Stakeholders’ Conference
Biodiversity and the EU – Sustaining Life, Sustaining Livelihoods
Grand Hotel, Malahide, Ireland
25-27 May 2004
MALAHIDE/INF/1
The value of Biodiversity
Insights from Ecology, Ethics and Economics
The opinions expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the European
Commission
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Foreword
The global loss of biodiversity is an issue which is high on the political agenda, both
within Europe and world wide. Both experts and politicians are increasingly concerned
about the rapid loss of genetic, species and ecosystem diversity (see e.g. Wilson 2002).
Biodiversity was one of the main topics of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992,
and culminated in the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). In
2001, EU Heads of State and Government made a commitment at the EU’s Spring
summit in Gothenburg "to halt the loss of biodiversity by 2010”. And in 2002, world
leaders agreed at the Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg to
“significantly reduce the current rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010”. New political
momentum towards implementing CBD and the global 2010 target was achieved at the
Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP-7), convened in Kula Lumpur in
February 2004. Now, little more than 5 years are left to meet the 2010 challenge.
Global concern of biodiversity loss largely involves the loss of species and genetic
diversity which, for the most part, is caused by loss and fragmentation of natural and
semi-natural habitats, by intensive agriculture, unsustainable forestry and river use and
fishing practices, mining, tourism, desertification, freshwater acidification and other sorts
of pollution, and by the introduction of invasive alien species (Ehrlich 1988, EEA 2003).
If now key players in civil society, business, the Member States, and the Commission
commonly agree on priorities, responsibilities and key actions to counteract these causes
there is hope to sustain life and livelihood on earth. By outlining the values attached to
biodiversity, this paper aims at examining the question: “Why does biodiversity loss
actually matter?”
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
STATUS OF EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY .................................. 3
2.
WHY IS BIODIVERSITY IMPORTANT? ................................................................ 3
2.1. Different kinds of values ................................................................................... 4
2.1.1.
Instrumental values .............................................................................. 4
2.1.2.
Intrinsic value ...................................................................................... 7
2.2. Monetary value approaches ............................................................................... 8
2.2.1.
Economic value of biodiversity ........................................................... 9
2.2.2.
Problems of monetarizing biodiversity.............................................. 10
3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................... 12
4.
LITERATURE........................................................................................................... 14
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1.
STATUS OF EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY
The European Union has a global responsibility to preserve both the character and species
richness of its ecosystems as well as to reduce its ecological footprint in other parts of the
world (see EEA 2003). Europe hosts a unique set of natural diversity, including
biodiversity hot spots like the Mediterranean. The 10 new Member States bring new
biodiversity riches to the EU. However, important ecosystems are currently at risk
including wetlands, forests, some marine areas, certain species-rich agricultural habitats
and several dry and arid ecosystem types (EEA 2003). Biodiversity loss has accelerated to
an unprecedented level, both in Europe and worldwide. It has been estimated that the
current global extinction rate is 1000 to 10000 times higher than the natural background
extinction rate (Wilson and Peter 1988, Powledge 1998, IUCN 2003). In a recent study,
published in Nature, Thomas et al. (2004a) suggested that climate change may lead 1537% of all species considered in the study being ‘committed to extinction’ by 2050.
According to estimates of Wilson (1992), species are becoming extinct globally at a rate
of 27000 per year. Pimm and Raven (2000) estimated that the extinction rate in the
middle of this century may be about 50000 per million species and per decade. This
equals a rate of about three per hours – each a unique specimen of life, gradually evolved
over hundreds of thousands of years. The focus in European conservation has long been
on the most threatened flagship species. However, some previously common species are
now facing serious decline towards very unstable populations and reduced distribution
(very often as a result of agricultural intensification) (EEA 2003). Comparing different
extensive data sets Thomas et al. (2004b) found out that 28% of native plant species have
decreased in Britain over the past 40 years, that 54% of native bird species have
decreased over 20 years, and that a majority of butterfly species (71%) have declined over
20 years. If insects elsewhere in the world are similarly sensitive, the known global
extinction rates of vertebrates and plant species may also have unrecorded parallels
among invertebrates (Thomas et al. 2004b).
How many species have already been lost and how many will disappear in the future if
the current rate of extinction continues cannot be determined precisely. At present it is
still very much unclear how many species exist globally. So far about 1.7 million animal
and plant species have been described scientifically. However, extrapolations about the
total species number vary between 2 and 50 million (sometimes even up to 100 million).
Most biologists consider an estimate of about 5 to 15 million to be realistic (Stork 1993).
Even though presently no exact figures about biological diversity are available, most
biologists agree that if current trends continue we are facing the sixth major extinction
event that life on earth has had in its 3.5 billion years history (see e.g.
Thomas et al. 2004b). If humankind is not succeeding in halting the loss of biodiversity,
members of today’s generation might become witness to the greatest catastrophe in the
history of life since the disappearance of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago (Gorke
2003).
2.
WHY IS BIODIVERSITY IMPORTANT?
In her speech to the Third Pan-European Conference “Biodiversity in Europe” held in
Madrid in January 2004, the European Commissioner for the Environment, Margot
Wallström, stated that the loss of biodiversity matters for Ethical, Emotional,
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Environmental and Economic reasons – 4 Es describing why to preserve biodiversity.
Biodiversity loss involves multifarious environmental, social and economic issues and
different kinds of values are often heavily intertwined. Conflicts in using biodiversity
arise where different values meet (Joosten and Clark 2002). Values may be mutually
incompatible, and when compatible, unequal distribution of benefits may often lead to
conflicts. In order to find sound decisions in the use of biodiversity, incompatible values
should be identified, and conflicting claims balanced against each other, and norms have
to be established for assigning priority to one over another. In committing themselves to
halting the loss of biodiversity by 2010, the EU Heads of State and Government have
established the principle to give high priority to biodiversity conservation in relevant EU
policy areas.
Based on current scientific concepts of Ecology, Environmental Ethics and
Environmental Economics, in the following sections it will be reflected upon the
different Ethical, Emotional, Environmental and Economic values – the 4 Es – that can
be ascribed to biodiversity.
2.1.
Different kinds of values
A great variety of complementary values can be attached to nature and biodiversity (see
e.g. Rolston 1988, Takacs 1996 and Krebs 1997). Basically, these values can be divided
into two broad categories (Lockwood 1999). Instrumental values are means to an end,
i.e. the referent entity is a means to achieving the benefit of another entity. Such values
can be assessed scientifically and are therefore often considered being more objective.
Intrinsic values, in contrast, ascribe worth to entities irrespective of utility, beauty, or
other quality (i.e. an entity has to be respected as such). Some schools of thoughts of
environmental ethics tend to distinguish further value categories (see e.g. Ott 1999). In
this paper it was decided to employ the binary approach as it offers a concise method to
categorise biodiversity values.
2.1.1.
Instrumental values
Instrumental values of nature can be subdivided into material and non-material life
support functions (Joosten and Clark 2002).
Material life support functions contribute to humans’ physical health. They provide
different resources, such as water, food, energy and raw-material (production functions),
space for habitation and activities as e.g. energy generation, science or recreation (carrier
function), and essential life-support systems and or ecosystem services (regulations
functions).
Production functions comprise the direct-use values of biodiversity, where people
directly utilize species, ecosystems or genetic diversity for their benefit. These include the
value of natural products for developing pharmaceuticals, for developing and maintaining
the genetic underpinning for agriculture and for providing the basis for industries relying
on natural resources such as fisheries, forestry etc. (for further discussion, see World
Resources Institute et al. 1992). Currently, humankind uses only a very small fraction of
biodiversity directly. About 15000 species are used for nutrition, many of them only as
herbs or spice. World nutrition largely depends upon 30 species only (wheat, corn, barley,
millet rise, etc.), delivering about 90% of all crops. However, 75% of all medicines are of
herbal, animal, or micro biotic origin (Ott 2004). A prominent example is the “rosy
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periwinkle” (Catharanthus roseus), occurring on Madagascar: the pharmaceutical agent
derived from it is used, among other things, to treat leukaemia. Also ocean and deep-sea
ecosystems are increasingly valued as potential reservoirs for important future medical
agents. Numerous examples of pharmaceutical benefits of biodiversity can be found at
Farnworth (1988) and Wilson (1992).
Carrier functions of ecosystems include the capacity to provide space and suitable
substrate respectively. This includes agriculture, aquaculture, conservation, sites for
recreation, water reservoirs, establishment of towns and infrastructure, industrial
development, sites for waste disposal, military exercises, etc.
Regulation functions include a great variety of benefits such as topsoil production, pest
control, groundwater recharge, photosynthesis and oxygen production, pollination, water
regulation, ozone layer, climate regulation, decomposition and recycling of organic
matter, regeneration capacities, waste assimilation, erosion control etc.
As the diversity-stability hypothesis in ecological science has been called into question, it
is not always easy to clearly link biodiversity and ecological stability (see e.g. Schulze
and Mooney 1993). Another famous disputed hypothesis, the “rivet hypothesis” (Ehrlich
and Ehrlich 1981) proceeds from the assumption that all species contribute to the
integrity of the ecosphere like rivets or screws in a plane. Critics may argue that species
are redundant (see e.g. Walker 1992), e.g. that any green plant can fix carbon dioxide
through photosynthesis or that alien species may play the same function as native species
once played. While this might be true to some extent, studies on the ecosystem level still
indicate that many aspects of stability and functioning of ecosystems depends on
biodiversity (see e.g. Tilmann et al. 1996, Mooney et al. 1995). One general objective for
conservation should be “maximization of functional redundancy because that offers the
best insurance for maintenance of ecosystem functions in a changing environment”
(Meyer 1997). After crossing a threshold, this insurance value of biodiversity might
become depleted. Although there is great scientific uncertainty on how to determine this
threshold, one has to be aware of the fact that by reducing global biodiversity humankind
is constantly approaching this threshold. Concerning the ability of ecosystems of adapting
to climate change, humankind is very much relying on species and genetic diversity and
the preservation of this evolutionary potential might be the most important ecological
value of diverse ecosystems (Gowdy 1997). The combination of climate change and loss
of biodiversity constitutes a great risk, and a “feed-back” effect cannot be ruled out (Ott
2004).
Non-material life support functions include a great variety of benefits which can be
subdivided into two broad classes: Proxy functions and Identity functions.
Proxy functions include emotional and pleasant experiences such as friendship and
company (social amenity), aesthetic experience or opportunities for recreation. Social
amenity involves attachment to places and interrelates with other humans, assuming a
close interaction of sustainable use of native biodiversity, coherence of local communities
and reduction of poverty as well as of poverty conditioned biodiversity loss. For many
people biodiversity was and is part of their home area, providing embodiment for identity
and belonging. The aesthetic functions of biodiversity refer to the beauty and aesthetic
fascination of nature (see e.g. Seel 1991). A problem involved with aesthetic
argumentation, however, is that there are large differences with respect to its significance
and that it is more difficult to make generalizations about aesthetic than about economic
or ecological matters.
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Figure 1: Material and Non-material life support functions. Source: Joosten and Clark (2002).
Biodiversity also has a very important and widely recognized recreational function.
Natural areas are used by hikers, bird watchers, skiers, divers, boaters, amateur anglers
and hunters, gatherers of berries and mushrooms and other people looking for nature
experience, quietness, and contemplation. These proxy functions of nature also provide
large direct and indirect economic benefits through ecotourism (interrelated with the
production functions of biodiversity) (Gowdy 1997). Johnson (1999) argued that the
biological asset of a region is a critical factor in its future economic competitiveness as it
attracts qualified and well educated people to live and to work there. Healthy natural
areas, a key for biodiversity, offer outstanding possibilities for recreation and tourism,
wanted by inhabitants of urban high density areas.
Identity functions serve self-identification and provide opportunities for cognitive
development, e.g. through providing notions of cultural and historical continuity,
ecological connectedness, religious enrichment or opportunities to carry out scientific
research. They play an important role for human self- or group identification. Very often
biodiversity (e.g. certain natural landscapes or species) play an important role in a
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country’s national self-image. In many cultures biodiversity also has an important
spirituality function which provide for reflection and spiritual enrichment. In contrast to
other types of instrumental values, identity functions are restricted to self-conscious
beings (Groot 1992).
The instrumental functions mentioned above, all contain aspects related to the future.
Transformative functions refer to possibilities to change future preferences and character
building. Many concepts of nature or wilderness tourism and education are based on
personality development through nature experience (for further reading refer e.g. to
Trommer 2001). Transformative values require a societal acceptance that certain
preferences are better than others (Norton 1987). Option functions refer to functions that
are presently not used or recognised, and which this generation will pass on to future
generations (Ott 2004).
2.1.2.
Intrinsic value
Many important international environmental conventions or declarations ascribe intrinsic
moral value to nature. The Convention on Biological Diversity states in its preamble:
“The Contracting parties, Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity…”
(CBD 1992), the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty contains a commitment to
protect “the intrinsic value of Antarctica” (Madrid Protocol 1992) and the European
Commission states in the Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on
Biodiversity Action Plans that “we have an ethical responsibility to preserve biodiversity
for its intrinsic value” (European Commission 2001). The concept of intrinsic moral
value is logically also included in “objective” instrumental values, namely when a chain
of means comes to an end – to an entity having value for its own sake (Ott 2000). Thus
also in systematic preference approaches an ultimate entity has to be identified, deserving
moral respect as such and which is independent of any preferences. An important
question for reflections upon values of biodiversity therefore is which entities deserve
intrinsic moral value.
The position that only human beings have intrinsic value is represented in
“anthropocentrism” (see Norton 1987). Anthropocentrism derives human obligations
towards other entities on realising the interests of human beings. Many environmental
declarations or concepts, such as the Rio Declaration (UNCED 1992) or the concept of
sustainable development, seeking to meet “the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987),
are predominantly based on anthropocentrism, attaching intrinsic moral value to present
and future human beings.
The assignment of intrinsic moral value can reach different width. Frankena (1997)
distinguishes between personalism, which attaches intrinsic value only to persons,
humanism, which ascribes intrinsic value to all human, pathocentrism to all sentient, and
biocentrism to all living beings, ecocentrism attaches intrinsic value to ecological systems
and holism to all existing entities.
Advocates of non-anthropocentric positions argue on behalf of an extension of the moral
community. They argue that any set of morally relevant characteristics, which is shared
by all human beings, is not exclusively possessed by human beings and that it is arbitrary
to value certain states, like for instance freedom from pain, for humans but not for nonhuman beings.
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As one of the most consistent examples of ethical holism, Gorke (2000, 2003), a recent
analysis of holism carefully considering attaching intrinsic value to all of nature, will be
outlined in the following paragraph. Gorke assumes a fundamental decision between two
options, which every single person has to make. These are “egoism” and “moral point of
view” (i.e. non-egoist point of view). In case the latter option was chosen, any exclusion
of entities from the moral community involves a high risk of being an act of egoism as
the individual person determines who deserves moral consideration. He stresses the
universal character of morality as not permitting the establishment of limits of moral
consideration. If the moral point of view is taken seriously, moral consideration is to be
expanded to all entities, including systemic entities or wholes, such as species and
ecosystems. Every disclaimer would be arbitrary and hardly possible to justify. Gorke
shifts the burden of proof to supporters of other ethical approaches, which have to give
the evidence why lack of certain qualities justify exclusion from the moral community – a
task that, due to the prohibition of the naturalistic fallacy, cannot be logically achieved in
anthropocentric, pathocentric and biocentric ethics (i.e. naturalistic fallacies are
commonly found in environmental debates. They arise when deriving moral
consideration only from an empirical quality, from “is” to “ought”). Gorke argues that
every intrusion is connected with a certain amount of “guilt” depending on the need for
an intrusion. To deal with practical management conflicts he therefore argues in favour of
a graduated approach (“the less intrusion the better”) instead of moral concept, which
contains only two options (allowed/forbidden).
Biodiversity conservation, a common approach in conservation, is emphasising the value
of species, ecosystems and genetic diversity. While in traditional ethics intrinsic moral
value is mostly attached to individual organisms, in holism and ecocentrism it can also be
ascribed to systemic wholes such as ecosystems or species. Whereas anthropocentrists
attach value to biodiversity for what it can do for humankind – for instance serving as
reservoir of potential medical agents – ethical holists value biodiversity in the first place
for its own sake.
There is an ongoing discussion whether different concepts of environmental ethics matter
at all in practice. The assumption that different moral positions finally converge to a
political consensus for the practical outcome has been called convergence hypothesis
(Norton 1991). This hypothesis has been critically discussed in many publications,
showing that indeed different ethical commitment can lead to different political outcome
(see e.g. Steenmark 2002).
2.2.
Monetary value approaches
A persistent argument has been that monetary valuation is essential to include
environmental issues in government and business decisions. Hence, environmental
economists have developed methods attaching monetary value to different characteristics
of nature (see e.g. Spash and Hanley 1993). Money proposed as a common indicator
allows for cost-benefit analysis “for an objective and realistic evaluation of the economic
consequences of different development options…necessary to avoid decision in disfavour
of nature” (Bräuer 2003).
The measure, normally used to balance different types of values against each other, is the
“market price” i.e. the amount of money one has to pay to for a service or product. In this
respect monetary amounts reflect the relative importance attached to one thing compared
to another (Simpson 2000). However, there is a broad and diverse critique on the
methodology of measuring the economic value of biodiversity as well as on the valuation
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techniques applied in cost-benefit analysis in general, questioning the feasibility of
capturing all relevant values in terms of monetary value.
2.2.1.
Economic value of biodiversity
Various methods have been developed attempting to overcome difficulties in
monetarizing biodiversity and to estimate non-market components of environmental
assets. Such methods try to identify market values for goods and services provided by
nature where none would otherwise exist.
Contingent valuation attributes monetary value to nature by asking people directly to
state their preferences of a proposed change (e.g. willingness to pay for enjoying a Natura
2000 site or how much money they would demand in case of its loss). Hedonic price
methods establish values for nature by comparing market prices (e.g. house prices and the
level of natural amenity in the surrounding) across situations, differing in providing
certain services. Other methods indirectly measure the value of certain ecosystem services
– i.e. processes and interactions through which natural ecosystems and their constituting
species, sustain human life (Daily 1997) – by accounting for the costs of artificially
replacing these services (replacement cost).
In a prominent paper, published in Nature, Constanza et al. (1997) synthesized more than
100 studies which estimated the monetary value of ecosystem goods and services. They
derived average values per hectare for 17 ecosystem services throughout 16 different
biomes and then extrapolated to the entire biosphere by multiplying with the respective
current global surface area. The Constanza team estimated that ecosystems provide
services at least worth between US$16-54 trillion per year (US$16-54 yr-1 x 1012) with an
estimated annual average value of US$33 trillion (US$33 yr-1 x 1012), equalling
approximately twice the global GNP. These figures have been criticized by many
economic experts. One of the main problems is that ecosystems after conversion by
humans still provide (although rather different) substantial benefits.
A more recent study published in Science by Balmford et al. (2002) therefore attempted
to monetarize undisturbed habitats by estimating not the gross value of benefits
generated, but the difference in flows of goods and services between intact and converted
versions of the same types of biomes. In every case study examined by the Balmford
team, loss of non-marketed services was considerably greater than the marketed marginal
benefits of a conversion. One example from Canada’s most productive agricultural areas
showed that draining freshwater wetlands generated net private benefit; however, societal
benefits (e.g. sustainable hunting, fishing and trapping) of conserving these marshes
exceeded agricultural gains by far.
The total economic value was higher when the wetlands remained intact, exceeding
figures for conversion by about 60%. Further examples from tropical rainforests,
mangrove systems or coral reefs showed similar results (see Figure 2). The mean loss in
total economic value due to conversion in all four biomes examined, amounts to about
one-half of relatively intact systems. Although in the past conversions probably often
benefited society, Balmford et al. (2002) made clear that “conversion of remaining
habitat for agriculture, aquaculture, or forestry often does not make sense from the
perspective of global sustainability”.
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Figure 2: Marginal benefits of retaining and converting natural habitats expressed as Net Present Value (for
NPV please refer to p. 12). Source: Balmford et al. (2002).
Furthermore Balmford et al. (2002) estimated that a hypothetical effective global reserve
network would provide goods and services with an annual monetary value between
US$4400-5200 billion (US$4400-5200 yr-1 x 109), whereas the annual cost of such a
network would account for US$45 billion (US$ 45 yr-1 x 109). The benefit-cost ration for
a global coherent network of protected areas, meeting minimum safe standards would
accordingly be about 100:1.
2.2.2.
Problems of monetarizing biodiversity
The question then arises: why are habitat conversion and biodiversity loss still taking
place?
One of the main reasons is market failure playing a fundamental role in driving loss of
biodiversity. Benefits associated with conserving biodiversity are mainly of use for
society as a whole and most of the time not covered by the market (Joosten and Clark
2002). Many ecosystem functions and services defy monetarization as they have no clear
ownership or their precise contribution to human life support (e.g. of regulation
functions) is unknown or difficult to assess (Vatn and Bromley 1993). Intrinsic values are
by definition without price and also transformative values and option values cannot be
monetarized as preferences of future generations are unpredictable (Brennan 1992). Such
external benefits are often of little importance to economically rational individuals who
gain personal benefits e.g. from land conversion, one of the major causes of biodiversity
loss. Decisions taken in sense of the common narrow economic rationality are often
detrimental to biodiversity since they only take into account a small part of the overall
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value. This may lead to decisions that are wise for the gaining individual but unwise for
society as a whole (Hardin 1968).
Many benefits of biodiversity have transboundary character. Without paying the countries
of origin (often developing countries) for conserving biodiversity, they mostly show little
commitment to looking after it (global appropriate failure) (Pearce and Moran 1994).
Other economic reasons, leading to continued loss of biodiversity, are information
failures (i.e. the lack of information on and valuation of ecosystem services) and
intervention failures (i.e. interventions that may be financially rational for private or
public sectors in short term while leading to erosion of natural services and economical
insufficiency in long term). Balmford et al. (2002) specified the total sum of subsidies
leading to intervention failures as up to US$ 1950 billion. Identifying and removing these
“perverse subsidies” (Myers and Kent 2001) would lead to reduced rates of biodiversity
loss while at the same time making funds available for other policy objectives with
societal importance. Balmford et al. (2002) concluded that counteracting all of these
underlying economic problems of progressing habitat conversion requires timely and
efficient political action of public and private decision makers.
There is also a broad and diverse critique of the methodology of measuring the economic
value of biodiversity (Nunes and van den Bergh 2001, Gowdy 1997, Spash and Hanley
1995), as well as of the valuation techniques applied in cost-benefit analysis in general
(Martinez-Alier et al. 1998, Munda 1996, Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). For the
contingent valuation on biodiversity issues, Spash and Hanley (1995) show that
understanding of the biodiversity concept is extremely limited raising concerns over the
reliance of stated preferences. They also point to common phenomena such as
asymmetrical valuation of gains and losses, lexicographic preferences and the dichotomy
of individuals as political citizens and economic consumers as being inconsistent to the
prevailing economic theory.
As figures relating to biodiversity are often uncertain and the extent of the role
biodiversity plays within ecosystems as well as for human beings remains to some extent
unknown, monetarization of biodiversity functions can only be partial. Further general
points of criticism on monetary valuation as a sufficient decision tool for environmental
policy making are:
 Determination of monetary value is always marginal, i.e. it refers to a small portion of
a larger total.
 Because of the narrowness of economic value theory monetarization fails in the
context of wider social values (see O`Neill, 1993).
 Monetarization fails to express information of environmental quality and the nature of
environmental problems.
 Validity of valuation is questionable with regard to criticism of specific applications of
cost-benefit analyses referring to the failure to respect microeconomic and welfare
theoretic constraints (see above).
As cost-benefit analysis is commonly used in long-term decision making, another major
problem for biodiversity conservation revolves around the issue of discounting the future.
The monetary value of a certain ecosystem function is normally expressed as the annual
return from the service. In a well-managed area this service might be provided openended (SNH 2003). In cost-benefit analysis, a tool often employed in long-term decision
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making, the future value of an ecosystem function is normally transferred into a current
value, the net present value (NPV). The net present value expresses future values in
current terms and allows comparison with the return of a project which might have
detrimental effects on the ecosystem function. The actual net present value is established
by subtracting the present value of all costs from the present value of all benefits for an
option. The question is then which discount-rate should be applied (Joosten and Clark
2002). A discount rate of e.g. 5-6% would effectively value environmental capital within
30-40 years close to zero, a situation which could make non-sustainable use economically
preferable to sustainable use. A situation where reproduction of renewable resources
create less financial incentives than monetary capital, may lead to the extinction of these
resources (Clark 1973). This important aspect of monetary approaches in valuing
biodiversity raises the important question of “who speaks for future generations and with
what authority”, as embodied in the concept of sustainable development (SNH 2003).
3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In 2000, the Lisbon Council set the strategic goal for the EU “to become the most
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European
Council 2000). In this study it has been shown that a competitive society greatly depends
on its diverse natural asset as well as on the various benefits provided by functioning
ecosystems. European society and economy are based on these benefits and a competitive
transformation of the economy must necessarily come along with halting the loss of
biodiversity.
The European Commissioner for the Environment, Margot Wallström, has stressed that
loss of biodiversity matters for ethical, emotional, environmental and economic reasons.
This study examined a whole range of biodiversity values, manifesting the paramount
importance of biodiversity. While to most economists biodiversity is just another
commodity, subject to trade-offs and substitution for many biologists, the total value of
biodiversity is infinite being essential to the sustainability of life on earth (Gowdy 1997).
Although it seems trivial to ask what the total value of biodiversity is: in the light of the
urgency to take political actions against further biodiversity loss, valuation of biodiversity
might be essential to decision making. It is therefore necessary to assess how alterations
in quality and quantity of biodiversity, ecosystem services and natural goods may impact
the ecosphere and to give these changes a value. But, as Gowdy (1997) states: “It is
critical to clarify the language and concepts we use to estimate the value of biodiversity,
and thus the policies leading to its destruction or preservation.” Monetary valuation can
play a supportive role as it may offer a means to communicate value of biodiversity to
politicians and the public in a tangible way (see e.g. Hampicke 2000).
But the manifold practical and ethical problems of monetary valuation of biodiversity
should be kept in mind when using such methods in policy advice. In this study it has
been elaborated that a comprehensive protection of all genetic, species and ecosystem
diversity can arguably only be achieved with concepts going beyond economic valuation.
Although ethical reasons are often more difficult to articulate, for many people these
concerns are the core motives for protecting biodiversity. Born et al. (2001) show that 7090% of the European and the U.S. American population agree that nature has a right to
exist for its own sake. In a study carried out by Grenstad and Wollebaek (1998), 76%
within a sample of 965 persons supported the positions of preserving undisturbed nature,
regardless of human interests. The intrinsic value of biodiversity has already been
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recognized in several international agreements, among others in the Convention on
Biological Diversity, as well as in numerous reports and communications of the European
Union (see above). Addressing the ethical dimension of biodiversity loss emerges as one
of the major future challenges in moving from words to deeds in conserving nature’s
diversity (Wilson 2002).
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4.
LITERATURE
Balmford, A., Bruner, A., Cooper, P., Constanza, R., Farber, S., Green, R.E., Jerkins, M., Jefferiss,
P., Jessamy, V., Madden, J., Munro, K., Myers, N., Naeem, S., Paavola, J., Rayment, M., Rosendo,
S., Roughgarden, J., Trumper, K., Turner, K. (2002): Economic reason for conserving wild nature.
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