States of Affairs 1
Though many philosophers hold that propositions exist and that their ontological status
resembles that of universals, there is far less agreement on the existence of states of affairs.
Some think states of affairs are reducible to propositions (or vice-versa).1 Others consider states
of affairs to be real, irreducible entities, distinct from propositions. But even among these
philosophers, there is significant disagreement concerning their nature. In this essay I will
present a series of arguments for holding that states of affairs are indeed real entities distinct
from propositions. Before doing so however it will be necessary to consider arguments for the
doctrine of propositional realism since arguments for states of affairs realism parallel the former
in several ways. Having established the distinction, I will provide an account of states of affairs
that satisfies several desiderata. After providing this account, I will move to an additional
examination of the relation that holds between isomorphic states of affairs and propositions. In
the final section of this essay, I will give a critique of Roderick Chisholm's and Quentin Smith's
accounts of states of affairs.
Propositional Realism
Among contemporary philosophers propositional realism appears to be a far less
controversial doctrine than that of states of affairs realism. Thus, examining the reasons given
for the former will, if analogous to reasons for the latter, give us more reason to think the latter is
true. Now certainly these reasons are not without controversy and we cannot stop to address all
objections here. Our main task is to consider the evidence offered for propositional realism
which, considered in toto, provides significant justification for holding the view. There are five
common pieces of evidence offered for the doctrine. These are: (1) propositions serve as the
meanings of declarative sentences/statements; (2) propositions are bearers of truth-values; (3)
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propositions stand in the relation of logical consequence that in turn preserves the validity of
arguments; (4) propositions are bearers of modal properties; and (5) propositions serve as
intentional content of various mental states like belief. Let's look at each of these briefly.
More common than any reason for holding to propositional realism is the argument that
declarative sentences, being basic units of language, must have meanings.2 Similarly, it is
argued that given the empirical fact that sentences of one language are translatable into those of
another language, there must be a common meaning to both (pace Quine).3 Propositions are
proffered as these common meanings. As George Pitcher notes,
If one person says "It is raining," another "Il pleut," and a third "Es
regnet," a correct answer to the question "What did he say?" would
in each case be "He said that it is raining"—for each would have
said the same thing. And it is this element which all three
utterances have in common—this same thing that is said in all
three cases—that is the real bearer of truth, not the different
sentences which the speakers happen to utter.4
For those who do not accept this argument, it is sometimes argued that meanings could
not have a truth-value, and hence, propositions qua meanings could not have a truth-value. Thus,
while one might countenance propositions, she rejects that they are meanings.5 I do not wish to
address this objection at any deep level, but will say that this rebuttal is little more than questionbegging. It seems to emerge from the fact that we more commonly attribute meaning to
individual words, but less so to sentences. But common usage is not significant enough alone to
show that sentences cannot have meanings. Perhaps we rarely talk about the meaning of
sentences in our common parlance because we learn language by starting with words and then
moving to complete sentences. But of course learning—coming to understand—a language is
about learning the meaning of the terms of the language and how those terms are properly
combined into sentences.
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We have already seen the second common reason given for propositional realism in
Pitcher’s quotation above: propositions are bearers of truth-value. If propositions are meanings
of declarative/indicative sentences and we ascribe the value true to a sentence, we also ascribe
truth to the proposition it expresses. We see a natural progression from propositions considered
as meanings to propositions considered as bearers of truth-value.
Similarly, we see a natural progression from propositions considered as bearers of truthvalue to propositions considered as the relata of the relation of logical consequence. To take the
case of a valid argument as an example, we must assume that truth-valued entities exist if we are
to categorize an argument as such. Valid arguments are by definition those arguments that have
premises which, if true, logically entail their conclusion. That is, logical form ensures that the
conclusion must be true if the premises are true. For such an entailment relation to hold then, its
relata must bear truth-values, by definition. Certainly there may be other forms of entailment
that don't clearly have truth-valued entities as their relata, e.g., the supervenience relation.6 But
if we grant that there are valid arguments, we have a clear example of the relation of entailment
that holds between truth-valued entities.7 Propositions are the best candidate for such entities.8
A fourth reason for realism about propositions is the need to explain the intuitively
obvious necessary and contingent aspects of our thought and language content. Clearly, the
content of certain beliefs and sentences seems true in a unique way. For example, the content of
'Seven is a prime number' seems necessarily true. But the content of 'There are nine planets in
our solar system' seems contingently true. Given that the manner in which these two sentences
are true is intuitively different, it is thought by many that there must be some entity that bears
these modal values of necessary and contingent truth. Propositions, again, are the most plausible
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candidate, especially if they are already thought to bear truth-values, since modality seems, at
least in part, to be a way in which the contents of our language and thoughts are true.
Finally, many find propositional realism explanatorily powerful because intentional
mental states are, by definition, about something, and hence have a content. My belief that the
earth is, on average, 93,000,000 miles from the sun has a content with a truth-value. What better
candidate than a proposition? Propositions could be the mental content of a whole host of other
intentional states, e.g., hopes, some desires, wishings, etc. I note this reason for propositional
realism last since it is more controversial and less agreed upon than those that precede it. As
Jaegwon Kim notes, there is a wide disagreement about the nature of objects of belief.9
Nevertheless, most philosophers of mind recognize that there is a problem of content for such
intentional states.10 Propositions are commonly offered as at least a beginning to a solution of
this problem.
Methodological Preliminaries
Having seen five common pieces of evidence given for the doctrine of propositional
realism, we are now in a position to see that similar evidence is available for countenancing
states of affairs as real, distinct entities from propositions. Before examining these reasons,
however, I want to pause to consider a method for doing ontology that Roderick Chisholm
suggests. States Chisholm,
From the fact that a true sentence seems to commit us to the
existence of a certain object, it does not follow that there is in fact
such an object. What we should say is rather this: If (i) there is a
sentence which seems to commit us to the existence of a certain
object, (ii) we know the sentence to be true, and (iii) we can find
no way of explicating or paraphrasing the sentence which will
make clear to us that the truth of the sentence is compatible with
the nonexistence of such an object, then it is more reasonable to
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suppose that there is such an object than it is not to suppose that
there is such an object. Given an adequate view of the nature of
philosophy, it does not seem to me to be reasonable to deny this
conditional…
So, asks Chisholm,
Can we paraphrase 'There is something that Jones long dreaded
and that Smith tried very hard to bring about' in such a way that the
result can be seen not to commit us to the existence of propositions
or of states of affairs? I do not know of any such paraphrase.11
I quote Chisholm here to reveal my own proclivity to take a common sense approach in
determining basic ontological categories.
As we will see more closely later, Chisholm argues that propositions are in fact reducible
to states of affairs. Ironically, I will apply his own guide expressed above to argue that this
reduction does not satisfy Chisholm's three conditions. Certainly I think that ontological
parsimony is a noble goal in doing ontology such that if we can in fact do without a certain
entity, like states of affairs, we ought to. But, as I will argue, there is no plausible way that we
can.
The Distinction between Propositions and States of Affairs
Before arguing for the distinction between propositions and states of affairs, I should first
give a brief sketch of what I mean by the expression 'states of affairs'. Later I will provide a
more detailed account, but something brief should initially be said here. By states of affairs I
have in mind those entities which involve the potential exemplification of a property(s) and/or
other abstract objects like relations. Typically states of affairs will involve not just an
exemplification of some abstract object(s), but the exemplification of an object(s) by a subject.
States of affairs have the same ontological status as propositions, necessary existence, but unlike
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propositions cannot have a truth-value. So, Bush's being president, red's being a color, Santa's
being jolly, yellow's being brighter than blue, and it's raining are all states of affairs. As we see,
all of these examples are formed by the nominalization of indicative/declarative sentences. 12 For
example, 'Bush is president' becomes 'Bush's being president'. As Jaegwon Kim points out,
States of affairs are designated by gerundial nominalization of
indicative sentences. I believe this to be the most fundamental
fact about states of affairs; it seems to me that much of what
Chisholm and others have to say about states of affairs stem from
their intuitions about these nominalizations and their putative
referents. Thus some examples of states of affairs are there being
horses, there being unicorns, Brutus stabbing Caesar in 44 B.C.
and all humans being mortal…However you develop your theory
of states of affairs, you get your initial grip on them through
sentence nominalization.13
With this initial grasp of states of affairs before us, we can now consider reasons for
thinking they are distinct from propositions. First, in our review of reasons for propositional
realism, we noted that indicative/declarative sentences are thought by many to express
propositions. If in granting that words are not the exclusive expressers of meaning, but that
sentences express (distinct) meanings as well, we will be hard-pressed to exclude other sorts of
sub-phrases (like gerunds) as distinct expressions of meaning.14 Thus, not only does the sentence
'I'm thinking about there being unicorns' express a proposition as well the individual terms of the
that sentence ('I'm', 'thinking', etc.) express individual meanings, but so do sub-phrases like 'there
being unicorns'. It is plausible to think that the meaning of such sub-phrases is a state of affairs.
Secondly, we notice that propositional realists take 'that'-clause nominalizations of
indicative sentences to refer to the proposition expressed by the indicative sentence. For
example, the indicative sentence 'Jones is jolly' can be nominalized to produce 'that Jones is
Jolly'. On propositional realism, if the former is true, so is the latter. 'That'-clause
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nominalizations are not the only nominalizations one can perform on indicative sentences
however. We can also perform gerundial nominalizations. Yet, when we do, we don't get the
same result that we do in 'that'-clause nominalizations. For example, if we perform a gerundial
nominalization on 'Jones is jolly', we get 'Jones being jolly'. If we predicate 'true' of this
nominalization, we get the ungrammatical (or false) sentence 'Jones being jolly is true'. This
ungrammatical result points to a distinct denotation of the gerundial nominalization than that of
the 'that'-clause nominalization of the same sentence. The distinction in denotation, we can
plausibly reason, lies between a proposition and a state of affairs. What does seem
grammatically correct (and possibly true) in the case of the gerundial nominalization is the
sentence 'Jones being jolly obtains' or 'Jones being jolly is so' or 'Jones being jolly is the case'. I
will assume that these various predications are synonymous and use the predicate obtains as that
which is expressed in each of these examples. The significant point here is that the predicate
'true' and the predicate 'obtains' appear distinct in meaning.
One might object here that any apparent difference between a 'that'-clause nominalization
and the gerundial nominalization is only linguistic, but neither semantic nor ontological. But, if
we are to follow Chisholm's methodology, we can ask the question, is 'Red being a color is true'
well-formed sentence in English? If it is not, then we cannot apply the additionally meaningful
predicate true to this sentence. Such a sentence does not sound natural to our grammatical ear.
Given our desire to take natural language seriously, it would put undue strain on putative English
grammar to say that this is a well-formed sentence. Thus, the "sentence" does not commit us to
an entity at all, much less one that is identical to a proposition, since it fails Chisholm's second
condition, viz., knowing a sentence to be true. Yet, if we replace 'is true' with 'obtains' we not
only gain a well-formed sentence, but one that is in fact true. Thus, 'Red being a color obtains' is
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a true sentence and seems to commit us to the existence of the object denoted by 'Red being a
color', since there is no paraphrase readily available that will enable us to avoid ontological
commitment to the entity denoted by this phrase.
While we noted in our outline of reasons for propositional realism that mental content of
intentional states remains one of the more controversial appeals for the doctrine, I want to push
the claim that this reason is weak. While I am not prepared to provide any developed argument
for the solution to the problem, I do want to say that if we are willing to countenance the real
phenomena of intentionality for mental states like belief and we remain unsympathetic toward
eliminativism in the philosophy of mind, it seems that propositions are the most plausible
candidates for the contents of such intentional states.
One of the primary reasons philosophers reject propositions as a solution of the problem
of mental content seems to stem from Naturalistic ontological constraints. For example, David
Armstrong's rejection of this solution is evidenced by his comment that "…no Naturalist can be
happy with a realm of propositions."15 But if Naturalism is our only reason for rejecting the
existence of propositions, this is a weak reason for doing so. Armstrong's and other attempts to
solve the problem of mental content fall unsatisfactorily short. For example, Armstrong suggests
replacing propositions with classes of intentionally equivalent token beliefs making the
fundamental correspondence not between truth (true propositions) and their truthmakers (states
of affairs for Armstrong), but between token beliefs and thoughts on the one hand and
truthmakers on the other. But this solution merely helps itself to the common content of belief
by postulating intentionally equivalent belief tokens while leaving the intentional equivalence
unexplained. For example, that George Bush is President is clearly the common content of many
persons' beliefs. But Armstrong ignores the pressing question of what metaphysical status this
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belief type has. His enthymematic assumption is that its status must be physical. Without any
argument for this, however, I see no reason to grant such an assumption. Without any promising
physicalist explanation on the horizon, propositions seem to be the most plausible explanation
for this intentional equivalence, since propositions, considered as universals, are capable of
serving as the common mental content of multiple minds.
Admittedly, these comments are preliminary and further argument is needed here. I offer
them to at least point to the power of propositions in providing a plausible solution to the
problem of mental content. Assuming there are good reasons to accept this solution, we can ask
the further question: is there any reason to think that only propositions can serve as the content
of intentional attitudes? I do not believe that there is any such reason.
Having favored propositions as the most plausible solution to the problem of the mental
content for belief, we can provide an argument along similar lines for the distinction between
propositions and states of affairs. We do so by considering other intentional attitudes. Naturally,
we can pick out many intentional attitudes that would most naturally take propositions as their
content. So, for example, belief, supposing, and judging are all intentional attitudes we easily
associate with 'that'-clauses, which we have said denote propositions. We believe that studying
mathematics has intrinsic value in developing a sound mind; We suppose that  p is true in a
reductio ad absurdum; and We judge that modus ponens is a valid inference form. In each of
these examples it looks like the content of the intentional attitude is a proposition denoted by the
relevant 'that'-clause. But now consider other intentional attitudes like entertaining or thinking
of. In building our children's anticipation of Christmas we might notice their tendency to
entertain a situation in which a jolly rotund man travels at near light speed on the eve of
December 25th. First, we see the absence of a 'that'-clause in the expression of this observation,
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but of course the intentional attitude of entertaining. Clearly, the children's intentional state of
entertaining has a mental content. And, no doubt, they could believe, suppose, or judge that a
jolly rotund man travels at near light speed on the eve of December 25th. We could in such cases
say that their belief, supposition or judgment was either true or false. But to simply entertain a
situation in which a jolly rotund man travels at near light speed on the eve of December 25th
does not afford itself of an ascription of truth-value as the former intentional attitudes do. Thus,
the most plausible content of an intentional attitude like entertaining is a state of affairs.
Having considered the several reasons to think that there is a real distinction, we are now
in a position to provide a more detailed account of states of affairs. I will postpone addressing
objections to the distinction I have argued for, since these objections are often aimed at various
accounts given of states of affairs.
A General Account of States of Affairs
A distinction must be made between an analysis with necessary and sufficient conditions
and a general account. If the former is available—a question I remain undecided on—such an
analysis is not within the purview of this essay given its difficulty. My task here is simply to lay
out how we might understand states of affairs in a manner similar to how realists understand
propositions.
Where do we begin? We must first list several desiderata for our account in order to
avoid engaging controversies that would make our basic task unbearably tedious. The first is an
anti-existentialist understanding of intensional entities (particularly propositions and states of
affairs). Such an understanding holds that intensional entities can exist without their relevant
"constituents" existing.16 For example, the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher exists,
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though Socrates does not exist. I will assume the merits of this position without arguing for
them.17 Secondly, if states of affairs possess the same ontological status as propositions, our
view should maintain that they necessarily exist, since propositions do as well.18 This follows
from a realist, non-conceptualist understanding of intensional entities; a position I assume to be
correct here.19 Third, states of affairs ought to serve as the mental content for certain intentional
attitudes as well as the semantic value for certain gerundial expressions.20 This follows from our
above argument that just as propositions are suitable candidates for the content of intentional
attitudes and the semantic values of linguistic expressions, so are other intensional entities like
states of affairs. Fourth, states of affairs ought to be the sorts of entities than can bear the modal
properties of necessity and contingency. Here, however, it will not be the way in which a state
of affairs is true that is modal, but the way in which it obtains. I will address the distinction
between the predicates obtains and true in more detail below. Fifth, an acceptable account of
states of affairs ought to preserve states of affairs as a sui generis intensional entity irreducible to
any other intensional entities or particulars.21 Sixth, a theory of states of affairs should avoid
possibilism, the view that there are objects that do not exist. Instead a theory of states of affairs
should preserve actualism, the view that the only objects that exist are the actual objects, i.e.,
there are no merely possible objects. This view is the more intuitive, commonsense view, though
again, I will simply assume its truth here. With these desiderata in place, let us turn to a basic
account of states of affairs.
The most natural approach to formulating a theory of states of affairs is to begin with
logical form. Do states of affairs have a logical form much as propositions do? With the
evidence of natural language before us, it appears that they do. Moreover, the logical form of
states of affairs looks to be isomorphic, though not identical, to propositions. So, just as we can
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describe the logical form of some propositions in terms of subject and predicate, we can do so for
some states of affairs as well. For example, the logical form of the proposition that Alice is
friendly can be symbolized [Fa]prop where syntactically, '[…]prop' is a singular-term-forming
abstraction operator. The logical form of this proposition is subject-predicate and is formed by
predicating friendliness of Alice. In the same way, the state of affairs of Alice being friendly can
be symbolized similarly as [Fa]soa where syntactically '[…]soa is a singular-term-forming
abstraction operator. This state of affairs is formed in a similar way as the proposition that Alice
is friendly. To note the distinction symbolically, however, it is helpful to add the subscripts prop
and soa respectively when the logical form appears identical. So far, the logical form of these
entities appears identical, so wherein lies the difference? The difference lies in what predicate
we can ascribe to each in order to produce a new, true proposition. In the former expression of
the proposition [Fa]prop, we can predicate truth (T) of [Fa]prop producing a new proposition
[T[Fa]prop]prop.22 Now, if we were to predicate truth of the state of affairs [Fa]soa, we would
produce the proposition [T[Fa]soa]prop. However, this proposition is not true, nor even possibly
true. Why not? The nature of states of affairs is such that they cannot be true or false; to say so
is a category mistake similar to saying that the number seven is red. 'The number seven is red' is
a meaningful sentence expressing a proposition which is necessarily false.23 The same is true of
the sentence 'Alice being friendly is true'. Such a sentence cannot be true since states of affairs
cannot take the truth predicate to produce a true proposition. Natural language confirms this in
the ill-formed sentence 'Alice being friendly is true'. The most plausible explanation for the
ungrammatical nature of this sentence is that there is an ontological reality underlying this—that
of the category mistake we have just pointed to.
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We might nonetheless continue to pick out various states of affairs by their logical form,
just as we do propositions on an algebraic approach. Thus we can point to conjunctions,
disjunctions, conditionals, bi-conditionals, universal quantification, existential quantification and
any additional logical form one might consider. And evidently nothing rules out there being an
infinite number of logical forms for both states of affairs and propositions, in which case no
stateable logical exhaustive analysis of states of affairs is possible. Nevertheless, it should be
clear from this enumerative beginning how such an analysis would go were we confident that all
of the logical forms of propositions (and states of affairs) were known to us. To proceed with
these other logical forms, we can symbolize states of affairs with these various logical forms in
an identical way that we might for propositions. So, '[[Fa]soa ^ [Gb]soa]soa' symbolizes the
conjunctive state of affairs Alice being friendly and Bill being gregarious. '[[Fa]soa V Gbsoa]soa'
symbolizes a disjunctive state of affairs; '[[Fa]soa → [Gb]soa]soa symbolizes a conditional state of
affairs and so on. So, states of affairs and propositions will be identical in logical form when
they share the corresponding (or associated) logical operations and "constituents" until one
attempts to produce a new proposition involving the proposition or state of affairs. Predicating
true of a state of affairs will always produce a false proposition. What then can we predicate of a
state of affairs to produce a true proposition? The predicate obtains (O). So, while [T[Fasoa]]prop
is necessarily false, [O[Fasoa]]prop is a true proposition on the assumption that Alice is in fact
friendly.
It is apparent then that this account of states of affairs rests on the distinction between the
'true' and 'obtains' predicates and their proper subjects of predication (propositions and states of
affairs respectively). What then are we to say of the predicate 'obtains', assuming that the
predicate 'true' is straightforward.24 Again, a full-blown analysis proves too difficult for my
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project, but there is still something to be said here. It would seem that there is an intimate
connection between the exemplification of properties and relations and the obtaining of states of
affairs that involve those properties and relations. So, in the case of Jones being jolly, the
properties of being Jones and being jolly, their simultaneous and joint exemplification will bear
directly on the truth of the proposition that [O[Jones being jolly]]prop. I am of course assuming
that we can make sense of such identity properties of being Jones.25 If we are left with a
primitive here, it is best left at this level of property/relation exemplification and not that of
obtaining. Just as the truth predicate does not seem to be primitive, i.e., we can make sense of
the correspondence of a true proposition to a relevant fact in the world, it seems like we can do
something similar in the case of a state of affairs that obtains in virtue of its relationship with
some fact (property/relation exemplification) in the world. I am not resigned to the primitive
nature of property/relation exemplification, but certainly no alternative account is obvious to all.
What shall we say of the notion of a state of affairs involving entities? In our above
example using the state of affairs of Jones being jolly we said that this state of affairs involves
the properties of being Jones and being jolly. This notion may also be primitive insofar as we
seek to preserve our desideratum of a non-reductionistic approach to states of affairs. But, since
we have approached states of affairs from the perspective of logical form, it is most intuitive to
explain the notion of involving in a similar manner. If states of affairs are formed through
various logical operations like predication, conjunction, etc., then these operations certainly play
a key role in understanding the notion of a state of affairs involving a property or a particular.
However, it is not clear that just this notion will do. Given our anti-existentialist and actualist
constraints, we know that by saying a state of affairs involves a non-existent object, e.g.,
Socrates, this involving cannot be taken in terms of part-whole constitution, since such states of
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affairs do exist, though their "constituents" do not. Moreover in light of our metal content
desideratum, it would be implausible to think of states of affairs as built out of physical parts
while simultaneously serving as mental content.26 Thus, to speak of a state of affairs as
involving a particular (be it existent or non-existent), is not to speak in a constitutional sense
where that particular is a "part" of the state of affairs. Rather, to speak thus is to point to the
relevant intensional entities pertinent to identifying the particular(s). Identity properties like
being Socrates are the most plausible candidates. So, for example, the relevant intensional
entities of being a philosopher and being Socrates are those pertinent to identifying the state of
affairs of Socrates being a philosopher since this state of affairs involves Socrates. We have
spoken of properties and relations as the those entities states of affairs involve, but there is no
reason to limit involved entities to these; any intensional entities would seem to be equal
candidates for such involvement, including concepts, numbers, and perhaps sets, depending on a
correct ontology. 27 The key here is simply to maintain that whatever states of affairs involve,
the entity must be intensional. Now, if identity-properties can be explained in terms of a special
logical operation of predication, call it "identity-predication", we might be close to producing an
analysis of involving. I think such an approach to identity properties is promising, but leave the
details for another project.
With this general account of states of affairs before us, we can explore an important
distinction that follows from our account, given our above desiderata. I follow both Alvin
Plantinga and John Pollock here in their distinction between states of affairs that obtain and
states of affairs that exist.28 All states of affairs that obtain exist, but not all states of affairs that
exist obtain. We have already said that we desire a theory in which states of affairs have the
same ontological status as propositions, viz., necessary existence. Thus, necessarily, if x is a
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state of affairs, x exists. For example, both the states of affairs of there being one philosophy
department in the world and there being a president of the United States exist, but only the latter
obtains. This distinction parallels that between propositions which exist (all necessarily do) and
those that are true. So, the state of affairs of there being elves exists, but does not obtain just as
the proposition that there are elves exists but is not true. Such a distinction preserves our
desideratum that states of affairs serve as mental content of certain intentional attitudes. We can
entertain or think of the Eiffel tower being in London, though it fails to obtain. It is most natural
to assume that this state of affairs existed independently of our contemplating it; for example, it
existed when no one happened to be contemplating it, thus preserving our non-conceptualist
desideratum. With this account of states of affairs in place, we can now examine the relationship
between isomorphic states of affairs and propositions.
Isomorphic States of Affairs and Propositions
We can label those states of affairs and propositions that involve all and only the same
intensional entities as isomorphic. Formally, we can say:
Necessarily, for all propositions p, states of affairs s, and
intensional entities i¸ p is isomorphic to s iff p involves all and
only those i that s involves and vice-versa, and the logical form of
s is isomorphic to the logical form of p.29
Given the isomorphism that holds between certain states of affairs and propositions, we see that
that following conditional holds:
Necessarily, for all states of affairs s and propositions p, if p is
isomorphic to s, then s obtains iff p is true.
All isomorphic propositions and states of affairs will be true or obtain if their isomorphic
partner is true or obtains.30 We must be careful to note here that this entailment relation is a
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logical and not a causal relation. Propositions are not true as the causal effect of the obtaining of
an isomorphic state of affairs. Rather, it is a purely logical entailment that holds here. This
result runs counter to a view of states of affairs which takes them to be truthmakers of true
propositions. Philosophers Quentin Smith, David Armstrong, and Michael Tooley hold such a
view. Ramon Lemos, who also holds such a view, states, "It is because [emphasis mine] various
states of affairs do or do not obtain that various propositions are true or false."31 Lemos takes
'because' here to denote a truth-making instead of a logical relation. If the category of a truthmaker is necessary for a proper understanding of truth, something along the lines of a
correspondence theory I assume, states of affairs are not suited for such a role. This follows
from our anti-existentialist desideratum and the assumption that intensional entities do not
possess causal power, but only particulars do. For example, suppose that the proposition that
Dick Gephardt is president is true. If the state of affairs of Dick Gephardt being president in
some way caused the former to be true, that state of affairs or one of its "constituents" would
possess causal power, but this is wrong on our assumption that states of affairs only involve
intensional entities and intensional entities do not have causal power. To see what makes
propositions true and states of affairs actual, we will need to briefly consider a distinct category
of being, namely facts.
Facts
The opponent of our distinction between states of affairs and propositions cries out, "In
virtue of what do states of affairs obtain and propositions come out true?" My suggestion is to
postulate a distinct category of being for both of these roles: facts. Facts can explain why state
of affairs obtain and propositions are true. Facts make true propositions, and make actual states
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of affairs, i.e., cause them to obtain. Thus, we can say that propositions are true and states of
affairs obtain by standing in respective truth-making or obtaining-making relations to a particular
fact. While we have assumed that intensional entities do not possess causal power, there is no
reason to think that these entities cannot be causally affected by particulars. For example, when I
think about the property of squareness, this property is causally affected in that is now before my
mind while it wasn't prior to my thinking about it. Thus, a proposition is true because there
exists some fact in the world to which it corresponds. And, a state of affairs obtains because
there exists some fact in the world to which it corresponds. The existence of this fact is logically
entailed by the obtaining of some state of affairs and the truth of its isomorphic proposition, but
it is caused by neither. To take an example, the fact that George Bush is president makes true the
proposition that George Bush is president and makes actual (causes to obtain) the state of affairs
of George Bush's being president.
Unlike states of affairs and propositions, facts are not necessarily intensional entities
(though I leave it open as to whether some might be), because they are subject to being
constituted by particulars.32 Thus, facts are contingently existing entities in those cases in which
they are constituted by particulars.33 For example, George Bush being president is a fact that is
distinct from the state of affairs denoted by the same expression. I will not in any detail
elaborate on how I take this containing of concreta by facts. There are several questions
regarding facts I must leave unanswered. All I seek at this juncture is an ontological category to
serve as a truth-maker for propositions and an obtaining-maker for states of affairs.
We have also noticeably avoided discussion of events throughout this essay for reasons
similar to leaving facts unanalyzed. A consideration of events raises a dozen other questions, not
the least of which is the nature of time and causation. I am content to remain silent on whether
States of Affairs
19
events are a real ontological category distinct from facts. My hope is that facts and events turn
out to be identical categories, for sake of ontological parsimony and to appease my presentist
inclinations regarding the nature of time. But again, I must set aside any consideration of events.
I do not believe that neglecting an analysis of either facts or events poses any serious
threat to the account of states of affairs that I have presented here. While I do think that facts
(and if identical, events) are needed to explain what causes states of affairs to obtain and
propositions to be true, as long as we countenance an ontological category that is at least initially
plausible in its identity conditions, we are able to confidently maintain our account of states of
affairs. Hence, with my account outlined we can now turn to alternative accounts.
Alternative Accounts that Fail
Chisholm's Reduction of Propositions to States of Affairs
While some philosophers have thought that a distinction between states of affairs and
propositions is untenable, the general tendency is to argue that states of affairs are reducible to
propositions. Roderick Chisholm, however, holds that states of affairs are the basic ontological
category of which propositions and events are species.34 Let's briefly sketch Chisholm's system
before seeing why this collapse for the sake of ontological parsimony fails.
Chisholm's identity condition for a state of affairs is:
p is a state of affairs =definition It is possible that there is someone
who accepts p.35
So, we see that Chisholm solely identifies states of affairs as the potential mental content of the
intentional state of acceptance. Chisholm distinguishes two species of states of affairs,
propositions and events:
States of Affairs
20
p is a proposition =definition p is a state of affairs, and it is impossible
that there is a time t and a time t' such that p occurs at t and does
not occur at t'.36
In other words, if a state of affairs is a proposition and that state of affairs occurs
(obtains), it always occurs. In the case of an event,
p is an event =definition p is a state of affairs which is such that: (i) it
occurs; (ii) it is not a proposition; and (iii) it entails a property G
which is such that (a) only individual things can exemplify G, (b) it
is possible that no individual things exemplify G, and (c) G is not
such that it may be rooted outside the times at which it is had.37
The most significant difference between an event and a proposition for Chisholm is that events
occur at some but not all times whereas propositions, if they occur, do so at all times. On
Chisholm's schema, those propositions that do occur are true propositions and those that do not
are false. Now it is not my task to provide any complete critique of Chisholm's system here,
especially of events, which others elsewhere have done.38 Primarily for our purposes we are
interested in Chisholm's reduction of propositions to a species of state of affairs in the first
definition above. Proleptically, Chisholm says,
Yet it would seem that we are multiplying entities beyond
necessity if we say that among the things that exist eternally in all
possible worlds is the state of affairs of Socrates being mortal and
also the proposition that Socrates is mortal.39
But according to Chisholm's criteria for ontological commitment, if we are unable to do without
an entity in explaining the reference or meaning of our different terms and phrases, which in turn
constitute sentences we take to be true, then we ought not to dismiss the existence of that entity.
Let's examine if Chisholm provides a satisfactory linguistic explanation of this reduction.
Chisholm states an objection we might offer:
(i) Your theory implies that, if a man believes that a storm is
occurring, then that state of affairs which is the occurrence of a
storm is the object of his belief. But (ii) the sentence "He believes
States of Affairs
21
that a storm is occurring" is natural and clearly grammatical,
whereas "He believes the occurrence of a storm" is unnatural and
not clearly grammatical. Hence (iii) if a man believes that a storm
is occurring something other than the occurrence of a storm is the
object of his belief.40
Chisholm responds,
The premises of the argument are certainly true. If we wish to say
of a man that he believes that a storm is occurring, we do not say
'He believes the occurrence of a storm'. But we may say 'He
believes in or suspects, or is counting on, or is mindful of, the
occurrence of a storm'. And where we may say of a man that he
fears, regrets, hopes or knows that a storm is occurring, we may
also say, equally well, that he fears, regrets, hopes for, or is
cognizant of the occurrence of a storm. Such points of usage may
throw light upon various intentional attitudes. But surely they give
us no reason to suppose that 'the occurrence of a storm' and 'that a
storm is occurring' refer to different things. The argument is
simply a non sequitur.41
Sorting out the semantics of intentional attitude terms by examining various linguistic
expressions of those attitudes is an involved process with pitfalls at every turn. Chisholm's hasty
inclusion of several intentional attitudes in his list—all of which he argues take a state of affairs
as their mental content—will not withstand closer scrutiny, however. But a thorough inquiry of
each intentional attitude term is unnecessary. All that must be pointed out here is that Chisholm
is trading on an ambiguity in the reference of 'the occurrence of a storm'. The reason 'He
believes the occurrence of a storm' is unnatural and even ungrammatical is because the content of
belief here is ambiguously expressed by 'the occurrence of a storm'. 'The occurrence of storm'
could express the proposition that a storm is occurring, in which case the sentence might be ruled
grammatical. Alternatively, the state of affairs of a storm or the second-order state of affairs of a
storm's occurring could equally be the referents of 'the occurrence of storm'. In this case the
sentence would remain ungrammatical since such states of affairs, as we have argued, are not
States of Affairs
22
eligible candidates for belief, since they cannot possess truth values.42 Furthermore, 'the
occurrence of a storm' might refer to the existent fact of the occurrence of a storm, a third
ontological category. What would be clearly grammatical, if 'the occurrence of the storm' was
taken to denote a state of affairs, would be a sentence like 'Jones was entertaining the occurrence
of a storm' where the intentional attitude of entertaining naturally takes a state of affairs as its
mental content. Thus, the difference in how the meaning of 'the occurrence of a storm' is taken
strongly suggests that propositions are not a mere species of states of affairs, but a sui generis
intensional entity. The distinguishing feature is that the former have truth-values, but the latter
cannot, as we have seen.43 So we see that Chisholm is betraying his own guide for doing
ontology by asserting an identical meaning here that is not at all apparent. There is no readily
available paraphrase to reduce such expressions of 'the occurrence of a storm' to a proposition
that does not in turn change the potential meaning of the expression; if one is reading 'the
occurrence of a storm' as denoting a state of affairs, then reducing it to a proposition will produce
a new content, and thus a new meaning, which is distinct from a state of affairs.
Jaegwon Kim extends this objection to Chisholm's identity condition for a state of affairs,
viz., that it is possible that there is someone who accepts p. Kim argues that little sense can be
made of accepting nonpropositional states of affairs like events:
…a serious difficulty seems to arise for Chisholm's generic
conception of states of affairs as objects of intentional attitudes.
As noted earlier, the defining characteristic of states of affairs is
that they are objects of belief or acceptance. This is perfectly all
right for those states of affairs that are propositions. But what
about those that aren't propositions, and, in particular events?
What is [it] to accept or believe an event?…What sense can be
attached to believing, disbelieving or suspending belief with
respect to, say, Jones walking at t…It would seem that acceptance
makes sense only with respect to truth-value bearers…I do not
believe Chisholm has provided us with an explanation of what
States of Affairs
23
belief or acceptance really amounts to with regard to events and
other nonpropositional states of affairs.44
Since, as we have seen, facts, events, and states of affairs are all commonly stated in nominalized
gerundial phrases, Kim's remarks here apply to facts and states of affairs as much as they do to
events (especially if events just turn out to be facts). So, Chisholm's identity condition for a state
of affairs is incomplete.
In summary, while there is a certain appeal to Chisholm's ontologically parsimonious
account of states of affairs, we see that he forfeits a plausible ontological explanation for such
expressions as 'the occurrence of a storm' in his reduction of propositions and events to states of
affairs. We now turn to a second failing account of states of affairs that Quentin Smith offers.
Quentin Smith's Account of States of Affairs as Truth-makers
Several philosophers have rejected such an analysis as ours on grounds that this account
leaves out the vital notion of a truthmaker. Quentin Smith has articulated this objection as well
as any.45 Smith notes that accounts of states of affairs such as Chisholm's and Plantinga's hold
that states of affairs are truth-valued complexes whereas his account holds that states of affairs
are what make truth-valued complexes true, i.e., they are truth-makers of true propositions.46 We
have already seen where our account departs from Chisholm's. While our account is in various
respects more filled out than Plantinga's, his account is similar enough in its fundamentals to
ours that we can apply Smith's objections to Plantinga to our own account as well. Says Smith,
It seems to me however, that there are no "states of affairs," if this
expression is used in Plantinga's sense to refer to something
different from both propositions and the truth-makers of
propositions.47
States of Affairs
24
With Plantinga, we have argued for the distinction between states of affairs and propositions
while denying the former the role of truth-maker. But Smith argues that the identification must
be made if 'states of affairs' is not being used in his sense to refer to truth-makers. For Smith, the
existence of a state of affairs is sufficient for making some proposition true:
S is a truth-maker of [proposition] P if and only if (a) P's being
true consists in its correspondence to S and (b) S's existence is both
sufficient and necessary for the relation of correspondence to
obtain between P and S.48
On my account, however, what makes the proposition that Spiro Agnew is the president of Yale
University true is Agnew's exemplification of the property of being president of Yale University.
The existence of this fact both makes the proposition true and makes the state of affairs of Spiro
Agnew being president of Yale University obtain. However, being obtaining or being true is just
a verbal difference according to Smith; there is no reason to think that there is any ontological
difference here. Says Smith,
But what are these strange "states of affairs" of Plantinga?
Plantinga distinguishes between their existence and their obtaining,
since some states of affairs exist but do not obtain. This means
they are, in a relevant sense, truth-valued complexes, since their
"obtaining" and "not obtaining" is exactly analogous to the "being
true" or "being false" of propositions. But it is hard to see, then,
how Plantinga's states of affairs differ, except verbally, from his
propositions.
While we have said that there is an intimate relationship of logical entailment between a
state of affairs actually obtaining and its isomorphic proposition being true, we can still maintain
a clear distinction between each. But if the obtaining of a state of affairs entails that an
isomorphic proposition P is true, it does not follow, as we have said, that the former makes the
latter true. Therefore, 'exactly analogous' in Smith's does not prove to be the relation of identity;
his move here is too quick.
States of Affairs
25
Smith's account of states of affairs and consequent rebuttal to Plantinga rests on a
constitutive analysis of propositions and states of affairs. Smith argues,
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the constituents of
Plantinga's states of affairs seem indiscernible from the
constituents of his propositions. Consider that the proposition
expressed by a de dicto use of the sentence "The tallest human is
wise" consists of the properties of being the tallest human, the
property of wisdom, and a temporal property. But Plantinga's state
of affairs the tallest human's being wise also appears to consist of
all and only these properties (as ordered to each other in the same
way) and thus appears to be identical with the proposition. If there
is some difference between the constituents of the state of affairs
and the constituents of the proposition, Plantinga does not tell us
what it is. To say that one "obtains or does not obtain" whereas the
other "is true or false" seems to be merely a verbal difference,
given the absence of any difference in the constituents of the two
complexes.
As can be seen from our above argument, isomorphic states of affairs and propositions do look
identical in logical form when dealing at the "constituent" level of each. But a clear difference in
logical form is seen when we move to predicates true and obtains. Here an isomorphic
proposition and state of affairs do distinctly differ in logical form.
On Smith's account of states of affairs and propositions, each has the same parts, though
they are ordered differently in each. Moreover, these parts also include particulars.49 For
example, when we consider the de re proposition John is running, Smith tells us that
Both the proposition and the state of affairs [John running] have
for their parts John, running, and presentness. But they are ordered
in the proposition in a different way from how they are ordered in
the state of affairs. They are related in the proposition in such a
way that (1) the existents can be so related even if John is not
presently walking (but given that the proposition is de re, they
cannot be so related if John does not exist, since John is a part of
this proposition only if he exists); (2) the complex is not identical
with John's present walking (this is entailed by condition [1]). But,
John, walking, and presentness are related in the state of affairs in
such a way that (1) they are so related if and only if John is
presently walking; (2) their being related in this way does not
States of Affairs
26
possess a truth-value but corresponds to something (namely, the
proposition) that possesses the value of true; and (3) the state of
affairs is identical with John's present walking (i.e., it is not a set or
merelogical sum or aggregate composed of John's present walking,
it just is John's present walking and is nothing different from this
or over and above this). The state of affairs is John's exemplifying
walking and his exemplifying walking's exemplifying presentness.
This entails that if there is the state of affairs, then John is
presently walking; accordingly, it makes no sense to say that there
is this state of affairs but that it does not obtain, since this could
only mean "There is this state of affairs, but John is not presently
walking," which, given my definition of a state of affairs, is an
implicit logical contradiction. Accordingly, if states of affairs are
truth-makers, then there is no distinction between their existence
and their obtaining, such that "the state of affairs S exists" means
"S obtains" and "S does not obtain" means "S does not exist."
We have taken it as a desideratum that an account of states of affairs be anti-existentialist. We
can see in Smith's account here a clear reason for doing so. According to Smith the proposition
that John is running cannot exist unless John exists. This claim leaves Smith with an unsavory
result. Suppose that I am close friends with John and that John is a long-distance runner. I know
John has been training for the Boston Marathon for several months. I know John well enough to
know that his schedule is quite predictable and that he runs everyday between 10 a.m. and 12
p.m.. During my 10:30 a.m. coffee break one day I reflect on John's upcoming trip to Boston.
At this time I believe the proposition that John is running. Unbeknownst to me, however, John
has tragically died that morning as the result of an automobile accident. So, John no longer
exists and my belief that John is running is false. But, on Smith's existentialist account of
propositions, the mental content of my belief cannot be the proposition that John is running since
John does not exist; John's existence is a necessary condition for the existence of this
proposition. But surely the mental content of my belief is no different than it would be had John
remained alive and continued with his morning routine. The belief would have been true instead
States of Affairs
27
of false, but its content would have been identical.50 So, on these existentialist grounds alone, we
can reject Smith's account of propositions and states of affairs.
Aside from this objection, however, we can see fairly easily that Smith is using 'state of
affairs' in a manner similar to our use of 'fact'. But there is more than a trivial nomenclature
debate ensuing here. Smith is denying the category of a state of affairs as we have defined it, but
as we have argued, these intensional entities clearly seem to be the contents of certain intentional
attitudes like entertaining or thinking of.
As Plantinga says, when authors of fiction tell us a
story, they present or call our attention to a state of affairs:
He brings it to our mind for us, helps us focus our attention upon it,
enables us to entertain, explore, and contemplate it, a procedure we
find amusing and titillating or edifying and instructive as the case
may be.51
But Smith's account would force us to take propositions as the mental contents of such
intentional attitudes—attitudes that involve no predicable truth value of their content.
Smith's objection to such an accounts as mine also rests on a neglect of facts. Says
Smith,
What is missing from the philosophy of Chisholm, Wolterstorff,
Plantinga, and others is the notion of a truth-maker of a
proposition, that is, the notion that I (but not they) express by
"state of affairs." They would not deny that there is something that
makes a proposition true, but they have no theory of such items;
and in this respect, their philosophy is impoverished.
As I have suggested earlier, we need another ontological category for truth-maker which I call a
fact. Plantinga does not mention, much less provide an account of such truth-makers. So, we
can grant Smith's objection to Plantinga's account at this point. However, the absence of such a
category does not count against our account of states of affairs, given our assignment of facts to
this role. Yes, an account of facts is needed for a complete analysis of the relationship between
States of Affairs
28
propositions, states of affairs and their truth/actuality makers. Since I have little doubt that such
an account is available, Smith's charge will not stand against my account of states of affairs.
Thus, we preserve good reason to maintain our distinction between propositions and states of
affairs noting that facts will play an important role in telling us what makes the former true and
the latter actual.
In conclusion, we have seen that there is good reason to think that states of affairs are sui
generis intensional entities that serve as the mental content of certain intentional attitudes like
entertaining. We have examined the relation of isomorphism that holds between a state of affairs
and a proposition, both of which involve the same intensional entities. Additionally, we have
seen the need for facts as truth-makers of propositions and actuality-makers of states of affairs.
Finally, we have seen Chisholm's and Smith's accounts of states of affairs fail.
1
See Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter IV "States of Affairs," (Open Court: La Salle, Illinois, 1976),
114-137 for a reduction of propositions and events to states of affairs. See Quentin Smith, Language and Time
(OUP: New York, 1993), 151-158 for a quasi-reduction of states of affairs to propositions. Smith does countenance
a distinction between propositions and states of affairs, but, as we will see in our examination below, he reduces our
notion of states of affairs to propositions. David Armstrong rejects propositions outright, but has developed a
complete analysis of states of affairs—one similar in many ways to Michael Tooley's and Smith's notion of states of
affairs. See David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997), 131
and Michael Tooley, Time Tense & Causation, (OUP: New York, 1997) 33-36, 238-240.
2
We need not be limited to indicative/declarative sentences, but these are the most common sorts considered. I will
set aside questions concerning indexical sentences that express different propositions while remaining identical
sentences.
3
See Alonzo Church, "Propositions and Sentences," in The Problem of Universals: a Symposium, (University of
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1956), 3-11. I am assuming that Quine's argument for indeterminacy of translation
is unsound. See W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1964), 26-73.
4
George Pitcher, "Introduction" in Truth, ed. George Pitcher, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1964), 5.
See R. Cartwright "Propositions" in Truth, 81-103 and Michael Loux Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction,
(Routledge: New York, 1998), 142.
6
I am in fact skeptical that sense can be made of the supervenience relation at least with respect to the mind-body
problem. Nevertheless, this example merely suggests the possibility that there are entailments that lack truthbearing entities as their relata.
7
See also Jon Barwise and John Perry "Situations and Attitudes," The Journal of Philosophy 78:11 (November,
1981), 668-691 on the view that situations (non-truth-value-bearing entities) can also stand in entailment relations.
Other logical relations like that of compatibility and incompatibility are also thought to hold between bearers of
truth-value; see Michael Loux, Metaphysics, 139.
8
This argument will be charged with question-begging if the opponent rejects the existence of valid arguments.
Given that realism about valid arguments is not in significant dispute, however, we need not take this threat
5
States of Affairs
29
seriously. I am assuming that sententialism is false. See Hartry Field's Truth and the Absence of Fact (ClarendonOxford Press: Oxford, 2001).
9
Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," Grazer philosophische Studien 7/8 (1989), 148. Here
Kim is using 'objects of belief' not as intentional objects—those objects in the world that our beliefs are about—but
as the mental content of our beliefs.
10
For example, see David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, (Blackwell:
Oxford, 1996), 176-179.
11
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 117.
12
I will assume from this point that indicative and declarative sentences are interchangeable for our purposes.
13
Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," 148-149.
14
I am assuming that the Fregian position that holds that sentences, but not words, are the only possessors of
meaning is wrong.
15
David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 131.
16
We will speak of constituents in scare quotes to indicate that propositions and states of affairs do not literally have
parts; e.g., the proposition that George Bush is president does not have George Bush as a part.
17
For arguments to this position see Alvin Plantinga, "On Existentialism," Philosophical Studies 44 (July 1983), 120 and George Bealer's "Universals," Journal of Philosophy 90(1) (Jan. 1993), 5-32.
18
As we shall see below, the existence and obtaining of a state of affairs will remain distinct such that while all
states of affairs necessarily exist, not all obtain.
19
See George Bealer's "Property Theories" in The Handbook of Philosophical Logic, ed. D. Gabbay, (Kluwer:
Dordrecht, 1989), 133-251 for arguments for a realist view of intensional entities.
20
The most common sort of gerundial expression is one in which there is a subject and a predicate. For example,
the Eiffel Tower being in London is such a gerundial expression. Were this fragment of language embedded in a
sentence such as 'The Eiffel Tower being in London would cause envy to arise in the hearts of the French', an
acceptable account of states of affairs should assign the states of affairs of the Eiffel Tower's being in London as the
semantic value of this embedded gerundive.
21
For a discussion of these counter-intuitive results as well as Bealer's algebraic approach, see his "Propositions,"
Mind 107 (Jan. 1998), 1-32; "Theories of Properties, Relations, and Propositions," The Journal of Philosophy, 76,
634-48; Quality and Concept (Clarendon-Oxford: Oxford, 1982); and "A Solution to Frege's Puzzle," Philosophical
Perspectives 7 (1993), 17-60. This desideratum is compatible with that of George Bealer's in his algebraic approach
to propositions, relations, and properties. This approach takes these intensional entities as irreducible to other
entities. Such an approach runs counter to accounts which attempt some sort of reduction resulting in quite counterintuitive results.
22
I will use brackets [ ] when there is a proposition or state of affairs imbedded within a proposition or state of
affairs.
23
Alternatively and no implausibly one might hold that this expression does not even express a proposition and is
not even a sentence, i.e., a syntactically well-formed expression.
24
I am of course assuming that such theories of truth, e.g., redundancy or disquotational, that discount or dismiss
such a truth predicate are unsound theories. See Graham Forbes' "Truth, Correspondence and Redundancy," in Fact,
Science, and Morality: Essays on A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic ed. Graham Macdonald and Crispin
Wright (Blackwell: Oxford, 1986), 27-54 for the failure of such accounts.
25
See my Bare Particulars vs. Identity-properties qua Individuators for arguments to the effect that we can make
sense of such properties.
26
I am assuming that externalist theories of mental content fail.
27
I am inclined to think that sets are reducible to concepts on a conception that sets are existentialist entities
dependent upon the existence of their members for their existence.
28
See Alvin Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds," reprinted in The Possible and the Actual, ed. Michael
Loux (Cornell University Press: Ithica, 1979), 257-258, and John Pollock, The Foundations of Philosophical
Semantics, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1984), 52.
29
The relation of isomorphism is symmetric in that if p is isomorphic to s, s is isomorphic to p.
30
Note that  sp ((p isomorphic s)  (O(s)  T(p))) does not hold since the right side is not a sufficient
condition for the left side. That is to say that (O(s)  T(p)) could be true, though s and p are not isomorphic. For
example, 7 being a prime number obtains and the proposition that 7 is not divisible by 2 is true, but this state of
affairs and proposition are not isomorphic. As can be seen here, a fine-grained view of propositions and states of
affairs is being assumed.
States of Affairs
31
30
Ramon Lemos, Metaphysical Investigations (Farleigh Dickinson University Press: Rutherford, NJ, 1988), 116117.
32
I use the term 'constituted' loosely here realizing that there several different notions of constitution.
33
Without developing any theory of facts, it would appear that some facts necessarily exist and are not constituted
by particulars. For example, on the view being advanced, there is both a proposition that 7 + 7 = 14, a state of
affairs of 7 +7 equaling 14, and a fact that 7 +7 = 14, but this fact is not constituted by any particulars and it
necessarily exists. Facts that are constituted by particulars contingently exist if their constituents contingently exist
since, most naturally, facts are at least partially identified by their particulars.
34
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 114-137.
35
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 117.
36
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 123.
37
Ibid.
38
See Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," 7/8 Grazer philosophische Studien (1989), 147162; John Pollock, "Chisholm on States of Affairs," Grazer philosophische Studien, (1979), 163-175; and Edward
Wierenga, "Chisholm on States of Affairs," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 54:2 (August 1976), 148-152.
39
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 123.
40
Ibid. Here again 'object' can be used ambiguously either for the mental content of his belief, or the intentional
object. I am assuming that Chisholm is using 'object' in the former sense.
41
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 123-124.
42
The state of affairs of a storm occurring is a different expression that our subject-predicate examples above. How
would we symbolize this state of affairs? Here's one suggestion: Os soa. Here O represents the predicate occurring
or, synonymously, obtaining—not obtains (not the 'ing'-ending). One could predicate obtains of this state of affairs,
symbolized O[Ossoa], which produces a proposition. The interesting point here is that n-order states of affairs are
produced by predicating obtaining of n-1-order states of affairs. In this case, the storm is a first-order state of
affairs, the storm's obtaining is a second-order state of affairs, and if we wished to, we could form the third-order
state of affairs of the storm's obtaining's obtaining. But, as soon as we predicate obtains of any, including all n-order
states of affairs, we produce a proposition.
43
Facts do not possess a truth value either.
44
Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," 155.
45
See Quentin Smith, Language and Time (OUP: New York, 1993), 151-158; David Armstrong and Michael
Tooley would also be good representatives of those who would offer this objection given their notion of states of
affairs. See David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997), and
Michael Tooley, Time Tense & Causation, (OUP: New York, 1997).
46
While Smith says that Plantingian states of affairs are truth-valued complexes, Plantinga never says as much;
propositions are, but not states of affairs.
47
Quentin Smith, Language and Time, 156.
48
Quentin Smith, Language and Time, 157.
49
Quentin Smith, Language and Time, 158.
50
I am assuming a narrow view of mental content here. See Frank Jackson and David Braddon-Mitchell Philosophy
of Mind and Cognition, 176-235 for a discussion.
51
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, (Clarendon-Oxford: Oxford, 1974), 159.