Organizational Gestalt, personnel management and performance:
Towards conceptual clarification and empirical extension
Paper, 4th Organization Studies Summer Workshop
Pissouri, Cyprus, 5-7 June, 2008
Max Visser*
Assistant professor of organizational behavior
Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University
P.O. Box 9108
6500 HK Nijmegen
The Netherlands
Email: m.visser@fm.ru.nl
Webpage: www.ru.nl/fm/visser
Draft, 150308
Text, incl. 75 ref’s: 6.962 words
Abstract: 258 words
Abstract
Purpose – This paper intends to contribute to the discussion on organizational configurations and
performance by providing a theoretical clarification of the concept of configuration (or Gestalt)
and an empirical extension towards army organizations.
Methodology/approach - The paper entails a conceptual analysis and a secondary analysis of military and historical empirical research material.
Findings – The paper develops a theoretical framework on the basis of Gestalt theory with a threefold distinction between aggregate whole, functional whole (or system) and Gestalt (or configuration), in which related concepts like (in)consistency, system strength, harmony and simplicity are
incorporated. Empirically the paper finds that the internal organization and personnel management of the German Army in World War II were to a high degree configured towards fighting power, which in its turn was positively related to the battlefield performance of that army.
Research limitations/implications – The research scope of the paper is limited to the analysis of
one particular army in World War II and a brief comparison to two other armies in that war. Implications for theory primarily reside in the analysis and clarification of the concepts of Gestalt and
configuration in relation to personnel management and performance.
Practical implications – The paper has practical implications for armies and organizations that
resemble armies in one or more aspects, like prisons, correctional facilities, police forces, hospitals,
mental institutions and fire departments.
Originality/value – The paper is the first to analyze army organization and personnel management from a Gestalt theoretical perspective. Furthermore, it analyzes these aspects in an army only
seldom studied by students of organization and personnel management.
Introduction
The relationship between organizational Gestalt (or configuration) and performance has
received increasing attention in the literature. Theory and research on these subjects
generally adopt the proposition that the more closely configured (or “Gestaltet”) an organization’s elements are, the better its performance is expected to be (e.g., Miller, 1996;
Siggelkow, 2002). This proposition has been elaborated in various forms. For example,
in the field of human resource management researchers have inquired into the relationship between configurations of human resource management practices, employee behavior, and organizational performance (e.g., Bowen and Ostroff, 2004; Delery and Doty,
1996; Ichniowsky, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006). Others
have inquired into the relationship between organizational configurations and innovative behavior (Lee et al., 2004), psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999), and dysfunctional behavior (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981).
There are, however, several theoretical and empirical problems surrounding the relationship between degrees of configuration and organizational performance. Theoretically, it seems that the concepts of configuration and Gestalt are defined and applied rather
loosely (e.g., Delery and Doty, 1996; Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, 1993; Miller and Friesen,
1982). They often appear in conjunction with concepts like inconsistency (Lee et al.
2004), system strength (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004; Siggelkow, 2002), or simplicity (Miller, 1996), while their definitions often contain vague and abstract references to wholes,
patterns and harmony without a clear indication of theoretical differences. In this paper
I propose a more coherent theory of organizational part-whole relationships, centering
on the concept of Gestalt.
Empirically, the relationship between degrees of configuration and performance is
mostly researched in single firms or samples of firms, using financial indicators as
measures of performance (e.g., Delery and Doty, 1996; Fiss, 2007; Miller and Friesen,
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1982). In this paper I propose to extend the empirical base from private firms to army
organizations, and to extend performance measures from financial indicators to mutually inflicted casualties between army organizations in battlefield engagements.
Army organizations relatively seldom have been studied by students of organization
and personnel management, probably due to unfamiliarity with (or even repugnance to)
military affairs, the dangers in acquiring data, and a shared image of armies as simple,
routine-ridden “machines” (Morgan, 1997; Moskos, 1984; Mutch, 2006). This lack of attention, however, does not seem fully justifiable. Armies constitute the world’s oldest
large-scale organizations, representing centuries of experience in surviving arguably the
most competitive, turbulent and dynamic situation an organization may encounter, i.e.,
actual war. Moreover, the image of armies as hierarchical and bureaucratic “machines”
seems at odds with the degree of flexibility and adaptation current organization theory
requires of organizations in turbulent and dynamic situations (March and WeissingerBaylon, 1986; Wilson, 1989). In other words, army organizations seem to pose an apparent paradox here.
In solving this apparent paradox, the German Army before and in World War II appears as a particularly interesting case from the military and historical literature. This
seems surprising, since this army is often associated with a rigid hierarchy (“Befehl ist
Befehl”) and strict discipline (“Kadavergehorsam”), which characteristics do not seem
conducive to a flexible adaptation to the contingencies of war. Yet, despite this association and in spite of having lost Word War II, military historians generally agree that the
German Army was one of the most effective of all armies in that war (e.g., Dupuy, 1984;
Hart, 2001; Murray, 1992; Van Creveld, 1983).
In this paper my purpose is to show, first, that the German Army’s organization and
personnel management were to a comparatively high degree configured towards
fighting power and, second, that this high degree of “Gestaltung” may be positively related to a comparatively strong battlefield performance. Fighting power of an army is defined here as “the sum total of qualities that make armies fight, resting on mental, intellectual, and organizational foundations, and manifest in discipline and cohesion, morale
and initiative, courage and toughness” (Van Creveld, 1983: 3). Here I abstain from analyzing the quality and quantity of equipment, which, together with fighting power, determines military strength (e.g., Showalter, 2002). Battlefield performance is defined by
two measures, combat effectiveness and score effectiveness, discussed below (Dupuy,
1984, 1986).
This paper will proceed as follows. In the second section I will present a theory of organizational part-whole relationships, intended to link various concepts of Gestalt, configuration, system, consistency and simplicity. In the third section I will present an analysis of German army organization, personnel management policies, and fighting power
during World War II on the basis of historical and military sources, together with a brief
comparison with two Allied armies. The fourth section contains a quantitative analysis
of relative battlefield performance, while the paper ends with discussion and conclusions.
The organizational Gestalt
The study of part-whole relationships has been a central theme in a broad scientific and
philosophical movement known as Gestalt theory. Initiated by the treatise of Von Ehrenfels on “Gestaltqualitäten” (1890), Gestalt theory made important inroads in early twentieth century Continental philosophy (Ash, 1995; Smith, 1988). In 1912 Wertheimer in-
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troduced Gestalt theory in the field of experimental psychology, from which the Berlin
school of Gestalt psychology emerged (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1947; Wertheimer 1938).
This school inspired further extensions of Gestalt theory to interpersonal relations and
group processes, leading to the formulation of field theory (Lewin, 1951), attribution
and balance theories (Heider, 1958) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957).
Other applications of Gestalt theory reached the fields of neurology (Goldstein 1939),
psychotherapy (Perls, Hefferline and Goodman, 1973) and political science (Visser,
1994ab), while parts of communication science also underwent Gestalt influences
(Bateson, 1972; Visser, 2003ab, 2007ab).
The applicability to a diversity of psychological and social phenomena and the firm
empirical base Gestalt theory has enjoyed over the years invite an extension to the study
of organizational part-whole relationships. Here I propose a theoretical framework on
the basis of a logical analysis of the Gestalt concept (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988abc;
Simons, 1988; Visser, 1997, 2003b). The framework formulates three criteria for the
specification of wholes, which in the remainder of this section I will apply to organizations.
The first criterion refers to the unilateral dependence of a whole on its basis (or fundament). The existence of objects that form the basis of the whole is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the whole itself, but the reverse is not true: a whole cannot exist without constituent parts or elements. In wholes conforming to this criterion there is
a low degree of interdependence among constituent elements. Reciprocal determination
between parts approaches or equals zero, and no energy and tensions are present between the elements. An example would be a heap of stones lying by the side of the road
(Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988ac; Simons, 1988).
In the organizational literature this criterion is exemplified in approaches that, for example, look at aggregations of human resource management practices (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004), at combinations of conditions (Lee et al., 2004), and at patterns or integration without specifying the dynamics thereof (Freeman, 1999; Edmondson, 1999).
Wholes conforming to this first criterion I propose to label as aggregate wholes.
The second criterion refers to supersummativity, often expressed in the statement that
the whole is more than (or different from) the mere sum of its parts. It is a property of a
whole which cannot meaningfully be ascribed to the totality of the parts making up that
whole. In wholes conforming to the first and the second criterion there is a high degree
of interdependence among constituent elements. Reciprocal determination between
parts is high, involving energy and tensions. An example would be a charged and isolated conductor: the whole under consideration is the field containing the charges, the
parts are the field elements that reciprocally determine each other through the influence
of the field’s forces (Köhler, 1947).
Characteristic of such wholes is the fact that their internal processes depend upon the
topographical boundaries of the system, but at the same time take place independent of
the nature of that system. These internal processes tend toward a state of stationary
equilibrium, according to which the distribution of parts and forces display a tendency
towards equalization or balance. In Gestalt theory this tendency appears as the law of
“Prägnanz” or “good” Gestalt, according to which the organization of wholes will always
be as “good” as the prevailing conditions permit. The term “good” refers to properties
like regularity, symmetry, and proximity (Koffka, 1935; Wertheimer, 1938).
In the organizational literature this second criterion is exemplified in approaches that,
for example, look at patterns that represent non-linear synergistic effects and higherorder interactions (Delery and Doty, 1996), at a holistic stance in which the parts of a
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social entity take their meaning from the whole (Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, 1993), and at
systems that attain a state of consistency or harmony, due to mutual reinforcement
among system elements (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Siggelkow, 2002). Wholes conforming to this second criterion I propose to label as functional wholes or systems.
The third criterion refers to the notion of transposition, which refers to all kinds of
modification of wholes in which some aspect of form remains constant or invariant. In
wholes conforming to the third criterion there is not only a high degree of reciprocal determination between parts, involving energy and tensions, but also an underlying theme
or principle that remains constant in all transformations that whole undergoes. An example would be a melody played in different keys (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988ab;
Simons, 1988).
Characteristic of such wholes is their degree of organization in accordance to a single
theme or principle. Some wholes are perfectly arranged in accordance with the principle, while other wholes are just barely organized enough to recognize the principle. The
law of “Pragnänz” or “good” Gestalt under this criterion takes a somewhat different form
than under the second criterion. It may either formally refer to “Prägnanz” as originality
(the primacy or autonomy of a phenomenon, its capacity to serve as a prototype), or materially to “Prägnanz” as meaningfulness (in accordance with the specific nature of the
given structure, its types of mental set, habits and traditions in relation to a given environment) (Smith, 1988).
In the organizational literature this third criterion is exemplified in approaches that,
for example, look at simplicity, the degree to which an organization’s elements are orchestrated by a single theme, principle or workplace philosophy (Kaarsemaker and
Poutsma, 2006; Miller, 1996; Mintzberg, 1978). More in general, this criterion is exemplified in chaotic or “fractal” organizations, in which the organization’s core values and
mission are patterned into the behavior of its members (Morgan, 1997; Wheatley,
1992). Wholes conforming to the third criterion I propose to label as Gestalten or configurations.
Army organization and fighting power
Comparatively more than the US and British Armies, the German Army’s internal organization and personnel management were configured towards fighting power. I distinguish six interrelated aspects, the first pertaining to organization and the remaining five
pertaining to various aspects of personnel management.
As a first aspect, the German philosophy of war acknowledged the existence of environmental uncertainty and turbulence and emphasized the need for a decentralized approach to adapt to it. This philosophy was deeply influenced by the crushing defeat of
the Prussian Army at the hands of Napoleon in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806). In reflecting on the causes of defeat, leading military philosophers and practitioners like Von
Clausewitz, Von Scharnhorst and Von Moltke gradually came to the fundamental insight
that friction, uncertainty and ambiguity are inherent in the “fog of war”. These characteristics should be accepted as given, rather than being contained in vain through detailed planning and upper-echelon hierarchical control (Dunivan 2003; Echevarria,
1996; Frieser, 2005).
To deal effectively with the “fog of war”, German war doctrine increasingly encouraged
individual initiative, independent thinking and responsibility at all levels of command.
This doctrinal approach became known as “Auftragstaktik”, a command and control system in which commanders were being given missions, rather than orders (“Befehlstak-
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tik”). In this system “the mission must unmistakably express the will of the commander.
The objective, course of action and mission constraints, such as time, must be clear and
definite without restricting freedom of action more than necessary in order to make use
of the initiative of individuals charged with the tasks to be accomplished. Limits as to the
method of execution, within the framework of the higher commander’s will, are imposed
only where essential for coordination with other commands” (Von Lossow, 1977: 87-88;
Uhle-Wetter, 1993; Widder, 2002).
As a second aspect, the German Army’s internal organization concentrated on combat
effectiveness, delegating supporting functions to the rear. Towards that purpose, the
German Army was divided into a Field Army, responsible for all military operations, and
a Replacement Army, responsible for training, replacements, procurement, and administration. Both branches were organized on the basis of regional defense districts, with
the purpose of bringing men, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers together
from the same region, thus promoting social homogeneity. Both branches also maintained close connections, through rotation of officers and personnel, frequent visits and
close personal ties between officers (Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
As a third aspect, officers and NCOs were primarily selected on the basis of character
and trained towards decisive combat leadership. The selection of officers, their admission to officer training and their commission rested with the regimental commanders of
the men involved. Only in 1942 a central screening office was instituted for officer testing, but the other decisions remained at the regimental level. Officers were primarily selected on the basis of character and will power, more than intelligence or education.
Psychological tests, examinations and personal evaluations played a main role in the selection process. Formal training lasted between 9-16 months, in which tactics and operations were emphasized, while strategy, logistics and organization were relatively neglected. As the war proceeded, active front service increasingly came to be regarded as
the best training of aspiring officers, including those NCOs who showed leadership and
initiative in front of the enemy. Promotion to higher ranks primarily occurred on the basis of personal evaluations of character, competence and the ability to generate trust
under front line conditions, increasingly more than seniority or General Staff training
(Dupuy, 1984; Knox, 2000; Van Creveld, 1983).
Although in the course of the war a shortage of officers developed, the German Army
in general did not compromise on their quality, preferring competent junior or no officers over incompetent ones. Officers should show responsibility, independent action and
quick decision-making, while remaining within the framework of the mission of their
senior commanders. They should lead from up front, issuing their own mission orders
on the basis of first-hand knowledge of the situation. Unlike most other armies, officers
were expected to live with their men and allowed to fraternalize with them when off duty. At the same time they were expected to enforce strict discipline, thus combining attitudes of sternness and benevolence. In general both officers and senior NCOs, at least
below battalion level, were highly regarded by their men (Antal, 1993; Frieser, 2005;
Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
The selection of NCOs and their admission rested with the company or battery commanders of the men involved, acting on General Staff guidelines. Selection again occurred mainly on the basis of character and will power. Aspiring NCOs received two
years of training in special battalions by regimental officers and senior NCOs, leading to
a strong “esprit de corps” among them. The avenue to and from of NCO-ship was relatively open, with one in six men being promoted to NCO and many NCOs becoming officers, eleven of them even attaining the rank of general. Due to a shortage of men, howev-
6
er, NCO selection and training requirements had relaxed noticeably by the end of 1944
(Rush, 1999; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
As a fourth aspect, men were selected, trained and organized in ways that bolstered
unit cohesion and morale. The selection of recruits occurred in local centers by a selection officer and a physician, while their admission to specific army branches rested with
their future regimental commanders. Selection again was based on personal judgments
and tests, assessing character more than intelligence. Recruits received their mainly tactical and practical basic training of about 12-21 weeks in the Replacement Army, after
which they were transferred to the Field Replacement Battalions (“Feldersatzbattallione”) of their future Field Army division for advanced training (Hart, 2001; Van
Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
In the German Army replacements were mainly used to set up new divisions, not to
bring existing divisions up to strength. This practice turned divisions into cohesive,
tightly knit units with considerable fighting power, until cohesion gains were offset by
the depletion of men and officers due to war attrition. Further, this practice made rotation of divisions in and out the line possible to the very end of World War II. Rotation involved a few weeks of refreshment, rearmament, recovery and rest, which were quite
important for morale (Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
Replacements reached their divisions in 1,000 men strong, armed and self-sustained
marching battalions (“Marschbattallione”), led by officers of the receiving division. Upon
arrival, the men and their officers were dispersed over the three companies of a “Feldersatzbattallion”, which were closely tied to the division’s three regiments. Recovered men
and officers traveled back to their last field unit in the same “Marschbattallione”, which
in this way were instrumental in integrating old and new men and officers. Recovered
soldiers, though small in numbers, were particularly welcomed by their units, since
these veterans were important for group cohesion and front atmosphere (Kershaw,
1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
Since especially at the Eastern front war attrition often broke up cohesive units in a
matter of days, other sources of morale were important as well. Although the influence
of Nazi propaganda is often mentioned in this respect, it is estimated that Nazi enthusiasts made up only 10-15 percent of all enlisted men. However, they were more numerous among NCOs and young officers, and much more numerous among Waffen SS and
paratroopers. Particularly appealing in Nazi propaganda was the idea of “Volksgemeinschaft”, an ideal that promised a harmonious society without class conflict in which individuals would be integrated in their communities. Further, personal faith in Hitler as a
leader was widespread among the troops (Fritz, 1996; Madej, 1978; Messerschmidt,
1983; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
As the war progressed, other forces driving German morale became the increasing realization that the German Homeland was now in danger, the still faint but uneasy realization that the war excesses and crimes committed by German forces, in particularly at
the Eastern front, would now backfire on Germany at the hands of the revenging Russians, and the Allied call for unconditional surrender. It led to the sardonic exhortation:
“Enjoy the war while you can, because the peace will be terrible” (Kershaw, 1990: 57;
Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
As a fifth aspect, the General Staff of the German Army played an important role at the
higher levels of command. Established in 1814, it was the Army’s most prestigious and
exclusive institution, until late 1942 the only road to preferred promotion and the rank
of general. General Staff training was geared towards tactics and operations and combining practical and formal training, relatively neglecting strategy and administration.
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Again personal character was deemed more important than intelligence, and the tough
18 month training program was intended primarily to test and bolster character. After
1942, however, the influence of staff training on career development waned as Hitler
sought to decrease the influence of the General Staff and the Army’s “old guard” in favor
of “Volk” officers showing combat talent and accomplishment (Dupuy, 1984; Knox,
2000; Van Creveld, 1983).
In the spirit of Napoleon, the General Staff (and its equivalents at army, corps and division levels) functioned as a small, well-trained, integrated support unit of commanders,
emphasizing execution over planning and shunning detailed paperwork that, in the
words of Von Moltke, “would not survive the first contact with the enemy”. Staffs were
very reluctant to place administrative burdens on the troops in the field, relying on
global ten days reports on strength and losses instead of detailed daily reports. Staffs at
all echelons remained well-informed and closely connected to one another, though, because officers rotated continuously between the General Staff and senior field command
positions (Boothe, 2005; Dupuy, 1984; Hughes, 1986; Van Creveld, 1983).
An important role of the General Staff was the rigorous and objective analysis of victory and defeat on the basis of after action reports (“Erfahrungsberichte”) from lower
units. The General Staff as a rule demanded that these “Erfahrungsberichte” be as critical, honest and accurate as possible. In general lower commanders were not afraid to issue reports in this spirit, indicating a high level of trust and honesty between echelons.
The General Staff used the results of analysis for the continuous improvement of doctrine and tactics and their translation in training programs, which it developed in close
collaboration with the Replacement Army (Hart, 2001; Murray, 1981, 1992).
As a final aspect, the German Army’s personnel administration consistently and ostensibly rewarded good combat performance. Leave was more readily granted to front-line
troops, veterans and married men, equitable across ranks. It was systematically used as
a reward of brave deeds by men in particular. In such cases it was immediately granted,
with an endorsement by the army commander. Decorations were awarded for independent action and bravery, with higher requirements for officers than for men. They
were cumulative, rewarding repeated acts of bravery. Decisions on higher decorations
were taken by Hitler personally, on recommendation of the direct superior and corps or
army commander, often within two to five weeks and surrounded by broad military media coverage. However, military justice was harsh and often draconian, with 11,753 men
executed for desertion and undermining morale, which probably led to relatively low
desertion rates. Men were as well protected against their officers as the other way
round. The harsh system was given a “human face” by the veterans and by relative lenience on private transgressions, like drunkenness and women in the barracks (Kershaw,
1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
In comparison to the German Army, the US Army in World War II grew rapidly, and for
that reason had to be centrally organized. In its internal organization it adhered to principles of scientific management. Its command and control systems relied on large
amounts of detailed information, collected by large staff units and applied in detailed
orders from the higher echelons downward (“Befehlstaktik”, with General Patton as a
notable exception). The US Army strove for an optimal and efficient distribution of men
and material, dispersing men and officers randomly over its divisions without considerations of unit cohesion or morale. Officers were primarily selected on the basis of intelligence and rewarded for information procuring and processing, much to the detriment of
leadership at the front. Instead of fighting power, the US Army relied on numerical supe-
8
riority in technology and equipment to overwhelm its enemies (Dunivan, 2003; Leonhard, 1993; Hart, 2001; Van Creveld, 1983).
Further, in comparison to the German Army, the British Army in World War II was
characterized by a considerable degree of decentralization, with the regiments as foci of
organization, identification and communication. This characteristic hampered the adoption of army wide doctrine and the formation, development and training of coherent
fighting units above regimental level, such as brigade and division. Further, continuity
and cohesion suffered from regimentally-induced wholesale replacements of battalions
inside divisions, from the rotation of battalions between the Home Command and field
commands, and from frequent leadership changes at senior levels. The latter problem,
combined with the lack of army wide doctrine, led to radically different operational
styles, meaning that divisions and higher had to learn a new way of waging war with
each new commander (French, 2001; Hart, 2001; Heginbotham, 2000; Mutch, 2006).
Battlefield performance
The differences in degrees of configuration towards fighting power between the German
Army on the one hand and the US and British Armies on the other seem to be related to
battlefield performance. When looking at actual battle engagements between German
and Allied forces during World War II, it may be argued that the Germans rather clearly
prevailed in most of them. Quantitative evidence comes from Dupuy (1984, 1986), who
has developed a model for battle engagements with two measures, combat effectiveness
and score effectiveness.
The first measure, Combat Effectiveness Value, is concerned with the ratio of relative
combat outcomes and combat power. In a formula it is defined as: CEV = (Rg/Ra)(Pg/Pa),
whereby CEVg = 1/CEVa. In this formula P represents Combat Power, which in its turn is
defined as: P = S x V. Here S represents Force Strength (sum of operational lethality indexes for the weapons inventories of each side, modified for the effects of weather, terrain and season), and V represents Variables affecting the employment of the force under the circumstances existing as the time of the engagement (most importantly posture,
terrain, weather, mobility, and vulnerability). Calculating P values for the German and
Allied sides in the engagements results in Pg/Pa ratios. Further, in the CEV formula R
represents Result, the actual outcomes of engagements defined by three sub measures
(mission accomplishment, spatial effectiveness, and casualty effectiveness). Calculating
R values for the German and Allied sides in the engagements results in Rg/Ra ratios.
Applying the CEV formula to 81 engagements between German and Allied forces in
Southern and North Western Europe between 1943-1944, Dupuy discovered that the
German R/R values were usually higher than their P/P values and the reverse for the Allies. In all 81 engagements the German CEV usually was between 1.1 and 1.3, the Allied
CEV between 0.7 and 0.9. The actual outcomes of these engagements could thus only be
predicted with the equations “when it was assumed that, man for man and unit for unit,
the Germans were 20-30 % more effective than the British and American forces facing
them” (Dupuy, 1984: 253).
Further, applying the same analysis to 14 engagements at the Eastern front showed a
German CEV of about 3.0 (1941) to 2.5 (1943) to 1.8 (1944). This indicates that in 1941
German combat effectiveness superiority over the Russians was close to 200 %, meaning that on the average one German division was a match for at least three Russian divisions of comparable size and firepower. In 1944, when the course of war had turned de-
9
cisively in favor of the Russian forces, this superiority was still nearly 100 % (Dupuy,
1984; 1986).
The second measure, Score Effectiveness, is not concerned with outcomes and weapons. Instead it counts the number of men and the number of casualties (killed, wounded,
missing) on both sides of an engagement, from which a score is calculated, i.e. the average number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by blocks of 100 men on each side. The
Score Effectiveness is calculated by dividing the score by a constant, the value of which
depends on posture (1 for attack, 1.2 for delaying resistance, 1.3 for hasty defense, 1.5
for prepared defense, and 1.6 for fortified defense) (Dupuy, 1984, 1986).
When in all 81 engagements at the Western front the German Score Effectiveness was
divided by the Allied one a differential of 1 : 1.52 was obtained. This differential held for
Germans attacking or defending, for Germans fighting with numerical superiority or inferiority, for Germans fighting British or American troops, for Germans winning or losing. Dupuy (1984: 253) concluded: “On a man for man basis the German ground soldiers
consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 % higher rate than they incurred from the
opposing British and American troops under all circumstances.”
At the Eastern front in 1941 the average German frontline soldier inflicted 7.78 Russian casualties for each German lost, but this differential plummeted in the course of the
campaign. Still, in 1944 the Germans on a man-for-man basis inflicted about 300 % more
casualties than they incurred from the opposing Russians. Further, a calculation of Score
Effectiveness in the Polish campaign (1939) indicated a German casualty-inflicting superiority of nearly 4 to 1, indicating a German combat effectiveness superiority of close to
2 to 1 (Dupuy, 1984; 1986).
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper the notion of organizational Gestalt or configuration has been conceptually
developed and refined and related to battlefield performance, in an extension of performance indicators normally used in the literature. It has been argued that the German
Army in World War II to a comparatively high degree was configured towards fighting
power. Its philosophy of war acknowledged the existence of environmental uncertainty
and turbulence and emphasized the need for a decentralized approach to adapt to it. Its
internal organization concentrated on combat effectiveness and delegated supporting
functions to the rear. It selected its officers and NCOs primarily on the basis of character
and trained them towards decisive combat leadership. It selected, trained and organized
its men in ways that bolstered unit cohesion and morale. Its General Staff played an important role at the higher levels of command. Its system of personnel administration
consistently and ostensibly rewarded good combat performance.
When compared to the German Army in terms of the theoretical framework of this paper, the US Army may be regarded as a functional whole or system, in which the parts
were as efficiently as possible organized into the organizational whole. However, the US
Army’s organizational elements seemed less configured toward fighting power as a single principle than those of the German Army, which often sacrificed organizational efficiency for combat effectiveness. By identical comparison, the British Army may be regarded as an aggregate whole, in which the regiments constituted fairly independent elements. Within the regiments elements were more closely configured towards fighting
power, but the lack of an army-wide “Gestaltung” of elements made the British Army
vulnerable in large-scale battle engagements, as Dupuy’s equations attest.
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Current organizations that strive for high internal configuration and good performance can definitely learn from German army organization and personnel management.
This holds for army organizations, some of which already have attempted to incorporate
German doctrine and principles, especially the doctrine of mission tactics (“Auftragstaktik”), be it with varying degrees of success (e.g., Boothe, 2005; Leonhard, 1993; Vogelaar
and Kramer, 2004).1 This also holds for civilian organizations that more or less share
army features, like prisons, correctional facilities, police forces, hospitals, mental institutions and fire departments. These organizations regularly deal with emotionally intense
life-death emergency situations, they acknowledge the necessity of strong unit cohesion
and clear leadership in such emergencies, and they are all more or less characterized by
a inclusive atmosphere (Visser, 2007a).
Finally, to place things in a proper perspective, three cautionary notes are in order. As
a first note, it has been argued here that the Germans enjoyed a more effective battlefield performance than their Allied enemies, which may be positively related to their
comparatively high degree of configuration towards fighting power. However, other factors undoubtedly have played a role as well in determining performance. Besides the
important factor of equipment briefly mentioned in the introduction (e.g., Showalter,
2002), one could think of the factor of geographical proximity, with the Allied forces increasingly being forced to fight on remote battlefields and the German forces increasingly fighting relatively close to home (e.g., Kershaw, 1990). Further, one could think of the
political factor, with the Allied forces consisting of multiple nations with concomitant
political complications and the German forces being led by one man, at least in principle
(e.g., Beaumont, 1986).
As a second and related note, the specific operations of the German Army were sharply
circumscribed by the context of Hitler’s national-socialist policies and institutions. Matters of strategy, politics and economics largely were beyond the Army’s sphere of influence and competence. In the course of World War II, strong battlefield performance
could not overcome political and strategic blundering (indeed it only exacerbated it).
There is virtually unanimous agreement among military historians that waging a twofront war against the combined Allied forces constituted a grave political and strategic
mistake, given the balance of industrial, logistical and human resources between German and Allied forces (e.g., Beaumont, 1986; Frieser, 2005; Murray, 1992; Van Creveld,
1988).
As a concluding note, I wish to make clear that I do not intend to diminish the responsibility of the German Army for World War II war crimes and genocide, which by many
accounts was considerable (e.g., Bartov, 1991; Beaumont, 1986; Hart, 2001), nor do I
wish to engage in revisionist history (re)writing. Yet, six decades after the end of the war
an attempt may be made to extract some positive lessons from this tragedy. The German
Army was a very effective and highly configured fighting machine, whose principles of
organization and operation today may be placed in the service of more peaceful and socially useful purposes.
Notes
* I thank Jan Achterbergh, Claudia Gross, Andreas Grössler, Fred Huijgen, Erik Poutsma and the
participants of the 5th International Conference HRM Network, Tilburg, The Netherlands, 9-10
November 2007, for their stimulating and critical remarks on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Interestingly, the army that resembles the German army most seems to be the Israeli army between 1948 - 1973. Like the Germans, the Israelis adhered to a decentralized system of command and control, thoroughly trained their officers, NCOs and men, emphasized decisive leader11
ship from up front, maintained strong unit cohesion, and often sacrificed organizational efficiency for combat effectiveness (e.g., Dupuy, 1978; Horowitz, 1970; Van Creveld, 2002). While the
reasons for this resemblance largely fall outside the scope of this paper, the comparable geographical position of Prussia (later Germany) and Israel as relatively small states surrounded by
powerful (potential) enemies may have been an influential factor here.
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