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22.954 words
‘ILLUMINATING WHAT IS THOUGHT’
A Platonist placitum on ‘Voice’, in Context
BY
JAAP MANSFELD
ABSTRACT
The Plato kefãlaion in Aëtius’ chapter On Voice is the result of the interpretation,
modernization, and systematization of brief passages dealing with hearing, voice and
speech to be found in several dialogues. This construction of Plato’s doctrine of ‘voice’
was mainly inspired by the systematic and innovative Stoic tÒpow On Voice. The
‘physical’ definition is based on passages in Theaetetus and other works, the
‘physiological’ on a passage in Timaeus. The distinction and relation between voiceless
internal lÒgow (or thought) and spoken lÒgow in Theaetetus and Sophist was
interpreted as being equivalent to that between internal and uttered f≈nh-cum-lÒgow
which played an important part in the Stoic view of the relation between thinking and
speaking. Because as a rule Plato uses fvnÆ of the human voice, the rigorous distinction
between this voice and that of animals and lifeless things postulated by Diogenes of
Seleucia and other Stoics could be attributed to him, and his unsystematic usage justified
by claiming that he used fvnÆ both in the proper and in a loose (or improper) sense.
Approaches such as these are characteristic of Middle Platonism. In the present case the
neutralization of Theophrastus’ criticism of Plato in the De sensibus played a significant
part. Plato’s statement that thought is mirrored in what is spoken was updated by
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replacing it with a (fanciful) etymology of fvnÆ which must be dated to at least the
Hellenistic period (it was known to e.g. Philo of Alexandria and used by the grammarian
Philoxenus). Surprisingly full parallels for virtually the entire contents of the Aëtian
kefãlaion are found in the Commentaria in Dionysium Thracem. The etymology of
fvnÆ, and others like it, were quoted and used by grammarians and lexicographers from
the later 1st cent. BCE up to late Byzantine times. The attempt to understand the
doxographer’s lemma on Plato on voice thus becomes a case-study demonstrating both
the openness and the tenacity of philosophical interpretation in antiquity. But note that
the present inquiry is not concerned with the Aristotelian or (partly) Aristotelianizing
tradition according to which language is conventional.
One of the side-effects of the present inquiry was the unsurprising realization (again)
that ‘parallel passages’, once quoted and interpreted out of context, may sort of drift from
one book or paper to the next, while their interpretation hardens into received truth. In the
present case the so-called parallels in Plato for the later distinction between the internal
and the spoken voice proved to be not so parallel after all.*)
1. Doxographical Definitions
The first kefãlaion of Aëtius, Placita 4.19, the chapter On Voice (per‹ fvn∞w,
in both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus) runs as follows:
T 1 Plato defines ‘voice’ (fvnÆ) as
(a) [on its physical side] breath (pneËma), impelled from the mind through the mouth,
and
(b) [as physiological stimulus of hearing] as a shock propagated by the air through the
ears and brain and blood to the soul;
* A considerable part of this study was prepared and written in the hospitable environment and
thanks to the indispensable library of the Fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres, August 2004. Gratitude
for criticisms of earlier drafts is due to Tiziano Dorandi, Frans de Haas, Jan van Ophuijsen,
David T. Runia, and Teun Tieleman.
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(c) in a loose sense (or: improper sense, kataxrhstik«w)1) ‘voice’ is also said in the
case of irrational animals and lifeless things, such as whinnyings 2) and mere noises,
(d) but in the proper sense (kur€vw) it is articulate (¶naryrow) voice, considered as
illuminating
(fvt€zousa—i.e.
revealing)
what
is
being
thought
(tÚ
nooÊmenon).3)4)
The two definitions which come first, (a) plus (b), are based on passages in the
dialogues.5) Diels ad loc. (1879, 408) however stated that the next two paragraphs, (c)
1)
kataxrhstik«w (as opposed to kur€vw) may imply misuse either in a relatively strong
sense, viz. when a term is used for something which has no name, or indicate extended or
metaphorical use in a much less severe sense; see Runia (1988, 76, 83-7), also for references. I
here prefer the less strong sense, because strictly speaking fvnÆ in the case of the animal
example replaces something for which a name does exist, viz. xremetismo€, and this will also
hold for numerous cases of cÒfoi produced by êcuxa.
2)
Qosta ibn Luqa (ed. Daiber, 1980) has ‘dem Wiehern und dem Eselsgeschrei’ (my emphasis),
which may or may not have been in the Greek text translated. Cf. further e.g. Diomedes, Gr.L. I
p. 420.13-4 Keil, ‘confusa (sc., vox) est irrationalis vel inscriptilis [= égrãmmatow], simplici
vocis sono animalium effecta, quae scribi non potest, ut est equi hinnitus (= xremetismÒw),
tauri mugitus’ (quoted Ax 1986, 18). Also cf. Hsch. v. x 693: xremetismÒw: ≤ fvnØ t«n
·ppvn, and xremetistikÒw as epitheton ornans of ‘horse’.
3)
Tr. Beare (1906, 107) inclusive of explanatory glosses; wording modified. Good brief
overview of the ancient debate about speech (not: a certain kind of fvnÆ) as the distinguishing
mark of humans, or as also attributable in some respect to animals, or to certain species of
animals, at Sorabji (1993, 80-2).
4)
Aët. Plac. 4.19.1 Diels, Plãtvn tØn fvnØn ır€zetai pneËma diå stÒmatow
épÚ diano€aw ±gm°non, ka‹ plhgØn ÍpÚ é°row di'
ka‹
a·matow
m°xri
kataxrhstik«w
xremetismo‹
§p‹
ka‹
cux∞w
t«n
cÒfoi:
diadidom°nhn:
élÒgvn
z–vn
kur€vw
d¢
fvnØ
fvnØ
tvn ka‹ §gkefãlou
l°getai
ka‹
≤
t«n
d¢
écÊxvn,
¶naryrÒw
§stin
ka‹
…w
…w
fvt€zousa tÚ nooÊmenon. Note that Stob. 1.57, the sorry remains of the chapter On
voice and whether it is incorporeal and <***> what is its regent part, consists of only this
single passage. Ps.Galen’s text stops after diadidom°nhn, which however need not entail that
what follows was lacking in his copy of ps.Plutarch.
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plus (d), “non iam ad Platonem pertinent”. In his index verborum s.v. fvnÆ he cited (c)
and (d) not among the ‘placita’, but separately at the beginning, so perhaps as definitions;
no further comments elsewhere in the Doxographi Graeci. Apparently this verdict has
been influential. Little attention has been paid to the Aëtian lemma, and what has been
said about its second half (to judge from what I have seen)6) is far from sufficient. In
what follows I shall argue that paragraphs (c) plus (d), pace Diels, “ad Platonem
pertinent”.
We should observe that definitions (a) and (b) belong to the domain of physical
philosophy (and the Placita explicitly transmit ‘the physical doctrine’),7) while
paragraphs (c) and (d) are epistemological so belong to another part of philosophy.
Moreover, only the definition of voice sub (d), as ‘articulate voice’, is a proper one per
genus et differentiam; what is said at (c) helps to identify both the genus and its species
‘human voice’. The physical and physiological definitions sub (a) and (b) are descriptive.
The mix of physical and epistemological approaches need cause no surprise: book four of
5)
For (a) cf. Tht. 206d quoted below, n. 137, and Sph. 263e quoted below, n. 145, and the echo
at [Pl.] Def. 414d, quoted below n. 95; for (b) cf. Ti. 67b quoted below, n. 91 (good discussion of
how to translate this passage at Taylor (1928, 476-7)). See Ax (1986, 78-9), and further below,
sections 5 and 6.
6)
Ingenkamp (1966, 80) merely calls it an “anschliessende Erklärung”. Ax (1986, 78 n. 62)
believes it is a “kritische Anmerkung”, or scholium, emphasizing fvnÆ as human voice in the
Plato lemma “mit Hilfe der Etymologie”. For Tabarroni (1988, 107 n. 9) see below, n. 23.
Lachenaud (1993, 293) refers to parallels such as the important passage Nemes. nat.hom. p. 4.165.1 Morani for a distinction between humans and animals as to speech (it has momentarily
escaped him that “Plut., Mor. 909 A” is in fact the fourth lemma of ps.Plu. Plac. 5.20 [below, T
13], the tract he edits and comments upon). He has noticed a “jeu étymologique”, but also
adduces the role of the sun in Stoic cosmology, and in cognition according to passages in
Plutarch’s De facie—rather far-fetched. Baltussen (1993, 213) and (2000, 237) states that “the
rest [i.e. from (c), l°getai d¢ ka‹ …] derives from other Platonic writings”, but see
below, sections 5 and 6. On ancient etymologizing see e.g. Sluiter (1990, 12-3, 18-21, 27-33),
Schenkeveld (1999, 181-2), also for references; and below, n. 13.
7)
Aët. Plac. prooem. 1, the first words of the treatise: m°llontew tÚn fusikÚn
parad≈sein logon.
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the Placita contains more epistemological material, e.g. chapter 4.9, ‘Whether
perceptions are true’. As we shall see, in the present case the epistemological ingredient
came to be included because fvnÆ involves the multi-faceted notion, or rather notions, of
lÒgow.
That in the Plato lemma fvnÆ is more Stoico said to be pneuma, i.e. corporeal, entails
that sides are taken in the well-known controversy about its being either corporeal or
incorporeal.8) Actually, all the tenets (of [Plato], Epicurus, Democritus, the Stoics and
Anaxagoras) described [Plu.] Plac. 4.19.1-5 take fvnÆ to be corporeal. Curiously
enough, the diaphonia corporeal vs incorporeal is only at issue in the next (!) chapter,
Plac. 4.20: long title in ps.Plutarch ‘Whether voice is incorporeal and how echo comes to
be’, while the short and presumably original title ‘Whether voice is incorporeal’ may be
abstracted from Stobaeus (where the text is no longer extant; ps.Plutarch’s is excerpted
ps.Gal. Phil.Hist. 101). Here the first lemma lists ‘Pythagoras Plato Aristotle’ as arguing
that voice is incorporeal, while the second presents the arguments of the Stoics in favour
of its being corporeal. The postpoment of an exposition of the diaphonia is a further sign
that Aëtius (a bit atypically) does not give equal weight to the two opposite sides. But I
must postpone discussion of the surprising order in which these two Aëtian chapters have
been excerpted and transmitted to another occasion.
The etymological explanation ad finem of our passage is not, of course, an etymology
in the modern sense, but an instance of the ancient way of unfolding the original and true
meaning of a word. The function of this etymology is to demonstrate the role played by
the ‘articulate human voice’ in relation to the thought it so to speak makes visible, and to
do so more clearly than is the case at the beginning of this passage, where voice is already
said to come from the mind. It is noteworthy that we are not told where in the body this
mind is situated.
2. Grammarians and Lexicographers
8)
For this ‘vetus atque perpetua quaestio’ (Gell. N.A. 5.15.1) see Baumgarten (1962, 148-9 n.
119) and Ax (1986, 33-4 and esp. 178-89), both with references to the evidence; also cf. below,
n. 41.
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The main ingredients of the Aëtian lemma can be paralleled from the rather laboured
introductory paragraph of the Ars grammatica of Diomedes (ca. 370 CE, so about four
centuries later), though their order is different (as are also the contents of the physical
paragraph) and though, more importantly, the etymological explanation is lacking:
T 2 [others begin elsewhere], but we are happy to begin with speech (oratio = lÒgow).
For this, (d) revealing the secrets of the heart,
(a)/(b) transfers itself to the tongue which steers it, being guided by a certain mobile
breath
(d) of the articulate voice (vox articulata = fvnØ ¶naryrow)
(a)/(b) and by the rounded steering of its helm, and since the internal air which is near
(it) is struck by the adroitness of the heart, and the palate slowly and gradually made to
reverberate,
(d) it [sc., speech] is impelled, as a sort of intermediary and betrayer of the human mind,
to express the indications of the thinking mind in a rational way through the mouth and
through spoken language.
(c)/(d) By this its specific and great gift, reason expressed in spoken language, nature
alone declares and proves that we are humans, separated from the other animals .9)
9)
Gr.L. I p. 300.6-13 Keil, cf. FDS 517 (passage already cited by Schmidt (1839, 18 n. 31)) ‘[…]
nos vero ab ipsa oratione auspicemur. (d) haec enim secreta pectoris arguens (a)/(b) ad linguam
sui gubernatricem migrat, mobili quodam (d) vocis articulatae (a)/(b) spiritu rotundoque
gubernaculi moderamine temperata, et interiore vicino aere pectoris argutia verberato palatoque
sensim paulatimque pulsato (d) velut internuntius ac proditor humanae mentis ad indicia
exprimenda cogitationis per os sermonemque rationabiliter agitatur. (c)/(d) hoc enim suo
magnoque natura beneficio, expressa ratione sermonis, nos ceteris separatos animalibus sola
homines fatetur atque demonstrat’. For the expression secreta pectoris cf. Sen. Ben. 6.38.5, Tac.
Ger. 22.4; for the role of the physiological apparatus cf. also the references cited below, n. 15 ad
finem. Note that Diomedes is so to speak old-fashioned and wholly unaware of the revisions
argued by Galen, for which see Baumgarten (1962, 108-72).
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Diomedes, otherwise a far from original author though his treatise differs from the
general trend in grammar in treating the partes orationis or parts of speech first,10) has
committed a rhetorical tour de force in the proem of book one, jumping back and forth
from the physical to the cognitive aspect and indulging in choice expressions.11) Even so,
we can hardly fail to notice that the crucial distinction between humans, endowed by
nature with rational thought and spoken language on one side, and all other living beings
on the other, which is implicit in paragraphs (c) plus (d) of the Aëtian lemma, is here
spelled out explicitly. And whereas the doxographical passage simply states that the
‘articulate voice’ reveals what is thought, Diomedes uses more forceful language,
stressing that unspoken thoughts are secret, and that when spoken they are in a way
betrayed. We shall encounter further examples of this dramatic approach in section 3,
below.
Other parallels, which as to their lay-out are closer to the Aëtian lemma—that is to say
especially for the combination of the contents of paragraphs (c) and (d) in the same
sequence, and by the inclusion of versions of the etymological explicatio—are to be
found in the so-called Commentaria on Dionysius Thrax, the remains of commentaries
dating from late Antiquity and Byzantine times and separated from Aëtius by seven
centuries or more. I adduce three passages containing variously phrased but as to contents
very similar or even virtually identical information. As we shall see one cannot exclude
that one of these passages depends on one of the others; what is implied is at the very
least a shared tradition.
The first to be quoted (T 3.1) is from the Scholia Vaticana. Hilgard in his edition
attributes the paragraph from which I quote to the (otherwise unknown?) grammarian
th
Stephanus (early 7 cent.),12) but this attribution is not certain. The distinction between
10)
See Ax (1986, 17-22) and HLL 5 (1989) § 524 (Schmidt (1989, 132-6)).
11)
Dammer (2001, 68-9).
12)
Hilgard (1901, 180); Gudeman (1929, 2399) says he is “nur als Erklärer der Grammatik des
Dionysios Thrax [...] bekannt.” Wolska-Conus (1989) argues that Stephanus of Athens and
Stephanus of Alexandria are the same person, to be situated in an environment indebted to
Philoponus. She fails to mention the study of grammar, though Philoponus also taught grammar.
It is anyhow unlikely that our grammarian is to be identified with the Athenian, because in a
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kur€vw and kataxrhstik«w in (c) is explicit, just as in the Aëtian lemma; it is
exemplified here by quotations from the (authoritative) Iliad. And in paragraph (d) two
rather similar etymologies are spelled out at some length, while the ‘physical’ paragraph
(e), here not at the beginning but ad finem, is somewhat different:
T 3.1 (c) Note that phô-nê ‘(voice’) in the proper sense is said of humans, as in the poet:
‘not if I had ten tongues, and ten mouths, and a voice that cannot be broken’; in a loose (or:
improper) sense ‘voice’ is also said of others, as Homer said of the trumpet: ‘just as when
a voice is clear, when a trumpet calls’.
(d1) phô-nê (‘voice’) is formed from phô, phainô (‘bring to light’), coming to be through
addition of the syllable –nê [pho]13) phô-nê; for it brings the thoughts (§nyumÆmata) to
light and brightly clarifies them;
(d2) or because it is a sort of phôto-noê (‘light-thought’),14) for it brings forth the thoughts
of the no-os (‘mind’) into the phô-s (‘light’).
(e) voice is defined as follows: voice is a sort of breath brought up from a proper apparatus
and blood as far as the tongue, being struck by which it is articulated and transmitted as
intelligible to the ears of one’s fellow-men.15)16)
passage in the Schol.Vat. dealing with questions and answers attributed to him by Hilgard his
example of a po›ow-question is po›ow St°fanow; and the answer is ı fiatrÒw, S D.T.
p.239.21-2 Hilgard; see Gudeman (1932, 403). He accordingly distinguished at least two
different persons. But I cannot deal with the Stephanus-problem here.
13)
Bracketed by Hilgard; see however below, n. 24. For the four main ways of explaining, or
implementing, a change in a word or phrase see the list at Quint. 1.5.38-41, where also
alternative views are discussed; of these four three were already known to Pl. Crt. 394b. See Ax
(1987). Here we have addition (adiectio); see further below, nn. 32 (adiectio) and 40
(immutatio), and text thereto.
14)
The word fvtonÒh is only paralleled in T 3.2 (d), see below n. 19, and in the additamentum
from the Etymologicum Genuinum in the Etymologicum Gudianum quoted below, n. 40.
15)
S D.T. p. 181.28-182.2 Hilgard, (c) fist°on d¢ ˜ti ≤ fvnØ kur€vw <m¢n>
l°getai §p‹ t«n ényr≈pvn, …w parå t“ poihtª (B 489 f.) “oÈd' e‡ moi
d°ka
m¢n
gl«ssai,
d°ka
d¢
stÒmat'
e‰en,
fvnÆ
t'
êrrhktow”:
kataxrhstik«w d¢ ka‹ §f' •t°rvn l°getai fvnÆ, …w §p‹ sãlpiggow
e‰pen
ÜOmhrow
(S
219)
“…w
d'
˜t'
8
érizÆlh
fvnÆ,
˜te
t'
‡axe
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The second passage (T 3.2) is from the Scholia Londinensia. This is closely parallel to
the passage from the Scholia Vaticana just quoted, paragraph T 3.2 (c) being virtually
identical with T 3.1 (c), while paragraph T 3.2 (d), the only one I need translate, is
shorter and a shade different. Hilgard in his edition attributes the paragraph from which I
quote to the grammarian Heliodorus, who is believed to have excerpted Choeroboscus so
sãlpigj”. (d1) sxhmat€zetai d¢ ≤ fvnØ parå tÚ f«, tÚ fa€nv, katå
prÒslhcin sullab∞w t∞w <nh> ginom°nh [f«] fvnÆ: fa€nei går ka‹
lampr«w dhlo› tå §nyumÆmata (d2) µ ˜ti fvtonÒh t€w §stin: aÏth går
tå toË noÚw §nyumÆmata efiw f«w §jãgei.
(e) ır€zetai d¢ ≤ fvnØ oÏtvw: fvnÆ §sti pneËmã ti épÚ sustÆmatow
fid€ou ka‹ a·matow énaferÒmenon ßvw t∞w gl≈tthw, Íf' ∏w tuptÒmenon
diaryroËtai
ka‹
nohtÚn
ta›w
plhs€on
ékoa›w
parad€dotai.
This
‘physical’ definition (two parallels cited below, n. 19) is not so easy to place, see Schenkeveld
(1990b, 300); it is also in some respects very old-fashioned, see above, n. 9 ad finem. The
sÊsthma ‡dion remains unclear; could it represent the heart? The contribution of the tongue
can of course often be paralleled, see X. Mem. 1.4.12, Ar. HA 4.9.535a27-b3, and then e.g.
Diomedes (T 2 (a)(b) + (d), above, n. 9 and text thereto) and the Philonian texts (T 7.2 and 7.3)
quoted in section 3 below, while the ears of one’s fellow men are referred to implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly) in most of the texts about fvnÆ quoted in the present study. See also
Porphyry’s exegesis of Pl. Ti. 67b (cf. below, text to n. 110), in Harm. p. 47.29 Düring,
plÆssei ≤m«n tØn a‡syhsin ı éÆr, ‘the air strikes our sense organ’. So this
definition has a bit of everything, just as Plutarch’s account at Gen.Socr. 589C and even
Nemesius’ at nat.hom. p. 71.16-72.2 Morani.
FDS 503A contains p. 181.18-32 Hilgard up to and including paragraph (c).
16)
A very briefly phrased parallel for the etymologies is found in the Canones sive De
orthographia of the grammarian Theognostus (9th cent.), § 538.1 Cramer, fvnØ parå tÚ
f«w ka‹ noËw: ≤ tå §n t“ n“ fvt€zousa (‘phô-nê from phô-s and no-ûs; what
illuminates what is in the mind’).
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must be later than the first half of the 9th century.17) I do not think one can exclude that
Heliodorus(?) excerpted Stephanus(?) here. Note however that the etymological
explanation of fvnÆ through faonÆ is not found in T 3.1 (d2):
T 3.2 (d1) phô-nê (‘voice’) is spoken of as in a way being phao-nê18) (‘light’-nê) which
means splendidly clarifying the thoughs (noÆmata);
(d2) or because it is a sort of phôto-noê (‘light-thought’), from its illuminating (i.e.
revealing) the mind.19)
17)
Hilgard (1901, 482). For the date of Choeroboscus see Montanari (1997); for the relation of
Heliodorus to Choeroboscus the best account I have seen is still that of Hoerschelman (1874, 468).
18)
The quasi-hapax faonÆ is only paralleled in the explanation of fvnÆ at EM p. 803.52-6
Kallierges: fvnÆ: parå tÚ f«w ka‹ tÚn noËn, ≤ tå §n t“ n“ fvt€zousa:
µ tÚ toË noÚw f«w: parå tÚ fãow e‰nai toË noÒw: diå går t∞w fvn∞w
tå t∞w cux∞w §nyumÆmata gin≈skomen, faonÆ tiw oÔsa, ka‹ fvnÆ. The
etymology of fvnÆ from (noÚw) f«w is cited by Betz (1973, 272 n. 3) with reference to this
passage; he calls it “erbaulich”; following Steinthal (see next n.) he sees the etymology of fvnÆ
as f«w toË noË as Stoic (1973, 285 n. 6), but see next n., and below, section 4.
19)
S D.T. p. 483.5-6 Hilgard, fvnØ d¢ l°getai oflone‹ faonÆ tiw oÔsa,
tout°sti lampr«w dhloËsa tå noÆmata: µ fvtonÒh tiw oÔsa, parå tÚ
fvt€zein tÚn noËn (for faonÆ see above, n. 18, for fvtonÒh nn. 14 and 15). This
etymological account is followed by the same ‘physical’ definition as in paragraph (e) of the
passage cited above, n. 15. Another passage that is entirely parallel, from (c) up to and including
‘physical’ definition (e), is found in a late tract, [Theodosius] Per‹ grammatik∞w p. 16.6-19
Göttling. Here (d) is formulated as follows, p. 16.11-5: e‡rhtai d¢ fvnØ diå tÚ e‰nai
f«w noË, ≥goun ≤ tå §n t“ n“ fvt€zousa: tå går §ndiãyeta ka‹
kekrumm°na toË noË fanerå ≤m›n ≤ fvnØ §mpoie›, ka‹ tå noÆmata
lampr«w de€knusin. The etymological part of this passage is quoted by Schmidt (1839,
18 n. 31) and Heinze (1872, 142). It is discussed by Steinthal (1891, 285), who writes: “Die
Sprache aber, ı lÒgow, ist die Offenbarung dieser Vernunft [noËw], was die Stoiker auch in
dem Namen fvnÆ ausgedrückt fanden; denn nach ihnen war die Etymologie dieses Wortes f«w
noË”. There is however no evidence that the etymology is Stoic, see below, section 4.
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The third of these passages (T 3.3), an explanation of tÒnow (‘pitch accent’), is from
the Scholia Vaticana too, and again from a passage attributed to Stephanus by Hilgard in
his edition (1901, 174). No explicit reference in (c) here to the distinction between
kur€vw and kataxrhstik«w, but the distinction between the human voice issuing
from the mind and that of animals (i.e. here those animals which can imitate human
speech) is stated explicitly.20) The etymological explicatio uses other means to arrive at
the same conclusion:
T 3.3 (c) He says that pitch is a resonance of the enharmonic, or rather of the articulate,
that is to say the human voice; for only the human voice is articulate.
(d) This is why ‘man’ (ênyrvpow) is called phô-s, the voice (phô-nê) being in some way
luminous (phôtonoeidê),21) because it illuminates (i.e. reveals) and makes clear what is
inside the mind.
(c)(d) Accordingly the [sc., voice] sent out from the mind and going back to the mind is
also called enharmonic, i.e. articulate [...].
(c) Since there also other living beings, which imitate the enharmonic voice and speak in
such a way that one believes to hear a human being, should we therefore say that their
Steinthal’s claim is presumably based on the fact that the [Theodosian] passage is quoted by
Schmidt in his book on Stoic grammar.
20)
For another and differently worded parallel for the distinction between the human voice and
that of animals and lifeless things see S D.T. p. 130.8-21 Hilgard; cf. also Tabarroni (1988, 106).
For Stoic views of animals capable of imitating human speech see the passages cited below, n.
48.
21)
The word fvteinoeid∞ is only paralleled at S E. Hipp. 740, p. 92.8 Schwartz. The
etymology of fvnÆ from f«w/f≈w (= ênyrvpow) is paralleled Elias in Porph. p. 37.1-4
Busse, koinvnoËmen d¢ éllÆloiw diå fvn«n, ˜yen ka‹ fvnØ e‡rhtai …w
efiw f«w êgousa tå toË noË gennÆmata, diÚ ka‹ f∆w mÒnow ı ênyrvpow
l°getai …w polÁ tÚ fvtistikÚn ¶xvn ka‹ §jaggeltikÒn: o�tow går
ka‹ tå gnvstikå •autoË pãyh §jagg°llei diå t∞w fvn∞w t∞w §nãryrou
ktl. See also below, n. 31 and text thereto.
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voice too is enharmonic? We say it is not, for it imitates the voice of man, but is not sent
out from a mind.22)
In paragraph T 3.3 (d) I have printed fvw in the footnote without accent, to highlight
the etymological wordplay: f≈w, ‘man’ (synonym of ênyrvpow, ‘man’), is identified
with f«w (contraction of fãow),‘light’,23) in order to provide an explanatory etymology
for fv(-nÆ) as the exclusive property of humans. This wordplay is paralleled in T 4.2
below. ‘What is inside the mind’ are, obviously, thoughts.
The derivation at T 3.2 (d1) of phô-nê from a monosyllabic verbal root phô, said to be
equivalent to phai-nô, which is then supported by an explicatio, or explanatory comment,
viz. ‘for it brings the thoughts to light and brightly clarifies them’, is attributed to the
grammarian Philoxenus (late 1st cent. BCE) by the editor of his remains.24) The formula
22)
S D.T. p. 175.5-9 Hilgard, (c) l°gei d¢ tÚn tÒnon e‰nai épÆxhsin t∞w
§narmon€ou fvn∞w, ≥goun t∞w §nãryrou, tout°sti t∞w ényrvp€nhw:
mÒnh
går
≤
toË
ényr≈pou
fvnØ
¶naryrow: (d)
˜yen
ka‹
fvw
ı
ênyrvpow, …w e‰nai aÈtØn fvteinoeid∞ tina, tØn fvt€zousan ka‹
safhn€zousan tå §ntÚw toË noË. (c)(d) ˜yen ka‹ §narmÒniÒw §sti,
tout°sin ¶naryrow, ≤ épÚ diano€aw §kpempom°nh ka‹ efiw diãnoian
énerxom°nh [...]. (c) §pe‹ d¢ ka‹ êlla §st‹ z“a tØn §narmÒnion fvnØn
épomimoÊmena,
ka‹
fy°ggetai
…w
doke›n
ényr≈pou
ékoÊein,
îra
kéke€nvn e‡poimen §narmÒnion e‰nai tØn fvnÆn; fam¢n oÎ: mime›tai
går tØn toË ényr≈pou fvnÆn, oÈk épÚ diano€aw d¢ §kp°mpetai.
23)
Cf. above, n. 18. Tabarroni (1988, 107 n. 9) is the only scholar I know of who has noticed the
parallel between this D.T. scholium with Aët. 4.19.1, but he errs in stating that the scholium has
“light (phôs)”, and has failed to notice the parallels in T 3.1 and 3.2. For the derivation from
f≈w see below, n. 31 and thext thereto.
24)
Fragment abstracted from the passage quoted above, n. 15: S D.T. p. 181.33-5 Hilgard =
Philox.Gramm. fr. *195 Theodoridis (1976, 179), sxhmat€zetai d¢ ≤ fvnØ parå tÚ
f«, tÚ fa€nv, katå prÒslhcin sullab∞w t∞w nh ginom°nh: f« fvnÆ:
fa€nei går ka‹ lampr«w dhlo› tå §nyumÆmata. This is an “erschlossenes
Fragment” (which is why it is preceded by an asterix); for Theodorides’ reasons see ibid., 76-7.
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parå tÚ f« tÚ fa€nv vel. sim. is also found in a named Philoxenus fragment from
the Etymologicum of Orion (5th cent. CE), and in four anonymous others which have been
plausibly attributed.25) And the explicatio is paralleled ad sententiam in two fragments
where the name Philoxenus has been preserved as well. In the lemma on frãzv we read
‘we accomplish the publication and demonstration of thoughts by speaking (frãzein)’,
and in that on frÆn (phrên, in the sense ‘mind’)26) we hear that the frÆn is that ‘from
which deliberations come forth’. In the anonymous but convincingly attributed fragment
concerned with frÒnimow, ‘prudent’, this explicatio is stated more fully: the frÆn is
that ‘from which deliberations and judgements come forth’.27) And the derivation of
words from monosyllabic verbal roots is the shibboleth of Philoxenus.
As is to be expected the corpus of so-called Etymologica contains further echoes, or
versions, of the etymological explanations of fvnÆ. Critical editions are only available
for parts, or sections, so often enough one does not know what the transmission and
interrelations of the extant manuscript versions of this succession of treatises are.
It will be clear that I cannot agree with his remark that this “Glosse” has not been “andersweitig
überliefert”. Note that he reads fv fvnÆ:, so keeps fv, expunged by Hilgard (above, n. 13).
25)
Philox.Gramm. fr. 26 Th. ap. Orion Et. p. 160.23-7 Sturz, FilÒjenow §n t“ Per‹
monosullãbvn =hmãtvn, and frs. *40, *55, *60 and *107 Th. But parå tÚ f« tÚ
fa€nv is also found in passages that are perhaps less easily attributable, such as Et.Gud. v.
f≈skv, p. 560.35-7 Sturz
d¢ parå tÚ f« tÚ fa€nv, ka‹ pleonasm“ toË skv, or EM v. ¶rifow, p. 375.710 Kallierges, ¶rifow: ı mikrÚw a‡j, µ ≤ mikrå a‡j. parå tÚ ¶ar ka‹ tÚ
f«, tÚ fa€nv, §ãrifow ka‹ ¶rifow katå sugkopØn, ı §n t“ ¶ari
fainÒmenow, ≥goun pr≈Ûmow. ı goËn §n t“ xeim«ni texye‹w, x€marow.
26)
frÆn is standardly identified with diãnoia in the lexica, e.g. Suda v. phi 709, and
elsewhere, e.g. Gal. Hipp.Off.Med. XVIIIB p. 649.18-9 Kühn (SVF 2.135 1st text, cf. below, n.
48), tØn diãnoian, ¥n te ka‹ noËn ka‹ fr°na ka‹ lÒgon koin«w ofl
ênyrvpoi kaloËsin.
27)
Fr. 27a) Th., […] t«n går nohy°ntvn ¶kdosin ka‹ de›jin diå toË
frãzein poioÊmeya. oÏtv FilÒjenow §n t“ Per‹ monosullãbvn; fr. 29a)
Th., […] frÆn, éf' ∏w pro˝etai tå bouleÊmata. oÏtv FilÒjenow; fr.
*194a) Th., […] frÆn, éf' ∏w pro˝etai tå bouleÊmata ka‹ afl gn«mai.
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Accordingly the evidence is not as good as one would like it to be, but still, one supposes,
sufficiently reliable to be used. For one of the sources of the Etymologica, the Epimerismi
Homerici, the situation is good thanks to Dyck’s magisterial editions. Dyck moreover
quotes or refers to parallel passages in the Etymologica in his second apparatus, using ms.
evidence where no critical edition is available.28) Even so, I do not pretend to have
found all the lemmas in the Etymologica containing parallels that may be relevant, nor
shall I quote all those I have collected.
Early instances are found in the Etymologicum of Orion (a work cited above in
connection with the Philoxenus fragment). In the first of these brief entries we find the
term lÒgow in the sense of ‘speech’, or ‘discourse’ (compare the proem to book one of
Diomedes’ Ars quoted above (T 2) where the equivalent used is oratio):
T 4.1 phô-nê (‘voice’): what illuminates the (contents) of the mind (noûs) through speech
(lÒgow).29)
This is immediately followed, ibid., by two etymologies of f≈w, ‘man’:
T 4.2 phô-s: ‘man’ (ênyrvpow), the only one to illuminate the (contents) of the mind
(diano€a) through speech (lÒgow); alternatively from ‘phô’ ‘speak’ (l°gv);30) for man
is a rational (logikÒn) animal.31)
28)
I have consulted Reizenstein (1897) and (1907), Alpers (1969), Serrano Aybar (1977, 102-5),
Dyck (1983, 5-16, 22-33), Dyck (1995, 23-48, 848-64), and Tosi (1998); Schironi (2004, 16-25)
was not yet available to me.
29)
Orion Etym. p. 160.12 Sturz, fvnÆ: ≤ fvt€zousa t“ lÒgƒ tå toË noË.
30)
The formula parå tÚ f« tÚ l°gv (cf. attributed frs. *55, *159 and *191 Th.) is not
implausibly attributed to Philoxenus too by Theodoridis, whose fr. *196a)—abstracted from this
very Orion passage—runs: f≈w: … µ parå tÚ f« tÚ l°gv: logikÚn går z“on
ı ênyrvpow. Note that the part omitted by Theodorides is paralleled ad sententiam at
Philox.Gramm. fr. *195 Th., see above nn. 24 and 27. But parå tÚ f« tÚ l°gv also occurs
in passages which are less easily attributable (e.g. EM v. frãzv, p. 799.21 f. Kallierges).
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The remark in T 4.1 that the contents of the mind are revealed by means of lÒgow
entails that fvnÆ in this sense cannot be attributed to other living beings; T 4.2, where it
is said that man is the only one to do this, states this even more clearly. We should note
the wordplay which is the same as in T 3.3 (d) above: f≈w, ‘man’, is put on a par with
f«w, ‘light’. The etymological point in T 4.1 and T 4.2 about the illumination of the
contents of the mind is also paralleled in T 3.1 to T 3.3 above. Orion’s treatise is earlier
than the paragraphs of the Commentaria in Dionysium Thracem from which I have
quoted above, so one could argue that what is found there derives from (a fuller version
of ?) this Etymologicum, though naturally one cannot be certain.
A very similar explicatio is preserved in a lemma of Orion concerned with another
verb meaning ‘to speak’:
T 5.1 To speak clearly (phtheggesthai): is produced [viz., from pheggesthai] by the
insertion of the y (‘th’). For to shine (pheggesthai) is derived from bright light (pheggos).
Note that it [viz., phtheggesthai] is said from the bringing into light (phôs) of the
operations (kinÆmata) of the mind (toË noË).32)
31)
Orion Etym. p. 160.13-5 Sturz, f≈w: ı ênyrvpow, ı mÒnow tå t∞w diano€aw
fvt€zvn
t“
lÒgƒ,
µ
parå
tÚ
f«
tÚ
l°gv:
logikÒn
går
z“on
ˆ
ënyrvpow. Cf. Ep.Hom. f 15, p. 724.1-2 Dyck, and the parallels cited ad loc. by Dyck
(1995), among which a passage from the Et.Gen. Also cf. Apollon. Lex. p. 166.1-2 Bekker,
f«tew: ofl ênyrvpoi, épÚ toË fvt€zein tå nooÊmena pãnta diå toË
lÒgou.
32)
Orion Etym. p. 162.12-4 Sturz, fy°ggesyai: pleonasm“ toË <y>. f°ggesyai
går §st‹ parå tÚ f°ggow, ˜ §sti tÚ f«w. e‡rhtai oÔn parå tÚ efiw
f«w êgein tå toË noË kinÆmata. Insertion (adiectio) is a standard explanation or
effectuation of change, see above, n. 13. The expression noË (or diano€aw, or cux∞w)
kinÆmata in the sense cogitata, ‘thoughts’, is quite common, see e.g. S.E. M. 7.221-2, 8.11-3
(LS 33B), 70, 137-9, D.L. 9.70, the Nemesius passage referred to above, n. 6 and partly quoted
below, n. 48, and nat.hom. p. 71.9-10 (see below, n. 145), Cic. N.D. 3.71 mentis motus, Sen. Ep.
117.13 motus animorum enuntiativi corporum, Calc. p. 234.3 Waszink (SVF 2 p. 236.21 von
Arnim, see quotation below, n. 86). —Perhaps Plutarch alludes to this etymology, see Gen.Socr.
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The Byzantine Etymologica too preserve this sort of information. First, a passage from
the Etymologicum Gudianum, v. êsyma (I do not quote the whole entry):
T 5.2 phtheggesthai from phô, from the bringing to light (phôs) of the contents of the mind
(tå toË noË).33)
The compiler of this Etymologicum abstracted the entire lemma êsyma from the
Epimerismi Homerici plausibly attributed to Choeroboscus.34) Lentz, who quoted from
Cramer’s edition (1835) of the Epimerismi and from the Etymologicum Magnum, argued
that it derives from the Per‹ pay«n of Herodianus (2nd cent. CE), an attribution
provisionally accepted by Dyck (who ad loc. refers to the parallel in Orion) in his edition
of the Epimerismi.35)
Lentz also attributed other entries of similar content to this work.36) The most
interesting passage is found in Hdn. Path. fr. 220 Lenz, again deriving from the
Epimerismi for which now Dyck’s text is available:37)
589BC: humans get to know each others’ thoughts (noÆseiw) by means of voice, which is like
groping in the dark (ÍpÚ skÒtƒ), whereas the thoughts of the demons, which possess bright
light (f°ggow), shine upon (§llãmpousin) those able to <see> them (cf. also below, n. 89).
33)
Et.Gud. p. 211.12-3 di Stefani, tÚ fy°ggesyai parå tÚ f«, tÚ efiw f«w êgv
tå toË noË.
34)
Text at Dyck (1995, 105-6: a 143), where several parallel passages in the lexica are indicated
in the apparatus ad loc. For the attribution to Choeroboscus see ibid., 23-4.
35)
Lentz (1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 286) ad Hdn. Path. fr. *364, attribution accepted by Dyck
(1995, 105; for the text see now Dyck (1995) quoted in the previous note).
36)
See Lentz (1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 248) ad Hdn. Path. fr. 220, a cento composed by him from
passages in Et.Gud. and Ep.Hom.; for these texts see now Dyck (1995, 376: i 13 and 390-1: i
56), who attributes the first passage to [Hdn.] Ep..Hom. and the first part of the second to Hdn.
Path. and Cath.Pr. Finally Lentz (1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 371) ad Hdn. Path. fr. *627, quoted by
him from EM.
37)
Lentz (1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 248); better text at Dyck (1995, 376: i 13, p. 376), who
attributes it to [Hdn.] Ep. Hom.
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T 5.3 About ‘strong’ (iphthimos) Seleucus says [it is derived] by the insertion of the ‘th’;38)
just as from bright light (pheggos) comes to shine (pheggesthai) and [from this again] to
speak clearly (phtheggesthai), from bringing the lÒgow into the light (phô-s).39)
With the grammarian Seleucus, a contemporary of Tiberius and a (later) rival of
Philoxenus, we find ourselves in the early 1st cent. CE. Though the methods of derivation
of these two men are different, Philoxenus starting from monosyllabic verbal stems,
Seleucus adding supernumerary letters, in the present case both are agreed that words
pertaining to speech and speaking are to be explained by having recourse to a semantic
element, viz. the etymological explanation by means of words for ‘light’ and ‘shine’. One
cannot, of course, exclude that Seleucus was inspired by Philoxenus, but as we shall see
the idea itself was sufficiently common to make a derivation from a single source most
unlikely.
We should also cite the first explanation, in an additamentum to the Etymologicum
Gudianum deriving from the Etymologicum Genuinum (2nd half of the 9th cent.), of a
synonym of fvnÆ, viz. aÈdÆ (‘human voice’, ‘speech’, ‘sound’) via a synonym of f«w,
viz. aÈgÆ:
38)
This phrase is more intelligible in Dyck (1995, 390: i 56, p. 390.79-81), where anonymous
‘others’ (i.e. other than Herodianus mentioned at the beginning of the entry) derive ‡fyimow
in this way via ‰fi. For insertion see above, n. 32.
39)
Ep.Hom. i 13, p. 376.83-5 Dyck = Seleucus fr. 1 Müller, <§p‹> toË ‡fyimow ı
S°leukow
l°gei
pleonasmÚn
e‰nai
toË
y,
Àsper
parå
tÚ
f°ggow
f°ggesyai ka‹ fy°ggesyai, parå tÚ efiw f«w proãgein tÚn logon. Dyck
ad loc. says that it may come from Hdn. Path., as Lentz believed, but is very skeptical about
Lentz’ claim that Herodianus said he agreed with Seleucus. We may add that the words ka‹
≤me›w sugkatatiy°meya t“ SeleÊkƒ which Lentz apparently claims to have taken
from the text at p. 208 of Cramer’s edition of the Ep.Hom. are not in fact to be found there, and I
have been unable to establish their provenance.
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T 6 aud-ê: voice (phô-nê); it is said from aug-ê (‘bright light’) through substitution of d
for g; (audê/augê is that) through which the (contents) of the mind (noû) are shone upon
and illuminated (phot-izetai). And voice (pho-nê) the same, because it is a sort of phôtonoê (‘light-thought’).40)
An etymology of aÈdÆ is not found in texts T 1 and T 3 - T 5, but the link between
light (in T 6 aÈgÆ as well as f«w) and the expression of thought contents by speaking is
the same in all these passages, and the etymology of fvnÆ through fvtonoÆ at the
end is only paralleled in T 3.2 (d2) and T 3.3 (d2) above.
The evidence studied in this section demonstrates that the second part of the first
lemma of the Aëtian chapter On Voice can be paralleled in various ways in what we may
call a grammatical tradition. In one branch of this tradition, that of the Etymologica, the
material is (unsurprisingly) limited to versions and varieties of the etymological
ingredient. Two virtually identical passages in the Commentaria in Dionysium Thracem
are closer to the Aëtian lemma because they not only contain etymological explanations
but also a paragraph on the distinction between fvnÆ in the proper and in the loose, or
improper, sense, and a (different) physical description. In the third parallel passage from
the Commentaria (T 3.3) and in that in Diomedes (T 2) quoted above the etymology is
lacking.
40)
Et.Gud. add. p. 231.22-3 di Stefani, aÈdÆ: fvnÆ: e‡rhtai parå tÚ aÈgÆ §n
tropª toË <g> efiw <d>: di' ∏w aÈgãzetai ka‹ fvt€zetai tå toË noË:
ka‹ fvnØ tÚ aÈtÒ, fvtonoÆ tiw oÔsa (for fvtonoÆ cf. above, nn. 14 and 15). Di
Stefani ad loc. notes that this derives from the Etymologicum Genuinum, information he received
from Reitzenstein, see (ibid., iii). ‘Substitution’ (immutatio) too is an old etymological ploy, cf.
above, n. 13. —I note in passing that Gal. Hipp.Epid., XVIIA p. 757.6-759.8 Kühn (first part at
SVF 2.144 2nd text = FDS 478; partly in SVF 2.144 1st text = FDS 477, from the spurious
commentary on Hum. so to be discounted), explaining the co-occurrence of ênaudow and
êfvnow at [Hipp.] Epid. 3.17.(3), and also Def., XIX p. 79.16-80.3 Kühn, argues against the
view (attested Erot. p. 44.3-6 Klein, cf. e.g. Hsch., Suid., and Phot. s.vv.) that ênaudow and
êfvnow are synonyms; ênaudow, he posits, pertains to human speech only; see further Ax
(1986, 207-9).
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In the sections that follow we shall see that the evidence for the etymological
explanation (and also that for the physiological account) is not limited to grammatical or
lexicographical sources, so that we need not assume that whoever composed the Aëtian
lemma depended on a grammarian’s account of ‘voice’. We should moreover keep in
mind to what extent it ultimately derives from several dialogues of Plato, that is to say is
linked with a philosophical tradition. The extant Commentaria presuambly derive to a
large extent from the comments on Dionysius’ grammar by people who (like John
Philoponus derive) also taught philosophy, and they also contain other philosophical
items, such as definitions of definition, of technê, etc. 41) Accordingly, the passages from
these commentaries quoted above may ultimately be indebted to a philosophical as well
as a grammatical tradition.
3. Philo, Cicero, Heraclitus the Allegorist
Two species of human speech are mentioned in a passage of Philo of Alexandria (early
1st cent. CE), which lacks the etymology but provides an explanation which comes quite
close:
T 7.1 […] and beside truth he set a kindred quality which he called ‘clarification’
(dÆlvsiw); these [i.e. truth and clarification] represent both (species of) speech we
possess, viz. the internal and the uttered (§ndiay°tou te ka‹ proforikoË). For
41)
For a related passage in a philosophical commentary see the quotation from Elias, above n.
21. I cannot enter here into a discussion of the treatment of question per‹ fvn∞w by the late
Neoplatonist commentators in general; for some comments see Tabarroni (1988, passim), Chiesa
(1992, 16, 29). For definitions of definition in the S in D.T. see e.g. ‘Aristotle’, p. 107.1-2
Hilgard, ‘Chrysippus’, ibid. p. 107.5 (SVF 2.226 ), and‘Antipater the Stoic’, ibid. p. 107.6-7
(SVF 3 Ant. 23); for versions of the standard Stoic definition of technê (cf. SVF 1.73, 2.94) see
ibid. pp. 2.24-6, 6.20-1, 26.24-6, 108.31-3, 157.18-29, 161.27-9, 445.12-3; for an instance of the
diaphonia referred to above, n. 8, see ibid. p. 482.9-14.
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the uttered requires clarification, by which the hidden thoughts in each of us (tå éfan∞
t«n kay' ßkaston ≤m«n §nyÊmia) are made known to our fellow-men […].42)
There are, as a matter of fact, quite a few passages dealing with ‘voice’, and ‘speech’,
in Philo’s oeuvre which contain most of the ingredients studied in the previous sections
of this study, though the majority lack the etymology. Look for instance at his account of
‘articulate voice’. Philo insists on the crucial difference between men and animals,
describes the physical process of the production of voice as sound upon which
articulation and reason are imprinted, and declares that speech is the herald and
interpreter of the mind:
T 7.2 As to articulate voice (§nãryrou fvn∞w), moreover, an advantage possessed by
man alone of all living creatures, there are particulars of which we are aware; as, for
example, that it is sent up from the mind (diano€aw), that it is in the mouth that it
acquires articulation, that it is the stroke of the tongue that imparts articulation (tÚ
¶naryron) and speech to the (pneumatic) tension of the voice; it does not produce a
mere idle sound and formless noise (cilØn
…
fvnØn
érgØn
ka‹
édiatÊpvton ∑xon), as it performs for the suggesting mind the function of its herald
or interpreter (kÆrukow µ •rmhn°vw …tãjin).43)
42)
Ph. Spec. 4.69; tr. here and in the following passages by Colson — Whittaker, modified. For
other Philonic passages where ‘internal speech’ and ‘uttered speech’ occur (or are hinted at) see
FDS 530-534 (none of these is in SVF). Add Congr. 33-4, Mut. 69; also Anim. 12 and 98, see the
instructive comments of Terian (1981, 125-6, 203-4). Good brief overview at Betz (1973, 285);
Otte (1968, 131-9) is to be used with caution. For the ‘hidden’ thoughts cf. below, T 7.3 and nn.
86 and 89 and text thereto.
43)
Phil. Det. 40. Cf. Mos. 2.127 (FDS 531), Migr. 71 (FDS 530), Migr. 117, Congr. 33, Mut. 69.
Hülser (1987, 564-7, i.e. FDS 515-8) has a paragraph “Der Verstand als Quelle der Rede”, a
theme for which he also refers to passages elsewhere in his collection. But FDS 515 (SVF 2.840)
does not provide independent evidence; this quasi-apophthegm is derived from Galen’s note
toioÊtoiw
d¢
ka‹
tØn
diãnoian
sumf≈nvw
éforizÒmenoi
l°gousin
aÈtØn phgØn e‰nai lÒgou embedded in his excerpt from Chrysippus at PHP 2.5.18, or
from the fragment itself (PHP 2.5.15-20; SVF 2.894, FDS 450). Tieleman (1996, 271 n. 38)
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The mind (diãnoia), according to Philo, is the ‘source’ (phgÆ) of speech, a formula
which is first found in a verbatim fragment of Chrysippus preserved by Galen.44)
The best parallel passage, Deter. 125-9, demonstrates that Philo not only knew the
etymology of fvnÆ as f«w noË vel. sim., but apparently also that of aÈdÆ from
aÈgÆ.45) It is too long to translate and quote in its entirety, so I merely present the
following abstract:
T 7.3 The Creator says he knows that uttered speech (tÚn … proforikÚn lÒgon),
the brother of the mind (diano€a), does speak […]. This speech speaks and talks and
interprets the thoughts (§nyumÆmata) for both me and you and all humans, and goes
out to meet the reasonings of the mind. For when the mind bestirs itself and receives an
impulse towards some object belonging to its own sphere, either moved from within
itself or experiencing various impressions from external objects, it becomes pregnant
and is in labour as to its thoughts (noÆmata). It wishes to be delivered of them, but
cannot, until the sound produced by the tongue and the other organs of speech takes the
thoughts (noÆmata) into its hands like a midwife, and brings them forth into the light
(f«w). This [viz., articulate sound produced by human adults] is the farthest-shining
(thlaugestãth) voice (fvnÆ) of our thoughts. For just as things laid up in darkness
are hidden, until a light (f«w) shines upon them and shows them, in the same way
thoughts (§nyumÆmata) are stored in the mind—a hidden place—until the voice,
illuminating (§naugãsasa) them like a light (oÂa f«w), uncovers them.46)
suggests that Galen’s source for this interpolation is a Stoic lexicon. For the ‘interpreter’ cf.
below, nn. 48 and 86.
44)
For Stoic antecedents of the formula ‘source of speech’ see below, text after n. 69.
45)
See above, n. 40 and text thereto; thlaugestãth and §naugãsasa in Philo’s text.
46)
Phil. Det. 126-8. Cf. Bas. hex. 3.2.8-16 Amand de Mendieta – Rudberg, esp. for Basil’s
formula §n t“ krupt“ nÒhma (it has escaped the editors that this passage is quoted in part
at Melet. nat.hom. p. 22.8-3.6 Cramer, without the author’s name but after a quotation from
another oration of Basil which is not anonymous). See further Gronau (1914, 69-71), also for
parallel passages. Gronau believes that what is in Basil is Stoic, but the evidence does not
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Most of the ingredients of this somewhat fulsome passage we have met before. It is
hard to miss the Platonizing colouring: the well-known ‘Socratic’ simile of pregnancy
and deliverance is here applied to the everyday act of speaking. The etymology of fvnÆ
is not Stoic either, but a considerable part of its further contents seems to be of Stoic
provenance. Philo himself, who is quite familiar with the discipline of grammar, ascribes
its development to the influence of ‘philosophy’. 47)
A similar concatenation of ideas is found in a Ciceronian passage (the epistemological
setting here, however, lacks the Platonizing element): men are distinguished from the
beasts by ratio, i.e. by what ‘enables us to draw inferences, to prove and disprove, to
discuss and solve problems, and to come to conclusions’. This ratio, clearly, is what in
other texts is called ‘internal speech’. The ‘rudimentary beginnings of intelligence’ are
imprinted via the senses. ‘Speech’ is characterized as ‘the mind’s interpreter’.48)
support this view, see section 4 below. For ‘hidden thoughts’ also cf. the Philo quotation above,
T 7.1, and n. 42 ad finem.
47)
For Philo’s familiarity with ‘grammar’ cf. Congr. 148-50 (SVF 2.99), on which see
Schenkeveld (1990a, 105-6) and (1990b, 306).
48)
Cic. Leg. 1.30 (for the formula cf. above, text to n. 43; below, n. 86). For Cicero on the
production of speech and the distinction between men and animals cf. e.g. N.D. 2.149 (FDS 518),
with Pease’s notes. For Cicero on exclusively human thought processes see e.g. N.D. 2.147, Off.
1.11, with Dyck’s notes, and the parallel at Gal. Hipp.Med.Off. XVIIIB p. 649.16-650.5 Kühn
st
(SVF 2.135, 1 text = FDS 528, cf. the first words quoted above, n. 26; Arnim omits the final
words ˜sa t' êlla toiaËta, Hülser prints them), but note that Galen mentions neither
Stoics (only ofl filÒsofoi in general) nor animals. Sext. M. 8.275-6 (~ SVF 2.223 and in
part 2.135, 2nd text; FDS 529, LS 53 T) speaks of humans differing from animals (such as
parrots, which may imitate them) because humans have internal speech (the translation of
lÒgow §ndiãyetow as ‘disposition intérieure’ in the French tr. of LS 53T is peculiar) and
presentation arising from inference and combination; cf. Chiesa (1991, 304-7), Labarrière (1993,
235-6), Long (1996a, 117-8). Chrysippus ap. Varr. L 56 (SVF 2.143; for the sequel, not in SVF,
see below, n. 66) is reported to have argued that parrots and children only have ‘quasi-speech’
(ut loqui = …sane‹ l°gein, cf. Pohlenz (1970-2, 1.40, 2.23)). Nemes. nat.hom. p. 71.9-13
Morani compromizes by saying that humans are the ‘most rational’ (mãlista logiko€) of
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We may conclude this section with passages from the Allegoriae, or Quaestiones
Homericae, of Heraclitus (date uncertain; possibly 1st cent. CE), who like others
identifies Hermes with lÒgow,49) manages to believe that internal and uttered speech are
implied in the Homeric descriptions of the god, and rather forcefully stresses that internal
speech is hidden:
T 8.1 This is why Homer called the internal (speech) chthonic (Hermes), for invisible it
lies, darkened, in the depths of the mind; but the uttered (speech) he located in the
heavens, because it is clear from far away.50)
Earlier in the same chapter Heraclitus explains Hermes’ epitheton ornans
érgeifÒnthw, insisting here as well that it is speech which lays bare the operations
of the mind:
T 8.2 Homer calls the god argeï-pho-ntês […] because only the reality of logos as a whole
clearly reveals what is thought.51)52)
all living beings through the presence of internal speech. Long and Sedley (1987, 2.319) point
out that Sext. M. 8.275-6 is certainly Stoic (see also Long 1972, 87), while Sorabji (1993, 80)
speaks of “unnamed philosophers”.
49)
Thus already Pl. Cra. 407e-408b. For parallels see van der Stockt (1990, 189), Ramelli (2003,
331-2).
50)
Heraclit. All. 72.18, diå toËt' oÔn ÜOmhrow tÚn m¢n §ndiãyeton e‰pe
xyÒnion, éfanØw går §n to›w t∞w diano€aw buyo›w épeskÒtvtai, tÚn
d¢ proforikÒn, §peidØ pÒrrvy°n §sti d∞low, §n oÈran“ kat–kisen.
Cf. Zeller, cited below, n. 59.
51)
Heraclit. All. 72.10-1, êrgeifÒnthn te går Ùnomãzei tÚn yeÒn […] §peidØ
m€a pantÚw lÒgou fÊsiw §kfa€nei §narg«w tÚ nooÊmenon.
52)
This etymology is paralleled in Cornutus’ Epitome of Greek Theology, from the middle of the
st
cent. CE, Corn. N.D. p. 21.11-3 Lang: ‘argeï-phon-tês is like argeï-phan-tês (‘white-
1
revealing’), from showing everything whitely [i.e. clearly] and making it clear; for the ancients
called ‘white’ (leukos) argos’ (érgeifÒnthw d° §st‹n oÂon érgefãnthw épÚ toË
leuk«w pãnta fa€nein ka‹ safhn€zein^tÚ går leukÚn érgÚn §kãloun
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4. Stoic Views
The etymologizing explicatio of fvnÆ from f«w is also known to the learned
Eustathius, who in a passage of his commentary on the Odyssey explaining the Sirens’
song (m 197-8) declares that
T 9 the definitions of voice as ‘air that has been struck’ or ‘the proper sense-object of
hearing’ are not to the point, for we clearly need here (the definition) ‘light of the mind’.
For such is uttered speech, which illuminates for the hearers the internal speech which is
practised in the heart.53)
ofl palaio€.) The etymology by means of érgÒw = leukÒw is also found in the
Etymologica, see Et.Gud. v. érgeifÒnthw, p. 186.3 de Stefani and three of the additamenta
quoted ibid. p. 185.14-186.25. The first explanation of the epitheton (paralleled in the same
additamenta), at p. 185.8-9, attributed to Alexion, Archias and Aristarchus, is similar to that
given by Heraclitus and Cornutus, viz. ‘from making the presentations clear’ (parå tÚ
§narge›w tåw fantas€aw poie›n). The inference that Heraclitus and Cornutus
depend on a shared tradition is unavoidable, cf. Ramelli (2003, 334-5), also for further parallels.
53)
Eust. in Od. 2.7.36-8 Stallbaum, thnikaËta går oÈ fam¢n ırismÚn fvn∞w
toiaÊthw tÚ é°ra peplhgm°non aÈtØn e‰nai µ ‡dion afisyhtÚn éko∞w,
éllå dhladØ f«w noË. toioËtow går ı proforikÚw lÒgow, diafvt€zvn
to›w ékroata›w tÚn §ndiãyeton, ˘w §n kard€& meletçtai. The context,
from p. 7.24 ff., where Eustathius discusses various terms for voice or speech, insists on the
difference between humans and others, and of course demonstrates his knowledge of the
Etymologica is interesting. The poet’s ‘daring expression is cured in a philosophical way through
etymology’ (p. 7.35, yerapeÊetai … filosÒfvw ≤ tÒlma di' §tumolog€aw). At
in Il. 4.237.6-7 van der Valk (SVF 1.74) he states disertis verbis that ‘air that has been struck’ is
‘Zeno’s definition of voice’ (tÚn katå ZÆnvna t∞w fvn∞w ˜ron), but Zeno in this late
author (as so often) probably represents ‘the Stoics’.
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Part of this terminology is Stoic, or had become Stoic. The etymological explanation
of fvnÆ is not Stoic,54) but the standard definitions of ‘voice’ as ‘air that has been
struck, or the proper sense-object of hearing’, which Eustathius here disprefers, are found
in the abstracts from the influential handbook On Voice by Diogenes of Seleucia in the
longer account of Stoic dialectic of Diogenes Laërtius book seven, and elsewhere.55)
However our evidence for the terminological speciality ‘internal speech’ / ‘uttered
speech’ as early Stoic is not good enough.56) Max Pohlenz, who rightly pointed this out,
54)
See below.
55)
D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17, LS 33H). Later also found in a passage containing doxographical
material, S D.T., Schol.Lond. p. 482.5-7 Hilgard (FDS 481, not in SVF; see Ax (1976, 166 n.
112)). At Simp. in Ph. p. 425.34-426.2 Diels the second of these definitions is anonymous and
the first attributed to Diogenes (cf. SVF 3 Diog. 19). Parallels from or (perhaps) attributable to
Apollonius Dyscolus are cited by Schneider (1910, 2); also see Dalimer (2001, 265) ad A.D.
Conj. p. 220.3-4 Schneider. Stroh (1998, 442) also adduces [Plu.] Mus. 1131D, ır€zontai
tØn fvnØn ofl êristoi grammatiko‹ é°ra peplhgm°non afisyhtÚn ékoª.
Cf. in a doxographical passage Gell. 5.15.6 (SVF 2.141): ‘Stoici … ictum aëra’ (see also below,
n. 110). See also Tabarroni (1988, 107), Ax (2002).
56)
One may compare the technical term ≤gemonikÒn, already attested in verbatim fragments
of Chrysippus ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.70 (SVF 2.898, §n tª kard€& m¢n toË ≤gemonikoË
ˆntow) and 3.7.11-2 (SVF 2.885, m°row ... tÚ ≤gemonikÒn, and per‹ d¢ toË
≤gemonikoË m°rouw t∞w cux∞w, where the presence of m°row reveals that the use is not
yet entirely technical). This formula seems to have been preceded by the somewhat less
technically sounding tÚ m°row tÚ ≤goÊmenon aÈt∞w (sc., t∞w cux∞w), Cleanthes on
Zeno at Ar. Did. fr. 39 Diels ap. Eus. PE 15.20.3 (SVF 1.141), expression paralleled [Gal.] Def.
XIX p. 365.9 Kühn, tÚ ≤goÊmenon t∞w cux∞w m°row, and Dio Or. 36.51 (SVF 2.602),
tÚ fronoËn ka‹ tÚ ≤goÊmenon aÈt∞w (sc., t∞w cux∞w). Galen knows it, see PHP
2.5.81. Chrysippus’ terminology is not fixed; to support the claim of the heart as seat of the
regent part through etymology he calls it tÚ kurieËon ka‹ kratoËn t∞w cux∞w
m°row, ap. Gal. PHP 3.5.28 (SVF 2.896). Arist. EN 3.5.1113a6 exceptionally has tÚ
≤goÊmenon for the ‘commanding part’ of ourselves (the mind according to Asp. in EN p.
74.32 Heylbut), though not explicitly as a part of the soul and certainly not as a technicality
(he is already thinking of the Homeric commanders adduced 1113a7 ff.).
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also argued that the doctrine behind the formula, pace the consensus among earlier
scholars, cannot be attributed to the early Stoics.57) It would have been quite generally
known in the Hellenistic period and cannot be linked with a specific school. Its
provenance is stated to be the debate on animal intelligence between Stoics and
Academics. According to Pohlenz “internal” and “uttered speech” are only explicitly
attributed to “the Stoics” by as late an authority as Porphyry, while Sextus Empiricus in
the parallel passages only speaks of the “Dogmatists”.58)
But these arguments have failed to convince me. Pohlenz’—in itself correct—point
that a variety of this idea is already found in Plato59) does not preclude that the Stoics
subscribed to it; in fact, he writes: “Zweiffellos entspricht die Lehre [viz., die Scheidung
der beiden Logoi] den Anschauungen der alten Stoa”. But on the next page he takes this
back again: “Die Scheidung der beiden Logoi ist für die alte Stoa ausgeschlossen”.60) It is
also odd that he fails to exploit the fact that the (as he knows) parallel accounts of the
‘internal speech’ and ‘uttered speech’ which animals are claimed to possess in Philo,
Sextus Empiricus, and Porphyry must go back to a common source earlier than Philo.61)
57)
Pohlenz (1970-2, 2.21-2) “[d]ie Termini wie die Lehre sind der alten Stoa fremd” (my
emphasis). For details see his “Anhang: LÒgow §ndiãyetow und lÒgow proforikÒw”,
Pohlenz (1939, 191-8 = 1965, 79-86), followed e.g. by Waszink (1962, 55: “hanc distinctionem
non necessarie ad Stoicos referendam esse recte monet Pohlenz”), Babut (1973, 73 with nn. 9
and 10), van der Stockt (1991, 188-90), and Chiesa (1991, 312-4); Pohlenz’ argument is
criticized unsuccessfully by Mühl (1962, 8-16).
58)
Porph. Abst. 3.2, p. 187.20-4 Nauck (FDS 529A); cf. below, n. 61 and text thereto for the
context from which it is quoted.
59)
See already Zeller (1865, 61 n. 1), slightly revised Zeller (1888, 67 n. 1) and Zeller-Wellmann
(1909, 68 n. 4); for the phrase in Aristotle adduced as a parallel by Zeller (and Pohlenz, and
others) see below, n. 144. For the rather different Platonic view (which, unlike the Stoic, places
speech on a lower level than thought and stipulates that thought is voiceless, while Chrysippus
and Diogenes of Seleucia, as we shall see, speak of an inner voice) see below, section 6.
60)
Pohlenz (1939, 195 = 1965, 83 and 196 = 84).
61)
Phil. Anim. 12-70, S.E. P. 62-77, Porph. Abst. 3.2.1-82; argued by Tappe (1912), to whom
Pohlenz refers. Cf. Dierauer (1977, 269-70); good survey and table with three facing columns at
Bouffartigue – Patillon (1979, 138-43), informative account at Tabarrroni (1988, 108-11), further
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And though it is true that Philo omits to mention the Stoics, Porphyry is not the only
author to refer to them, for Sextus explicitly mentions them as well. Indeed, virtually the
whole argument in Sextus (concluding his exposition of the first trope of
Aenesidemus)62) is aimed at the Stoics.63) The fact that an idea, or formula, came to be in
common circulation does not entail that it is not Stoic: numerous Stoic terms and ideas
were, as we know, taken over by others. What is true is that one cannot conclude that a
doctrine is Stoic and nothing but Stoic when it is found to contain Stoic terminology—
but that is another matter.
Zeller will moreover be right that the ne≈teroi, to whom the formula ‘uttered
speech’ is attributed in a passage where they are contrasted by Theon of Smyrna with
another school of thought, viz. the Peripatetics, can only be Stoics:64)
T 10 lÒgow according to the Peripatetics has many meanings, (viz.) that accompanied by
voice called ‘uttered’ by the younger (philosophers); and the internal (logos) that lies in the
mind without sound and voice; and that of proportion, (etc.).65)
discussion at Chiesa (1991, 308-12). Also see the mainly anti-Stoic arguments at Plu. Soll.An.
960A-62C and 972F-73A already adduced by Tappe; the treatise efi lÒgon ¶xei tå z–a
(Lamprias 135) is lost.
62)
Not paralled in the versions of the first trope Phil. Ebr. 171-5 and D.L. 9.79-80.
63)
Pohlenz refers to S.E. P. 1.62 (cf. 1.64) and M. 8.175 for the dogmatiko€, but overlooks P.
1.65 on internal speech katå
toÁw
mãlista
≤m›n
éntidojoËntaw
nËn
dogmatikoÊw, toÁw épÚ t∞w Stoçw. For the thrust of Sextus’ (or Aenesidemus’)
argument see further Glidden (1994, 136-7).
64)
See reference above, n. 59. It is either the context or the specific doctrine attributed to
ne≈teroi which enables one to identify them when identification is possible. Here it is the
context.
65)
Theo Sm. p. 72.24-73.2 Hiller, lÒgow d¢ katå m¢n toÁw PeripathtikoÁw
l°getai pollax«w, ˜ te metå fvn∞w, proforikÚw ÍpÚ t«n nevt°rvn
legÒmenow, ka‹ ı §ndiãyetow [ka‹ uncis inclusi] ı §n diano€& ke€menow
êneu fyÒggou ka‹ fvn∞w [‘without sound or voice’: very Platonic!], ka‹ ı t∞w
énalog€aw ktl. This passage is not in SVF or FDS; it is cavalierly treated by Pohlenz
(1939, 192 = 1965, 80).
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Forms of the quite common verb prof°resyai may be behind a passage of Varro
which however need not apply to the Stoics only, though Chrysippus has been mentioned
a few lines earlier:66) ‘so he who knowingly puts each word in its own place does speak;
and then, when he has expressed by speaking what he had in his mind, he is (someone)
who has uttered’. Prolocutus is of course a Latin derivation, but it is analogous to a term
one could derive from the Greek verb. But in the formula tÚ … §g∆ proferÒmeya,
‘we utter the word “I”’, in a verbatim fragment of Chrysippus67) the term
proferÒmeya does not yet seem to be a technicality.
On the other hand the distinction between l°gein and prof°resyai in the
passage in Diogenes Laërtius which presumably derives from Diogenes’ On Voice (or
from that of his pupil Archedemus of Tarsus) is certainly technical: ‘to speak is different
from to utter, for what is uttered are voices [or: words, sentences], and what is spoken
[or: said] are states of affairs, which naturally turn out to be speakables [or: sayables]’.68)
Note that this statement lacks an explicit reference to the mind. I submit that the presence
of l°gein, a term which (together with lÒgow) is described and clarified in a technical
way in what comes before in Diogenes Laërtius’ account, is sufficient.
Furthermore, two verbatim snippets from Chrysippus’ On the Soul, the second of
which followed closely upon the first, provide an analysis of thinking-and-speaking. First
we have the process of ‘rehearsing statements and the like’ and the ‘thinking and
speaking’ which take place in the mind (diano€a). Then these are firmly linked with
each other: ‘speaking must be from the mind, and also speaking within oneself and
66)
Var. L 6.56 (passage included at FDS 512), ‘igitur is loquitur, qui suo loco quodque verbum
sciens ponit, et is tum prolocutus, quom in animo quod habuit extulit [proen°gkhtai or
prof°retai ?] loquendo’; comments at Stroux (1923, 309-15), Pohlenz (1970-2, 2.23),
Sluiter (1990, 206), Barnes (1993, 57), Labarrière (1993, 237), Sorabji (1993, 81). For the
reference to Chrysippus see above, n. 48.
67)
Ap. Gal. PHP 2.2.11 (SVF 2.895).
68)
D.L. 7.57 (SVF 3 Diog. 20), diaf°rei d¢ ka‹ tÚ l°gein toË prof°resyai:
prof°rontai m¢n går afl fvna€, l°getai d¢ tå prãgmata, ì dØ ka‹
lektå tugxãnei. Cf. Long (1996a, 121, 122).
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thinking, and going through voice in oneself, and sending it out’,69) §n •auto›w
fvnØn dieji°nai ka‹ §ktÚw §kp°mpein. The ‘voice within ourselves’ which
is ‘sent out’ and thus constitutes ‘speaking from the mind’ clearly represents what came
to be called ‘internal’ plus ‘uttered’ speech. In a longer verbatim fragment from the same
work, dealing with the regent part of the soul, Chrysippus argues that the ‘source of
speech [viz., the regent part] is not different from the source of mind, and the source of
voice is not different from the source of speech’. ‘It is plausible70) also for other reasons
that what is spoken (tå legÒmena) should receive its meaning from the place to which
it conveys meaning, and that spoken words (tåw fvnãw) should come from there in the
manner described’.71)
Following in Chrysippus’ footsteps but stating matters more precisely Diogenes of
Seleucia defined lÒgow, ‘speech’, as a species of articulate fvnÆ, which in its turn is a
species of fvnÆ in general.72) He argued that ‘from where voice is sent out, (from there)
also the articulate voice (is sent out), so also meaningful articulate voice, which is
speech’.73) ‘Some people’, he continues a bit further on, ‘define speech as voice sent out
from a mind.74) It is also for other reasons plausible that speech is sent out imprinted and
stamped, as it were, by the cogitations in the mind (ÍpÚ
t«n
§nnoi«n
Gal. PHP 3.7.34 and 43 (SVF 2.903); translations here and in the following passages are De
69)
Lacy’s, modified; my emphasis. See also Barnes (1993, 57).
70)
On the role of the piyanÒn in Chrysippus’ argumentation see Tieleman (1996, index s.v.).
71)
Gal. PHP 2.5.15-20 (SVF 2.894). See also Barnes (1993, 57-8).
72)
Gal. PHP 2.5.9-13 (SVF 3 Diog. 29, LS 53U). See Ax (1986, 149). Against the idea that fvnÆ
is the genus of lÒgow see e.g. Amm. in Int. p. 16.13-30 Busse, who argues that one should
follow Aristotle’s view in the De generatione animalium (viz., GA 5.7.786b20-5—Aristotle in
this passage inter alia also refers to the De anima, viz., to 2.8.419b3-421a6) that fvnÆ is only
the Ïlh of lÒgow.
73)
˜yen §kp°mpetai ≤ fvnÆ, ka‹ ≤ ¶naryrow: oÈkoËn ka‹ ≤ shma€nousa
¶naryrow fvnØ §ke›yen: toËto d¢ lÒgow. See also Barnes (1993, 58).
74)
¶nioi goËn ka‹ ırizÒmenoi aÈtÒn [sc., lÒgon] fasin e‰nai “fvnØn
shma€nousan épÚ diano€aw §kpempom°nhn”. Sluiter (2000) 379 translates diãnoia
as ‘thought’ not ‘mind’, which I find unfortunate.
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§nseshmasm°non t«n §n tª diano€& ka‹ oÂon §ktetupvm°non),75)
and that it is temporally parallel qua completion of thought and activity of speaking’. The
presence of the word oÂon shows that this imprinting-and-stamping is meant
metaphorically, not literally.
This presentation of the co-presence and co-duration of not only analogous but also
coterminous cognitive and vocal activity once more shows in what way what came to be
called internal and uttered speech are bound up with each other.76) Speech is invariably
prompted and accompanied by thinking, whereas the converse is of course not true.
The definition ‘meaningful articulate sound sent out from the mind’ quoted by
Diogenes can easily be abstracted from Chrysippus’ arguments and may indeed be
75)
Sedley (1993, 330-1) states that Diogenes amplified Zeno’s syllogism on the origin of speech
and voice (ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.8, SVF 1.148) with the help of the Theaetetus passage quoted
below, n. 137, where §ktupoÊmenon is said of the stamping of one’s opinion on the vocal
stream. We may add that Diogenes’ ÍpÚ t«n §nnoi«n §nseshmasm°non is paralleled at
the account of memory [not: soul, or voice] at Tht. 191c as a wax tablet (kÆrinon
§kmage›on) in the soul ‘which we hold under the perceptions or conceptions and imprint them
on it as we might stamp the impression of a signet-ring’ (Íp°xontaw aÈtÚ ta›w
afisyÆsesi
ka‹
§nno€aiw,
épotupoËsyai,
Àsper
daktul€vn
shme›a
§nshmainom°nouw). However the metaphors of stamping or imprinting and wax are not
restricted to Plato (for the possible impact of the Theaetetus on Zeno see Ioppolo (1990, esp.
438-9, 447)) but are also found in Denocritus’ explanation of visual perception according to the
detailed report of Theophrastus (Sens. 50-3 = Dem. fr. 68A135 DK). For details see below,
Appendix, p. 000 f.
76)
Cf. Long (1972, 82): “thinking as internal discourse goes back to Plato” [cf. Sorabji (2004)
211-3, but see below, section 6]. “In Stoicism it seems to mean that the processes of thought and
the processes of linguistic communication are essentially the same.” See further Baratin (1982),
whose argument is concerned with the relation between signifier and signified in the “énoncé”
(e.g. 1982, 13: “il n’y a pas de pensée sans parole, parole intérieure ou émise”), and Chiesa
(1991, 319-21), who, quoting and translating SVF 3 Diog. 19, points out ibid. 320: “Diogène fixe
le cadre théorique dans lequel la distinction (des) deux <<logoi>> [viz., the internal and the
uttered] devait s’insérer”, but I believe one may ascribe this “cadre théorique” to Chrysippus
already.
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originally Chrysippean.77)
Phonê
Virtually the same formula is attributed to Diogenes
himself at D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog, 17, 33H LS) in a definition of human voice, not
speech, as distinguished from that of living beings in general: ‘the voice of animal is air
that has been struck by impulse, and (that) of man is articulate and sent out from the
mind, as Diogenes says’.78) This formula, by the way, does not necessarily entail that no
animals (such as parrots) exist who may produce an articulate voice: the opposition is
between impulse, i.e. nothing but impulse, on the one hand and mind on the other.79)
Other Stoic texts may be cited in this context, for instance the strange argument cited
by late authorities concerning the nominative case, which is called ‘straight’ because ‘it
has fallen from the thought; for if we wish to show the thought “Socrates” which we have
in ourselves, we utter the name “Socrates” ’.80) Or the suggestive phrase in Diogenes
77)
78)
Barnes (1993, 59-60) only grants that the definition is Stoic.
D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17, LS 33H), z–ou m°n §sti fvnØ éØr ÍpÚ ırm∞w
peplhgm°now,
ényr≈pou
d'
¶stin
¶naryrow
ka‹
épÚ
diano€aw
§kpempom°nh, …w ı Diog°nhw fhs€n. See also Pohlenz (1970-2, 40), Tabarroni
(1988, 107-8), Barnes (1993, 58), and below, text to n. 124. Note the absence of shma€nousa
in Diogenes’ definition of ‘human voice’: a portion of articulate voice sent out from the mind
need not be meaningful (standard example: bl€turi, e.g. D.L. 7.57, SVF 3 Diog. 20). So I
cannot accept Long’s argument (1996, 123) that épÚ diano€aw and shma€nousa are
equivalent, the former explaining the latter, though in general I agree with his account of the
relation between thought and speech in Stoic philosophy in this paper (esp. 1996, 119-27).
79)
Chiesa (1991, 306-7) argues that the account at D.L. 7.55-7, esp. the definition of Diogenes
which says that the human voice is articulate, is at variance with that at S.E. M. 8.275-6 (above,
n. 48). But the abstract in Diogenes Laërtius does not say animal voices are never articulate.
80)
Amm. in Int. p. 43.11-6 Busse (SVF 2.164, LS 33K) épokr€nontai ofl épÚ t∞w
Stoçw …w épÚ toË noÆmatow toË §n tª cuxª ka‹ aÏth [sc., ≤ eÈye›a or
ÙryØ pt«siw] p°ptvken: ˘ går §n •auto›w ¶xomen tÚ Svkrãtouw nÒhma
dhl«sai boulÒmenoi, tÚ Svkrãthw ˆnoma proferÒmeya. Cf. the parallels
cited by Frede (1993, 18). Barnes (1993, 54) says “the contents of the last sentence [viz., from ˘
går §n •auto›w] is a commonplace”. Yes and no …
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Phonê
Laërtius brief account of Stoic logic: ‘the mind, being prone to expression, utters
(§kf°rei) by speech what it experiences by the agency of the presentation’.81)
In the account of fvnÆ, lÒgow and l°jiw provided by Diogenes Laërtius,82)
where Diogenes’ name is often mentioned, the division is the same as in the verbatim
Diogenes fragment about meaningful speech, articulate voice, and voice in general
quoted by Galen, but expressed in a different way:83) the technical term l°jiw
(‘articulate’ but not necessarily meaningful voice), here added to the formula ‘articulate
voice’ paralleled in the other passage, is a species of fvnÆ (‘voice’); and lÒgow,
speech (‘meaningful articulate voice’) is a species of l°jiw so a sub-species of fvnÆ.
Consequently the Stoics, and Diogenes of Seleucia in particular, argue in favour of a
rigorous distinction between voice and speech as issuing from the adult human mind on
the one hand, and voice and quasi-language produced by irrational impulse, as is the case
with other living beings, including parrots and children under the age of fourteen, on the
other.84) And I have found no evidence implying that speech is in any way inferior to
thought.
The etymological explanation(s) of fvnÆ discussed in the previous sections of this
study however are not found in Stoic reliquiae. Though a definition of ‘speaking’ in
Sextus Empiricus comes quite close, the point about the illumination of thought is
lacking:
81)
D.L. 7.49 (SVF 2.52, LS 33D), ≤ diãnoia §klalhtikØ Ípãrxousa, ˘ pãsxei
ÍpÚ t∞w fantas€aw, toËto §kf°rei lÒgƒ. Sluiter (2000) 376 translates diãnoia
as ‘thought’ not ‘mind’, cf. above, n. 74.
82)
D.L. 7.55-6 (SVF 3 Diog. 17 + 18 + 20).
83)
See Ax (1986, 165), Barnes (1993, 58-9).
84)
D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17, LS 33H), cf. above, n. 48. Cf. Tabarroni (1988, 107), Sorabji
(1993, 81), Glidden (1994, 136).
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T 11 To speak, as the Stoics themselves say, is is to utter the meaningful voicing of the state
of affairs that is being thought.85)
The only evidence I have found pertaining to speech as giving away (not yet:
illuminating) the secret thoughts of the mind according to the Stoics is late and dubious:
T 12 They [sc., the Stoics] say that the voice is sent out from the innermost part of the
breast, that is to say from the heart, the pneuma exerting itself in the depths of the heart,
where an interposed boundary, covered with sinews, separates the heart from the lungs on
both sides and the other vital organs. With this (pneuma) it [sc., the innermost part of the
heart], battering the narrow passages of the windpipe, through the tongue and the other vocal
organs which shape them produces articulate sounds, the elements of uttered speech, through
which the secret operations of the mind are laid bare. This (innermost part of the heart) he
[sc., Chrysippus] calls the regent part of the soul.86)
This is the final paragraph of a chapter in Calcidius where views of Zeno and
Chrysippus on the soul and its regent part (the spider in the web) are quoted at quite some
) S.E. M. 8.80 (SVF 2.167), l°gein gãr §sti, kay∆w aÈto€ fasin ofl épÚ t∞w
85
Stoçw,
tÚ
tØn
toË
nooum°nou
prãgmatow
shmantikØn
prof°resyai
fvnÆn. Cf. Barnes (1993, 60).
86)
Calc. ch. 220 p. 233.23-34.3 Waszink (SVF 2.879, p. 236.17-23 von Arnim), ‘vocem quoque
dicunt e penetrali pectoris, id est corde, mitti, gremio cordis nitente spiritu, qua nervis obsitus
limes interiectus cor a pulmone secernit utroque et vitalibus ceteris, quo [i.e., spiritu] faucium
angustias arietante formanteque lingua et ceteris vocalibus organis articulatos edit sonos,
sermonis elementa, quo quidem interpretem [for this metaphor cf. above, text to n. 43, n. 48]
mentis arcani motus aperiantur. id porro principale animae vocat’. For the change from
Chrysippus to the Stoics in general and back see Waszink ad loc.; cf. the move from fhsi +
proper name (Chrysippus twice, Posidonius once) to fasi at Ar.Did. frs. 23, 27, and 28 Diels,
and the switch from ofl Stviko€ fasin and kaloËsin to Zeno to kaloËsin again at
Aët. 4.21 (partly quoted in the text quoted to the next n.; the final sentence of this ch. reports a
minority position, cf. tinåw d¢ t«n Stvik«n at Phld. Piet. col. 9.8-12 Gomperz, printed
SVF 3 Diog. 33).
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Phonê
length, or at least paraphrased. This context is in favour of the authenticity of the
information just quoted. The at first sight bizarre omission of the role of the lungs can be
paralleled in the physical definition of the fvnçen ÍpÚ
toË
ZÆnvnow
efirhm°non, ˘ ka‹ fvnh<tik>Ún kaloËsin (‘the ‘vocal’ [sc., part of the soul],
thus expressed by Zeno, which they also call ‘phônêtikon’’).87) The idea is that a direct
stream of psychic pneuma stretches from the regent part to the speech organs,88) which
presumably is why the separation of the heart from the lungs is stressed in the Calcidius
passage. However I believe that the emphasis on the secrecy which is broken derives
from the Platonist tradition to which Calcidius is indebted, for such ‘secret operations’
87)
Aët. 4.21.4 (SVF 1.150), the translation of fvnçen in this passage as ‘power of speech’ in
LSJ is wrong, but this is by the way. fvnh<tikÒ>n scripsi, for ps.Plutarch’s fvnÆn (kept by
Diels, accepted by von Arnim, Mau, Lachenaud) does not make much sense, while the technical
term for the vocal part of the soul is fvnhtikÒn: see SVF 1.143 (Nemes. nat.hom. p. 72.7-9
Morani, cf. below for Panaetius), 2.828 (D.L. 7.110, 157), 2.830 (Porph. de An. ap. Stob.
1.49.25a = fr. 253F Smith); Panaet. fr. 125 Alesse (Nemes. nat.hom. p. 72.9-11 Morani); add
ps.Gal. Phil.Hist. 24, DG p. 615.3-10 Diels, where we are also told that the early 1st cent. BCE
Stoic Mnesarchus (?—conjecture of Diels for ms. men°maxow and men°paxow) tÚ
fvnhtikÚn <ka‹> tÚ spermatikÚn perie›len, ‘abolished the vocal and the seminal
part’. The corruption in ps.Plutarch is old, for Qosta ibn Luqa translates Laut. Note that the
excerpt of Aët. 4.21.4 at Thdt. CAG 5.20, quoted ad. loc. in the DG, has preserved tÚ
fvnhtikÒn, and so has the excerpt at ps.Gal. Phil.Hist. 102, DG p. 638.27-39.1 Diels.
88)
Aët. 4.21.4 (see previous n.), continued: pneËma diate›non épÚ toË ≤gemonikoË
m°xri fãruggow ka‹ gl≈tthw ka‹ t«n ofike€vn Ùrgãnvn. Gal. PHP 5.3.7 (SVF
2.841), discussing the parts of the soul according to Chrysippus, mentions the pneËma ...
fvnhtikÒn. I therefore believe that Gal. PHP 2.4.40, printed as a genuine Stoic fragment at
SVF 2.893 and accepted by Sedley (1993, 330), was thought up by Galen to serve his polemics,
for here the (psychic?) pneuma of the heart stamps the pneuma (i.e. breath) in the lungs, which
then imprints in accordance with itself the pneuma (breath) in the windpipe.
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(arcani motus) are paralleled several times by comparable expressions elsewhere in the in
Timaeum. We have also encountered ‘hidden th in passages of Philo.89)
5. Theophrastus, Platonists, Aëtius again
Theophrastus in the De sensibus famously criticizes Plato’s theory of sense-perception
in Timaeus. We look at his remarks on hearing and voice. Plato, the Eresian tells us,
T 12.1 defines hearing in terms of voice (ékoØn d¢ diå t∞w fvn∞w ır€zetai): for
voice is a blow given by the air to the brain and blood through the ears till it reaches the
soul; the motion caused by this blow and extending from the head to the liver is hearing.90)
From ‘voice is a blow ...’ this is a quite accurate abridged rendering of Plato’s
description in Timaeus.91) And ‘voice is a blow ... till it reaches the soul’ is repeated later
89)
Calc. p. 153.23-5 Waszink, ‘sine voce et sono ratio est in intimis mentis penetralibus residens.
haec autem differt ab oratione: est enim ratio interpres animo conceptae rationis’—cf. also
above, text to n. 43, and esp. Calc. p. 178.21-79.1: God speaks ‘non illa sermone qui est positus
in sono vocis ad declarandos motus intimos propter humanae mentis involucra’. Cf. the parallels
for silent communication cited by Waszink ad loc. and cited and those discussed by Theiler
(1954, 434-40 = 1966, 305-12); also see van der Stockt (1990, 183-4) for Plutarch (esp.
Gen.Socr. 588C-89C), and Kirwan (1994, 208-11) for Augustine on this topic.
90)
Sens. 6, ékoØn d¢ diå t∞w fvn∞w ır€zetai: fvnØn går e‰nai plhgØn
Íp' é°row §gkefãlou ka‹ a·matow di'
tvn m°xri cux∞w, tØn d' ÍpÚ
taÊthw k€nhsin épÚ kefal∞w m°xri ¥patow ékoÆn. Translations of Sens. are
Stratton’s, modified. Long (1996b, 352) points out that Theophrastus’ ‘report is impeccable and
almost verbatim’.
91)
Pl. Ti. 67b, ˜lvw m¢n oÔn fvnØn y«men tØn di'
tvn Íp' é°row
§gkefãlou te ka‹ a·matow m°xri cux∞w plhgØn diadidom°nhn, tØn d¢
Íp' aÈt∞w k€nhsin, épÚ t∞w kefal∞w m¢n érxom°nhn, teleut«san d¢
per‹ tØn toË ¥patow ßdran, ékoÆn. ‘In general, let us take it that voice is the
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Phonê
in the treatise, where it is made to function as a definition of voice.92) Finally,
Theophrastus criticizes Plato’s definition (lÒgow) of voice as insufficient, for it
T 12.2 is not equally applicable to all creatures (oÎte går koinÚw ëpasi to›w z–
oiw); and he fails to state the cause of the perception though he wants to do so. Moreover he
seems to be defining not sound or voice (tÚn cÒfon ka‹ tØn fvnÆn) but our sensory
process.93)
Theophrastus Sens. 6 and 91, when taken together, correspond in interesting ways to
the Aëtian lemma quoted in the first section of this study. The etymological explicatio of
fvnÆ is (unsurprisingly) absent, but several other ingredients are there. I quote Plac.
4.19.1 and Sens. 6 + 91 in facing columns, underlining expressions that are parallel either
verbally or ad sententiam:
¶naryrÒw
tØn
pneËma
diå
…w
fvt€zousa
tÚ nooÊmenon.
Aëtius
Plãtvn
§stin
fvnØn
ır€zetai
stÒmatow
épÚ
diano€aw ±gm°non, ka‹ plhgØn
ÍpÚ
é°row
§gkefãlou
ka‹
tvn
di'
a·matow
ka‹
m°xri
Theophrastus
cux∞w diadidom°nhn:
ékoØn
d¢
ır€zetai:
plhgØn
l°getai d¢ ka‹ kataxrhstik«w
ka‹
§p‹ t«n élÒgvn z–vn fvnØ ka‹
cux∞w,
t«n
k€nhsin
écÊxvn,
…w
xremetismo‹
ka‹ cÒfoi: kur€vw d¢ fvnØ ≤
diå
t∞w
fvn∞w
fvnØn
går
e‰nai
Íp'
a·matow
tØn
é°row
di'
d'
épÚ
§gkefãlou
tvn
ÍpÚ
kefal∞w
m°xri
taÊthw
m°xri
¥patow ékoÆn.
percussion of air by way of the ears upon the brain and the blood and transmitted to the soul, and
that hearing is the motion caused by the percussion that begins in the head and ends in the place
where the liver is situated’ (tr. Zeyl, modified).
92)
Sens. 85.
93)
Sens. 91. Good analysis of Theophrastus’ criticism at Ax (1986, 72-4).
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§ndeest°rvw
t∞w
afisyÆsevw boulÒmenow. ¶ti d¢
fvn∞w e‡rhtai lÒgow: oÎte går
oÈ tÚn cÒfon ka‹ tØn fvnÆn,
koinÚw ëpasi to›w z–oiw §st‹n
éllå
oÎte
¶oiken éfor€zein.
tØn
<d¢>
Phonê
afit€an
ka‹
ı
l°gei
t∞w
tØn
≤met°ran
a‡syhsin
Wolfram Ax argues that in the first Aëtian definition ‘(voice is) pneËma, impelled
from the mind through the mouth’ at Plac. 4.19.1 Plato’s accounts of voiceless, i.e.
mental, and spoken lÒgow at Th. 206d (mental lÒgow also at Tht. 189e-190a) and Sph.
263e have been transformed into one of voice.94) He strikingly calls this transfer from
lÒgow to fvnÆ “Umlemmatisierung des Originalbelegs”.95) One should add that the
introduction of pneËma in this context (rhyming with and replacing =eËma) must be
dependent on Stoic usage.96) Speaking of lÒgow in this context Plato uses other terms:
at Tht. 206d =oÆ, at Sph. 263e =eËma (echoed [Pl.] Def. 414d). The ‘flow of lÒgoi
streaming out’ is also mentioned Ti. 75e, lÒgvn nçma ¶jv =°on.
The swap of pneËma for =eËma etc. may have also been stimulated by the fact that
in the physical definition of hearing and voice at Ti. 67b (see further below) air is said to
play a major role. Aristotle knows a doctrine (ultimately based on an interpretation and
systematization of remarks on the senses in various paragraphs in Timaeus) according to
which individual elements are coupled with individual senses. In this way ‘the capacity to
94)
95)
Ax (1986, 78-9). See further below, section 6.
See already Ingenkamp (1966, 80), who argues that the definition of fvnÆ as =eËma diå
stÒmatow épÚ diano€aw at [Pl.] Def. 414d1 and the similar pneËma diå stÒmatow
épÚ diano€aw ±gm°non in the Aëtian lemma (he speaks of the “Epitome” of “Plutarch”)
suggest that “der Verfasser der Definition [viz., in Def. 414d] Platons lÒgow-Bestimmungen aus
dem Theaitet und Sophistes vor Augen gehabt und absichtlich oder unabsichtlich die auch für
fvnÆ sinnvolle ganze Definition des lÒgow zu fvnÆ gestellt hat.”
96)
Baltussen (1993, 212 n. 6) and (2000, 235 n. 61). For the voice as a stream of pneËma from
the mind to the speech organs see e.g. the verbatim fragment from Chrysippus’ On the Soul, ap.
Gal. PHP 3.1.10-11 (SVF 2.885), and Aët. 4.21 (SVF 1.41, 2.835). Ti.Locr. 58, p. 200.4-6
Thesleff is different: here the pneËm
(‘whose movement is
hearing’) is not that of uttered speech but of perceived sound, which is situated in the ducts of
the ears stretching to the liver. This is another attempt at modernization, see Baltes (1972, 1712). Note that Baltes (1972, 25) dates the tract to the 1st cent. BCE—1st cent. CE.
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perceive sounds belongs to air’.97) This doctrine is famously adopted by Posidonius
‘explaining Timaeus’: ‘voice is grasped by airlike (éeroeidoËw) hearing’. It is also
echoed in Aëtius, a lemma (in Stobaeus only) with the name-labels ‘Pythagoras Plato’:
here it is the ‘breathlike’ element (tÚ pneumatikÒn) which gives rise to hearing.98)
Air and breath (pneËma) are closely related;99) the Stoics held that pneËma is
composed of air and fire. The use of pneËma in this context moreover gives Plato’s view
a more actual scientific sense.
It may also be relevant that the term =eËma is preserved in the next lemma, Aëtius
4.19.2, name-label Epicurus:100) a contrast between updated Plato (and his Stoic allies)
and old-fashioned Epicurus may be intended.
The second Aëtian definition at 4.19.1 is based on Ti. 67b, as we have seen.101)
Because of the wording of this definition: ‘(voice is) a shock propagated by the air
through the ears and brain and blood to the soul’, we should, I submit, in the first place
think of the account of hearing at Ti. 67b as abridged by Theophrastus:
Plato
tØn
di'
tvn
Íp'
é°row §gkefãlou te
ka‹ a·matow m°xri
d¢
cux∞w
k€nhsin,
plhgØn
diadidom°nhn,
tØn
Íp'
kefal∞w
aÈt∞w
épÚ
t∞w
m¢n
97)
Ar. Sens. 2.438b20. See further Baltes (1978, 187-9 = 1999, 38-40).
98)
Posid. fr. 85 E.-K. (395a Theiler) ap. S.E. M. 7.93; Aët. 4.9.10 (in the chapter about the
reliability of the senses), and Taurus fr. 26B Lakmann (33 Gioè) ap. Phlp. Aet.Mu. p. 520.15
Rabe, katå tÚn é°ra ≤ ékoÆ, Apul. de Plat. 1.209, Gal. PHP 7.5.49, Nemes. nat.hom. p.
56.9-10 Morani. See Baltes (1978, 195-6 = 1999, 49-50). Also cf. Plu. Gen.Socr. 589C, ı går
éØr ... genÒmenow di' ˜lou lÒgow ka‹ fvnÆ.
99)
Baltes (1978, 185 and 190 = 1999, 35 and 42). For the composition of the Stoic pneËma see
SVF 2.310, 442, 796.
100)
For this acoustic =eËma see Epicur. Ep.Hdt. (ap. D.L. 10) 52-3.
101)
Ax (1986, 78-9, 105 n. 144); cf. above, nn. 5 and 93. The Platonic definition of hearing at
Aët. 4.16.4 is not an acceptable quotation or paraphrase of Ti. 67b, because this passage is “vage
und mit fremder Begrifflichkeit angedeutet” (Ax 1986, 80-1; cf. Whittaker 1990, 124 n. 343, and
Baltussen 1993, 210, and 2000, 233). A similar sloppy formula is found Gal. Plat.Tim. 15.23-6,
see Kraus-Walzer ad loc.
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Phonê
érxom°nhn,
d'
teleut«san
k€nhsin
épÚ
Theophrastus
kefal∞w
m°xri
plhgØn
Íp'
é°row
§gkefãlou
a·matow
m°xri
d¢
¥patow
taÊthw
¥patow ékoÆn.
tvn
cux∞w,
tØn
tØn
toË
ßdran,
plhgØn
ÍpÚ
é°row
di'
tvn
ka‹
§gkefãlou
ka‹
a·matow
m°xri
cux∞w
ka‹
di'
per‹
ÍpÚ
Aëtius
diadidom°nhn.
toË ¥patow ßdran,
ékoÆn.
ékoÆn. d¢ per‹ tØn
Han Baltussen has argued that this part of Aëtius’ text is closer to Plato’s original than
to Theophrastus’ excerpt, so has been excerpted from the passage in the dialogue.102) But
the tripartite comparison above shows how close the Aëtian sentence in fact is to the first
half of the phrase in the De sensibus. There is, to be sure, a minor difference in word
order: Plato has ears, air, brain, blood; Theophrastus air, brain, blood, ears; Aëtius air,
ears, brain, blood. So the ears, first in Plato, come last in Theophrastus and second in
Aëtius.
Baltussen is of course right in pointing out that Aëtius’ diadidom°nhn
(‘transmitted’) is lacking in Theophrastus and must have been imported from
Timaeus.103) The question, however, is whether this has happened directly or via an
intermediary tradition. I prefer to assume that retrograde contamination has taken place,
viz. of (a text based on) the excerpt in Theophrastus’ De sensibus with the Platonic
original, or possibly even with another source based on Timaeus, or an epitome of, or
excerpt from, this dialogue. One may point out that diadidom°nhn is quite successful
as an epitomists’ substitute for Theophrastus’ phrase tØn
d'
ÍpÚ
taÊthw
k€nhsin épÚ kefal∞w m°xri ¥patow ékoÆn (‘the motion caused by this
blow and extending from the head to the liver is hearing’).
102)
103)
Baltussen (1993, 210-3) and—a shade modified—(2000, 234-7).
Baltussen (1993, 212) and (2000, 236-7). Teun Tieleman points out to me that
diad€dosyai became a standard technical term for the transmission of impressions etc. in
physiological theory, cf. e.g. Gal. PHP. 2.5.35.
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The catalogue of Aristotle’s writings in Diogenes Laërtius lists a (lost) monograph
containing abstracts (i.e. an epitome) from Timaeus and from the works of Archytas, tå
§k toË Tima€ou ka‹ t«n ÉArxute€vn aÄ.104) We do not know for how long
this may have been available; but an epitome of Timaeus may have been one of the
sources of Timaeus Locrus.105) A (to some extent Stoicized) epitome of the first part of
the cosmology of Timaeus also containing material deriving from other dialogues is part
of Diogenes Laërtius presentation of Plato’s philosophy.106)
The paragraph on hearing (Ti. 67b) moreover was quite well known. It was not only
one of the starting-points of the theory concerned with the relation between the elements
and the senses,107) but was also cited or paraphrased in texts dealing with Plato’s
physical doctrine of hearing, such as that of Alcinous.108) The whole of Ti. 67a-c is
quoted (following upon Aët. 16.1-4) at Stobaeus 1.53, the (remains of the) chapter On
Hearing. And it has been generally overlooked that Porphyry quotes, and comments
upon, Ti. 67b (and 67c, less relevant here), ı dØ Plãtvn §n t“ Tima€ƒ per€
te fvn∞w ka‹ éko∞w diaforçw te fvn∞w dialegÒmenow grãfei
taËta ktl.109) He refers to what he claims to be the wrong view of ‘the Platonists
without exception’ (ofl
Platvniko‹
pãntew
èpajapl«w) who understand
Plato’s plhgÆ in a passive sense, viz. as a plhgØ é°row instead of (as Plato says
disertis verbis) a plhgØ Íp' é°row, and insists that we should think of ‘the effect of
this blow upon the listeners’ (katå … tÚ §nerge›n tØn plhgØn efiw toÁw
ékoÊontaw). We have seen that (unlike Porphyry’s Platvniko€) both Theophrastus
and the Aëtian lemma preserve Íp' é°row. 110) It is clear that our Timaeus passage on
104)
D.L. 5.25.
105)
Thus Baltes (1972, 24-5).
106)
D.L. 3. 67-77.
107)
Above, n. 98 and text thereto.
108)
Cf. below, n. 119.
109)
Porph. in Harm. p. 46.3-47.12 Düring. diaforçw fvn∞w pertains to the sequel about
pitch accent, which is not relevant here.
110)
Porphyry apparently did not know, or neglects, Plutarch’s paraphrase (esp. Plat.Qu. 1006B,
¶sti går ≤ fvnØ plhgØ toË afisyanom°nou di'
33
tvn Íp' é°row). We may
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hearing was discussed, or used, by more Platonists then we know of. Furthermore, the
participle diadidom°nh found in Aëtius is not only paralleled in Alcinous’ paraphrase,
but also in Porphyry’s and Stobaeus’ excerpts. Timaeus Locrus paraphrases it with
diiknoum°na.111)
Baltussen claims that Aëtius’ xremetismo‹ ka‹ cÒfoi (which he calls “animalnoises”) derive from a passage in Plato’s Republic about imitating animals, and e.g. the
sea, on stage.112) But the Aëtian lemma explicitly echoes what had become a standard
distinction between sounds produced by humans, animals, and lifeless things
respectively, the xremetismo€ representing animal ‘voices’, the cÒfoi (‘sounds’)
those of things. What cannot be paralleled in Plato (as Baltussen correctly argues) is the
terminological distinction between ‘voice’ in the ‘proper sense’, according to which it
pertains to humans, and in the ‘loose (or: improper) sense’ in which it may also pertain to
animals and things. Though it has been shown that most of the time Plato does use fvnÆ
of humans,113) a rigorous distinction between them and the rest is never formulated in his
oeuvre. But as we have noted it is presupposed in Theophrastus’ critique of Plato’s use of
fvnÆ; no wonder, since Aristotle had done much to clarify the difference between
observe that Porphyry’s criticism is to some erxtent captious, for the formula Íp' é°row is
ambiguous. Other cases in Plutarch look more vulnerable but are in fact equivalent (Fort. 98B,
plhg∞w
é°row di'
»tÚw
ka‹
§gkefãlou
prosferom°nhw, Def.Or. 436D,
ékoÊein d¢ tª plhgª toË é°row). And plhgØ é°row is attributed to Plato in
dialectico/doxographical passages (cf. above, n. 8) such as S D.T. p. 482.9 Hilgard (cf. ibid. p.
181.7, without Plato’s name); already Gell. N.A. 4.15.7, where Plato himself is made to reject the
first part of the Stoic definition of voice (see above, n. 53), a phrase followed by a free
paraphrase of Ti. 67b.: ‘Plato autem non esse corpus putat: “non enim percussus`’, inquit, “aer,
sed plaga ipsa atque percussio, id vox est”.
111)
Ti.Locr. 58, p. 220.4 Thesleff.
112)
Pl. R. 396b; Baltussen (1993, 213) and (2000, 236-7). cÒfow in this sense (and without
further qualifications) seems to be specifically Aristotelian, see Ax (1986, 122-6).
113)
Ax (1986, 102-13).
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articulate and significant sound on the one hand and other kinds of sound on the other.114)
And because it is not exclusively Stoic, I cannot agree with Baltussen’s view that “the
concept of ‘articulate phônê’ here is certainly Stoic”,115) though I accept that the specific
technical formula looks like being originally Stoic.116) His conclusion that the gist of
Theophrastus’ critical remark is only “remotely akin to the [second half of the] Aëtian
passage”117) should be revised. The relationship is closer, for Theophrastus, as we have
seen, severely criticizes Plato’s indiscriminate use of fvnÆ for all living beings.
We may perhaps render Ax’s Umlemmatisierung into English as ‘translemmatization’,
and may well ask what is the cause of this modification in the present case. I believe that
someone at some time stood Theophrastus’ criticism on its head. Theophrastus in his
critique says that Plato defines hearing through voice; in order to defend Plato we react
by starting with voice straightaway. Theophrastus criticizes Plato (from a Peripatetic
point of view rightly, one may say) for using fvnÆ in a broad sense, according to which
it applies to both humans and other living beings. This we admit, but we stipulate that (of
course!) he distinguished between the proper and the loose (or: improper) use of the word
so knew what he was doing.
This person must have been a Platonist. Confirmation is fortunately forthcoming. It
has been noticed that the account of sense-perception and its objects in chapters 19 and
20 of Alcinous’ Didascalicus has been significantly influenced by Theophrastus’
114)
Ax (1986, 98 n. 119, 130-8) and (1993, 18-9) on Aristotle on diãlektow,
diãryrvsiw, and lÒgow. Cf. also Dierauer (1977, 234-5), Sorabji (1993, 81), Schenkeveld
(1999, 185).
115)
Baltussen (1993, 212 n. 56) and (2000, 235 n. 31).
116)
The formula is attested twice in the verbatim fragment SVF 3 Diog. 29 ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.9
cited above, n. 73; cf. further D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17), S.E. M. 7.38 (SVF 2.132) and 8.275-6
(SVF 2.135/223), cf. above, n. 48. Already for Philo fvnåw §nãryrouw, ‘articulate
utterances’, belong with the domain of ‘grammar’ (grammatikª), see Opif. 126 and above, n.
47.
117)
Baltussen (1993, 211) and (2000, 235).
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discussion of Plato’s views in the De sensibus.118) Little attention however has been paid
to the first sentence of ch. 19, which states that ‘hearing has come into being for the
cognizance of voice’.119) This is translemmatization with a vengeance: the whole
purpose of hearing turns out to be knowledge of ‘voice’. Theophrastus’ criticism has been
successfully neutralized.
So Plato is updated, not only in Alcinous (or rather in the tradition upon which
Alcinous depends), but also, and even much more so, in the Aëtian lemma. The Stoics
had given the part of logic dealing with ‘voice’ a prominent position on the philosophical
agenda. Earlier philosophers, esp. Aristotle, had dealt with various aspects of this theme
in different works and contexts; the Stoics brought all this together, made it more
systematic, and considerably revised and added to it. The majority of the Stoics, Diogenes
Laërtius tells us, ‘are agreed that dialectical theory begins with the part (tÒpow) dealing
with voice’.120) Porphyry tells us that the Early Academic Xenocrates too began dialectic
with ‘voice’, but all that is further attributed to him is a distinction between scriptible and
118)
Whittaker (1987, 104-5) and (1990, 124-5; and first apparatus ad loc.), followed by Dillon
(1993, 143-5) and Baltussen (2002, 44).
119)
Alc. p. 173.42 Hermann, ékoØ d¢ g°gone prÚw fvn∞w gn«sin. This is p. 173.42-
174.4 followed by érxom°nh m¢n épÚ t∞w per‹ tØn kefalØn kinÆsevw,
teleut«sa d¢ per‹ ¥patow ßdran: ≤ d¢ fvnÆ §stin ≤ di'
tvn
§rxom°nh §gkefãlou te ka‹ a·matow, diadidom°nh d¢ m°xri cux∞w
plhgÆ, ‘beginning from a movement situated in the head, and terminating in the seat of the
liver. Sound is a blow transmitted through the ears, the brain, and the blood, and penetrating as
far as the soul’ (tr. Dillon); ‘physical’ definition based on Ti. 67b (quoted above, n. 91) again.
Whittaker (1990, 124 n. 342) submits that “Alcinoos a oublié de préciser que le son est transmis
Íp'é°row”. But if the criticism voiced by Porphyry (above, text after n. 109) was already
known to Alcinous (or his tradition), the words Íp' é°row may have been omitted on purpose.
Tim.Locr. 58, p. 220.4 Thesleff has §n é°ri.
120)
D.L. 7.55 (SVF 2.136), t∞w d¢ dialektik∞w yevr€aw sumf≈nvw doke› to›w
ple€stoiw épÚ toË per‹ fvn∞w §nãrxesyai tÒpou. This is followed by
Diogenes’ definition cited above, n. 78 and below, text to n. 124. For the Stoic revision of earlier
efforts see Ax (1986, 152-62) and (1993, 12-5, 17); for the tÒpow in general see Schenkeveld
(1999, 184-6).
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musical and melodious voice.121) Melodious voice is mentioned in the Stoic tÒpow on
voice,122) but as far as one can see it is quite unimportant in this context, while in
Xenocrates it is the second subdivision. Even so, the position of Xenocrates may not only
have influenced the Stoics to some extent, but will also have been a factor of some
weight in so top speak preparing Platonic doctrine for its updating modo Stoico. One may
add that in the group of grammatical and logical definitions in the pseudo-Platonic
Definitiones,123) itself undoubtedly attesting a modernization of Platonic doctrine,
diãlektow (‘phrase’) is two times said to be ‘without melody’, êneu m°louw—
could this be an echo of Xenocrates’ main division?
We have seen that the Stoic Diogenes of Seleucia is the first philosopher on record to
have distinguished sharply between lÒgow, or the meaningful articulate voice of human
adults sent out from the mind, and the (eventually but not necessarily also articulate and
meaningful) voices, or utterances, of other living beings sent out from impulse.124) It is
precisely this distinction which is at the basis of the statement at Aët. 4.19.1, ‘in a loose
(or: improper) sense ‘voice’ is also used in the case of irrational animals and lifeless
things, such as whinnyings and mere noises, but in the proper sense it is articulate voice’.
At the end of another Aëtian lemma a comparable point of view is formulated, one
book further down:
T 13 Pythagoras Plato (hold) that also the souls of so-called irrational animals are rational,
but not rationally active because of the bad composition of their bodies, and because they
121)
Fr. 10 Heinze = fr. 88 Isnardi Parente ap. Porph. in Harm. P. 8.20-30 Düring, §st‹ t∞w
fvn∞w
tÚ
m¢n
toioËton,
oÂon
§k
grammãtvn
sugke›syai,
tÚ
d¢
toioËton, oÂon §k diasthmãtvn te ka‹ fyÒggvn. See Frede (1978, 50 = 1987,
319), Ax (1986, 160-1).
122)
In the short account of dialectic, D.L. 7.44 (FDS 474), see Schenkeveld (1990b, 303).
123)
[Pl.] Def. 414d-e. I cannot deal with this rather neglected passage here. No comment on the
formula êneu m°louw in Ingenkamp (1966); parallels S D.T. p. 451.4 Hilgard, Dicaearch. fr.
89 Wehrli. Def. is generally believed to be Academic, see Ingenkamp (1966, 8-12, 110-4); the
earliest and first attestation is in the lexigographer Ammonius (1st-2nd cent. CE ?), the second in
Olympiodorus (Ingenkamp 1966, 104, 112).
124)
Cf. above, n. 78 and text thereto.
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lack the apparatus for speaking, as in the case of apes and dogs; for they prattle, but do not
speak.125)
This tenet distinguishes between between humans and other living beings as to their
utterances. The animals’ inability to speak is attributed entirely to their bodily
constitution.126) The view that they have rational souls can be paralleled in the so-called
Pythagorean Hypomnêmata preserved in Diogenes Laërtius, and in the tradition upon
which Philo, Aenesidemus in Sextus Empiricus, and Porphyry depend in the passages
referred to above.127) Note that only the final colon of T 13, viz. ‘they prattle but do not
speak’, provides a parallel to what is at Aët. 4.19.1. But as we have seen the refusal to
allow ‘speech’ to animals is not consistent with Plato’s own attitude.
Such attempts to attribute a more up-to-date view to Plato can be paralleled in the
paragraph on fvnÆ in the so-called Divisiones Aristoteleae which purportedly report
Plato’s doctrine: a short abstract at D.L. 3.107, a longer version in Marcianus gr. 257.128)
125)
Aët. 5.20.4 (ps.Plutarch only), PuyagÒraw Plãtvn logikåw m¢n e‰nai ka‹
t«n élÒgvn z–vn kaloum°nvn tåw cuxãw, oÈ mØn logik«w §nergoÊsaw
parå tØn duskras€an t«n svmãtvn ka‹ t“ mØ ¶xein tÚ frastikÒn,
frãzousi d°.
126)
Cf. e.g. Porph. Abst. 3.4.6, some animals ‘do not speak because they are thwarted by their
vocal organs’, t“ ÍpÚ t«n Ùrgãnvn t«n t∞w fvn∞w §mpod€zesyai. This
ultimately goes back to Ar. HA 4.9.535a27-b3.
127)
For the Pyth.Hyp. see Burkert (1972, 75). He also compares what he calls ‘the Stoic’
doctrine of internal and uttered speech, but according to the Stoics the fundamental difference
between humans and beasts is not a matter of uttered but one of internal speech (see above, n. 48
and text thereto). Gal. Protr. 1, p. 103.2-6 Marquardt, knows this doctrine too but does not
attribute it to specific people; he says that though maybe ‘all (animals) do not possess speech
(lÒgow) in respect of voice, which they call uttered (proforikÒn), they share in that in
respect of soul, which they call internal (§ndiãyeton)—some more, some less’. See Sorabji
(1993, 80 with n. 21). For Philo, Sextus, and Porphyry see above, n. 61 and text thereto.
128)
Tabarroni (1988, 108 n. 12) compares D.L. 3.107 and Aët. 4.19.1. Baltussen (1993, 211 n.
55) and (2000, 235 n. 30) too refers to D.L. 3.107 only. I quote from the obsolete edition of
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Though the version in Diogenes Laërtius is formulated as a bipartite division into
‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’, its first part, ‘animate’, is further subdivided into articulate
(humans) and inarticulate (animals).
The longer version presents a division into four. First, voice is divided into animate
and inanimate, just as in Diogenes Laërtius; then into ‘in letters’/‘scriptible’
(§ggrãmmatow) and ‘not in letters’/‘unscriptible’ (égrãmmatow). Animate voice is
that of living beings, inanimate voice is ‘e.g. sounds and noises and the voice of the lyre
and the flutes’. ‘Scriptible’ is the ‘voice of men and of some animals, e.g. nightingales
and swallows and sparrows and the like, unscriptible the unarranged (édiãyetow)
voice, such as cluckings and sounds and noises and the like’. The word édiãyetow (not
at D.L. 3.107) can only be paralleled in late authors. It would seem that whoever is
responsible for this unhistoric scholastic exercise attempted to bring Plato in line with a
more Peripatetic point of view.129)
6. Plato interpretatus
To sum up. The ingredients of the first lemma of Aëtius’ chapter On Voice (4.19.1)
can be shown to be Platonic, or ‘Platonic’. It has long been seen that the formula ‘breath
(pneËma) impelled from the mind through the mouth’ is a Stoicized version (pneËma
!) of the ‘stream’ or ‘flow’of speech described in Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, Philebus,
and Timaeus (=eËma, or =oÆ, or nçma, of lÒgow, or lÒgvn, from the
diãnoia, or cuxÆ, or frÒnhsiw through and from the mouth, diå toË
stÒmatow, ¶jv =°on).130) The translemmatization, or transfer from lÒgow to
Mutschmann (1906). Div.Arist. is now believed to be (Early) Academic, see e.g. Rossitto, 1984
(and 200-2 on the present passage), but the text of such manuals is unstable, as the various mss.
versions show; see Dorandi (1996).
129)
Mutschmann ad loc., followed by Rossitto (1984, 202), aptly quotes Ar. de An. 2.8.420b5-
10.
130)
Tht. 206d quoted below n. 137, Sph. 263e quoted below n. 145, Ti. 75e quoted below n. 141
(for nçma cf. Phdr. 235d), Phlb. 17b (only fvnØ … diå toË stÒmatow fioËsa).
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fvnÆ of the descriptive formula, is paralleled in the spurious Definitiones, where the
original term =eËma has been preserved.131) The fact that the location of the mind in the
body (according to Plato this was the head, according to the Stoics the heart) 132) is left
undecided in this Aëtian chapter helps the re-formulation of the Platonic =eËma etc. as
pneËma.
The formula ‘shock propagated by the air through the ears and brain and blood to the
soul’ is an abridged version of a passage in Timaeus.133) This descriptive formula too has
been transferred to fvnÆ—but from Plato’s account of hearing, ékoÆ, a
translemmatization paralleled in the Middle Platonist author Alcinous. Xenocrates is said
to have begun dialectic with a treatment of voice. More important, however, is the fact
that the Stoics did so too and, as far as we can see, in a much more systematic and
influential fashion. The updating of Plato in the first part of the lemma is indeed indebted
to the Stoic example.134)
The added comment, viz.: ‘in a loose (or: improper) sense ‘voice’ is also used in the
case of irrational animals and lifeless things, such as whinnyings <und Eselsgeschrei ?>
and mere noises, but in the proper sense it is articulate voice’ is more difficult to
determine. I have argued that someone who knew his Plato well (and had seen
Theophrastus’ critique) was aware of the fact that the master mostly, though not
exclusively, uses fvnÆ of the human voice. Updating Plato in this case meant applying
to him the rigorous Stoic distinction between humans and animals, and rewriting his
doctrine in a more up-to-date terminology: ‘articulate voice’, and ‘in a loose (or:
improper) sense / in the proper sense’.135)
We are left with the etymological definition of fvnÆ ad finem, articulate human voice
‘considered as illuminating what is thought’, which describes the function of voice as
making what is thought accessible. This etymology cannot be paralleled in such evidence
131)
Def. 414d. For this translemmatization see above, nn. 94 and 95, and text thereto.
132)
I have discussed part of the evidence at Mansfeld (1990, 3092-3107), starting from another
Aëtian chapter, viz. 4.5, t€ tÚ t∞w cux∞w ≤gemonikÚn ka‹ §n t€ni §st€n.
133)
Ti. 67b, quoted above n. 91.
134)
Above, sections 4 and 5.
135)
Above, section 4.
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for Stoic philosophy as is still available. That it is at least Hellenistic, and must have been
quite familiar, is proved by the fact that in some form or other it was known e.g. to the
grammarian Philoxenus (late 1st cent. BCE), the Platonizing exegete Philo of Alexandria
(early 1st cent. CE), and Heraclitus the Allegorist (perhaps 1st cent. CE). A similar
etymology was used by the grammarian Seleucus (early 1st cent. CE).136)
I believe that this formula, too, should be interpreted as a modernization of something
in Plato. We should look again at the passage in Theaetetus, where Socrates says:
T 14.1 The first [sc., meaning of lÒgow] would be making one’s thought visible through
voice by means of names and verbs—when a man impresses his opinion upon the stream
through the mouth, as if upon water or in a mirror. Don’t you think this kind of thing is
speech (lÒgow)?137)
The crucial bit is tÚ tØn aÍtoË diãnoian §mfan∞ poie›n diå fvn∞w,
‘to make one’s thought visible through voice’ (my emphasis). The locution §mfan∞
poie›n is surprisingly rare.138) That thought, or mental speech, is so to speak made
visible is further emphasized by the illuminating image added by Plato: thought is
reflected in voice as in a mirror, or as upon the surface of water. This however could
entail that spoken language is inferior to mental speech, for according to a well-known
passage in the Republic images in water and other mirroring surfaces represent the lowest
mode of cognition. Furthermore, a few pages down in Theaetetus lÒgow in the sense
described in T 14.1 is said to be ‘so to speak the image (e‡dvlon, my emphasis) of
136)
Above, sections 2 and 3.
137)
Tht. 206d, tÚ m¢n pr«ton e‡h ín tÚ tØn aÍtoË diãnoian §mfan∞
poie›n
diå
fvn∞w
metå
=hmãtvn
te
ka‹
Ùnomãtvn,
Àsper
efiw
kãtoptron µ Ïdvr tØn dÒjan §ktupoÊmenon efiw tØn diå toË stÒmatow
=oÆn. µ oÈ doke› soi tÚ toioËton lÒgow e‰nai; A definition of lÒgow
meaning ‘account’ is provided by giving a far too wide definition of lÒgow meaning ‘speech’.
Cf. Chiesa (1991, 303). Sedley believes this passsage influenced Diogenes’ physicalistic
description of significant speech, but see above, n. 75, and below, p. 000 f., Appendix.
138)
Mostly found in later authors; in Plato only paralleled Lg. 634c.
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mind [i.e., thinking mind] in voice’, and we know that in Plato an image of something is
on a lower level than what it is an image of. 139)
We should also acknowledge that earlier in the dialogue Plato presents the part of this
tenet concerned with what is going on inside because he wishes to define (silent) opinion
(Socrates again):
T 14.1a to opine I call ‘speak’ and opinion ‘speech that has been said’—not to someone else
and not with voice, but silently to oneself.140)
139)
Tht. 208c—Chiesa’s view (1992, 26) that e‡dvlon here is “neutre” is arbitrary, but note
that he also discusses its “connotations négatives” “même dans le corpus platonicien”; for
examples in Tht. cf. 150b-51c, 191d (the quality of the impression varies because it depends on
that of the receiving material). Further Platonic passages on speech at Derbolav (1972, 187-94),
who however fails to mention Tht. 206d in this context. Plutarch states that ‘verbs and names’
are mere ‘images and likenesses of what is thought’ see van der Stockt (1990, 181-2), but links
this up with the Aristotelian notion of ‘symbols’ (Gen. Socr. 589C, =hmãtvn oÈd'
Ùnomãtvn, oÂw xr≈menoi prÚw éllÆlouw ofl ênyrvpoi sumbÒloiw e‡dvla
t«n nooum°nvn ka‹ efikÒnaw ır«sin). Context is decisive; as Teun Tieleman points
out to me, Phd. 99d-100a is more positive than Rep. 510a, 510e about looking at reflections
in water. But note that Socrates is ironic and even a bit reluctant (100a, oÈ går pãnu
sugxvr« tÚn §n to›w lÒgoiw skopoÊmenon tå ˆnta §n efikÒsi mçllon
skope›n µ tÚn §n to›w ¶rgoiw). Tht. 208c is echoed Plot. 5.1 [10] 3.7-8 and
paraphrased 1.2 [19] 3.27-8; here the hierarchy is very clear.
140)
Tht. 189e-90a, tÚ
dojãzein
l°gein
kal« ka‹
tØn
dÒjan
lÒgon
efirhm°non, oÈ m°ntoi prÚw êllon oÈd¢ fvnª, éllå sigª prÚw aÍtÒn.
Sedley (1993, 331 with n. 70) believes that the ‘internal speech’ (i.e. the lÒgow
§ndiãyetow) at S.E. M. 275-6 (cf. above, n. 48) derives from this Theaetetus passage, but at
the very least it does not do so directly (cf. above, n. 75); we have moreover seen in section 4
above that the pair ‘internal’/’uttered speech’ was very widely used. Also note the emphasis on
opinion in the full Platonic sense both in this passage and in T 14.2a below; for this aspect of
Tht. 189a-90e (and Sph. 263d-64b) see Chiesa (1992, 18), and Trabattoni (2002, 176-7): “il
passo platonico ... non ha come suo scopo quello di dire che cos’è il pensiero, ma piuttosto di
dire appunto che cos’è la dÒja”.
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That ‘the flow of lÒgoi streaming out [i.e., uttered speech] which is subservient to
thought’ is praised as ‘the most beautiful and best of all flows’ at Ti. 75e141) is
presumably due to a difference of context rather than a change of mind, for in Timaeus
this outgoing stream is set off against that of food and drink which goes in. But the point
that uttered speech ministers to thought entails that it is thought which is in command and
so is superior, and therefore is consistent with the hierarchy implied in Theaetetus. The
metaphor of speech as the ‘servant’ of the mind is close to that of speech as its
‘interpreter’, which we have encountered in philo-Platonic later authors such as Cicero,
Philo of Alexandria, and Calcidius.142)
We have seen that the connection between mental and spoken language argued by
Chrysippus, Diogenes of Seleucia and other Stoics appears to have led to the widely
occurring technicality ‘internal speech’ / ‘uttered speech’.143) It has long been seen (but as
a rule the all-important differences have been ignored) that this combination plus
distinction is to some extent anticipated by Plato, not only in the Theaetetus passage just
quoted, but also elsewhere; such passages have already been referred to above, in various
contexts.144) Another well-known passage we may look at again is in Sophist—the visitor
from Elea (V.) is addressing Theaetetus (Th.):
T 14.2 V.: Aren’t thought and speech the same, except that what we call thought is a
dialogue with itself [sc. of the soul with the soul] that occurs without the voice inside the
141)
tÚ d¢ lÒgvn nçma ¶jv =°on ka‹ ÍphretoËn fronÆsei kãlliston ka‹
êriston. Cf. the paraphrase Apul. de Plat. 1.212, ‘quae prudentia corde conceperit, ea sensa
promat oratio’.
142)
Above, text to n. 44, and n. 86.
143)
Above, section 4.
144)
E.g. above, nn. 5, 91, text to nn. 59, 101, 103, and text to n. 130. The Aristotelian parallel
already cited by Zeller (above, n. 59), and then by Pohlenz (above, n. 57 and text to n. 59) who is
followed by others, viz. Ar. APo. 1.10.76b24 oÈ går prÚw tÚn ¶jv lÒgon ≤
épÒdeijiw, éllå prÚw tÚn §n tª cuxª, is not so significant, because lÒgow here
means ‘argument’; the parallel with Plato only obtains when the phrase is quoted out of context.
For lÒgow as ‘speech’ in Aristotle see Pol. 1.2.1253a7-18 with Schütrumpf ad loc. (1991, 2125), and Sens. 1.437a9-17 where the doctrine of Int. chs. 1 and 4 is presupposed.
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soul? Th.: Of course. V.: And the stream from the soul that goes through the mouth
accompanied by sound is called speech?145)
But this time too the tenet is presented in order to determine opinion:
T 14.2a When this [viz., affirmation of denial] takes place silently in the mind in the soul,
can you call it anything but opinion?146)
Sph. 263e-64b is the first of the three abstracts from Plato which (now) constitute
Stobaeus’ chapter On Opinion (1.53, per‹ dojhw). Quotations or paraphrases of Sph.
263e in other sources147) as a rule do not take the doxastic aspect into account.
An important difference between Plato’s view of the relation between thought and
speech and that of the Stoics discussed above (in section 4) is that the hierarchical
145
) Sph. 263e, JE. oÈkoËn diãnoia m¢n ka‹ lÒgow taÈtÒn: plØn ı m¢n
§ntÚw t∞w cux∞w prÚw aÍtØn diãlogow êneu fvn∞w gignÒmenow toËt'
aÈtÚ ≤m›n §pvnomãsyh, diãnoia; YEAI. pãnu m¢n oÔn. tÚ d° g' ép'
§ke€nhw (sc., t∞w cux∞w) =eËma diå toË stÒmatow fiÚn metå fyÒggou
k°klhtai lÒgow; Cf. Chiesa (1991, 302-3); but there is no need to distinguish with
Chiesa (1992, 18) the “structure profonde”, viz. the “identité du langage et de la pensée”, from
the “structure superficielle” indicated by the “clause restrictive” beginning with plÆn. Note
however that Chiesa’s discussion of the ambiguities of the Platonic passages (ibid., 19-22, 24)
sometimes comes close to the view argued in the present paper. As to the tradition concerned
with the Sophist passage, see the version in the handbook of Alcinous, who omits êneu fvn∞w
(possibly a case of Stoic influence), p. 155.17-20 Hermann: tØn d¢ diãnoiãn fhsi tÚn
aÈt∞w t∞w cux∞w prÚw aÍtØn diãlogon, lÒgon d¢ tÚ ép' §ke€nhw
=eËma diå toË stÒmatow xvroËn metå fyÒggou, that of Calc. p. 153.23-5
Waszink quoted above, n. 89, and that of Nemes. nat.hom. p. 71.9-10 Morani, ¶sti d¢
§ndiãyetow m¢n lÒgow tÚ k€nhma t∞w cux∞w tÚ §n t“ dialogistik“
ginÒmenon êneu tinÚw §kfvnÆsevw (note the intrusion of §ndiãyetow … lÒgow).
146)
Sph. 264a, ˜tan oÔn toËto §n cuxª katå diãnoian §gg€gnhtai metå
sig∞w, plØn dÒjhw ¶xeiw ˜ti prose€p˙w aÈtÒ;
147)
See above, n. 145.
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Phonê
ordering which is part of Plato’s descriptions is lacking in the verbatim or quasi-verbatim
Stoic evidence.148) The etymological explicatio concluding the Aëtian lemma on Plato on
voice too does not show any trace of a such a distinction. So this is the extent to which
Plato’s view has been Stoicized: no hierarchy involved.
I do not know who first thought of the etymologies of fvnÆ as fvt€zousa tÚ
nooÊmenon, or as fvtonÒh, or as faonÆ, or as derived from f≈w or f«w,
or from f«/fa€nv. Several of these derivations could be quite early, just as the
related etymology of fantas€a from fãow or f«w, which is not only found in
Stoic texts but already in Aristotle.149) However this may be, what I think happened is
that someone modernized the striking formula found in Theaetetus by replacing it with an
equivalent (and apparently quite popular) etymological explanation.
Thus Plato’s incidental remarks concerned with speech, voice, and hearing in
Theaetetus, Sophist and Timaeus were abstracted from their context, and coalesced to
form a single account dedicated to voice, just as the Stoics had assembled and then
worked out much further the suggestions of their predecessors in order to create a single
tÒpow per‹ fvn∞w. And these remarks were modernized by borrowings from other
philosophical traditions, esp. from Peripatetic (think e.g. of Theophrastus’ De sensibus)
and Stoic philosophy. This is typical of so-called Middle Platonism.150) We may suppose
this Platonist Per‹ fvn∞w to have contained more than is now to be found in the
148)
See Chiesa (1992, 24-5) on the lÒgow §ndiãyetow and proforikÒw; cf. also above,
n. 59.
149)
Chrysippus ap. Aët. 4.12.2 (SVF 2.54) on which see Long and Sedley (1987 Vol, 1, 239),
Long (1999, 572); cf. S.E. M. 7.162 (SVF 2.63); Arist. de An. 3.2.429a1-4. Tabarroni (1988, 107
n. 9) correctly points out that the etymology of fvnÆ from f«w “is highly reminiscent of the
Chrysippean derivation of representation (phantasia) from light (phôs)” but has missed the
passage in Aristotle.
150)
Excellent surveys in Runia (1986, 49-52, 495-9). See further Whittaker (1987, 110-4) on
“The Aristotelian component in Middle Platonism” and (ibid., 114-7) on “The Stoic component
in Middle Platonism”.
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Phonê
abstract in the Placita, which does not give us much more than the first section of a
treatment of Voice. Perhaps a bit more is extant in the pseudo-Platonic Definitiones.151)
The Didascalicus of Alcinous may be the best known example of this approach to
Plato; think for instance of the results of a scan of the Platonic dialogues for anticipations
of Aristotle’s syllogistic in ch. 6.152) The revised and abridged Timaeus which constitutes
the De naturae mundi et animae of pseudo-Timaeus Locrus is another example. This
author (or rather the tradition to which he belongs) too is capable of appropriating Stoic
and Peripatetic material as Platonic.153) Several of the ancient sources referred to above
also modernize Plato’s doctrine in other respects, e,g, as to the function of the liver.154)
Accordingly, I believe that we should position the immediate source for Aët. 4.19.1,
‘Plato On Voice’, in a Middle Platonist context.155)
Appendix: Imprinted Wax
According to Democritus the air between the visual organ and the thing seen is ‘imprinted’,
cf. Thphr. Sens. 50, tupoËsyai, ibid. to›w épotupoum°noiw; 51, épotÊpvsiw, tÚ
tupoÊmenon, épotÊpvsin; 53, tÊpvsiw, §napotupoËsyai; esp. Sens. 51, quasiverbatim: Àsper
ka‹
aÈtÚw
l°gei
parabãllvn
toiaÊthn
e‰nai
tØn
§ntÊpvsin, oÂon efi §kmãjeiaw efiw khrÒn, ‘even as Democritus himself, in
illustrating the character of the “impression”, says that “it is as if one were to take a mould in
wax” ‘(tr. Stratton; taken up 52, efi
d¢
dØ
toËto
sumba€nei
ka‹
ı
éØr
épomãttetai kayãper khrÒw, ‘if such an imprint occurs and the air is moulded like
wax’). Note that Friedländer (1960, 456-7 n. 60) refuses to accept khrÒn, (unsuccessfully)
151)
Cf. above, n. 123 and text thereto.
152)
See e.g. Whittaker (1990, xxi-ix) on vocabulary, modernization, quotation out of context,
and his commentary (passim) on doctrine, and Dillon (1993, xxx-xl) on doctrine.
153)
Baltes (1972, 25) argues that the tract is partly based on classes where the teacher used “das
Material der Stoa und des Peripatos als letzlich platonisches Eigentum”.
154
See Tieleman (1996, xxix, and esp. xxxi).
155)
For other Middle Platonist elements in the Placita see Tarrant (2000, 75-6).
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Phonê
defends ms. sklhrÒn, and of course argues that kayãper khrÒw is Theophrastean not
Democritean; he flatly denies that Democritus is quoted at Sens. 51 and clearly holds
Democritean influence to be infra dignitatem Platonis. The tÊpvsiw, naturally, cannot be
denied, see e.g. Baldes (1975). One should add that the verbal forms §kmãjeiaw and
épomãttetai are paralleled by §napomemagm°nhn in Zeno’s definition of the cognitive
presentation (SVF 1.18, cf. 2.53 (D.L. 7.46, LS 40C), 2.60 (D.L. 7.50, which adds
§napotetupvm°nh), 2.65 (S.E. M. 7.250-1 cf. LS 40E, where note daktul€vn
sfrag›dew ... §napomãttontai t“ khr“, ‘markings from signet-rings are stamped on
the wax’). épomãttein is found elsewhere in Plato, viz. Ti. 55e (describing imprints in the
Receptacle), while several forms of the verb §kmãttein occur in the passage about memory
(Tht. 191d-e). Forms of the substantive §kmage›on (one instance quoted above, n. 75) are
found ibid., 191c-96c. Also compare Aët. 4.20.2 (SVF 2.387; ps.Plutarch only) on the
corporeality of voice according to the Stoics: ‘we hear and percieve it (sc., voice) when it strikes
against the sense of hearing [which is a part of the soul, JM] and stamps it like (the stamp) of a
signet-ring in wax’ (ékoÊomen går aÈt∞w ka‹ afisyanÒmeya prospiptoÊshw tª
ékoª ka‹ §ktupoÊshw kayãper daktul€ou efiw khrÒn). This metaphor (cf. D.L.
7.46 = SVF 2.53, toË ÙnÒmatow ofike€vw metenhnegm°nou épÚ t«n tÊpvn §n
t“ khr“ ÍpÚ toË daktul€ou ginom°nvn, ‘the metaphorical designation being
derived correctly from the imprints from the signet-ring which are produced in the wax’) is
Zenonian and Cleanthean, not Chrysippean, see Ar.Did. fr. 39 Diels ap. Eus. PE 15.20.2 (SVF
1.141, 1.519), D.L. 7.50 = SVF 2.55 (LS 39A) with reference to Book 2 of Chrysippus Per‹
cux∞w, and the distinction between Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus e.g. at S.E. M. 7.227-31 =
SVF 1.58, 1.484, 2.56. Hoffmann (1921) convincingly argued that Plato depends on Democritus
here, but as we have seen this is rejected out of hand by Friedländer (loc. cit.), who believes the
“Prägemasse” is an idea of Plato himself, and by Pohlenz (1938, 175-6 with n. 2 = 1965, 3-4
with n. 2), who argues (a bit out of the blue) that the theory is originally pre-Democritean. On the
other hand Pohlenz makes the important point that Chrysippus’ criticism of Zeno’s and
Cleanthes’ view of tÊpvsiw (taken literally this would preclude the simultaneous or successive
presence of many ‘voices’ in the same air-space) is anticipated by Theophrastus’ criticism (see
Baldes 1975, 102-5) of Democritus, Sens. 53: ‘when several things are looked at in the same
place, how will all these stampings get on the same piece of air?’ “Chrysipp kennt also die ältere
Debatten” (Pohlenz ibid., 177 = 5). One cannot therefore exclude that Zeno (and then, indirectly
or directly, some of his followers) were influenced not only by Plato (and perhaps by Aristotle,
see below), but also by Democritus, presumably even by Theophrastus’ critical report as well.
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The views of Democritus and Aristotle (possibly influenced by both Democritus and Plato), esp.
de An. 2.12.424a17-20 on sense-perception as ‘the reception of sensible forms without matter,
just as wax recieves the sign of the signet-ring’ (tÚ dektikÚn t«n afisyht«n efid«n
êneu t∞w Ïlhw, oÂon ı khrÚw toË daktul€ou ... tÚ shme›on, cf. Mem.
1. 450a30-b3 on memory), part of a theory of perception, are qua type of theory even closer to
Stoic epistemology.
Burkert (1977, 99 with n. 6), referring to passages in Tht., Aristotle, and SVF, follows
Hoffman and implicitly rejects Friedländer’s apodictic pronouncement (but he has missed
Pohlenz’ contribution). He tersely and accurately points out that Democritus, using “the picture
of seal-imprints on wax”, created “a comparison which has loomed large in ancient and modern
epistemology”.
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