OISD-RP-233
FOR RESTRICTED CIRCULATION
(Draft –III)
FIRE & EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
FOR
E&P OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
Prepared By
FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT
OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS
7TH FLOOR, NEW DELHI HOUSE,
27, BARAKHAMBA ROAD,
CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI – 110001
1
NOTE
OISD publications are prepared for use in the oil and gas industry under Ministry of
Petroleum & Natural Gas, Govt. of India. These are the property of Ministry of Petroleum &
Natural Gas and shall not be reproduced or copied and loaned or exhibited to others without
written consent from OISD.
Though every effort has been made to assure the accuracy and reliability of the data
contained in these documents, OISD hereby expressly disclaims any liability or responsibility
for loss or damage resulting from their use.
These documents are intended to supplement rather than replace the prevailing statutory
requirements.
2
FOREWARD
The oil industry in India is nearly 100 years old. As such a variety of practices have been
in vogue because of collaboration/association with different foreign companies and governments.
Standardization in design philosophies and operating and maintenance practices at a national
level was hardly in existence. This, coupled with feedback from some serious accidents that
occurred in the recent past in India and abroad, emphasized the need for the industry to review
the existing state of art in designing, operating, and maintaining oil and gas installations.
With this in view, Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) was established in 1986 staffed
from within the industry in formulating and implementing a series of self regulatory measures
aimed at removing obsolescence, standardizing and upgrading the existing standards to ensure
safer operations. Accordingly, OISD constituted a number of functional committees comprising of
experts nominated by the industry to draw up standards and guidelines on various subjects.
The present document on “Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment and Fire Protection Systems for
E&P Offshore Installations” is the first edition of the document prepared by the Functional
Committee on “Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment and Fire Protection Systems for E&P Offshore
Installations". This document is prepared based on the accumulated knowledge and experience of
industry members and the various national and international codes and practices. It is expected
that the provision of this document will go a long way to improve the safety and reduce fire
incidents in Offshore Oil and Gas Industry.
This document will be reviewed periodically for improvements based on the new
experiences and better understanding. Suggestions may be addressed to:-
The Coordinator
Committee on 'Fire Protection System’
Oil Industry Safety Directorate
7th Floor, New Delhi House,
27, Barakhamba Road,
Connaught Place, New Delhi – 110001
3
FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE
(First Edition : JANUARY 2011)
_______________________________________________________________________
Name
Organization
_______________________________________________________________________
Convenor
Shri P. S. Narayanan
Oil India Limited, Duliajan
Members
Shri R.S.Bhutda
Engineers India Limited, New Delhi
Shri Sanjeev Kapoor
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Mumbai
Shri Maroof A. Sheikh
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, New Delhi
Shri H.C.Taneja
Oil Industry Safety Directorate, New Delhi
Co-coordinator
Shri Arshad Hussain
Oil Industry Safety Directorate, New Delhi
_______________________________________________________________________
In addition to the above, several other experts from industry contributed in the preparation, review
and finalization of this document.
4
FIRE & EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AND FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
FOR
E&P OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
Contents
Section
Description
1.0
Introduction
2.0
Scope
3.0
Codes, Standards & Approvals
4.0
Definitions
5.0
Fire and explosion management
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
Fire and explosion management philosophy
Fire and explosion risk categories
Fire and explosion strategies
Fire prevention approach
6.0
Fire and explosion hazard identification
7.0
Fire and explosion risk management process
8.0
Functional requirements for fire and explosion risk management
9.0
Production Installation design (with respect to fire protection)
9.1 Safety system
9.2 Equipment arrangement
9.3 Ignition prevention devices
9.4 Hot surface protection
9.5 Fire barriers
9.6 Electrical protection
9.7 Combustible gas detection
9.8 Bulk storage
9.9 Helicopter fueling facilities
9.10 Emergency power
9.11 Control of ignition
9.12 Control of spill
9.13 Ship Collision Protection
9.14 Unmanned Platform
10.0
Floating production facilities design (with respect to fire and explosion protection)
11.0
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) design (with respect to fire and explosion
protection)
12.0
Fire and gas detection and control methods
12.1
Detection system
12.2
Alarm system
12.3
Control actions
5
13.0
Emergency shut-down and blow-down system
13.1
Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) system
13.2
Blow down system
14.0
Active fire protection
14.1
Fire water system
14.2
Foam system
14.3
Dry chemical fixed systems
14.4
Dual agent suppression system
14.5
Clean agent system
14.6
Co2 based system
14.7
Kitchen cooking appliances and hood protection
14.8
Helideck fire protection
14.9
Portable fire extinguisher
15.0
Passive Fire protection
16.0
Inspection, maintenance and testing
17.0
Fire prevention
18.0
Emergency preparedness
18.1
Emergency action plan
18.2
Emergency communication
18.3
Emergency evacuation
18.4
Emergency lighting
19.0
Training
20.0
Product Service Support
21.0
References
Annexure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Summary of methods of controlling fire
Typical Safety Critical Elements
Topsides issues during conceptual design stage
Recommended number and distribution of portable extinguishers on MODU
Typical applications of fire/gas detectors
Selection of AFP systems on typical areas
Typical placement of fire extinguishers at production installation
Typical fire integrity requirements for fire barriers
Typical fire integrity requirements for load-bearing structures
Typical protection criteria for critical equipment
Typical description
6
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment and Fire Protection Systems for
E&P Offshore Installations
1.0
Introduction
Offshore oil gas installations are self contained units and have compact layout.
As per requirements of Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules, 2008
(Rules 23, 24 and 27) the operator shall establish a safety management system and shall ensure
that risk assessment is carried out, which will provide the necessary basis for taking decisions to
give due consideration to health, safety and environment. The process of evaluation and risk
management is key element of safety management system.
The recommended practices are based on an approach where the selection of control & mitigation
measures for fires and explosions is determined by an evaluation of hazards on the offshore
installation. The methodologies used in this assessment and the resultant recommendations will
differ depending on the complexity of the facility, type of facility (i.e. open or enclosed), manning
levels, and the environmental conditions associated with the area of operation.
Focus should be on following priority:



Safety of personnel
Protection of the environment
Protection of assets / minimization of financial consequences of fires and explosions.
It is impractical to control catastrophic fires. These types of events should be designed out or very
high integrity preventative measures should be provided to minimize the likelihood. Usual
requirement of an effective fire protection system is to prevent emergencies from developing into
major threat to these installations.
The requirement of fire fighting facilities, described in the following sections is based on the
consideration that the fire fighting services from other sources will not be immediately available.
2.0
Scope
These recommended practices cover the design criteria and minimum requirements of fire
protection and mitigation systems to be provided at E&P offshore installations.
The recommended practices can be applied to new or existing installations:
3.0

For new installations it shall start during conceptualisation and feasibility studies and be
fully developed during detailed design. The results shall then be communicated to
personnel operating the installation to ensure that they know the purpose and capability of
all the systems; can operate them properly and that adequate maintenance schemes are
in place.

For an existing installation the process shall be applied to current arrangements, and
during modifications. These should be assessed to determine if the high level
performance standards are achieved and that risks are as low as is reasonably
practicable.
Codes, Standards & Approvals
The latest edition of following codes & standards as applicable shall be followed:





NFPA standards
SOLAS, FSA CODE and IMO Resolutions
NORSOK Standard
Oil &Gas, UK (Fire and Explosion guidelines).
IMO Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
7





ISO 13702, Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production platforms
- requirements and guidelines (ISO, 1998)
UL / FM/ US MIL
RP 14C - Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems on
Offshore Production Platforms
RP 14G - Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type Offshore Production Platforms
RP 14J - Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities
The above standards outline the basic requirements of the fire protection equipment and systems.
All equipment / components / engineered systems supplied shall be as far as possible UL/FM
approved. The equipment / components / systems shall be suitable for marine application and
should be approved by maritime administration (or third party authorized by the maritime
administration) of country of origin.
Third party approval agencies shall be internationally recognized in the field of Marine fire
protection approvals / by the maritime administration.
To ensure system integrity, system shall be tested and listed / approved by the approval agencies
as a complete operating engineered system. Substitution of alternative components, where
approved components are available, shall not be permitted.
Where components are supplied not covered by third party approvals, the components shall be
built to the recognized international standards.
Pressurised containers wherever installed must have approval from PESO (Petroleum &
Explosives Safety Organization)
The equipment and system shall be of sustainable and proven technology.
All systems shall be in place and functional for the life cycle of the installation.
The equipment / systems shall be installed and commissioned by qualified person, trained and
certified by the manufacturer.
Technical, operational and service manuals shall be provided both in hard and soft copies by the
manufacturer for all equipment / components / systems supplied.
4.0
Definitions
Active fire protection: Any fire protection system or component which requires the manual or
automatic detection of fire and initiation of consequential response.
ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable
Assembly point:
evacuation alarm.
Area where mustering shall take place in the event of general and/or
Clean agent: Electrically non-conductive, volatile or gaseous fire extinguishing agent that does
not leave a residue upon evaporation and meets the requirements given in the latest NFPA 2001
on clean agent fire extinguishing systems.
Evacuation, escape and rescue (EER): Results of the process that uses information from the
evaluation of events, which may require EER, to determine the measures required and the role of
these measures.
Fire and explosion risk assessment: Analytical study of likelihood, and severity of fire and
explosion hazard scenarios.
Fire and explosion strategy (FES): Results of the process that uses information from the fire and
explosion risk assessment, to determine the measures required to manage these hazardous
events and role of these measures
8
Means of escape: Fixed stairways, ladders, passages of non-combustible construction or
portable flexible ladders, knotted manropes, or other devices of approved construction.
Offshore installation: A mobile or fixed installation including any pipeline attached thereto, which
is or is to be, or has been used, while standing or stationed in relevant waters with a view to
explore or exploit petroleum and natural gas.
Passive fire protection : Any fire protection system or component which by it’s inherent nature,
plays an inactive role in the protection of personnel and property from damage by fire and
functions independently without requirement of any human, mechanical or other intervention to
initiate consequential response.
Safety critical elements (SCE): Such parts of an installation, purpose of which is to prevent, or
limit the effect of fire and explosion incident, and the failure of which would cause or contribute
substantially to major fire and explosion incident.
Temporary refuge (TR): Place provided where personnel can take refuge, for a predetermined
period, at the same time as investigations, emergency response, and evacuation preplanning are
undertaken.
Shall: Indicates provisions that are mandatory in nature.
Should: Indicates that requirement is recommendatory as per good engineering practices.
5.0
Fire and explosion risk management
The fire and explosion risk management shall start very early in the design stage and shall be
used as basis for hazards management during all life cycle stages of an installation.
5.1
Fire and explosion risk management philosophy
The overriding requirements for the fire and explosion risk management philosophy are:
 Minimize injuries and fatalities from the initial event.
 All large off-site inventories should be isolated during all design fire and explosion events.
 Provide escape to temporary refuge (TR); one escape route to the TR should remain
functional at all times.
 Protect personnel in the TR; TR and its supports should be compatible and maintain their
integrity during all design fire and explosion events. TR should provide refuge on the
installation for as long as required for evacuation of the installation
 .Provide other means of escape / evacuation; means of evacuation should be available at
all times. Ability of personnel to escape from, and to shelter safely, from the effects of a
fire and explosion event, and the ability to evacuate to a safe location should not be
compromised.
The philosophy shall ensure that:
 The hazard scenarios are addressed.
 Likely fire and explosion scenarios have been considered and corresponding accidental
loads have been determined.
 Plant and equipment minimises escalation (personnel within the TR do not continue to be
threatened by the incident, until such time as the hazard has dissipated to a safe level via
shutdown, blow down or other means).
 Personnel are able to escape to a safe location, away from the hazard.
5.2
Fire and explosion risk categories
Complexity in the fire and explosion risk management process shall be based on the risk level.
Prescriptive design against the fire and explosion hazards can be an acceptable alternative, for
low risk installations. This method is based on standardized guidance or requirements based on
industry practices. For medium risk and high risk installations, the performance based approach
presents a more specific prediction of potential fire and explosion hazards for a given system or
process. This approach provides solutions, based on performance, measured against the chosen
performance standards; rather than on prescriptive requirements. Solutions are supported by a fire
and explosion hazard identification and risk assessment.
9
Determining installation risk category:

Low risk (consequences) installation examples are; where the overpressure level is
predicted to be relatively low, radiation levels are predicted to be relatively low and
immediate and delayed consequences are also low. The equipment count would probably
be low.

A medium risk (consequences) installation would be typically a platform or compartment,
where the congestion and confinement exceeds that defined for the low consequence
case. Alternatively, a medium consequence installation may be a processing platform,
necessitating permanent manning but with low escalation potential to quarters, utilities and
control areas which are located on a separate structure.

A high risk (consequences) installation would encompass remaining installations and
compartments where there is significant processing on board leading to significant
congestion and potential confinement with populated areas. This may typically be
characterized by a bridge connected process, utilities, living quarter and well platform
(with or without rig) or installation with quarters on the same structure as the process.
Where there is doubt regarding the category, into which an installation should fall, it is
recommended that the category with next higher consequence / likelihood shall be used.
5.3
Fire and explosion strategies
Fire and explosion strategies are developed to manage each fire and explosion hazards:
 To identify plant / equipment, personnel and procedures, required to manage these
hazards; and
 For setting performance standards by identification of safety critical elements and their
functional requirements.
In developing the fire and explosion strategies (FES), there are a wide range of issues which
should be considered to ensure that the measures selected are capable of performing their
function when required to do so. For the FES, these issues include:
 Initiating events which may lead to fire and explosion
 The nature of the fires and explosions which may occur
 The risks of fires and explosions
 The marine environment
 The nature of the fluids to be handled
 The anticipated ambient conditions
 The temperature and pressure of fluids to be handled
 The quantities of flammable materials to be processed and stored
 The amount, complexity and layout of equipment on the installation
 The location of the installation with respect to external assistance/support
 The evacuation, escape and rescue strategy (EERS)
 The production and manning philosophy
 Human factors.
Fire and explosion strategies (FES) shall be updated, whenever there is a change to the
installation, which may affect the management of the fire and explosion hazardous events. The
level of detail in the strategy will vary, depending on the scale of the installation and the stage in
the installation life cycle when the risk management process is undertaken.
The fire and explosion strategies should describe the role and functional requirements for each of
the systems required to manage possible hazardous events on the installation. In developing
functional requirements, the following should be considered:
 The functional requirements of the particular system. This should be a statement of the
purpose and essential duties that the system is expected to perform.
 The integrity, reliability and availability of the system.
 The survivability of the system under the emergency conditions which may be present
when it is required to operate.
 The dependency on other systems which may not be available in an emergency.
The identification of safety critical elements (SCEs) and corresponding performance standards,
10
should demonstrate that FES fulfils the requirements of Rule 77 (main safety functions) of
Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules, 2008. The performance
standard should define the item’s functionality, reliability or availability, survivability and measures
of interaction with other safety systems.
Inherently safe design approach, reduces complexity and requirement for human intervention;
resulting in a simpler and robust system.
5.4
Fire prevention approach
When fire hazard cannot be eliminated by inherently safer design, the steps of the fire and
explosion strategy, in order of priority are:
 Prevent or minimise fires at source
 Detect fires early
 Control fires
 Mitigate against effect of fires
The following steps are typically involved
1. Prevent or minimize fires at source
Methods for prevention or minimization of fires at source considered at design stage are:






Minimise inventories
Optimise layout
Minimise the potential for loss of containment events
Minimise the time to ESD and blow down
Minimise ignition sources
Providing an inert environment
On existing installations, it may be possible to identify ways of reducing the risks through
changes in operational practices.
2. Detect fires early
Fires that have not been prevented should be detected and then controlled to reduce the
size, duration, and escalation potential of the fire. Methods of detection include gas
detection and fire detection.
3. Control fires
The control methods commonly used for offshore are tabulated in Annexure -1.
4. Mitigate against effect of fires
Mitigating measures for fires are passive fire protection methods and active fire protection
methods.
6.0
Fire and explosion hazard identification
The starting point for risk assessment is the systematic identification of the hazards and effects
which may arise from offshore activities. In the context of fires and explosions, the evaluation of
these events may be part of an overall installation evaluation or may be treated as a separate
process which provides information for the overall evaluation. Fire and explosion risk assessment
includes - assess the fire risk, assess the explosion risk and manage accordingly.
The fire and explosion hazards may be identified by formal processes such as:




Hazard identification studies (HAZIDs)
Hazard and operability reviews (HAZOPs)
Layout review / hazardous area review
Safety studies like FRA, EERA etc
11
Fire and explosion hazard sources can be:



Reservoir hazard: direct release from the reservoir may occur due to well intervention
during drilling or work-over operations.
Process hazard: release from any section of process operations including production
manifolds (well manifolds); water, oil and gas separators; stabilising and dewatering; oil
pressurising for export; gas compression including condensing and knockout; gas drying;
high pressure gas export including gas lift and gas injection; oil and gas metering etc.
Import and export risers.
Fire and explosion risks include both the risks from the initiating event and subsequent escalation.
Initiating events (causes of a release) may be plant and equipment failures such as exceeding
design conditions / parameters, dropped objects, vessel collision, intervention, fatigue, vibration,
extreme environmental conditions, and human or procedural error.
The personnel from relevant disciplines, including operational personnel, should be involved in this
fire and explosion hazard identification process, to acquire an extensive understanding of potential
hazards. Personnel carrying out this process shall be suitably trained or experienced in the hazard
identification methods to be used.
The results of the hazard identification process should be used both to evaluate the consequences
of hazardous events and to determine appropriate risk reduction measures. Everyone involved in
the design, commissioning, operation, maintenance and modification of the installation should
have sufficient knowledge of the fire and explosion hazards and their contribution to the overall
risks. Safety systems shall be selected based on the hierarchy of prevention, detection, control
and mitigation. Where any conflict exists between explosion and fire management it is the latter
which will tend to take priority, however the optimum solution should generally be a balance
between the two.
Investigate the hazard with a view of: prevention, detection, control and mitigation; to reduce the
frequency and severity of the hazard. Risk reduction measures should include which prevent
incidents (i.e. reduction of the probability of occurrence), control incidents (i.e. limiting the extent
and duration of a hazardous event) and mitigate the effects (i.e. reduction of the consequences).
Preventative measures, such as using inherently safer designs and ensuring asset integrity should
be emphasized, wherever practicable. Mitigation effectiveness will depend on detection, inventory
isolation and deluge activation; together with the probabilities that these measures will be initiated.
The process of selecting risk reduction measures, should predominantly lead to the use of sound
engineering judgments. Principles of inherent safety should be applied early in the
conceptualization and design stage, to eliminate or reduce hazards to the ALARP level.
7.0
Fire and explosion risk management process
Fire and explosion risk management is a continuous process, rather than a series of discrete
steps, with review and revision of earlier decisions, as necessary. There may be overlaps and
iterations between the various stages of the design, commissioning and operational phases.
Basic steps in fire and explosion risk management process are:
1.
During concept selection process, fire and explosion hazards should be identified and this
information should be utilised for optimising layout and hydrocarbon processing methods.
2.
Based on the selected concept, identify which codes and standards will be used (in case
of new installation) to design the structure, plant and equipment; and operational regime.
3.
Re-confirm that all fire and explosion hazards have been identified.
Typical fire and explosion events



Pool fire (combustion of a flammable liquid pool)
Jet fire (combustion of high pressure gas or liquid)
Spray fire (combustion of a pressurized liquid release)
12


Blowout (wellhead spray or jet fire)
Flash fire (combustion of a flammable gas where the flame propagates at a speed
insufficient to result in damaging overpressures)
Explosion (combustion of flammable gas/ vapour in which confinement and/or
flame velocities are sufficient to result in damaging overpressure)
BLEVE (rapid ignited release of flammable pressurized contents of a heated
vessel resulting in blast overpressure, missile fragments and fireball)
Cellulosic fire (fire involving material, such as wood, paper, etc.)
Electrical equipment fire.
Pyrogenic materials
Condensate fire with invisible flame
Vent fire due to lightening
Metal fires or radioactive materials

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

Factors affecting fire behavior

Emergency shutdown (ESD): Assuming the ESD operates, the volume of the
isolatable volumes will affect the duration of the larger leak scenarios and result in
a transient fire size, reducing with time.
Blow-down: Similar to ESD operation, this could result in a transient release rate.
Additionally, blow-down may reduce the consequences of the fire scenario by
depressurizing a vessel or pipework onto which a fire is impacting, thereby
preventing escalation.
Confinement: Fires in confined areas with limited ventilation may change over
time, for example, become progressively more severe as ‘external flaming’ occurs,
when the fire moves through the ventilation openings.
Wind: The direction of wind will have significant affects on the behavior of fire and
smoke generation which will affect escape, evacuation and rescue.
Passive fire protection (PFP): The use of passive fire protection may not affect the
nature of the fire but will affect the response of objects subjected to fire attack and
delay or prevent incident escalation.
Deluge: Depending on the fire type, active water deluge systems (area specific /
equipment dedicated) may affect both the nature of fire and the thermal loading to
engulfed objects and in most cases will be beneficial to escaping personnel.





Transition between fire scenarios
Some fire scenarios may change with time, for example, a fire occurring in a confined
space may lead to increasing fire severity with time and the movement of the flame
through the vent may produce external flaming. Similarly, some fire scenarios may lead to
incident escalation and result in a different fire event occurring as a direct consequence,
for example, a jet fire impacting onto a pressurized vessel may lead to vessel failure and a
BLEVE fireball event. A liquid spillage may start as a pool fire on the installation but
drainage of the spill may ultimately lead to a pool fire on the sea. Therefore, it is important
that a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) considers the potential sequence of fire
events and that a fully representative set of events is analyzed. The QRA should be
supported by a thorough HAZID with input from people with experience of the existing or
similar plant or processes.
4.
Determine the explosion loads (including escalation analysis due to fire and explosion) to
be used in design; overpressure, duration and dynamic pressures, on the structure and
other safety critical elements.
For typical list of safety critical elements refer Annexure-2.
The likelihood of a significant fire will depend upon the likelihood of occurrence, of a large
release and ignition. The following parameters will influence the potential likelihood of a
fire:


Hazardous inventory complexity, i.e. the number of flanges, valves, compressors
and other potential leak sources.
The type of flanges, valves or pipework. Some special types of flange tend to
have lower leak frequencies associated with them, e.g. hub type flanges.
13



The number of ignition sources within the flammable region of a potential spray
release, gas or vapour cloud.
The ventilation regime.
The equipment reliability and the maintenance philosophy.
The escalation analysis is an important aspect, of fire and explosion hazard identification
and risk assessment. Escalation analysis should consider:






The location and description of the initial event; especially its size, severity,
duration and frequency.
The means by which the initial event may escalate, and at each escalation stage,
the corresponding probability and time to escalation.
The effects of the events on the installation, including the safety systems at each
stage of escalation and how these affect subsequent event progression.
The contribution of safety systems in reducing the consequences and the
probability of their successful operation.
The effects on the key facilities or systems such as the temporary refuge (TR) and
evacuation escape and rescue (EER) facilities in terms of impairment, time to
impairment and impairment frequency.
The fatality levels associated with each scenario.
For detailed guidance on explosion loads and fire loadings refer API RP 2FB,
‘Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast
Loading’ and ‘Fire and Explosion Guidance: Oil and Gas, UK (2007)’.
5.
Identify plant and equipment, which can fail due to fire and explosion. Similarly identify
personnel and escape routes, which are vulnerable to fire and explosion hazards. During
this process, special attention should be provided to escalation scenarios.
Design the hardware to meet the requirements, and plan for future verification, by
establishing performance standards.
Define the role and functionality, reliability, availability and survivability for engineered
(hardware) systems.
Define the role, manning and competence requirements for procedural systems.
6.
Verification shall be done, to ensure that design codes are suitable for severity of
hazardous events. In the case of shortcomings, either design codes can be changed; or
operating parameters, procedural system can be changed. If required, additional specific
preventive measures should be provided.
The structure and other SCEs shall be designed for the identified fire and explosion
scenario design load cases. Determine the response of the structure and other SCEs to
fire and explosion loads including overpressure, dynamic pressures, strong shock and
missiles. Where practicable designs cannot be achieved, alternative means of fire and
explosion mitigation must be sought; in order to reduce the magnitude or risk of exceeding
design load scenarios (the structure and other SCEs shall be able to accommodate these
design loads).
There is always the potential for the systems, to be damaged in a hazardous event.
Inherent safety avoids this potential, by aiming for prevention rather than protection and
the preference for passive protection over active systems. It is particularly important to
follow inherently safe design principles, where the consequences of process release or
system failure, are high. Where it is possible to reduce the reliance on engineered (active
or passive) safety systems or operational procedures, this should be done.
For new installations, review layout and process design, to eliminate or reduce the
hazards, to meet the performance standards. In case of existing installations, it may be
possible to identify ways of reducing the risks though changes in operational practices.
7.
Develop procedural safety systems at existing installations: assessment of existing
procedures should be done to ensure that operation and maintenance of systems meet
their functional requirements. These include establishing effective operational,
14
maintenance and test procedures; setting maintenance and test frequencies; and
identification of training and competence requirements.
8.
Evaluation - analyse results of response analysis, against the appropriate performance
standards to demonstrate that ALARP has been achieved.
The results of the evaluation process and the decisions taken with respect to the need for,
and role of, any risk reduction measures should be recorded so that they are available for
those who operate the installation and for those involved in any subsequent change to the
installation.
9.
Verify that systems are effective and reliable, throughout lifecycle of the installation. This
requires continuous maintenance and operation of the facility, so that the engineered and
procedural systems continue to meet, their original intent as developed during the design
and initial assessment process. This also includes carrying out periodic function testing,
and ensuring that performance standards are met. Ensure that personnel are trained and
competent to operate, maintain and test engineering systems: and implement procedural
systems.
Inherent safety practices must be maintained throughout the life of the installation,
continuing through the operational phase, by adherence to effective inspection and
maintenance regimes and by ensuring that management systems and related procedures
are followed.
Verifications should check that:
 The initial design of the safety critical system /element is appropriate for the hazard.
 The SCEs procured, installed and commissioned, still achieve their required function.
 The maintenance being carried out is compatible with the reliability and availability,
specified in the performance standard (functional requirements).
 The maintenance considers the likely failure modes (especially un-revealed failures)
of the components. For detailed guidance on failure modes ISO 14224 should be
referred.
During the life of the installation, changes may take place, for example changes in the produced
fluids from the reservoir. Alternatively a safety system may deteriorate, so that it is unlikely to
continue to achieve its intended functional performance, reliability and availability. All changes
should be assessed to determine the effects on the performance standards and, where necessary,
improvements should be considered to the systems’ provision.
The fire and explosion risk management process should be documented and communicated to
operational personnel so that they have adequate information about the hazards, hazardous
events and safety systems provided to manage them. The identified fire and explosion hazards
should be compiled in hazard register, listing all hazards, their causes, and how each hazard is
handled.
8.0
Functional requirements for fire and explosion risk management
The following goals should be considered for setting functional requirements for fire and explosion
management:

All fire and explosion hazards have been identified, analysed and understood by everyone,
with a part to play in their management.

A practical strategy to manage each of the hazards has been identified, documented and
implemented. Strategy takes into account sensitivity of the installation’s overall risk profile to
fire and explosion hazards and the mitigation and control measures accordingly.

The operating limits for the whole facility have been identified and there are clear instructions
for the continued operation of the facility or use of additional controls whenever operating
limits are exceeded.

All causes of hazards have been identified, understood and sufficient effective prevention
measures have been implemented. The characteristics of those hazards which may require
evacuation have been carefully analyzed to reduce the severity and potential for escalation,
15
thereby minimizing the need for evacuation.

All reasonably practical steps to reduce the risks from fires and explosions have been taken,
concentrating first on prevention and thereafter on control, the prevention of escalation and
evacuation. Appropriate combinations of prevention, detection, control and mitigation
measures have been put in place, to implement the chosen strategies; and are maintained
throughout the lifecycle of the installation. All of these measures: including people, processes
and engineering systems have been documented, have clear ownership and have functional
requirements.

Where the effects of failure could overwhelm the installation and require evacuation; these
measures have been specifically identified and are of high integrity.

The systems provided to detect fires, are suitable for the hazard types and the environmental
conditions.

Fire detection systems provide sufficient information to warn personnel and allow an
assessment of the hazards to be undertaken, without personnel being exposed to hazards.

Effective isolation of all major external sources of hydrocarbons, including pipelines and the
reservoir is ensured. These isolations have been designed to survive all reasonably
foreseeable fire and explosion hazards on the facility.

Location of personnel at installation is such that their exposure to fire and explosion hazards is
minimized.

Areas required to shelter personnel from fire effects and their supports shall remain viable until
either the incidents have been brought under control or full controlled evacuation has taken
place.

A minimum provision of routes, systems and arrangements to allow evacuation; shall remain
viable, under the effects of every incident, which may require them.

The design, operation and maintenance of the fire and explosion risk management systems
are undertaken by competent personnel, who understand their responsibilities in the
management of the hazards and possible hazardous events.

Any changes to the installation, which may affect the likelihood or consequences of fires and
explosions, are identified, assessed and the systems revised, to take the changes into
account, as necessary.
For guidance on functional requirements of installation layout; emergency shutdown system
and blow down; control of ignition; control of spills; emergency power system; fire and gas
systems; active fire protection; passive fire protection; explosion protection and mitigation
system; evacuation escape and rescue; and inspection, testing and maintenance: ISO 13702,
“Petroleum and natural gas industries — Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on
offshore production installations — Requirements and guidelines” and NORSOK standard S001 (edition 4, February 2008) “Technical Safety” should be referred.
9.0
Production installation design
(with respect to fire and explosion protection)
Design and layout of installation shall ensure adequate firefighting access, means of escape in
case of fire, and also segregation of facilities to extent possible so as to minimize fire risk to the
adjacent facilities.
This section describes critical specific issues / items which should be considered during design of
production installations for effective management of fire and explosion risk.
9.1
Safety systems
Safety systems play an important role in preventing fires and minimizing their effect. The primary
purpose of a safety system is to detect abnormal conditions and initiate appropriate action to
prevent situations that could result in an accidental fire. The primary action normally initiated by
16
the safety system is to shut off process flow, thus eliminating the major fuel source on a platform.
The safety system may also shut down potential ignition sources such as engines, compressors,
and heaters.
The amount of venting available and the degree of congestion in the process area significantly
influence the severity of an explosion.
In this respect, the following points should be considered:
 Long and narrow modules containing pressurized hydrocarbon systems should be
avoided, as large distance between possible ignition points and the vent can contribute to
high over pressures;
 Explosion pressure is dependent on blockage, so blockage should be reduced;
 Repeated obstacles should be avoided. If this cannot be achieved, vent
openings
along the wall with the repeated obstacles should be provided.
The design, operation, and maintenance of these safety systems are addressed in API RP 14C
and ISO 10418.
9.2
Equipment arrangement
In developing the layout of the installation, consideration shall be given to maximizing so far as is
reasonable the separation by distance of the temporary refuge (TR), accommodation and
evacuation, escape and rescue (EER) facilities from areas containing equipment handling
hydrocarbons. Guidelines for the arrangement of production equipment are presented in API RP
14J. Particular consideration should be given to the location of fired process vessels and the
placement of temporary equipment during work over, completion, and construction activities.
Topsides issues (mainly locations) during conceptual design stage for fire consideration in items
like wells, risers/pipelines, process & piping, structures and supports, fire protection etc. are given
in Annexure-3.
9.3
Ignition prevention devices
Natural draft components should be equipped with spark and flame arrestors to prevent spark
emission. Recommended safety systems for fired components are presented in API RP 14C.
9.4
Hot surface protection
Surfaces with a temperature in excess of 400°F (204°C) should be protected from liquid
hydrocarbon spillage and mist, and surfaces in excess of 900°F (482°C) should be protected from
combustible/flammable gases and vapors. API RP 14C (for equipment and machinery component)
and API RP 14E (for piping) should be consulted for guidance.
9.5
Fire barriers
Barriers constructed from fire resistant materials are primarily meant to provide a heat shield and
may be helpful in special situations to prevent the spreading of forces. Locations of fire barriers
should be reviewed carefully due to the possibility that the fire barriers may impede natural
ventilation to such an extent that hydrocarbon vapors and gases may accumulate. For details on
ventilation refer API RP 500/ ISO 15138. Fire barriers are covered in detail in section 9.0 on
passive fire protection.
9.6
Electrical protection
Protection from ignition by electrical sources should be provided by designing and installing
electrical equipment in accordance with API RP 14F/ API RP 14FZ considering the area
classification as per API RP 500/ API RP 505.
9.7
Combustible gas detection
The concentration of a combustible gas can be determined by detection devices that may initiate
alarms or shutdowns. The usual practice is to activate an alarm at a low gas concentration and to
initiate action to shut off the gas source and/or ignition source if the concentration reaches a
17
preset limit below the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL). Gas detection system is covered in detail in
section 11.0 on fire and gas detection and control methods.
9.8
Bulk storage
The inventories of flammable/combustible fluids should be consistent with operational needs and
should be minimized to the extent practical. Recommended practices for permanent bulk storage
(crude oil, condensate, methanol, jet fuel, diesel, etc.) include the following:



9.9
Tanks should be installed, as far as practical, away from the ignition sources and should
also be protected from damage (lifting operations, etc.).
Tanks should be enclosed by curbs, drip pans, or deck drains, to prevent liquid
accumulation. The drain system should be designed with provisions to prevent vapor
return.
Tanks should be adequately vented or equipped with a pressure or pressure/vacuum relief
valve and should be electrically grounded.
Helicopter fueling facilities
Recommended practices for helicopter fueling facilities include the following:





9.10
Fire extinguishing equipment should be adequate and readily accessible to the helicopter
fueling area.
Helicopter landing areas with fueling facilities located above living quarters should be
constructed so as not to retain flammable liquids and to preclude these liquids from
spreading to, or falling on, other parts of the platform.
The helicopter fuel hose should be of a type recommended for aircraft fuel service and
should be equipped with a static grounding device and a “deadman” type nozzle. The
helicopter should be bonded with self-releasing or spring-clamp bond cables (same
potential as hose).
Suitable storage should be provided for the fueling hose. The fuel transfer pump should be
equipped so that it can be shut down from the fueling station.
Provision should be made, by providing releasing mechanism, for dumping ATF storage
tank into sea, in the event of fire on ATF tank.
Emergency power
Emergency electrical power may be provided by one of the following systems: An emergency
generator; Installation mains power generation provided it can reliably provide power under
emergency conditions; Cables with suitable integrity from land or other installations; Battery
systems; or some combinations of these.
The design of the emergency electrical power system should consider providing automatic-start
arrangements to avoid the need for manual intervention during emergency condition.
The essential safety systems, which may require emergency power, include:
 emergency and escape lighting;
 vent and obstruction warning lighting;
 identification lights and navaids;
 telecommunication equipment;
 fire and gas detection and protection systems;
 ESD systems;
 public address equipment and intercom systems;
 installation of visual and audible alarms;
 ventilation/cooling for the equipment contained in this list;
 embarkation areas, sick bays and other areas necessarily manned in an emergency;
The duration of the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to systems such as the emergency lighting,
F&G system, emergency communications, ESD systems etc. should be designed to cater for the
emergency conditions, which may be experienced. Where UPS systems are selected they should
18
provide power for a period considerably longer than the TR endurance time to cater for those
events where immediate evacuation is unnecessary or not practical.
In a major gas emergency, mains power generation may stop, resulting in the loss of the
instrument air compressor(s). If the integrity of the air supplies cannot be guaranteed, the need to
power an air compressor from the emergency generator should be considered. Similar
requirements are to be considered for hydraulic systems also.
9.11
Control of ignition
Ignition occurs when sufficient heat is present to cause combustion. Ignition sources that may be
present in offshore installations are:
 Chemical reaction
 Electric sparks and arcs
 Mechanical sparks
 Lightning
 Static electrical sparks
 Flame and radiation heat
 Hot surfaces
 Heat of compression
To minimize ignition sources following points should be considered:
a. All electrical equipment shall be suitable for use in the area in which it is installed. This is
to cater for ‘fugitive’ leaks in accordance with hazardous area design codes. However, the
dispersion distances for such leaks, from which the hazardous zones are calculated, do
not cater for major accident releases.
b. A gas cloud from a medium or large leak can, and will, drift outside hazardous area limits.
Therefore caution must be exercised in locating unclassified equipment such as generator
sets, temporary pump skids, heating equipment etc in ‘safe’ open locations around the
installation.
c. Installation should be suitably earthed and all operators trained in awareness of offshore
static spark risks (a recurring cause of fires).
d. Equipment, which provides an ignition source and is unacceptably close to release
sources, should either be located inside an enclosure with ventilation ducts that close off
automatically on detection of gas, or be provided with some alternative form of protection.
e. Electrical equipment outside the TR and control station, which is required to operate
during a gas emergency, should be suitable for operation in a flammable gas atmosphere.
f. Diesel engines in non-hazardous areas powering essential safety systems should be
provided with protection such that the diesel engine can continue to operate if gas can
realistically reach the area in an emergency. This may include isolation of non-suitable
electrical components, over-speed protection and, possibly, cooling of hot surfaces.
g. The integrity of physical barriers between hazardous and non-hazardous areas is
important to prevent gas migration to non-hazardous areas.
9.12
Control of spill
Control of spills is fulfilled through the open drain system. The purpose of the open drain system is
to provide measures for containment and proper disposal of liquids including handling of FW, e.g.
through fire seals.
The design of the open drain shall limit the spread of a spill and route the spill away to avoid
escalation.
Hazardous and non-hazardous open drains shall be physically separated to prevent back flow of
hydrocarbons from a hazardous to a non-hazardous area. The hazardous drain collection tank
shall be purged.
The capacity of the drainage system should be sufficient to handle credible spill coincident with
deluge and/or firefighting activities. The design of drainage systems should make allowance for
possible blockage which may restrict the capacity of the system. When a drainage system is
provided, it should be designed to prevent burning fuel spreading fire to other areas.
19
Separate larger drainage systems may be necessary to control major releases and any associated
firewater. In areas where there is no likelihood of oil spill, it may be acceptable to provide firewater
drains which discharge fire-water directly to the sea.
Consideration should be given to the need to prevent fires spreading to sea level where they may
affect the integrity of the installation-supporting structure and impede evacuation.
Kerbs or drip-pans should be provided around vessels, pumps and other potential sources of
leakage to limit the spread of small spills.
Storage arrangements for movable containers of flammable liquids or gases should take account
of the possibility of leaks or spills and measures for handling these should be in place.
9.13
Ship collision protection
The ship collision avoidance system and protection (such as barge bumper, riser guard) shall be
provided to reduce the risk for ship collision.
The radar system shall be able to register the vessel’s course & speed including plotting facilities
and have function to transmit the signal unit responsible for surveillance.
The radar system shall be equipped with proximity alarm to warn the observer of an approaching
vessel with time to closest point of approach.
9.14
Unmanned platform
Protection against fire and explosion on unmanned platforms should be based on FES considering
both scenarios – when it is unmanned and when it is temporarily manned.
10.0
Floating production facilities design
(with respect to fire and explosion protection)
The floating production facilities can be:

Floating production system (FPS)

Floating production storage and offloading system (FPSO)

Spar (also called Deep draft floating structures)

Tension leg platform (TLP)

Semi-submersible
Special features having impact on fire and explosion risks, on the floating facilities, include:

The geometry of the layout

Methods of construction

Compartmentalisation

Operations

Fire and explosion scenarios

Response characteristics of marine construction to fires and explosions

Special features associated with the motion, station keeping, marine systems and stability
of the structure.
Fire and explosion risk management on floating production facilities should include:
 Fire and explosion risks which may impact integrity of floating structure (structural integrity
of hull, stability of structure, station keeping, marine systems etc.).
 Fire and explosion risks which may impact topside evacuation, rescue, living quarters, and
temporary refuge.
Fire and explosion risk management process shall be similar to section 6.0, with the following
specific considerations, in addition to the applicable issues / items brought out in section 8.0:
a.
b.
Nature of crude; less volatile will stabilize easily in comparison to more volatile (higher
risk).
Tie-in of satellite wells will increase the risk due to increased production throughput.
20
c.
Buoyancy, stability and station-keeping must be maintained at all times, and the systems
associated with these functions must be protected from fire hazards. High consequence
events with possibility of losing the facility are:

Stability of the facility may be compromised during fire and/ or explosion events
(escalation events should also be considered)

Loss of buoyancy due to significant leakage from riser and subsea equipment
underneath floating facility

Flooding of a riser resulting in reduced buoyancy of hull.
d.
Potential for large fire and explosion events:

Storage tanks of crude oil on the facility may present hazards in the form of either
large scale storage of stabilized crude or with empty storage tanks containing
potentially explosive mixtures (possibility of accumulation of gas cloud from vent
pipes).

Non-process hydrocarbon inventories; the floating facility requires substantial
stores of diesel to maintain station, process and utilities power demands plus
other life-support systems. The vessels are often located in difficult or remote
places and will generally be designed to be “self-sufficient” for extended periods in
the event that supply vessels cannot reach them.

Fire and explosion in engine room.
e.
Potential of hydrocarbon releases:

FPSO swivel connections are source of releases; the turret contains a large
number of swivel joints in order to function. These are often at the highest process
pressure and pass the reservoir fluids prior to any cleaning or conditioning and are
therefore subject to most onerous process duty.

FPSO storage tanks

Piping due to hogging and sagging of deck structure
f.
Potential for spread of fire to multiple decks or compartments:

Layouts having proximity of process area with living quarters

Presence of grated decks
g.
Considerable movement of floating structure has potential of contributing to spreading of
pool fires.
h.
The top decks should be designed to follow a hazard gradient from the most hazardous
area (with respect to fires and explosions) to the least hazardous. This will generally be
from the turret outwards. In case of turret-moored FPSO with weathervaning capability,
due to the weathervaning effects (either due to wind or current and their effects on the
superstructure height and hull draft) the fires can escalate downwind and at the very least,
toxic products of combustion will be distributed downwind. The layout should consider
these additional hazards and the design should take these into consideration to maintain
levels of safety.
i.
Equipment spacing and layout variations:

Spread out spacing between equipment and utilities on tanker type FPSO

Closer equipment spacing on semi-submersible, TLP and Spar
Segregation to avoid escalation of a fire can be achieved by separation of modules and
sometimes separated by fire barriers (if required, based on risk assessment).
j.
Potential of confinement of gas, with increased potential for explosion event, in the areas
such as:

FPSO turret, process area, storage tanks and pump room

Spar moon pool machinery or storage spaces inside hull
k.
The layout of surface and sub-sea facilities should be carefully considered early in the
design to account for the following shipping related hazards:

Passing ships and fishing boats

Supply and maintenance vessels with respect to anchoring or dropped objects

Anchor mooring patterns of drilling rigs during positioning and rig moving (in case
drilling or well servicing is envisaged)
21

Safe access (approach the production facility, moor, load their cargo, unmoor and
proceed to open waters) by off take tankers, avoiding interference with other
moorings, flow lines and risers as well as other field operations.
The key considerations are identified maneuvering areas and weather limits, derived by
means of a risk assessment study, for the operations of tankers.
l.
Offloading to shuttle tankers is a regular event and poses a significant risk both on the
floating production facility and the shuttle tanker. The risks comprise the breakage or
leakage of the transfer hoses and the potentially flammable mixing of hydrocarbon and air
in the storage holds of floating production facility and shuttle tanker. During the offloading
operation, the shuttle tanker and floating production facility are in relative proximity and
the risks of fire and explosion on either vessel are compounded by increased potential for
escalation to another vessel. Floating production facility shall be equipped with emergency
shutdown and release equipment that will allow the vessels to part in the event of an
emergency on one vessel.
m.
The process decks on floating production facility are often lifted clear of the cargo storage
tank roof for several design and operational reasons. The space provided also allows jet
fires from the underside of the process to reach other process or utility modules without
any impingement to reduce the effect of the flame. Though the gaps provide other risk
reducing and operational benefits but steps should be taken to reduce the likelihood of jet
fires by careful layout and orientation of the higher pressure equipment.
n.
Volatile organic compounds (VOC) return lines and their use during offloading is also an
important hazard. During loading, it is required to continuously vent hydrocarbon vapors;
venting system should be designed to accommodate the maximum volume of VOCs
vented from storage. The adopted loading procedures should minimise VOC emissions.
Also, consideration should be given for the high temperatures the vents may experience
during venting at maximum production rates and / or possible process upsets.
o.
In storage tanks, the atmosphere should be maintained in a non-explosive condition.
Purging should be carried out before introducing air into the tank to ensure that
atmosphere will never enter the flammability zone.
p.
Escape routes and piping runs may be very long and personnel may be required to pass
the origin of the incident to reach the temporary refuge. Design for escape (over long
distances) during incidents and incident escalation shall take these into consideration.
q.
Fire water mains may be extensive and distant from the fire pumps in the process area.
Correct fire-pump sizing and firewater-main hydraulic analyses shall be required to ensure
adequate pressure at deluge points, hoses and monitors.
Measures which may be taken during design phase to reduce risks from fire and explosion events
associated with specific features of floating structures are controlled through various rules and
regulations of certifying agencies as well as SOLAS.
Specific Design issues for floating production facilities are:

The design of hull against explosion overpressure shall ensure that the hull sustains only
local damage, which is not detrimental to the integrity of complete facility at least for the
period of evacuation.

The hull compartment design shall consider potential for containing damage within the
same compartment and eliminate the chain of events leading to spreading the damage to
the adjacent compartments or to deck, so that significant loss of buoyancy and instability
of the complete facility and failure of the mooring system is not compromised. The
compartments with potential for initiating or escalating fire or explosion events shall be
designed accordingly.

The design of piping in hull compartments shall be suitable to eliminate potential for
spreading damage to multiple compartments; design considerations may include provision
22
of ‘pipe chamber’ or ‘pipe chute’ to limit damage and eventual flooding of multiple
damaged compartments.
11.0

The upper hull design shall account for impact of fire events from topsides or moon pool
with potential of deteriorating structural capacity of the hull and thereby reducing stability.
Special attention shall be given to concentrated load areas such as topsides connection,
or mooring chain-jack foundation.

Open drain systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for
all sea states in which the hydrocarbon inventory is present in the process system.
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) design
(with respect to fire and explosion protection)
MODU includes both jack up drilling rigs and floating drilling rigs.






Additional fire and explosion risk assessment on MODU should include hazards from the wells
including well testing operations. Following fire and explosion hazards related to wells should be
considered:
Subsea shallow gas blow out
Shallow gas blow out in cellar deck
Blow out from well at drill floor
Subsea well blowout
HC gas release / ignition in mud processing area
Fire and explosion in well testing areas
Well programmes shall be designed considering the anticipated hazards out of the above
mentioned hazards.
MODUs have to meet the requirements of Conventions and Codes of International Maritime
Organisation (IMO), which includes MODU code, FSS code. Fire and explosion risk management
at MODU can be ensured by meeting the requirements of these codes.













Following issues have been taken into consideration by MODU code:
Structural fire protection layout plan for decks and bulkheads
Protection of accommodation spaces, service spaces and control stations
Means of escape
Fire pumps, fire mains, hydrants and hoses
Fire extinguishing systems in machinery spaces and in spaces containing fired processes
Portable fire extinguishers in accommodation, service and working spaces
Arrangements in machinery and working spaces
Fire detection and alarm system
Gas detection and alarm system
Fireman’s outfit
Provisions for helicopter facilities
Fire control plan
Ensuring fit for purpose status of fire extinguishing appliances (operational readiness and
maintenance is detailed in MODU Code 2009)
Number and type of portable extinguishers provided on the MODU should be based on the fire
hazards for the spaces protected. Requirement of portable extinguishers on MODU, as generic
guidance (based on the requirements of IMO MODU code) is placed at Annexure- 4.
12.0
Fire and gas detection and control methods
F&G detection systems should be designed in accordance with recognized codes and standards
(such as NFPA 72 and/or EN54) applicable to the area of operation to achieve the level of
performance stated in the fire and explosion strategies (FES). Parts 1 to 7 of IEC 61508 should be
referred for guidance on requirements for electrical, electronic and programmable electronic
system. Loss of power or key input signals should be considered in determining the reliability of
the F&G system.
23
Where provided, the F&G system should be designed to perform the following functions:
a) Monitoring
 to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases/oil mist;
 where considered necessary, to detect leaks (e.g. near pump seals);
 to detect fires at an early stage;
 to detect ingress of smoke and flammable gas into places where they may present a
hazard;
 to permit manual initiation of alarm.
b) Alarm
 to indicate the location of any fire or hazardous accumulation of flammable gaseous or oil
mist;
 to immediately alert people of possible fire or gas incident.
c) Control action

to immediately initiate appropriate control actions.
F&G System shall receive and display the status and any alarm signals from fire and gas
detectors, manual call points (manual stations for initiation of ESD) and fixed fire protection
systems on fire zone basis. The system shall also be capable of

monitoring continuously the status of associated self contained systems such as
HVAC fan and fire dampers, fire water ring main, fire water pumps, and gaseous
extinguishing systems

Providing the controls for the fire water distribution system, fire water pumps and
gaseous extinguishing systems.
The F&G system shall operate as an independent system. F&G detection safety instrumented
functions shall be functionally and physically segregated from other systems or functions.
Equipment used for fire and gas detection, and control shall be listed/ approved by independent
international certification agency namely UL/ FM. Where systems are supplied, such systems shall
be listed / approved by the above mentioned agency as a complete operating system. Substitution
of alternative components, where approved components are available shall not be permitted.
Equipment, if any, which is not listed / approved by UL/ FM, shall be certified by a reputed third
party who is recognized in the field of fire protection of offshore installation.
New technologies, if introduced, shall have UL/FM approval before acceptance/introduction for
field application and shall have proven record of service in a similar environment.
12.1
Detection system
F&G detection shall be accomplished by the following automatic and manual methods:






Detection of flammable gas
Detection of heat
Detection of flame
Detection of smoke
Detection of toxic gases
Manual alarm call point
These detection circuits shall be fault monitored continuously, and shall provide early warning of
an outbreak of fire or gas release in an area.
Automatic detection system whether electric or pneumatic, shall have provision to detect failure of
equipment or loss of supervising air pressure or failure of power supply.
Typical applications of fire/gas detectors excluding toxic gases are tabulated in Annexure - 5.
Toxic gas detectors shall be provided in all areas where potentially toxic gas concentrations may
be present or be formed.
24
F&G detectors shall be subject to a regular maintenance and testing programme. The design of
the F&G system field devices should consider the requirements for maintenance in order to
minimize the need to provide special access arrangements for calibration, cleaning or testing.
Fire and gas detection system shall be designed to testing without interrupting other system
onboard. Faults of detection systems should, once detected, raise an alarm at a control station.
Temporary removal or isolation of the F&G system, or part of the system, is acceptable provided
that adequate alternative arrangements are ensured.
Placing of detectors shall be based on relevant scenarios, hazard analysis, simulations and tests.
Electric automatic detection equipment and it’s auxiliary electric equipment in hazardous areas
shall be designed and certified for use in such areas.
Fire detectors shall, except for fusible plugs, be of resettable type such that after activation they
can be restored to normal surveillance without the renewal of any component.
For automatic operation of system, adequate and reliable source of power supply shall be
provided. The need for an alternate power supply shall be determined considering criticality of the
facility to be protected.
12.2
Alarm system
Where automatic operation of F&G System is provided, an alarm condition shall remain until
manually reset. The detection system shall activate a local alarm as well as an alarm at a
constantly attended location. The detection system’s alarms shall also be actuated when the
system is operated manually.
An alarm system comprises:

manual alarm input devices

input lines from detector and shutdown systems

alarm central unit receiving and evaluating input signals and creating output signals to
alarm sounding devices

alarm sounding devices such as bells, flashing lights and/or loudspeakers

power supply.
Alarms initiation from the following systems shall be provided, as applicable:

general emergency (ESD) or muster

fire detection

hydrocarbon gas detection

toxic gas (e.g. Hydrogen Sulphide) detection

fire extinguishing medium release (CO2 or other gases with lethal concentrations)

power-operated watertight door closing

machinery fault detection.
All alarms shall be indicated visually and audibly in the control room.
An alarm philosophy shall be established ensuring that the alarms are simple and unambiguous.
The philosophy shall define which alarms are to be broadcasted to the entire unit or installation
and whether this should occur automatically or not.
The unit or installation shall be equipped with a public address system. The alarm system may be
combined with the public address system, provided that:

alarms automatically override any other input

volume controls are automatically set for alarm sounding

all parts of the public address system (e.g. amplifiers, signal cables and loudspeakers) are
made redundant

redundant parts are located or routed separately

all loudspeakers are protected with fuses against short circuits.
The number of alarms during abnormal conditions shall be assessed and reduced as far as
practicable by alarm processing/suppression techniques in order to have operator attention on the
most critical alarms that require operator action.
25
The alarms shall be clearly audible at all locations on the unit or installation, and shall be easily
distinguishable. If noise in an area prevents the audible alarm being heard a visible means of
alarm shall be provided.
Alarm to areas which are not regularly manned may be covered by procedural precautions, e.g.
using portable radios.
Activation of the general alarm shall be possible from the main control stations, including
navigation bridge and radio room.
In addition to the alarm systems, a two-way communication system shall be provided for
transmittal of alarm, instructions and information between those who may require them.
Manual alarm call points (MCP) should be provided at convenient locations around the installation,
to allow personnel to initiate an alarm of a hazardous situation and allow rapid initiation of any
necessary control actions. Where-ever applicable, MCP shall be designed and certified for use in
hazardous areas.
12.3
Control actions
Control actions initiated by F&G system shall include






isolation of the installation from the reservoir and pipeline,
initiation of emergency depressurization,
isolation of electrical equipment to prevent further development of electrical fires
shutdown of ventilation system to minimize ingress of smoke or flammable gas;
isolation of electrical equipment and other potential ignition sources upon detection of
flammable gas to minimize the risk of ignition;
initiation of AFP systems where these have been provided to control or mitigate
hydrocarbon fires;
13.0
Emergency shut-down and blow-down system
13.1
Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) system
The Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) system provides the means of isolating the installation from
import and export pipelines, in order to control the topsides inventory in an emergency or quickly
terminate export in the case of a pipeline or riser leak. The blow down system rapidly transfers the
gas or oil inventory to the vent, flare or reservoir in a controlled manner, in order to reduce the
potential for further escalation in the case of a fire or leak. Pressure relief devices are provided on
process systems to prevent rupture of pressure vessels and leakage of pipework joints under
applied pressure arising from faults in the process control system or as a result of fire. The
isolation systems enable safe and secure isolation of key inventories and components to enable
draining and purging of fluids prior to maintenance or inspection.
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems should be designed to initiate appropriate shutdown,
isolation and blow down actions to prevent escalation of abnormal conditions into a major
hazardous event and to limit the extent and duration of any such events which do occur.
An ESD system shall be provided, in accordance with the requirements of the FES, in order to:
a.
Isolate the installation from the major hydrocarbon inventories within pipelines and
reservoirs which, if released on failure, would pose an intolerable risk to personnel,
environment and the equipment.
b.
Where appropriate, sectionalize topside inventory to limit the quantity of material released
on loss of containment.
c.
Control potential ignition sources such as fired units, engines and non-essential critical
equipment.
26
d.
Control subsurface safety valve(s).
e.
Where appropriate, depressurize hydrocarbon inventory and vent it to a safe place.
Upon failure of the shutdown system, all connected systems shall default to the safest condition
for the unit or installation. There shall be a provision to activate functions manually from the central
control room in such a manner that the facility is brought to a safe condition in the event of failure
in the programmable parts of the system.
Emergency shutdown system shall be in addition to systems for management and control and
other safety systems e.g. if an ESD valve is connected to the process control system, the process
control function shall be performed completely separate from the ESD functions. The emergency
shutdown system may have an interface with other systems if it cannot be adversely affected as a
consequence of system failures, failures or single incidents in these systems.
An ESD system shall provide adequate information at a control station so that personnel involved
in managing an emergency have required information to effectively execute the required actions in
an emergency.
The design of an ESD system may be for manual or automatic initiation or both based on FES.
When manual initiation is required, the systems shall be simple to operate and shall not require
operators to make complex or non-routine decisions. Once initiated, all control actions required by
the ESD system shall occur automatically.
The ESD system may also be initiated automatically when process conditions indicate a loss of
control which requires ESD, for instance low air pressure, high liquid level in a flare system. The
system may include a number of independent process shutdown systems that can also be
actuated separately. Activation of the ESD system should result in the termination of all production
activity on the platform, including the closing of all pipeline SDVs. The ESD system should be
designed to permit continued operation of electrical power generating stations and fire-fighting
systems when needed in an emergency.
Equipment that is critical for the effectuation of system actions shall be protected against
mechanical damage and accidental loads until shut down sequence is complete. This includes
ESD valves, accumulators, electrical cables, pneumatic and hydraulic tubing. ESD valves shall
remain in safe position during dimensioning event.
Riser ESD valves shall be located in easily accessible, open, well-ventilated areas, to avoid
damage from wave impact and dimensioning accidental events such as fire, explosion and
mechanical impact.
Stations for manual activation of the ESD system shall be located in strategic positions, be readily
accessible, well-marked and protected against unintentional activation. Manual stations for
initiation of ESD for complete platform shutdown should be installed at the following locations of a
platform:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
helicopter decks;
exit stairway landings at each deck level;
boat landings;
at the centre or each end of a bridge connecting two platforms;
emergency evacuation stations;
near the driller's console during drilling and work over operations;
near the main exits of living quarters;
control room;
other locations as needed to provide stations accessible to all platform areas;
near well bay;
near arriving/departing pipelines.
ESD stations at boat landings may utilize a loop of breakable synthetic tubing in lieu of a valve or
electric switch.
27
Because of key role of ESD system in the safety system, all ESD components used should be of
high quality and be corrosion-resistant.
The ESD system shall contain facilities for testing of both input/output devices and internal
functions.
ESD point shall have provision for self illumination.
Emergency shutdown and operational shutdown of the satellite platform (associated well platforms)
shall be able to be carried out locally on the satellite platform as well as from the main platform.
Activation of the ESD system should result in the termination of all production activity on the
platform, including the closing of all pipeline SDVs. The ESD system should be designed to permit
continued operation of electrical power generating stations and fire-fighting systems when needed
in an emergency.
The ESD system of the satellite platform shall not be able to be taken out of service from the main
platform and shall be in operation when the platform is unmanned.
13.2
Blow down system
Rapid blow down or draining of topsides process inventories in order to prevent escalation of a fire
situation should be provided unless there are specific good reasons for not doing so (e.g. very
small topsides process). Blow down should be designed in the light of the specific escalation times
for each fire scenario and generally be as fast as feasible once activated.
Blow down shall be at a safe location with respect to personnel, bearing in mind the likelihood of
spurious blow down events as well as real emergency events, and designed such that the heat
radiation for maximum foreseeable flaring (or ignited venting) rate does not pose a hazard to
escape and evacuation.
While designing blow down system, following approach should be considered:





For each item of equipment, define the type of fire (pool, jet, partial or total engulfment)
likely to affect it.
Calculate the rate of heat input appropriate to that type of fire.
Calculate the rate of temperature rise of the vessel wall neglecting heat transfer to the
contents. This simplification is appropriate for jet or other fires, which might affect only a
small area of the vessel. More complex methods can allow for heat transfer to the
contents.
Estimate the time to vessel rupture. From this temperature-time profile prepare a yield –
stress-time profile and a corresponding rupture pressure-time profile. Compare this to the
actual pressure vessel versus time for the required blow down time.
If the time to rupture does not meet the established safety criteria (such as time to
evacuate), then design changes may be necessary to improve the vessel protection.
These may be a reduction in blow down time, or application of fire protection insulation, or
changes to the plant layout to reduce the fire exposure.
In case of unmanned platforms, manual depressurization of all pressurized systems should be
possible from the platform when it is manned. The consequences of ignited vent pipes should be
considered. Vents on atmospheric vessels, which are not dimensioned to withstand a full inside
explosion pressure, should be provided with adequate flame arrestors.
14.0
Active fire protection
Fire and explosion strategies developed to manage fire and explosion hazards should ensure that
the measures selected are capable of performing their function by setting performance standards
(functional requirements) of safety critical elements.
In developing the fire and explosion strategies (FES), there are a wide range of considerations that
influence the selection of AFP systems, e.g. the size and complexity of the installation, the nature
of the operations, availability of external fire-response equipment, and the fire-response strategy
adopted by the operator.
28
Initiation of AFP systems may be automatic, manual or both. The means of activation will depend
on the expected location, size and type of fire, and the fire-response strategy for the installation.
For automatically initiated systems, a manual release station shall be provided and conveniently
located outside the protected area.
Objectives of active fire protection system are:




To control fires and limit escalation;
To reduce the effects of a fire to allow personnel to undertake emergency response
activities or to evacuate;
To extinguish the fire where it is considered safe to do so;
To limit damage to structures and equipment.
The active fire protection system shall be provided on the offshore installation, out of the following,
based on FES:
 Water Based System
 Foam Based System
 Dry Chemical Based System
 Water cum foam Spray System
 Dual agent suppression system ( DCP and Foam)
 Clean Agent System
 Carbon Dioxide Based System
 Kitchen Cooking Appliances and Hood Protection System
 Portable Fire Extinguishers
Selection of active fire protection systems for typical areas on offshore installations is given in
Annexure - 6 for initial design. Final selection of types and quantities/rates should be based on
FES.
Effects of the marine environment offshore shall be considered in the selection of equipment,
materials, and systems. Equipment used for active fire prevention shall be listed/ approved/
certified by independent international certification agency namely UL/ FM. Where systems are
supplied, such systems shall be listed / approved by the above mentioned agency as a complete
operating system. Substitution of alternative components, where approved components are
available shall not be permitted. Equipment, if any, which is not listed / approved/ certified by UL/
FM, shall be certified by a reputed third party who is recognized in the field of fire protection of
offshore installation.
The manufacturer of equipment/system shall confirm to provide after sales service support
including supply of spares during life cycle of the equipment.
New technologies, if introduced, shall have UL/FM
listing/approval/
certification
before
acceptance/introduction for field application and shall have proven record of service in a similar
environment.
Various Active fire protection systems applicable in offshore are covered below:
14.1
Fire water system
Fire water system shall comprise of fire water pumps and distribution piping network along with,
deluge system, sprinkler system, hose reels, hydrants and monitors, as the main components.
Sea water is used for fire extinguishments, fire control, cooling of equipment and for exposure
protection of equipment/personnel from heat radiation.
For these purposes, water in appropriate form should be used such as water jet, water spray,
water fog, water curtain, and for foam making.
The fire-water pump system should be selected to deliver the pressure and flow required for the
operation of water based AFP systems (deluge water spray, monitors, hoses, etc.) sufficient to
meet the role of these systems as defined in the FES. This will typically be the single largest
29
credible fire area (if deluge/ water spray systems are installed), plus any anticipated manual firefighting demand (monitors/hose streams). Where required in the FES, allowance should be made
to cope with escalation of the fire to adjacent areas.
For further guidance on fire water system section 5.2 of API RP 14G (4 th edition, 2007) should be
referred.
14.1.1 Fire water pump selection
The fire-water pumps, their prime movers and starting arrangements should be designed so as to
operate for a minimum period sufficient for them to fulfill their functions.
The speed of response of the fire-water pump unit should be selected so that fire-water is made
available to the systems which use fire-water in time for them to fulfill their function.
The FES should identify the number of fire-water pumps required and the arrangement necessary
to provide a reliable supply of fire-water. This should consider situations such as when a fire-water
pump unit is unavailable due to maintenance or breakdown. On normally manned installations this
may require at least two independent pump units.
If more than one fire-water pump is provided, fire-water pump units should be designed to
minimize the risk of common mode failures occurring during emergencies. Pump inlets should be
separated such that in the event of an incident rendering a pump inoperative, the other pump
unit(s) will not be affected.
Suitable arrangements should be provided to allow verification of fire-water pump system
performance over the full range of the fire-water pump curve.
Fire-water pump stop should be local only. Except during testing, any alarms from pump
monitoring systems should not automatically stop the fire pump.
Fire-water pumps should normally have two different means to start the pump automatically.
Fire detection at the fire-water pump should not stop the pump or inhibit the start of the fire-water
pump driver.
If not running continuously, the system should be designed to start automatically in a fire
emergency. In addition, facilities should be provided for local and remote manual start of the
pumps.
If the connection to the control room is lost, the fire-water pumps should start automatically.
The fire-water pump system should be located, or protected, so that it is able to supply water in a
fire emergency. Protection against damage of associated power cables, hydraulic/piping and
control circuits should be considered.
Fire-water pump units required to operate when gas is present should be designed to be suitable
for such operation.
Water treatment may be necessary to prevent marine growth from impairing fire-water system
performance. The requirements for inlet filtration should be considered where debris may damage
the pump.
Sufficient instrumentation (both local and, where appropriate, remote) should be provided to
enable personnel to ascertain the operational status of any pump unit.
The provision of relief devices or other arrangements may be required at the pumps to prevent
damage to pipe work due to high operating pressures or surge. Such devices should reset
automatically once the excess pressure has been relieved.
Firewater pump systems shall be self-contained. It shall be possible to start the fire water system
even if no other systems on the platform are operational.
30
Fire water pumps shall be exclusively used for firefighting purpose only.
NFPA 20 “Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection” should be
consulted as guideline for design and installation of fire water pumps.
14.1.2
Fire water mains
Fire water mains are the means by which water for fire-fighting is transmitted from the fire-water
pumps to the points of use. The fire-water mains should be designed to provide an adequate
amount of water to the discharge points at the required pressure. The fire water mains should be
suitable for the marine environment.
In developing the FES, incidents which could result in damage to the fire mains should be
considered. Where necessary, fire-water mains should be routed or protected to avoid such
damage. The design should consider whether arrangements are necessary to provide adequate
fire protection when a section of the fire mains is isolated due to damage or maintenance.
Fire-water mains should be equipped with an adequate number of shut-off valves to allow sections
of the mains and branches from the mains to be isolated. Easy access for operation of these
valves should be provided.
Piping should be designed to be robust and should be adequately secured and supported. The
effects of surge should be considered. Consideration should be given to protecting deluge pipe
work against the effects of fires and explosions
The fire-water mains should be provided with suitable arrangements to permit testing of the pump
units and the firewater mains under full operating conditions to determine any deterioration in
efficiency.
Liquid filled pressure gauges shall be fitted at prominent locations to indicate pressure in fire water
network.
Fire water mains should be designed using a recognized technique for the hydraulic analysis of
these systems.
Fire water mains of steel pipes, cupronickel (or copper-nickel), glass reinforced epoxy coated or
pipes made of material suitable for the quality of water should be used. Alternately, pipes made of
composite materials should be used. The composite material to be used as per API 15LR / API
15HR
14.1.3
Deluge system
Fixed deluge systems should be provided to:




control pool fires and thus reduce the likelihood of escalation;
provide cooling of equipment and structures not impinged by jet fires( in case of jet fire,
assessment should be carried out whether deluge will contribute for fire control);
provide a means to apply foam to extinguish hydrocarbon pool fires;
limit effects of fires to facilitate emergency response and EER activities.
The four broad types of deluge protection include:
a)
area protection designed to provide non-specific coverage of pipe work and equipment
within hydrocarbon handling areas;
b)
equipment protection designed to provide dedicated coverage of critical equipment such
as vessels and well heads;
c)
structural protection designed to provide dedicated coverage of structural members;
31
d)
water curtains to reduce thermal radiation and to control the movement of smoke in order
to provide protection to personnel during escape and evacuation.
Fixed deluge systems should be designed using a recognized technique for the hydraulic analysis
of these systems. NFPA 15 “Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection” should
be referred for design and installation of deluge systems.
The speed of response required for a deluge system to fulfill its function should be determined and
the system should be engineered accordingly. Area deluge or local cooling system should be fully
operational as soon as possible after the receipt of an initiating signal.
The water pressure available at the inlet to the system or an individual section should be sufficient
for the efficient operation of all nozzles in that system or section under design flow conditions.
The deluge valve should be of globe pattern design with material of construction suitable for sea
water service. Limit switches should be provided for monitoring opening and closing of the valve.
The deluge valve should be pneumatically opened and locked. Facility for both pneumatic and
electrical operation from Control Rooms must be provided. The types of deluge nozzle selected
and the location of these nozzles should be suitable to fulfill the role of the system during the fire
events and the environmental conditions which may occur.
It shall be possible to manually activate deluge valve locally, from control room and at release
stations located along the escape routes outside the fire area itself.
The sizes of nozzle and associated pipe work should be selected to avoid blockage caused by
corrosion products or build-up of salt deposits after operation and testing. Self-draining design is
an important feature in this respect.
The location and orientation of deluge nozzles should be defined so that the required quantity of
water will impinge on surfaces to be protected. Due account should be taken of the effects of
obstructions and air movements on the stream of droplets.
For systems where local manual initiation is unlikely to be adequate, remote operation should be
provided from a control station at which the operating status of the system (e.g. deluge valve
open/closed) is indicated.
Isolation of any automatically operated deluge system should be possible by means of a manually
operated valve located outside the protected area.
Piping should be designed to be robust and should be adequately secured and supported. The
effects of surge should be considered. Consideration should be given to protecting deluge pipework against the effects of fires and explosions. Piping material should be suitable for sea water
application.
Means should be provided to enable the testing of deluge valve performance without discharging
fire-water through the pipe-work and nozzles.
Fixed deluge protection should be considered for temporary equipment such as modular rigs. The
design of the installation fire-water pumping system should consider the needs of any anticipated
temporary deluge systems
14.1.4
Sprinkler system
Automatic sprinkler systems are typically used in areas where fires are expected to involve
cellulosic fuels (living quarters), and where slow fire growth is expected. Once initiated sprinkler
systems can be effective to control fire spread, to reduce fire and smoke damage and to provide
alarm at a control station. They are not normally suitable for extinguishing fires in flammable liquid
spills which can spread rapidly over large areas and exceed the capacity of the sprinkler system.
Automatic sprinkler systems should be connected to a pressurized water supply so that the
system is capable of immediate operation and no action by personnel is necessary.
Where an automatic sprinkler system is connected to an unpressurized main, it should have a
reliable supply of water available with sufficient capacity to provide protection until the main is
32
pressurized. Automatic supply from a pressurized fire main or deluge main which activates upon
drop of pressure in the sprinkler system may be an acceptable water supply arrangement.
If sprinklers are provided in cooking areas, they should be prevented from impinging directly on to
equipment used for heating cooking oil or fat. Electrical power supply to the galley should be
switched off automatically in the event that the sprinkler system is operated.
Facilities should be provided to enable each part of the sprinkler system to be drained and tested
and to remove all air from water-filled systems.
For large sprinkler systems, consideration should be given to dividing the system so that each
section can be monitored to indicate which section has operated.
Over board test line shall be provided to fully function test the sprinkler system without spraying
water in the protected area. This can be done by use of suitably located test sprinkler using fresh
water.
There shall be a pressure sensor downstream of each sprinkler valve and a flow indicator
upstream of each area indicating in which area release is taking place. Indication in the control
room shall be provided.
NFPA 13 “Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems” should be referred for design of
sprinkler system. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per
NFPA.
14.1.5
Water mist system
Water-mist systems are an alternative to gaseous systems in some applications. A water mist
system is a fire protection system using very fine water sprays (i.e., water mist). The very small
water droplets allow the water mist to control or extinguish fires by cooling of the flame and fire
plume, oxygen displacement by water vapor, and radiant heat attenuation.
Considerations which should be addressed in evaluation of the use of water-mist systems include:
 suitability of the system for the particular application;
 provision of a suitable water supply and air supply, if needed for the particular system;
 the size of the protected area and the degree of congestion;
 the fuel type and the nature of the fires which may be experienced;
 the effect on electrical and other sensitive equipment within the area of water-mist
application.
NFPA 750 “Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems” should be referred for guidance.
14.1.6
Hydrants and hose reels & nozzles
Nozzles and hoses (and portable foam equipment if used) should be located in the most suitable
positions considering the probable direction of approach of fire teams.
Where appropriate, enclosures should be provided to protect this equipment against mechanical
damage and against the environment.
Fire-water mains should be equipped with hydrants to which hoses can be connected and/or
provided with fixed hose reels. The number and position of hydrants/hose reels should be
sufficient to permit effective fire-fighting by the emergency response team in the intended areas.
Hydrants and hose reels should not be supplied from the same section of a fire main as a deluge
or sprinkler.
The system should be designed so that the maximum pressure possible in the line is less than the
rated working pressure of the equipment.
Hoses, nozzles, valve keys, etc. should be stored adjacent to hydrants. Couplings should be
standard throughout the installation. Nozzles should be of robust construction, easy to operate and
made of materials suitable for the intended duty.
33
NFPA 14 “Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems” should be referred for
installation of hydrants and hose reels. Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and
maintenance as per NFPA.
14.2
Foam system
Foam-forming additives can significantly increase the effectiveness of water in controlling liquid
hydrocarbon pool fires. Firefighting foam is a stable aggregation of small bubbles, of density lower
than water or oil, having a tenacious ability for covering and clinging to horizontal or inclined
surfaces. It has the capability of flowing freely over a burning liquid surface, cooling the liquid and
forming an air-excluding, continuous blanket to seal volatile combustible vapours from access to
air. Foams are ineffective for fires such as pressurized oil/gas jet fires where smothering effects
cannot be achieved. NFPA 11 “Standard for Low, Medium, and High Expansion Foam” should be
consulted for design and installation of foam systems.
Foams may be employed using hose stations, fixed systems, portable extinguishers or fixed
monitors. The foaming agent may be applied directly by introducing foam concentrate into the firewater system in fixed proportions, or may be applied as a premixed solution of concentrate and
water.
Where foam concentrates are introduced directly into the fire-water system, the method of
proportioning should provide sufficient accuracy so that the required performance is obtained over
the full range of flows and pressures which may occur in the fire-water system.
The foam concentrate selected should be suitable for use on the flammable liquids present in the
protected area, in the expected environmental conditions. Where foam concentrate is injected into
the fire-water main it should be of a type which is compatible with sea water.
Where provided, the foam pump, its sources of power supply, foam concentrate and means of
controlling the system should be readily accessible, simple to operate, capable of being put into
operation rapidly and located/protected so that it will be able to operate when required.
Central foam systems should not be utilized as the primary source of supply of foam solution to
hand-held equipment as accurate proportioning cannot be guaranteed at low flow rates.
The foam concentrate should conform to UL, US MIL-F-24385 standards and should be suitable
for use and storage at anticipated ambient temperatures. When dry chemical and foam
extinguishing agents are expected to be used at the same location, compatibility should be
confirmed.
Minimum pressure for system required shall be ensured at the remotest location of the hydrant.
For further guidance on Foam Extinguishing Systems refer NFPA 11 “Standard for Low, Medium,
and High Expansion Foam” and section 5.3 of API-RP-14G ( 4th edition,2007). Provision shall be
made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per NFPA.
14.2.1 Monitors
Fire-water monitors may be used to provide water-spray coverage or apply water-foam solution.
They may also be provided to supplement fixed deluge systems.
The design of monitors should consider location, size of supply piping, arrangement of control
valves.
Remote operation of monitor(s), wherever applicable, should be considered.
Monitors arranged for local operation should be provided with an access route, which is remote
from the part requiring protection and so sited as to protect the operator from the effects of radiant
heat, unless the monitor is also automatically/remotely operated.
34
Each monitor should have sufficient movement in the horizontal and vertical planes to permit the
monitor to be brought to bear on any point of the part protected by that monitor. There should be
means for locking the monitor in position.
Each monitor should be capable of discharging under jet and spray conditions. The locations and
discharge characteristics of the monitor should be selected to suit the role and exposure protection
required from the monitors and the local environmental conditions. Monitor should be capable of
discharging foam also.
Monitors which can be remotely actuated should be arranged so that they cannot cause injury or
impede escape routes when operated. Local manual override controls should be provided.
Minimum pressure for system required shall be ensured at the remotest location of the monitor.
Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per NFPA.
14.2.2 Foam Water Hose Reel Unit
Foam water hose reels are ideal means of fighting small oil and gas fires on E & P platforms.
Typical description of Foam Water Hose Reel Unit is given in Annexure- 11.
Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per NFPA.
14.3
Dry chemical fixed systems
Dry chemical fire-fighting systems can provide an effective means for extinguishment by chain
breaking mechanism. A major advantage is their self-contained feature which provides for
protection without reliance upon an external energy source. The nature of potential fires should be
carefully considered in selecting and sizing the type of dry chemical and equipment. NFPA 17
“Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems” should be consulted for design and installation
of dry chemical systems.
Dry chemical from fixed systems may be applied from hand hose line or fixed nozzle systems. To
cover several areas with a single supply of agent, hand hose lines with local actuators may be
connected by rigid piping to a single dry-chemical supply. A single large supply unit is likely to lose
fire fighting capabilities, if the unit malfunctions or is damaged. Therefore several smaller units
may be considered.
Dry chemical powder and its delivery systems (equipment) shall be approved by certifying agency.
Type of dry chemical used in the system shall not be changed unless proven to be changeable by
a testing laboratory, recommended by the manufacturer of the equipment and approved by
certifying agency.
The discharge of dry chemical and expellant gas is a two-phase flow, and the flow characteristics
depend upon the particular dry chemical, expellant gas and equipment being used. Therefore, it
is important to use the manufacturers’ data, which have been established by investigation and
tests, when designing the piping.
Nitrogen gas shall be utilized as expellant.
Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per NFPA.
Typical description of dry chemical fixed systems is given in Annexure- 11.
14.4
Dual agent suppression system
Dual agent suppression system is self contained system utilizing simultaneous or sequential use
of dry chemical powder and foam. Large Class B fires requires rapid knockdown and suppression
of flaming liquid which can be achieved using dry chemical powder, and the foam blankets the fuel
with a thick film there by preventing escape of flammable vapours and also ensures cooling.
35
Dry chemical powder used in dual agent suppression system shall be compatible with foam.
Both dry chemical powder and foam shall be stored in separate tanks. Nitrogen gas shall be
utilised as expellant.
The skid unit shall be hydraulically designed to achieve balanced flow rates of dry powder and
foam.
The dry chemical powder and foam concentrate shall also conform to the standards of certifying
agency.
The unit shall be capable of operation by one person.
Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per NFPA.
14.5
Clean agent system
Gaseous systems may be used to extinguish fires or, at higher concentrations, to inert a space
and prevent ignition.
Use of Halon has been banned for new systems due to their detrimental effect on atmospheric
ozone and causing global warming. Clean agent based system as per Montreal and Kyoto
Protocol shall be installed for new installation and as replacement to existing Halon system.
HFCs are green house gases having large global warming potential can also pose health risk to
personnel if exposed to extinguishing concentrations and should be avoided.
The Gaseous clean agent system should have, as minimum, bank of cylinders filled with the agent
under pressure, piping network, dual actuating system, discharge nozzles and operated through
the control panel. 100% redundancy should be provided in bank of cylinders. The system should
be capable of the being recharged at site.
The company should obtain a long term replacement warranty (10 years or more) from the OEM in
case the clean agent is found to be environmentally unsustainable within this period.
Where existing Halon system are to be replaced, safe disposal of Halon must be carried out either
by destruction using Plasma Arc technology as per EPA guidelines or to be handed over to
Authorized Governmental Agency for Halon banking.
Onsite refilling of gaseous agent should be preferred. Gaseous agent system shall have the
approval of certifying agency.
Each hazard area to be protected by the protection system shall have an independent system.
100% standby containers shall be considered for each protected hazard. Over and above this, the
time needed to obtain the gas for replacement to restore the systems shall be considered as a
governing factor in determining the reserve supply needed.
Storage containers shall be located as near as possible to hazard area but shall not be exposed to
fire.
Storage containers shall be carefully located so that they are not subjected to mechanical,
chemical or other damage.
All the components of the system shall be capable of withstanding heat of fire and severe weather
condition.
Clean agent system shall also have on line monitoring and display system for pressure of
cylinders at control room.
Selection and design of clean agent system shall be in line with the NFPA 2001 “Standard on
Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems”. The clean agent should also comply with the
36
requirements of “Ozone Depletion Substances Regulation & Control Rules - 2000, Ministry of
Environment & Forests, Government of India.
Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per NFPA.
14.6
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) based System
Fixed CO2 system shall be designed in accordance with NFPA-12.
CO2 is generally not used for protection of spaces that can be occupied by personnel due to
suffocation risk. Before CO2 flooding system is operated; persons in confined area, if any, should
be evacuated.
Suitable safeguard shall be provided to ensure prompt evacuation of personnel and prompt rescue
of any trapped person.
CO2 snuffing system: For fighting the fire occurring at cold flare/cold vent boom where it is difficult
to approach, a system employing the phenomena of dilution by CO 2 snuffing system are
commonly provided. The CO2 snuffing system normally consists of amount of CO 2 gas in cylinders
which are manifolded and are located at easily accessible area. CO 2 snuffing system shall be
designed and installed in accordance to NFPA 12.
Provision shall be made to facilitate inspection, testing and maintenance as per NFPA.
14.7
Kitchen cooking appliances and hood protection
Where kitchens are installed in conjunction with accommodation facilities to provide food services,
the kitchens should be protected with appropriate fixed pipe protection of the cooking appliances
and exhaust duct systems.
Agents for kitchen shall be wet chemical suitable for K Class fires as per NFPA 10.
Portable fire extinguishers suitable for K Class of fire shall be provided for response to small fires
without discharging the main system.
14.8
Helideck fire protection
Protection requirements may vary depending on helicopter types, the size of facility, the manning
arrangements and the area of operation. Existing practices include portable fire extinguishers,
local dedicated foam systems and foam monitors connected to the fire main. Helidecks should
comply with the standards of any authority having jurisdiction for the helideck, as well as
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).The helideck fire protection should be designed to
deal with fires on the helideck without placing helideck crew in undue danger.
Typically on manned installations, AFP systems suitable for fires involving aircraft engines, crash
incidents or fuelling activities should be provided. Fire-extinguishing equipment should be readily
accessible at the helideck. Where fire-water is required, location of fire-water pump start facilities
should be considered at each helideck emergency response location, and the supply
arrangements should ensure that there will be no interruption in firewater supply during firefighting.
A central foam system which injects foam concentrate into the fire-water mains at the fire pump
discharge should not normally be used as the primary means of helideck protection, unless it can
be shown that the delay in the firewater/ foam solution reaching the helideck foam monitors is
acceptable. Such a central foam system may, however, be used as a back-up system for
protection of the helideck, should the dedicated helideck foam system be unavailable. Central
foam systems may be used if foam is immediately available for induction at the helideck foam
system.
Where foam is applied by means of fixed monitors, sufficient monitors should be provided, spaced
at approximately equal distances around the helideck.
37
14.9
Fire extinguishers
Mobile (wheeled) and handheld fire extinguishers are intended as a first line of defense against
fires of limited size and should be provided even when other fixed firefighting systems are
provided. A major advantage of fire extinguishers is their self-contained feature, which provides for
protection without reliance on an external source of energy.
Within the various types of extinguishing mediums, there are differences between the specific
extinguishing medium and the methods by which the medium is expelled. Extinguishers also vary
significantly in size ranging from very small hand portables, which can be transported to the fire
quickly and easily, to large mobile units, where the container must basically remain in place and
the extinguishing medium discharged through a long hose.
Fire extinguishers should be simple to operate and be designed in accordance with a recognized
standard which is suitable for anticipated environmental conditions.
The various types of fire extinguishers available are water, dry chemical, carbon dioxide & clean
agent type. Hence, class of fire anticipated shall be considered while selecting the right type of fire
extinguisher.
Oil, gas and electrical fires anticipated on the offshore installations would generally be classified
as Class B and C fire risk which can be controlled by dry chemical powders and CO2 fire
extinguishers.
The fire extinguisher should be light weight and of compact design with considerations of reliability
and ease of refilling. The extinguisher body and components shall be designed for marine
environment.
Fire extinguishers containing an extinguishing medium which, either by itself or under expected
conditions of use, gives off toxic gases in such quantities as to endanger persons should not be
used.
Suitable arrangements should be made for mobile extinguishers to accommodate the hose so that
the hose will not kink and can be handled quickly. Mobile extinguishers should be fitted with
discharge hoses of length sufficient to reach any part of the protected area. The hose should not
be of such length as to preclude efficient discharge of the extinguisher's contents.
Fire extinguishers are most effectively utilized when they are readily available in sufficient number
and with adequate extinguishing capacity for use by persons familiar with their operation. The
actual placement of fire extinguishers should be based on a physical survey of the area to be
protected.
Suitable extinguishers should be provided such that personnel in an area have ready access to
permit rapid intervention while fires are still in their incipient stage.
Particular attention should be paid to the distribution, siting and visibility of extinguishers in order
that they are accessible and can be clearly distinguished.
Extinguishers should be clearly marked, to identify the extinguishing medium contained, and the
type of fire for which it is suitable.
While selecting the location for mobile extinguishers, consideration for their mobility in the area
should be carefully considered. If mobile extinguishers are located indoors, the size of the
doorways and passages should be sufficient for easy movement of extinguisher.
Procedures should be established so that expended extinguishers can be immediately recharged
or replaced. Reserve supplies of dry chemical should be stored in a dry area in containers
designed to prevent entry of moisture.
Extinguishers should be provided with suitable means for mounting. Suitable shades or covers
should be provided to protect extinguishers in the open from excessive heat, cold, rains or
corrosive environment. Where such shades or covers are provided, they should be designed so
that the removal of extinguishers is not hampered in the event of fire.
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Extinguishers should be located to minimize the possibility of damage from a fire or explosion and
be provided in sufficient number that the overall fire control capability is not seriously impaired by a
single fire. Typical placement of fire extinguishers at production installations is placed at
Annexure-7.
NFPA 10 “Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers” should be referred for selection, installation,
inspection, maintenance, and testing of Portable fire extinguishers.
Typical description of CO2 and dry chemical powder fire extinguishers are given in Annexure- 11.
15.0
Passive fire protection
Passive fire protection (PFP) comes in many forms, but the objective is always to provide some
sort of heat insulating barrier between the fire and the item to be protected. PFP should be
designed for use on vessels, pipework, structural members, boundary walls or individual items of
safety critical equipment. All PFP systems should be designed according to the specific fire
scenarios based on FES.
Modern design philosophy is to identify specific areas or items of concern (usually structure or
piping which on failure would escalate the initial event) and target these items for PFP application.
PFP is preferred over deluge in such situations since it is immediately available and has no
moving parts to fail and prevent operation.
Fire walls
Firewalls are often provided for area segregation. On many installations combined fire and blast
rated walls divide the process areas from the wellbay and the wellbay from the utilities and
accommodation areas giving multi-barrier protection across the platform from the high hazard
process end to the low hazard accommodation end. Firewalls are usually composite items
consisting of a structural part and an insulating part, both parts need to retain their integrity for the
life of the installation. Based on fire risk analysis appropriate class division is selected (like A-60,
H-60 and H-120 class division).
Typical fire integrity requirements given in Annexure-8 may be used as guidance in determining
the PFP requirements (fire barrier) for the protected area.
PFP on structures and structural supports
One of the functional requirements of the passive fire protection system is to protect the critical
structural members. Typical fire integrity requirements given at Annexure-9 may be used as
guidance in determining the PFP for structural members required to support the protected area
including its external boundaries.
All PFP applications must take account of the need for periodic inspection of key parts of the
underlying structure. This can be catered for by providing inspection hatches. However, it must be
emphasized that PFP integrity must be sufficient to prevent the ingress of water and subsequent
corrosion under the insulation and that the application of inspection or access points must not
degrade the “water-tightness” of the PFP.
PFP on process vessels
PFP is the preferred method of protecting vessels from heating up and failing when exposed to
fire. Water cooling is possible but not as reliable and requires large amounts of water. If the fire
exposure is severe, unprotected vessels could BLEVE with devastating consequences. The main
concern with PFP on vessels is that it makes NDT of the vessel difficult.
PFP for risers and safety critical equipment
Typical protection criteria for critical equipment are provided in Annexure-10, which may be used
as guidance in determining the PFP requirement of critical equipment in order to allow it to fulfil its
function in an emergency.
Water tightness in case of risers is a key issue when the PFP goes down to the splash zone. It is
no use protecting a specific item of safety-related equipment if escalation will then take place
39
through failure of the pipework on either side of the fire protected equipment. In designing any
PFP system, an holistic view of the whole module, must be taken. Design of protection for just
‘safety critical’ items in isolation can lead to inefficient safety spends.
PFP wrapping
Wrapping jackets for protection of valves and critical piping sections may be considered which are
easy to install and remove for inspection. It has potential for external corrosion, which should be
monitored when removed for inspection.
Mesh screens
These reduce heat radiation on escape routes by approximately 50 %, provided the flame is not
actually impinging on the route. They are frequently used to protect open stairways.
16.0
Inspection, maintenance and testing
Inspection, testing and maintenance frequencies should be determined as part of the FES
development, reflecting the role and importance of the system in managing fires and explosions.
All systems for fire and explosion management shall be inspected, tested and maintained to
NFPA, SOLAS Regulation and manufacturer’s guidelines at predetermined intervals by competent
personnel. These intervals will be determined by the required probability that the equipment will
not have an unrevealed fault (e.g. would not start or continue to operate when required); the
systems should be inspected thoroughly at least annually, following an established procedure.
These intervals and standards should be determined after taking into account the required
reliability or the criticality of the system, historical information on the likelihood of failure, known
causes of failure, the environmental conditions and taking into consideration OEM
recommendations. Systems should be maintained at all times. Records of inspection reports
showing date of inspection, scope of inspection, any corrective action taken or required with the
name and initial of person carrying out inspection should be retained.
The company shall be responsible for the establishment of health, safety and environment
procedures covering all activities during servicing and maintenance.
Periodic inspections and servicing, as recommended by the manufacturer, shall be conducted
under direct supervision of the company’s fire officer / safety officer in accordance with
instructions/ procedures provided by the manufacturer.
Any major repair shall be conducted by the Manufacturer’s representative or a person
appropriately trained and certified by the manufacturer for the work to be done.
Spares, agents and consumables shall be as per manufacturer’s requirements and standards to
maintain the system integrity and original approvals. After sales service support shall be provided
by such supplier with assurance of spares availability for at least 10 years.
A competent fire officer /safety officer shall be made responsible for inspection, maintenance &
testing of fire protection system. The duties of fire officer shall be clearly defined, explained and
communicated to him in writing for role clarity.
Fire and gas detectors, general alarms, ESD and blow down system
Fire and gas control panel: functional checks at regular interval (at least quarterly) should be
conducted to ensure that detectors annunciate correct zones and initiate the appropriate alarms or
extinguishing systems.
Detectors (flame, heat, smoke and gas): should be tested (at least quarterly) for operation and
recalibrated if required. The frequency of testing detectors will be dependent upon the type.
General alarm: alarms initiated from the fire and gas detection system should be regularly (at least
monthly) tested.
Emergency shutdown and blow down systems: operational tests should be performed annually, to
substantiate the integrity of the entire system.
40
Fire-water pump systems:
1.
Inspection and tests: drivers and pumps should be regularly started (at least weekly) and
operated for a period sufficient to establish normal operating conditions. They should start
reliably and run smoothly at rated speed and load. At least monthly water should be
discharged simultaneously from minimum two discharge points, to qualitatively verify the
integrity of pump and water delivery system. Pump performance (flow volume and
discharge pressure) should be tested (at least annually) to ensure the pumping system
satisfies the fire-water system functional requirements.
2.
Maintenance: engines should be kept clean, lubricated and in good operating condition.
Correct oil and coolant levels should be maintained. Diesel fuel tanks should be checked
after each engine run to assure an adequate (at least 30 minutes running) fuel supply
exists. Fuel-gas scrubber vessels on natural-gas fuel engines should be drained before
and after any engine run. Pressure-gauge readings on fuel-gas lines should be checked
during engine tests to verify the fuel gas delivery pressure. At a frequency dictated by flow
test and experience, submerged pumps should be lifted to inspect for corrosion and/or
wear which could cause failure when required to function during an incident.
3.
Batteries and charger systems: storage batteries should be kept in charged conditions at
all times. They should be regularly tested (at least quarterly), to determine the condition of
the battery cells. The automatic-charging feature of a battery charger is not a substitute for
proper maintenance of the battery and the charger. Periodic inspection is required to
ensure that the charger is operating correctly.
Fire water mains
The ring main shall be checked for leaks (at least once in a year) by operating fire pump & keeping
the monitor, hose reel and hydrants closed to get the maximum pressure.
The ring mains, hydrant, monitor & deluge/sprinkler header valves shall be visually inspected (at
least monthly) for any missing accessories, defects, damage and corrosion and records
maintained.
All valves on the ring mains, hydrants, monitors & deluge/sprinkler headers shall be checked for
leaks, smooth operation and lubricated once in a month.
Deluge and sprinkler systems:
Deluge systems may be susceptible to plugging due to corrosion, biological fouling or other foreign
objects. An effective means (e.g. inspection, testing) should be established to verify that the
system has the capability to function as designed. It is recommended that the established
procedures allow for verification (at least annually) of the integrity of the system. Pressure testing
of piping system should meet the requirements of NFPA-13.
Where installed, sprinkler system water-flow alarms should be tested (at least monthly) for correct
operation.
Testing of alarms/actions (e.g. fire-water pump start) should be possible from deluge/sprinkler
systems.
Hydrants, hose reels, nozzles and monitors:
Where necessary to confirm integrity, all fire hoses should be tested (at least annually)
subjecting them to the maximum fire-water system operating pressures. Nozzles should
function-tested (at least monthly) for proper operation. After each use, fire hoses should
inspected for damage and returned to their storage device. Cotton-jacketed hoses should
carefully cleaned and dried after use.
by
be
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Hydrants and monitors should be physically inspected periodically to ascertain any leakage or
damage and should be function tested quarterly.
41
Fixed dry chemical systems:
All dry-chemical extinguishing systems and other associated equipment should be inspected and
checked (at least annually) for proper operation by competent personnel. All expellant gas
containers should be checked (at least quarterly) by pressure or mass against required minimums.
All stored dry-chemical pressure containers should be checked (at least quarterly) by pressure and
mass against specified data. Except for stored pressure systems, the dry chemical in the system
storage container should be sampled from the top centre and near the wall. Any samples which
contain lumps that will not be friable when dropped from a height of 100 mm shall result in the
replacement of the chemical. After use, hoses and piping should be cleared of residual dry
chemical.
Manufacturer's recommendations with respect to cleanliness and dryness should be followed for
refilling extinguishers.
Foam system
At least annually, all foam systems shall be thoroughly inspected and checked for correct
operation. The operation shall include performance evaluation of the foam concentrate or premix
solution quality or both. Deficiencies, if any, shall be rectified as per requirements of NFPA 11.
Gaseous systems (including water-mist systems):
Systems should be thoroughly inspected and tested (at least annually) by competent personnel for
proper operation. Discharge of the system during function-testing should not be required. All
stored pressure containers should be checked (at least semiannually) by pressure and mass
against specified data (allowable weight loss is 5% or pressure loss is 10%). The weight and
pressure should be recorded on the tag attached with the container.
Mobile and hand portable fire-fighting equipment:
Extinguishers should be visually inspected frequently (at least monthly) to ensure that they are in
the designated location, to ensure that they have not been activated or tampered with and to
detect any obvious physical damage, corrosion, compaction of powder or other impairments. In
case of stored pressure type of extinguishers, compaction of powder to be checked at the time of
refill or based on shelf life of the powder.
Fire extinguishers should be hydrostatically tested in accordance with a NFPA 10.
Any cylinder which shows evidence of corrosion or mechanical damage should be hydrostatically
tested to ensure its integrity.
Nitrogen cylinders used for inert gas storage and used as an expellant for wheeled extinguishers
should be hydrostatically tested by competent personnel in accordance with recognized standards.
At regular intervals (at least annually), extinguishers should be thoroughly examined. Deficient
extinguishers should be repaired, recharged or replaced, as appropriate.
Manufacturer's recommendations with respect to cleanliness and dryness should be followed for
refilling extinguishers.
Extinguishers out of service for maintenance or recharging should be replaced by an
extinguisher(s) having the same classification and at least equal rating.
Each extinguisher should have a permanently attached identification tag indicating the
maintenance or recharge date and the initials or name of the person who performed the work.
The mixing of different powders can cause a corrosive mixture and abnormal pressures to
develop, resulting, in the extreme, in explosion of the extinguisher. Extinguishers should only be
refilled with the same type powder originally contained in the unit.
Passive fire protection
Generally, passive fire protection systems have few maintenance demands. However, periodic
42
visual inspections are recommended, with repairs to damaged areas as appropriate. The
inspections should identify damage such as cracks or voids, either in the top coating or the
fireproofing itself. Repairs should be carried out in accordance with manufacturer's
recommendations.
These periodic inspections are important in order to maintain the integrity of the fireproofing
coating and to provide early detection of corrosion. If partial debonding of the fireproofing coating
has occurred and there are surface cracks in the area of the debonding, moisture may migrate to
the base surface, establish a corrosion cell and become a source of corrosion. This corrosion
potential highlights the need to have a fireproofing coating application procedure, which ensures
that a proper bond is established between the fireproofing compound and the base surface.
17.0
Fire prevention
There should be fire prevention plan based on FES.
A fire prevention plan must include:
1.
A list of all major fire hazards, proper handling and storage procedures for hazardous
materials, potential ignition sources and their control, and the type of fire protection
equipment necessary to control each major hazard;
2.
Procedures to control accumulations of flammable and combustible waste materials;
3.
Procedures for regular maintenance of safeguards installed on heat-producing equipment
to prevent the accidental ignition of combustible materials;
4.
The name or job title of employees responsible for maintaining equipment to prevent or
control sources of ignition or fires; and
5.
The name or job title of employees responsible for the control of fuel source hazards.
All employees shall be informed upon initial assignment to a job, of the fire hazards to which they
are exposed. OIM shall also review with each employee those parts of the fire prevention plan
necessary for self-protection.
18.0
Emergency preparedness
The emergency (support) systems provided for the management and control of an incident include
the communications systems, escape and evacuation arrangements, power generation system(s)
and explosion protection (vents/suppression system). Periodic functional tests of these systems
should be performed, to substantiate the integrity of each system.
Specific test procedures should be in accordance with equipment manufacturer's
recommendations.
For guidance on emergency preparedness refer OISD-GDN-227.
Emergency response plan of the offshore installation should include response plans for fire and
explosion incidents. They should include the following:
18.1
Emergency action plan
An emergency action plan must include as a minimum:
1.
Procedures for reporting a fire or other emergency;
2.
Procedures for emergency evacuation, including type of evacuation and exit route
assignments;
43
3.
Procedures to be followed by employees who remain to operate critical plant operations
and firefighting before they evacuate;
4.
Procedures to account for all employees after evacuation;
5.
Procedures to be followed by employees performing rescue or medical duties;
6.
The name or job title of every employee who may be contacted by employees who need
more information about the plan or an explanation of their duties under the plan.
7.
Description of purpose, scope and responsibility;
8.
Description of organization, alerts, mobilization and communication.
9.
Description of field(s) and facility(s) and potential areas impacted by acute pollution;
10.
Description of installation resources, area resources, regional resources and external
resources and equipment;
11.
Instructions for emergency preparedness personnel;
12.
Co-operation procedures and agreements, if applicable, for co-ordination with other
participants;
The emergency action plan must be reviewed with each employee covered by the plan; when the
plan is developed or the employee is assigned initially to a job; when the employee's
responsibilities under the plan change; and when the plan is changed.
18.2
Emergency Communication
The PA system, alarms & emergency communication system shall have emergency power supply
from emergency generators & UPS.
The emergency communication shall be in accordance with hazardous areas classification.
Radio frequency radiation from antennas shall be in compliance with the requirements of
authority having jurisdiction.
The PA system, alarms and emergency communication system shall be located and protected
from the effects of fire/explosion to ensure their continuous operation.
Public Address System
The location, number, type and sounds from alarms shall be easily recognizable in any area where
alarm is required.
The alarm shall be heard in an area where noise level is up to 85 dB.
In areas where noise level is up to 85 dB and above, the audible alarm shall be supplemented with
visual signals.
The PA & alarm system shall be divided into two independent systems.
Alarm Signals & Codes
Alarm system with announcer in the galley and push buttons in the field shall be installed.
The alarms shall be routed to central control room. The code of alarm signals shall be as per the
uniform policy of the company.
Internal Emergency Communication System
The platform shall be provided with page phones and/or intercoms so that Central Control Room
(CCR) may be easily contacted during emergency and CCR operators shall also be able to
contact with operators anywhere on the platform.
44
Two way portable VHF/UHF radio sets shall be provided for use by emergency response team.
Driller’s intercom function shall provide two way communication in drilling areas between the driller
and drilling personnel.
Intercom function shall provide two way communication between radio room and critical areas.
The crane operator shall be able to communicate with CCR, ship and operators on deck.
Maritime VHF/UHF radio, PA loudspeaker and telephone shall be located in the crane cabin.
External Emergency Communication System
The platform shall be provided with satellite phones and UHF/VHF sets for communication with
external emergency response teams.
The communication system shall be able to communicate with other installations, helicopter,
lifeboats, multi support vessels, offshore supply vessels, life rafts and shore.
Alternative Emergency Control Room
Emergency response plan should designate an emergency response control center (incident command
center) with alternate center for each installation.
18.3
Emergency evacuation
At the time of an emergency, employees should know what type of evacuation is necessary and
what their role is in carrying out the plan. In some cases where the emergency is very grave, total
and immediate evacuation of all employees is necessary. In other emergencies, a partial
evacuation of nonessential employees with a delayed evacuation of others may be necessary for
continued plant operation. In some cases, only those employees in the immediate area of the fire
may be expected to evacuate or move to a safe area such as when a local application fire
suppression system discharge alarm is sounded. Employees must be sure that they know what is
expected of them in all such emergency possibilities, which have been planned in order to provide
assurance of their safety from fire or other emergencies.
The refuge or safe areas for evacuation should be designated, identified and clearly marked in the
plan.
Exterior refuge or safe areas may be locations which are away from the site of the emergency and
which provide sufficient space to accommodate the employees.
Communication and alarm systems shall be provided to alert all personnel on board, at any
location, of an emergency. The systems shall be suitable to provide instructions for emergency
response.
The alarm and communication system shall be powered from the main power system and from a
monitored Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS).
18.3.1 Means of Escape
The platform shall be provided with at least one safe escape route to enable maximum personnel
on board to reach assembly point from any part of the platform following a platform abandon
alarm. The escape routes should have emergency power supply and lighting to ensure safe and
fast escape & evacuation, if main power supply fails.
The escape routes should preferably be provided on the outside along the periphery of the
platform and shall be part of the daily used passageways. Escape routes shall be clearly marked
with photo luminescent signs. Marking should distinctly show the direction of escape.
There shall be at least two exits to escape routes outside living quarters and offices leading in
different directions. Escape routes should be so arranged and constructed as to minimize the
possibility of blockage by any one fire or other emergency condition. The escape routes shall be
planned such that they lead to assembly point, life boats and life raft stations, helicopter deck,
45
etc.The escape routes shall be of appropriate dimensions to facilitate easy transport of injured
personnel on stretcher.
Escape routes on deck should be provided with a non-skid oil resistant coating in yellow. On deck
grating, two parallel 10 cm wide yellow lines shouldl be painted with photo luminescent paint
indicating the width of escape route.
Escape routes in the living quarters shall be provided with low level self glow, florescent arrows
and/or directional lighting to indicate correct escape direction. Escape routes leading to higher or
lower level should be provided by stairways. Vertical ladders can be used in areas where only
three persons are there for a short time.
Lift shall not be considered as a part of escape route. However, it shall be possible to escape from
the lift and the hoist way with the lift/hoist way at any elevation. On loss of main power supply, lift
shall automatically go to next floor level and stop.
If use of lift is necessary to ensure adequate and effective escape, the lift shall satisfy the
requirements concerning transport of injured personnel on stretcher, protection, ventilation and
emergency power supply.
Escape routes shall be arranged from the drill floor to adjacent modules and also down the
substructure. The protection of these escape routes from heat exposure shall be considered and it
shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a wellhead area.
Personnel shall be able to use the escape routes without being exposed to excessive toxic fumes,
smoke, excessive heat loads, hot liquids or falling objects.
Escape route outside the area shall be designed and protected so that at least one route of
escape is available for the required time considering possible search & rescue operations.
The steel should be the preferred material for escape routes including handrails and stairs.
18.3.2 Means of Evacuation
The safe evacuation should be met by using a combination of helicopter, fixed davit launch life
boats and throw overboard life rafts.
Wherever installations are connected by bridge to other installations, the bridge may be
considered as the primary means of evacuation. The number, size and location of evacuation
means shall be decided based on manning, risk of exposure of assembly point and escape route
towards this area.
The min. no. of fixed davit launch life boats in the main evacuation area shall be sufficient for the
maximum no. of personnel 100% on board, including visitors. 100% redundancy shall be
maintained in means of evacuation through life boats or/and life rafts
The total capacity of throw overboard life raft shall as a minimum be sufficient for maximum.
number of personnel onboard for each escape route on either side .
One additional evacuation system in the far end of the installation should be installed, if escape to
the main evacuation area is impossible.
The distance between life boats and platform structure shall be sufficient to ensure a safe drop of
the life boats.
Life boats and throw overboard life rafts shall be type approved by the Maritime Administration in
the country of origin and accepted / approved by the Directorate General of Shipping, Government
of India; conforming to the latest SOLAS Regulations and National Maritime Regulatory Authority
and tested in accordance with latest IMO Resolution as applicable.
46
18.3.3 Life Boats & Launching Appliances
Life boats should be totally enclosed, fire protected with self contained air support system, water
spray system and fitted with approved inboard engine and on load release mechanism. The life
boat shall be designed for min. 10 minute running in a gas cloud or fire on sea. The engine
exhaust shall not act as source of ignition.
The launching appliance should be capable of recovering the lifeboat with full complement of loads
in up to 2 m wave height. The winches shall be designed for full load recovery including
personnels and should be fed by main power. The hoisting speed for recovery should be min. 3
m/min.
Main power should be available for charging of life boat batteries. The disconnection point should
be in the vicinity of life boat and disconnection shall be automatic when dropping or lowering the
life boat.
Access ways should be provided with antiskid coating. Cabinet housing should be provided for
winches and consoles.
The davit structure and life boat shall be so designed that they are easily approachable for
operation and maintenance.
Every life boat should be provided with approved EPIRB (Emergency Position indicating Radar
Beacon) and SART (Search and Rescue Transponder). Both the equipment should be serviced
every year at DG Shipping approved Service Station. Two way communication shall be provided
between the installation and the lifeboat by means of approved VHF Radio (GMDSS).
Weekly & monthly inspections and routine maintenance of lifeboat launching appliance and on
load release gear shall be carried out as per manufacturer’s guidelines under direct supervision of
safety officer. Repairs and replacement of parts should be carried out in accordance with
Manufacturer’s requirements and standards.
All other inspection, servicing and repair should be conducted by the manufacturer’s
representative or a person appropriately trained and certified by the manufacturer for the work to
be done.
18.3.4 Life Rafts
Life rafts shall be throw over board type and construction of the liferaft shall be as per the SOLAS
LSA Code latest edition with stowage height of min. 30 mtrs. The Liferaft shall be stowed in a
suitable cradle provided with strap and sen-house slip such that it is easily launched. The Life rafts
shall be provided with SOLAS ‘B’ Pack.
The Life rafts shall be annually serviced as per manufacturer’s guidelines and certified by party
duly authorized by the D G Shipping and provided with manufacturer’s original log card.
18.3.5 Life Jackets & Lifebuoys
Sufficient no. of life jackets shall be available at embarkation point. Personnel to don the life
jackets before entering the lifeboat/throw overboard life raft. Sufficient no. of lifebuoys shall be
provided, fitted with water activated lithium battery light, whistle and other requirements
conforming to the SOLAS LSA code.
Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) should be provided to each personnel before boarding the life
saving appliances. PLB to be serviced annually at D G Shipping approved service station.
Life jackets and lifebuoys shall be periodically inspected for any deterioration/damage.
47
18.3.6 SCBA & EEBD
Based on FES, sufficient number of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and emergency
escape breathing device (EEBD) shall be provided.
The SCBA and EEBD shall be serviced (at least annually) as per the manufacturer’s guidelines.
18.4
Emergency lighting
All manned areas on the unit or installation shall be equipped with emergency lighting, which is
supplied from the emergency source of power. The illumination level shall be sufficient to ensure
that necessary emergency response actions, including reading of signs and layouts, can take
place efficiently.
Escape routes, access routes and exit points shall be marked and illuminated so they are readily
identifiable in an emergency.
Muster areas, embarkation areas, launching arrangements and the sea below lifesaving
appliances shall be adequately illuminated by emergency lighting
19.0
Training
New employees should receive training in alarm recognition and fire protection soon after
deployment to an installation. They should be instructed in the response and escape plans for
platforms where they are working. Platform visitors and contractors should be instructed and
trained upon boarding the platform in the response and escape plans they are expected to perform
in an emergency. They should also be instructed as to the various alarms and to their meaning.
All operating personnel and other personnel who go to offshore frequently should have fire-fighting
training. This training should include practice in combating staged gas and oil fires similar to what
would be expected on an offshore platform. Each session should include defensive fire response
and operation of all the equipment personnel are expected to use. Each employee should know
the location of incipient stage fire equipment, how to use it, and how to report a fire alarm. They
should be given actual experience in handling the equipment on small practice fires simulating
actual situations as closely as possible.
All offshore going personnel shall undergo Helicopter Underwater Escape Training (HUET) to gain
understanding and awareness of emergency response to helicopter emergencies that may occur
during boarding, traveling to and from offshore installation and disembarking. HUET should be
able to provide trainees ability to efficiently and safely exit from a helicopter which has come down
in the sea and has flooded. HUET should meet the requirements of OPITO guidelines on the
subject.
Offshore going personnel shall also undergo sea survival training to achieve understanding and
awareness of risks and its management which they are exposed to, sea survival techniques and
effective use of life saving appliances.
Personnel should repeat the trainings at regular intervals to develop and maintain confidence.
Person’s competence and confidence in his ability to handle an emergency situation depends on
how much practice he has had in using the equipment. Refresher training should include the use
of equipment expected to be used and practice in combating staged emergency scenarios similar
to what may be expected.
Planned drills should be used to ensure that each employee is familiar with the alarm signal
systems, and the escape or response plan at his work place, and that they know their assignment.
The escape or response plan will set forth the special duties and duty stations of each member of
the personnel in the event of an emergency. Practice scenario drills should be held including the
announced walk-through type as well as the unannounced type. Effective training and procedures
should be provided for the personnel to escape and survive at sea.
Equipment / system supplier should impart training for inspection, service and operation of the fire
fighting equipment / system
Documentation covering fire drills, training, etc. should be maintained
48
20.0
Product Service Support
Equipment / system supplier shall technical support/after sales service support for a period of 10
years or more after handover of the system. These consulting services shall be provided by
factory trained and authorized technicians of the supplier.
The equipment / system supplier shall confirm to provide after sales service support including
supply of spares during the lifetime cycle of the equipment.
21.0
References
1.
API RP 2 FB “Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire
and Blast Loading”
2.
API RP 2 FPS “Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing, and Constructing
Floating Production Systems”
3.
API RP 14 C “Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of
Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms”
4.
API RP 14 E “Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore Production
Platform Piping Systems“
5.
API RP 14 F “Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems for
Fixed and Floating Offshore Petroleum Facilities for Unclassified and Class I, Division 1
and Division 2 Locations”
6.
API RP 14 FZ “Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems
for Fixed and Floating Offshore Petroleum Facilities for Unclassified and Class I, Zone 0,
Zone 1 and Zone 2 Locations”
7.
API RP 14 G “Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Fixed Opentype Offshore Production Platforms”
8.
API RP 14 J “Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore
Production Facilities”
9.
API RP 500 “Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical
Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and Division 2”
10.
API RP 505“Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical
Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2”
11.
API RP 520 “Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in
Refineries”
12.
‘Fire and Explosion Guidance: Oil and Gas, UK (2007)
13.
IEC 61508 “Functional safety of electrical, electronic and programmable electronic
(E/E/PE) safety-related systems”
14.
IMO MODU Code
15.
IMO MSC/Circ.1093 “Guidelines for periodic servicing and maintenance of lifeboats,
launching appliances and on-load release gear”
16.
IMO Fire Safety Systems (FSS) Code,2007 Edition
17.
International Life-Saving Appliances Code (LSA Code)
49
18.
ISO 14224 “Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries -- Collection and
exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment”
19.
ISO 13702 “Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Control and mitigation of fires and
explosions on offshore production installations -- Requirements and guidelines”
20.
ISO 10418 “Petroleum and natural gas industries —Offshore production installations
Basic surface process safety systems”
21.
NFPA 10 “Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers”
22.
NFPA 11 “Standard for Low, Medium, and High Expansion Foam”
23.
NFPA 12 “Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems”
24.
NFPA 13 “Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems”
25.
NFPA 14 “Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems”
26.
NFPA 15 “Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems
27.
NFPA 16 “Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems”
28.
NFPA 17 “Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems”
29.
NFPA 20 “Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection”
30.
NFPA 25 “Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection
Systems”
31.
NFPA 72 “National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code”
32.
NFPA 750 “Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems”
33.
NFPA 2001 “Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems”
34.
OISD-GDN-227 “Emergency Response Preparedness in E&P Industry”
35.
“Ozone Depletion Substances Regulation & Control Rules - 2000, Ministry of Environment
& Forests, Government of India
36.
Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules,2008
37.
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974
50
Abbreviations
AB
AFP
ALARP
API
BA
BOP
CCR
CF
CFR
CS
EDP
EEBD
EER
EERS
ESD
FES
FM
SCE
SDV
F&G
HC
HVAC
IMO
JF
MODU
OPITO
PA
PFP
PLC
SSSV
TR
UA
UKOOA
UL
UPS
WH
Accommodation Block
Active Fire Protection
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
American Petroleum Institute
Breathing Apparatus
Blowout Preventer
Central Control Room
Cellulosic Fire
Code of Federal Regulations
Control Station
Emergency Depressurization
Emergency Escape Breathing Device
Evacuation, Escape and Rescue
EER Strategy
Emergency Shutdown
Fire and Explosion Strategy
Factory Mutual Global
Safety Critical Elements
Shutdown valve
Fire and Gas System
Hydrocarbon
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
International Maritime Organization
Jet Fire
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation
Process Area
Passive Fire Protection
Programmable Logic Controllers
Sub-Surface Safety Valve
Temporary Refuge
Utility Area
United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
Underwriters Laboratories
Uninterruptable Power Supply
Wellhead Area
51
Annexure – 1
Summary of methods of controlling fire
[Source: Fire and explosion guidance (2007), Oil and Gas UK]
Control
method
Process
Emergency
Shut
Down
Valves
(ESDVs)
Control mechanism
Fire related design considerations
Automatic
–
Reduces
inventory available to leak or
fire by isolating process into
separate, smaller, segments.
Ease of testing and maintenance. Regular test of
process ESDVs often neglected.
Specify and justify test interval and acceptable
leak rate as part of design.
Record in
performance standard documentation.
In fire situations several ESDVs plus adjacent
pipe work may be engulfed at one time, releasing
several inventories to prolong fire.
Riser ESDVs
–
(Topsides
and subsea)
Automatic – isolates platform
from pipeline inventories at
the topsides.
ESDVs are frequently used at module
boundaries to prevent inventories from one
module feeding a fire in another, these divisions
then match the designated fire areas and their
associated firewater coverage. Where no such
boundary isolations are in place, it becomes
possible for hydrocarbon which is stored in one
module to be released into another module and
fuel escalation of further fires.
Topsides valves to fail close.
Locate away from process fire areas wherever
possible.
Protect valve and exposed riser sections against
foreseeable fire scenarios.
Always consider benefits of subsea pipeline
isolation, even a simple NRV may provide
significant risk reduction. Justify and record basis
of decision.
Topsides valves to fail close.
Sub-sea
Isolation
Valves
(SSIVs)
Automatic – Isolates platform
from pipeline inventories at a
defined distance.
Well head and
downhole
isolation
valves.
General
Platform Alarm
(GPA)
Automatic – Isolates platform
from reservoir inventories
Locate away from supply vessel routes, incoming
jack-ups and other potential sources of dropped
objects or dragging anchors. Locate the valve
such that uncontrolled events just the far side of
the SSIV will not pose a radiation problem for the
installation, distances are often of the order of
about 250-350m.
Surface and downhole valves to fail close on
confirmed fire or gas release event.
Automatic – Removes people
to place of relative safety
Any prolonged fire necessitates evacuation as a
precaution.
Automatic or manual –
Removes gases to flare or
cold vent.
OIM and deputies must understand escalation
mechanisms and time frames for all emergency
scenarios in order to be able to make competent
decisions.
BDVs to be fail-open, unless this endangers
helicopter operations and pre-warning not
feasible.
Blowdown and
blowdown
valves (BDVs)
52
Automatic facility recommended. Any manual
arrangements
need
clear
and
detailed
instructions for operation to offshore staff.
Process drain
facility
Manual
fighting
fire
Automatic or Manual –
Removes
main
liquid
inventories from vicinity of fire
to a safer location (e.g. cellar
deck surge tanks)
Manual fire intervention with
hydrants, fire hoses, foam
monitors, extinguishers etc.
Appropriate blowdown time to be developed from
escalation scenarios.
Usually manual facility
Consider vulnerability of dump line route.
Consider time required for draining
Appropriate for very small fires – Immediate
intervention on discovery of small fire can
prevent fire taking hold. All personnel trained for
small fire intervention.
Fire fighting, equipment cooling and helideck fire
control only possible where trained fire teams
available.
Effectiveness
depends
on
understanding of installation-specific fire and
escalation scenarios and plus realistic offshore
exercises.
Remote
manual
fire
fighting
Inerting agents
Initiation of fixed or oscillating
fire monitors, with or without
foam.
Prevents fire from starting /
taking holds by rendering the
atmosphere inert – clean
agent, CO2 etc.
Note that even with training, fire fighting teams
that remain to fight a fire will be at greater risk.
Comparative risk issues must be understood and
precise criteria defined to limit fire fighting team’s
exposure.
Often used on helideck or open upper or weather
decks. May be affected by strong winds.
Useful in enclosed, remote spaces difficult to
access in fire situations (e.g. pump rooms in
semi sub or ship hulls).
Static discharge may ignite atmosphere, causing
explosion – check potential with vendor.
Foam
application
Dirivent
systems
Other HVAC
systems
Reduces
evaporation
of
vapours.
Creates film / foam to prevent
oxygen reaching liquid fuel
thus
reducing,
or
extinguishing pool fire.
Disperses very small leaks to
prevent flammable cloud
build-up.
Provides air exchange within
an enclosed area to prevent
or slow flammable cloud
build-up.
Bunds
Control spread
releases
of
liquid
Drains
Remove liquid and deluge
Inerted atmosphere may not be breathable so
warnings and pre-discharge alarms required.
Suitable for contained liquid fires. Less effective
on running pool fires, not effective on jet fires.
Only effective for fugitive (very small) leak
scenarios. System shuts down during major
release scenarios.
System needs special attention to be able to
provide adequate air flow rates and be safe, i.e.
to not introduce any ignition sources and also not
move the fuel / air mixture to other areas hitherto
safe within the context of the originating accident.
While bunds can contain a liquid release / fire,
they can also concentrate a fire around the
equipment in the bund and should be used in
conjunction with foam. Design must ensure
deluge does not cause bund overflow by being
sized for maximum foreseeable liquid volume
release.
Small releases are usually within drain system
53
release to drain system.
capacity.
The drain capacity needs to be
capable of removing maximum foreseeable liquid
volume release although the effects of burning
liquids in the drain system must be checked.
Sea-fire possibilities and consequences need
checking.
In emergency scenarios environmental issues
become secondary to preservation of life.
54
Annexure - 2
Typical Safety Critical Elements
[Source: Fire and Explosion Guidance (2007), Oil and Gas UK]
Hydrocarbon Containment – Pipelines, Risers, Vent lines, firewater pipework.
Hydrocarbon Containment – Topsides Process Facilities
Hydrocarbon Containment – Wells
Fie & Gas Detection System
Riser Shutdown System
Topsides Shutdown System
Wellhead Shutdown System
Ignition Prevention
Platform Sub-structure
Topsides Structure
Uninterrupted Power Supply
Emergency Lighting
Evacuation & Escape Systems
Rescue & Recovery
Telecommunications
Navigational Aids
Personal Protective Equipment
Helideck
Escape Routes
Temporary Refuge
55
Annexure - 3
Topsides issues during conceptual design stage
[Source: Fire and explosion guidance (2007), Oil and Gas UK]
Item
Wells
Fire considerations
Location and segregation for all anticipated types of well operation (including drilling and
work over) and maintenance during field life.
Location, accessibility and vulnerability of automatic and manual isolation valves in fire
situations.
Location of artificial lift arrangements, inventories (including down hole gas lift inventories)
and isolation.
Risers /
pipelines
Riser and riser isolation valve locations – vulnerability to fire attack.
Risers and Pipelines as source of release and potential for escalation.
Riser vulnerability to passing and attendant vessel collision especially during cranes
operations.
Future risers, e.g. gas lift risers or other proposed tie-ins.
Process &
piping
Location of major inventories
Location of relief, blow down and flare and/or vent lines
Number and rough location of process ESDVs and BDVs
Location of overboard discharge lines or atmospheric vents (in worst case process upset
condition) with respect to ignition points.
Location of fuel-gas piping and potential for fires / explosions outside main process
locations (especially turbine enclosures)
Exposure of personnel and equipment (including piping, instrumentation and safety critical
elements) in closed or open module designs needs the consideration.
Structures and
supports
Location of tall structures or structural supports vulnerable to fire attack with severe
consequences.
Points of
ignition
Consider ignition potential for all release scenarios
Especially consider the location of all non-certified equipment with respect to releases and
associated gas plumes (e.g. cranes and generator or motor enclosures).
Egress,
escape
and
evacuation
routes
TR and
alternate
protected
muster points
For potential fire scenarios:

Consider egress routes, checking for trap points or need for protected muster point
alternative to TR;
 Consider location of escape routes to sea;
 Consider time to escalation Vs time to muster, appraise and evacuate;
 Consider impairment of TEMPSC loading area and helideck access routes.
Location of air supply ducts.
Vulnerability to heat / smoke
56
Vulnerability of TR supports to fire scenarios.
Communicatio
ns
UPS
Location and vulnerability of any critical communications hardware
Fire Protection
Location of firewalls and PFD
Check for vulnerability to fire
Vulnerability of fire pumps and ring-main to damage in fire scenarios.
Vulnerability of deluge piping inside module and supply lines. Location of back-up supply
lines.
Discharge location for oil and firewater drained to sea in fire incident.
57
Annexure – 4
Recommended number and distribution of portable extinguishers on MODU
[Source: MODU Code 2009]
Type of space
Minimum number of extinguishers
Space containing the controls for
the main source of electrical
power
1; and 1 additional extinguisher
suitable for electrical fires when main
switchboards are arranged in the
space
Cranes:
With electric motors/ hydraulics
Cranes:
With internal combustion engine
Drill floor
Helidecks
Machinery spaces of category A
Machinery spaces of category A
which
are
periodically
unattended
Main switchboards
Mud pits, Mud processing areas
Class(es) of
extinguisher(s)
A and/or C
0
2
(1 in cab and 1 at exterior of engine
compartment)
2
(1 at each exit)
In accordance with section 9.16 of
MODU code 2009
In accordance with section 9.8 of
MODU code 2009
At each entrance in accordance with
section 9.82 of MODU code 2009
2 in the vicinity
1 for each enclosed space.
(Travel distance to an extinguisher
not to exceed 10 m for open space)
B
C
B
B
B
C
B
1. Minimum size should be: DCP and CO2 - 5 kg capacity, Foam- 9 l capacity.
2. A portable extinguisher provided for that space may be located outside near the
entrance to that space. A portable fire extinguisher placed outside near the entrance
to that space may also be considered as satisfying the provisions for the space in
which it is located.
3. Class of extinguisher is as per NFPA 10.
In addition to the above requirement, the following additional requirements shall be considered:
1. Cranes (With electric motors/ hydraulics) : 02 number C class extinguishers
2. Drill floor
: 02 number B and/or C class extinguishers
3. Mud pits, Mud processing areas
: 01 number B class extinguisher for each enclosed
space
58
Annexure - 5
Typical applications of fire/gas detectors
[Source: ISO 13702]
Hazard
Fire
Type of detector
Heat
Typical application
Typical actions
Pneumatic
Process, wellhead, utilities
Alarm, Emergency Shutdown
(ESD), Emergency
Depressurization (EDP),
closure of the SSSV, active
fire protection
Electric
Turbine hoods, workshops,
stores, engine
rooms, process, wellhead,
utilities
Process, wellhead utilities,
generators, gas
turbines
Control rooms, electrical
rooms, computer
rooms, accommodation
Alarm, ESD, EDP, active fire
protection
Air intakes to TR and control
stations
Process,
wellhead utilities areas,
engine
Rooms (Only for rooms
containing essential safety
systems)
Alarm, isolate ventilation
Air intakes
Alarm, ESD, EDP, isolate
power, ESD ventilation
system
Enclosed areas handling low
GOR liquid
hydrocarbons
Alarm, ESD, EDP, isolate
power
All areas, escape routes,
muster points, TRs
Alarm, start of fire pumps
Flame
Smoke
Flammable gas
Oil mist
Manual call point
59
Alarm, ESD, EDP, active fire
protection
Alarm, isolate power, active
fire
protection (if present)
Alarm, ESD, EDP, isolate
power
Annexure - 6
Selection of AFP systems on typical areas
[Source: ISO 13702 and Fire and explosion guidance (2007), Oil and Gas UK]
Area/room
Type of protection
in addition to
portable
Typical
minimum water
application
rates
l/min/m2
10
(or
400l/min/well)
Remarks
Wellhead*/manifold
area
Deluge/foam/dry
chemical
Process areas
Deluge/foam/dry
chemical
10
Pumps/compressors
Deluge/foam
20
Gas treatment area
Deluge/dry chemical
10
Methanol area
Alcohol-resistant
foam or deluge
None, if no HC risk
10
Deluge
Deluge/foam
10
400
Only if FES shows role for this system
The objective is to prevent fires on one
well, affecting adjacent wellheads and
derrick floor.
Deluge is suitable provided pool fire is
not a spray.
None
Deluge/foam
Deluge/foam
Deluge/foam
None
10
10
10
Only if FES shows role for this system
Water-injection
treatment area
Drill floor
BOP area
Drillers cabin
Degasser room
Shale shaker room
Active mud tank room
Sack/bulk storage
room
Mud lab
Cementing unit room
Control station
Central control
room(CCR)
Instrument room
adjacent to CS/CCR
Local equipment room
False floor and ceiling
in CS/CCR and
instrument rooms
Turbine hall
Turbine hood
Switch board room
The objective is to prevent fires on one
wellhead, affecting adjacent wellheads.
Deluge is suitable provided pool fire is
not a spray fire.
Addition of foam is beneficial.
General area deluge may not be
suitable for protection of specific items
against impinging jet fires.
Key items such as vessels with BLEVE
potential should be protected by other
means such as PFP or equipment
specific deluge.
Addition of foam is beneficial.
Foam if area contains significant
flammable liquids
Where gas jet is large in comparison
with size of module, deluge may
provide limited benefit.
Foam if area contains significant
flammable liquids
Portable foam units, if the methanol
area is small
Provided that no flammable materials
stored
Clean Agent
Watermist/deluge/foam
Clean Agent
Clean Agent
10
To be confirmed in developing FES
Clean Agent
To be confirmed in developing FES
Clean Agent
To be confirmed in developing FES
Lifting gear for floor hatches.
Deluge
Clean Agent
water-mist
Clean Agent
10
or
Dedicated system only if flammable
inventories within the hall
Interlock access to hood, if gaseous
To be confirmed in developing FES
60
Battery room
Emergency generator
room
Fire pump room
HVAC room
Mechanical workshop
Instrument workshop
Storage of gas bottles
Paint store
Accommodation**
Vent extract from
galley
General galley area
Galley cooking
appliances and range
Crane cabin
Crane engine room
Helideck
Hangar
Chain locker
Ballast control room
Turret area
Pump room in column
Vertical and horizontal
structures
Escape and
evacuation routes
Clean Agent
Watermist/foam/deluge
Watermist/foam/deluge
Clean Agent
Sprinkler
Sprinkler
Water-mist/sprinkler
Sprinkler
Agent
Sprinkler
/
10
Effect of water on equipment in the
room should be evaluated
Effect of water on equipment in the
room should be evaluated
6
6
Provided stored externally and not
exposed to radiant heat
Clean
Kitchen
Hood
Systems
None
Wet
Chemical
System
None
Portable/water-mist
Foam/dry chemical
Sprinkler/foam/dry
chemical
Water
None
Deluge/foam
None
Deluge
Water curtain
10
6
Section flammable materials to limit fuel
at risk
Operated locally in galley
According to supplier recommendation
Deluge, water-mist for diesel drives
6
10
60
10
Unless flammable liquid present
10
(4 l/min/m2 for
horizontal)
15 l/min/m2 to
45 l/min/m2
45 /
m
i
n
/
m
*For wellheads, as per API RP 2030, water requirement should be 760-920 l/min/well.
**As per requirements of API-RP-14G, accomodation should have following fixed firefighting
systems:
a. Sprinkler or water mist system
b. Water hose reels strategically located near or inside the living quarters.
61
Annexure – 7
Typical placement of fire extinguishers at production installation
[Source: API RP 14 G]
Type of space
Main corridor of
building
Stairway
Minimum number of extinguishers
living quarter
Sleeping accommodations
(Where occupied by more than 4
persons.)
Radio room or other enclosed
areas containing a significant
concentration of electrical
equipment or controls
Galleys
Internal combustion or gas turbine
engine installed in an enclosed
area
Internal combustion or gas turbine
engines installed in open areas
Electric motors ( 3.75 KW or
greater)
Electric generators
Gas or Oil fired boilers or heater
Crane
1
1 within 10 ft of each stairway on each
deck level
Class(es) of
extinguisher(s)
A
B
A
1
1
1 for each engine
C
A, B and C
B
1 for three engines
B
1 for each 2 motors
C
1 for each 2 generators
1 for each boiler or heater
1 on or in the vicinity of each crane
C
B
B
1. Wheeled dry chemical extinguishers provide more capacity and range than hand portable
units. This factor and the nature of potential fires must be carefully considered in selecting
the size and number of extinguishers.
2. Hand portable fire extinguishers with less than B-20 kg rating or multipurpose Class A, B, C
extinguishers are not recommended for installation in the process areas of production
platforms.
3. The maximum travel distance from any point on the platform deck area having a potential for
fire to an extinguisher should not exceed 50 ft (15.2 m).
4.
Class of extinguisher is as per NFPA 10.
In addition to the above requirement, the following additional requirements shall be considered:
1. Main corridor of living quarter building : 03 number A , B and/or C class extinguishers
2. Radio room
: 01 number C class extinguisher
3. Internal combustion or gas turbine engine
installed in an enclosed area
: 01 number B class extinguisher for each engine
4. Internal combustion or gas turbine engine
installed in open areas
: 03 number B class extinguishers for three engines
5. Electric motors ( 3.75 KW or greater)
: 01 number C class extinguisher for each motor
6. Electric generators
: 03 number C class extinguishers for each two
generators
7. Gas or Oil fired boilers or heater
: 01 number B class extinguisher for each boiler or
heater
8. Crane
: 01 number B class extinguisher in the vicinity of each
crane
9. Control room/ Data room/server room
: 02 number C class extinguishers for each compartment
62
Annexure – 8
Typical fire integrity requirements for fire barriers
[Source: ISO 13702]
Adjacent protected area
NonWellhead areas
Process areas including
Control
hazardous
and drilling areas Gas compression areas
Stations
utility areas
(WH)
(PA)
(CS)
(UA)
1/CF-60
1/CF-60
Not to be adjacent
1/CF-60
1/CF-60
1/CF-60
1/CF-0
1/CF-0
1/CF-0
1/CF-0
Not to be adjacent
1/JFa-0
1/JFa-0
1/JFa-0
1/JFa-0
1/JFa-120
1/JFa-60
1/JFa-0
1/JFa-0
1/JFa-0
1/CF-80
1/CF-60
1/CF-60
1/CF-60
1/CF-60
Rating is specified as: Endurance duration, in hours/ Type of Fire for protection/insulation requirements,
in minutes, to reach 139 oC above ambient temperature on the non exposed surface.
1/JF-‘x’ indicates requirements to maintain stability and integrity against jet fires for one hour with insulation
requirements for x minute. Likewise, 1/CF-x indicates requirements to maintain stability and integrity
against cellulosic fires for one hour with insulation requirements for x minute.
Type of fire: HC =Hydrocarbon pool fire, CF=Cellulosic fire, JF=Jet fire.
Fire area
AB
UA
WH
PA
CS
Note 1
Note 2
Note 3
a.
Accommodation
blocks
(AB/TR)
‘HC’ type of fire may be appropriate if the evaluation of the fires likely in the area indicates that ‘JF’ is
not a credible basis for the design of the passive fire protection.
Annexure – 9
Typical fire integrity requirements for load-bearing structures
[Source: ISO 13702]
Area relying on structure in fire area for integrity
Non-hazardous
Wellhead areas
Process areas
Control
utility areas
and drilling areas
including
Stations
(UA)
(WH)
Gas compression
(CS)
areas
(PA)
AB/TR
1/CF/400
1/CF/400
Not applicable
Not applicable
1/CF/400
UA
1/CF/400
1/CF/400
1/CF/400
1/CF/400
1/CF/400
WH
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
PA
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
1/JFa/400
CS
1/CF/400
1/CF/400
Not applicable
Not applicable
1/CF/400
Note 1 Rating is specified as: Period of resistance (hours)/ Type of fire / critical temperature (oC).
Note 2 Type of fire: HC =Hydrocarbon pool fire, CF=Cellulosic fire, JF=Jet fire.
Note 3 Critical temperature is the temp. at which yield stress is reduced to the minimum allowable stress under
operational loading conditions. (400 oC has been used as a typical value for structural steel. For Aluminium the corresponding temp. is 200 oC).
a.
‘HC’ type of fire may be appropriate if the evaluation of the fires likely in the area indicates that ‘JF’ is
not a credible basis for the design of the passive fire protection.
Fire area
Accommodation
blocks
(AB/TR)
63
Annexure – 10
Typical protection criteria for critical equipment
[Source: ISO 13702]
Protection criteria
Surface temperature
Protection period
oC
min
Riser sections
< 200a
60b
Riser supports
< 400
60b
Riser topside SDV
< 200
60b
Fire pumps
< 200
60
Emergency generators
< 200
60
UPS systems
40c
30
Control panels for SSIV/SSSV/BOP
40c
15
a. In the absence of any knowledge as regards the relative location of the fire on the riser, the ESD
valves and the contents of the riser, it has been assumed that the fire is near the ESD valves and
the riser is filled with liquid hydrocarbon. As a result, 200 oC has been used as the default surface
temperature for the riser sections to ensure the integrity of the ESD valves.
b. Or the minimum time period considered sufficient for a complete evacuation of the installation.
c. PFP may be provided to prevent temperature in the enclosure containing this equipment rising to
these levels when subjected to an external fire.
64
Annexure – 11
Typical description
Foam Water Hose Reel Unit
The unit should consist of SS foam tank of 230 ltr capacity with SS hose reel. Inline Brass
Educator 1 ½ “ of 95 GPM capacity at 100 psi suitable for sea water shall be connected to the
hose reel with suitable SS foam and waterline ball valves. Hose of 23 mtr length fitted with 1 ½ “ of
fixed 95 GPM flow at 100 psi brass/ gun metal nozzle capable of giving jet spray & foam and shut
off function shall be provided.
Monitor
Monitor should be of dual water way design with integral nozzle and light weight in construction.
Slide bearing systems should be provided for horizontal movements. Where remote controlled
monitors are installed, the monitor shall be fitted with flame proof electric motor and remote
controlled with joystick operation for both the movement of the monitor and the control of the
nozzle.
Dry Chemical fixed system
The Dry Chemical powder fire fighting system shall as a minimum include common welded
structural frame mounting the primary system components and inter-connection pipe work,
nitrogen expellant system including nitrogen cylinders (conforming to US DOT 3AA 2400 or
equivalent), powder storage tank (as per ASME section – VIII) with relief mechanism, actuator
system, bursting disc, discharge devices and all other items necessary for safe and proper system
operation, recharge and maintenance.
The dry chemical powder selected shall be free flowing, water repellant, non abrasive, potassium
bicarbonate, UL listed /FM approved for application with the equipment. The powder shall be
compatible with AFFF foam concentrate as per MIL –F-24385 F. The Dry Chemical Powder should
have chemical pigment added which changes the colour, for identification purposes..
The system shall be provided with close couple hose reels either skid mounted or located
remotely. The hose reel shall be fitted with 150 ft. rubber hose as per UL 92. The hose reel shall
be provided with actuator and one piece spun nitrogen cartridge in accordance with US DOT 3A
800.
The special tools required for operations and maintenance should be provided with each system.
CO2 Extinguishers:
The Cylinder body should be steel and the valve should be squeeze grip type and should be of
forged brass chrome plated. Pins, hose bands etc. should be of stainless steel. Visual seal must
be provided to help prevent unwanted discharge of contents.
Typical technical parameters of the fire extinguishers shall be as under:
Capacity
Effective Range
Discharge Time
2 Kgs
6 ft. and above
Less than 12 secs.
6.8 Kgs
6 ft. and above
Less than 12 secs,
Shell
UL Rating
USCG Rating
Suppression capability
High tensile steel
5-B-C
Type B C size I
12 sq.ft and above
High tensile steel
10-B-C
Type B C size II
24 sq.ft and above
9.2 kgs
6 ft. and above
Less
than
14
secs.
High tensile steel
10-B-C
Type B C Size II
24 sq.ft and above
Dry Chemical Powder Extinguishers
The Extinguisher body shall be steel and the handles, levers, pull pins, hose bands etc should be
stainless steel / aluminum. The Extinguisher shall be external cartridge operated type containing
65
non corrosive
cartridge.
potassium bicarbonate (Purple K) as the extinguishing agent with CO2 expellant
Typical technical parameters of the fire extinguishers shall be as under:
Capacity
Effective Range
Discharge Time
Shell
Corrosion Resistance
Charge Weight
UL Rating
USCG Rating
Suppression capability
4 kgs
30 ft and above
Less than 20 secs.
Carbon steel
minm 1.5mm thk
Passed 2000 hrs
salt spray test with
min.
total
paint
thickness 3-6 MIL
Less than 10 kgs
60-B-C
Type B C size II
140 sq.ft and above
66
12 kgs
45 ft and above
Less than 30 secs.
Carbon Steel
minm 1.9mm thk
Passed 2000 hrs
salt spray test with
min. total paint
thickness 3-6 MIL
Less than 24 kgs
120-B-C
Type B C Size IV
280 sq.ft and above
45 kgs
25 ft and above
Less than 55 secs.
Carbon steel
minm 2.0mm thk
Passed 2000 hrs
salt spray test with
min. total paint
thickness 3-6 MIL
Less than 202 kgs
320-B-C
Type B C Size IV
750 sq.ft and above