DAVIDSON ON RADICAL INTERPRETATION Theories of radical interpretation in outline Radical interpretation is an inferential investigation into the meanings of utterances of an unknown language. The evidential base of radical interpretation The investigation begins from information that makes no use of linguistic concepts such as meaning, interpretation, and synonymy. Hence, not even the meanings of expressions in one’s own language are allowed. Presuppositions of radical interpretation revealed by this starting point It is thus presupposed that one can describe the world, and particularly the behaviour of language using creatures, without using linguistic concepts. Because radical interpretation maintains that semantic facts, i.e., facts about meaning, are determined by non-linguistic facts, a dualistic theory of content is false, and may even be unintelligible. A dualistic theory of content says that there are facts about the meanings of a physical system’s utterances in virtue of the physical system being related to an unobservable entity, or has an unobservable property. Thus, a theory of radical interpretation is committed to a materialist, non-eliminativist theory of mind, i.e., a theory which says that the mind is a material thing and that has beliefs, desires, thoughts, etc. The context of Davidson’s discovery of radical interpretation In ‘Truth and Meaning’ Davidson emphasises that natural languages contain a potential infinite variety of sentences, and we are creatures with finite cognitive capacities. From these observations, Davidson concludes that a theory of meaning for a natural language, a theory that would suffice as a theory of understanding for creatures like us, a theory would have to be finitely axiomatisable utilising a finite stock of words. Thus, a theory of meaning is one that is compositional: sentences are complex items whose meanings are determined by the meanings of their parts. A Tarskian style theory of truth meets these requirements and could therefore serve as a theory of meaning for natural languages. So, a theory of meaning should issue theorems of the form: S is true iff p. So, on this account a theory of meaning is empirically confirmed if it issues in true biconditionals of the form: S is true iff p. But a Tarskian style truth theory does not seem to suffice as a theory of meaning, for there could be different theories which are extensionally equivalent, i.e., issue only true biconditionals of the form ‘S is true iff p’, but only one of them seems to be a theory of meaning. Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation provides a response to this objection: a theory of meaning is no longer adequate if it merely issues in true Tarskian biconditionals, it must also respect the Principle of Charity, which says that we should interpret others so that their utterances are largely true and that they are rational. (The seeds of principle this might be found in ‘Truth and Meaning’, pp. 25-27.) With the Principle of Charity in play, the extensionally equivalent but non-meaning giving theories are ruled out. Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation The evidential base of Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation is the observation of a subject holding true an utterance S. That is, the subject is willing to sincerely assert S. The radical interpreter then seeks to systematise the utterances that the subject holds true in order that she might determine patterns in the subject’s utterances. These patterns then serve as the guidelines for constructing a theory of truth for the subject’s utterances. This theory of truth will consist in a finite number of axioms and a finite number of words that characterise the semantic properties of the subject’s utterances. In constructing this theory, the theorist is constrained by the Principle of Charity, that is, the theorist must construe the subject is both: (i) largely right about the world and (ii) is rational. The Principle of Charity then provides the vital link between the interpreter observing the subject holding S true and S’s being true. With this link in place, the interpreter can observe the subject holding S true; then infer that S is true; observe the truth condition of S, namely, ‘S is true iff p’; and then infer the meaning of the subject’s utterance of S, which is its truth condition. Consequences of Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation Meaning is a normative concept. Meaning is indeterminate, in some respects. 2 3