DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA, 1914-1999
Indian Journal of Politics(XL No 2&) April -Sept 2006)
S.O. Aghalino
Abstract:
This article examines the intractable problem of constitutional engineering in
Nigeria. It is asserted that the drafting of constitutions is a recurring decimal in
Nigeria’s chequered political history. Right from the colonial period, Nigerians
were barely involved in the art of constitution making while the British colonial
overlords employed constitution making to consolidate their imperial strategies.
Post colonial Nigerian leaders have utilized constitution drafting to ensure regime
longevity. The current 1999 constitution is a product of haste because the receding
military junta was in a hurry to leave the political turf. Consequently, the 1999
constitution has all the trappings of military centralization of power resulting in
de-federalization of Nigeria and the consequent clamour and agitation for the
amendment of the constitution.
Introduction:
The drafting of constitutions has been a recurring decimal in the political
history of Nigeria. Right from the colonial period, Nigeria has witnessed incessant
clamour for one form of constitution or the other. The series of constitutions that
were put in place during the colonial period were geared towards consolidating
British imperial strategies.
____________________________
1 Senior Lecturer, department of History, University of Ilorin, Nigeria
Dynamics of Constitutional Development in Nigeria, 1914-1999
2
The point to note about colonial constitutions is that, the Nigerian people were
barely involved in the drafting process. When Nigeria was eventually de-colonised,
post-colonial constitutions reflected the idiosyncrasies and worldview prospective
leaders, with little consideration for the interests of the citizenry. This is
particularly so because post-colonial Nigerian politics has been dominated by one
ruling military junta or the other. Indeed, constitution drafting initiatives embarked
upon by successive military regimes were merely cosmetic and plastic. At best,
they were time saving devices to ensure the longevity of their regimes.
In this paper, an attempt has been made to review, albeit briefly,
constitutional development in Nigeria. While it could be taken for granted that
colonial and military constitutions have generated due attention, it appears that the
1999 Constitution which is presently in operation has not received due attention
from scholars. In this light, the bulk of our analysis will tilt towards the 1999
Constitution while assessing how earlier efforts have coloured it.
Attributes of a constitution:
The constitution of a State is that collection of rules and principles according
to which a state is governed. In other words, the Constitution refers to the
framework or the composition of a government, the structure with regards to its
organs, how power is allocated and the process by which power is exercised. 1 The
criterion which served as the basis for assigning political powers reflects the ethos
of a given society. Nevertheless, it is conventional for the present day constitutions
to reflect the composition of government and the relationships among these
institutions.
3
Second, a constitution should provide for the distribution of governmental power
over the nation’s territory. Third, and more importantly, a constitution should
provide a compendium of fundamental rights and duties of citizens including their
rights to participate in the institutions of government.2
Among the aforementioned attributes, the fundamental and inseparable
segment of the constitution is its origin from the organic will of the people who it
governs. This is referred to as in the autonomy of constitution, implying that the
people have been part of the deliberation, formulation and adoption of the
constitution, taking the heterogeneous nature of such a country as reflected in her
multi-ethnic, multi-linger and multi-religious nature.3 since the constitution must
be, logically, the original act of the people directed resulting from the exercise of
the inherent power, it becomes a binding instrument by which the sovereignty of
the people is measured. Thus, the phrase ‘we the people….hereby resolve to make
for ourselves the following constitution’, should not be dismissed as a mere
preliminary formalism because it suggests that the document is a replica of the
compendium of the people’s view and the objectives of their association. The
question that naturally arises is whether successive Nigerian constitutions contain
the above-identified salient pre-requisites for a good and durable constitution. A
close examination of the litany of constitutions in Nigeria should assist us to drive
home the point.
Constitutional development in Nigeria: A synopsis:
It is on record that until now, eight constitutions have been operated in
Nigeria. It began with the sir Frederick Lugard’s Amalgamation Report of the
1914.
4
Thereafter, there were the sir Clifford Constitution (1922); Sir Arthur Richards
Constitution (19465); Sir John Macpherson Constitution (1951), Oliver Littleton’s
Constitution (1954), the Independence Constitution (1960); the Republican
Constitution (1963) and the 1979 Constitution (1979).4 There was another draft
Constitution in 1989 prepared during the regime of former President Ibrahim
Babangida. This was never tried until general Sanni Abacha’s administration
brought about the 1994/95 constitutional Conference, which laid the foundations
for the 1999 Constitution.
The Clifford constitution, which was introduced by sir Hugh Clifford in
1922, replaced both the Legislative council of 1862 which was subsequently
enlarge in 1914, and the Nigerian council of 1914. Under the Constitution, a
Legislative Council was for the first time established for the whole of Nigeria,
which was styled as, ‘The Legislative Council of Nigeria.’5 In spite of the
embracive colouration of the Council, its jurisdiction was confined to the southern
Provinces, including the colony of Lagos, whose Legislative council was
subsequently abolished. The Legislative Council did not legislate for the Northern
Provinces but its sanction, signified by a Resolution was necessary for all its
expenditure out o 5the revenues of Nigeria in respect of those Provinces.6
The point to note is that the Nigerian Council was not created for any
altruistic motive, But rather to ‘enable the British officials obtain, in the central
exercise of their power, as much local advice and opinions as could be evoked.’
One feature of Clifford’s Constitution was that only Africans with minimum gross
income of $100 a year were eligible to vote and be voted for.7
5
This might have been a strategy to divide and rule – a fallout off the so-called
‘Indirect rule Principle’ that was in operation in colonial Nigeria. Though, this
charge cannot be easily denied, there is no written evidence that it was in
operation. The elective principle in the Constitution simulated political activities in
Lagos as in other parts of Nigeria and by extension created the leeway for the
formulation of political parties. Besides, the wide powers conferred on the
governor created a forum for unrestrained use of absolute power and this was
naturally unacceptable to Nigerian nationalists.
The disaffection caused by Clifford’s constitution invariably created the
need for another constitution. Thus, when Sir Richards became the governor of the
colony of Nigeria, he initiated moves to draft a new constitution. In March 1945,
through a Sessional Paper Number 4, the Chief Secretary to the government, sir
general whitely, initiated a motion in the Legislative Council which was passed
unanimously in the House. This motion for a new constitution gave birth to the
Richards Constitution. In this constitution there was one Legislature for the whole
of Nigeria. It also made provisions for three delineated provinces, viz – North,
West and East. There was an overwhelming African majority, but were not to be
elected in the provinces and the Central Legislative House.8 The constitution also
created three regional Assemblies. The monetary requirement noticeable in
Clifford’s Constitution was reduced in order not to disenfranchise eligible voters
and contestants for political offices. The salient feature of the Richards
Constitution is the emphasis on regionalism with its attendant negative
consequences.
6
In spite of the fact that some concessions were granted to Nigerian nationalists in
the Richards constitution, it was regarded as a divisible document. In fact, Nigerian
nationalists opposed Richards Constitution on two major pedestals. The first was
the manner and procedure by which the constitution was introduced. Second, and
most importantly, were its inherent weaknesses. Just like Clifford’s Constitution,
Nigerians were hardly given the opportunity to shape their future. The constitution
did not make provisions for the training of Nigerians in their gradual march
towards self-rule.9
Richard’s constitution could not run its full course of nine years due to the
vociferous opposition to its configurations. In order, therefore, to “rectify” the
perceived deficiencies of Richard’s Constitution, when Sir Macpherson became the
Governor of Nigeria in 1948, he decided to fashion out a new Constitution. After
much deliberations and debates of the draft constitution Macpherson Constitution
(1951) sought to impose a colonial hybrid arrangement, which had the
characteristics of both Federal and unitary legal frameworks.10 Nevertheless, it
represented a major advance from the pre-existing constitutional provisions
because it introduced majorities in the Central Legislature and the Regional Houses
of Assembly. Among other provisions of the constitution were a Central
Legislative Council, Central executive Council, Regional Executive Councils,
Regional Legislature and the establishment of the Public Service Commission. One
shortcoming of the Constitution which was conspicuously highlighted was the
establishment of a Regional Legislature. This invariably led to the emergence of
ethnic-based parties such as the National Council of Nigerians and the Cameroons,
(NCNC) Action Group,(AG) and the Northern Peoples congress, (NPC). The
acrimonious way these parties contested the elections has been duly documented.
7
Despite the fact the Macpherson Constitution represented a major constitutional
advance, yet it was unsatisfactory to Nigerian nationalists who vigorously
campaigned for its sack. Consequently, the Macpherson Constitution was set aside
and replaced by the Littleton Constitution, which laid the foundations for a
classical Federation for Nigeria. The component units of Nigeria were “separate
yet united” in their sub-economies, civil service, legislature and public services.11
The constitutional evolution of Nigeria which started in concrete terms with
the Clifford’s constitution of 1922, climaxed with the enactment of the1960
Independence constitution. The Constitution, as expected, was fashioned after the
British West Minster model. Amongst its provisions was the presence of the office
of governor-General who was the non-political Head of State, while the Prime
Minister was the Head of government. Even when Nigeria became a republic in
1963, the Republican constitution did not change this position but merely removed
the constitutional umbilical cord binding Nigeria to Britain.12
Within six years of independence, the constitution had failed, basically due
to the cracks that had started appearing within its first two years. One of the factors
that led to the collapse of the first republic was the nature of political authority
within the State. The President, who was constitutionally, the chief executive
usually, exercised his powers on the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet
Members. The West Minster model could not fit into African society where “the
leader wants to assert his authorities without restraint.”13 Expectedly, there were
‘clashes between the President and the Prime Minister, the climax of which was
the federal elections crisis of 1964.14
8
The consequent collapse of the First Republic in January 1966 and the assumption
of position of governance by the Military dealt a fundamental blow on
constitutional development in Nigeria.
It would appear that the discovery of the apparent con traditions in the
parliamentary system of government made the drafters of the 1979 Constitution to
jettison the dual system of leadership for the executive presidential system. The
Constitution Drafting committee admirably rationalized the choice of the
presidential system when it claimed that the choice was based on the need for:Effective leadership that expresses on aspiration for
national unity without at the same time building a
leviathan whose powers may be difficult to curb.15
The process and ways of curbing the powers of the President were enshrined
in the Constitution and were also rooted in the principle of separation of powers.
One fundamental innovation in the 1979 Constitution was the primacy given to
federal character principle aimed at national integration and equitable
representation of all the ethnic groups.16 The inadequacy of the federal character
principle has received due attention from scholars. A related stabilizing device in
the 19790Constitution was the prescription that political parties should not be
ethnically based. Ethnic politics was an observable feature of the First Republic. It
is difficult to accept the 1979 Constitution as a document which emanated from the
people. This is particularly so because the Constitution was not adopted by the
people through a referendum, although there was a Constituent Assembly
established through a military decree in 1977 with 230 members.
9
It is relevant to add that of this number, 20 were appointed by the government.
Other members were elected not direly by the people rather they were elected by
the local councils acting as electoral colleges.17 Clearly, a Constituent Assembly
Elected this way cannot claim to have the mandate of the people to adopt a
Constitution on their behalf.
An attempt was also made by the General Ibrahim Babangida administration
to draft a constitution for the country. Indeed, a constitution was drafted for
Nigeria. The 19089 Constitution was promulgated through Decree Number 12 of
1989.18 As things were, a Constitution review process was embedded on the
transition programme of the administration. A close scrutiny, of the modalities for
drafting the 1989 Constitution would suggest that there was adequate consultation
and had some semblance of popular participation. In reality however, the outcome
of the process turned out to be highly influenced and manipulated. At the end, one
critic stressed, “the outcome was more of political engineering than of popular
consultation and participation.”19 What is important, however, is the fact that the
provisions of the 1989 Constitution did not depart markedly from the 1979
Constitution.20
The 1999 Constitution: An Appraisal:
The Constitutional conference, which produced the 1999 Constitution, was
inaugurated in 1994 in the wake of the turmoil that greeted the annulment of the
June 12, 1993 Presidential election. Some members of the conference were
“elected” ⅓of he members of the conference. Those appointed were pliant
individuals who openly canvassed the position of the regime ofn the floor of the
Conference.
10
As was expected, the Abacha regime used its effective grip on the technical and
executive committees of the Constitutional Conference to manipulate the decisions
arrived at on the floor of the Conference. Nevertheless, the Body identified and
somehow discussed Nigeria’s problems for well over a year before it wound up.
No doubt, the Conference had an image problem, as participants were highly
discredited. Suffices to say however that, in spite of the tensed-up political
atmosphere they worked, the body brought some ideas that could lead to solving
nation’s myriad problems.
Immediately after the conference submitted its reports, the Abacha regime
appointed another Constitution review Committee (CRC) consisting of about 40
persons to “rework” the report and evidently make if in tune with the
self-succession agenda of his regime. When the CRC finished its task in 1997, its
report was further subjected to scrutiny by a group of close advisers to Generals
Abacha. The point to note is that the recourse to the drafting of constitution by the
Abacha regime, apart from securing his self-succession agenda, was merely
diversionary in order, for the regime, to consolidate its hold on the nation.
Expectedly, the regime reasoned just like Babangida initiative that, once the people
were pre-occupied with the “why and how” of constitution making, their attention
would be diverted from the monstrous policies of the regime. But the Nigerian
people did not fall for this, as they were hell-bent on subverting the Abacha
regime. In any case, General Abacha did not live long enough to actualize his
self-succession agenda s he died mysteriously in June 1998.
11
With his death, General Abdulsalam Abubakar’s regime re-invigorated the hope of
Nigerians when it became clear at the beginning that the new regime was willing to
be difficult from the high handed regime of General Abacha. This ray of optimism
was again buoyed up with the dismantling of some of the transition structures of
Abacha’s administration. The people’s positive euphoria was dimmed when
Generals Abubakar announced that his administration was willing to review
Abacha’s 1995 draft constitution with a view to its possible adoption.21
To most Nigerians, this was rather an unpopular measure. Critics insisted
that everything associated with generals Abacha should be discountenanced
including the constitution. The Abubakar administration was not receptive to this
radical posture. Instead, it raised a committee to organize a debate on the draft. The
committee was named the Constitution Debate Co-coordinating Committee.
Shades of opinion were harvested by the committee, which later submitted its
report to the government in the end of December 1998.
An overriding opinion of the “debaters” was put together. The over-riding
feeling was a preference for the 1979 Constitution. Some amendments and reviews
were recommended. The 1999 Draft Constitution was signed into Law on May 5,
1999 after an agonizing wait. It is obvious that the 1999 constitution being
practiced today was hurriedly put together. Besides, it was exclusive and devoid of
consultation and popular participation. However, it may be said that Abdulsalam’s
regime would no really harvest different shades of opinion before the 1999
Constitution was drafted is understandable.
12
The regime was in a hurry to conduct elections and relinquish power to a
democratically elected civilian administration because popular opinion was against
continuous stay of the military in politics.
Since the 1999 constitution came into force on May 29, 1999, it has been
variously dismissed as a “false” document and a mere Tokunbo (fairly used). The
preamble, which states among other things “we the people of the federal Republic
of Nigeria do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following constitution”,
amounts to a false claim.22 It would appear that this criticism is predicated on the
fact that the people of Nigeria were barely consulted before the 1999 Constitution
was enacted. Nonetheless, some salient provisions in the constitution deserve a
close study. A cursory look at the second Schedule of the Constitution which deals
with the legislative powers of the National Assembly under the executive lists
reveals that all the important sectors of the society are listed here. The import of
this is that, the ability of the State assemblies to legislate on these matters is
restricted. And to this extent, the pseudo-sovereignty of the States in the Federation
is greatly checkmated in such a way that the federal arrangement appear in reality
to be a unitary one.23 The erosion of the powers of the States is more pronounced
when Part II of the Second Schedule of the Constitution, which deals with the
concurrent powers of the federal government and the federating states, is
examined.24 section 4 (5) in clear language, gives the National Assembly express
power where there is a conflict between the laws enacted by the States Assembly
and the National assembly. This gives the impression that the States are mere
appendages of the federal government when in reality they are part of a whole.25
13
With regard to public revenue allocation, as spelt out under Section 162 of
the Constitution, the revenue allocation formula titled heavily in favour of the
federal Government. Of particular interest is in the realm of derivation. The
Constitution is succinct when it states that “The principle of derivation shall not be
less than 13 per cent of the revenue accruing to the federal Account directly from
natural sources.”26 The handling down of the percentage to be paid on derivation
negates the principle of true federalism.27 It is not surprising therefore that oil
mineral producing states have opposed the 13 percent derivation and instead are
clamouring for total control of their resources while agreeing to pay taxes to the
Federal Government.28
A corollary to this is that Item 34 on the executive Legislative List
empowers the central government to legislate on national minimum wage There is
no doubt that this is in prejudice to the disparity in conditions of service, revenue,
derivation and resources of each State. Recent events in the country clearly
demonstrate the absurdity of this Section of the constitution. Currently, there are
spates of strikes and lock-outs in virtually all the States in the country in view of
the demand for a new minimum wage which the federal government pegged at
seven thousand and five hundred Naira (about $54) for Federal workers and five
thousand and five hundred Naira for State workers (about $39). Naturally, States
should determine how much they could pay to their workers based on their
available resources. The Federal Government has no business fixing of minimum
wages for States. This perhaps haves demonstrated in bold relief, some of the
contradictions in the 1999 Constitution.
14
One area in the Constitution, which has attracted so much controversy is
Section k275, which provides that “There shall be, for any State that requires it, a
Sharia Court of Appeal.” Section 277 provides that the ‘Sharia court of appeals of
a state shall in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by
the law of the state, exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil
proceedings involving the questions of Islamic Personal Law, which the court is
competent to decide’… The Constitution no doubt recognizes the Sharia to the
extent that Section 6(3), (5) recognizes a Sharia court of appeal as a court of
superior record in Nigeria, but the constitution did not elevate Islam to a State
religion. Indeed, Section 10 of the constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria
1999 prohibits State religion.29 Thus, the foregoing provisions makes the official
launching of the adoption of the Sharia in Zamfara and Kano States to be in direct
conflict with the spirit and letter of the constitution of the Federal republic of
Nigeria, 1999.
It would appear that the authorities off the concerned States might have
relied on Section 4 (7) of the 1999 Constitution, which states: ‘The House of
Assembly of a State shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good
government of the State or any part thereof…’ Whatever be the provision of
Section 4(7), it is clear that sub-section 4(7) (e) stipulates that the State Houses of
assembly may make laws but must not contravene the provisions of the 1999
constitution.
It is noteworthy that Sharia had been operational in some parts of Northern
Nigeria even during the colonial period.30
15
It was then known as Alkali courts, now area courts. Under this system the Islamic
law was employed only in civil and personal matters. With the adoption off the
Sharia, all Muslims in the said states have to abide by the Sharia provisions in both
civil and personal matters as well as criminal matters. The adoption of the Sharia
has all the trappings of infringing on individual rights as provided for under
Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution.
Under Section 130 of the 1999 Constitution, the President is described as the
“Head of State, the chief executive of the federation and commander-in-Chief of
the Armed forces.” In addition to the monstrous and alarming executive powers
bestowed on the President; the President is empowered with legislative’ judicial
powers to alter, amend, repeal, or modify any “existing” law so as to bring the law
into conformity with the provisions of the constitution. Granted that a level-headed
President would not deliberately abuse these enormous powers but there is no
guarantee that a power-drunk President who is conscious of his powers would not
abuse them and virtually declare a reign of terror on the citizenry by displaying
dictatorial tendencies. Falana has shown that “it can be argued that what the 1999
Constitution had done is to confer all the dictatorial powers that hitherto were
exercised by the former military Heads of state on the elected President of the
Federal republic of Nigeria.”31 In a way this could be excused based on the
background of the initiators of the constitution.
The point was made earlier that the 1999 Constitution is a product of a
highly exclusive, hurried and closed process. The present clamour for its disuse
and/or review is therefore not unexpected.
16
The Constitution is widely rejected because it was imposed and it is entirely
undemocratic as such it cannot serve as the foundation for a new Nigeria. There kis
a concern and demand for a more open, legitimate and popular process of
re3viewing the Constitution. This is particularly so when it is realized that the
people’s aspirations have not been met by the 1999 Constitution. Popular
participation in constitution making is essential because it confers legitimacy on it
and by extension, makes it popular, acceptable and sovereign.
The 1999 Constitution is merely an embellishment of a unitary constitution.
It is clear that all the trappings of federalism have been eroded particularly in the
realm of the control of resources and separation of powers within the various tiers
of government. The Obasanjo regime seems to have acknowledged the deficiencies
in the 1999 Constitution. The Obasanjo regime has responded positively to
demands of Nigerians for the need to review the Constitution, hence, he set up the
Yusuf Mamman – led Constitution Review Committee. The National Assembly
appears to be working towards this direction with the setting up of its own
Committee to review the constitution. Just like earlier attempts at constitution
making, the present review process has been elitist rather than popular and much
more exclusive rather than inclusive. The Yusuf Mamman Committee appears to
be too elitist and technical to the extent that the committees sits in Abuja, the
federal Capital and calls on Nigerian people to “submit memoranda in ten (10)
copies typed in double spacing and submitted personally or by speed post or
e-mail.”32 The point must be made that in this kind of elitist and exclusive
arrangement, the voice of the “ordinary” Nigerian would not be heard. At the end
of the exercise, the committee would submit a report that reflects the class and
aspirations of the elites rather than a popular and a people-driven report.
17
Consequently, such thorny issues like Niger Delta question, the issue of Sharia,
resource controls and the nationality debate would be treated as non-issues and the
vicious cycle of constitution making would continue.
Summary and Conclusion:
The point has been made that right from the colonial period, Nigeria has had
a plethora of constitutions. Starting from the 1914 initiative of Lord Lugard to the
Independence constitution, the people of Nigeria were hardly involved in the
drafting of their constitutions. We opined that the colonial state used constitution
drafting to consolidate imperial strategies. The post-colonial period does not look
promising. Post-colonial Nigeria until recently was dominated by the military who
in a bid to earn legitimacy had drafted one form of constitution or the other. The
current 1999 constitution is characterized by a number of deficiencies that have
inevitably led to a clamour for its disuse. For one, it has all the trappings of a
unitary constitution. The concept of federalism as embedded in the constitution is
only a paid lip service. Nevertheless, the document may not be perfect, but it
signals a starting point. In due course, it would be amended to reflect the views of
Nigerians. In this process, it would fulfill one of the attributes of a constitution,
which is that it should reflect the ethos of the people.
18
References:
1.
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1985, (Also see, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. “Consultation on
Participation in constitution Making recommendation to CHOGM”, Holiday
Inn, Burgerspark, Pretoria, 16-17 August, 1999.
2.
B.O. Nwabueze, Ideas and Facts in Constitution Making. Spectrum Books,
Ibadan, 1993, p.1.
3.
Enugu, Friends of the Environment and Minorities, 1999.
4.
The Guardian, Lagos, Nigeria, May 9, 1999.
5.
B.O. Nwabueze, The Presidential constitution of Nigeria, C. Hurst & Co.,
London, 1982.
6.
G.O. Olusanya, “Constitutional development in Nigeria, 1861-1960”, in O.
Ikime (ed.), Groundwork of Nigerian History, Heinemann, Ibadan, 1980, p.
518.
7.
N. Nwosu et.al., Introduction to Constitutional development in Nigeria,
Sunad, Ibadan, k1998.
8.
G.O. Olusanya, Op. Cit., p. 520.
9.
K. Eso, “Opening address”, in Frederick Ebert, Constitution and Federalism,
Frederick Ebert, Lagos, 1976.
19
10.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo asserted that the Constitution failed to satisfy the
three criteria by which federalism and Unitarianism should be judged and
concluded that the Constitution was therefore “a wretched compromise
between federalism and Unitarianism.” For details, see Awolowo, Awo: An
Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Oxford University Press, k1960,
p. 179.
11.
The Guardian, Lagos, June 16, 1997.
12.
M.O. Adeniran, “Separation of Powers in the 1999 Constitution: a Myth or
Reality?”, paper presented at the 2000 Biennial Law Week of the Ilorin
chapter of The Nigerian Bar association held on 18-20, April 2000.
13.
Constitution Drafting Committee report, Vol. I, Federal Ministry of
Information, Lagos, 1976.
14.
A.A. Madiebo, The Nigerian revolution and the Biafran War, Enugu, Fourth
Dimension, 19870, pp. 1-14.
15.
CDC. Vol. II XXXI, k1978.
16.
See Section 14 (3) of the 1979 Constitution.
17.
R.T. Suberu, “Background Principles of Nigeria’s Presidential System”, in
V.I. Ayeni and K. Soremeku (eds.),Nigeria’s Second Republic, Daily times,
Lagos, 1988.
18.
N. Nwosu, Op. Cit.
19.
The Post Express, Lagos, September 6, 2000.
20
20.
M. Abubakar, “The History of constitution Making in Nigeria (1922-1999)”,
in CDHR, Path to People’s constitution, CDHR, Lagos, 2000.
21.
The guardian, Lagos, May, 1999.
22.
Community Rights Initiative, “We Cannot Go on Like this,” a position paper
presented at the conference of the Peoples of the Niger delta and the 1999
constitution, port-Harcourt 2-04 November, 1999, p.1.
23.
This kind of subtle device was also noticeable in the Macpherson
constitution, which was desperately resisted by Nigerian nationalist.
24.
See Part II, Schedule II of the 1999 Constitution.
25.
Nigerian Institute of Human rights, “Federalism: The 1999 constitution and
the People of the Niger Delta”, position paper presented at the conference of
the people of the Niger Delta”, position paper presented at the conference of
the people of the Niger delta and the 1999 constitution held in Port Harcourt,
2-4 November 1999, p. 3.
26.
See Section 162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution.
27.
B. Onimode, ”Fiscals Federation and revenue Matters in Nigerian
Constitution”, Conference Paper. The centre for Democracy and
Development (CDD), Nicon Hilton, Abuja, 1999.
28.
The Guardian, Lagos, 16 July 2000; and The Comet, Lagos, 6 March 2000.
29.
See Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution.
21
30.
E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria, Geoffrey Chapman,
London, 1976.
31.
F. Falana, “The Nigerian Federation, the 1999 Constitution and Sovereign
National Conference”, in CDHR, Path to People’s Constitution, CDHR
2000, p.133.
32.
J.O. Ihonybere, “Towards Participatory Mechanisms and Principles of
constitution Making in Africa”, in CDHR, Path in People’s Constitution
CDHR, Lagos, 2000.s