ICNND Research Paper
Countries Planning to Introduce Nuclear Power Generation and the 3Ss
- Making the 3Ss an International Standard -
June 2009
(Amb.) Tetsuya ENDO
The Japan Institute of International Affairs
Associated Research Centre of ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear
Non-proliferation and Disarmament)
Countries Planning to Introduce Nuclear Power Generation and
the 3Ss—Making the 3Ss International Guiding Principles ENDO Tetsuya
Senior Adjunct Fellow
The Japan Institute of International Affairs
June 2009
Introduction
The term “the 3Ss” has come into use recently; it was mentioned in the Chairman’s
Summary and the Leaders’ Declaration at the G8 Summit held in Toyako, Hokkaido
in July 2008, and it has appeared in IAEA documents. In addition, there have been
many occasions on which the constituent elements – safety, security and
non-proliferation (or safeguards, its key feature) – have been discussed in parallel
even when the term “the 3Ss” itself has not been used directly, and the 3Ss have
gradually gained international recognition. These 3Ss comprise guiding principles to
which countries introducing nuclear power generation should most certainly adhere.
Commitment to these principles must be a two-way street, though, with provider
countries assisting countries new to nuclear power to incorporate the 3Ss into their
nuclear programs rather than simply decreeing compliance.
In this paper, the author will address the following points:
 The present international situation concerning nuclear power
 The nature of the 3Ss
 The interrelationships between safety, security, and safeguards, the constituent
elements of the 3Ss
 The introduction of nuclear power generation and the 3Ss
 Efforts to make the 3Ss international guiding principles
The present international situation concerning nuclear power
The introduction of nuclear power generation has picked up pace considerably since
the two oil crises of the 1970s, especially in Europe, the US, Japan and South Korea,
but this momentum was significantly slowed by the 1979 Three Mile Island incident
in the US and the 1986 Chernobyl incident in Ukraine, after which nuclear power
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went into a winter-like freeze. The US has seen no orders for nuclear power plants
in the US nor the construction of any new plants since these incidents, and country
after country in Europe has adopted policies moving away from nuclear power.
However, the situation has significantly changed of late, primarily for two reasons.
The first is the sharp rise in global energy demand. The rapid economic growth of
China, India and other developing countries has boosted the demand for energy,
particularly for petroleum, and petroleum production is beginning to lag behind.
Despite the recent financial crisis having quieted down somewhat, petroleum prices
remain on the high side. As countries engage in competition to acquire petroleum
resources for the sake of energy security, they have begun seeking to replace
petroleum with nuclear power as an alternative energy source. The second reason is
the need for approaches to prevent global warming. This issue is one of the most
serious confronting the world at present, and reliance on nuclear power will
undoubtedly prove inevitable even as efforts are made to conserve energy and thus
reduce as far as possible the consumption of fossil fuels, a principal source of CO2
emissions. Greater efforts should be made to develop natural energies such as solar
and wind power, but no source of electricity can top nuclear power in terms of energy
density, stability of supply, and cost.
This is the backdrop to the recent “nuclear power renaissance.” Signs of a rush to
construct nuclear power plants hint that the US has awoken from a long hibernation,
while in Europe, Finland has taken the lead in new construction, the UK has reversed
its negative stance toward nuclear power, and Italy is losing its post-Chernobyl
aversion to nuclear power; France and Russia’s commitment to nuclear power have
never been in doubt. Drawing the most attention, though, are the developing
countries, more than 60 of which have expressed interest in nuclear power. In
addition to the previously mentioned China and India, Vietnam and Pakistan already
have plans/facilities for nuclear power generation, with Thailand and Indonesia
among others that have expressed great interest. In the Middle East, Iran has already
begun construction on a nuclear power plant, while Turkey, Egypt and even the
oil-rich Gulf states have exhibited interest. Several Latin American countries (e.g.,
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) and South Africa also have plans to more build
large-scale nuclear power plants, and moves in this direction can be seen in other
African countries. While no one knows if these intentions will all be translated into
reality someday – and the recent financial crisis has slammed the brakes on these for
at least the short term – a “nuclear power renaissance” over the medium to long term
is a near certainty. IAEA forecasts hold that 65 or more million-kW-class nuclear
power plants could be built by 2020.
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The scope of the 3Ss
This flowering of a “nuclear power renaissance” should be welcomed from the
perspectives of achieving energy security and combating global warming, but this
welcome should not be without reservation. A larger number of nuclear reactors
could increase problems and risks in terms of safety, security, and safeguards, and
careful consideration must be given to these three aspects when introducing nuclear
power generation to alleviating these. Naturally this goes for countries already
operating nuclear power plants, but it is especially applicable to countries new to
nuclear power.
The IAEA’s 2007 “Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for
Nuclear Power” listed 19 items to which consideration should be given when newly
introducing nuclear power generation. While all of them are necessary and
important, the 3Ss stand out as the major prerequisites for the peaceful use of nuclear
power.
What are these 3Ss and what connections exist among them? A brief description of
the 3Ss is warranted here. Safety was likely the first of the three to garner interest
internationally and to be systematically established, followed by safeguards.
Nuclear security is to a certain degree included in the concepts of safety and nuclear
non-proliferation, but it has come to be treated as an independent concept in view of
the changes internationally prompted by the terrorist attacks in the US on September
11, 2001.
Nuclear safety
Nuclear safety can be divided by focus into the safety of plant design and operation
and the safety of material handling, and by phenomenon into safety for the prevention
of radioactive exposure and safety for the prevention of critical accidents. Safety for
the prevention of radioactive exposure is the oldest of these, traceable back to the
discovery and use of X-rays by Roentgen in 1895. The International X-Ray and
Radium Protection Commission was established in 1928, and it took on its present
form as the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 1950.
The safety standards used for dealing with radiation are to this day those formulated
by the ICRP. The safety of plant design and operation, particularly the prevention of
critical accidents, was first addressed in the US safety regulations for nuclear power
plants and other civilian uses of nuclear power stipulated in the 1954 Atomic Energy
Act, and standards were gradually systematized.
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Following the Three Mile Island incident (1979) and the Chernobyl incident in
Ukraine (1986), efforts were made to establish a safety culture by upgrading nuclear
power safety regulations, creating international cooperative frameworks for both
government and private-sector use (the World Association of Nuclear Operators
[WANO] is the most famous of the private-sector organizations) and international
treaties such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and having the IAEA draw up
necessary documents (e.g., Fundamental Safety Principles) and databases.
Safeguards – nuclear non-proliferation
The first official reference to “safeguards” with respect to nuclear power can be found
in the November 1945 Declaration on the Atomic Bomb by President Truman and
Prime Ministers Atlee and King. Inspections were thus considered a primary
element in safeguards from early on, and the Declaration went on to discuss what
safeguards would be acceptable to all countries.
President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech to the UN General Assembly in
December 1953 eventually led to the creation in 1957 of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, whose primary duties were promoting the peaceful use of nuclear
energy and implementing safeguards.
The IAEA Statute sets out safeguards as one of the organization’s primary duties.
Initially the IAEA implemented safeguards from bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreements (safeguards for the materials covered under the bilateral agreements)
transferred to its charge (1st generation safeguards) and, after the NPT went into force
in 1970, the IAEA was given responsibility for full-scope safeguards under the NPT
(2nd generation safeguards). The discovery of a secret nuclear development program
in Iraq and suspicions about North Korea’s nuclear program in the 1990s led to the
adoption of an Additional Protocol incorporating expanded declarations and
supplementary measures to detect hitherto undeclared nuclear activities. In
conjunction with this, integrated safeguards were implemented under the Additional
Protocol, enabling safeguard streamlining (3rd generation safeguards). However, the
Additional Protocol has yet to gain universal acceptance; it has been signed by 120
countries but ratified by only 91 of 189 NPT parties as of May 2009.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime represented by the safeguards has faced serious
challenges from numerous directions – e.g., the increase in nuclear armed states, the
case of Iran, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, behind-the-scenes activities by
non-state actors – and, though these are being addressed by a variety of reinforcement
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measures, the time has come for a more substantial approach.
Nuclear security
Nuclear security has not been specifically regarded as a matter for concern nearly as
long as nuclear safety and safeguards (nuclear non-proliferation) have. The concept
of security was first taken up in the 1960s and 1970s from the perspective of the
physical protection of nuclear material. This period saw a sharp rise in international
transfers of research reactors and increases in the installed capacity of nuclear power
plants, even as hijackings and terrorism gained much of the public’s attention.
Recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material were prepared by the
IAEA (published in 1975 as INFCIRC225), which then began preparing a
legally-binding document on physical protection (adopted in 1977 as the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material). Nevertheless, it was not until the
latter half of the 1990s that nuclear security began to be examined in earnest and, with
nuclear terrorism becoming a realistic scenario after the 9-11 terrorist attacks of 2001,
the international community reviewed its counterterrorism measures with a new sense
of urgency and strengthened its efforts in this regard.
Initially these efforts had focused exclusively on nuclear material as the target of
nuclear terrorism, but this scope was gradually extended to nuclear power plants and
the illegal use of radioactive material other than nuclear material.
Although “nuclear security” does not appear explicitly in its Statute, the IAEA uses as
a working definition of nuclear security “the prevention and detection of, and
response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious
acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.”
To amplify this in more concrete terms, nuclear security involves the prevention and
detection of, and response to the four threats of (a) thefts of nuclear material, (b)
nuclear explosive devices manufactured using the stolen nuclear material, (c)
dispersion devices for radioactive material (“dirty bombs”) and (d) sabotage or
destruction of nuclear power facilities or of radioactive material in transport.
Nuclear security has been attracting an extraordinary level of interest, reflecting the
uneasiness of the international community, and the topic has unfailingly been
discussed at G8 summit meetings in recent years. This interest is manifest in the
many international treaties and approaches adopted thus far, including (1) the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the IAEA’s nuclear
material protection guidelines, (2) the International Convention for the Suppression of
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Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, (3) the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), (4) the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative, (5) UN Security Council Resolution 1540 against
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and (6) the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS),
headquartered in Vienna, Austria, was recently established as an international
private-sector organization to prevent nuclear terrorism, essentially a nuclear security
version of WANO.
Connections between Safety, Safeguards, and Security
The interrelationships among the three elements comprising the 3Ss are difficult
indeed. For example, the IAEA Secretariat previously delegated authority for
nuclear security to the Safeguards Department, but this responsibility was later
transferred to the Department of Nuclear Safety, which was then renamed the
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. The complexity of the interrelationships
among the three arises from the overlap of their respective domains. The three can
be compared in terms of their objectives, the parties responsible (i.e., the party
responsible for taking action in this area), similarities and differences in causes,
transparency of action, etc. A few of these will be discussed below.
Comparison of Scopes and Objectives
Nuclear power has a dual nature – it can be employed for military or for peaceful
purposes – and entails the use of radioactive material, and thus “peace” and “safety”
can be regarded as the keywords for regulating nuclear power. “Peace” is the
dimension of preventing nuclear material intended for peaceful use from being
converted for military use into nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices that
threaten peace, while “safety” is the dimension of preventing radiation exposure from
critical accidents and radiation sources. Safety can itself be broadly subdivided into
safety to prevent accidents due to the negligence of nuclear power companies (which
might be termed engineering safety or intrinsic safety), and safety to prevent
malicious (willful) sabotage or destruction by terrorists or other third-party offenders
(extrinsic safety).
Looking at the relations among safety, safeguards, and security in keeping with these
criteria, safeguards can be thought of as addressing “peace,” nuclear safety as
addressing “safety,” and nuclear security as spanning both “peace” and “safety.” In
the context of nuclear security, the prevention and detection of, and response to, the
theft of nuclear material that can be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices is connected with “peace”, while the malicious intentions of
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terrorists are addressed under “safety.”
Safeguards fundamentally target state actors, nuclear security focuses on terrorists and
other non-state actors, and nuclear safety covers engineering phenomena.
On the topic of the transparency of regulations, transparency in safety matters is
required throughout the entire process, including the construction of the system and
its results. By contrast, certain safeguards are considered confidential, and there are
numerous aspects of nuclear security that by their very nature require the maintenance
of secrecy and thus are not suited to public disclosure; it would not do to teach thieves
how to break in.
Comparison of Primary Actors
Safeguards, safety and security also differ by primary actors. The entity responsible
for implementing safeguards is the IAEA, under which national regulatory authorities
put safeguards into practice within their respective countries, and nuclear power
companies are subject to these safeguards. On the other hand, the relevant national
authorities are responsible for regulation and external accountability in nuclear
security and safety, and these are essentially implemented by nuclear power
companies.
Among the basic roles of the IAEA in nuclear security and nuclear power safety are
the presentation of standards and guidelines, the dissemination of information, and the
conduct of peer reviews.
The interrelationships among the 3Ss discussed above are summarized in Table 1.
Introduction of Nuclear Power Generation and the 3Ss
Safety, safeguards, and security are all general concepts so, if countries newly
introducing nuclear power generation are to be asked to adopt the 3Ss, these concepts
must be made concrete to a certain degree if they are to prove useful either as
guidelines or as standards. Overly strict guidelines/standards will prove impractical,
however, so they should be limited to the minimum necessary. To lend international
legitimacy to the standards, it would be preferable to have the IAEA develop these
standards rather than have individual provider countries of materials and technology
set their own separate standards. The previously mentioned “Milestones in the
Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power” prepared by the IAEA
will be helpful in this regard.
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Table 1
Interrelationships among Safety, Security, and Safeguards
Nuclear security
Protection of nuclear
material
Scope of
activity
Nuclear power
safety
Protection
Prevention
from
of nuclear
Prevention
radioactive
Prevention
smuggling
of sabotage/
sources
of theft
destruction
IAEA
National regulatory authorities
(National
regulatory
authorities)Principal actor Nuclear power
companies
(implementing
actors)
Nuclear power companies (implementing actors)
Insiders
Objective
Prevention of
accidents
Safeguards
Offenders (terrorists, etc.)
Insiders
Prevention of conversion to non-peaceful uses
(including military uses)
National regulatory
authorities
Nuclear power
companies
(subjected to
safeguards)
Prevention of
conversion to military
use
Prevention of
accidents
Below is outlined one possible proposal for each of the constituent elements of the
3Ss.
Nuclear power safety
Safety covers an extremely broad spectrum of stages – from planning the introduction
of nuclear power generation to constructing, operating and closing nuclear facilities as
well as processing/disposing the waste therefrom – and a commitment to the IAEA’s
Fundamental Safety Principles (September 2006) should first be required.
These principles include:
・ Establishment of a system in which responsibility for safety lies with the
operator
・ Establishment of legal and administrative organizations
 (Creation of an independent regulatory organization, processing/disposal
of radioactive waste, emergency measures to handle accidents, etc.)
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・ International cooperation
 (Conclusion of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and participation in
peer reviews, and then conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency, etc.)
・ A positive stance toward safety culture
・ Establishment of a nuclear liability system compliant with international
standards (having the country conclude an international treaty would be
desirable)
・ Membership in WANO (preferably)
Safeguards
・ In connection with safeguards as a stand-in for the nuclear non-proliferation
regime, it is necessary that countries first join the NPT, conclude a full-scope
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and faithfully observe this agreement.
Even better would be to have countries also conclude an Additional Protocol
designed to bolster the IAEA’s verification abilities.
・ A means of nuclear material accountancy must naturally be put into place
domestically in order to execute the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It
is also essential that domestic legislation be put into force on the
implementation of safeguards. If at all possible, systems facilitating IAEA
verification should be incorporated into the design of nuclear power plants at
the construction stage.
・ Other means of reinforcing the NPT regime would be to place a total ban on
nuclear testing, to internationalize the management of nuclear fuel cycle and
other sensitive technologies, and using highly proliferation-resistant
technology. This perspective would require countries to conclude to the
CTBT and to pledge not to acquire uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing (extraction) technology.
Security
・ Security has a shorter history than the other two constituents and security
culture has not matured as much as safety culture, so security culture must be
fostered promptly.
・ Legislative frameworks must be put in place for measures to protect nuclear
material/facilities and combat nuclear terrorism and nuclear smuggling, and
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these measures must actually be implemented.
・ It is necessary that the design-basis threat be accurately assessed by the
relevant authorities at all times and that measures be taken to counter the
threat.
・ Participation and fulfillment of the following international frameworks,
treaties, etc., for the sake of international cooperation:
 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (first and
foremost)
 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism
 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
 Global Threat Reduction Initiative
 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction
 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
 IAEA INFCIRC/225
 Participation in WINS (preferably)
Conclusion
Making the 3Ss International Guiding Principles
The 3Ss can be said to be absolutely essential to the peaceful use of nuclear power,
and so the question is how best to promote the 3Ss and develop this concept into an
international standard. Provider countries unilaterally demanding acceptance of the
3Ss by countries newly introducing nuclear power generation would likely be
counterproductive; the countries new to nuclear power are almost all developing
countries, and each of the 3Ss more or less has regulatory elements. Developing
countries are extremely sensitive to discrimination and inequality and, given that
discrimination is integral to the NPT at the heart of the nuclear power regime, they
would strongly oppose further discrimination. This attitude has clearly emerged in
the debates hitherto on regulating the nuclear fuel cycle, and has even been apparent
among some developing countries in discussions on the 3Ss as well.
(1) Consequently, provider countries must not unilaterally demand compliance with
the 3Ss, but must instead adopt an approach of working alongside countries newly
introducing nuclear power. In other words, provider countries should not require
acceptance and establishment of the 3Ss from the outset (as preconditions) but
instead should put these into effect by stages – nuclear plant construction,
completion and operation – in an evolutionary fashion. To this end, assistance
should be provided to develop human resources, establish legal frameworks, and
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cooperate through innovative funding to enable countries new to nuclear power to
accept the 3Ss.
(2) The 3Ss are an idea propounded by Japan, and Japan should thus take the
initiative in promoting them. Japan is presently hosting regional seminars, etc.,
but promoting the 3Ss on a multilateral basis, if possible through the IAEA, would
be vastly preferable, as doing so would give international legitimacy to the 3Ss
and draw a line of demarcation from the competition of economic interests among
the developed countries. It goes without saying, of course, that talks with
concerned developed countries and bilateral talks with countries interested in
introducing nuclear power should be conducted.
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Bibliography/References
1. Chairman’s Summary and Leaders’ Declaration, G-8 Summit in Toyako,
Hokkaido, July 2008
2. Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of
the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond, Report prepared by an Independent
Commission at the Request of the Director-General of the IAEA, May 2008.
3. Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear
Power, IAEA, 2007.
4. Handbook on Nuclear Law, IAEA, 2003.
5. Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA, 2006.
6. Irie, K., Inter-relationship between Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Nuclear
Security, vol.5, no 1, Energy Policy Research, July 2007
7. Tsuboi, H., Interrelationship and Future Prospect of Safeguards, Nuclear
Security and Nuclear Safety, vol.5, no.1, Energy Policy Research, July 2007
8. Kurihara, H., Control on Nuclear Activities – Safety and Security, vol.2, no.1,
August 2003.
9. Nakagome, Y., Current Status and Technology of Nuclear Security in the
World, Journal of the Atomic Energy Society, June 2009.
10. Japanese Foreign Minister’s Speech on Nuclear Disarmament, 28 April 2009.
Ambassador Tetsuya Endo
Ambassador Endo is currently a Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Institute of
International Affairs. He was Vice Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy
Commission. He served in various overseas diplomatic postings, including Vienna
and New Zealand as ambassador. During his tenure in Vienna, he was a member of
the IAEA Board of Governors and Chairman (1987-1988). His domestic postings
include Director-General for Science and Technology at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary in Charge of Japan-North Korea Normalization
Talks and Ambassador in Charge of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO).
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