Understanding Other Minds: An Evaluation of Simulation Theory
Prof. Dr. Albert Newen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Extended Handout
I.
Overview of the talk
The general background claims
- We start with a definition of simulation as involving (a) pretending propositional
attitudes (b) using a (the same) decision making mechanism (as in the first-person
case) (c) projecting the result of using that mechanism onto a third person by
attributing a decision
- There are two ways of understanding other minds:
(1) Recognizing the mental states someone is having.
(2) Estimating the decision someone is going to make on the basis of her/his
mental states.
- We have to distinguish low-level and high-level mindreading
Specific criticism
- In cases of low-level mindreading, feature (3) - the “projection” - is not realized. A
representation of an emotion as realized by someone else may only involve a
registration of a mental phenomenon together with a self-representation. Therefore
in such cases there is no need of a simulation being involved. The central features
are (i) recognizing a mental phenomenon and (ii) applying a self-other distinction.
- In cases of high-level mindreading Goldman suggests that not only projection but
also enactment imagination is constitutive:
o A lot of cases of high-level understanding are not relying on enactment
imagination
o If projection is involved then it seems to have the structure of a “theory”:
o A working definition of a theory: A theory of a class of phenomena is a
systematically interconnected class of beliefs concerning this class of
phenomena.
o The preferred concept of belief: - having background knowledge:
knowledge that can be used in concrete situations and can at least partly
made explicit in communicative exchange.
Conclusion: To characterize the different cases of understanding other minds as cases of
simulation is mainly missing the point:
(i) In the case of low-level mindreading we do not find a projection, a fortiori no
simulation.
(ii) In the case of high-level mindreading we do not need an enactment imagination and
the projection process seems to be best characterized as including the application
of a theory (in the sense of a background knowledge). Therefore the
characterization as simulation is at best incomplete but often simply inadequate
(or wrong).
(iii) Theory-Theory does not account for cases of low-level mind-reading.
(iv)
The debate between ST and TT is enfolding relevant features of understanding
other minds but neither account is adequate.We need a new account. I suggest a
multi-level theory of understanding other minds which starts with the insight that
there are very different mechanisms of understanding other minds which can be
characterized with the help of a theory of kinds of representations.
II.
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A Definition of Simulation and first critical remarks concerning the Simulation
Theory
„Generic simulation: Process P is a simulation of another process P‘ = df P duplicates,
replicates, or resembles P‘ in some significant respects (significant relative to the
purposes of the task)“ (Goldman, 2006, 36)
According to Goldman‘s analysis the main point of duplication, replication or
resemblence is the fact that in the case of a first-person decision to do m and a thirdperson attribution of such a decision the same decision making mechanism is
involved.
Is the use of the same mechanism a simulation process? If we have exactly the same
mechanism the relevant relation is identity. To speak of simulation does no
explanatory work in this case.
Goldman‘s strategy: We have to a compare the whole processes (not only the common
core mechanism), the first person decision making and the third person decision
attribution.
Is the third person decision attribution adequately charaterized as a case of simulation
compared to the first-person case?
Third-person attribution of a decision consists of
(i) pretending propositional attitudes
(ii) using a (the same) decision making mechanism (as in the first-person case)
(iii)
projecting the result of using that mechanism onto a third person by attributing
a decision
Is the third person decision attribution adequately charaterized as a case of simulation?
• Goldman‘s strategy: Yes, the relevant resemblence (but non-identity) is given by the
fact the we are not having propositional attitudes but just pretend them. And
pretending a mental state has to be characterized as „enactment imagination“ (this
kind of imagination involves a typical phenomenal experience): If pretending were
only neutrally considering to be in a mental state m (imagine that I am in m) then it
could be easily evaluated to be part of a theory that I am constructing about the other
person.
III: Is high-level mindreading a case of simulation or how does it work?
What is the role of imagination in understanding other minds?
• Goldman argues that enactment imagination is a central element of understanding
other minds in the case of high-level mentalizing while low-level mentalizing is not
presupposing it.
• High-level mentalizing involves explicit considerations concerning the mental states
of others.
• Critic: These cases do not essentially involve enactment imagination.
– Argument 1: Phenomenological Everyday Observation: In a lot of cases of
high-level mentalizing it is irrelevant whether I have a similar „experience“ as
the person having that mental state (e.g. when I attribute someone the belief
that she wants to go to cinema on the basis of her utterance or Email or on the
basis of seeing the ticket lying on her desk).
– Analysis of Goldman‘s view: He is focussing on examples where I understand
people on the basis of seeing faces or other low-level mentalizing processes.
While theory-theory has overlooked low-level mentalizing, Goldman
underestimates the cases of understanding other minds on the basis of
„objective, emotionally neutral“ facts.
– Argument 2: If also often have to understand people form radically different
cultures or people suffering from severe mental diseases. In such cases we
have to build a class of background beliefs how this people „function“ and we
are not able to have a similar„experience“ (examples)
– Argument 3: The important aspect of high-level mentalizing is not enactment
imagination but nonmodular information processing: High-level mentalizing
does not need the aspect of enactment in thinking about their mental life.
Presupposing (for the sake of argument) that we have a low-level recognition
of someone‘s mental state, then this information is used to construct a highlevel mental state attribution on the basis of nonmodular processes.
What is the status of nonmodular information processing involved in high-level mentalizing?
• A typical case of nonmodular information processing is involved in passing a false
belief task. It involves the so-called theory-of-mind ability (ToM). The ToM ability
includes background attitudes which can be made explicit in a communicative
exchange.
Does the ToM ability involve having a theory?
• To answer this question we should have a basic understanding about what should
be called a „theory“;
• Working definition: A theory of a class of phenomena is a systematically
interconnected class of beliefs concerning this class of phenomena.
• Qualifications (ignoring the difference between belief and knowledge in this
context):
– Having a belief (or in the case of justified true beliefs = knowledge) can be
understood in at least three ways:
• Knowing-how_1 (procedural knowledge): - the ability to do
something
• Knowing-how_2 (background knowledge): - having background
knowledge: knowledge that can be used in concrete situations and
can at least partly made explicit in communicative exchange.
• Knowing that: - fully explicit language-based propositional
attitudes
• If we presuppose that having a theory presupposes having a systematically
interconnected class of beliefs in the sense of fully explicit language-based
propositional attitudes then 4 year old children do not rely on any theory when they
pass the false-belief task. But if we have a less demanding notion of theory such that
systematically interconnected background beliefs are sufficient then we have to admit
that 4 year old children possess a theory about mental states.
• Observation: The ToM ability involves having background beliefs, e.g. about the
mental dispositions of one person one knows very well, about the interconnections of
mental states and adequate behaviour.
• -> The debate between simulation theory and theory-theory melts (at least partly)
down to a question of defining having a theory. This aspect is of course not a fruitful
discussion.
The incompletness of Goldman‘s picture
• Two ways of understanding other minds:
(1) Recognizing the mental states someone is having.
(2) Estimating the decision someone is going to make on the basis of her/his
mental states.
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Thesis: Simulation-Theory is only offering a theory for phenomenon (2) while theorytheory is mainly focussing on (1). Theory-Theory also understood as answering
question (2) and here the debate is located by Goldman. But the researchers defending
theory-theory are mainly relying on observations dealing with phenomenon (1).
Understanding other minds is starting with phenomenon (1) and here simulation
theory is not even claiming to offer an explanation (in the case of high-level mindreading)
How can we recognize the mental states of other people?
• We need different answers in the cases of low-level and high-level mentalizing.
• General theoretical ideas:
– Direct perception theory: We can directly perceive all kinds of mental states of
others (Shaun Gallagher)
– Inference theory: We always infer the mental states of others because we can
only perceive nonmental physiological or behavioral features.
– Multiple-level theory: We can directly recognize/perceive (based on
nonmodular information processing) basic mental states and need a
nonmodular information processing (including background beliefs) to
recognize complex mental states.
• Simulation Theory: There is no answer given (in the case of high-level mindreading)
• Theory-Theory (TT):
• If we presuppose that having a theory involves having a systematically interconnected
class of beliefs in the sense of fully explicit language-based propositional attitudes
then TT seems empirically wrong. But if we have a less demanding notion of theory
such that that systematically interconnected background beliefs are sufficient then TT
offers a story to account for the ToM ability.
• Multiple-level theory (MLT): Evidence for this claim can e.g. presented by a theory of
emotions.
Back to question 2: How can we estimate the decision someone is going to make on the basis
of her/his mental states?
• Is there going on a process of simulation or a process of theory formation?
• Concerning the three aspects (pretending, using a decision mechanism and projecting)
we discussed the pretense for high-level mentalizing: Contrary to Goldman enactment
imagination is not relevant for high-level mentalizing. The imagination that is
involved in ToM can be characterized as a theory in the sense of having a class of
systematically interconnected background beliefs (the case of low-level mentalizing
needs further treatment).
• What about the projection? Is this a process that supports one of the views in debate?
– Observation: An important aspect of understanding other minds is the ability to
withhold (not to use) one‘s own attitudes in case they are essentially different
from the person one has to understand (showing quarantine)
Projection in the case of high-level mentalizing
• The story: If I am pretending the attitudes of person p I may start to evaluate what p
will do. The pretended attitudes are fed into my decision making mechanism resulting
in a decision to do m (given the attitudes). Such a decision must then be projected to
receive the attribution „P decides to do m“ and while projecting I must withhold those
attitudes of mine that are essentially different from the other person (individual
properties: temperament, physical and mental dispositions, especially longterm desires
etc.)
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The process of projection presupposes that I am able to distinguish those attitudes and
properties that are specific for my personality from those that are (1) not specific for
me, but more or less general for most human beings and (2) those which are specific
for the other person.
Therefore:
– > I must have a high-level self-other distinction concerning the attribution of
attitudes and properties in general.
– > I have to develop a theory (at least in the sense of having background
beliefs) about the personality of myself and the other. Projection seems to
involve a class of systematically interconnected attitudes about myself and
about others.
– > In the case of high-level mentalizing, pretending and projection both are best
characterized as a cases of theory formation in the sense of including classes of
systematically interconnected attitudes. Since the decision making mechanism
is exactly the same, there is no need for a talk of simulation. (Simulation may
be used to characterize those cases of high-level mentalizing involving
enactment imagination but those are not the central cases).
IV. Analyzing low level mentalizing: Discussing pretense and projecting
So far, we have discussed high-level mentalizing: Is low-level mentalizing a case of
simulation?
The most important story to tell in the case of low-level mentalizing is the mirror
neuron story.
Mirror Neuron Theory
• Mirror neuron theory: Basic action-types are realized by mirror neurons in the cortex
area F5. The basic action type, e.g. grasping a glass is represented as a goal-directed
action.
• -> Mirror neurons can explain the causation and observation of all basic motor actions
and some basic emotions like gustatory disgust.
The limits of the mirror neuron explanations
• So far it has been shown that mirror neurons represent basic action types like grasping
a glass. But the action type is represented independent from the subject that is acting
since the same neuron fires while acting or while observing the relevant type of action.
There is a need for an „WHO“ –system (Jeannerod)
• There is also evidence that mirror neurons play an important role for the development
of sympathy but other factors seem also to be very important.
• Mirror neurons cannot account for perspectivity and all the body-centered
informations. They have at least to be supplemented by an additional mechanism „WHO“-system - that accounts for these body-centered informations and additional
mechanisms seem also to be relevant for emotions or social cognition (like sympathy).
• Thesis: Any case of understanding other minds involves two features:
• the registration of a mental phenomenon
• a self-other distinction realized by self-representations versus other
representations
Is low-level mentalizing a case of simulation?
• In the case of neonate-imitation or in the case of other basic mental phenomena (goaldirected behavior) realized by mirror neurons, we have a clear of case of representing
the mental state that needs an additional self-other representation.
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This self-other representation can be realized on very different levels (as will be
shown soon). In the case of babies the goal-directed behavior is „immediately“
connected with a self- or with an other-representation. Of course there are relevant
features connecting up with the activity of the mirror neurons which lead to a selfrespectively or to an other-representation. But there is no evidence that the connection
with an other-representation is mediated via a self-representation, i.e. there is no
projection involved. Neither projection (nor pretense) are not taking place on lowlevel mentalizing realized by mirror neurons.
V: Closing the artificial debate
• Defenders of simulation theory are concentrating on the fact that the same mechanism
is involved in representing someone elses decision to do m and work out important
aspects of high-level mentalizing like pretense and projection. The claim that
simulation and not theory formation is involved in such cases rests on a notion of
theory that is too demanding.
• Theory-Theory relies on an understanding of having a theory in a less demanding
sense which allows them to account for high-level mentalizing. Nevertheless those
accounts cannot do justice to low-level mentalizing were no theory (but also no
simulation) is at work.
– -> We need multiple-level theory of understanding other minds that accounts
for the fact that low-level understanding and high-level mentalizing are
essentially different. If we account for the fact that understanding other minds
involves two features (registration of a mental phenomena and a self-other
distinction) then this opens the search for distinct kinds of understanding other
minds.
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VI. Developing a multiple level theory of understanding other minds
I am focussing on the development of self-other representations in human beings
illustrating that we can observe different levels of self-other representations in
combination with the development of new kinds of content representations.
1. step: levels of self- and other-representations
2. step: empirical evidences for these levels
3. step: level of social interactions
Levels of self-representations are established via:
• Central cognitive capacities according to developmental psychology
• Central forms of representation and their development
Empirical evidences for different kinds of self-representation
• Self/other in spatial perspective: study 1
• Self/other in cognitive attitudes: study 2
Self-Other-Representation and Social Interaction
• The multilevel theory of understanding other minds claims:
– That there are different mechanisms on different levels of content and
self/other representations that lead to a variety of ways of understanding other
minds
– None of these ways of understanding other minds is completely characterized
by TT or ST. Nevertheless both theories highlight important factors.
– Empathy and enactment imagination seem to be essentially important for
social interaction (but not for understanding other minds). But understanding
other minds has to be distinguished form being competent in social interaction.
Important levels of social interaction
Interaction at the level of
• (i) Nonconceptual state-Consciousness:
• e. g. feeding processes (parents – baby), gaze interaction
• (ii) (Conceptual) object-Consciousness:
• e. g. joint attention of mother/father and baby
• (iii) Propositional event-Consciousness:
• Cooperative interaction, shared intentions e. g. ball games
• (iv) metarepresentational Theory of Mind:
• Communicative interaction (with facial expressions, gestures and
especially with the use of natural language)
• (v) Iterative metarepresentational Theory of Mind:
• Communicative interaction about social relation and social interactions
VII: Conclusion
• Contrary to ST and TT there is not a unitary strategy to understand the other mind
• There are different strategies to understand oneself and the other minds which can be
characterized by the development of two features: (i) content representation/
registration of mental phenomena and (ii) self/other-representation
• -> Therefore we need a multilevel theory of understanding other minds.