G.I.F. Young Scientists’ Program – Application Form
Title of Research Proposal: Settlements in Criminal Cases – A Comparative
Study
Last Name: Gazal-Ayal First Name: Oren
Date of Birth: May, 24 1970 Place of Birth: Haifa, Israel Nationality: Israel
Academic Degree and Status: Doctor, Lecturer
Institution: University of Haifa
Department: Faculty of Law
Full Address (of Institution): Mt. Carmel, Haifa, 31905, Israel
Tel: 04-8240679
Fax: 04-8240681 E-mail: ogazal@law.haifa.ac.il
Research Area (Keywords): Law, Economics
Have you previously received or applied for a Minerva,
Alexander von Humboldt or any other Fellowship?
Yes
No
If yes, please detail:
Have you personally ever received a research grant: Yes
No
If yes, please detail:
Fulbright Grant for Post Doctoral scholars 2004-2005 for research on the
Economics of Plea Bargaining and the Innocence Problem
Humphrey Fellowship in Law and Economic Policy (granted by the Olin
Center in for Law and Economics in the University of Michigan Law School)
2004-2005, for research on the Economics of Plea Bargaining
Are you currently supported by any funding agency: Yes
No
If yes, please detail:
Applicant’s
Signature: Oren Gazal
Institution
Endorsement:
(signature & Stamp)
Date: 8/11/05
The following documents should be included (original, 4 copies):
Curriculum Vitae+ Publications
(1/2 page)
Research Proposal (4 pages only) Abstract
Photocopy of Ph.D./M.D. Diploma
2 Letters of Recommendation (in English)
Valid Approval for Experiments on Human or Animal Models (if required)
1
CURRICULUM VITAE
(Please use this form only)
SURNAME: Gazal-Ayal FIRST NAME: Oren
BIRTH DATE: May, 24 1970 CURRENT INSTITUTE: University of Haifa
A) ACADEMIC BACKGROUND
From-Till
Institution
Area of specialization
Degree
1/00-9/02
University of Haifa
Law
Ph.D.
9/97-8/98
University of Hamburg &
University of Ghent
Law and Economics
European
Master in
Law and
Economics
(EMLE)
9/92-7/96
University of Haifa
Economics
B.A,
9/92-3/96
University of Haifa
Law
LL.B.
Major research interests: Criminal Procedure, Law and Economics, The Economics of
the Criminal Justice System
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT (Start with present position)
From-Till
Institution
Research Area
Title
1/00-9/04
& Present
University of Haifa
Law
Lecturer
(since 9/02)
9/04-8/05
University of Michigan
Law and Economics
Humphrey
Faculty
Fellow
8/98-12/99
Ministry of Justice, Israel
Law
Assistant to
the State
Attorney
B) POTENTIAL COLLABORATORS IN THE OTHER COUNTRY (if available)
Name
Institution (full address)
E-mail
Hans-Jörg Albrecht
(Director)
Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law, Freiburg
h.j.albrecht
@iuscrim.m
pg.de
2
Oren Gazal
Curriculum Vitae and List of Publications
I. Curriculum Vitae
1. Personal Details
Name: Oren Gazal
Place and Date of Birth: May 24, 1970, Haifa
Permanent Address: 49 KKL St. Kiryat Biyalik 27091, Israel
Telephone Number: +972-77-5615057
Office Address and Phone: University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa, 04-8240679
Electronic Address: ogazal@research.haifa.ac.il
Fax Number: 04-8240681
2. Higher Education
1) LL.B. - Bachelor of Laws Cum Laude (Position in Class – 1st) June, 1996,
University of Haifa, Faculty of Law.
2) B.A. Bachelor of Arts – Economics Summa Cum Laude (Position in
Class – 1st), June, 1997, University of Haifa, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Department of Economics.
3) EMLE - European Master in Law and Economics, Rated Outstanding
(Position in Class – 1st, Winner of the Best Thesis Prize), September,
1998, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law, in cooperation with the
University of Ghent, Faculty of Law.
4) Ph.D. - Doctor of Philosophy, September, 2002, University of
Haifa, Graduate Studies Authority.
3. Academic Ranks in Institutes of Higher Education
1) October 2002 – Current: Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa
2) September 2004 – August 2005: Humphrey Faculty Fellow, Michigan
Law School
3) July 2004 – August 2005: Visiting Professor, Connecticut Law School
4) August 2001 – October 2001: Visiting Professor, Nova Southern
University
5) August 2000 – March 2001: Visiting Scholar, New York University, Law
School)
3
4. Offices in University Academic Administration
1) Academic Coordinator of the Haifa Branch of the Erasmus Programme in Law
and Economics
2) Academic Coordinator of the program "legal and information skills"
3) Member of the Student Affairs Committee in the Faculty of Law 2002-2004
4) Member of the Teaching Committee in the Faculty of Law
5) Organizing a Conference – International Human Rights Day – Organizing a
Conference on Defendant Rights against Victims Rights, Dec. 9, 2003, in the
Faculty of Law at the University of Haifa.
5. Scholarly Position and Activity outside the University
1) Researcher for the Israeli Judicial Authority – Member of a research team
of five researchers that won a tender to examine the caseload on the Israeli
Judicial Authority and its internal distribution. (since September 2005)
2) External Counselor – The Ministry of Justice – Academic counselor to the
committee for reforming the criminal procedure headed by Mrs. Yehudit Karp,
the Deputy Attorney General (since March 2002)
3) Academic Coordinator of the Continuance Studies Program in Criminal Law
of the Haifa Bar (2003)
4) Assistant to the State Attorney, Mrs. Edna Arbel (31.8.1999 – 31.12.2000)
5) Law Clerk for Justice Dorit Beinisch, in the Supreme Court of Israel 1.9.1996
– 31.8.1997
6) Member of the Editorial Board of the Review of Law and Government in
Israel (1995-1996)
6. Active Participation in Scholarly Conferences
1) The Annual Law and Economic Conference of the Erasmus Programme in Law
and Economics, Hamburg, Germany, March, 1998, "Economic Analysis of
Unfair Terms in Standard Form Contracts"
2) The Annual Law and Economic Conference of the Erasmus Programme in Law
and Economics, Ghent, Belgium, March 2002, "Court's Rejection of PleaAgreements as a Tool to Protect the Innocent"
3) The Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics,
Athens, Greece, 2002, "Court's Rejection of Plea-Agreements as a Tool to
Protect the Innocent"
4) The Annual Conference of the Israeli Association of Law and Economics, The
Interdisciplinary Center, Herzelia, June, 2002, "Court's Rejection of PleaAgreements as a Tool to Protect the Innocent"
4
5) The need to reform the criminal process in Israel – Is there a risk of Conviction
to Innocent Defendants, The College For Management, Rishon Lezion,
November, 2002, "Pleas Bargaining and Lay Judges – a Comparative View"
6) The International Human Rights Day – Social Rights as Constitutional Rights,
The Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, December 2002, "Social Rights as
Constitutional Rights – the Institutional Dimension".
7) The Annual Conference of the Israeli Association of Law and Economics, Tel
Aviv University, June, 2003, "Reexamining the Economic Analysis of Standard
Form Contracts".
8) The Annual European Association of Law and Economics Conference, Nancy,
France, September, 2003, "Reexamining the Economic Analysis of Standard
Form Contracts"
9) The International Human Rights Day – Defendants' Rights Against Victims'
Rights, The Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, December 2003, "The Rights
of the Defendants Against the Rights of the Potential Victim"
10) The Annual Conference of the Canadian Law and Economics Association,
Toronto, Canada, September, 2004, "Plea Bargaining Only for the Guilty"
11) The Annual Conference of the American Law and Economics Association ,
NYU, New York, USA, May, 2005, "Plea Bargaining Only for the Guilty"
12) The Annual Conference of the European Law and Economics Association,
Ljubljana, Slovenia, September, 2005, " Plea Concessions – How Low should
We Go"
7. Colloquium, Talks and other Invited Addresses
1) Reception and Guest Presentation in the Faculty of Law in Nova Southern
University, FL, USA: "The Legal System in Times of Terror – The Israeli
Experience", September, 2001.
2) Faculty Seminar in the University of Haifa, Faculty of Law, "Court's
Rejection of Plea-Agreements as a Tool to Protect the Innocent", January
2001.
3) Colloquium in Law and Economics, Tel Aviv University: "Court's Rejection
of Plea-Agreements as a Tool to Protect the Innocent", April 2003.
4) Colloquium in Law and Economics, Tel Aviv University: "Economic
Analysis of Unfair Terms in Standard Form Contracts", April 2004.
5) The University of Michigan Law School - Informal Lunches Lectures,
“Occupying Jurisdiction: The Israeli Supreme Court and the Occupied
Territories”, September, 2004.
6) The University of Michigan Law and Economics Workshop, “Plea Bargaining
Only for the Guilty” November, 2004.
7) The University of Illinois Law School – Faculty Talk, “Partial Ban on Plea
Bargaining”, April 2005.
5
8. Scholarship, Awards, Research Grants, etc.
Prizes
1) The Minister of Public Security Prize for Research and Development
a) About the Prize: A prize of an amount equal to three years tuition fee in a
university awarded to a scientific researcher for an original scientific
research and/or special achievements in the field of research and
development that contributed substantially to the field of law enforcement.
The prize is given annually to a winner determined by a committee
nominated by the Minister of Public Security.
b) Awarded for: Research paper about the problem of caseload in the public
prosecution service.
c) Awarded in April, 2002.
2) Prize for the best thesis: Prize for the best thesis in the Erasmus Programme
in Law and Economics. Awarded in March 1999.
Scholarships
1) Fulbright Post Doctoral Fellowship, A Fellowship Granted by The United
States-Israel Educational Foundation for the year 2004-2005.
2) Humphrey Faculty Fellowship in Law and Economic Policy, A Fellowship
Granted by The University of Michigan Law School for the year 2004-2005.
3) Doctoral Candidate Scholarship, A Scholarship awarded by the University
of Haifa for the Doctoral studies period September 2000 – August 2002.
4) Scholarship for participating in a condensed course about "Writing an
Economic Model" in Hamburg University, Germany in April 2002. The
scholarship of €1082 was given by the hosting university.
9. Teaching - Courses Taught in the Last Three Years
1) The Criminal Justice System (Seminar), 2005, University of Haifa – School of
Law
2) Punishment, 2005, University of Haifa – School of Law
3) Criminal Procedure, 2002, 2003, 2005, Tel Aviv University – School of Law
4) Criminal Procedure, 2002, 2003, 2005, University of Haifa – School of Law
5) Law and Economics, 2004, Connecticut Law School
6) Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law, 2003, University of Haifa –
School of Law
7) Basics of Economics for Lawyers, 2003, 2005, University of Haifa – School
of Law
6
B. Publications
1. Publications in Refereed Journals and Books
1) "Partial Ban on Plea Bargain", 26 Cardozo Law Review (2005) (forthcoming)
2) “Plea Bargaining only for the Guilty”, (With Oren Bar-Gill) The Journal of
Law & Economics (Forthcoming)
3) “Plea Bargaining and the Innocent Problem”, Mishpatim, Vol. 35 (1) (2005),
1 – 80.
4) "Detention for Investigation", Yitzhak Zamir book on Law, Government
and Society, (Harry and Michael Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and
Comparative Law, the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Ariel
Bendor and Yoav Dotan Eds., 2005) 353-297.
5) “The Prosecution's Position in an Appeal against Rejection of a Plea Bargain,
Haifa Law Review, Vol. 1. (2004), 507-532.
6) "Restrictions of Basic Rights “By Law” or “As Prescribed By Law”", Law
and Government in Israel Vol.4 No. 2 (1998), pp. 381-423.
2. Publications of Working Paper in Conference Proceedings
1) "Economic Analysis of Unfair Terms in Standard Form Contracts", Erasmus
Programme in Law and Economics, Discussion papers on Law and
Economics, (Hamburg, Germany, 1999) pp. 100-140.
2) "Court's Rejection of Plea Agreement as a Tool to Protect the Innocent",
published in Center for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics, 5th
CASLE Workshop, (Ghent, February 2002) pp. 1-16.
3. Other Scientific Publications
1) The Criteria for Judicial Rejection of Plea Agreements, 37 Hasanegor (2000),
3-9
2) “Deferred Prosecution”, 63 Hasanegor (2002), 5-8
3) “Plea Bargains and a Plea for Shorter Proceedings” 95 Hasanegor (2005), 2831
4. Other Work and Activities connected with the Scholarly field
1) The Caseload on the Criminal Prosecution Service (January 2000, 126
pages) – a research examining the scope and effects of the caseload on the
criminal prosecution in Israel, and presenting few remedies to the problem.
The research was awarded the Minister of Public Security Prize for Research
and Development for the year 2002.
2) Punishment by Consent – An Essay on the Alternatives to Criminal Trials
(Hebrew, 378 pages). Written under the Supervision of Prof. Ariel Bendor and
Supreme Court Justice Dorit Beinisch. September 2, 2002
7
C. Description of Current Research Activity
1) The current proposal forms part of a larger research project on settlements and
other alternatives to criminal trials. The research on "The Caseload on the Criminal
Prosecution Service" which I authored in 2000, presented a set of alternatives that
can be easily incorporated to the Israeli law, without additional legislation. The
Attorney General supported the adoption of the proposals in the research and
formed a committee, headed by the deputy attorney general, to implement them. I
am serving as the academic advisor to this committee. The state comptroller, in his
51st annual report, also referred to the research and called for the adoption of some
of its proposals.1 Another committee, headed by the State Attorney, recommended
in its final report to the Minister of Justice to adopt the proposals in the research.2
For this research I was awarded the Minister of Public Security Prize for Research
and Development.
2) The Ph.D. Dissertation analyzed systematically all the alternatives to criminal trial
that are used in Israel, and presented a theoretical basis for a unification of such
alternatives into one more coherent structure of procedures.
3) Later in few papers I concentrated on different alternatives that are currently in use
in Israel, mainly, but not solely, plea bargaining.
4) In the last academic year my research concentrated on the American practice of
plea bargaining. The research was conducted in the University of Michigan with
the generous support of the Fulbright Postdoctoral Scholarship and the Humphrey
Fellowship in Law and Economics, in the Olin Center of Michigan Law School.
5) Currently I am also conducting a research, together with three other researchers
from the University of Haifa, for the Israeli Judicial Authority. The research,
financed by the Judicial Authority, is aimed at creating a general criterion for
evaluating caseload, in order to assist the head of the Judicial Authority in
allocating resources to different courts and judges in Israel.
1
See Israel State Comptroller Annual Report Number 51B (2001), Page 387
2
See Praklitut 2000 (State Attorney 2000), A report submitted to the minister of Justice (2000) Pages
63-67
8
TITLE: Settlements in Criminal Cases – A Comparative Study
Abstract:
Criminal justice systems around the world are struggling with the increase in depth and
scope of the criminal law. The growing caseload, the increase in the complexity of the
criminal trial and the expansion in criminalization, prompts legal systems to look for
alternative ways to dispose of criminal cases. In Israel and other common law countries the
most prominent alternative to a full trial is the plea bargain, though other forms of
settlements, like deferred prosecution, fixed penalty notice and consent decrees, are also in
use. In Germany, the major alternatives to full trials are penal order and conditional
dismissals; though in recent years a certain form of sentence bargaining also emerged in the
German judiciary. Many other forms of settlements can be found in other countries in
Europe, among them the transactions in Belgium and the Netherlands, the fiscal fine in
Scotland, the agreed penalty proceedings in Italy, and more.
The purpose of this research is to provide a unified analysis of these procedures. Such an
analysis is required for two main reasons. First, the different procedures do not only
substitute the regular criminal trial, each procedure also substitutes the others. Therefore, a
comparison of the different procedures is necessary to allow an informed choice to be made
between them. Secondly, despite their differences, most of these procedures have one
feature in common – a consensual disposition of the case. Meaning, a punishment imposed
with the explicit or implicit agreement of the prosecutor and the defendant, in the shadow of
a potential trial.
The first part of the research will concentrate on this unifying feature. In this part I set out to
evaluate different criticisms that have been raised against these processes and examine
whether the criticism are inherent to any consensual disposition of criminal cases.
The second part will scrutinize the differences between the alternative procedures. The
analysis will concentrate on each of the characteristics that distinguish between the different
procedures, including: the result of the settlement (whether criminal conviction or not), the
possible sanction (whether it can include imprisonment or only fines), whether there is a
judicial role in the bargaining or approving the settlement, whether the defendant is required
to admit his/her guilt to be eligible for a settlement and other differences.
Using the analysis of the first two parts, the third part aims to suggest how to model a
system of settlements that will be efficient, accurate as well as fair.
9
The findings of the research are likely to advise the Israeli Ministry of Justice Committee
which is currently considering adopting a new procedure for settling criminal cases.
Research Plan (incl. theoretical background)
TITLE: Settlements in Criminal Cases – A Comparative Study
Introduction
Criminal justice systems around the world are struggling with the increase in depth
and scope of the criminal law [Stuntz 2001, Ashworth 1999]. The growing caseload,
the increase in the complexity of the criminal trial and the expansion in
criminalization, prompts legal systems to look for alternative ways to punish
offenders [Fisher 2003, Albrecht, 2001]. True, these alternatives often serve
additional goals including reducing stigmatization for minor violations, enabling
flexibility and more. Yet, it is generally agreed that the main drive behind the
development of these alternative measures is the increasing pressure of the caseload.
In common law countries, including Israel, the most prominent measure used to
bypass the expensive trial is plea bargaining. In civil law countries, different measures
of prosecutorial sanctions are in use, the most common of which are conditional
dismissals and prosecutorial fine. In Germany, prosecutorial sanctions are especially
developed. In misdemeanors (Vergehen) prosecutors can apply for a penal order
(Strafbefehlsverfahren) which is, after the court's approval, sent to the defendant and
becomes a final sentence if the defendants do not contest it. It can also condition the
dismissal of misdemeanor charges on the defendant's acceptance of a specified
sanction (usually a fine). In petty infractions (Ordnungswidrigkeiten) administrative
agencies or the police are authorized to offer a penance money decree, and the
suspected violator can choose to contest the decree and demand a simplified version
of a criminal trial [Fionda 1995, Langbein 1974]. German courts also allow a form of
sentence bargaining (Absprachen) [Albrecht, 2001].
Other countries also adopted forms of prosecutorial sanctions, such as the transactions
in the Netherlands, France and Belgium and the compound fine in Denmark [Van Den
Wyngaert, 1993, Albrecht, 2001]. Lately, the distinction between the types of
alternatives to trials used in common law and civil law systems is becoming blurred.
Some common law countries are on the way to adopt prosecutorial sanctions while
some civil law countries have already adopted different types of sentence bargaining
that are similar to plea bargaining. Some, like Italy and lately also France, have
adopted types of sentence bargaining through legislation, while others, like Germany,
did so through judicial practices. [Langer, 2004]. Other alternatives including deferred
10
prosecution, official cautioning, fixed penalty notices and consent decrees also exist
in different legal systems.
Outline of the Planned Research
Most of the proceedings outlined above are analyzed thoroughly in the literature. Plea
bargaining, for example, is one of the most debated issues in criminal procedure in
many common law countries. [Gazal-Ayal, 2005] However, these alternatives to trial
are rarely analyzed together.
A combined analysis is required and seems timely for two primary reasons. First, the
different procedures do not only substitute the regular criminal trial; each procedure
also substitutes the others. For example, a transaction fine, if adopted in a system that
allows plea bargaining, is likely to be used in some cases that otherwise would have
been concluded through plea bargaining. Therefore, when evaluating a certain
procedure one should not only compare it to the regular trial but also to other potential
procedures that could have been adopted. Secondly, despite their differences, most of
these alternative procedures share one common feature – a consensual disposition of
the case. In all of them, the defendant agrees to a certain result and waives his/her
right to a full trial in return for lighter sanction, a simpler process or less publicity.
What is lacking is an integrated analysis of the differing and similar features of these
procedures to enable a coherent and effective discussion of how to optimize
settlements in criminal cases.
The research proposed here aims to fill that gap. At first, it will concentrate on the
unifying feature of these alternatives: the consent. While settlements in private law
cases are also subject to some criticism [Fiss, 1984], they are criticized much more
harshly in criminal cases. Some argue that the practice undermines constitutional
protections by allowing effective waiver of constitutional rights under duress.
[Langbein 1978, Kipnis 1976], others assert that the settlements are unfair because the
result of the process is influenced by tactical factors, such as the ways parties
negotiate or the procedural decisions they take, which are irrelevant for the proper
objectives of the criminal proceedings [Alschuler, 1975, Feeley 1979]. Further, these
irrelevant tactical factors lead to an unjust disparity between the sentences after a
settlement and the sentences after trial [Wright & Miller 2003]. In addition, it is
argued that the practice hardens defendants against the system, leaving them with “an
11
image of corruption in the system, or at least a system lacking meaningful
purpose.”[Enker 1967]. Moreover, the practice allegedly distorts the role and ethos of
the different players in the criminal process [Schulhofer 1992, Huber, 1996].
Specifically, the decision-making power in the criminal justice system shifts from
judges, who were nominated to use that discretion, to the prosecutor [Alschuler, 1976,
Huber, 1996]. These settlements also stir under the search for truth in the criminal
process [Alschuler 1981]. Additionally, settlements sometimes harm the interests of
the victims [Albrecht 2001, Harnon, 1997]. Maybe most important, such settlements
might induce innocent defendants to accept responsibility for an offence they never
committed [Gazal-Ayal 2005]. The research will review whether these deficits are
inherent in any type of consensual settlement, and, if not, how they can be addressed
practically within a settlement framework.
While in the first part of the research I plan to concentrate on the unifying feather of
the examined procedures, in the second part I will examine their differences. These
differences, to be scrutinized consecutively, are numerous. First, some settlements,
like conditional dismissals and penal orders in Germany, transactions in Belgium and
the Netherlands, and compound fines in Denmark, result in a non-incarceration
sanction. Others, like plea bargains in common law countries, and sentence bargains
in Germany (Absprachen), Italy (patteggiamento) and France (plaider coupable),
allow the parties to agree on imprisonment term. Second, some procedures, like plea
bargains, the German penal order and the English and Israeli fixed penalty notice,
usually result in a conviction of the defendants; others, like conditional dismissals in
Germany, the common law practice of deferred prosecution, fiscal fine in Scotland
and transactions in the Netherlands do not. Third, the settlements also differ with
regard to the role of judges in the process. Some settlements, like the Dutch
transaction and the Danish compound fines, take effect without any need for judicial
approval. Others, including penal orders and conditional dismissals, in Germany are
conditioned upon judicial approval. Still other settlements, like the German sentence
bargaining and the French penal order, are mediated or even initiated by a judge.
Judges’ participation in plea bargaining can take each of these forms, depending on
the jurisdiction and the type of plea bargain. Other differences that will be examined
and analyzed are the determination of the sanction's severity, whether set up in
regulation or determine by the parties in each case, whether the procedure require the
12
defendant to confess or not, whether the practice evolved through judicial practices or
was establish by legislation and more.
Using the analysis of the first two parts, the third part will evaluate the existing
procedures and seek to suggest how to model a system of settlements that will be
efficient and accurate as well as fair. The study will also examine whether unifying
the settlements system and creating up to two basic types of settlements for all
criminal cases, one type for cases that result in imprisonment and another for all other
cases, would improve the quality of the criminal justice system. This analysis will
then be used to suggest the adoption of a new procedure for settlement of criminal
cases in Israel. Currently, a committee headed by the Deputy Attorney General in
Israel, and of which I am academic advisor, is examining how to incorporate into the
Israeli law a process of prosecutorial sanction. As a by-product, the research will be
used to promote a more coherent, efficient and fair system of settlements in Israel,
through that committee
Expectation Concerning Future Cooperation
The proposal aims at establishing long term cooperation with German scholars of the
criminal justice system. Since Israel is considering the adoption of prosecutorial
sanction system, the three decades of German experience with a few types of pre-trial
settlements can assist the Israeli system. Similarly, the German system is relatively
new to the phenomenon of sentence bargaining and the debate about it can benefit
from the long Israeli experience in that field. The Max Planck Institute for Foreign
and International Criminal Law in Freiburg is an optimal venue to establish such
cooperation.
13
Bibliography
Albrecht , Hans Jörg, Simplification of Criminal Procedure: Settlements out of Court - A
Comparative Study of European Criminal Justice Systems. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
COMMISSION, RESEARCH PAPER 19. (Pretoria 2001)
Alschuler, Albert W. The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179
(1975)
Alschuler, Albert W. The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059, (1976)
Alschuler, Albert W., The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. (1981)
652.
Ashworth, Andrew, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford, 1999).
Enker, Arnold Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, reprinted in THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108,
(1967)
Feeley, Malcolm M. THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT (1979)
Fisher, George, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA (Stanford, 2003).
Fiss, Owen M., Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. (1984) 1073.
Gazal-Ayal, Oren, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, Cardozo Law Review (Forthcoming
2005)
Harnon, Eliahu, Plea Bargaining in Israel - The Proper Functions of the Prosecution and
the Court and the Role of the Victim, 31 ISR. L. REV. 245 (1997)
Huber, Barbara, Criminal Procedure in Germany, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(London, 1996) 96.
Julia, Fionda, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION – A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Oxford,
1995)
Kipnis, Kenneth, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea 86 ETHICS 93, 98 (1976)
Langbein, John H., Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U.C.L. REV.
(1974) 439
Langbein, John H., Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978)
Langer, Máximo, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (2004).
Schulhofer, Stephen J., Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992)
Stuntz, William J. The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICHIGAN LAW
REVIEW 505 (2001).
Van Den Wyngaert, Christian (editor), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (London, 1993)
Wright, Ronald & Miller, Marc, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1409 (2003)
14
BUDGET REQUEST:
Code
Item
Details
Amount (EURO)
03
Personnel
Research assistants both in
Israel and in Germany
29,000
21
Non-expendable Portable computer and other
Equipment
computing equipment
2,600
31
Expendable
Materials
400
41
Computer Time
51
Books, Reports,
Publications
Scientific literature,
photocopies, printing
1,000
61
Foreign Travel
1-2 trips to Germany
5,000
81
Others
Translations
2,000
TOTAL
40,000
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION:
03: The bulk of the funds requested will be allocated towards research of the
operation information gathered about the existing procedures in Germany and
other countries in Europe. Since the German system has the most developed
system of alternatives to trials, much of the research material is in German.
Assistance with research in other European languages would be found, either
through the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in
Freiburg or through direct contact with universities in these countries.
21: To allow travel with the data
31: For materials such as ink for printer, cd’s. etc.
51: For the collection of relevant literature
61: As many as two trips to Germany are likely to be necessary for creating
the collaboration and collecting the relevant data.
81: Translation to English will be required, for at least part of the material.
Applicant’s Signature:
15