What do we mean by “political opposition”: a theoretical perspective
Nathalie Brack and Sharon Weinblum
Introduction
As Schapiro put it in one of his famous works, “it is perhaps too obvious to require
stating that the process of government must be studied not only in the light of what those with
power under their control try to do and actually achieve; but also with regard to those who
oppose those aims, or whose interests and resistance have to be conciliated before those in
power can act”1. Indeed, one of the fundamental bases for the development of democracy is
the recognition of rights for political and social actors to publicly criticize and challenge the
government, its actions and policies2. In this perspective, whoever is interested in studying
democracy is compelled to tackle, in a way or another, the question of political opposition
which one of the greatest political theorists of our times has defined as the first axis
constituting polyarchies, alongside the inclusion/participation axis3.
It is thus not surprising that the topic has drawn the attention of many scholars who have
tackled the question from different perspectives. The first important branch of the literature to
which Robert Dahl greatly contributed has concentrated on the function of opposition in
democratic regimes and has been interested in the different forms opposition could take in
democratic states4. Trying to understand the development of political opposition, comparatist
politists have also dealt with the factors explaining the emergence, institutionalization and
decline of opposition in both democratic and non-democratic regimes5. Relating to this
literature, an important number of studies have also focused on opposition in non-democratic
SCHAPIRO L., “Foreword” in Government and Opposition, vol.1, n°1, 1966, p.2.
HELMS L., “Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues and Perspectives”, The
Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 14, n°1, 2008, pp. 6-19.
3
DAHL, R.A. Polyarchies: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971.
4
Ibid. ; DAHL, R.A., (dir.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, CT, Yale University
Press, 1966 ; BLONDEL J., “Political Opposition in the Contemporary World”, Government and Opposition,
vol. 32, n°4, 1997, pp. 462-486 ; HELMS L., op.cit., 2008.
5
See DAHL R.A. (dir.), op.cit., 1966; SARTORI G., “Opposition and Control Problems and Prospects”,
Government and Opposition, vol.1, n°1, 1966, pp.149-154 ; HELMS L., “Five Ways of Institutionalizing
Political Opposition: Lessons from the Advances Democracies”, Government and Opposition, vol., 39 n°1,
2004, pp.22-54; MUTALIB H., “Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in Singapore”, Third World
Quarterly, vol.21, n°2, 2000, pp.313-342; CARBONE G., “Political Party in a ‘No-Party Democracy’ :
Hegemony and Opposition Under Movement Democracy in Uganda”, Party Politics, vol. 9, n°4, 2003, pp. 485501; BARBER J., “Opposition in Russia”, Government and Opposition, vol. 32, n°4, 1997, pp.598-613.
1
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1
and non-competitive regimes6 and on its role in the democratization process7. Besides, many
scholars, amongst which Dahl himself, have been interested in the structural elements
affecting the opposition’s modalities of action in the parliament and its relations with the
majority in power8. Finally, and usually starting from a different theoretical perspective and
interests, different scholars have concentrated on extra-parliamentary opposition and more
specifically on social mobilization and the role of civil society9.
However, despite the very wide range of studies that have dealt with the notion of opposition,
it also appears very strikingly that, since the seminal works of Dahl, Ionescu and de
Madariaga and Schapiro in the late sixties and early seventies 10, political opposition has
generally “been studied within a larger framework: as a co-subject, usually included in the
study of power, government, parliaments, parties, social movements”11. Thus, most
surprisingly, 40 years later, the remark of Ionescu and de Madariaga still holds true: “very
few works have ever dealt with [opposition] specifically and exclusively” 12. This lack of
studies is even more blatant when it comes to theoretical contribution13. Except from the
theoretical chapters of Blondel and Helms14, most of the works on opposition have indeed
been case studies lacking theoretical inference and Dahl and Ionescu’s works remains the
See SCHAPIRO L., “Putting the lid on Leninism. Opposition and dissent in the communist one-party states.”
Government and Opposition vol.2, n°2, 1967 and SCHAPIRO L. (dir.), Political Opposition in one-party States,
London, Macmillan, 1972; MUTALIB H., op.cit., 2000; CARBONE G., op.cit., 2003; FRANKLIN J., “Political
Party Opposition to Noncompetitive Regimes: A Cross-National Analysis”, Political Research Quarterly, vol.
55, n°3, 2002, pp. 521-546; LECA J., “Opposition in the Middle East and North Africa”, Government and
Opposition, vol. 32, n°4 , 1997, pp. 557-578 ; HLAVACEK P. and HOLZER J., “Opposition in Non-Democratic
Regimes: Notes on Possibilities and Limits of Current Theory”, World Political Science Review, vol.5, n°1,
2009, pp. 1-16.
7
See STEPAN A., “Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory”, Government and Opposition, vol.32,
n°4, 1997, pp. 657-678; SPENCE J.E., “Opposition in South Africa”, Government and Opposition, vol.32, n°4,
2007, pp.522-540.
8
See KERR H.H., “The Structure of Opposition in the Swiss Parliament”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol.3,
n°1,1978, pp. 51-62; JOHNSON, N., “Opposition in the British Political System”, Government and Opposition,
vol.32, n°4, 1997, pp.487-511.; MUJICA A. and SANCHEZ-CUENCA I., “Consensus and Parliamentary
Opposition : the Case of Spain”, Government and Opposition, vol. 41, n° 4, 2006, pp. 86-108.
9
See WEIGLE M.A. and BUTTERFIELD J., “Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The Logic of
Emergence”, Comparative Politics, vol. 25, n°1, 1992, pp. 1-23; KOLINKSY E. (dir.), Opposition in Western
Europe, London, Croom Helm, 1987.
10
DAHL, R. A. (dir.), op.cit., 1966; IONESCU G. and DE MADARIAGA I., Opposition-Past and Present of a
Political Institution, London, The New Thinker Library, 1968; SCHAPIRO L. (dir.), op.cit., 1972.
11
DE GIORIGI, E. “Parliamentary opposition in Western European Democracies today: systemic or issueoriented ? A comparative Study of two Parliamentary systems”, paper presented at the ECPR Joint sessions of
worshops, Helsinki, 7-12 May 2007, p.2.
12
IONESCU G. and DE MADARIAGA I., op.cit.,1968, p. 2
13
Neunreither noted that indeed there have not been many recent attempts to theorize about political opposition.
See NEUNREITHER K., “Governance without opposition: the case of the European Union”, Government and
Opposition, vol. 33, n°4, 1998, p.423
14
BLONDEL J., op.cit., 1997; HELMS L., op.cit., 2008.
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benchmark in comparative studies on the subject15. This observation already constitutes as
such an incentive to reconsider the question from a theoretical perspective.
Secondly, 40 years after these seminal works, the context, in which the opposition had
originally been conceptualized -Western democracies based on strong political parties acting
in a supposedly powerful political arena- has changed in some dramatic ways: the
democratization of ex-authoritarian states; the regionalization of unitarian states; the
development of a supranational structure at the European Union level and the changes that
have occurred both in the relationships between the executive and the legislative
(prezidentialisation of politics, change or decline of the parliament’s roles)16 and in terms of
the roles performed by the parties17 (decline of party membership, decline of the traditional
functions of the political parties, notably through the cartel-party thesis) are all important
elements of change that should push us to new theoretical questioning on opposition.
Finally, as will be seen, most of the studies on opposition have focused on very limited
dimensions of opposition and have used a very specific approach, hence engendering a very
narrow perspective (generally neo-institutionalist) on the question of opposition as well as
very restrictive range of research questions
Starting from these observations, the aim of this paper is to offer a new perspective on
political opposition. In order to do so, the article is structured in two main parts. The first part
of the analysis is a critical state of the art. It reviews the classical and contemporary literature
on opposition in order to highlight their limits. We argue that the literature on opposition has
neglected many dimensions, actors and types of relations due to three main biases: a
normative definition of the opposition and its roles; a restricted definition of the actors seen as
opposition actors; and finally, a narrow definition of the locus of opposition that is usually
It has even led to some studies on the field after the works of Dalh such as PULZER P., “Is there life after
Dahl?” in KOLINKY E. (dir.), op.cit, 1987.
16
See amongst others ANDEWEG R., “Executive-Legislative Relations in the Netherlands: Consecutive and
Coexisting Patterns”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol.7, n°2,1992, pp.161-182; BLONDEL J., Comparative
Legislatures, Englewood Cliff, Prentice Hall, 1973; COPELAND W.G., PATTERSON S.C., Parliaments in
Modern World, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1994; COSTA O., KERROUCHE E. and
MAGNETTE P., Vers un renouveau du parlementarisme en Europe ?, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de
Bruxelles, 2002; LENMAN B.P., The Eclipse of Parliament, London & New York, Edward Arnold, 1992;
LOEWENBERG G., Modern Parliament: Change or Decline, Chicago, Aldine Atherton, 1971; NORTON P.,
Parliaments in Western Europe, London, Frank Cass, 1990.
15
17
See amongst others MULLER-ROMMEL F. (dir.), New Politics in Western Europe: the Rise and Success of
Green Parties and Alternative Lists, London, Westview, 1989; KATZ R. and MAIR P., “Changing Models of
Party Organization and Party Democracy -The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1, n°1, 1995,
pp. 5-28; POGUNTKE T. and WEBB P., The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern
Democracies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
3
studied. In a second part, we seek to provide with a broad definition of opposition and with
new possible research questions.
For different reasons, the article will not cover all the aspects of “opposition” but will rather
focus on the notion of “political opposition”, hence including actors other than political
parties but obviously excluding non-organized actors. Moreover, our aim is not to address the
full question of checks and balances in democracy. Therefore, although some actors might
play an important role as opposition, we will exclude them from the analysis if politics is not
their primary concern or objective, such as the judiciary institutions. Limiting the research
object is indeed a prerequisite if we want to provide with a potential new definition and
reflections on opposition. Moreover, we need to put several limitations on the actors under
scrutiny in order not to incorporate any kind of discontents against the power, be them
privately or publicly expressed, in the category of political opposition.
A. A critical state of the art: rethinking the notion of opposition
The contribution of the classical literature
A study of the classical literature on opposition provides us with a quite nebulous and
extensive definition of opposition. Sometimes assimilated to checks and balances, to
institutionalized conflicts or to minority parties, opposition is not easily defined. Most often,
the notion is used as a relative term, referring to a relationship: “standing in some form of
disagreement to another body”18. And indeed, Dahl defines it in a very simple way: there is
opposition when B is opposed to the conduct of government A19, and Ionescu and de
Madariaga sees it as “logically and morphologically […], the dialectic counterpart of
power”20.
However, besides the very broad and open definition of opposition offered by Dahl, Ionescu
and de Madariaga, a large part of the classical literature has tended to comprehend opposition
in a rather restrictive and normative way.
On the one hand, when studying political opposition in a more empirical way or when
typifying it, classical authors have usually attributed more emphasis to one specific kind of
NORTON P., “Making Sense of Opposition”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 14, n°1, 2008, pp.236250.
19
DAHL R.A. (dir.), op.cit., 1966, p.18.
20
IONESCU G. and DE MADARIAGA I., op.cit, 1968, p.2.
18
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political opposition, namely the parliamentary opposition, which was presented by Ionescu
and de Madariaga themselves as the “most advanced and institutionalized form of political
conflict”21. Thus, for Schapiro, opposition should be defined as “an organized political group,
or groups, of which the aim is to oust the government in power and to replace it by one of its
own choosing”22. In this perspective, political opposition has most often been limited to one
specific arena in the classical literature: the parliament; to one specific actor: the minority
parties with one supposed major goal: taking power.
On the other hand, historically and culturally embedded in the specific post-second world war
context and that of the cold war, the classical literature has entailed a very normative
dimension when discussing the roles or “functions” of opposition. Besides the somehow
evolutionist perspective of the authors, the normative aspect appears strikingly when we look
at the typologies offered by some of the classical authors. More or less implicitly, it is indeed
possible to distinguish a difference made between a ‘normal’ opposition on the one hand, and
a ‘deviant form’ of it on the other hand, be it called disloyal or anti-system, that is supposed to
be more disruptive and not very positive in democratic regimes. For instance, Kircheimer first
distinguished three different types of opposition: “classic” or “loyal” opposition, offering
alternative to the chosen policies while recognizing the government the right to govern and
the constitutional system in place; principled opposition, opposing both the policies of the
government and constitutional requirements of the political system; and finally, “political
competition” where the minority group competes with the incumbent for power but cease to
present alternative goals and objectives from that of the government
23
. During the same
period, G. Sartori also differentiated the normal opposition from its deviant form. According
to him, “a ‘real opposition’ presupposes consent on fundamental that is consent on the
community and regime level”. It opposes “the government, not the political system as such”24
and acts quietly and constructively, by opposing but not obstructing. Alongside this
“constitutional opposition”, he identified another type of opposition: the anti-system
opposition, which challenges the very legitimacy of the regime as it is. This latter acts
“irresponsibly” as it has no chance to be called to power and to respond. In this perspective,
any “non-government” party would thus fall under the category of “irresponsible” parties.
21
Ibid., p.9
SCHAPIRO L., op.cit, 1967.
23
KIRCHEIMER O., Politik und Verfassung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1964.
24
SARTORI G., op.cit., 1966, p.151.
22
5
This restrictive and normative perspectives, -which, as such, is not so problematic if we admit
that the notion of opposition is part of the political theory sub-field-, has clearly left its mark
on the contemporary studies on opposition. A first consequence has been to presume that the
opposition actors have only very specific roles and objectives. Second, it has led most of the
scholars to integrate a very limited range of actors studied under the label of “political
opposition”. Third, it has narrowed the scope of studies, assuming that the first (and only)
locus of opposition would be the parliament. These dimensions were further reinforced by the
neo-institutionalist turn in political research after the 1980s. All these elements have
engendered a very narrow questioning in terms of research, which we believe, should be
overcome.
A narrow perspective on the opposition’s roles and goals
The rather normative and restricted definition of opposition by the classical literature has
engendered three limits regarding the conception of the opposition’s roles and goals, which
are often presented as intertwined in the literature.
A first limit relates to the roles which are attributed to the opposition. In the narrowest
perspective, the opposition’s role or “function” is defined as to provide alternative policies
and to prepare an alternative government. It is then seen as highly institutionalized with a
clear defined and recognized statute25. The classical example is the Westminster model where
the loyal Opposition in the House of Commons takes its role as an alternative government,
“complete with shadow ministers, a shadow cabinet and at least the shadow of a legislative
program”26. In a less restrictive approach, authors have also conceived opposition as a force
trying to influence the legislative agenda. Thus, most scholars have focused on the
opposition’s room of maneuver and on its influence on the legislative process from a (neo)institutional perspective27.
However, only within the parliament, an opposition can have more roles than offering
alternative policies or preparing for an alternative government. For instance, in compound
societies, it plays an important role of representation of the out-groups by voicing their
25
NORTON P., op.cit. 2008, p. 237.
MILNOR A. J. and FRANKLIN M.N., “Patterns of Opposition Behavior in Modern Legislatures,” in
KORNBERG A. (dir.), Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, New York, David McKay, 1973, p. 423, cited
by KERR H.H., op.cit, 1978 ,p.52.
27
See amongt others most of the articles in The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 14, n°1/2, 2008, and
MUJICA A. and SANCHEZ-CUENCA I., op.cit., 2006.
26
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concerns even though they might not be taken into account28. Instead of offering alternative
policies, a parliamentary opposition can also collaborate with the majority to reform the
system, especially in consensual regimes29. Finally, an opposition can use formal rules to
make sure that the majority and the government are responsive and justify their actions to the
parliament. Besides, one should not forget the informal powers of opposition actors. Indeed,
alongside the formal powers provided to the opposition in the parliament, the opposition can
play many other roles; serve as a channel of communication by informing the public on
specific political issues or serve as a “safety valve”30. It can also politicize a question, by
turning a non-issue into a political issue, notably through public debate, and by so doing,
conscientizing the public opinion on a specific question. Finally, through its input, the
opposition can also improve the legitimacy of the government and that of the political system
as a whole by making it more responsive to the needs of a broader part of the electorate31.
Starting from the consciously or unconsciously admitted assumption that the opposition’s first
function would be to offer alternative policies and to form an alternative government,
contemporary scholars like most classical ones, have also deduced a very a narrow
perspective on the opposition’s goals: seeking to take power and to influence the legislative
process. Indeed, very commonly, political opposition has been seen as power-seeking and the
idea is that, for the opposition parties, “the aim is not accommodation but conquest”32.
However, as Pizzorno underlined, this assumption is quite restrictive for political opposition
may have a multiplicity of goals besides or instead of preparing for another government,
while sometimes, institutional structures simply impede it to do so. This is of course the case
in non-democratic regimes but also in the hybrid European parliament: despite the absence of
a majority and a minority (and so the impossibility to govern as such), moving oppositions on
different dimensions exist and more particularly, an opposition on the pro/anti-EU dimension
has been able to emerge33. This state of facts does not prevent these actors from playing an
opposition role for it can be a non-power seeking force but nevertheless contributing to the
politicization of certain issues and to the conscientizing of the public opinion; it can wish to
PARRY G., “Opposition Questions”, Government and Opposition, vol.32, n°4 ,1997, pp.457-461.
MUJICA A. and SANCHEZ-CUENCA I., op.cit., 2006.
30
SARTORI G., op.cit., 1966, p.150.
31
HOLZHACKER R., “The Power of Opposition Parliamentary Party Groups in European Scrutiny”, The
Journal of Legislative Studies, vol.11, n°3, 2005, p.430.
32
KING A. cited by NORTON P., op.cit., 2008, p.238.
33
BRACK N., “Quelle opposition au sein du parlement européen?” in CRESPY A. and PETITHOMME M.
(dirs.), L‘Europe sous tensions :appropriation et contestation de l”intégration européenne, to be published.
28
29
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remain and act outside of the parliament and by so doing, contributing to the formation of a
new form of polity frame etc.
Impact on the actors under study: excluding anti-system parties from the analysis
A second consequence engendered by the premises that the opposition’s major and specific
function would be to form an alternative government and to offer alternative legislation is that
the literature on opposition has quasi systematically differentiated the regular and legitimate
opposition from the so-called anti-system parties regarded as a deviant form of opposition.
This has progressively led to the establishment of two separate and very rarely connected
fields of studies: the study of mainstream parties acting as opposition parties in the parliament
on the one hand, and that analyzing the anti-system, anti-establishment, anti-incumbent
parties on the other, which are usually considered as de facto protest actors using different
modes of action in the political arena, and outside of the parliament.
This a priori distinction between both types of actors seems however to be inconsistent in
many respects. First, from a purely theoretical perspective and if we admit that the opposition
can play a wide range of roles, we should assume that anti-system parties can also carry on
these roles, namely, influencing the legislative process, criticizing, politicizing issues,
conscientizing the population etc. Moreover, still from a theoretical perspective, we need to
admit both the normativeness and relativity of discriminating between “constitutional” and
“unconstitutional” groups or between system and anti-system parties. Indeed, as Dahl himself
highlighted in 1973, when writing on opposition’s vision in hegemonic regimes: “ […] if all
opposition are treated as dangerous and subject to repression, opposition that would be loyal
if it were tolerated becomes disloyal because it is not tolerated.”34. Pizzorno has also shown
that a party may be seen as seeking to obstruct the government because of its anti-system
stance, while the party defines itself as a party working within the system.
The relativity of the “anti-system party” notion and more specifically the dynamic process
engendering such labeling also leads us to challenge the static vision of the irresponsible antisystem parties incapable or not willing to “respond”. Thus, regarding the supposed
“irresponsible” modalities of actions of so-called anti-constitutional opposition parties, there
is no empirical justification for assuming a particularly protest-based or irresponsible pattern
of behaviour. Indeed, as Ionescu and de Madariaga already pointed out in 1968, we observe
34
DAHL R.A. (dir.), Regimes and Oppositions, London, New Haven, 1973, p.13.
8
that such parties that have a very critical rhetorical appeal against the system as a whole in
fact both tend to compete in elections and tend, when elected, “to accept the ‘rule of the
game’”35, at least in the parliament where the same modalities of actions are used against the
incumbents as that used by the other so-called “normal” opponents36. This was for instance
the case of the Italian communist party, which despite its status of “anti-system” party, has in
fact contributed after the 1970s to the passing of many laws amongst which constitutional
reforms and the transformation of the economic structures37. This has also been the case of the
Communist party in France before the 1980s as well as that of regionalist parties that play the
democratic game in several countries, or of some eurosceptic parties in the European
Parliament that use the same kind of modalities of action as the other opposition parties in the
assembly38.
Consequently, without denying the relevance of studying these actors per se, it seems
however problematic when it leads to the creation of a conceptual barrier between these
supposedly outsiders and the actors considered as the “real legitimate and institutionalized”
opposition. In contrast to these interpretations and classifications, we believe that any study of
the opposition in democracy should not exclude political actors that denounce the incumbents
or even the system as a whole. If these actors accept to play the democratic game and enter
the electoral competition, we would suggest carrying on an in-depth analysis with the same
theoretical tools as the so-called “constitutional” opposition.
Impact on the arena under study: sticking to the parliamentary opposition
A third consequence of the normative stance vis-à-vis opposition, is the very obvious focus of
the literature on one particular site of opposition: the parliament where the opposition would
be constituted of the parties of the minority. In a recent period, several authors like Blondel
have encouraged researchers to look at the extra-parliamentary dimension of political
35
IONESCU G. and DE MADARIAGA I., op.cit., 1968, p.83
See on this topic, DE GIORGI E., op.cit., 2007.
37
PIZZORNO A., “Opposition in Italy”, Government and Opposition, vol. 32, n°4 ,1997, p.649.
38
Lavau showed interestingly that the Communist party in France could be seen as playing a “tribunitian
function” (fonction tribunitienne). See LAVAU G., A quoi sert le Parti Communiste Français?, Paris, Fayard,
1981 (in particular pp.342-356) ; LAVAU G. “A la recherche d’un cadre théorique pour l’étude du Parti
communiste français”, Revue française de la science politique, vol.18, n°3 ,1968, pp. 445-466.
36
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opposition, but nevertheless, except rare exceptions39 most of the studies have continued to
focus, usually from a (neo)-institutionalist approach, on the minority-majority relation within
the national legislative arena.
This posture seems however very questionable. On the one hand, it seems insufficient to
consider only the opposition as a minority-majority relation acting within the parliament.
Firstly, because it is sometimes impossible to distinguish a majority and a minority in the
classical view and it is thereby very difficult to study opposition in those narrow terms, e.g. in
Nordic countries or in Swiss40. Secondly, because only inside of the parliament, we can
envisage many more possibilities of political opposition actors and relations. In some cases,
As Andeweg and Norton have shown drawing on King’s typologies, the relation of political
opposition can indeed include a very broad number of relations 41 oppositions: the opposition
mode, which is the one where the majority opposes to the minority; the inter-party mode
which refers to an opposition from a party in the coalition; the intra-party mode, which
encompasses an opposition within a party against a policy; the non-party mode that involves
different actors who unit independently from their party affiliation against a government
policy; the cross-party mode, which refers to the processes or loci where political parties in
opposition achieve consensus over specific policies.
Moreover, and even more important, if the parliament is the privileged locus for the
institutionalization of political action in our nowadays democracies, it seems very restraining
to take the parliament as the sole place of political opposition action.
First because the role and structure of the legislature are not equally the same across countries
and the strategies of parliamentary opposition might vary according to the relative strength
and functioning of the institution. In some cases, the codes and norms of conduct foreclose
the expression of opposition within the chamber but these constraints set into motion various
oppositions outside the parliament.42 This element is especially relevant, in a context of multilevel governance (regionalization and supranationalism), where we observe a multiplication
of institutionalized sites of opposition and centres of decisions. This indeed affects the
government and the opposition as well as their relations and dynamics.
DUBROW J. and TOMESCU I., “Political Opposition to the USA Patriot Act of 2001” Paper presented at the
Annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 14 August 2004; KRAMM L., “Grundzüge einer
Theorie der politische opposition”, Zeitschrift für Politik, vol. 3, n°1, 1986, pp. 33-43.
40
KERR H. H., op.cit., 1978, p. 52.
41
ANDEWEG R., “Executive-Legislative Relations in the Netherlands: Consecutive and Coexisting Patterns”,
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol.17, n°2, 1992, pp.161-182; NORTON P., op.cit, 2008, pp.244-246.
39
10
Secondly, political parties and political actors in general also act as opponents outside the
assembly. On the one hand, opposition parties represented in the parliament can also act as an
opposition force through extra-parliamentary tools, like the media, demonstrations or the call
for a referendum or even the seizing of a constitutional court. In doing so, they can influence
both the agenda setting and the legislative outcome and put into question government’s
decisions. Thus as Kerr stressed, “an accurate portrayal of the patterns of conflicts and
consensus within parliamentary arena must be sensitive to the patterns of political opposition
generated by political activity outside Parliament”43. On the other hand, political forces that
do not succeed in being elected in the national arena can nonetheless continue to play an
opposition role as long as they are organized to assume one of these roles and have some
chance to continue in the future. This is for instance the case for small political parties which
fail in passing the electoral threshold or which compete only at one level of representation in
multi-level systems.
Third, with the evolving role of political parties and the crisis of representation and
participation, we can assume that political actors do not have the monopoly on the perception
of being the sole ‘legitimate representatives’ of those opposing the government. As Parry
quickly mentioned, multiple oppositions can be found in lobbies and civil society. 44 If the
latter has been much analyzed as an actor of opposition in democratization studies45, we
should not overlook it in democratic regimes and should try to grasp the links established
between extra-parliamentary and parliamentary opposition and stop studying public and
parliamentary arenas as two separated spheres.
Consequently, we believe that we should pay more attention to this extra-parliamentary
dimension of opposition and encourage a decompartmentalization of the literature on these
topics, which would allow for very interesting mutual contributions.
B. Toward a broad framework for the study of opposition
42
Ibid,, p. 53
Ibid.
44
PARRY G., op.cit.,1997, pp. 457-461.
45
STEPAN A., op.cit, 1997; KOPECKY P. and SPIROVA M., “Parliamentary Opposition in post-Communist
democracies: Power of the Powerless”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 14, n°1/2 ,2008, pp. 133-159.
43
11
Rethinking opposition: a tentative new definition
In order to provide with a broader framework for the study of opposition, which would not
confine itself to specific and normative perspectives of opposition, we need to go back to
the fundamentals. More specifically, we need to start by offering a new definition of what we
mean by political opposition. In order to overcome the flaws that were underlined in the
existing literature on opposition, and especially the very restrictive approach on the topic, we
believe, following the footsteps of Dahl and Ionescu and de Madariaga’s studies on
opposition that we should define it by starting from the whole range of roles that the
opposition entails, rather than from its locus or from its institutionalized and visible form,
both of which may vary over time. This perspective would allow us to adopt a more neutral
look –although influenced by Dahl’s definition of polycarchy and democracy- on the
opposition but also to take into account a larger range of actors and types of relations.
As mentioned above, the roles and targets of the opposition are numerous and go from
criticizing to offering new options, shedding lights on a specific question, politicizing issues
etc. All these activities can have different targets, amongst which influencing the government,
or the legislative arena, but also the public opinion. From these premises, we thus offer the
following definition of the political opposition or rather of the political oppositions:
“ *any organized actor –the parliament; represented political parties; non-represented political
forces; trade unions; social movements
* expressing its stance in the public sphere –in the government; in the parliament; in the
media; in the street etc.* that permanently or punctually checks, informs and criticizes the current state of affairs
* through different non-violent modalities –legislative processes; parliamentary questions;
press releases; mobilization of the media; public protests, demonstrations etc.
* the targets of its critiques being the government and/or its policies and/or the political elite
and/or the political regime as a whole.”
New possible research questions on oppositions
Starting from this broader definition and from the critiques presented in the first part, we
would like to offer new possible research questions, which would in our sense overcome
some of the limits previously mentioned: the limited view on the roles of opposition; the
barrier between the studies of anti-system and “normal” oppositions; the focus on the
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parliament and the compartmentalization between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary
opposition -although most of the research questions offered can be used for studying
parliamentary opposition only. More generally speaking, we would like to offer an alternative
to the use of the neo-institutionalist approach for the study of opposition.
First, in order to specifically go further than the study of parliamentary opposition, we believe
that one should focus on the relations between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary
oppositions. It would indeed be interesting to analyze how political parties can use extraparliamentary forces both as channel to create public debates and awareness, and as a tool to
increase their legitimacy within the political arena. It would also be possible to ask this
question the other around, by looking at the relationship the extra-parliamentary forces
establish with the parliamentary opposition in order to politicize issue.
Second, in order to overcome the restrictive (neo)-institutionalist perspective, it appears
essential to think about the question of perceptions and legitimacy of both parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary opposition actors46. More particularly, we could consider how the
opposition actors perceive themselves, their objectives and the political arena within which
they act as well as the way they are described and presented by the forces in power. Indeed,
when an opposition actor whether or not against the system as a whole is presented as a
“system-rejective”47 actor (e.g., Arab parties in Israel, extreme right parties in Europe, eurosceptic in the European parliament, some radical social movements etc.) by either the
majority or the media, this type of labeling may produce at least two consequences: a process
of delegitimization vis-à-vis the public and a process of self-redefinition by the actor. Both
processes may affect their strategies, channels of communication and modalities of action.
Moreover, the labeling of these opposition actors as anti-system may also influence the
public’s perceptions of the opposition forces and it would be interesting to analyze further to
what extent anti-system labeling can form structures influencing the roles of theses forces as
their capacity to politicize issues.
Third, and as a result of our previous point, we believe in the importance of language and
rhetoric when studying opposition. Indeed, one of the main characteristics of democratic
politics is its distinctive medium of communication, that is language and deliberation.
See for instance on the question of perceptions and legitimacy the work of MUTZ D.C., “Effects of “In-Yourface” Television Discourse on Perceptions as a Legitimate Opposition”, American Political Science Review, vol.
101, n°4, 2007, pp. 621-635.
46
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Deliberation as a means and principle for governing in democracy implies that decisions are
taken through a process contradictory and conflicting discussions and debates 48. In that
respect, language can be seen in democracy as the primary medium of political decisionmaking, as the way through which dissent is processed and as the opposite of violence 49.
Whereas the literature on anti-politics and populist actors devotes attention to language and
rhetoric, it is peculiar to note that it has been generally overlooked by studies on opposition. A
more systematic and thorough analysis of the discourse and rhetoric and its use by the actors
would lead to a better understanding of the style of opposition as well as of its strategies.
Some research could for instance be developed on the content of the language used by the
oppositions, the different frame of representation and meanings attached to the same concept
(such as democracy or representation) by the governing actors and the opposition and inside
the various opponents. One could also determine if the opposition accepts the deliberative
process and simply assumes a declarative stance. It would allow us to assess the impact of
opposition in a more relevant way as rhetoric can be used to shape perceptions, as an appeal
or claim but also to politicize a non-issue into an issue. In this perspective, an actor could be
seen as “efficient” in its role, even if it does not lead to changes in public policies or if it does
not provide an alternative government.
A fourth element that could be taken more into account is the nature and the saliency of the
issues debated in the political arena. Indeed, some authors demonstrated the relevance of the
issue as a key variable in studying opposition in the parliament. Firstly because some issues
on the agenda are more important for some actors than for others (saliency) and second,
because issues can mobilize certain types of opposition. Kerr for instance used the issues to
categorize oppositions, showing in the Swiss case how issues can lead to different types of
opposition. De Giorgi, Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca also revealed empirically how
parliamentary opposition can behave and react differently in its votes and collaboration with
the government/parliamentary majority depending on the nature of the issues debated. It
would be relevant to further develop this perspective to question the impact on the role, type
and modalities of action of oppositions depending on the issues, in a way that would include
the relations between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces. The questions could be
47
SHTROMAS A., Political change and social development. the case of the Soviet Union, Frankfurt am Mein,
P.Lang, 1981.
48
ROUSSELLIER N., Le Parlement de l’éloquence, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1997, pp. 17-19.
49
SCHEDLER A., “Anti-Political-Establishment Parties”, Party Politics, vol. 2, n°3, 1996, pp.291–312.
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framed as for instance: can we observe different coalitions of opponents on key issues? Are
other strategies and channels of influence used in an out the parliament depending on the
issues? How will the relationship between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary oppositions
be affected depending on the issues under scrutiny? What mobilization capacity will the
opposition have depending on the issues debated?
Finally, we believe that the study of oppositions nowadays has not only to look outside of the
parliament as previously mentioned but should also consider the change in model of
governance and be better connected with other types of literatures, e.g. literature on
federalism and multi-level governance. Even if we are only interested in political parties as
opposition force, a broad spectrum of questions arises from the different levels of power and
opposition. For instance in the case of asymmetric coalitions where a party is governing at
one level and opposing at another, it would be interesting to focus on how this configuration
impacts its modalities of action, its rhetoric and language and how it influences its selfperception. One could also consider how this asymmetry affects the way the electorate
perceives the situation and the strategy of the party and supports it or not. Finally, one could
also analyze the various tools and strategies put in place at the different levels to see if
differentiated tactics and types of relations with other actors are used depending on the level
of power.
Conclusion
Despite the very common use of the “opposition” notion, few recent articles have
concentrated on this topic specifically and even less articles have provided with a theoretical
reflection on the notion, since the 1970s. Moreover, most of the recent articles dealing with
opposition have analyzed it in a very restrictive perspective, usually with an institutional
focus. Starting from this notable observation, the objective of this article was to offer a critical
state of the literature on opposition in order to rethink the way we commonly study this
subject. A first step was to look at the classical studies on opposition and to see the impact it
has had on the way contemporary scholars have analyzed this topic. We have thus highlighted
three frequent biases both in he classical and contemporary literature: a normative and
restrictive view of the opposition’s roles and goals; a limited view on actors and a restrained a
priori on the locus of mobilization. We have also underlined the very frequent use of a (neo)institutionalist approach to study the subject.
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Without denying the relevance and importance of studying the opposition acting in the
parliament and its relations with the majority in power, we believe that this focus is too
restrained on the one hand, due amongst other things to the developments that have taken
place in the last decades and, on the other hand, that it too often implies a normative stance on
the supposed “normal” function that an opposition should fulfill.
Therefore, we have suggested a tentative broader definition of opposition in order to better
grasp its different components and dimensions in terms of actors, sites of action and roles. In
this perspective, opposition(s) could be understood as any organized actor that permanently or
punctually checks, informs and criticizes the current state of affairs through different nonviolent modalities, the targets of its critiques being the government and/or its policies and/or
the political elite and/or the political regime as a whole.
Finally, new possible research questions have been offered which would take into account
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary relations, perceptions and self-perceptions; the rhetoric
and discourse of the oppositions; the issues which are opposed to and the impact of the
multiplicity of “levels of oppositions” on the opposition actors. We assume that these new
questions and perspectives on opposition would overcome the underlined flawed of the
literature and widen its scope to better grasp the complexity of the roles of opposition in
contemporary democracies.
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