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Page 1
LEXSEE 477 U.S. 619
OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL. v. DAYTON CHRISTIAN
SCHOOLS, INC., ET AL.
No. 85-488
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
477 U.S. 619; 106 S. Ct. 2718; 91 L. Ed. 2d 512; 1986 U.S.
LEXIS 71; 54 U.S.L.W. 4860; 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
78; 40 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P36,195
March 26, 1986, Argued
June 27, 1986, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION:
766 F.2d 932, reversed and remanded.
DECISION:
Younger v Harris abstention doctrine held to apply where school
brought federal suit to enjoin proceeding by state agency investigating
alleged sex discrimination in school's
hiring and termination decisions.
SUMMARY:
A private, nonprofit corporation
was formed by two churches in Dayton,
Ohio to provide education at elementary and secondary school levels. When
a teacher employed by the corporation
told her principal that she was pregnant, she was told that her employment
contract would not be renewed because
of the corporation's religious doctrine that mothers should stay home
with their preschool-age children. The
teacher filed a complaint with the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, alleging
that the nonrenewal decision constituted sex discrimination in violation
of an Ohio statute. The corporation
terminated the teacher's employment
and rejected a proposal by the commission that it reinstate the teacher
with backpay, whereupon the commission
initiated administrative proceedings
against the corporation by filing a
complaint. While these proceedings
were pending, the corporation filed an
action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Ohio under 42 USCS 1983, seeking a
permanent injunction of the state proceedings on the ground that any investigation of its hiring process or any
imposition of sanctions for its nonrenewal or termination decisions would
violate the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. The commission filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
District Court should refrain from enjoining the administrative proceedings
based on federal abstention doctrines.
Without addressing the abstention argument, the District Court refused to
issue the injunction (578 F Supp
1004). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate both the free exercise and establishment of religion
clauses of the First Amendment (766
F2d 932).
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In
Page 2
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
an opinion by Rehnquist, J., joined by
Burger, Ch. J., and White, Powell, and
O'Connor, JJ., it was held that (1)
the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction under 28 USCS 1254(2) to review the decision of the Court of Appeals that the Ohio sex discrimination
statute, as applied, violated the religion clauses of the First Amendment,
(2) the District Court should have abstained, under Younger v Harris, 401
US 37, 27 L Ed 2d 669, 91 S Ct 746,
and later cases, from adjudicating the
case, since the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination was a sufficiently important state interest to
bring the case within the ambit of the
Younger abstention principles, and
there was no reason to doubt that the
corporation would have an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional
claims, either before the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission itself or in state
court judicial review of the proceeding, and (3) the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission did not violate the corporation's First Amendment rights by
merely investigating the circumstances
of the teacher's discharge.
Stevens, J., joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurred
in the judgment, expressing the view
that (1) neither the investigation of
certain charges by the Civil Rights
Commission nor its conduct of a hearing on those charges was prohibited by
the First Amendment, and (2) the corporation's constitutional challenge to
the remedial provisions of the Ohio
statute was not ripe for review, but
(3) the Younger abstention doctrine
did not require the District Court to
dismiss the complaint, since such a
disposition would presumably deny the
corporation a federal forum to adjudicate the constitutionality of a provisional administrative remedy if the
Civil Rights Commission were to impose
such a remedy while refusing to address the merits of the corporation's
constitutional claims.
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:
[***LEdHN1]
APPEAL §254
Supreme Court -- jurisdiction -Headnote:[1A][1B]
The United States Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction under 28 USCS
1254(2) to review a decision of a Federal Court of Appeals that a state
statute, as applied to authorize a
state administrative body to investigate
sex
discrimination
charges
against a nonprofit corporation that
operates Christian schools and to decide whether to impose sanctions, violates the religion clauses of the
First Amendment.
[***LEdHN2]
COURTS §691
federal abstention -- injunction of
state proceedings -Headnote:[2A][2B][2C]
A Federal District Court should abstain, under Younger v Harris, 401 US
37, 27 L Ed 2d 669, 91 S Ct 746, and
later cases, from adjudicating a case
in which a nonprofit corporation that
operates Christian schools seeks a
permanent injunction of proceedings by
a state civil rights commission investigating alleged sex discrimination in
the corporation's hiring and termination decisions, where the corporation
claims that the religion clauses of
the First Amendment prohibit the commission from exercising jurisdiction
over it or imposing sanctions on it,
but where there is no reason to doubt
that the corporation will have an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims, either before the
commission itself or in state court
judicial review of the proceedings;
the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the
case within the ambit of the Younger
abstention principle. (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissented from this holding.)
[***LEdHN3]
APPEAL §254
Page 3
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
Supreme Court -- jurisdiction -Headnote:[3]
Under 28 USCS 1254(2), which authorizes an appeal to the United
States Supreme Court by a party relying on a state statute held by a Federal Court of Appeals to be unconstitutional, an appeal is authorized in
cases holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of
the case.
[***LEdHN7]
CIVIL RIGHTS §30
[***LEdHN4]
COURTS §691
COURTS §763
federal abstention -- state administrative proceedings -- exhaustion of
remedies --
ripeness -Headnote:[4A][4B]
The filing of an administrative action by a state civil rights commission, threatening sanctions against a
corporation for allegedly engaging in
sex discrimination in its hiring and
termination decisions, creates a ripe
controversy
where
the
corporation
seeks to enjoin the administrative action in a Federal District Court.
[***LEdHN5]
COURTS §683
federal
state --
Ed 2d 669, 91 S Ct 746, holding that
federal courts should generally not
enjoin state proceedings, have been
applied to pending state administrative proceedings in which an important
state interest is involved, such abstention may not be appropriate where
state law expressly indicates that the
administrative proceedings are not judicial in nature.
abstention
--
waiver
by
Headnote:[5]
A state may voluntarily submit to
federal court jurisdiction even though
it might have a tenable claim that the
court should abstain from exercising
its jurisdiction; however, a state
does not waive its claim to abstention
where it stipulates to the federal
court's jurisdiction but does not expressly urge the court to proceed to
an adjudication of the merits.
[***LEdHN6]
COURTS §691
federal abstention
proceedings --
--
nonjudicial
Headnote:[6A][6B]
Although the abstention principles
of Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 27 L
Headnote:[7A][7B]
The application of the principles
of Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 27 L
Ed 2d 669, 91 S Ct 746, holding that
federal courts should generally not
enjoin state proceedings, to pending
state administrative proceedings is
consistent with the rule that litigants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing
suit under 42 USCS 1983 in federal
court; federal abstention is proper
where the administrative proceedings
in question (1) are coercive rather
than remedial, (2) begin before any
substantial advancement in the federal
action takes place, and (3) involve an
important state interest.
[***LEdHN8]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §963
schools -- First Amendment -- state
investigation -Headnote:[8]
A state civil rights commission
does not violate the First Amendment
rights of a nonprofit corporation that
operates Christian schools by exercising jurisdiction over the corporation
to investigate the circumstances under
which one of its teachers was discharged, if only to ascertain whether
the religious-based reason ascribed by
the corporation was in fact the reason
Page 4
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
for the discharge; religious schools
cannot claim to be wholly free from
some state regulation.
[***LEdHN9]
COURTS §691
federal abstention -- pending administrative proceeding -- constitutional objections -Headnote:[9]
In order for the abstention principles of Younger v Harris, 401 US 37,
27 L Ed 2d 669, 91 S Ct 746, and later
cases to apply to a pending state administrative proceeding in which important state interests are involved,
it is sufficient that the party seeking to enjoin the proceeding has the
opportunity to raise constitutional
claims in state court judicial review
of the proceeding; thus, the proceeding of a state civil rights commission
affords an adequate opportunity for a
target of its investigation to raise
constitutional claims against the commission's potential sanctions for alleged sex discrimination where there
is no indication that judicial review
of the constitutional claims in state
court is not authorized by state statute.
SYLLABUS
Appellee Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc. (Dayton), a private nonprofit
corporation that provides elementary
and secondary education, requires that
its teachers subscribe to a particular
set of religious beliefs, including
belief in the internal resolution of
disputes through the "Biblical chain
of command." As a contractual condition of employment, teachers must
agree to present any grievance to
their immediate supervisor and to acquiesce in the final authority of Dayton's board of directors, rather than
to pursue a remedy in civil court.
After a pregnant teacher was told that
her employment contract would not be
renewed because of Dayton's religious
doctrine that mothers should stay home
with their preschool age children, she
contacted an attorney, who threatened
Dayton with litigation under state and
federal sex discrimination laws if it
did not agree to rehire the teacher
for the coming school year. Dayton
then rescinded its nonrenewal decision, but terminated the teacher because of her violation of the internal
dispute resolution doctrine.
The
teacher then filed a charge with appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission,
alleging that under Ohio statutes Dayton's original nonrenewal decision
constituted unlawful sex discrimination and its termination decision unlawfully penalized her for asserting
her rights.
Ultimately, the Commission initiated administrative proceedings against Dayton, which answered
the complaint by asserting that the
First Amendment prevented the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over
it since its actions had been taken
pursuant to sincerely held religious
beliefs.
While the administrative
proceedings were pending, Dayton and
others (also appellees here) filed
this action in Federal District Court,
seeking an injunction against the
state administrative proceedings on
the ground that any investigation of
Dayton's hiring process or any imposition of sanctions for its nonrenewal
or termination decisions would violate
the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. Without addressing the Commission's argument that the court
should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, the District Court refused
to issue an injunction, holding, inter
alia, that the Commission's proposed
action would not violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the
Commission's exercise of jurisdiction
would violate both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
Held:
1. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under 28 U. S.
C. § 1254(2), which authorizes review
of a court of appeals' decision holding a state statute unconstitutional
as applied to the facts of the case.
Page 5
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
Here, the Court of Appeals expressly
held that the Ohio statutory provisions relied on by the teacher, as applied to authorize the administrative
proceedings, were repugnant to the Religion Clauses. P. 625.
2. The District Court should have
abstained from adjudicating this case
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
and its progeny.
Younger, which held
that a federal court should not enjoin
a pending state criminal proceeding
except when necessary to prevent great
and immediate irreparable injury, was
based on concerns for comity and federalism. Such concerns are equally applicable to other types of state proceedings, including state administrative proceedings, judicial in nature,
in which important state interests are
vindicated, so long as in the course
of
those
proceedings
the
federal
plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim. The elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to
bring the present case within the ambit of the Younger doctrine, and there
is no reason to doubt that Dayton will
receive an adequate opportunity to
raise its constitutional claims. Even
assuming that Ohio law is such that
the Commission may not consider the
constitutionality of the statute under
which it operates, it is sufficient
that under Ohio law constitutional
claims may be raised in state-court
judicial review of the administrative
proceedings. Pp. 625-629.
COUNSEL: Kathleen McManus argued the
cause for appellants. With her on the
briefs were Anthony J. Celebrezze,
Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, and
Helen M. Ninos, Assistant Attorney
General.
William Bentley Ball argued the cause
for appellees. With him on the brief
were Philip J. Murren, Sandra E. Wise,
and Bruce E. Pence. *
*
Joan E. Bertin, George
Kannar, Charles S. Sims, Isabelle
Katz Pinzler, and Burt Neuborne
filed a brief for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging
affirmance were filed for the
American Jewish Committee et al.
by Kimberlee Wood Colby, Samuel
E. Ericsson, Michael J. Woodruff,
Samuel Rabinove, and Richard T.
Foltin; for Americans United for
Separation of Church and State by
Lee Boothby and Robert A. Yingst;
for the Associated Christian Conciliation Services by John D.
Robb; for the Catholic Conference
of Ohio by David J. Young; for
Concerned Women of America by Diane E. White, Joy R. Powell, and
Jordan W. Lorence; for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee
Boothby and Rolland Truman; for
the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists by Walter E.
Carson and Warren L. Johns; for
the Gulf & Great Plains Legal
Foundation by Jerald L. Hill and
Mark J. Bredemeier; for the National Jewish Commission on Law
and Public Affairs ("COLPA") by
Daniel D. Chazin, Nathan Lewin,
and Dennis Rapps; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W.
Charles Bundren, Guy O. Farley,
Jr., John W. Whitehead, D. Kevin
Ikenberry, Thomas O. Kotouc, Alfred Lindh, William B. Hollberg,
and Wendell R. Bird; and for the
United States Catholic Conference
by Wilfred R. Caron and Mark E.
Chopko.
Briefs of amici curiae were
filed for the American Jewish
Congress by Marc D. Stern and
Ronald A. Krauss; and for the
Catholic League for Religious and
Civil Rights et al. by Steven
Frederick McDowell.
JUDGES: REHNQUIST, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment,
Page 6
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
in
which
BRENNAN,
MARSHALL,
and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 629.
OPINION BY: REHNQUIST
OPINION
[*621]
[***518]
[**2720] JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion
of the Court.
[***LEdHR1A]
[1A] [***LEdHR2A]
[2A]Appellee Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc. (Dayton), and various individuals
brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U. S. C. §
1983, seeking to enjoin a pending
state
administrative
proceeding
brought against Dayton by appellant
Ohio Civil Rights Commission (Commission). Dayton asserted that the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment prohibited the
Commission from exercising jurisdiction over it or from punishing it for
engaging in employment discrimination.
The District Court refused to [*622]
issue the injunction on grounds that
any conflict between the First Amendment and the administrative proceedings was not yet ripe, and that in any
case the proposed action of the Commission violated neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that the exercise of jurisdiction and the enforcement of the statute would impermissibly burden appellees' rights under the Free Exercise
Clause and would result in excessive
entanglement under the Establishment
Clause. We postponed the question of
jurisdiction pending consideration of
the merits.
474 U.S. 978 (1985). We
now conclude that we have jurisdiction, and we reverse, holding that the
District Court should have abstained
under our cases beginning with Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Dayton is a private nonprofit corporation that provides education at
both the elementary and secondary
school levels.
It was formed by two
local churches, the Patterson Park
Brethren Church and the Christian Tabernacle, and it is regarded as a "nondenominational"
extension
of
the
Christian
education
ministries
of
these two churches.
Dayton's corporate charter establishes a board of
directors (board) to lead the corporation in both spiritual and temporal
matters.
App. 11.
The charter also
includes a section entitled "Statement
of Faith," which serves to restrict
membership on the board and the educational staff to persons who subscribe
to a particular set of religious beliefs.
The Statement of Faith requires each board or staff member to
be a born-again Christian
[***519]
and to reaffirm his or her belief annually in the Bible, the Trinity, the
nature and mission of Jesus Christ,
the doctrine of original sin, the role
of the Holy Ghost, the resurrection
and judgment of the dead, the need for
Christian unity, and the divine creation of human beings. Id., at 5-6.
The board has elaborated these requirements to include a belief in the
internal
resolution
of
disputes
through the "Biblical
[*623]
chain
of command." The core of this doctrine, rooted in passages from the New
Testament,
is
that
one
Christian
should not take another Christian into
courts of the State. Teachers are expected to present any grievance they
may have to their immediate supervisor, and to acquiesce in the final authority of the board, rather than to
pursue a remedy in civil court.
The
board has sought to ensure compliance
with this internal dispute resolution
doctrine by making it a contractual
condition of employment.
Linda Hoskinson was employed as a
teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979
school year. She subscribed to the
Statement
of
Faith
and
expressly
agreed to resolve disputes internally
through the Biblical chain of command.
In January 1979, she informed her
principal, James Rakestraw, that she
was pregnant.
After consulting with
his
superiors,
Rakestraw
informed
Page 7
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
Hoskinson that her employment contract
would not be renewed at the end of the
school year because of Dayton's religious doctrine that mothers should
stay home with their preschool age
children.
Instead of appealing this
decision internally, Hoskinson contacted an attorney who [**2721] sent
a letter to Dayton's superintendent,
Claude Schindler, threatening litigation based on state and federal sex
discrimination laws if Dayton did not
agree to rehire Hoskinson for the coming school year.
Upon
receipt
of
this
letter,
Schindler informed Hoskinson that she
was suspended immediately for challenging the nonrenewal decision in a
manner inconsistent with the internal
dispute resolution doctrine.
The
board reviewed this decision and decided to terminate Hoskinson.
It
stated that the sole reason for her
termination was her violation of the
internal dispute resolution doctrine,
and it rescinded the earlier nonrenewal decision because it said that she
had not received adequate prior notice
of the doctrine concerning a mother's
duty to stay home with her young children.
Hoskinson filed a complaint with
appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission
(Commission), alleging that Dayton's
[*624] nonrenewal decision constituted sex discrimination, in violation of
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A)
(Supp. 1985), and that its termination
decision penalized her for asserting
her rights, in violation of Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4112.02(I) (Supp. 1985).
The Commission notified Dayton that it
was conducting a preliminary investigation into the matter, and repeatedly
urged Dayton to consider private settlement, warning that failure to do so
could result in a formal adjudication
of the matter.
The Commission eventually determined that there was probable cause to
believe that Dayton had discriminated
against Hoskinson based on her sex and
had retaliated against her for attempting to assert her rights in vio-
lation of §§ 4112(A) and (I). Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
[***520]
§ 4112.05(B) (Supp. 1985), it sent
Dayton a proposed Conciliation Agreement and Consent Order that would have
required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson
with backpay, and would have prohibited Dayton from taking retaliatory action against any employee for participating in the preliminary investigation.
The Commission warned Dayton
that failure to accede to this proposal or an acceptable counteroffer
would result in formal administrative
proceedings being initiated against
it.
When Dayton failed to respond,
the Commission initiated administrative proceedings against it by filing
a complaint. Dayton answered the complaint by asserting that the First
Amendment prevented the Commission
from exercising jurisdiction over it
since its actions had been taken pursuant to sincerely held religious beliefs. App. 103.
While these administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton filed this
action against the Commission in the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.
S. C. § 1983, seeking a permanent injunction against the state proceedings
on the ground that any investigation
of Dayton's hiring process or any imposition of sanctions for Dayton's
nonrenewal or termination decisions
would violate
[*625]
the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. App.
118-120.
The Commission filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia,
that the District Court should refrain
from enjoining the administrative proceedings based on federal abstention
doctrines. Record, Doc. No. 9, pp. 78.
It also filed various documents
defending its action on the merits.
Without addressing the abstention
argument, the District Court refused
to issue the injunction. 578 F.Supp.
1004 (1984). The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed, as previously noted, holding that the exercise
of such jurisdiction would violate
both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Page 8
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
Establishment Clause of the
Amendment. 766 F.2d 932 (1985).
First
[***LEdHR1B]
[1B] [***LEdHR3] [3]We
hold that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) to
review the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
That statute authorizes an
appeal to this Court "by a party relying on a State statute held by a court
of appeals to be invalid as repugnant
to the Constitution." This authority
embraces cases holding a state statute
unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of the case.
Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 76, n. 6
[**2722]
(1970).
Here there is no doubt that
the decision by the Court of Appeals
satisfies this test.
The court expressly held that Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4112.02 et seq. (Supp. 1985) is repugnant to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as applied to authorize the administrative body to investigate the charges against Dayton
and to decide whether to impose sanctions.
See 766 F.2d, at 935, n. 5,
944, 955, 961.
[***LEdHR2B]
[2B] [***LEdHR4A] [4A]
[***LEdHR5] [5]Having taken jurisdiction over the decision below, we now
turn to whether the District Court
should have exercised jurisdiction
over the case itself.
We conclude
that the District Court should have
abstained from adjudicating this case
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
[***521]
(1971), and later cases. 1
The Commission urged such abstention
in the District [*626] Court, and on
oral argument here. Tr. of Oral Arg.
7-8. Dayton has filed a postargument
brief urging that the Commission has
waived any claim to abstention because
it had stipulated in the District
Court that that court had jurisdiction
of the action.
We think, however,
that this argument misconceives the
nature of Younger abstention. It does
not arise from lack
of jurisdiction
in the District Court, but from strong
policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where particular kinds of state proceedings
have already been commenced. A State
may of course voluntarily submit to
federal jurisdiction even though it
might have had a tenable claim for abstention. See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 500, n. 9 (1984);
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v.
Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-480 (1977);
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-397,
n. 3 (1975). But in each of these cases the State expressly urged this
Court or the District Court to proceed
to an adjudication of the constitutional merits. We think there was no
similar consent or waiver here, and we
therefore address the issue of whether
the District Court should have abstained from deciding the case.
[***LEdHR4B]
[4B]
1
We think that any ripeness
challenge to appellees' complaint
is
foreclosed
by
Steffel
v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974),
and Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922 (1975). Steffel held
that a reasonable threat of prosecution for conduct allegedly
protected by the Constitution
gives rise to a sufficiently ripe
controversy.
415 U.S., at 458460. If a reasonable threat of
prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the
actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions
in this case does not.
It is
true that the administrative body
may rule completely or partially
in appellees' favor; but it was
equally true that the plaintiffs
in Steffel and Doran may have
prevailed had they in fact been
prosecuted.
In Younger v. Harris, supra, we
held that a federal court should not
enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding except in the very unusual
situation that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate
irreparable injury.
We justified our
decision both on equitable principles,
id., at 43, and on the "more vital
consideration" of the proper respect
for the fundamental role of States in
our federal system.
Id., at
[*627]
Page 9
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
44. Because of our concerns for comity
and federalism, we thought that it was
"perfectly natural for our cases to
repeat time and time again that the
normal thing to do when federal courts
are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue
such injunctions." Id., at 45 (emphasis added).
[***LEdHR6A]
[6A]
[***LEdHR7A]
[7A]We have since recognized that our
concern for comity and federalism is
equally applicable to certain other
pending state proceedings.
We have
applied the Younger principle to civil
proceedings in which important state
interests are involved.
Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434
(1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
423 (1979).
[***522]
We have also
applied it to state administrative
[**2723]
proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those
proceedings
the
federal
plaintiff
would have a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his constitutional claim.
We stated in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 576-577 (1973), that "administrative proceedings looking toward
the revocation of a license to practice medicine may in proper circumstances command the respect due court
proceedings." Similarly, we have held
that federal courts should refrain
from enjoining lawyer disciplinary
proceedings initiated by state ethics
committees if the proceedings are
within the appellate jurisdiction of
the appropriate State Supreme Court.
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.
Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423
(1982). Because we found that the administrative proceedings in Middlesex
were "judicial in nature" from the
outset, id., at 432-434, it was not
essential to the decision that they
had progressed to state-court review
by the time we heard the federal injunction case. 2
[***LEdHR6B]
[6B] [***LEdHR7B] [7B]
2
The lower courts have been
virtually uniform in holding that
the Younger principle applies to
pending state administrative proceedings in which an important
state interest is involved. See,
e. g., Williams v. Red Bank Board
of Education, 662 F.2d 1008 (CA3
1981); Grandco Corp. v. Rochford,
536 F.2d 197, 206 (CA7 1976);
McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152,
1158 (CA2 1975); McDonald v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Division of Metropolitan Transit Authority, 565 F.Supp. 37 (SDNY
1983) (Weinfeld, J.).
Only the
recent case of Martori Bros. Distributors
v.
James-Massengale,
781 F.2d 1349, 1354 (CA9 1986),
departs from this position, and
it does so without analysis. Of
course, if state law expressly
indicates that the administrative
proceedings are not even "judicial in nature," abstention may
not be appropriate.
See Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 237-239 (1984).The application of the Younger principle to pending state administrative proceedings is fully consistent with Patsy v. Florida
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496
(1982), which holds that litigants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to
bringing a § 1983 suit in federal
court.
Cf.
Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.,
420
U.S.
592,
607-611
(1975). Unlike Patsy, the administrative proceedings here are
coercive rather than remedial,
began before any substantial advancement in the federal action
took place, and involve an important state interest.
[*628]
[***LEdHR2C]
[2C]
[***LEdHR8]
[8]We think the principles enunciated in these cases govern
the present one.
We have no doubt
that the elimination of prohibited sex
discrimination is a sufficiently im-
Page 10
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
portant state interest to bring the
present case within the ambit of the
cited authorities.
We also have no
reason to doubt that Dayton will receive an adequate opportunity to raise
its constitutional claims.
Dayton
contends that the mere exercise of jurisdiction over it by the state administrative body violates its First
Amendment rights. But we have repeatedly rejected the argument that a constitutional attack on state procedures
themselves "automatically vitiates the
adequacy of those procedures for purposes of the Younger-Huffman line of
cases." Moore, supra, at 427, n. 10.
Even religious schools cannot claim to
be wholly free from some state regulation.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213 (1972). We therefore think
that however Dayton's constitutional
claim should be decided on the merits,
the Commission violates [***523] no
constitutional rights by merely investigating
the
circumstances
of
Hoskinson's discharge in this case, if
only to ascertain whether the ascribed
religious-based reason was in fact the
reason for the discharge.
the Commission could not construe its
own statutory mandate in the light of
federal
constitutional
principles.
Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
In any
event, it is sufficient under Middlesex, supra, at 436, that constitutional claims may be raised in state-court
judicial review of the administrative
proceeding. Section 4112.06 of Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. (1980) provides that
any "respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the commission . . . may obtain judicial review thereof." Dayton cites us to no
Ohio authority indicating that this
provision does not authorize judicial
review of claims that agency action
violates the United States Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the
case remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CONCUR BY: STEVENS
CONCUR
[*629]
[***LEdHR9] [9]Dayton also
contends that the administrative proceedings do not afford the opportunity
to level constitutional challenges
against the potential sanctions for
the alleged sex discrimination. In its
reply brief in this Court, the Commission cites several rulings to demonstrate that religious justifications
for otherwise illegal conduct are considered by it. See, e. g., In re St.
Mary of the Falls, No. 948 (1975).
Dayton in turn relies on a decision of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d
23, 26, 309 N. E. 2d 900, 902
[**2724] (1974), in which that court
held that a local zoning commission
could
not
consider
constitutional
claims. But even if Ohio law is such
that the Commission may not consider
the constitutionality of the statute
under which it operates, it would seem
an unusual doctrine, and one not supported by the cited case, to say that
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE
BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE
BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment.
Appellee Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc. (School), employed Mrs. Linda
Hoskinson as a teacher. Shortly after
[*630]
learning that she was pregnant, the School refused to renew Mrs.
Hoskinson's teaching contract for the
next academic year.
The two reasons
for this decision, according to the
School, were (1) the School's belief
that Mrs. Hoskinson should remain at
home to supervise and care for her
forthcoming
child;
and
(2)
the
School's belief that Mrs.
Hoskinson
had violated the "Biblical chain of
command" by consulting an attorney regarding her disagreement with the
School's conviction that she remain at
home.
App. 115 (complaint of Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc., et al.).
Page 11
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
After
her
termination,
Mrs.
Hoskinson filed a sex discrimination
charge against the School with appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
The Commission investigated her charge
and, upon finding probable cause to
believe that the School had violated §
4112.02 of the Ohio [***524] Revised
Code, 1 scheduled a hearing.
The
School thereupon filed this action in
Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
1
That
part:
section
provides,
in
"§ 4112.02 Unlawful discriminatory practices.
"It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
"(A) For any employer, because
of the race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, handicap,
age, or ancestry of any person,
to discharge without just cause,
to refuse to hire, or otherwise
to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure,
terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to
employment." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4112.02 (Supp. 1985).
In the District Court, the School
argued that the Ohio antidiscrimination statute violates the First Amendment Religion Clauses as applied to
sectarian schools. 2 The District
Court determined that "[the] only conduct on the part of the Commission
that is presently being threatened
with sufficient [*631] immediacy and
reality to present a justiciable controversy is the investigation, which
has already taken place, and the pending hearing on the complaint filed by
the [Commission] concerning the discharge of Mrs. Hoskinson." 578 F.Supp.
1004, 1029 [**2725] (SD Ohio 1984).
Accord, id., at 1039. On the merits,
the District Court concluded that the
Commission's investigation and adjudication of sex discrimination charges
was constitutional.
The court recognized that "the statute could be ap-
plied in any number of ways that could
impermissibly interfere with" appellees' religious freedom, but it concluded that these concerns -- which
relate to the possible remedies that
might or might not be ordered if a violation is found -- were "hypothetical
or speculative" and therefore not ripe
on the current state of the record.
Id., at 1028. 3
2
The School also argued that §
4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code
is unconstitutional on its face.
The District Court held the section to be neither overbroad nor
void for vagueness.
Because the
Court of Appeals invalidated the
section as applied to the School,
it did not address appellees' facial attack. The School no longer presses the argument that the
statute is unconstitutional on
its face.
3
"In permitting the [Commission] to exercise jurisdiction
over the instant controversy, the
Court has in no way determined
either that the full force of
[the Commission's] jurisdiction
under [Ohio Revised Code] Chapter
4112 can be brought to bear on
[Dayton Christian Schools] without impermissibly burdening [appellees'] first amendment rights
or, even with respect to the present controversy, that any remedy
deemed appropriate by the [Commission] should they find [Dayton
Christian Schools] liable, would
necessarily present no further
first amendment problems. However, because many of the concerns
voiced by [appellees] about state
encroachment on their religious
freedoms remain as yet only possibilities, they cannot serve as
the basis for the issuing of a
permanent injunction against the
[Commission]." 578 F.Supp., at
1041.
The Court of Appeals reversed.
766 F.2d 932 (CA6 1985). It recognized
that the School "[challenged] only the
[Commission's] exercise of jurisdiction and its issuance of the complaint
Page 12
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
in this case." Id., at 950, n. 31. It
further acknowledged that "an order of
reinstatement or backpay is not at issue in this case." Ibid. It nevertheless determined that the "chilling
knowledge" that the School's selection
criteria for teachers "will be reevaluated, and, perhaps, adjusted by the
state
applying
secular
criteria"
placed an impermissible burden on appellees' religious freedoms.
Ibid.
Looking into the future, the Court of
Appeals
also
concluded
that
the
[*632]
"highly intrusive nature" of
backpay and reinstatement, as well as
the "continuing surveillance implicated by the conciliation agreement proposed by the Commission"
[***525]
and rejected by the School, "reveal
the 'significant risk that the First
Amendment will be infringed.'" Id., at
942-943 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502
(1979)). Accord, 766 F.2d, at 951.
Like the majority, I agree with the
District Court that neither the investigation of certain charges nor the
conduct of a hearing on those charges
is prohibited by the First Amendment:
"the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating
the circumstances of Hoskinson's discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religiousbased reason was in fact the reason
for the discharge." Ante, at 628.
I further agree with the District
Court that any challenge to a possibly
intrusive remedy is premature at this
juncture. As the majority points out,
ante, at 629, the Commission recognizes religious justifications for conduct that might otherwise be illegal.
Thus, although § 4112.02 forbids discrimination on the basis of religion,
the Commission has dismissed complaints alleging religious discrimination by religious educational institutions, see Menz v. St. Pius School,
No. 3823 (1983), and in particular has
dismissed
complaints
by
teachers
against sectarian schools for limiting
employment to instructors who subscribe to the appropriate faith, see
In re St. Michael's School, No. 2726
(1976); In re St. Mary of the Falls,
No. 948 (1975).
It bears emphasis
that the Commission dismissed these
complaints only after investigating
charges of discrimination, finding
probable cause that the statute had
been violated, and holding a hearing
on the complaint.
It therefore follows that the Commission's finding of
probable cause and decision to schedule a hearing in this case does not
also mean that the Commission intends
to impose any sanction, let alone a
sanction in derogation of the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses. In view
of this fact, the District
[*633]
Court was entirely correct
[**2726]
in concluding that appellees' constitutional challenge to the remedial
provisions of the Ohio statute is not
ripe for review. 4 Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 5
4
I fully agree with the majority's general statement that "a
reasonable threat of prosecution
for conduct allegedly protected
by the Constitution gives rise to
a sufficiently ripe controversy."
Ante, at 626, n. 1 (citation
omitted). Thus, when the constitutional challenge is to the arrest and initiation of criminal
proceedings -- as was the case
with the pamphleteer in Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458460 (1974), and the operators of
the bars in Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc.,
422
U.S.
922,
930-931
(1975) -- a "reasonable threat"
of arrest and prosecution is sufficient to make the controversy
ripe for judicial review. For
purposes of this case, it follows
from Steffel and Doran that appellees' First Amendment challenge to the Commission's decision to investigate and adjudicate a charge of sex discrimination against the School is ripe,
because the investigation has
been completed and the matter set
for hearing.
However, it does not follow
that a challenge to whatever remedy might ultimately be fashioned
Page 13
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
(should liability be established
and relief ordered) is ripe merely upon a showing of a "reasonable threat" that proceedings will
commence.
Doran and Steffel do
not suggest this result, for they
did not address the constitutionality of possible remedies for
the conduct prosecuted in those
cases. In view of the absence of
any finding of liability in this
case, and the Commission's demonstrated willingness to tailor
remedies to accommodate the exercise of religious freedoms, there
is plainly no "reasonable threat"
that an overly intrusive remedy
will trench on appellees' First
Amendment rights. To hold otherwise would require the District
Court to detail the constitutionally permissible range of the
Commission's sentencing discretion in advance of any facts regarding the School's discriminatory conduct or any explanation
by the Commission justifying the
relief it might fashion.
Either
or both of these items of information would inform the First
Amendment
analysis
and
might
prove decisive in determining the
constitutionality of the Commission's hypothesized remedy.
5
I do not agree with the majority that the doctrine of abstention associated with Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
required the District Court to
dismiss
appellees'
complaint.
That disposition would presumably
deny the School a federal forum
to adjudicate the constitutionality of a provisional administrative remedy, such as reinstatement pending resolution of the
complainant's
charges,
even
though the constitutional issues
have become ripe for review by
the Commission's entry of a coercive order and the Commission refuses to address the merits of
the
constitutional
claims.
Younger abstention has never been
applied to subject a federalcourt plaintiff to an allegedly
unconstitutional state administrative order when the constitutional challenge to that order
can be asserted, if at all, only
in state-court judicial review of
the
administrative
proceeding.
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S., at 462 (holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate
when no state-court proceeding
"is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed," because
in that circumstance "federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or
disruption of the state criminal
justice system"; it cannot "be
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon [a] state court's
ability to enforce constitutional
principles"; and the absence of a
pending
state-court
proceeding
deprives "the federal plaintiff
[of] a concrete opportunity to
vindicate
his
constitutional
rights").
See also Middlesex
County Ethics Committee v. Garden
State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423,
437 (1982) (requiring abstention
where "an adequate state forum
for
all
relevant
issues
has
clearly been demonstrated to be
available prior to any proceedings on the merits in federal
court" (citation omitted)).
REFERENCES
32A Am Jur 2d, Federal Practice and
Procedure 587, 1797, 1803
1 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Access to
District Courts 1:577, 1:583; 2 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Appeal, Certiorari
and Review 3:10
2 Federal Procedural Forms, L Ed, Appeal, Certiorari and Review 3:764; 8
Federal Procedural Forms, L Ed, Declaratory Judgments 21:34
11 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Federal
Practice and Procedure 1991-1995
USCS, Constitution, 1st Amendment; 28
USCS 1254
Page 14
477 U.S. 619, *; 106 S. Ct. 2718, **;
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 71
US L Ed Digest,
683, 691, 700.5
Appeal
254;
Courts
Index to Annotations, Abstention Doctrine; Appeal and Error; Courts; Pending Actions and Proceedings; Sex Discrimination; Supreme Court of United
States
Supreme Court's rule, and exceptions
to rule, against federal judicial intervention in pending or threatened
state criminal proceedings.
44 L Ed
2d 692.
Annotation References:
Exhaustion of state administrative
remedies as prerequisite to federal
civil rights action based on 42 USCS
1983. 43 L Ed 2d 833.
Supreme Court's views as to application to noncriminal proceedings of
rule against federal judicial intervention in pending or threatened state
proceedings. 73 L Ed 2d 1416.
Construction and application of 28
USCS 1254(2) authorizing appeal to Supreme Court from Court of Appeals
judgment invalidating state statute.
27 L Ed 2d 840.
100297
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