TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THOMAS KUHN:
REVOLUTION, PARADIGM, AND CONVERSION
On occasions in history certain books have come to the forefront on a popular level to
evoke radical change in society with the popularizing of an idea. The writings of Martin Luther
in German, the language of the people, including a German translation of the Bible, set flames to
the Reformation. John Calvin’s Institutes, originally written in French for the people, had the
same effect. The writings of Marx and Engels set in motion a whole movement for social
transformation that now shapes three-fourths of the world. The works of certain men in the
scientific community have also had a phenomenal effect on man’s understanding of himself, his
world, and his universe.
One book that has come to the forefront as an attempt to explain the radical
transformations in science is Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. While this
book is somewhat controversial within and without the scientific community it is an attempt to
analyze parallel movements that lead to the radical shift in the way men understand the universe
and a radical shift in the scientific enterprise.
In trying to gain an understanding of Kuhn’s book, this writer could not help but see
Kuhn as a keen student of the scientific community much like Alex de Tocqueville was a student
of social science.
As a serious student of the conditions necessary for revolution, Tocqueville tried in the
late 1840s to warn the governing powers in France about the possibility of overthrow.
He was convinced that the government and the Court had so offended the people that
democratic passions would soon overturn the government. On January 27, 1848,
Tocqueville, a deputy, rose in the Chamber of Deputies. “They tell me that there is no
danger because there are no disturbances,” he said. “They say that as there is no visible
perturbation on the surface of society, there are no revolutions beneath it. Gentlemen,
allow me to say that I think you are wrong. Disturbance is not abroad but it has laid hold
of men’s minds.” Within four weeks the people revolted, the king fled, and the Second
Republic was proclaimed. (Ferguson, The Aquarian Conspiracy, p. 37)
What Tocqueville understood about social science Kuhn is attempting to understand
about the physical science (and resulting sciences). As this paper attempts to move toward an
understanding of Kuhn’s book, rather than analyzing its content, there are two broad ideas that
must come under scrutiny: revolution and paradigm. Without attempting to offer a critique of
Kuhn’s book, this paper now moves to gain an understanding of these two concepts.
I. Toward Understanding Revolution
One basic problem that must be approached in understanding Kuhn’s analysis is arriving
at an understanding and definition of the term “revolution.” After one comes to an understanding
of this concept then one can seek an understanding of how Kuhn uses the term in reference to his
analysis of the history and development of science.
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A. A History of Change
The term “revolution” whether in English, Latin, or other languages) has gone through
the process of slow change and transformation. And, if one is not careful, it is easy to get lost in
the ambiguous definitions of the term. A history of the development and changes in meaning is
necessary. Unfortunately, this is lacking in Kuhn’s analysis. However, such an historical
account does exist in the writings of researchers of like concern with Kuhn. See for example, I.
Bernard Cohen’s book, Revolution in Science, section IV, pages 197-269. This book gives a
thorough examination of the development of the term from its ambiguous beginnings, until it
come to mean, in this writer’s words, a radical discontinuity and change. It is in this vein that
“scientific revolution” becomes used in Kuhn’s work. See also The Journal of the History of
Ideas, vol. 37, 1976, an article by I.B. Cohen entitled, “Eighteenth Century Origins of the
Concept of Scientific Revolution” (pp. 257-288). Here Cohen reasons that it was d’Alembert
and Diderot who were chiefly responsible for the popularization of the interpretation of the
history of science in terms of revolution.
Stanley L. Jaki criticizes Kuhn’s thesis and use of paradigm and revolution as a sort of
historicism. He reminds his readers that Kuhn’s critics “paid less attention to the lack of rigor in
Kuhn’s use of the word revolution which played an equally important role in his theory” (The
Road of Science and the Ways of God, p. 273). And, while Jaki does not fully develop his
criticism along these lines, he does serve to remind Kuhn’s readers that an understanding of
Kuhn’s use of “revolution” must be understood before one can comprehend Kuhn’s thesis. In
fact, the use of “revolution” as a principle of radical discontinuity of one science for change into
another understanding of science lies at the foundation of Kuhn’s book. Jaki says again, “He had
hardly passed the midpoint of his book when he declared that its remainder served to
demonstrate the striking similarity of paradigm changes to political crises resolved by
revolutions” (The Road to Science, p. 237). Kuhn believes that scientific change (revolution)
occurs in parallel fashion to political change (revolution). He seeks to demonstrate this as fact
through the second half of his book. This is how one can determine whether a revolution has
actually occurred in science—the “assumption” of revolution.
B. The “Assumption” of Revolution
Kuhn seeks to defend his position that science changes in a revolutionary fashion
rather than in an evolutionary fashion by paralleling political and scientific change. “In the face
of the vast and essential differences between political and scientific development, what
parallelism can justify the metaphor that finds revolutions in both?” (Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, p. 92) Kuhn then moves to define two parallels.
1. Stagnate institutions replaced by new ones in keeping with current need.
2. This change always goes radically against the structure of the first institution.
Kuhn develops the first parallel as follows:
One aspect of the parallelism must already be apparent. Political revolutions are
inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community,
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that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an
environment that they have in part created. In much the same way, scientific revolutions
are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the
scientific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the
exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the
way. In both political and scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead
to crisis is prerequisite to revolution (p. 92).
The second parallel has to do with the crisis that comes to exist either in the political life
of a nation, or the scientific understanding of the scientific community. This crisis leads to those
defending the older institution and those defending the new institution, or way of doing things.
“Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that those institutions
themselves prohibit” (p. 93). Kuhn and his supporters look to the actual development of science
to defend this position of revolution over evolution. A few examples will serve to illustrate this.
C. Historical Examples
Alexandre Koyre’s work, The Astronomical Revolution, is one example of using
Kuhn’s thesis as a framework to understand the radical shift from the Ptolemaic understanding of
the universe to the Copernican model, and to the latest model. Copernicus represents a radical
break from earlier views of astronomy, even though Copernicus’ understanding and method did
not radically differ from that of Ptolemy (and was later replaced). In fact, Koyre begins his book
with a section entitled “Copernicus and the Cosmic Overthrow.” He then goes on to establish
the leaders of the radical discontinuity of the Ptolemaic system in favor of the Copernican
change, men such as Kepler, Borelli, Tycho Brahe, and others. The impact of this new
understanding of the universe had a revolutionary impact on Western society.
History has provided man with other examples of this radical shift from one
understanding to another. A revolution in scientific understanding was caused by Newton in
mathematics with the invention of calculus, and the application of mathematics to physics and
astronomy. A biological revolution was instigated by Vesalius, Paracelsus, and Harvey as they
moved to replace the Galenic doctrines of understanding the human body.
Without going into detail, this writer refers the reader to Cohen’s book, Revolution in
Science, to gain an understanding of the revolutionary ideas of men like Darwin, Freud, and
Albert Einstein, who along with many others evoked a revolution in their respective sciences.
But just as important to understanding Kuhn as a discussion of “revolution” is a
discussion of “paradigm” must be taken up. This discussion will serve to further clarify Kuhn’s
thesis. With that in mind, this paper now turns to a discussion to help move toward
understanding paradigm.
II. Toward Understanding Paradigm
Perhaps the most misunderstood concept underlying Kuhn’s work on scientific
revolutions is his use of the term “paradigm.” This is a concept that he has come increasingly
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under attack concerning. Indeed, Kuhn has sought to defend himself from many of his critics by
writing further on the concept. Still it is a concept that is difficult to understand. First, then, one
must search for a definition of the term.
A. Searching for a Definition
Attempting to define “paradigm” is a difficult process. Kuhn uses the term in a number
of different ways in his book. Margaret Masterman, in Lakatos and Musgrave’s Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge, attempts to identify the various categories of meaning that Kuhn
gives to the term in her essay “The Nature of Paradigm.” Masterman says, “On my counting, he
uses ‘paradigm’ in not less than twenty-one different senses in his 1962 edition, possibly more,
not less.” (p. 61) Here is Masterman’s list of Kuhn’s twenty-one senses of paradigm:
(1) As an universally recognized scientific achievement (p. x);
(2) As a myth (p. 2);
(3) As a ‘philosophy’, or constellation of questions (pp. 4-5);
(4) As a textbook, or classic work (p. 10);
(5) As a whole tradition, and in some sense, as a model (pp. 10-11);
(6) As a scientific achievement (p. 11);
(7) As an analogy (p. 14);
(8) As a successful metaphysical speculation (pp. 17-18);
(9) As an accepted device in common law (p. 23);
(10) As a source of tools (p. 37);
(11) As a standard illustration (p. 43);
(12) As a device, or type of instrumentation (pp. 59-60);
(13) As an anomalous pack of cards (pp. 62-63);
(14) As a machine-tool factory (p. 76);
(15) As a gestalt figure which can be seen in two ways (p. 85);
(16) As a set of political institutions (p. 92);
(17) As a ‘standard’ applied to quasi-metaphysics (p. 102);
(18) As an organizing principle which can govern perception itself (p. 112);
(19) As a general epistemological viewpoint (p. 120);
(20) As a new way of seeing (p. 121);
(21) As something which defines a broad sweep of reality (p. 128).
While one may see some of these uses as being a bit trite, they nevertheless illustrate the
necessity of coming to an understanding of Kuhn’s uses of paradigm. What does he mean by the
term? Masterman goes on to put these twenty-one differing uses of the term into three broad
categories:
(1) Metaphysical paradigms—equaling those sues in which Kuhn “equates ‘paradigm’
with a set of beliefs” as a metaphysical notion or entity, rather than a scientific one.
(2) Sociological paradigms—when used in a sociological sense, i.e., as a universally
recognized scientific achievement (p. x).
(3) Construct paradigms—when the term is used in a more concrete way, such as an
actual textbook or classic work (p. 10).
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The rest of Masterman’s paper is an attempt to coming to an understanding of the uses of
“paradigm” in these three contexts. Obviously this varied use of the term by Kuhn has led to
much criticism, and rightfully so. Jaki, for example, says, “While Kuhn himself admitted that he
used the word as a substitute for ‘a variety of familiar notions,’ minor consternation was felt
when it was pointed out that he had attached to the word at least twenty-one different meanings
within the covers of a not very long book.” (The Road of Science, p. 273)
Masterman concludes her analysis of Kuhn’s use of paradigm by giving it the following
guidelines:
I wish to say that a paradigm draws a ‘crude analogy’; and further to define a crude
analogy as an analogy which has the following logical characteristics:
(a) a crude analogy is finite in extensibility.
(b) it is incomparable with any other crude analogy.
(c) it is extensible only by an inferential process of ‘replication’, which can be
examined by using the computer-programming technique of ‘inexact matching’,
but not by the normal methods of examining inference (p. 79).
If this writer may oversimplify the discussion, it seems to him that “paradigm” is the
structural standard upon which a given group of people (i.e., scientists/theologians/governments)
bases their actions and concerns. Kuhn openly acknowledges the vagueness of the term in his
paper “Reflections on my critics,” (Lakatos and Musgrave, pp. 231-278) and in his Postscript to
the second edition of Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In his Postscript he says, “A paradigm
is what a scientific community shares, and conversely, a scientific community consists of men
who share a paradigm” (p. 176). In this sense a paradigm becomes an unwritten structure that
sets off a group of people in their understanding.
In attempting to move toward understanding Kuhn and paradigm, revolution comes again
into play as that thing which causes a shift from one paradigm (way of doing things?) for another
paradigm. Cohen has attempted to define what brings about a revolution in science and thus a
shift in paradigm.
B. Paradigm Shift
Kuhn, Postscript to 2nd edition: "A paradigm is what a scientific community share, and,
conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm" (p. 176). A paradigm
defines those who share a common belief or disciplines (his "disciplinary matrix" and "shared
commitments.").
Kuhn's thesis is that science progresses not through evolutionary development or a
gradual growth, but through a revolutionary displacement of one paradigm for another. Scientific
revolution is a paradigm shift.
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Cohen attempts to give four tests in which one can determine whether a scientific
revolution, or paradigm shift has occurred. First, Cohen describes Kuhn’s understanding in this
way: “Kuhn’s characterization (1962) of a revolution in science as a shift in ‘paradigms’ (to use
his original language) that arises when a series of ‘anomalies’ has produced a ‘crisis’ helps us in
our attempt to formulate a definition and test.” (Revolution in Science, p. 40) Cohen sees the
process of revolution or paradigm shift as moving from anomaly to crisis to a new paradigm.
His four tests are given as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The testimony of witnesses: the judgment of scientists and nonscientists of that time.
An examination of later documentary history of the subject.
The judgment of competent historians, notably historians of science and philosophy.
The general opinion of working scientists in the field today. (pp. 41-44)
Though Cohen’s analysis differs slightly from Kuhn’s, it still gives the reader criteria for
judging historical events which have been considered revolutionary in the history of science.
The accumulation of anomalies forces the “normal science” (to use Kuhn’s words) into a crisis,
for this crisis resolution is only found in a revolution, a paradigm shift, to a new model of
understanding and doing science.
III. Paradigmatic Shift and Conversion
Perhaps the earliest instance of connection between modern scientific endeavor and the
rather religious concept of 'conversion' is found at the onset of the Copernican astronomy: "In
1596, in the original preface to The Secret of The Universe (1981,63), Kepler described the
stages of his conversion to the Copernican astronomy" (Cohen, p. 10). Kepler also wrote of his
"duty" to "attest to" and to "publicly defend" the new astronomy. Even earlier than this, however,
had the Latin noun, 'revolution', come to have "the sense of 'conversion' in classical Latin" by
Martianus Capella as (1) "the courses of sidereal revolution" and by Augustine as -(2)
"revolutions through different bodies" (Cohen, p. 56). And, more recently, we find J. Tuzo
Wilson announcing revolution within the earth sciences after his conversion to the theory of
continental drift (Cohen, p. 464).
Thomas Kuhn, in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, discusses "an irreversible
'gestalt switch,' and a 'conversion experience'" (Cohen, p. 468). We are provided a variety of
examples of such occurrences:
(1) Joseph Priestly in reference to the conversion of the Scots to Lavoisier's chemistry (1796).
(2) "Two centuries later, the physicist A. Pais (1982, 150) used the same language in relation to
the new physic.
(3) And J. Tuzo Wilson has already been mentioned (Cohen, 468).
(4) Huxley in reference to Darwin's work (Cohen, p. 469).
(5) Darwin with reference to his own work (Cohen, p. 469f).
(6) J. J. Thomson "wrote about how difficult it was to convince himself that atoms are
composite" (Cohen, p. 470).
We even have Cannizzaro's allusion to Acts 8.11 in explanation of his conversion.
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Kuhn defines "paradigm" in two senses: as sociological and as exemplary past
achievements (Kuhn, p. 175). The sociological refers to the set of "group commitments" (181) to
definition (184) or concrete problem solutions by which we learn the paradigm. Exemplary past
achievements refer to paradigms as shared examples (187) i.e., "acquired similarity relations"
(189) which serve as reference points. Foundational to any paradigm, Kuhn insists, is "tacit
knowledge and intuition" (191 ff), but this is not merely individual or unanalyzable. An example
of such knowledge is that "the world changes" (192). That there is such knowledge tends to be
verified by its transmission by education, that it has been found more effective than anything
else, and that it is subject to change both through education and through discovery of misfits with
the environment (196). Conversion occurs when two incommensurable theories are debated and,
simplistically put, one is falsified followed by concession and conversion by the proponent of
this theory to the other (198,99).
Selective Bibliography
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Kuhn, T. The Copernican Revolution. Harvard University Pres, 1957.
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7
A Select Bibliography: Problems in Epistemology
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Bouillard, Henri. The Knowledge of God. NY: Herder and Herder, 1968.
Bradley, Denis. “Transcendental Critique and Realist Metaphysics”. The Thomist 39 (1975):
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Buber, Martin. The Knowledge of Man. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965.
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Cassirer, Ernst. The Problem of Knowledge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
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Gilson, Etienne. Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge. San Francisco: Ignatius
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McCarthy, Harold E. “Knowledge Skepticism and the Individual”. Philosophy East and West
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McKelvey, Charles. “Christian Epistemology and Social Scientific Method: Bernard
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McNicholl, A.J. “Epistemology and Metaphysics”. Angelicum 38 (1961): 200-212.
McRae, Robert. The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences: Bacon to Kant. University of
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Matilal, Bimal Krishma. Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in India. Mouton: The Hague,
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Mayor, Robert J.G. Reason and Common Sense. London: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1952.
Milavec, Donald A. “The Bible as Inspiring and Authorizing Incompatible Doctrines and
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Whitehead, Alfred North. The Function of Reason. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958.
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Stanley L. Jaki Bibliography
The Relevance of Physics. University of Chicago Press, 1966.
Brain, Mind and Computers. South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions, 1969.
The Paradox of Olbers’ Paradox. Herder and Herder, 1969.
The Milky Way: An Elusive Road for Science. Science History Pubs., 1972.
Science and Creation: From Eternal Cycles to an Oscillating Universe. Scottish Academic Press;
Science History Publications, 1974.
Planets and Planetarians: A History of Theories of the Origin of Planetary Systems. Scottish
Academic Press; John Wiley, 1978.
The Road of Science and the Ways to God. University of Chicago Press, 1978. This is Dr.
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The Origin of Science and the Science of Its Origin. Gateway Editions, 1978, Fremantle
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Cosmos and Creator. Scottish Academic Press, 1980.
Angels, Apes and Men. LaSalle, IL: Sherwood Sugden, soon to be published.
9
Translations with Introduction and Notes:
Giordano Bruno, The Ash Wednesday Supper, Mouton, 1975.
J.H. Lambert, Cosmological Letters on the Arrangement of the World Edifice, Science History
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Major Essays
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10
Cohen, J. Bernard. Revolution in Science. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985.
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Riordan, M. and D. Schramm. The Shadows of Creation: Dark Matter and the Structure of the
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