Oil Production – Timings and Market
Recognition”, Energy Policy, Volume 37, Issue 4, April 2009, pp. 1267-1276, available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03014215.
11 The Oil Drum/Wikipedia Oil Megaprojects Database, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_megaprojects.
12 “A Quantitative Assessment of Future Net Oil Exports by the Top Five Net Oil Exporters”,
Energy Bulletin, 8 January 2008, at http://www.energybulletin.net/38948.html.
13 Jeff Rubin, “OPEC’s Growing Call on Itself”, presentation to the 6th Annual International
ASPO Conference, Ireland, September 2007, at http://www.aspoireland.org/contentfiles/ASPO6/2-3_ASPO6_JRubin.pdf.
14 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of
Civilisation, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 2006, pp. 9-30.
15 Ibid., p. 12.
16 Robert L. Hirsch, World Oil Shortage: Scenarios for Mitigation Planning, presentation to
ASPO-USA World Oil Conference, Houston, October 2007, p. 3, at
http://www.aspousa.org/proceedings/houston/presentations/HIRSCH%20HOUSTON-ASPOUSA.pdf.
17 Jeff Rubin and Peter Buchanan, “What’s the Real Cause of the Global Recession?”,
StrategEcon, CIBC World Markets, 31 October 2008, pp. 3-6, at
http://research.cibcwm.com/economic_public/download/soct08.pdf.
18 Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation and Risk Management, February
2005, pp., 27-28, at http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/others/pdf/Oil_Peaking_NETL.pdf.
19 Ibid., p. 30.
20 Ibid., p. 59.
21 See for example former Prime Minister John Howard, Australia’s National Challenges:
Energy and Water, speech to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA),
17 July 2006, transcript at
http://ceda.com.au/public/package/howard_200607/howard_200607_speech.html.
22 See for example Commonwealth of Australia, Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984, Canberra,
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/lfea1984213/.
23 CSIRO Future Fuels Forum, Fuel for Thought: The Future of Transport Fuels, June 2008,
at http://www.csiro.au/resources/FuelForThoughtReport.html.
24 Jago Dodson and Neil Sipe, Unsettling Suburbia: The New Landscape of Oil and Mortgage
Vulnerability in Australian Cities, Griffith University, August 2008, at
http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/88851/urp-rp17-dodson-sipe-2008.pdf.
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See for example Jean Laharrère, Peak Oil and Other Peaks, Presentation to CERN
Meeting, 3 October 2005, at http://www.hubbertpeak.com/laherrere/CERN200510.pdf; Sonia
Shah, “Peak Oil’s Bumpy Plateau”, New Matilda, 6 July 2005, at
http://newmatilda.com/2005/07/06/peak-oil%2526%2523039%3Bs-bumpy-plateau; and
Michael C. Ruppert and Michael Kane, The Markets React to Peak Oil, From the Wilderness
Publications, 2006, at
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/members/100406_markets_react.shtml.
26 Rubin and Buchanan, op. cit.
27 International Air Transport Association, Airlines Financial Health Monitor, OctoberNovember 2008, p. 2, at http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/economics/index.htm.
28 Jeff Rubin and Benjamin Tal, “Will Soaring Transport Costs Reverse Globalization?”,
StratagEcon, CIBC World Markets, 27 May 2008, pp. 4-7, at
http://research.cibcwm.com/economic_public/download/smay08.pdf.
29 See IEA, Medium Term Oil Market Report, July 2008, at http://omrpublic.iea.org/mtomr.htm.
30 Quoted in Tyler Hamilton, “Energy Giants Trim Spending Plans for 2009”, Toronto Star, 12
December 2008, at http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/552534.
31 Op. cit., p. 6.
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