Sullivan 1
The Denial of Genocide: U.S. Policy Before and During the Cambodian Massacre
Jamie Sullivan
Smith College
Gov 341
April 15, 2010
Sullivan 2
Abstract
The United States played a significant role in the Cambodian civil war from 1970 to
1975. The U.S. bombed, invaded, and installed an oppressive regime during the civil war,
all of which motivated the Khmer Rouge (KR) to commit revenge killings and genocide
against thirty percent of its population from 1975 to 1979. Yet after the civil war, the
U.S. government abandoned Cambodia. The genocidei occurred during the Cold War at
the height of non-interventionism and post-Vietnam syndrome.1 The Cambodian
genocide was denied both by members of the U.S. government and by anti-war and
humanitarian activists.2 The U.S. government followed a policy of nonacknowledgement, non-engagement, and non-interventionism, which was successful
because of the lack of effective opposition against U.S. policy in Cambodia. The
following factors allowed for this success: the U.S. government’s control over
information (such as disseminating information that would frame the situation to support
U.S. policy), the lack of information outside of U.S. intelligence (e.g., firsthand
accounts), and the way in which the Cold War environment influenced both the left and
right wings conclusion that the U.S. should not become involved with Cambodia.3
U.S. Involvement in the Cambodian Civil War (1970-1975)
The civil war in Cambodia started during April 1970. Prince Norodom Sihanouk
had become king of Cambodia in 1941 when the French appointed him. Sihanouk
negotiated independence from France and remained a very popular leader to many
1
Michael Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodia Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1991), 85; Jon Western, Selling Intervention and War (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press, 2005), 122.
2
Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2002); Peter Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005).
3
Ibid; Hass, Genocide by Proxy; Kenneth Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,”
Diplomatic History, 2003, 27(2), 251.
Sullivan 3
Cambodians despite his authoritarian style of ruling. In 1965, he severed relations with
the U.S. in response to the Vietnam War.4 When the Viet Congo’s presence increased on
Cambodia’s eastern border, Sihanouk reestablished relations with the U.S. in 1969.
Sihanouk’s pro-American military chief Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak took advantage
of Sihanouk’s absence on an overseas trip and overthrew him on March 20, 1970.5 The
civil war started with the coup d’etat.
The civil war consisted of the Nol government and the U.S. on one side and the
North Vietnamese (Viet Cong) and Cambodian communist revolutionaries (the Red
Khmer) on the other. The Red Khmer later became the Khmer Rouge (KR) and was led
by Saloth Sar (Pol Pot). The KR was educated in Paris and studied Maoist thought. China
provided extensive military and political support to the KR.6 Cambodia is one of the only
countries in mainland Southeast Asia that has not been invaded or suppressed by China
since the third century AD.7 Although the KR originally formed in opposition to
Sihanouk’s authoritarian rule, they later formed an alliance with Sihanouk against the Nol
regime and his pro-American allies. The U.S. government supported Nol financially
(with $1.85 billion) and militarily.8 U.S. policy of supporting the Nol government during
the civil war motivated the KR to commit genocide in 1975.
The U.S. supported the Nol government despite the fact that he practiced corrupt,
repressive, and brutal policies. In 1972, he declared that he was president, prime minister,
4
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 43.
Ibid.
6
Power, A Problem From Hell, 94.
7
Chang Pao-Min, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985),
1-5; One possible reason for this positive relationship is that the Chinese recognize Cambodia as a
sovereign nation and view the country positively. They have recorded and described Cambodia as a nation
that has “distinct culture and ethnic peculiarities” since third century AD.
8
Power, A Problem from Hell, 93.
5
Sullivan 4
defense minister, and marshal of armed forces.9 As typical of the U.S. Cold War policy,
the U.S. continued to support ABC governments (Anything But Communist) despite the
fact that many of the governments practiced policies that went against American
principles (e.g., freedom and democracy).10 President Richard Nixon’s policy after his
inauguration in 1969 became even more directly involved in supporting the Nol
government, which was a continuation of supporting pro-U.S. and ABC governments.
Nixon, believing that the North Vietnamese were using the Ho Chi Minh trail to
transport supplies, extended the war to Vietnam in eastern Cambodia. While the Ho Chi
Minh trail did exist,11 Nixon’s strategy was ineffective. He led a secret bombing
campaign (Operation Menu: Breakfast, Lunch, Snack, Dinner, Dessert, and Supper) in
1969 without Congressional approval.12 On April 30, 1970, Nixon led a ground invasion
of 31,000 American and 43,000 South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia. During the 200
nights of bombing from February to July in 1970, Peter Maguire reports that 15,000
pounds of explosives were released for every square mile of the Cambodian territory,13
totaling 540,000 tons.14 The estimated amount of casualties “are difficult to estimate” and
range from 5,000 to 500,000.15 In 2000 President Bill Clinton released an extensive Air
Force database on the American bombings of Indochina from 1964 to 1975. This
database (which is still incomplete) revealed that from October 4, 1965 to August 15,
1973, approximately 2,756,941 tons of bombs were dropped in 230,516 sorties on
9
Power, A Problem from Hell, 92-3.
Brent Durbin, US Foreign Policy, Fall 2009: Smith College.
11
Vatthana Pholsena, "HIGHLANDERS ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL." Critical Asian Studies, 2008
40(3): 445-474.
12
Richard Reeves, President Nixon (New York City: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 48-9.
13
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 45.
14
Power, A Problem from Hell, 95.
15
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 45.
10
Sullivan 5
113,716 sites in Cambodia. This reveals that the bombing began four years earlier than
what is popularly believed. The amount of civilian casualties are most likely higher given
the fivefold increase in the amount of bombs dropped.16 Yet the bombing campaign and
invasion forced the North Vietnamese further into Cambodia, in the process turning
“uprooted Cambodian peasants into zealous revolutionaries.”17 The end of the bombings
and U.S. military and political support to Nol’s side of the civil war ended only with the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam in 1973 and with Nixon’s resignation.18 U.S.
involvement provoked the KR.
The civil war ended on April 17, 1975 when the KR captured the capital Phnom
Penh. The estimated death toll is disputed and ranges from half a million to 1.7 million
total.19 During the civil war, the Nol regime committed mass atrocities (e.g. executions
and cannibalism) against the KR and others.20 The types of violence that the Nol forces
employed motivated peasants to join the KR and to commit revenge killings.21 The KR
utilized similar techniques that the Nol government employed during the civil war (e.g.
cannibalism against perceived enemies), which became even more severe during the
genocide.22 The animosity between the Nol government and the KR was due to clashing
ideologies and their motivation to obtain power. The KR was anti-U.S. and communist;
16
Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan, “Bombs Over Cambodia,” The Walrus, Oct. 2006, from
http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2006.10-history-bombing-cambodia/.
17
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 45.
18
Owen and Kiernan, “Bombs Over Cambodia”; Maguire, Facing death in Cambodia, 45.
19
Bruce Sharp, “Counting Hell,” Cambodia: Beauty and Darkness, April 2005, from
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/deaths.htm.
20
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 49.
21
Alexander L. Hinton, “Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide” in book Genocides by
the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice, edited by Nicholas A. Robins and Adam Jones
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Alexander Hinton, “A head for an eye: Revenge in the
Cambodian genocide." American Ethnologist 25, no. 3 (August 1998): 352; Donal Dutton, Ehor O.
Boyanowsky G., and Michael Harris Bond. "Extreme mass homicide: From military massacre to genocide,"
Aggression & Violent Behavior 10 (4), May 2005: 437-473.
22
Power, A Problem From Hell, 100.
Sullivan 6
the Nol government was pro-U.S. and adhered to U.S. principles (e.g., capitalism). Both
sides were authoritarian and committed human rights violations against one another. U.S.
support of the Nol government during the civil war largely influenced the KR’s
motivations to kill American allies and bystanders during the Cambodian genocide.23
How U.S. Involvement in the Civil War Affected Access to Information
The active involvement of the U.S. in the Cambodian civil war provided unique
and extensive U.S. government access to information and press coverage. The
dissemination of information allowed the U.S. public to survey the situation and decide
whether U.S. policy in Cambodia was morally right. Although the U.S. knew very little
about Cambodia in 1971, the access to information increased throughout the war. When
Central Intelligence Analyst Sam Adams began to study the situation, he concluded that
Cambodian communist troops were stronger than the official U.S. estimate and that the
KR was not simply an extension of the Viet Cong. Adams identified the “ancient hatred”
between Cambodia and Vietnam and correctly predicted that it could reemerge.24 U.S.
involvement and access to information enabled the press to cover the civil war.
The press coverage on the Cambodian civil war was extensive. In April 1975
alone, 272 stories were published in two papers as the KR approached Phnom Penh.25
Extensive information was provided to the American public. Anti-war activists protested
at Kent State University when they learned about the U.S. invasion in Cambodia. At the
protest, the National Guard killed four students.26 These activists risked their lives to
protest the U.S. human rights violations in Cambodia. Their access to information
Hinton, “Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide” in book Genocides by the Oppressed:
Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice.
24
Sam Adams, War of Numbers (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1994), 202-3.
25
Power, A Problem From Hell, 110-1.
26
Ben Kiernan, ed. Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia
Studies, 1993), 9.
23
Sullivan 7
regarding the civil war enabled them to protest U.S. involvement in Cambodia. Yet
information was lacking during the genocide. After the KR took power, the access to
information, the activism of the American public, and U.S. policy changed significantly.
The Cambodian Genocide (1975-1979) and the Response of the U.S.
In April 1975, the KR played on the emotions of the Cambodians and announced
that the Americans were going to bomb the capital again and that all citizens needed to
evacuate the capital (which was a lie that enabled the KR to kill their ‘perceived
enemies’). All citizens and twenty thousand of Phnom Penh’s hospital patients were
evacuated. The KR set up checkpoints in numerous zones in order to kill soldiers and
government officials of the Nol government.27 Despite the fact that many hospital
patients were wheeled out, half naked, with IVs attached to them without anywhere to go,
Gareth Porter, a scholar of the Institute of Policy Studies at the time, went as far to justify
the evacuation of hospitals as “a reasonable alternative to move the patients as fast as
possible to locations outside the cities where there were in fact other facilities.”28 Porter
justified this action so that the U.S. would not have to engage or condemn the KR.
President Gerald Ford, who took office in 1974, was more vocal about the human
rights situation than Nixon. In 1975, Ford had correctly predicted that a “massacre” and
“bloodbath” would follow if Phnom Penh came under the rule of the KR.29 The National
Security Fact sheet supported this prediction and estimated the scale of possible deaths to
equal the Holocaust. The NSC fact sheet was distributed to Congress and the media.
Although the American public was provided information about the Cambodian genocide,
Paul Bellamy, “Cambodia: remembering the killing field,” New Zealand International Review, 2008,
33(2); Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 37.
28
U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Human Rights in Cambodia, Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st session, May 3, 1977, 14.
29
Power, A Problem From Hell, 102.
27
Sullivan 8
the public was hesitant to believe the Ford administration due to widespread American
distrust of the government as a result of Nixon’s dishonesty and the demonstration of
“anti-Communist paranoia” of past administrations.30 Thus, the history of U.S. Cold War
policy influenced the way in which scholars and the American public reacted to the
refugee accounts of the Cambodian genocide.
How the U.S. Responded to Early Warnings at the Start of the Genocide: 1975
Another factor that influenced the denial or apathy towards the Cambodian
genocide was the lack of firsthand information from Cambodia. On April 12, 1975, the
U.S. embassy staff and American nationals were evacuated (Operation Eagle Pull).
Nearly all American and European journalists left as well as other foreign embassies.31
Journalists were then barred from entering Democratic Kampuchea (DK, the state ruled
by the KR) and those that did faced either death or torture.32 The evacuation of embassies
and barring of journalists from DK restricted the access of firsthand information.
However, there were forewarnings that genocide was going to occur.
Despite the fact that President Ford, U.S. National Security Adviser Henry
Kissinger, and representatives like Bella Abzug (D-NY) warned that a bloodbath would
ensue, the U.S. government did not act on the issue and even ignored the two warnings
that indicated that genocide was going to occur. In May 1975, hard intelligence indicated
that eighty to ninety Cambodian officials and their spouses were to be assassinated.33 A
leaked translation of secret KR radio transmissions were published in the Washington
Post, which said, “Eliminate all high-ranking military officials, governmental officials…
30
Power, A Problem From Hell, 102.
Times, “CAMBODIA: American Pullout from a City Under Siege,” Times, April 21, 1975.
32
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, p. 36.
33
Power, A Problem From Hell, 105.
31
Sullivan 9
Do this secretly. Also get provincial officers who owe the Communist Party a blood
debt.”34 These two pieces of hard intelligence were one of the few accounts that indicated
that genocide was going to occur; yet they were ignored. As the genocide escalated,
numerous refugees also told their stories. Firsthand accounts were obtained but limited.
Nature of the Genocide and Revenge Killings
Charles Twining was able to interview Cambodian refugees on the Thai border
while he was posted at the U.S. embassy in Bangkok. Twining came to the conclusion
that the KR was exterminating anyone who wore glasses, that had a high school
education, and who was Buddhist. What Twining did not know was that the genocide
also included the killing of the Vietnamese, Chinese, Muslim Chams, Buddhist monks,
and anyone considered a traitor. Even the KR’s own supporters were killed if they
showed any signs of disloyalty. Yet the majority of the population was miserable and felt
disloyal to the genocidal regime and was therefore murdered. All intellectuals were
slaughtered as well (since they were perceived as potential rivals to the KR) and included
anyone who completed seventh grade.35 Over 200,000 of the Muslim Chams were killed,
which constituted forty percent of their population in Cambodia. The Vietnamese were
completely wiped out. Only a thousand out of the 60,000 Buddhist monks survived. Two
million in total died from execution or starvation.36
The KR was mainly motivated to commit genocide because of their history of
being oppressed first under the former Sihanouk regime and later by the Nol government.
The KR leaders, “directly and indirectly called for their followers to take subaltern
Kim Willenson and Paul Brinkley-Roger, “Cambodia’s Purification,” Newsweek, May 19, 1975.
Power, A Problem From Hell, 118; Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” 251.
36
Power, A Problem From Hell, pg. 143.
34
35
Sullivan 10
vengeance upon their ‘class enemies’ who had formerly oppressed them.”37 Pol Pot made
a speech in 1977 that asserted that Cambodia remained a “semi-colony, in a situation of
dependence,” which was still under the influence of U.S. imperialism. Classism existed
between the workers/peasant, who made up 80 percent of the population, and the
capitalists.38 The DK advocated for class revenge through propaganda, embedding and
reinforcing this ideology within culture (e.g. songs), through educational seminars for KR
followers, and various other means before, throughout, and after the civil war. The Nol
regime and its “American lackeys” were portrayed as the corrupt enemy, but later this
expanded to include those who were intelligent and/or an ethnic minority (who were
perceived as foreigners). The KR played on the emotions of the peasants by increasing
preexisting feelings of xenophobia, anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, classism, and
nationalism.39 As KR propaganda increased, so did the killings.
The killings first focused on the Nol regime and its American lackeys. On May
12, 1975, the Phnom Penh Domestic radio reinforced the KR propaganda by saying that
the areas that had been controlled by the Nol government were overtaken with, “injustice,
corruption… burglary, and prostitution… the rotten culture [of U.S. imperialism]… had
poisoned [the urbanites].”40 The peasants already resented the Nol followers and
American bombing, a feeling that was intensified by KR propaganda. The first wave of
genocide began with the killing of high-ranking Lon Nol soldiers, police, government
personnel, and their entire families. Over 200,000 were killed during the first wave. The
Hinton, “Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide” in book Genocides by the Oppressed:
Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice, 85; Hinton, “A head for an eye: Revenge in the Cambodian
genocide”; Alexander Hinton, Why did they kill? Cambodia in the shadow of genocide,” (Berkeley and Los
Angelas: University of California Press, 2005).
38
Ibid., 87; Ibid.
39
Ibid., 87-91; Ibid.
40
Ibid., 92; Ibid.
37
Sullivan 11
KR continued to rally support for the genocide against American lackeys and the
oppressor classes. In April 1976, the KR celebrated the anniversary of the Cambodian
revolution by incorporating song, dance, and heightened annihilation of their perceived
enemies.41 ‘Class enemies’ eventually included capitalists, intellectuals, professionals,
and low ranking Nol soldiers, police, government employees, and often their entire
families.42 The reason that ethnic minorities were killed (in addition to the presence of
extreme xenophobia) was that many of the cities were home to local foreigners and
contained a “disproportionately” large percentage of ethnic minorities: the Chinese,
Vietnamese, Cham Muslims, Buddhist monks, and others.43 Ethnic minorities were
murdered not only because of preexisting feelings of xenophobia, but also killed because
the ‘class enemy targets’ were embedded in communities where large percentages of
ethnic minorities lived. Therefore, U.S. allies were mainly targeted for revenge killings,
but countless bystanders were killed as well, which at times was done purposely to
eliminate those perceived to be foreigners (e.g., minorities) or foreigner sympathists.
The KR used various methods of extermination. Labor camps, such as Tuol Sleng
(commonly referred to as S-21), were common practice; less than a dozen survived out of
the 14,000 to 20,000 who lived there.44 In order to exert control over the population,
families were broken up and children often were not allowed to call anyone ‘Mom’ or
‘Dad’ and Cambodians also did not have names themselves. Women were commonly
raped. No one could pray or own property.45 Sex and marriage were a capital offense and
those who were caught were sentenced to death. The KR soldiers publicly displayed
Hinton, “Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide,” 92-6; Hinton, “A head for an eye:
Revenge in the Cambodian genocide."
42
Ibid., 97; Ibid.
43
Ibid., 92; Ibid; Dutton et. al. "Extreme mass homicide: From military massacre to genocide,” 445-446.
44
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 56.
45
Sokhen Mao, speaker at Conflict Panel, Smith College, April 8, 2010.
41
Sullivan 12
killings by sticking severed heads onto poles, killing in front of labor workers and
children, and by practicing cannibalism and forcing others to watch, all of which were
done to discourage anyone from resisting the KR.46 In order to do all of this, the KR
needed supplies. China supplied them with military advisers, arms, and ammunition,
which increased dramatically in 1978.47 Despite the fact that many of the refugees spoke
about the atrocities that they witnessed, it did not motivate the American public or its
officials to intervene, engage, or condemn the KR.
Responses of Activists to Refugee Accounts of Genocide
Anti-war and humanitarian activists were against U.S. instigation and
participation in proxy wars, as well as its covert or overt support of ABC governments.
Past governments, like the Nixon administration, repeatedly lied to and manipulated
public opinion through anti-communist propaganda. Therefore, the typical population
that lobbies U.S. officials to intervene in situations of massive human rights violations
(either through political, economic, or military influence) was in a mindset that was
paranoid about the U.S. government engaging in anti-communist fear mongering and
military action. Humanitarian organizations and scholars were set on opposing the
government and therefore interpreted U.S. media coverage and refugee accounts from the
Cambodian genocide as just another ploy by the American government to rally support
for overthrowing another communist government.48 These activists could have influenced
U.S. policy if they had been against the Cambodian genocide.
If these activist groups had protested against the genocide in Cambodia and for
U.S. engagement and condemnation, it is possible that they could have made a difference
46
Sokhen Mao, speaker at Conflict Panel; Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 50.
Power, A Problem From Hell, 127.
48
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 54.
47
Sullivan 13
and at least have raised awareness about the events in Cambodia. The anti-Vietnam war
protests show that the public can influence policy (as shown by the withdrawal of troops).
Present day anti-genocide movements have also been successful in many ways. STAND
(a Student Anti-Genocide Coalition) succeeded in getting the U.S. government condemn
the Sudanese government in regards the Darfur genocide, in sending a U.S. Special
Envoy to Sudan, in divestment, and by influencing crucial legislation.49 During the
Cambodian genocide, activists missed the opportunity to do the same.
Noam Chomsky, an anti-war activist, researcher, and political analyst, said at the
time that refugee accounts “were placed in circulation with the aim of discouraging
trained Cambodians from assisting in the reconstruction of their devastated country.”50
He believed that refugee accounts were being used to motivate the public to support the
U.S. ousting of another communist and anti-American government. Chomsky and his
followers repeatedly questioned the truth of refugee ‘stories’ of KR atrocities by writing
to magazines and press that published anything negative about the KR communists.51
Edward Herman (a media analyst who co-wrote Manufacturing Consent with Chomsky)
also believed that refugee accounts, media coverage of the Cambodian genocide, and
support for U.S. intervention were evidence of anti-communist propaganda. The State
Department also shared this mentality, along with conservatives who wanted to avoid
another Vietnam-esque engagement and embarrassment.52 Yet Chomsky and Herman had
different concerns, which were that the U.S. would again show its imperialistic
tendencies by promoting ABC governments that violate human rights. Human rights
49
http://www.standnow.org/
Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, “Distortions at Fourth Hand,” The Nation, June 6, 1977.
51
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 54.
52
Power, A Problem in Hell, 112.
50
Sullivan 14
organizations also dismissed refugee accounts. Amnesty International, dismissed the
evidence as “flimsy… secondhand accounts.”53 The Cold War environment tainted the
judgment of traditional advocates of human rights.
The argument that secondhand accounts of genocide are inaccurate is a common
excuse for non-intervention. However, the ability to obtain first-hand accounts is often
limited when genocide is occurring. Most victims do not survive to tell their stories or do
not make it outside of the country. Reporters and foreign officials are either evacuated or
not allowed inside of the country. The US government often had to rely on statements of
senior KR officials, who denied the genocide because they did not want to be held
accountable for the crimes they committed.54 While limited intelligence existed about the
Cambodian genocide, it was ignored by the Ford administration and was not made public.
U.S. Access to Information and Press Coverage on Cambodia: 1974-1978
As early as 1974, numerous U.S. press outlets reported on the Cambodian human
rights atrocities. Kenneth Quinn, who was stationed as a U.S. Foreign Service officer on
the border of Cambodia, recorded that mass killings and the burning of villages were
occurring increasingly. However, the U.S. officially looked at the situation as the KR
clashing with the Viet Cong, which was the way the American press framed it as well.55
In May of 1976, the State Department released “Life Inside Cambodia,” a report that
explained the forced labor, separating of families, and execution of America’s former
allies and the educated.56 Yet the Ford administration did not respond. On June 8, 1976, a
53
Power, A Problem in Hell, 112.
Ibid.
55
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia”, 247.
56
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 51.
54
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confidential policy paper was sent from the State Department to embassy posts and
indicated that U.S. intelligence was:
… not significantly different from the obtained journalists and comes primarily
from refugees… these reports are too numerous to ignore and sufficient
information certainly exists for further inquiry by appropriate international or
humanitarian organizations.57
Despite the qualitative information on the subject, Congressional hearings on the human
rights abuses in Cambodia were not conducted until 1976.58 Although the Ford
administration acknowledged the fact that atrocities were being committed, action was
not taken. Congress did not remain entirely silent but its representatives were ineffective
in their advocacy for U.S. condemnation and intervention in the Cambodian genocide.
Several representatives made speeches about the Cambodian genocide.
Representative John Ashcroft (R-OH) was disgusted by the dearth of information about
the Cambodian genocide as covered by the “liberal media.” Senator Alan Cranston (DCA) was also critical of U.S. policy in Cambodia and credited the reports that came out
about the thousands of deaths in Cambodia. Despite the fact that journalists were barred
from entering Cambodia in 1976, representatives like John P. Murtha (D-PA), Claiborne
Pell (D-RI), and others spoke out public against the KR regime.59 Stories published about
the genocide largely decreased after the civil war. In 1976, only 126 articles were
published within two papers. In 1977, 118 were published. There was little information
on televised news. Francois Ponchaud, a priest from France, evacuated the French
embassy in 1975 but continued to cover the story from the Thai border in the French
newspaper Le Monde. He translated refugee accounts and Cambodian radio reports and
57
Power, A Problem From Hell, 123.
Ibid., 127.
59
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” 248.
58
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was one of the first persons to share firsthand accounts that were from a foreigner, which
had a greater affect on the public. American citizens read Ponchaud’s stories and some
asked President Ford to speak out about the horrors.60 When Jimmy Carter took office in
1977, U.S. policy of non-condemnation and non-interventionism continued.
The Carter Administration’s Response and Congressional Hearings: 1977-1979
Carter ran for president in 1976 on a human rights platform and stated that
situations like Cambodia and Vietnam would not occur again. Yet when he became
president in January 1977, Carter did not follow through on the promises he had made
about Cambodia.61 He only condemned the situation after Congressional Hearings. In
May 1977, Stephan Solarz (D-NY) succeeded in generating a discussion about the
Cambodian genocide by organizing a hearing at the Subcommittee on International
Organization of the House of International Affairs Committee. Solarz and historian David
Chandler believed that a “bloodbath” was occurring in DK. Chandler emphasized the
important role that the U.S. played during the civil war, which he believed helped
motivate the genocide in Cambodia.62 Four witnesses (including Chandler) discussed the
situation. All four witnesses agreed that humanitarian aid was needed but did not have
any suggestions on how to change the situation in Cambodia. 63 Yet possible solutions
existed: confronting and/or condemning the KR publicly, talking to China about their
support to the KR, enforcing an embargo on arms trades with Cambodia, imposing
economic sanctions on Cambodia and/or its supporters, and/or armed intervention.
60
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” 248-9; Power, A Problem from Hell, 121.
Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodia Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard, 80.
62
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 53.
63
U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on International Organization, 3.
61
Sullivan 17
Donald Fraser (D-MN), who had been one of the most vocal human rights
advocates for Cambodia, was greatly frustrated by the inability of the witnesses to come
up with a solution.64 In June, the committee again heard from Twining and Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke about the DK
human rights violations that they had been documenting.65 In response, the committee
passed a resolution protesting the KR’s brutality and urged the Carter administration to
take action to end the human rights violations in Cambodia.66 Carter’s first denunciation
of the Cambodian genocide occurred shortly after in April 1978, when he stated that the
KR was, “the worst violator of human rights in the world today.”67 The Congressional
hearings may have influenced his decision to make this statement. Although he
condemned the KR, he did not take any action to stop the genocide.
Carter’s first (yet late) acknowledgment of the human rights abuses did not
precipitate a change in U.S. policy with regard to intervention or condemnation. Activism
and condemnation by human rights advocates and government representatives continued
and increased after Carter’s statement and in response to his inaction. The United People
for Human Rights in Cambodia protested and fasted outside of the White House in June
of 1978 regarding the genocide. By October 1978, Senator George McGovern (D-SD)
and William Buckley Jr. banded together to rally support from fellow senators to sign
onto a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance urging him to support international action
to stop the Cambodian genocide. McGovern and Buckley obtained eighty senators’
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” 250-1; U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Organization, 14.
65
Ibid., 251; Ibid, 15, 24.
66
Ibid., 251; Ibid.
67
Bangor Daily News, “Carter flays Cambodia for human rights violations,” Bangor Daily News, April 21,
1978, 37.
64
Sullivan 18
signatures onto the letter. A 667-page report on the atrocities was released that included
refugee testimonies.68 Yet the increase in public outrage was delayed and came three
years after the start of the genocide and only months before the genocide ended in 1979.
China’s Role in the Cambodian Genocide and U.S. Response
In 1978, the U.S. attempted to establish diplomatic relations with China. At the
same time (from April to October), an NSC report was released that included updates on
the mass atrocities taking place in Cambodia and recommended taking action. Congress
had just passed the Dole-Solarz bill that allowed 15,000 Cambodian refugees from
Thailand into the U.S. Representatives like McGovern advocated for armed intervention
and insisted that condemning the KR be brought up with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC).69 Others, like Twining, believed that even the Chinese could not influence the
KR’s behavior.70 Eighteen representatives demanded that Carter make Cambodia a part
of the bilateral negotiations with China. Assistant Secretary of State Douglas J. Bennet
replied it would be a “serious mistake” that would, “seriously complicate this process
without significant positive impact on the situation in Cambodia.”71 Therefore, the U.S.
government did not confront China about Cambodia.
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was the main advocate for
normalizing the U.S. relationship with China. Brzezinski continued the policy of noncondemnation of the KR when negotiating with the PRC, despite the fact that the PRC
was the main military, economic, and political backer of the KR government. The
disconsensus between Brzezinski and Carter’s opinions about the bilateral negotiations
68
Power, A Problem From Hell, 131-136.
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” 252-3; U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Organization,17-18.
70
Ibid., 251; Ibid, 15, 24.
71
Ibid., 254; Bennet to James M. Hanley et. al, 17 August 1978, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40, Carter Papers.
69
Sullivan 19
with China was documented through confidential papers and not revealed to the public.72
Therefore, the public did not see the disagreement between them, which could have led to
a reassessment of the way the public viewed U.S. policy. If any of the U.S. officials
disagreed on the U.S. response to the Cambodian genocide, the disconsensus could have
caused the public to question the government’s policies.73 Yet the officials appeared to be
in agreement. Jeopardizing the U.S.’s burgeoning relationship with China was to be
avoided at all costs. All three administrations made clear geopolitical calculations of what
was more important: ending the Cambodian genocide or expanding U.S. power (by
avoiding intervention, which could led to humiliation and economic/military costs as well
as the endangering the U.S. alliances with China and Thailand).
During December of 1977, Pol Pot led numerous attacks on the CambodianVietnam border. Although the Soviet Union had previously restricted investigations into
the human rights atrocities in Cambodia due to its partnership with the KR, the Soviet
Union changed their policy after Cambodian attacks on the Vietnam border. Vietnam
began to document the KR massacres and increased their security on the border.74 At the
same time, the KR took measures to improve their public image in 1978 along with the
support of China; Chinese leaders started a public relations campaign and produced
propaganda films that showed the KR in a positive light. Foreigners were also welcomed
back into the country.75 The Chinese did this because they wanted to avoid condemnation
from the international community because of the PRC’s support of the KR. In order to do
this, the PRC led a campaign to make it appear as though the genocide never occurred.
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” 255.
For more on consensus effects on American public opinion (in Somalia and Bosnia), see: Jon Western,
“Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on
Somalia and Bosnia,” International Security, Vol. 27, no. 1 (July/August 1999).
74
John Sharkey, “Vietnam, Cambodia Exchange Bitter Charges,” Washington Post, January 1, 1978.
75
Power, A Problem From Hell, 136-7.
72
73
Sullivan 20
The KR encouraged Asian and European countries to travel to Cambodia (in
selective locations where genocide would not be witnessed). Elizabeth Becker, the
correspondent in Cambodia for The Washington Post, and other reporters were allowed to
interview Pol Pot. Yet the reporters were constricted to certain areas of Cambodia so that
the story would be framed the way that the KR wanted it to be (as a non-genocidal
regime). Malcolm Caldwell, one of the journalists that came with Becker and who
believed that the KR was committing genocide, was murdered by the KR during his
stay.76 Almost every journalist that was discovered in the restricted press areas by the KR
was killed or tortured during the genocide (as was done during the civil war).77 The KR
eliminated critical access to press coverage. Although the death of foreigners and
journalists often receive special attention from the international community and the
country of origin, the death of Caldwell did not draw mass attention to the genocide nor
did it prompt a change in the international community or U.S.’s policy towards the KR.
The End of the Genocide
The genocide in Cambodia ended when Vietnam intervened unilaterally. On
January 8, 1978, Vietnam announced that it had successfully captured Phnom Penh. In
October of 1978, Vietnam charged that the KR had killed over two million Cambodians
and by the second week of January in 1979, Cambodia was completely under Vietnamese
control.78 The Vietnamese installed Heng Samrin as the prime minister for the People’s
Republic of Kampuchea. Although the Vietnamese may not have been solely motivated
by humanitarian intentions and may have acted to extend their sphere of power, the
action nonetheless stopped the genocide. The U.S. responded, once again, in favor of the
76
Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 55; Power, A Problem from Hell, 137-40.
Ibid., 37, Ibid.
78
Ibid., 61; Ibid, 147.
77
Sullivan 21
KR. Bringing up the genocide in Cambodia during the bilateral negotiations with China
in 1978 was deemed inappropriate, yet Carter brought up Vietnam’s intervention (which
he characterized as an invasion) when he met with Chinese Vice Chairman Deng Xioping
in January of 1970. The Chinese responded by sending 170,000 troops and many combat
aircrafts to invade Vietnam on February 16, 1979.79 The Carter administration framed
Vietnam’s intervention as an invasion to the U.S. public in order to gain support for his
policy of returning the KR to power. Carter did not take into account the repercussions
that would occur if the Vietnamese left.
U.S. Relief Efforts and Post-Genocide Cambodia
On February 22, 1979, Solarz and eight other members of Congress wrote to
Carter stating that the “genocidal Pol Pot regime” would come to power again in Phnom
Penh if the Vietnamese left, which would once again create regional instability.80 The
Carter administration did little in response. The administration claimed that it would find
a solution and listed Cambodia as a possible talking point with China. Yet there was no
concerted effort made to change the situation in Cambodia. The forced withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia was again mentioned to the House Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs without mention of its repercussions.81 The Carter
administration’s goal was to get the Vietnamese to leave Cambodia, yet this would have
serious repressions to the KR’s victims. As efforts to get the Vietnamese to leave
Cambodia continued, 45,000 refugees in Thailand were forced to return to Cambodia,
who faced great violence upon reentry. The U.S. did not condemn the KR, blaming the
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Democracy,” 256.
Ibid., 258; Solarz et. al to Carter, 22 February 1979, WHCF: Subject File: National Security and Defense,
Box ND-47, Folder “Executive ND 16/CO-172, 1/1/78-4/30/79,” Carter Papers.
81
Ibid., 258-9; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Legislation for
Fiscal Years 1980-1981, part 4, Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 27 February 1979, 69, 96-7.
79
80
Sullivan 22
situation instead on the Vietnamese troops. Many Cambodians and refugees were
starving.82 The public pushed for further action in Cambodia.
The public’s outrage in response to lack of relief efforts influenced Carter’s
policies as reelections drew closer in 1980. This shows that the public can influence U.S.
policy when provided with information on the subject. Carter was forced to respond to
the public outcry from citizens and representatives like Senator Edward Kennedy (DMA). Seven million dollars were given to the Commission on World Hunger and an
additional $3 million to the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In total, $30 million was given to
Cambodian relief with another $9 million to the Catholic Relief Services and UN
programs for refugees in Thailand. An additional $30 million was also given after
Senator C. Danforth (R-MO) testified before Congress about what he had witnessed in
Phnom Penh. At the same time, the Carter administration was secretly supporting
(politically and financially with a total of $85 million) the Chinese and Thai military
assistance to the KR long before 1980.83 Relief efforts to help the victims were
supported; intervening to stop the problem that it originated from was not. Carter again
demonstrated that geopolitics surpassed the importance of genocide and human rights.
During the genocide, the KR continued to have a seat in the UN. The UN did little
to stop the genocide and saw the problem as consisting solely of the Vietnamese
occupation, not the KR.84 The UN General Assembly refused to allow the Cambodian
Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Democracy,”259; Marjoleine Zieck, UNHCR and Voluntary
Repatriation of Refugees: a Legal Analysis (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997), 147.
83
Ibid., 260-3 and 276; John Pilger, “The Long Secret Alliance: Uncle Sam and Pol Pot,” Covert Action
Quarterly No. 62, Fall 1997, 1.
84
Benny Widyono, ed. Dancing in the Shadows (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, inc., 2008),
xxviii.
82
Sullivan 23
“puppet regime” installed by the Vietnamese to have a seat at the UN.85 Thus, the KR
continued to hold a seat at the UN under a joint coalition in 1982 until the U.S. voted
against the KR coalition in 1990. The KR flag continued to fly outside the UN.86 In
addition to giving legitimacy to the genocidal regime, the UN also pardoned the KR.
The UN and its member states never used the word genocide to describe the KR’s
actions. The investigation into the situation in Cambodia was released in a report in 1985,
which concluded that it was not genocide, although it was the worst thing to have
happened since the Holocaust. U.S. officials did not consult the Genocide Convention* to
see if it fit the atrocities in Cambodia.87 The Paris peace accords (the agreement that
ended the war in Vietnam) and the Paris Peace Agreements (which specified the duties of
the United Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC, in 1991) did not include the
words genocide either, but instead, “the universally condemned policies and practices of
the past.”88 Although Cambodia had ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, the KR
was not held accountable to the convention it had signed. Gregory H. Stanton writes that
the evidence is clear that the KR intended to destroy a group (such as the Cham, Buddhist
monks, Vietnamese, Chinese, American lackeys, and other foreigners or foreigner
sympathists) in whole and in part.89 Thus, the evidence that Stanton and others have
collected proves that the KR committed genocide.
What Can Be Done in the Future?
85
MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers: 1979-1998 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998), vii.
86
Power, A Problem From Hell, 154.
87
Ibid., 153-4 and 122. *See notes for the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention.
88
Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers: 1979-1998, 86.
89
Gregory H. Stanton, “The Cambodian Genocide and International Law,” in Genocide and Democracy in
Cambodia, ed. Ben Kiernan, (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993),143-2.
Sullivan 24
Genocide can be prevented. In the situation of Cambodia, there were numerous
signs that indicated that genocide might occur. Past genocides have often been preceded
by oppression, years of interstate and/or civil war, nationalism, and racial hierarchies that
support ethnic hatred (often as a result of colonial policy). There is a common pattern of
the way in which the U.S. responds to genocide and the conflict that leads up to it. The
U.S. frames the suspect country in a way that supports non-interventionism. In the case of
Cambodia, refugee accounts were discounted as inaccurate, as the situation being
unsolvable, or as supporting anti-communist propaganda. Other genocides like those in
Rwanda, Bosnia, or Darfur have been framed as being irreconcilable because of the
ancient ethnic hatred between the groups involved. The history of the conflict leading up
to the genocide is purposely overlooked it would reveal that genocide is in fact
preventable and often occurs out of a postcolonial, oppressive, or imperialistic context.
The genocide in Cambodia could have been prevented. The Responsibility to
Protect doctrine changes the discussion of humanitarian intervention from the question of
state sovereignty to a responsibility to protect the citizens whose state is unable to or
unwilling to do so. There are three main strategies to deter genocide and violent ethnic
conflict. First, and most ideal, is prevention. The Nixon administration had the
intelligence that indicated that genocide might occur and could have used their
involvement in Cambodia to prevent the genocide through previously mentioned methods
(e.g., diplomatic, economic, and/or political means) to prevent the genocide. The second
responsibility is to react. The Ford and Carter administrations failed to do this as well and
did not employ the available measures that could have stopped the genocide. Multilateral
military intervention should be considered a last resort, which is why prevention is
essential. Carter could have responded militarily (through a UN peacekeeping mandate)
Sullivan 25
to end the genocide like the Vietnamese did. The third obligation is to rebuild.90 Although
the UN and U.S. were involved in rebuilding Cambodia through programs like the
UNTAC from early 1992 to late 1993,91 it did not include the most essential component
of rebuilding: recognition of the genocide and accountability.
Conclusion
The U.S. played a significant role the Cambodian civil war, which influenced the
KR’s motivation to commit “revenge” genocide. Yet U.S. policy towards the Cambodian
genocide consisted of non-acknowledgement, non-condemnation of the KR, and not
engaging in conversation or action that could have led to the dismantling of the genocidal
regime. The U.S. was able to follow these policies because of three critical factors: the
U.S. governments domination over intelligence (which enabled the government to frame
the situation as not being genocide), the lack of evidence and information (e.g., absence
of firsthand accounts and press access), and the way in which the Cold War political
environment shaped the opinions of humanitarian activists. Revisionist historian Kenneth
Clymer states that “by not linking the two issues [China’s relationship with Cambodia],
American policy appeared to be based purely on realpolitik calculations and, in
particular, a desire to play the China card in the strategic battle with the Soviet Union.”92
The Ford and Carter administrations did not employ this strategy (one of many) that
could have potentially led to the end of the Cambodian genocide. As Samantha Power
notes, “For neither the first nor the last time, geopolitics trumped genocide.”93
Evans, Gareth, Sahnoun, and Mohamed, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2002,
81(6), 99-101.
91
Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers: 1979-1998, 60.
92
Ibid., 254-5.
93
Power, A Problem From Hell, 142.
90
Sullivan 26
Notes
Article II of the Genocide Convention: In the present Convention, genocide means
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
i
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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