A History of Philosophy
Volume VI, Part III: Immanuel Kant
Frederick Copleston, S.J.
Chapter X: Life and Writings
A. Kant’s Life and Character
1. Kant’s life was very uneventful
a. He spent all his life in East Prussia (unlike the well-traveled Leibniz)
b. “He was simply an excellent professor in the not very distinguished university of a provincial
town” (unlike Hegel) (180c)
c. Later in life, he was noted for his methodical regularity of life and for his punctuality, but it
would hardly occur to anyone to think of him as an abnormal personality (like Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche)
d. “But perhaps one can say that the contrast between his quiet and comparatively eventful life
and the greatness of his influence has itself a dramatic quality” (180d)
2. Born at Konigsberg on April 22, 1724, the son of a saddler
a. Brought up in the spirit of the pietist movement
i.
He continued throughout his life to appreciate the good qualities of sincere pietists,
but it is evident that he reacted rather sharply against the religious observances to
which he had to conform at the college (180e-181a)
b. In 1740, he entered his university studies (181bc)
i.
The main influence on his mind was that of Martin Knutzen, professor of logic and
metaphysics.
ii.
He was a disciple of Wolff, but had a particular interest in natural science
iii.
From him Kant was stimulated to acquire knowledge of Newtonian science
3. From 1755-1770, he became a professor of logic and metaphysics at Konigsberg. This is
generally called his “pre-critical period” (181d)
a. Lectured on subjects from logic, metaphysics and moral philosophy to physics, mathematics,
geography, anthropology and mineralogy.
b. “It must not be thought that Kant was a recluse. Later on he found himself compelled to
economize with his time, but at this period, he went a good deal into local society” (182a)
c. Rousseau stimulated in Kant a lively interest in educational reform, besides helping to
develop his political views in a radical direction (182b)
4. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment at which his pre-critical period of thought ended and
the critical period began – when exactly Kant rejected the Leibniz-Wolffian system of philosophy
and began to work out his own system
a. It was his conviction that students needed factual knowledge of things such as anthropology
and physical geography in order that they might understand the part played by experience in
our knowledge. (182d)
b. Critique of Pure Reason appeared in 1781 and his other famous writings followed quickly
c. “It is understandable, therefore, that with this heavy programme Kant had to husband his
time” (183a)
5. He came into collision with political authority only once due to Religion within the Bounds of
Reason Alone. (183cd)
a. The censor claimed that the second part attacked biblical theology
b. In a later work, The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant discussed the relation between theology,
in the sense of biblical belief, and philosophy, or the critical reason
6. Kant died on February 12th, 1804
Copleston’s History of Philosophy, Ch X
2
a. “The salient trait in Kant’s character was probably his moral earnestness and his devotion to
the idea of duty, a devotion which found theoretical expression in his ethical writings” (184a)
b. He was a sociable man and regularly assisted poor persons. He was not a sentimental man,
but had respect for others
c. “As regards religion, Kant was not given to the ordinary observances, and nobody could
claim that he was inclined to mysticism. Nor was he precisely an orthodox Christian. But he
certainly possessed a real belief in God” (184bc)
d. “Though he maintained that morality is autonomous, in the sense that its principles are
underived from theology, natural or revealed, he was also convinced that it implies or
ultimately involved belief in God” (184c)
e. “It would be an exaggeration to say that he had no idea of religious experience…at the same
time he showed no real appreciation of the activities of adoration and prayer…of the mystical
element in religion” (184c)
f. “But this does not mean that he had no reverence for God, even if his approach to religion
was practically exclusively through the consciousness of moral obligation…he wrote on
religion without possessing any deep understanding either of Christian piety, or for instance,
of oriental mysticism” (184d)
B. Earlier Writings and the Newtonian Physics
1. Stimulated by Knutzen. Spent much time reading scientific literature as a tutor (185a)
2. Instead of the customary twofold division of Kant’s intellectual life – pre-critical and critical –
some historians prefer a threefold division (185c)
a. Recognize the existence of an initial period in which he was primarily concerned with
problems of a scientific nature (1755,6 until pre-critical philosophical period in 1760s)
b. This threefold division is good in that it draws attention to the predominantly scientific
character of Kant’s earlier writing, but for general purposes the traditional 2-fold is sufficient
(185e)
3. The important thing to note is that Kant acquired a knowledge of Newtonian science, and that the
validity of the scientific conception of the world remained for him a firm fact (186b)
a. The nature of scientific knowledge was open to discussion and the range of applicability of
scientific categories and concepts constituted a problem
b. But Kant never doubted the general validity of Newtonian physics within its own field; and
his later problems arose on the basis of this conviction
c. “Given his acceptance of the scientific conception of the world and given at the same time his
acceptance of the validity of moral experience, Kant found himself compelled in the course of
time to discuss the reconciliation o of the world of necessity with the world of freedom”
(186e)
4. “Given the facts of scientific advance and of the common acceptance of classical physics, he
found himself driven to ask whether the lack of comparable advance in metaphysics and of a
common acceptance of any one metaphysical system did not demand a radical revision of our
ideas of the nature and function of metaphysics” (186e-187a)
C. Philosophical Writings of the Pre-Critical Period
1. At the end of The Only Possible Ground for a Demonstration of God’s Existence (1762), Kant
remarks that “though it is thoroughly necessary to be convinced of God’s existence, it is not quite
so necessary that one should demonstrate it”
2. Proofs for the existence of God must take 1 of 4 forms, according to Kant, with 2 main divisions:
concept of the possible or empirical idea of the existent (188c)
a. Possibility as ground to existence of God as consequence  ontological argument, from the
idea of God to the divine existence (St. Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz)
i.
Kant rejects it b/c it presupposes that existence is a predicate, which is a false
presupposition.
Copleston’s History of Philosophy, Ch X
3
b. Prove existence of a 1st and independent cause of things, and then show that such a cause
must possess certain attributes, which make it proper to speak of it as God  Cosmological
argument (3rd form)
i.
Rejects it b/c we cannot demonstrate that a first cause must be what we call God
c. Prove at the same time both the existence and the attributes of God  Teleological Proof
(Proof from design, 4th form)
i.
Kant shows it considerable respect, but ultimately rejects it – brings us at best to a
divine mind or intelligence that produces order and teleology in the world, not to a
creator (188e)
d. Possibility as consequence to existence of God as its ground (2nd form)
i.
Kant proposes this as the only possible basis for a demonstration of God’s existence.
ii.
Can’t affirm possibility and deny that there is an existent ground of possibility
iii.
Can’t deny possibility without thinking it, and to think is to affirm the realm of
possibility
iv.
From this, Kant argues that this being must be one, simple, immutable, eternal,
spiritual and whatever else is included in the meaning of the term ‘God’ as used in
metaphysics
v.
Reminiscent of Duns Scotus
3. In The Only Possible Ground, Kant spoke of metaphysics as a ‘bottomless abyss’ and as a ‘dark
ocean without shore and without lighthouses’ (189e)
a. Are metaphysical truths in general, and in particular, the first principles of natural theology
and morals, capable of the same degree of demonstrative certainty as the truths of geometry?
i.
If not, what are the peculiar nature and degree of the certainty which they enjoy?
(190a)
b. There are fundamental differences between mathematics and metaphysics:
c. Math  a constructive science in the sense that it proceeds ‘synthetically’ constructing its
definitions arbitrarily…the concept arises through the definition (190b)
d. Philosophy  definitions are obtained by analysis (190c)
e. Philosophers may very well construct definitions ‘synthetically’, but when they do, these
definitions are not properly speaking philosophical definitions. (191a)
f. Analogously, the mathematician often deals with concepts which are capable of philosophical
analysis and not mere arbitrary constructions
g. “While in mathematics I have no concept at all of my object until the definition provides one,
in metaphysics, I have a concept which is already given to me, although it is confused, and I
should try to make it clear, explicit and definite” (191c)
h. Kant defines metaphysics in the Enquiry as “nothing else but philosophy about the ultimate
principles of our knowledge”
i. The principle rule if certainty is to be obtained in metaphysics: ascertain what it is that one
knows immediately and with certainty of the subject-matter in question and to determine the
judgments to which this knowledge gives rise. (191d)
4. “Metaphysics is without a doubt the most difficult of all human studies; only no metaphysics has
yet been written” (191e)
a. Kant says that a change of method is required: “The genuine method of metaphysics is
fundamentally of the same kind as that which Newton introduced into natural science and
which was there so fruitful” (192a)
b. The metaphysician should start with some phenomena of ‘inner experience’, describe them
accurately and ascertain the immediate judgments to which they give rise and of which we
are certain.
c. Kant rejects the method of starting with very general definitions and proceed to the more
particular (the method of Baumgartner’s metaphysics)
Copleston’s History of Philosophy, Ch X
4
d. The metaphysician is not concerned primarily with the relation of ground to consequent in a
purely logical and formal sense – he is concerned with ‘real grounds’; and he must start with
the given (192b)
e. Kant does not intend to deny the existential import of metaphysics
f. If the metaphysician is to increase our knowledge of reality, he must cease trying to ape the
mathematician and turn rather to a method analogous to that which was employed so
successfully by Newton in natural science (193c)
g. His recommendation to the metaphysician to substitute the Newtonian for the mathematical
method should not blind us to his growing skepticism about the pretensions of speculative
metaphysics, although his critical point of view is not yet full-blown (193d)
i. This recommendation is linked with the conviction that whereas natural science has made
good its claim to increase our knowledge of the world, metaphysics has not yet done so.
h. In Dreams of a Ghost-Seer explained by Dreams of a Metaphysics, Kant makes it clear that
the theories of speculative metaphysics are in a weaker position that those of visionary
experiences of Swedenborg (194c)
i. Metaphysical theories are supposed to be rationally demonstrated, and this is what
metaphysical theories about spiritual beings cannot be.
ii. Metaphysics must not include the doctrine of spirits and must consist determining ‘the
limits of knowledge which have been set by the nature of the human reason’ (194e)
5. Kant’s attitude toward metaphysics was influenced by the criticism of Hume.
a. Causes and effects can be known only thru experience and therefore we cannot employ the
idea of causality to transcend experience and attain knowledge of supersensible reality
b. Kant does not deny that there is supersensible reality: what he denies is that metaphysics can
open the door to it in the way that metaphysicians of the past have thought that it could
(195a)
6. Kant says that it is no good saying that traditional metaphysics is necessary for morality, in the
sense that moral principles are dependent on metaphysical truths (195b)
a. Moral principles are not conclusions drawn from speculative metaphysics
b. At the same time, moral faith may well point beyond the empirical world: “It seems to be
more in accordance with human nature and the purity of morals to ground the expectation of
the future world on the experience of a virtuous soul than, conversely to base its moral
attitude on the hope of another world”
7. Anticipations of Kant’s later views found in Dreams of Ghost-Seer…:
a. Speculative metaphysics of the traditional type is no, and cannot be, a source of scientific,
demonstrated knowledge
b. Morality is autonomous and not dependent on metaphysics or on theology – moral principles
are not conclusions drawn from metaphysical or theological premises
c. At the same time, morality may point beyond itself – moral experience produces a reasonable
moral faith in certain truths which cannot be demonstrated by the metaphysicians (Pascal and
act like a saint…)
d. Kant has not yet arrived at the critical standpoint
D. The Dissertation of 1770 and its Context
1. Kant was convinced that Leibniz was right in maintaining against Newton and Clarke that space
and time cannot be absolute realities or properties of things-in-themselves (196c)
a. Kant accepted Leibniz’ view that space and time are phenomenal and are not properties of
things-in-themselves
b. He does not accept Leibniz’ notion, however, that they are confused ideas – rather, they are
‘pure intuitions’ (196d)
2. Sensitive Knowledge  its objects are sensible things (197a)
a. Matter: that which is produced by the presence of sensible objects
Copleston’s History of Philosophy, Ch X
3.
4.
5.
6.
5
b. Form: that which co-ordinates the matter – it is contributed by the knowing subject and is the
condition of sensitive knowledge (197b)
i. 2 conditions: space and time
ii. “Time and space are not anything objective and real”, it is the subjective condition,
necessary b/c of the nature of the human mind
c. The union of form and matter precedes all reflection.
d. “From appearance to experience there is no way except by reflection according to the logical
use of the intellect” (Kant, 198d)
i. The empirical sciences belong to the sphere of sensitive knowledge b/c it does not
provide new concepts out of its own resources but simply organizes logically the
materials drawn from a sensuous source (198e)
Intellectual knowledge  knowledge of objects which do not affect the senses (199b)
a. Sensitive knowledge is the knowledge of objects as they appear (subjected to the a priori
conditions of space and time) and intellectual knowledge is knowledge of things as they are.
b. The empirical sciences  sensitive knowledge
c. Metaphysics  intellectual knowledge
Suggests that in metaphysics, the mind apprehends objects which transcend the sense; above all
God (199c)
a. But Kant explicitly denies that we enjoy intuition of spiritual realities – rather, we conceive
of supersensible objects by means of universal concepts, not by direct intuition
b. In the absence of intuitive material as far as the intelligible world is concerned, can these
concepts be used to grasp supersensible realities in such a way that we can make positive and
certainly true statements about them? (200b)
Kant divides knowledge into sensitive and intellectual knowledge and the world into the sensible
and intelligible worlds (200cde)
a. Naturally suggests intellectual knowledge is knowledge of intelligibilia, just as sensitive
knowledge is knowledge of sensibilia.
b. Inasmuch as supersensible realities belong to the class of intelligibilia, we would naturally
expect Kant to maintain that dogmatic metaphysics is possible
c. This twofold scheme of knowledge and of objects of knowledge makes it difficult for him to
throw dogmatic metaphysics overboard
d. Yet, he says enough in the dissertation to weaken very considerable the position of dogmatic
metaphysics and cast doubt upon its claims…it is worth while dwelling on this point:
Kant asserts that the ‘real use’ of the intellect in the sphere of intelligibilia gives us only symbolic
knowledge (200e)
a. This might suggest to someone trained in the Thomist tradition that Kant is saying that we
can have valid knowledge of supersensible realities, though this knowledge is analogical in
character
b. But what Kant seems to mean is that in the absence of intuitive material the extension of the
‘real use’ of the intellect into its dogmatic use provides us only with symbolic indications of
supersensible realities, so that the description, for example, of God as first cause would be an
instance of symbolism.
c. In the natural sciences and in mathematics, where sense intuitions supplies the data or
material and where the intellect is employed only according to its logical use, ‘use provides
the method’ (201c)
i. Analyze the method employed after these sciences have already acquired a certain degree
of development
d. But in pure philosophy – such as metaphysics – method precedes all science
“In dealing with material things, which affect the senses, we can come to know much about
them without having first worked out a scientific method. But when we are dealing with
supersensible realities, such as God, or with things-in-themselves as distinct from the way in
Copleston’s History of Philosophy, Ch X
6
which they appear to us in sense intuition, it is essential to ascertain first how we can come to
know them (201e)
i. In the absence of intuition, the problem of method becomes all important
e. The chief rule of method, according to Kant, is to ensure that the principles of sensitive
knowledge are not extended from sensible to supersensible realities.
7. Kant does not maintain, and indeed never maintained, that there are no supersensible realities.
E. The Conception of the Critical Philosophy
1. While thinking out his projected book, Kant realized that something essential was wanting: a
thorough treatment of the relation of mental presentations to the objects of knowledge (204e)
2. A question arises: how can pure concepts of the understanding refer to objects when they are not
affected by the latter?
a. In order to answer this – if the assumption that the pure concepts of the understanding and the
axioms of the pure reason are not empirically derived is to be maintained – Kant must
abandon his statement that sensuous presentations present us with objects as they appear
while intellectual presentations give us objects as they are (205e)
b. Instead, there will be an ascending process of synthesis whereby empirical reality is
constituted (206b)
i. Kant will be able to maintain his sharp distinction between sense and intellect
c. Objects will then conform to our concepts (206b)
i. Our concepts will refer to objects, b/c these concepts are a priori conditions of the
possibility of objects of knowledge, performing a function analogous to that of the pure
intuitions of space and time
d. Kant was not satisfied with previous explanations of the conformity between concepts and
objects b/c many of them have recourse to a Deus ex machina.
i. Therefore he resolved to write his own explanation in which he reduces the concepts of
the pure reason to certain number of categories (transcendental philosophy) and which
will deal with the nature both of theoretical and of practical (moral) knowledge. (206e)
3. Critique of Pure Reason
a. First appears in 1781
b. Kant treats of mathematical and scientific knowledge and endeavors to justify the objectivity
of this knowledge in the face of the empiricism of Hume. (207b)
c. He does this by proposing his ‘Copernican revolution’ – the theory that objects conform to
the mind rather than the other way round
d. Endeavored to isolate and give a systematic account of the a priori elements in scientific
knowledge
e. “Because the structure of human sensibility and of the human mind is constant, objects will
always appear to us in certain ways.
i.
“We are thus enabled to make universal scientific judgments which hold good not
only for actual but also for possible experience.”
ii.
“The Newtonian science is thus theoretically justified despite the dissolvent
tendencies of empiricism.”
iii.
“From this position it follows, however, that the pure concepts of the understanding
do not enable u to apprehend things in themselves, apart from the way in which they
appear to us, or supersensible realities.”
f. In this, Kant tries to explain how speculative metaphysics of the traditional type arose and
why it is foredoomed to failure (207c)
g. This work was misunderstood, so Kant published Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics to
serve as a kind of introduction or explanation (207d)
4. Meanwhile, Kant turned his attention to the fundamental principles of morals
a. Fundamental Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)
Copleston’s History of Philosophy, Ch X
7
b. Critique of Practical Reason (1788)
c. In between these, he also published the 2nd edition of Critique of Pure Reason and wrote
Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science
d. Kant attempted to ground obligation and the universality of the moral law not on feeling but
on the practical reason – on reason as legislating human conduct (208a)
e. This does not mean that he tried to deduce from reason alone all the concrete duties “Smith”
encounters in his life nor that he thought we could work out a set of concrete moral laws
without any reference to empirically given material.
f. Both in theoretical and in practical knowledge, there is the given – the ‘matter’ – and there is
the ‘formal’ and a priori element (derived from the practical reason and applied to
empirically given material)
i.
The latter is what Kant deals chiefly with in his ethical writings and in this sense he is
concerned with the ‘metaphysics’ of morals
5. Kant is also concerned in his ethical writings with metaphysics in another sense – He tries to
establish as postulates of the moral law the great truths of freedom, immortality and God (208c)
a. “Thus the principal truths which, according to the first Critique are incapable of scientific
demonstration, are later re-introduced as postulates of moral or practical faith”
b. This theory is not a mere appendix to the Kantian philosophy; it is an essential part of Kant’s
attempt to harmonize the world of Newtonian science with the world of moral experience and
of religious faith (208d)
c. While the notion that pure concepts of the understanding can give us theoretical knowledge
of things in themselves and of a supersensible world has been ruled out, Kant makes room for
‘faith’
d. Recognition of the fact of moral obligation is seen to demand or postulate a practical faith in
the truths of human freedom, immortality and the existence of God – they are implications of
the moral law (208d)
e. Thus Kant still maintains that there is a supersensible sphere; but he finds the key to it,
not in dogmatic metaphysics, but in moral experience (208e)
6. Critique of Judgment (1790)
a. 2 main parts
i.
Aesthetic judgment
ii.
Teleological judgment – judgment of the purposiveness in Nature
b. Very important work b/c in it Kant tries (as far as our consciousness is concerned at least) to
bridge the gulf between the mechanistic world of Nature as presented in the physical science
and the world of morality, freedom and faith (209b)
c. He tries to show how the mind passes from one to the other
d. Kant is deeply concerned with the reconciliation of the scientific outlook with that of the
moral and religious man (209c)
7. “We have seen that the human mind does not, on Kant’s view, constitute or create the object in its
totality.”
a. “That is to say, although things as perceived and known are relative to us in the sense that we
perceive and know them only through the a priori forms embedded in the structure of the
human subject, there are things-in-themselves, even if we cannot know them as they are in
themselves” (210ab)
b. The appearance of things is due to a factor in the perceiving subject, but it does not follow
that things do not exist independently of the perceiving subject